

**Ammianus Marcellinus as a Guide to the Strategies  
of Julian's Gallic Campaign  
356 - 361**

by  
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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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## **Abstract**


In the early 350's AD eastern Gaul was being overrun by German raiders as a result of the neglect of the frontier during civil conflicts. This thesis examines Ammianus Marcellinus' *Res Gestae* for its portrayal of the strategies of Julian's Gallic campaign (356 - 361) with respect to manpower, the elimination of the Germanic threat and the fortification of the frontier. Ammianus' history and the additional information offered by the works of contemporary writers and by the archaeological record make it possible to follow the strategic planning for the restoration of the Rhineland. However, Ammianus was a great admirer of Julian and it is shown that he altered or obscured facts in his history in order to impart to his audience an image of the Caesar as a great general and leader.

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**Gaul and the Rhineland**

## **Introduction: Ammianus and Contemporary Sources for Julian's Gallic Campaign**

The words uttered by Septimius Severus on his deathbed in AD 211 to his sons: 'live in peace with one another, enrich the soldiers and ignore everyone else' (Dio 77. 15. 2) reflect an age where who would wear the purple was decided by the force of arms each contender had behind him. Money was an effective source for winning an army over to one's side and it could also put down military revolts. Even in the fourth century, in the years prior to Julian's war with the Germans, the points Severus made about the importance of peace and stability between the rulers and the importance of the army are illustrated. The turmoil in Gaul upon Julian's arrival had arisen out of the civil wars between the sons of Constantine, then the war fought between Constantius (the surviving son of Constantine) and Magnentius, and the usurpation of Silvanus. The military resources of the Empire were spent by various defenders of or contenders for the throne. The defence of the Rhine frontier was neglected. The inhabitants of eastern and central Gaul were forced to contend with the German raiders themselves. In some towns, the inhabitants remained closed up in the walls, living off what they could, while in other towns, mainly in Lower Germany, the inhabitants were forced to flee, leaving the walls undefended against the raiders. Severus' advice, given in 211, was still relevant in the fourth century.

This thesis will be examining Ammianus' portrayal of the strategies of Julian's Gallic war with respect to manpower, the elimination of the Germanic threat and the fortification of the frontier. His *Res Gestae* will be examined against the accounts of contemporary authors, including Julian himself, who deal with the Gallic war in their works. I will show the accuracy of parts of his work where they agree with the other sources. Where Ammianus is vague or inaccurate, the other sources can shed light on the problem. It is important to note that Ammianus does not always concern himself with the technical or military details in his history. His main interest is in the *res gestae* or deeds of men. He is a highly rhetorical historian and his work is meant to be a literary feat and not exclusively a treatise on military affairs. His interest in *Res Gestae* is particularly notable in his depiction of Julian during the Gallic campaign. It will be argued in the following chapters that Ammianus has obscured details in order to enhance Julian's image as a great man and general, while offering the reader insights into the military strategies.

By using Ammianus as a guide for Julian's campaign, it is possible to understand the long- and short-range strategies towards the restoration of Gaul. The other sources are helpful in sorting out the problems that are encountered in Ammianus from time to time. I also looked at the archaeological sources to see if they could shed light on the reliability of Ammianus' descriptions of the efforts to re-fortify the Rhine frontier. I was hoping that the records would offer clear confirmation of Julian's frontier strategy as described by Ammianus. However, the archaeological record, although it offers some insights, is not in



itself conclusive. Archaeological sites can be dated by indicators such as pottery and coin finds, but they often require literary or historical parallels to explain the reasons or circumstances behind the destruction and building phases of forts and towns. There are finds indicating building phases during the mid-fourth century in many of the sites mentioned by Ammianus. These findings alone cannot tell us under which emperor the building phases took place, or why. Archaeologists and modern scholars have frequently attributed a building phase of a fort to Julian based on Ammianus' writing and the fact that the available finds are compatible with what he says. This, then, creates a circular argument when determining Ammianus' reliability on the subject. However, I have made a survey of the frontier fortifications under Julian, as identified by Ammianus, in Chapter Four.

The author around whose work this thesis centres is Ammianus Marcellinus. Ammianus was born c. 330 AD in Antioch to what was probably a prosperous pagan family. Around 350 he entered the corps of *protectores domestici*, a regiment of high social standing, which may indicate family connections with the imperial service at Antioch. It is likely that his family belonged to the *curiales*, the wealthier families who were obligated to shoulder the expenses of membership in the city council. During this period, members of the *curiales* would often try to escape this burden, usually through service in the imperial army or administration. Ammianus' harsh words against Julian's failed attempt to block these routes to exemption seem to indicate where his loyalties and interests lay (21. 12. 23; 22. 9. 12; 25. 4. 21). In 353 (if not sooner) he was a member of the personal staff of

Ursicinus, the commander-in-chief of the armies in the East, at the important frontier station of Nisibis in Mesopotamia (14. 9. 1). When Ursicinus was sent by Constantius to destroy the usurper Silvanus at Cologne, Ammianus went with him. He remained in Gaul during Julian's first campaigning season there in 356, but left in June 357 when Ursicinus was recalled to the eastern frontier. Ammianus then participated in Constantius' wars against Persia. He gives a vivid description of the siege of Amida in 359, where he was one of the besieged (19. 1 - 8). Although there is an autobiographical absence from Ammianus' work after the dismissal of Ursicinus from office in 360 and his position at this time is unsure<sup>1</sup>, we know that he was later present during Julian's disastrous Persian expedition, during which the emperor died of a wound inflicted by an unknown assailant in 363 (25. 3). Whether or not Ammianus remained in the army after Julian's death is uncertain. In 371 he was back in Antioch when treason trials hit the city, and he appears to have felt some personal danger (29. 2. 4). Eventually, he settled in Rome and it is possible that he was one of the educated foreigners who was expelled from Rome for fear of famine in 383 because his description of this incident is filled with bitterness (14. 6. 19). It is not certain why Ammianus chose to write his history in Latin. Thompson feels that Ammianus went to Rome to improve his Latin. The Latin that he would have picked up in the army was conversational Latin, far different than the language of literary works<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Most modern scholars believe that he either resigned his commission and returned voluntarily or was reactivated for a short time to participate in the Persian campaign. Others (Thompson, 1947, p.10 - 11; Laistner, 1955) have suggested that he remained in the army but found no opportunity to discuss his own actions.

<sup>2</sup> Thompson (1947, p. 16 - 17) adds that he was never able to shake the words and idioms that he had used for years in the army, nor was he able to perfect the language.

Matthews supposes that Ammianus may have learned Latin as a child, as his family was probably connected to the Roman administration at Antioch<sup>3</sup>. Elliot suggests that if it is assumed that Ammianus was a pagan partisan, then a movement away from the highly Christian city of Antioch to Rome, the home of pagan reaction, was a natural choice, as was the use of Latin<sup>4</sup>. Libanius (*Autobiography* 214) speaks of the migration of Greek-speaking people to Italy to learn Latin because it was a common belief that Latin was increasing in importance and brought power and wealth. Although it is unknown where Ammianus spent the last days of his life or where he wrote his history, he did recite parts of his work at Rome. Libanius (*Ep.*1063) wrote a letter to a Marcellinus (no doubt Ammianus) in which he congratulates him on the reputation that he has won after giving readings of his newly composed history. Ammianus completed books 1 - 25 in 392 and books 26 - 31 around 395 (close to which date he seems to have died).

Ammianus wrote a Latin history which covered the period between the accession of Nerva in AD 96 and the death of Valens at Adrianople in 378. His work was meant to continue Tacitus' history, but the first 13 books have been lost, leaving us with the last 18 books, dealing with the years 354 - 378. Books 14 - 31 are much more detailed than the first 13 books as they deal with a period of only 25 years during Ammianus' lifetime. It has been suggested that Ammianus broadened the scale of his history after the year 353, which has no particular significance in Roman history, because this is when he received his first

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<sup>3</sup> Matthews, 1989, p. 80.

<sup>4</sup> Elliot, 1983, p. 213f.

promotion and became an officer on the staff of Ursicinus<sup>5</sup>. At this point he had access to an extensive range of information, with opportunities to meet politicians, court officials and military officers. Other suggestions are that Ammianus began to give his history a fuller treatment from at least the death of Constantine in 337, judging by the fact that Ammianus makes references in his extant books to events that he had already discussed, such as Constans' campaign in Britain in 343<sup>6</sup> (27. 8. 4). Another suggestion is that Ammianus began to expand his history as early as the ascent of either Diocletian or Constantine or even at the latter's death<sup>7</sup>.

Ammianus claims that he relied on his own experiences and on the accounts of eyewitnesses to events as sources of information for his history (15. 1. 1; 29. 1. 24; 31. 14. 8). Ammianus has even identified some of his informants (15. 8. 2; 19. 9. 9; 20. 5. 10; 21. 14. 2; 25. 2. 3; 25. 10. 16; 31. 13. 16). In addition to these sources of information, he seems to have had access to reports sent in to the central government by provincial governors and such (28. 3. 7; 28. 6. 22, 28), and although he seems to have had access to the *tabularia publica*, he found that they were not a useful source (28. 1. 15)<sup>8</sup>. He was also able to relate to his audience the details of letters between emperors, such as the ones

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<sup>5</sup> Thompson, 1947, p. 35 - 36.

<sup>6</sup> Syme, 1968, p. 7 - 8; Matthews, 1989, p. 18. Matthews suggests that Ammianus possibly began to expand his history at book 11 (p. 27f.).

<sup>7</sup> Rowell, 1967, p. 276f.

<sup>8</sup> Thompson, 1947, p. 20 - 22.

between Julian and Constantius after the former's usurpation (20. 8. 3 - 19; 20. 9. 4ff.). Ammianus appears to have had knowledge of the intelligence brought to Roman commanders during the wars of 376 - 8 and of their responses to it. This indicates that he had access to highly-placed informants as this material would not have made its way into any official announcements<sup>9</sup>. Austin argues that Ammianus was involved with intelligence work<sup>10</sup>. Some commentators have found similarities between Ammianus' history and works by Libanius and Zosimus when they discuss similar events<sup>11</sup>. However, the parallels in Zosimus' *New History* and Libanius and Ammianus are not frequent or close enough to show that the authors relied upon the same information. Zosimus agrees with them about a few major events which were likely common knowledge. Zosimus' work is derived from the writing of Eunapius, indicating that Eunapius also did not use the same source as Ammianus. Ammianus' work corresponds more closely with that of Libanius, but there is no agreement on a common source for these two authors. Crump suggests that they may have uncovered their facts through separate efforts, especially as their treatments of the same subjects are dissimilar. He further suggests that, as acquaintances, they may have shared their findings. Crump avers that there is no proof that Ammianus relied on

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<sup>9</sup> Matthews, 1989, p. 379. Ammianus' information for the time before the battle of Adrianople is discussed in detail in Austin, 1979, p. 72 - 80.

<sup>10</sup> Austin, 1979, p. 13 - 14. Ammianus (18. 2. 2) writes about the tribune Hariobaudes' intelligence work in 359 when he was sent to learn the Germans' plans because of his fidelity and his knowledge of their language.

<sup>11</sup> Crump (1975, p. 25f.) offers a detailed discussion on suggested sources for Ammianus' history, of which Julian, Libanius and Eunapius will be examined here as they are the main sources, after Ammianus, used in this thesis to discuss Julian's Gallic campaign.

contemporary written sources to any great extent for his work on the Gallic campaign, but that he probably took some details from a now lost pamphlet that Julian wrote on the battle of Strasbourg for his narrative of the event<sup>12</sup>. Either way, there is a passage which seems to indicate that he used, to some degree, descriptions from men who had fought there: "*quod voti magis quam spei fuisse fatebitur quilibet tunc praesens*" ("anyone there present will admit that it was a means of escape more prayed for than expected")<sup>13</sup> (16. 12. 51).

Ammianus, as was traditional in ancient historiography, claims repeatedly to tell the truth (14. 6. 2; 15. 1. 1; 16. 1. 3; 18. 6. 23. 26. 1. 1; 29. 1. 15, etc). However, Ammianus' work is filled with rhetorical devices and, although he does generally give an accurate account of fourth-century history, his view of certain characters has caused their depiction and that of some of the events surrounding them, to receive a biased presentation. For example, his portrayals of Constantius II and of the Caesar Gallus are negatively biased. Constantius is described as violently defensive of his position as emperor and only capable of success in civil war (14.10. 16; 11. 8; 20. 11. 32). In his *elogia* of the emperors, Ammianus gives a fairly balanced account of their characters. This had been considered to be an indication of honesty and impartiality in Ammianus that was unusual in ancient historiography. However, it does not follow that the mention of a few merits indicates a

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<sup>12</sup> Crump, 1975, p. 26; Thompson (1947, p. 22) also suggests that Ammianus did not rely upon other written sources, but he does not believe that he used Julian's pamphlet on the battle of Strasbourg.

<sup>13</sup> Translation Rolfe, 1935 (Loeb).

well-balanced portrait<sup>14</sup>. A biased writer may throw in a few virtues while summing up a character in order to avoid the impression that he is biased. Specifically in the case of Constantius, the virtues attributed to him were not mentioned during the narrative, which indicates that they had been left out. It has also been suggested that Ammianus skilfully contrived to make Constantius' merits seem insignificant next to his suspicion and cruelty<sup>15</sup>. In addition to the negative character of Constantius, Gallus is portrayed as a blood-thirsty tyrant. Although it is likely that he was cruel, a more well-rounded description of the Caesar would have acknowledged his abilities as a military commander, his popularity with the troops and ordinary people, and the possibility that when he acted against conspirators, some of them may actually have been guilty<sup>16</sup>. On the other hand, Ammianus' portraits of Julian and, to a lesser degree, Ursicinus appear to have been too favourable. In the case of Ursicinus, there is an example where Ammianus obscured details in order to benefit the image of his commander. Ammianus (15. 5. 21) tells us that Ursicinus was in temporary command of the Gallic army immediately after the death of Silvanus. At this time, frequent messages were sent to Constantius concerning the fact that the Germans were overrunning Gaul with no opposition (15. 8. 1; cf. 16. 12. 5). Libanius (18. 42) refers to the generals in Gaul as being asleep. He specifically blames the generals for not preventing these disasters, while Ammianus avoids mentioning Ursicinus

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<sup>14</sup> Elliot, 1983, p. 203.

<sup>15</sup> Matthews, 1989, p. 19.

<sup>16</sup> Grant, 1970, p. 363.

as one of the chief defenders of the area<sup>17</sup>. In this manner, he obscures the fact that Ursicinus failed to defend Gaul and maintains his image of a successful general.

Ammianus' treatment of Julian borders on the panegyric. To Ammianus, Julian was the ideal king<sup>18</sup> and, no doubt, his efforts to reestablish paganism in the Empire made him even more heroic. It becomes apparent in the narrative that there is a tension between Ammianus' desire to tell the truth and his desire to idealize Julian<sup>19</sup>. However, his treatment of Julian in the west differs from that of Julian in the east. Blockley offers a plausible explanation for this<sup>20</sup>. Ammianus' sources for the events in the west were enthusiastic about Julian and his activities there. As Ammianus was far away (he was no longer present for Julian's Gallic campaign after the first year), the details were difficult to check and, from a distance, it was easier to idealize him. For Julian's activities in the east, Ammianus was himself a source and was able to verify his other sources. He was personally affected by some of these activities, like Julian's attempt to remove exemptions from the *curia*, and was less likely to remain idealistic. Despite this, in the overall history, Ammianus does emphasize Julian's heroic role. He writes at great length about Julian's triumphant career as Caesar, but his treatment of Julian's career as Emperor is much shorter. It is in this latter part of Ammianus' work where most of his criticisms of Julian

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<sup>17</sup> Thompson, 1947, p. 46 - 47; cf. Frézouls, 1962, p. 676.

<sup>18</sup> See Blockley, 1975, Chapter Five and Ammianus, 25. 4. 1.

<sup>19</sup> Op. Cit. p. 100 - 101.

<sup>20</sup> Op. Cit. p. 100 - 101.



are found<sup>21</sup>. Even so, the worst of Julian's faults and failures are omitted or obscured<sup>22</sup>. In addition, in Julian's *elogium* (25. 4), his faults which are mentioned are outnumbered by his strengths. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters Two and especially Three, in his narrative of the Gallic campaign Ammianus is less than accurate when he contrives to create an image of Julian as the heroic general. He sharply contrasts Julian with Barbatio by putting the blame for military failures, probably incorrectly, on the latter. Ammianus also exaggerates Julian's role in the successes in Gaul. Ammianus' history is *Res Gestae* - the deeds of men. He is concerned with the influence that certain characters have over events, rather than the influence of external forces<sup>23</sup>. So the characters of the players in his history were, to him as to his contemporaries, important factors in determining the outcome of events.

To ancient historians, character played an important role. History was meant to show the audience examples of good and bad conduct. The use of *exempla* or the recounting of the previous deeds of men (*res gestae*) was a way of demonstrating the correlation between certain types of behaviour and the conclusions of events. This element is strong in Ammianus in his account of Julian's life. This can be seen in Julian's role as a general in Gaul. Personal leadership in combat is important to Ammianus (25. 4. 9 -12) and he attributes much of the success there to the leadership of his hero. Ammianus does not

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<sup>21</sup> Thompson in Dorey (ed.), 1966, p. 147.

<sup>22</sup> Elliot, 1983, p. 208.

<sup>23</sup> Blockley, 1975, p. 139.

give a methodical treatment of Julian's Gallic campaign, but concentrates on his character and compares him to other heroic figures such as Alexander the Great. Ammianus' work was highly rhetorical, but it has been considered that this does not compromise the value of his military history or his account of the mid-fourth century<sup>24</sup>. However, it will be seen that Ammianus did obscure facts in his narrative of the Gallic campaign in order to praise Julian. Despite these problems of bias, Ammianus offers the most detailed account of Julian's Gallic campaign and his facts generally stand up to those offered by other authors. In addition, his descriptions of Julian's work on the Rhine frontier do not conflict with the archaeology and often agree with its findings.

The historical figure around whom Ammianus' work, as well as this thesis, are centred is Julian, known as the Apostate. Julian was born at Constantinople in 331. His father, Julius Constantius, was a half-brother of Constantine I. After the death of the Emperor Constantine in 337, the Empire was divided between his three sons, Julian's cousins, Constantius II, Constantine II and Constans and to a lesser degree between Constantine's nephews Dalmatius, who had been appointed Caesar, and Hannibalianus, who had been named king of Armenia. In order to secure the Empire for the three sons of Constantine, Julian's father, eldest brother and cousins were murdered by the army. Julian and his half-brother Gallus were spared because of their youth and spent six years confined to a remote castle called Macellum in Cappadocia. In 348 Julian was allowed to pursue his studies in Greek literature and philosophy in Constantinople, but he was later sent to Nicomedia in

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<sup>24</sup> Crump, 1975, p. 31 - 32.

late 348 or 349 because Constantius was worried that his capital would favour Julian over him<sup>25</sup>. While he was in Nicomedia, in 351 his half-brother Gallus was appointed as Caesar in the east by Constantius. Ammianus (Book 14) describes Gallus' reign as bloody and cruel, and says that he was eventually executed in 354 by Constantius when it had falsely been reported that he was aiming at a loftier position. Upon Gallus' promotion, Julian had more freedom of movement and he went to Pergamum where he was exposed to Neo-Platonic philosophers. He then went to Ephesus and studied under Maximus the theurgist. It is to this time (351) that he dated his conversion to Paganism (*Ep.* 47)<sup>26</sup>. He did not display his new religion and pretended to be a Christian until ten years later, when he was securely on the throne. Julian did not display any interest in politics over the next few years. He continued his education at Athens, but this was interrupted after Gallus' execution by a summons to Constantius' court at Milan. Ammianus (15. 2. 7) says that Julian's life was in danger at Milan, due to the plots of enemies. He was saved after seven months by the Empress Eusebia who obtained for him his only audience with the emperor and permission to return to Athens. Shortly afterwards in 355, Julian was called again to court to be appointed Caesar in the west. Julian's career up to 361 will be discussed in the following chapters.

Julian was the author of speeches and other works in Greek, including *Against the*

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<sup>25</sup> Libanius, *Or.* 18. 13.

<sup>26</sup> Libanius indicates that the conversion took place while Julian was with Maximus (*Or.* 12. 34; cf. 13. 12).

*Galileans*, *Misopogon* ('Beard-hater') and his *Letter to the Athenians*. The *Letter to the Athenians* is the work of the Emperor that is most relevant to the study of his Gallic campaign. It was written in Illyricum in 361 while Julian was on the march against Constantius. In it, he was attempting to justify his usurpation to the citizens. Similar letters were written to Rome, Sparta and Corinth, but only the one written to the Athenians survives. In this work Julian describes his successes in Gaul and his perilous relationship with Constantius and his court. While he was Emperor (361 - 363) Julian attempted a vigorous program of pagan activism in the interest of Hellenism. He intended to restore the temples and the finances of the ancestral cults and to appoint provincial and civic pagan priesthods. At the same time the Christian churches and clergy lost the financial subsidies and privileges that had been given to them since the time of Constantine. Julian forbade Christian professors from teaching classical literature and philosophy. The pagan authors who will be discussed below were great admirers of Julian, as was Ammianus. These authors thought that Julian could save the Empire from the encroaching Christianity that had been the imperial religion since Constantine the Great. Julian was seen as the hero who would restore the Empire to its traditional and classical ways. They praised him in their works and they, in varying degrees of detail, wrote about his exploits in Gaul.

Libanius was a Greek rhetorician and a man of letters who was born in Antioch in 314 to an old established family. Among his works is an autobiography, leaving us with many details of his life. There are also 64 surviving speeches, 16,000 letters, 51 school

declamations, numerous model rhetorical exercises and minor rhetorical works which he composed while he was a teacher. Several of his works discuss Julian's Gallic campaign: *Oration*s 12, 13, 15, 17 (The Lament over Julian) and especially 18 (Funeral Oration over Julian). Libanius completed his studies in Athens, where he was noted for his ability and unconventionality as a student. In 339/340 he became a private teacher in Constantinople but was driven out by a group of rival colleagues. Libanius taught in Nicomedia from 344 until 349. He was present when Julian arrived there in late 348 or 349, but as he was an open pagan and hostile towards the new imperial religion, it is possible that Julian did not associate with him in case the suspicious Constantius misinterpreted his intentions<sup>27</sup>. Julian also avoided Libanius' lectures but he hired someone to copy them for him. However, the two were not in the same city for long. In 349 the emperor summoned Libanius back to Constantinople where he stayed for four years before returning to Antioch in 354, where he accepted an official chair of rhetoric.

We also have details of Julian's Gallic campaign from the fragments of Eunapius' works. He was born at 349 at Sardis. He went to Athens to study under a Christian sophist, Prohaeresius, whom he admired despite his hatred of the ever-growing influence of Christianity. He was recalled to Sardis in 369 by his parents and seems to have spent the rest of his life teaching there. His chief work was a *Universal History*, in which he continued the *Chronicle* of Dexippus, starting from the year 270 and ending at the reign of Arcadius at the start of the fifth century, where it was terminated probably because of his

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<sup>27</sup> Browning, 1975, 52 - 53.

own death (414). Some fragments of his history have been preserved in the *Lexicon* called the Suda, the *Excerpta de Sententiis* and in the *Excerpta de Legationibus*. The book was partly a polemic against Christianity and it seems that Julian was the hero of his narrative. For his career, Eunapius could have gained a lot of information from his friend Oribasius, the physician, who had been with Julian in Gaul. In the fifth century Zosimus followed Eunapius for his account of Julian's life. In fact, it has often been thought that Zosimus reproduced Eunapius' history for the period that both writers had in common (270 - 404)<sup>28</sup>. Eunapius' other work is *Lives of the Sophists*, which appeared sometime after 395 and still exists in full.

Zosimus, whose insights into Julian's Gallic campaigns were derived from Eunapius' work, wrote a history (*Historia Nova*) of the Roman Empire from the time of Augustus reaching as far as AD 410, where his extant text ends just before Alaric sacks Rome. It was probably written in the early sixth century<sup>29</sup>. Not much is known about him, but Photius (*Bibl. cod.* 98), in the ninth century, tells us that Zosimus was a count and an advocate of the imperial treasury, that he was known to be a militant pagan and that his main source was Eunapius. It is assumed that Zosimus was from the east because he both wrote in Greek and used Greek sources. His views of events and characters are coloured by his paganism. Two main themes of the history are the decline of paganism and the

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<sup>28</sup> This has been challenged by some due to differences between the two writers in detail and attitude, especially with respect to religion. See Blockley, 1981, p. 2.

<sup>29</sup> Ridley, 1982, xii.

entry of the barbarians into the Empire, leading to its fall<sup>30</sup>. Zosimus felt that the Empire had lost the protection of the gods by its neglect of the pagan ceremonies. He was naturally an admirer of Julian's, and his attitude reflects that of Eunapius.

A minor source for Julian's activities in Gaul is Claudius Mamertinus. He was a civilian from a distinguished Gallo-Roman family and was appointed consul in 361 by Julian at Constantinople. The work of his that briefly surveys Julian's time in Gaul is a speech of thanks delivered to Julian upon his entering the consulship (*Latin Panegyric XI/3*). Since this work was written as a panegyric, it was not intended to be an accurate historical work. Mamertinus mentions few details on the Gallic campaign and exaggerates Julian's success at Strasbourg (4.3).

In addition to the pagan sources for Julian's Gallic campaign, there are two Christian writers who briefly describe it. These are Greek church historians and so they concentrate more on eastern and religious affairs. Their view of Julian is far from the heroic one which is found in the pagan sources. The church historians mainly concentrate on Julian's religious life and not on his deeds in Gaul. The first is Socrates, about whom little is known. He was born at Constantinople in either 379 or 380 and he lived there during his entire life. Socrates wrote a continuation of Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History* and he ended his history at the year 439. The date of his death is not known. Socrates was familiar with the writings of Julian and Libanius, among other pagan writers. He mainly

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<sup>30</sup> Op. Cit., p. xiii.

dealt with the eastern Empire and only discussed the west in relation to the east. So it is while he is discussing the life of the Emperor Julian that Socrates makes mention of his early career as Caesar and beforehand (3.1). Another account of Julian's activities in Gaul is given by Sozomen who wrote a church history in nine books which followed that of Eusebius. Much of Sozomen's relevant narrative is based upon Socrates, although he does add some detail. He was a lawyer in Constantinople, as was Socrates, and at about the same time. Sozomen was not a native of the city but was of Palestinian background. His grandparents, who were converted Christians, had to flee during Julian's reign.

Ammianus does offer the most detailed account of Julian's Gallic campaign, from which most of the information known about it is derived. Its reliability has been appreciated by historians and archaeologists who have used his work to gather information about the fourth century and to date building phases in Rhineland forts. However, Ammianus' contemporaries have been useful as additional sources for Julian's years in Gaul. They are important as sources for additional detail and can, at times, help to clarify parts of Ammianus where facts have been obscured or altered for the sake of Julian's image. Because the writers who have the most to say about Julian's Gallic campaign (the pagans) were all great admirers of the Caesar, they do not offer the objective and analytical views of modern scholars who analyse the movements and strategies of the army, as well as the merits and faults of the commander's decisions. This is not to be expected of ancient historiography. These authors, except for Zosimus, used sources independent from one another and they offer details that are not in the others' works. These pieces can be fitted



into Ammianus' generally complete narrative to increase the amount of details known about Julian's Gallic campaign.

## Chapter One: The State of Gaul at the time of Julian's Accession

When Julian was sent to Gaul as Caesar in 355 AD it was for the purpose of reintroducing a strong imperial presence, sweeping the German raiders back behind the Rhine frontier, strengthening the fortifications and restoring order to a chaotic area. But should Julian, previously a student of Greek philosophy with no military experience, fail to do this and be killed in the process, this would also be an acceptable result. At least that is how Ammianus Marcellinus along with some other ancient authors saw it<sup>1</sup>. Although Constantius was considered to be responsible for the murder of many of Julian's male relatives<sup>2</sup> and had executed Julian's half-brother, Gallus Caesar, the year before, in order to eliminate competition for the throne, he needed someone to take control of Gaul and the Rhineland while he concentrated his energies in the east. Julian was a sensible choice as the Caesar in the west because he was Constantius' cousin and did not appear to be interested in the throne. The army tended to remain loyal to hereditary rulers, and Gaul had enjoyed the patronage of Constantine, especially in Trier, and would no doubt be more likely to accept Julian than a non-relative. Most importantly though, Eusebia, Constantius' wife, argued favourably for Julian, possibly saving his life as well as getting

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<sup>1</sup> Eunapius, *Vit. Soph.* 476; *fr.* 14 M; Ammianus, 16. 11. 13; Socrates, 3.1 (although he personally thought that this was unlikely); Zosimus (3.1) attributes this idea to Eusebia while convincing Constantius to appoint Julian Caesar.

<sup>2</sup> Ammianus, 21. 16. 8; Julian himself considered Constantius to be responsible (*Ep. ad. Ath.* 270cd; 281c).

him his new position as Caesar in Gaul<sup>3</sup>.

During the third century a dangerous situation in Gaul existed as a result of the high turnover of emperors, of internal and external warfare and of the total collapse of the silver currency. Between the death of Septimius Severus in 211 and the accession of Diocletian in 284, the empire was in disorder. There were twenty-four “legitimate” emperors and many more usurpers, but none lasted long in an era of palace plots, murder and internal fighting. Most emperors and usurpers were murdered or killed in civil war. With no strong government and with a high turnover of emperors, the defence of the frontiers was neglected. The troops were often removed from the frontiers in order to participate in private wars between emperors and usurpers. This movement of the troops led to an increased number of external attacks on the empire and it is also possible that it created additional internal conflicts<sup>4</sup>. Regional usurpations were partly a reaction to the central government’s inability to protect the frontier. At times, the security of his office was more important to the emperor than the peace of remote frontiers. Philip the Arab (244 - 249) abandoned the Persian campaign of his predecessor Gordian III (238 - 244) and agreed to an unfavourable peace treaty in order to return to Rome and secure his

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<sup>3</sup> Ammianus, 15. 2. 8; there had been false accusations made against Julian and a group of flatterers were demanding his execution, but Eusebia intervened; 21. 6. 4; Julian, Oration 3. 116c - 118d. Eusebia helps dispel suspicions about Julian and she arranges for him to go to Greece; Oration 3, 120c; also Socrates, 3.1. Accounts of Eusebia convincing Constantius to appoint Julian as Caesar: Ammianus, 15. 8. 2; Julian, Oration 3. 121bc; Zosimus, 3. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Luttwak, 1976, p. 129.

position.

By the 250's the Germanic tribes had begun to take advantage of the Roman weakness. The Alamanni and the Franks increased their raiding activities into Gaul. They were now invading deeper into Roman territory and on a larger scale. The Alamanni even reached Italy and were only stopped when Gallienus defeated them at Milan in 258. Milan was becoming an important administrative centre of the Empire as it was easier to communicate with the provinces from there than from Rome. The fact that the barbarians could now threaten an important city so close to the centre of the Empire was no doubt a sign that these dangers were increasing in significance. The Germanic invaders were also venturing deep into Gaul and even made it to Tarraco in Spain in 262. The pressure was increased by the loss of the *agri Decumates* and by the refugees pouring into Gaul. The *agri Decumates* were a territory east of the Rhine and north of the Danube that was annexed by the Flavian emperors to shorten the communications between the Rhine and Danube frontiers. When the Germans moved eastward, the land was given to the Gauls and subsequently to Roman veterans, on the payment of a tenth of their produce. The loss of this area to the Germans was exceptional because the barbarians were now occupying land that had once been part of the Empire. It is possible that the Germanic raids had not increased due to the instability of the Empire alone<sup>5</sup>. On the Rhine and Upper Danube the fragmented tribes began to join together in larger groups even before the internal strife began. The combination of more concentrated barbarian manpower and the shortage of

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<sup>5</sup> Luttwak, 1976, p. 128.

manpower of the central empire had serious effects on Gaul.

During the third-century crisis, of which the critical period is considered to be from the death of Alexander Severus (235) until the accession of Diocletian (284), the size of the army had to be increased and so it became a larger financial burden on the Empire.

Military pay and supplies became more difficult to manage. The soldiers had mostly been paid in the silver *denarii* collected as taxes which were becoming increasingly debased.

By the 260's the *denarius* was made virtually of base metal. This caused inflation as the purer gold and silver coins were hoarded, thus taking them out of circulation. The soldiers began to be paid partly in kind as the taxes began to be collected in kind. Direct exactions had always been used for providing the grain supplies or *annona militaris* to the army as well as for the *angareia* or the military transport. During this period exactions were made on a much larger scale, often putting immense pressure on the people who had to provide them. In order to assure supplies to the soldiers, they were no longer stationed only at the frontiers. They were placed in smaller units near the centres of production.

The soldiers could now be found in the countryside and towns, and they were not always under control. Conversely, supplies were also distributed to granaries (*horrea*) which were fortified and placed near the frontier. This continued to be the situation even after the reforms of Diocletian (284 - 306) and Constantine (306 - 337). Since Septimius Severus' (193-211) reforms (the legal recognition of soldiers' marriages and increases in their pay and privileges), the army became more prominent and, at times, dangerous. The provincial armies began to declare the emperor of their choice and when their favour

ended they could just as easily kill him. The emperor at Rome had little chance of controlling these situations on the edges of the Empire in the midst of other crises.

Although a degree of stability was introduced into the Empire by the joint reigns of Valerian (253-260) and Gallienus (253-268), the Empire did not regain its full strength. Gallienus took over the control of the western part of the Empire while Valerian administered the eastern part. Valerian had to contend with pressure from the North, mainly from the Goths, and in the east there was the renewed and aggressive Persian Empire. The Persians began to attack the Roman frontier in the 250's, resulting in the loss of some forts. In 259, Valerian was defeated and captured by the Sassanian king, Shapur I, along with many of his soldiers. It was left to the Palmyrene ruler, Odenathus, to attack the Persians, and once he defeated them he stretched his power over a large part of the east. Gallienus was in no position to remove him and recognized him as the ruler of the east, giving him the titles *dux* and *corrector totius Orientis*. Odenathus always recognized the imperial power of Rome, which justified Gallienus' policy towards him. Upon the death of Odenathus, Queen Zenobia took over his position in the name of her young son, giving him the Roman titles that had belonged to his father. In 270, she reacted to the political instability that followed the death of Claudius (II) Gothicus (268 - 270) by taking over Egypt and much of Asia Minor. When Aurelian (270 - 275) defeated Zenobia in 272, she had already named her son Augustus and herself Augusta. In 260, soon after the death of Valerian, Gallienus' lieutenant at Cologne, Marcus Postumus, murdered the praetorian prefect, Silvanus, and Gallienus' son, Saloninus. He declared himself emperor

and managed to obtain the control of Gaul, Germany, Britain and Spain until it was lost by his successors in 274. The central Empire reluctantly accepted what is called the 'Gallic Empire' because it was not strong enough to defeat it. It appears that Postumus succeeded in preventing any new Germanic invasions until 268. There seems to have been no city-wall constructions in this period in the interior of Gaul which indicates that there was no need for protection beyond the Rhine boundaries. Gallic cities had generally developed as unwalled sites and remained so as long as the frontier was secure. The destructive raids came in the 270's when the power of the Gallic Empire was fading and was finally destroyed when Aurelian (270-275) advanced into northern Gaul.

The barbarians, with their usual sensitivity to Roman weakness, perceived that the confusion of the 270's would be ideal for making inroads into Gaul. Towns at this time were still mostly undefended and so many walls were built in Gaul and Germany around this time. The fact that the walls encompassed a smaller area than the size of the town indicates the possibility that the populations were shrinking or that the smaller defended areas were to be used during times of crisis by the people who dwelt outside the walls. The emperor Probus (276-82) arrived on the scene after the major invasions and defeated the barbarians. There was a treaty made with the Germans, allowing them to return to their side of the Rhine although they had to return prisoners and booty<sup>6</sup>. Probus even settled a group of Vandals and Burgundians in Britain who would help him protect it

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<sup>6</sup> Zosimus, l. 67; 68.

against insurrections<sup>7</sup>. Although not entirely peaceful, Probus' reign was a much calmer period in Gaul. Probus renewed the frontier by building new forts, including some on the right bank of the Rhine in territory that had been lost to the Romans since 259. There were also changes in the organization of the army. The cavalry field armies that had begun to emerge from the time of Gallienus<sup>8</sup> became the armies that campaigned with the emperor or an important army commander. The legions were mainly used for frontier defences along with some auxiliary regiments, which meant that they were not as frequently the main force to battle the barbarians in the field.

More military changes emerged after the breakdown of imperial defences during the third-century crisis. A new strategy began to emerge which has been termed by modern scholars 'defence in depth'<sup>9</sup>. Luttwak states that after the frontier had been breached, the defensive response of the Empire had been to send troops to the threatened area. Eventually a system developed where the frontier garrisons would monitor the movement of the barbarians and call the mobile troops to the endangered region, creating a strategy that combined both static frontier forces and mobile field armies. However, the 'defence in depth' strategy was not used exclusively in the later third century. Once the enemy was

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<sup>7</sup> Zosimus, 1. 68.

<sup>8</sup> Gallienus had introduced a fast, mobile cavalry. Before this time, Roman soldiers sometimes rode on horseback to the scene of the battle but dismounted to fight, while Gallienus' cavalry fought from horseback.

<sup>9</sup> Luttwak, 1976, p. 130 f.. Whittaker (1994, p. 206) and Southern and Dixon (1996, p. 29) disagree that there was ever any 'defence in depth' strategy intentionally adopted by an emperor.



put into a weakened position, either on the defensive or defeated and pacified, the army aimed at reverting back to the previous preclusive system of security. This military policy would continue from Diocletian's reign until Valentinian I (364 - 375). Incursions by the barbarians into Gaul could only be held at the border if they were very small-scale because the garrisons had been reduced. For larger invasions the garrisons could alert a mobile force behind the frontier to stop the raiders before they moved very far into the interior. Although this new strategy was effective in preventing major incursions into Gaul, the zone behind the frontier became a battle-ground. For this reason, the interior of Gaul had to be protected against the raiders. The cities had strong walls, while the farmhouses, granaries and refuges were fortified. These could resist the barbarians who were unequipped with siege-machines. The mobile forces fighting in this area had the advantage of the fortified sites. They could serve as supply depots, which in the Later Empire benefitted the Romans, especially as the raiders often had no food supplies. In addition, road forts were built to safeguard the passage of the assembling Roman troops as well as the travels of civilians. The road forts were manned by small detachments and although they could not stop large enemy incursions, they could stop stray groups of raiders or foraging parties, or at least they could delay them until a larger force arrived to the area. Before the road forts had been built, even small bands of invaders had been able to raid deep into Gaul.

Under Diocletian (284-305) order in the Empire was partially restored and the effort was continued by Constantine (306-337). Despite this, there were other problems that

threatened the safety of Gaul in the late third century. The *bagaudae* or rural brigands were discontented rural people, refugees, old soldiers and deserters who fell into brigandage mainly because of the barbarian invasions, the poor economy and civil wars. For a century there had been sporadic peasant revolts, but in 284 there was an organized and armed rebellion. This sort of uprising was a real threat to the imperial government in the area and it is possible that the new town walls in Gaul were a result of this as much as they were a result of barbarian invasions<sup>10</sup>. Another blow to the strength of the central government was the loss of a portion of the western Empire. Carausius, a Batavian who had an impressive record as a soldier, was commanding the fleet that was protecting the coasts of Brittany and Gallia Belgica against raiders like the Saxons. He was accused of allowing the raiders to plunder the land and then attacking them by sea and capturing them while they were loaded with booty. It was also said that he did not return the property to the provincials, nor to the emperor, but that he kept it for himself. Diocletian's colleague, Maximian ordered Carausius' execution, to which he responded by declaring himself emperor in 287, with control over Britain, northern Gaul and parts of Germania Inferior. Carausius was able to remain safe in Britain. He had the fleet that he already commanded as well as a strong land force in Gaul to block Maximian's advance north. This loss of power was damaging to Diocletian. These areas were of military importance to Rome, and Britain was economically stable compared to Germany and Gaul. Also the well-established grain route from Britain to the continent would have been blocked. The British Empire did not fall until 296, when Carausius's successor, Allectus, was defeated

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<sup>10</sup> Salway, 1993, p. 205-206.

by Constantius Chlorus, the father of Constantine.

The Romans made use of barbarian allies to help watch the frontier, especially as by the end of the third century it was difficult for the army to protect all the borders of the Empire. It might appear that Diocletian vastly increased the size of the army but in fact he increased the number of legions by creating new ones out of the detachments of already existing legions<sup>11</sup>. There were now more but smaller units. Diocletian increased the number of troops on the frontiers in an effort to strengthen the borders of the Empire. This effort also included the building of forts along the frontiers. He divided the mobile cavalry force that had been in use since the reign of Gallienus. By about this time, the troops that accompanied the imperial court had become more or less a permanent fixture and received the name *comitatus*. These troops probably profited from their proximity to the emperors and it is likely that there were other similar troops that could be called as reinforcements, as there were to be in the next century. By the fourth century it became clear that the *comitatus* enjoyed a higher status in the army, as had the praetorian guard in earlier times.

Under Diocletian, the provinces were subdivided into a larger number of provinces and grouped into *dioceses*. Each new province required a governor and each governor

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<sup>11</sup> It is likely that Diocletian made a modest increase to the size of the army. He did, in fact, create new units but it is not certain that he made any significant changes with relation to the number of troops especially as the army had risen to about something over 350, 000 during the third century (Cameron, 1993, 33f.).

required a staff, and, in addition, the *vicarius* (the head of each *diocese*) required a staff. Gallia Belgica, Gallia Lugdunensis, Germania Inferior and Superior became the *diocesis Galliarum*, while Aquitania, Narbonensis and the Alpes Maritimae became the *diocesis Viennensis*. Diocletian also altered the taxation and civil service system so that the empire became much more bureaucratic. Military and civil careers were separated with senators excluded from the former. The state became more centrally controlled with new measures taken to ensure that it was able to handle the new needs of the Empire. New offices were created to deal with financial, judicial and military affairs throughout the empire. Previously, the land-taxation system had varied throughout the Empire, with Italy being exempt. Diocletian had the entire empire surveyed and introduced a standardized tax-system. He also tried to control the climbing rate of inflation by setting a maximum price for every commodity or service. This was probably ineffectual as these laws had to be made repeatedly all over the Empire, indicating that they were not being followed.

Diocletian reorganized the empire by dividing its power into four parts. In 286 Diocletian took a partner, Maximian, in ruling the Empire as Augusti, and they each took a deputy (or Caesar) who would help them rule and eventually succeed them. This Tetrarchy helped the emperor to spread his influence throughout the Empire and it was hoped that it would resolve any issues of succession upon the death of an Augustus. An Augustus and a Caesar would take control of the western part of the Empire, while the other two ruled the eastern part. In the 290's Constantius Chlorus, the Caesar of Gaul, Germany, Britain and Spain, was busy campaigning against the Germans, and Roman control was brought

back into the area<sup>12</sup>. The presence of a Caesar in the north-west of the Empire on a permanent basis with an imperial staff increased the amount of involvement of the central government. The presence of the imperial army secured this area, no doubt increasing its wealth as well. For example, Constantius Chlorus' choice of Trier as a base gave it the prestige and importance of an imperial city.

Diocletian's Tetrarchy system did not last nor did it solve the problem of succession. After Diocletian abdicated with his colleague, Maximian, in 305, the system worked as expected, with the two Caesars, Constantius Chlorus and Galerius, becoming Augusti, while two new Caesars, Severus and Maximinus Daia, were chosen for the west and the east respectively. However, with the death of Constantius Chlorus in Britain in July 306, the system was disturbed. His son, Constantine, was proclaimed emperor by the troops, and Galerius, who was far away in Nicomedia, had no choice but to accept this. He insisted that Constantine act as a Caesar while the remaining members of the Tetrarchy be promoted to Augustus. But the order of succession was lost. Next, Maxentius, the son of Diocletian's retired colleague Maximian, felt that he deserved the purple, too. In October 306, he induced the garrison and people of Rome to proclaim him emperor. His father joined his cause. At this point there were six claimants to the throne. The number was soon reduced to four after Maximian and Maxentius defeated the armies of Galerius and Severus, and won control of Italy, Africa and Spain.

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<sup>12</sup> Julian (Oration 1. 7 c) indicated that Constantius Chlorus and Maximian had been responsible for building forts and expelling barbarians from Roman territory.

To deal with the clutter of emperors, Diocletian came out of retirement and a conference was held at Carnutum on the Danube in November 308. A third Tetrarchy was formed with Galerius and Licinius as Augusti, and Constantine and Maximinus Daia as Caesars. Maxentius was ignored, but effectively controlled Italy and Africa. Galerius died in 311, leaving Constantine, Licinius and Maximinus Daia acting as independent rulers in Trier, Sardica (Sofia) and Nicomedia respectively. Maxentius' rule was centred at Rome but was not recognized by the others. The system that had been designed by Diocletian to preserve the Empire as a whole was now leading to the isolation of its parts. Constantine began to work towards a situation where the Empire would be centralized under one emperor. In 312 he killed Maxentius, thus becoming the sole emperor of the west. In 313, Maximinus died, most unnaturally for a Roman emperor, of natural causes. This halted a civil war between the new alliance of Licinius and Constantine against the threatened but now dead Maximinus. After 316, the relations between the two remaining emperors were hostile, with Constantine having control over the western Empire. They appointed Caesars for themselves, except now these played only the role of successor and not deputy, as they were the infant and teenaged sons of the emperors. Finally in 324, Licinius was defeated and the Empire was united again under one ruler until Constantine's death in 337.

In 306 the newly made emperor, Constantine, repulsed Frankish raids into Gaul. He then reinforced the frontier with new fortifications on both sides of the Rhine. Constantine was frequently in Gaul during his reign. The presence of the imperial army and strong

fortifications kept the Germanic attacks at a manageable level. Zosimus (2. 34) criticized Constantine for his frontier policy. He accused him of having disregarded Diocletian's strong defence line by removing the soldiers to the cities, leaving the frontier population neglected, imposing the burden of the army on the towns and, in the process, weakening the soldiers through the luxury of town life. However, Zosimus' pagan view of Constantine may have induced him to ignore the difficulty of getting supplies to the soldiers and the need to put them near the centres of distribution. The Rhine frontier remained stable until the 350's when internal strife weakened the defences and invited the Germans to raid deep into Gaul.

After Constantine's death in 337, his three sons divided up the Empire between themselves as Augusti. However, Dalmatius, a nephew of Constantine, had been appointed Caesar by his uncle in 335 and commanded against the Goths in Thrace, Macedonia and Greece. He, along with another of Constantine's nephews, Hannibalianus (who had been named King of Armenia), and Constantine's half-brother Julius Constantius (Julian and Gallus' father who had been consul in 335) were murdered in 337 apparently by Constantius II because he was threatened by their proximity to the throne<sup>13</sup>. Zosimus (2. 40) attributes Constantius' killing spree of his male relatives to a need to prove his manliness. He writes that Constantius II put the army up to killing Julius Constantius, Dalmatius and Hannibalianus, and that in the case of Hannibalianus he incited the soldiers to express their

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<sup>13</sup> Zosimus, 2. 39 - 40; they were given the title of *nobilissimi* and wore a purple robe with a gold fringe because of their close kinship to Constantine.

unwillingness to accept any other rulers than the sons of Constantine I. Ammianus (21. 16. 8) and Julian (*Ep. ad Ath.* 270cd; 281c) also believed that Constantius II was responsible for the murders, but whether or not this is fact is uncertain<sup>14</sup>. Next, came the deaths of Constantius II's brothers and co-Augusti. In 340, Constantine II was killed while attempting to invade his brother Constans' territory in northern Italy. Constans, who was in charge of the west, was in his turn killed in 350 by a palace coup. An army officer, Magnentius, was responsible for his death. He asked for recognition as emperor of the west and that Constantius' sister (the widow of Hannibalianus and the future wife of Gallus), Constantina, become his wife, but Constantius refused these terms. After Magnentius' rise to power, Vetranio, the general of the army in Pannonia, was declared emperor by the legions there<sup>15</sup>. This may have been instigated by Constantina and Constantius in order to keep his troops from going over to Magnentius. At this time, Constantius, even though he was heavily burdened by war with the Persians, decided to move against these two usurpers. He first made peace with Vetranio. Constantius had intended to deceive Vetranio and, while he was in his presence, he turned the soldiers against him. According to Zosimus (2. 44) Constantius gave a speech to the soldiers reminding them of their loyalties to the house of Constantine and they reacted by refusing to accept any "bastards" as emperor. Vetranio was allowed to live in Bithynia until he died.

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<sup>14</sup> Eusebius (*Life of Constantine* 68), Socrates (3. 1) and Sozomen (5. 2) say that it was the doing of the soldiery.

<sup>15</sup> Zosimus, 2. 43.



Constantius still had to deal with Magnentius in the west, but he also needed to protect the east. He had no heirs, so in 351 he appointed his cousin Gallus, whose life had been spared in 337 because he had been a sickly child, as the Caesar in the east. As in the later case of Julian, Zosimus (2. 45) represents Constantius' motive for this appointment as two-sided; either Gallus would withstand the Persians or Constantius might find a reason to have Gallus eliminated, as was the case. Constantius finally defeated Magnentius in 353. Julian (*Or.* 1. 34 b, c, d; 35 a) writes that Magnentius had used the force of soldiers, which had been originally assembled to repel the Germans, against Constantius' army instead. He discusses how every city and fortified place along the Rhine was without its garrisons and claims that the whole area was left open to the barbarians. It was also claimed that Constantius was responsible for some of the barbarian attacks in this period because he induced them to act aggressively against Magnentius in order to weaken his position in Gaul<sup>16</sup>. Clearly, this whole episode increased the troubles in Gaul, so that in 354 Constantius needed to campaign against the Alamanni<sup>17</sup>. The Alamanni sued for peace and a treaty was made. Constantius then returned to Milan for the winter, where he summoned his Caesar, Gallus, to him because he had received some unfavourable reports concerning his activities in Antioch<sup>18</sup>. Gallus was executed that same year because he was

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<sup>16</sup> Zosimus, 2. 53; Socrates, 3.1; Sozomen, 5. 2.

<sup>17</sup> Ammianus, 14. 10.

<sup>18</sup> According to Ammianus (14. 11), Gallus was sent a series of false friendly letters and visitors that called him to Milan to take care of some important public business, possibly the devastation of Gaul (14. 11. 9).

wrongly believed to have been aspiring to the throne<sup>19</sup>. In 355, Constantius was again campaigning in the Rhineland against Alamannic tribes<sup>20</sup>.

That summer, Constantius was faced with another rebellion in Gaul. In August 355, Silvanus, the emperor's commander-in-chief in Gaul, was proclaimed emperor at Cologne by the soldiers there<sup>21</sup>. He had been plotted against by a minor supply officer named Dynamius, the praetorian prefect, Lampadius, and other high officials. They had forged letters, supposedly from Silvanus, in which he stated that he wanted greater power. Silvanus knew that he would not be able to convince an excessively cautious Constantius of his innocence, nor would he be able to live with the Franks (his own people) without being betrayed to the Romans at some point. He only had his popularity among the soldiers to count on. By the time news of Silvanus' proclamation reached the emperor, Constantius was already aware of his innocence but had to act against the usurper anyway. He chose Ursicinus, *magister equitum* or the commander-in-chief of the army in the east, who had been in disgrace since his name had been linked to a thwarted plot against Constantius<sup>22</sup>. The plan was that Ursicinus would pretend that the emperor was unaware

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<sup>19</sup> Ammianus Marcellinus gives a detailed description of the Gallus affair in Book 14. He portrays Gallus and his wife as cruel and savage but says that he was executed due to lies created by two men (14. 11. 24); Zosimus (2. 55) wrote that two men convinced Constantius that Gallus was aiming for the throne.

<sup>20</sup> Ammianus, 15. 4.

<sup>21</sup> The account of the treachery against Silvanus, his rise to power and destruction is given by Ammianus in full detail in 15. 5.

<sup>22</sup> Ammianus, 15. 2. 1-6.

of the usurpation and that he was merely Silvanus' normal replacement. This was a dangerous plot for Ursicinus and the few staff officers who accompanied him (a young Ammianus among them). If Silvanus guessed that Ursicinus had actually come to Cologne to trick him on behalf of Constantius, their lives would not be worth much. Because rumour, in those days, travelled faster than people, Silvanus was aware that the Emperor knew of his insurrection when Ursicinus arrived. Ursicinus protected himself by acknowledging Silvanus' position and by going along with it. Ursicinus' group, through bribes, induced the Bracchiati and Cornuti, troops of wavering loyalty, to join their cause. When this was arranged a band of armed men emerged at dawn and hacked Silvanus to pieces while he was trying to seek refuge in a chapel<sup>23</sup>.

The episode of Silvanus not only introduced our author Ammianus to Gaul, but it also increased the barbarian pressures there. As Ammianus puts it: "*Cum diuturna incuria Galliae caedes acerbas rapinasque et incendia, barbaris licenter grassantibus, nullo iuvante perferrent, Silvanus pedestris militiae rector, ut efficax ad haec corrigenda, principis iussu perrexit*" ("Since through long neglect Gaul was enduring bitter massacres, pillage, and the ravages of fire, as the savages plundered at will and no one helped, Silvanus, an infantry commander thought capable of redressing these outrages, came there at the emperor's order")<sup>24</sup>. Silvanus had been in the process of driving back the savages<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> Julian (oration 1. 48 c; 2. 98 c, d) says he was torn from limb to limb.

<sup>24</sup> Ammianus, 15. 5. 2, translation Rolfe, 1940 (Loeb).

<sup>25</sup> Ammianus, 15. 5, 4.

but his work had been forestalled. After the death of Silvanus, Eastern Gaul was once again outside of Roman control. The German raiders had taken numerous cities<sup>26</sup> in Gaul along with many captives and spoils. This was not the first time in the fourth century that the frontiers had been neglected. The civil wars that had occurred after the death of Constantine the Great had also increased the danger of the situation there. Constans, the ruler of the west, had been killed in 350 and subsequently Constantius and Magnentius used their forces to fight each other rather than to keep the German barbarians out of Roman territory. In addition to this, it seems that Constantius had been encouraging the barbarians to rise up against Magnentius. The situation was worsened by Silvanus' usurpation. Ammianus (15. 8. 1) tells us of the continuing pressure that Gaul suffered from the Germans during Constantius' rule. The emperor was receiving frequent messages concerning the desperate state of Gaul. The barbarians were destroying everything with no opposition. According to Ammianus, Constantius did not want to leave the safety of Italy for the dangers of a distant region, so it occurred to him to appoint his cousin Julian as his partner. Zosimus (3.1-2) mentions that Constantius had other pressing matters to deal with in other parts of the Empire and he could not deal with all the problems alone. The Quadi and Sarmatae were overrunning Pannonia and Upper Moesia at this time, and he needed to give his attention to the Persian invasions in the east.

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<sup>26</sup> Zosimus (3. 1) and Julian (*Ep. ad. Ath.* 279a) put the number of cities at 40 and 45 respectively.

Constantius then went to his associates at court with his idea but they were against it. Eusebia supported it saying that a relative was a better choice than anyone else<sup>27</sup>. In Zosimus' account of this affair (3. 1-2), Constantius was mistrustful of anyone and disliked sharing his power, but his wife Eusebia convinced him that Julian was useful and harmless. If Julian succeeded, the success would be in Constantius' name, and if he got himself killed, then there would be no relatives left to claim the throne. For whichever reason, Constantius finally agreed with his wife and summoned Julian to Milan. He was ceremoniously declared Caesar before the soldiers and was given Constantius' sister, Helena, as a wife. As he left the ceremony in Constantius' chariot, Ammianus (15. 8. 17) wrote that Julian whispered this phrase: “ἔλλαβε πορφύρεος θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή” (“by purple death I'm seized and fate supreme”). Julian's pessimistic attitude is also reflected in his own writings (*Ep. ad Ath.* 277 a, b) where he also refers to his situation after he has become Caesar: “ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δουλεία καὶ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπικρεμάμενον δέος Ἡράκλεις ὅσον καὶ οἶον” (“The slavery that ensued and the fear for my very life that hung over me every day, Heracles, how great it was, how terrible!”). Clearly, Julian was not or pretended not to be pleased with his circumstances, nor did he feel that he was secure among the emperor and his cronies. Julian was now the intended saviour of Gaul, even though he would not secure the trust or total support of Constantius. The civil wars were, for now, at an end. The emperor could concentrate his forces on the frontiers of the Empire. For Gaul, the arrival of a Caesar would mean stronger defences and fortifications, but as we have seen

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<sup>27</sup> Ammianus, 15. 8. 2-3.

from the third-century crisis and from the civil wars of the first half of the fourth century, the security of the frontier could last only if the Empire remained united.

## Chapter Two: Julian's Strategy on Manpower

When Julian left the Augustus' court in Milan on the first of December, 355, Ammianus writes that he was accompanied by only the *comitatus*, or the troops that normally accompanied the imperial court (15. 8. 18). Other authors, including Julian, tell us that this number of men was 360<sup>1</sup>. Libanius (*Or.* 18. 37) indicates that Julian's army would be assembled from the men who were already stationed throughout Gaul, even though they were accustomed to defeat. The number of troops in Gaul was presently low and many of them had been scattered throughout the province after the Germanic invasions. The garrisons of overthrown cities and fortresses along the Rhine were no longer present to exert any Roman control in the region. Ammianus (16. 12. 5) describes how the Germanic king Chonodomarius had destroyed and sacked many cities and had been raiding Gaul without encountering any opposition since he had defeated Magnentius' Caesar, Decentius. In fact, Zosimus' first statement (3. 3) concerning Julian's activities in Gaul was that he found most of the armies destroyed and the barbarians crossing the Rhine unhindered. He then enlisted as many recruits into the legions and accepted as many volunteers as he could. Ammianus himself (16. 3. 1) wrote that while Julian was wintering (356-357) at Sens after his first successful battle season, one of his main concerns was to

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<sup>1</sup> Julian, *Ep. ad. Ath.*, 277 D; Zosimus, 3. 3; Libanius, who says that the number was 300 (*Or.* 18. 37) and less than 400 (*Or.* 12. 44), sees this as proof that one of Constantius' intentions was to send Julian to his death as Constantius presently had under his control an army that had once served three emperors (Constantine II, Constans and himself) and was unwilling to equip Julian with sufficient troops.

regroup the soldiers who had abandoned their usual posts and to return them to the war zones.

Julian needed to increase not only the military manpower in Gaul, but the agrarian manpower as well. Due to the turmoil caused by the Germans' raids, agriculture had become difficult, leaving the Gauls and the army short of supplies. Increasing the agrarian population and bringing regular supplies to Gaul were also important objectives of Julian's campaign. In order to accomplish these, Julian reintroduced the shipment of grain from Britain, settled Franks on depopulated Roman soil and secured the safety of Gaul so that the inhabitants could return and practice agriculture. The safety of Gaul was restored, first of all, by Julian's efforts to increase the numbers of the army. Although Ammianus does not specifically mention the recruitment of the pacified Germans as a part of Julian's strategy, it can be assumed that this was an important benefit of his many peace treaties with them<sup>2</sup>.

The need for a strong army was the greatest concern for Julian when he arrived in Gaul. As discussed in the previous chapter, the protection of all the frontiers of the Empire was becoming more difficult as the threat of invasion and civil war grew. By the fourth century it became impossible to defend the *limes* of the Empire in the manner of the Principate, by stationing all the forces permanently along the frontiers. The adoption of a

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<sup>2</sup> This practice was not new. For example, Marcus Aurelius (161 - 180), when faced with a shortage of recruits, settled the conquered Marcomanni within the Empire as landowners under the obligation to supply recruits to the army (Dio lxi. 11. 4; SHA *Vita Marci* 22. 2).



'defence in depth' strategy meant that the number of *limitanei* or border troops was reduced, and there was instead a reliance upon mobile forces in times of crisis. This was often successful, but if there was a shortage of manpower, as there was in Gaul upon Julian's arrival, the frontiers would be poorly defended. Several factors, in addition to the extensive military needs of the Empire, contributed to the depletion of manpower that existed in Gaul during the 350's. The reluctance of Romans to join the army in the Late Empire must be considered. Traditionally, one of the major benefits of a career in the army was the granting of citizenship upon retirement. The enfranchisement by Caracalla in AD 212 of all free inhabitants in the Empire negated this important benefit<sup>3</sup>. It has also been suggested that there were problems of depopulation due to plague and continuous warfare<sup>4</sup>. However, it is possible to have a manpower shortage even with a stable population<sup>5</sup>. It has been suggested that there was a manpower shortage from the end of the third century but that it was not caused by a decline in population, but by the increased demand for soldiers<sup>6</sup>. When the town walls in Gaul were built or rebuilt in the late third or early fourth centuries after the devastation of the raids in the 270's, they were equipped with walls which encompassed only a fraction of the former urban area. This may have been related to the needs of defence. The walled city became a refuge for the inhabitants

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<sup>3</sup> Salmon, 1958, p. 43 - 57.

<sup>4</sup> Boak, 1955. Moses Finley's review (1958) shows that Boak assumes depopulation but does not prove it.

<sup>5</sup> Boak, 1955, p. 1 - 2; Finley (1958, p. 159) agrees with this assertion.

<sup>6</sup> Jones, 1948.

of the entire area as much it was a living space for the inhabitants of the city itself. It has also been suggested that the smaller walls were related to the shrinkage of the population<sup>7</sup>, which would also reflect a reduced manpower on hand for the army<sup>8</sup>. Additionally, with the destruction of a number of Gallic cities in the 350's and the occupation of the farmlands by the Germans, the area immediately affected by the attacks would have lost a great proportion of its inhabitants, some to captivity and death, others to flight. The Germans also occupied the farmland surrounding the walled towns, creating a shortage of food supplies for the inhabitants. It is possible that many of them would have left the towns and moved west away from the barbarian threats. Also, the area just beyond the destroyed areas may have been deserted by the Gauls in order to leave a buffer zone between themselves and the Germans. In these conditions, the towns became isolated; both from the countryside and from each other. In addition, the roads were dangerous because of brigands, barbarians and marching Roman troops. Trade became difficult and the commercial and industrial classes became impoverished, which increased the general impoverishment of the cities and the need for people to move to more prosperous areas to survive.

The cities in Gaul along the Rhine upon Julian's arrival had become especially isolated due to the barbarian attacks. Normally, the Germanic invaders struck in small uncoordinated groups which were mainly interested in plunder. However, where the imperial military

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<sup>7</sup> Boak, 1955, p. 57 - 58.

<sup>8</sup> Grenier, 1959, p. 574.

presence was weak, the barbarians might establish rural settlements. This pattern was identified by Ammianus (16. 2. 12) when he writes that the barbarians had taken seven *civitates* and were living off their lands. This is supported by Julian (*Ep. ad Ath.* 278d-279a) and Libanius (*Or.* 12. 44 and *Or.* 18. 34 - 35) who refer to the Germans as attacking the cities (πόλεις) and cultivating their lands. Libanius also tells us that booty and people to be used as slaves were carried off by the Germans from destroyed cities and villages. The Germans were now farming Roman land and their own land was being farmed by captives from Roman territory. The inhabitants who had been protected by their walls were forced to use empty spaces inside the city walls for growing food. The defence of Gaul at this time had been neglected due to the revolt of Magnentius which ended in 353 and Silvanus' usurpation in 355. The weakened state of Gaul is demonstrated in the *Res Gestae*. Although Ammianus does not offer a discussion on the shortage of manpower available to Julian when he arrived in Gaul, he does display patterns in Julian's decisions that indicate a strategy to repopulate the cities and the countryside and to increase the size of his army.

The primary purpose of sending a Caesar to Gaul would have been to cause the dispersed troops and new recruits to gravitate towards such a powerful imperial presence. This suggests that Constantius had judged that there was sufficient manpower in Gaul but that a leader for the existing forces was needed<sup>9</sup>. Julian had ordered that the whole army

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<sup>9</sup> Constantius' demand for a large part of the Gallic troops in 360 after the Rhine frontier had been consolidated, reflects this idea. Ammianus says the demand to move troops to the east was part of a plan to weaken Julian. However, Blockley (1989) shows that

should assemble at Rheims (Remi), where Ursicinus and Marcellus were in charge, and wait for him (16. 2. 8). This indicates that soon after his arrival in Gaul, the scattered troops had come together to exert Roman power under the new Caesar. Julian's imperial prestige seems to have had an influence on the Gauls as well. Libanius (*Or.* 18. 43 - 44) certainly attributes aggressive acts by the residents of Gaul against the barbarians to Julian's newly arrived presence. Ammianus (15. 8. 21) also shows the effect that Julian's presence had on the province when he describes the joyous reception Julian received upon his arrival at Vienne (Vienna). The residents there felt that Julian's presence would save them from their desperate situation. The hope must have been that a strong imperial army would secure the province, as the presence of Constantine had earlier in the century.

Ammianus (15. 8. 19) tells us that while Julian was still in Turin in the winter of 355, he heard about the destruction of Cologne (Colonia Agrippina) by the barbarians<sup>10</sup>.

Apparently, Julian took this as a bad omen and could be heard mumbling that now he would die with a heavier work load (15. 8. 20). This may be Ammianus' manner of introducing his audience to the state of Gaul and to Julian's heavy labours, for which he expected to be rewarded with his own execution. The disastrous fall of Cologne can be

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Constantius had a need for more troops for his upcoming Persian campaign. Also, Ammianus (15. 5. 2) seems to have implied Silvanus' task as the commander of the army in Gaul was to reorganize the existing troops as he was also sent without an additional army..

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Julian, *Ep. ad Ath.* 279 C.

linked with the assassination of Silvanus which had occurred in the previous year<sup>11</sup>. With the destruction of Cologne and other towns, Ammianus demonstrates the weakened condition of Gaul and the Gallic army. Ammianus states that barbarians were not capable of, or accustomed to, besieging walled cities<sup>12</sup>. The destruction of the cities in Gaul would indicate that they were insufficiently garrisoned and lacked the support of a mobile army. Few reliable details are known about the ways in which the Germans took walled cities or fortresses. The impression is that it was not done through sieges, but rather by surprise or treachery or through the incompetence or neglect of the defenders<sup>13</sup>. It can be presumed that the towns that had been taken by the Germans had been deserted, or partly deserted, by the inhabitants and left without effective defence. As mentioned above, when the Germans were occupying the countryside around the towns, food supplies became scarce, and so without help from the imperial armies many inhabitants would have been forced to leave. Zosimus (3. 1 and 3. 5) and Libanius (*Or.* 12. 48) give the number of towns destroyed as forty, while Julian (*Ep. ad. Ath.* 279 A) gives it as forty - five. Ammianus (16. 2. 12) names seven cities (*civitates*) that were being occupied by barbarians who were living on the surrounding lands. He also lists cities and fortresses whose walls had been destroyed by Germanic invasions. Savernes (*Tres Tabernae*) had recently been destroyed in an attack (16. 11. 11). In Lower Germany, three forts were repaired on the river Maas

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<sup>11</sup> Whittaker, p. 163, 1994.

<sup>12</sup> 16. 4. 2; 17. 6. 1; 29. 6. 12; 30. 3. 3; For more on German sieges see Johnson, 1983, p. 78 - 79 and Thompson, 1965, p. 130 f.

<sup>13</sup> Thompson, 1965, p. 136 - 137.

(Mosa) (17. 9. 1). In 359, Julian seized seven cities and repaired their walls (18. 2. 4). In addition, granaries had been destroyed in the attacks and needed to be restored (18. 2. 3). Ammianus also refers to the region of Cologne as having no city or stronghold in sight, except for one at Remagen (Rigomagus) and one near Cologne itself. This is reflected in Julian's comment concerning the devastation of Gaul (*Ep. ad Ath.* 279 A - B). He writes that the barbarians controlled the lands on the Roman side of the Rhine that extended from its sources to the Ocean and that some had settled as far as 300 stades (55 km) from the banks of the Rhine. Furthermore, a district three times as wide had been left a desert by the raids.

The shortage of defenders is reflected in Ammianus' portrayal of two cities which were being attacked by the Germans. The first took place while Julian was wintering in Vienne in 356 and he learned that the ancient walls of Autun (Augustudunum) were being assailed (16. 2. 1). Ammianus tells us that the garrison there was paralysed and that the defence of the city was left to the veterans who often came together, as we are told, when the situation became desperate. He does not explicitly state the reason for the inability of the garrison to defend the city, but it can be assumed that the number of men was insufficient to ward off the German threat, and that reinforcements were not available. Not only was the garrison weak, but there was no mobile force to support it. In Libanius' description of this episode he writes that the inhabitants of the city charged with aging steps (*Or.* 18. 43 - 44) and that, contrary to the normal practice, the young men attacked the barbarians from the other side and drove them away. Libanius says that this action was inspired by the

nearby presence of Julian, although he was not involved. Here, he demonstrates that both veterans and local young men defended the city when the army was not available. Although the practice of settling veterans around the Empire to help with its defence was a long-standing tradition, Libanius informs us that the practice of the civilians arming themselves was a new occurrence. That this action was inspired by Julian's presence may be true to the extent that the people of Autun expected the Germanic pressures to become more manageable with an imperial army nearby, attacking any barbarians that they encountered in the area<sup>14</sup>. However, it does demonstrate the need for alternative action by the Gallic citizens who had been left undefended by Rome.

Ammianus also demonstrates the desperate situation of Troyes (Tricasae) that Julian encountered shortly after leaving Autun (16. 2. 6 - 7). Moving from Auxerre (Autosudorum) to Troyes, Julian was attacked by bands of Germans. This area had already been overrun by barbarians who had previously encountered no opposition. Ammianus' account supports Julian's description of the widespread loss of Gallic territories as these cities are more than 200 km from the banks of the Rhine. The townspeople only opened the gates to Julian and his army after a delay because they were surprised by his appearance and feared that while the gates were opened the barbarians might squeeze through. The insecurity of Troyes is demonstrated here. The inhabitants did not have the reinforcements to remove the Germans from the surrounding area but had to imprison themselves inside the walls of the town. This concurs with Libanius'

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<sup>14</sup> Ammianus (16. 2. 2) states that this was the action taken by the army at that time.

statement that the inhabitants of cities had to become self-sufficient using the soil within their own walls.

We know from Ammianus that Julian, in order to strengthen the Gallic armed forces, had ordered that the whole army should assemble at Reims and wait for his arrival (16. 2. 8). Regathering the dispersed soldiers into a united and organized force was an obvious step, but something had to be done about the lack of men. There is no doubt that Julian recruited troops once he arrived in Gaul. Previously, Ammianus had stated that Julian had arrived at Autun after *satis omnibus comparatis* - all was sufficiently prepared (16. 2. 2), signifying that he had arranged the supplies and the soldiers. This statement probably indicates that Julian had increased his original number of troops from the 360 men that Constantius had given him before he relieved the siege of Autun. Certainly, the campaign required more manpower. However, he had not yet joined up with the troops at Reims. This connects with Zosimus' statement that he began to accept volunteers after his initial assessment of the province. The details are missing from the *Res Gestae*, yet it is likely that Julian recruited Gauls into his army or he found some soldiers from the previous army to join him before he left for Autun. This practice of recruitment, although not explicitly stated by Ammianus (except for the case of Charietto, to be discussed below), continued throughout the rest of Julian's campaign in Gaul.

Throughout Ammianus' work, Julian repeatedly grants peace to various tribes on both sides of the Rhine (17. 1. 12 - 13; 8. 4; 5; 10. 4; 7 - 9; 18. 2. 19; 20. 10. 2; 21. 4. 8).



Ammianus tells us that some of these peace treaties included the provision of grain, building supplies and a degree of protection. Julian also demanded that prisoners be returned to Gaul. However, Ammianus does not discuss the advantages that the treaties offered to Julian's efforts to increase manpower, both military and agrarian. Although it is clear that the peaceful tribes were a great source of recruits, Ammianus does not directly mention their use as such. His work does confirm that there was a large-scale recruitment among the Germans when he later writes that Constantius commanded Julian to send his auxiliaries to the East. Ammianus (20. 4. 4) says that Julian was concerned about the men who had come over from their side of the Rhine to fight for him because he had promised them that they would never be sent beyond the Alps. He feared that the barbarians would no longer volunteer to join the Roman army if they heard of this broken promise. We hear of special conditions given to Germanic soldiers in order to raise the number of recruits, as they did not want to leave their families and tribes unguarded. The prisoners sent back to Gaul from the German tribes also provided an additional source of recruitment. These potential recruits were clearly important to Julian because he could only strengthen the army with the recruits available to him in the region.

The conditions of these treaties helped replenish agrarian resources which were also depleted by unstable and destructive conditions. The supply of grain from the Germans compensated somewhat (as a short term-solution) for the lack of crops in the Gallic Rhineland and from the interior of Gaul. As we learn from various sources, the barbarians had either taken over the Gauls' farmland or they had unleashed such destruction that no

one had dared return to the fields. In addition to this, there was the loss of the agrarian workers who were captured in raids and were now tilling fields in Germany. There was no stored grain available from the area. Julian had to resort to bringing in grain from Britain and Aquitania or to capturing it from the Germans. The grain supply from Britain had been cut off because the situation with the barbarians along the banks of the Lower Rhine was too unstable. By taking grain from the German tribes, he increased the supply to the granaries without needing to rely on plundering the enemy's fields or importing grain from a distance, which could mean a delayed start to the battle season. The peace also allowed German and Gallic agriculture and, hence, a supply of grain to be maintained. It was not until after Julian defeated the Salii and the Chamavi in 358, who lived at the mouth of the Rhine, that ships could safely import grain from Britain once again.

Ammianus (17. 8) describes these successful campaigns, and although he does show that there was a lack of grain supplies, he does not directly give the grain route as a reason for them. Julian (*Ep. ad Ath.* 280 A - C) does attribute his war against the Salii and Chamavi to the need to transport of grain from Britain. Eunapius (*Exc. de Leg. Gent.* 1) writes that peace with the Chamavi was important to Julian because, without their cooperation, he could not import grain from Britain to the Roman garrisons. Zosimus (3. 5) says that because so many fields were untilled due to the invasions, Julian built ships to bring food from Britain. This passage should be connected with the war against the Chamavi<sup>15</sup>.

We learn from Ammianus (17. 8. 1) that Julian usually had to wait until July to start the

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<sup>15</sup> Blockley, 1983, page 132, note 32.

battle season because that was when the grain supplies arrived from Aquitania. Julian had to find sources of grain to feed his army as well as the released captives who would, to a diminished degree, repopulate Gaul. He also required that grain be on hand so that he could begin a campaign at a time that was strategically important, rather than at a time dictated by the crop availability. Julian decided to begin the battle season before the grain arrived in 358 and went north from Paris where he wanted to surprise the barbarians, taking with him only a limited supply of grain. Ammianus (17. 9. 2 ff.) informs us that Julian's plan was to acquire grain from the harvest of the Chamavi, but the soldiers found that the crops were not yet ripe and nearly mutinied. Although Ammianus does not mention if they found a source of food or not, in the next chapter he describes the Romans crossing the Rhine and making peace with the Alamannic king Suomarius (17. 10. 4). On this occasion, the first in Ammianus, the Germans were obliged to supply the Roman soldiers with food on general terms. Previously (17. 1. 13) the Germans had only agreed to supply the repaired fortress of Trajan on their side of the Rhine with grain. With the grain route from Britain open and a new source of grain from the Germans, Julian was able to compensate for the lack of crops from Gaul.

In Ammianus' description of Julian's strategy in Gaul, a policy of re-establishing the agrarian force can be discerned. His repeated demand that prisoners taken from Gaul be returned (17. 10. 4; 10. 7 - 8; 18. 2. 19; possibly 20. 10. 2) indicates a policy of repopulating not only the cities but the fields that had been left empty after the barbarian attacks and the fields that had, until their recent expulsion, been occupied by the Germans.

Julian's eagerness to have all the Gallic prisoners returned is portrayed in other sources. According to Zosimus (3. 4. 4) Julian, while in the territory of the king Hortarius, would not even discuss peace with a tribe unless they agreed to return all the prisoners taken in previous raids<sup>16</sup>. In order to insure that some of the prisoners were not secretly kept by the Germans, he had all the refugees from each destroyed city and village help the imperial secretaries make a list by naming everyone they knew who had been taken prisoner. When many on the list had not been returned as agreed upon, the secretaries demanded the return of the rest of them by name. This amazed the barbarians, who were then obligated to return them. Libanius (*Or.* 18. 77 - 78) also recalls the return of the prisoners by Hortarius and mentioned that the prisoners who were not returned were proven to be dead. He refers to the return of prisoners several times (*Or.* 12. 50; *Or.* 17. 14; *Or.* 18. 81; 89). Eunapius (*Exc. de Leg. Gent.* 2) writes about Julian's demand for prisoners from the kings represented by Vadomarius in 359<sup>17</sup>. He indicates that the number of captives was 3,000. Julian himself (*Ep. ad Ath.* 280 C) writes that after three invasions across the Rhine he recovered 1,000 captives. If Eunapius' figure is correct, then Julian recovered only a small portion of the captives, especially as he had demanded the return of captives from other tribes as well<sup>18</sup>. However, both Eunapius and Julian indicate the importance given to the retrieval of captives. In the Later Empire the taking and retrieval of captives

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<sup>16</sup> This is Zosimus' narrative of what is related in Ammianus (17. 10) when Julian crossed the Rhine into the territory of Hortarius (Ridley, 1982, note 23, p. 171).

<sup>17</sup> This situation corresponds to Ammianus 18. 2. 8 - 19 (Blockley, 1983, note 37, p. 132 - 133).

<sup>18</sup> Blockley, 1983, note 37, p. 132 - 133.

was of extreme political importance because of the shortage of manpower. Control of the enemy's manpower became significant because it was a necessary and scarce military resource. To take or to retrieve captives signalled a victory over the enemy and improved the chances for future victories. In addition, captives were an important element of war to the Romans, as is shown by their depiction in the traditional iconography of Victory. Even if the number of returned captives was small, the population of the Gallic Rhineland would have increased because of the improved conditions. No doubt the secure conditions in Gaul would attract refugees to return to the areas that were left depopulated.

The peace treaty that Julian made with the Salian Franks in 358 differed from the others in that he permitted them to live on Roman soil. According to Ammianus (17. 8. 3 - 4), the Salii had moved to Toxandria, in the northern, Roman, part of the Rhineland. After defeating them in battle, Julian allowed them to remain where they were. The motives for this decision correspond to other peace settlements that Julian had made with German tribes. By settling the Salian Franks in the most depopulated and least controlled part of Gaul, he returned a degree of Roman influence to the area. The farmlands would be in use, and no doubt exactions would be taken by the government. The settlement would also help to ensure that the Salii would not interfere with the grain boats from Britain. Julian now had an additional source of recruits<sup>19</sup>, and the Salii would block other Germans from crossing into this previously overrun area. Libanius (*Or.* 18. 75) describes this

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<sup>19</sup> Zosimus refers to Salian recruits working with Charietto at crushing raiding bands of barbarians (3. 7).

episode and says that Julian employed barbarians against barbarians. Zosimus (3. 6) gives a confused description, but does indicate that a peace treaty was made with the Salian Franks in the same general area. Julian (*Ep. ad Ath.* 280 B) also mentions that he received part of the Salian tribe under his control. Although the Franks first appeared in the second half of the third century and, throughout the fourth century, caused frequent trouble in the Empire, they also gave it loyal generals and soldiers. They were the first barbarians to be absorbed into the Roman armies, often in high office. The Franks who settled in Gaul would ultimately be incorporated into the Empire and offered much by way of recruits to the army as well as agrarian workers. When Julian allowed them to do this he was furthering his plans to rebuild Gaul and to secure the frontier.

Ammianus (17. 10. 5) also demonstrates a more unusual and specialized use of barbarian manpower. He describes Julian ordering Charietto, whom he calls a man of great bravery, to go out and capture a guide from the Alamanni. Ammianus' only mention of Charietto in Gaul has him carrying out a specific, small-scale operation. Other ancient sources offer additional information concerning Charietto and his specialized skills that Julian employed. About Charietto, Zosimus (3. 7) writes that he was a barbarian plunderer who decided to live in Roman Gaul and, in the time before Julian became Caesar, took it upon himself to defend the towns by sneaking into the forests at night and decapitating the sleeping Germans. Other robbers joined up with him. Charietto went to the Caesar and revealed to him the little known reasons why Julian's army could not easily defeat the barbarians during their nocturnal and secret raids. This was because the barbarians raided in small

and scattered bands by night and during the day hid in the dense forests. Zosimus informs us that Julian was forced to use the aid of the robber bands, to which he added some *Salii*, along with his army to defeat the raiders. The experts, as he calls them, worked in conjunction with the army. Charietto and his band would attack at night while during the day the soldiers would catch those who had escaped during the night. Eunapius also writes about the band of fighters that grew under Charietto's leadership (*Exc. de Sent.* 10). He says that Charietto stopped the band members from brigandage (*Suda* A 2395). This reference would indicate that Charietto disciplined the robbers, transforming them into an organized force before allying themselves with Julian<sup>20</sup>. Libanius (*Or.* 18. 104) says that Charietto's band gave up brigandage because of Julian and added that they had once been supporters of Magnentius who became robbers after his defeat. Ammianus' brief mention of Charietto does not draw a full picture of his role. Additional details have been found in other sources. Although the *Res Gestae* concentrates on the deeds of men, Ammianus may not have found the details of Charietto's involvement suitable for commentary. Perhaps it took away from Julian's greatness if he were overshadowed by another heroic figure, especially if he were a barbarian and a brigand. Later, Charietto is referred to by Ammianus as the commanding general of both Germanies in 365/6 (27. 1. 1).

When it came to the men whom Julian had already recruited, a policy of preservation and caution can be perceived. Ammianus (16. 12. 37 - 41) recounts that during the battle of

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<sup>20</sup> Blockley, 1983, note 30, pg. 130.

Strasbourg, the cavalry, which was holding the right wing, broke ranks and fled. They did not get far though, because the infantry stood their ground and blocked them. When Julian saw this and approached them, they were struck with fear and returned to the battle. Zosimus' version (3. 3. 4 - 5) of this episode adds that rather than giving them the punishment defined by law, he had them dressed up in women's clothing and paraded around the camp, as this was considered a fate worse than death. Libanius includes this episode in his work (*Or.* 18. 58 - 59, 66). Zosimus also notes that this was a troop of six hundred horse whose experience and strength Julian relied upon. From that statement it is clear that Julian would put himself at a disadvantage if he were to lose a large number of well-trained horsemen. Many of his recruits were inexperienced, especially as cavalry, because they were only recently recruited from barbarian tribes. Even the more experienced foot-soldier would need extensive training to become a competent cavalry member.

Julian can also be seen preserving his peace treaties with the Alamanni. Ammianus (18. 2. 7) writes that in 359 it was suggested that the Roman army cross the river at Mainz in order to attack the barbarians in their own territory. Julian disagreed with this. He did not want to enter into territories belonging to tribes with whom he had made peace because the rudeness of the soldiers could cause the end of the treaties<sup>21</sup>. Julian did not

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. Eunapius (*Exc. de Sent.* 8) seems to describe a speech given by Julian after the pacification of the Salian Franks and just before passing through their territory in order to attack the Chamavi (Blockley, 1983, p. 131, n. 26). He tells the soldiers not to harm the Sali nor to plunder their territory because the land of those who submitted to the Romans should be treated as their own.



want to jeopardize the benefits that these treaties offered him. However, it seems that it did become necessary to cross into allied territory after the Alamanni felt threatened by the Roman army at Mainz and, as a united group, hastened to Suomarius' canton opposite to bar the crossing (18. 2. 8). Julian did not want to build a bridge at this place on the Rhine because it was too dangerous and he was still hesitant to disturb an ally's territory (18. 2. 9). Presumably, Julian was even more hesitant to engage in battle in allied territory than he was to have the army pass through it because a battle would likely cause more damage than a marching army. Perhaps to lessen the damage, both to an ally's territory and to his soldiers, the Romans crossed the Rhine into the territory of Julian's other ally Hortarius instead. The army had sailed silently downstream in the night and was able to cross into his territory without opposition (18. 2. 12). There are additional possible reasons that Julian crossed into Hortarius' territory and not Suomarius' which can be discerned from Ammianus' text. The treaties that Julian had made with Hortarius and Suomarius in the previous year were different from one another. Suomarius' treaty included the return of captives and the supply of grain to the army when it was needed (17. 10. 4). However, the lands of Hortarius had been badly damaged by the army and he was not able to provide grain to the army as part of his peace agreement (17. 10. 5 - 9). He was obligated to supply timber to the Romans in order that the cities should be rebuilt (17. 10. 9). Ammianus indicates that this obligation had been fulfilled previously this year (359) when the fortifications on the Lower Rhine were repaired (18. 2. 6). He also adds (18. 2. 14) that the army crossed through his territory without causing any damage, indicating that there was still some concern about disrupting Hortarius' territory and breaking the peace.

Julian was clearly reluctant to break his peace with Suomarius and it was dangerous for the army to cross the river at a place opposite which there was a united force of Germans. Although concern was also shown for maintaining peace with Hortarius, his lands were not providing grain to the Roman army as were the lands of Suomarius. There was no risk to the grain supply should the unruly soldiers plunder the damaged fields. In addition, Julian had already received the timber necessary for the fortifications and had completed the work. Julian had less to lose if he risked taking the army into Hortarius' territory than into Suomarius'. While in Hortarius' territory, it also happened that the Romans encountered German kings leaving a dinner party given by Hortarius, and though they were unable to kill the noble guests who escaped on horseback, they did take the time to slaughter the slaves and servants who did not escape (18. 2. 13). It was understood by the Romans that Hortarius did not intend any hostility towards them with this gathering, but that he needed to retain peaceful relations with his neighbours and allies (18. 2. 3) and so this did not affect his peaceful relations with the Romans. However, Ammianus' previous statement that the Romans crossed through Hortarius' territory without causing any damage seems not entirely accurate because they did ruin his guests' night out in a rather violent manner.

Although Julian had been sent to Gaul with only a small *comitatus* and had to make do with the soldiers scattered around Gaul and the men whom he could recruit as his army, on one occasion Constantius sent him reinforcements. As told by Ammianus (16. 11. 2ff.), Barbatio, the commander of the infantry, was sent to Augst (Augusta Rauricorum) in

357 by the emperor with 25,000<sup>22</sup> soldiers. The Alamanni had been ranging even farther into Gaul than usual and the plan was that the two bodies of soldiers would trap them in a pincer-movement. This move was unsuccessful (the details will be discussed in the next chapter) but the incident may indicate that for large-scale expeditions Julian required more than the forces available to him. Libanius (*Or.* 18. 49 - 50) writes that Constantius had planned a large expedition on the right side of the Rhine but that he thought that Julian's army was too small for it. It would appear that the pincer movement was a prelude to the crossing. The combined armies would crush the barbarians who were raiding in Gaul. Once this was complete, they would be leaving no enemies at their back in an undefended Gaul. In addition to this, they would not be attacked from behind while campaigning in Germany. Although Julian had assembled a large enough force to create some order in Gaul, he normally only opposed smaller bands of Germans, as they were rarely organized in large groups<sup>23</sup>. For the large-scale invasions, reinforcements appear to have been needed. In sum, Julian was only able to operate piecemeal, while Constantius, with vaster resources, could organise a coordinated sweep.

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<sup>22</sup> Libanius puts this number at 30,000 (*Or.* 18. 49).

<sup>23</sup> Ammianus refers to unorganized groups of barbarians in Gaul: 16. 2. 2, *per diversa palantes barbaros*; 7, *diffusae multitudinis barbarae*; 11. 3, *vagantesque fusius*; 12. 4; 21. 3. 1; Libanius, *Or.* 13. 24; all references are from Thompson, 1965, note 3, p. 145. He also added that in 358 Julian expected the Alamanni to begin the campaign in one compact army (Ammianus 17. 8. 1, *Alamannos nondum in unum coactos*) but says it is doubtless that they would have divided up within a few days. On p. 147, Thompson writes that the Romans wanted to attack the Alamanni immediately at Strasbourg rather than taking a rest because the enemy was before them in a group at that moment. The troops might mutiny if the barbarians were able to disperse again, forcing the Romans to round up many elusive parties (Ammianus 16.12.13 f.).

A large-scale attack on the Romans was planned in 357 by seven kings of the Alamanni (16. 12. 1 ff.). They approached the Romans at Strasbourg (Argentoratum), feeling confident because they had heard that Julian only had 13,000 followers. Ammianus tells us that Julian was anxious and worried because Barbatio was gone and he was left "*cum paucis (licet fortibus)*" ("with a few men (although brave)") (16. 12. 6). Here, the historian displays the insecurities he perceived Julian must have felt when left only with his Gallic army after Barbatio and his army had been chased (or so Ammianus says) back to Augst by a group of Alamanni. He explains that the soldiers had a false sense of confidence prior to the battle of Strasbourg (16. 12. 15 - 17). They remembered how during their previous campaigns against the Germans, the enemy had moved out of their way and had asked for peace. But, they were unaware that the situation had changed. Previously, there had been other forces working against the Germans that had weakened them and made them more easily defeated by Julian. Constantius had been pressuring them in Raetia and they had been undergoing civil strife with their neighbours. With Julian coming at them from Gaul they were threatened from three sides. Ammianus is indicating that the successes of the previous year were in part due to factors aside from Julian's military success. He is also showing us the precarious state that Julian was in at this time because he only had his brave, but small army to defeat the Alamanni, with no supplemental help.

Ammianus, who is a dramatic and rhetorical writer, may have been using this information not to highlight how Julian was left with an insufficient number of troops to deal with a

large-scale invasion, but to illustrate how the great general Julian won the battle with the odds stacked so high against him. This would also emphasise the difference between Julian and his opponent Barbatio, who had been defeated by the Alamanni and was wintering in Augst<sup>24</sup>. The number of Alamanni according to Ammianus at Strasbourg was 35,000, almost three times the number of the Romans. This approximate number is supported by Libanius (*Or.* 18. 54), who used Julian's report as a source and gives the number at 30,000<sup>25</sup>. The accuracy of the number of barbarians given by Ammianus has been disputed. He may have exaggerated the number in order to glorify Julian and because a battle of such scale had the elements needed for an epic battle scene worthy of a dramatic history<sup>26</sup>. Although no one took the time to count the German attackers, it may have been an accurate impression that the Alamanni outnumbered the Romans by two to three times. This number has been accepted by many modern scholars<sup>27</sup>. Others have thought that the number of Alamanni was smaller than that, even as small as 6,000 -

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<sup>24</sup> Ammianus (16. 11. 14 - 15) writes that Barbatio had settled his soldiers as if he had won the campaign and returned to Constantius' court to make false accusations against Julian.

<sup>25</sup> (E.L.F. No. 25) from A. F. Norman's translation of Libanius, note c, pg. 314 - 315. Libanius (18. 54 - 55) differs here from Ammianus' account in which the Alamanni had already crossed the Rhine when he reached them. Libanius says that the Alamanni were still crossing when Julian arrived and that he allowed 30,000 to cross but blocked their reinforcements. Julian did not want to fight only a small number of them, but neither did he want to be overwhelmed.

<sup>26</sup> Thompson (1947, p. 73) writes that Ammianus' account of the battle of Strasbourg uses every device of rhetoric available to him to glorify Julian's victory and to make the battle the centre-piece of his military history.

<sup>27</sup> E.g., Browning, 1975, p. 85; Bidez, 1965, p. 153. Austin (1973, p. 333 - 335) estimates that there were 20,000 - 25,000 barbarians at the battle.

10,000<sup>28</sup>. Whether Julian was outnumbered or not, the Alamanni had assembled for a large-scale battle at Strasbourg and were in a much larger group than usual. Ammianus, although perhaps exaggerating that number, did express a concern over the size of Julian's Gallic army for such a battle. In a later part of his work he referred to a band of only 600<sup>29</sup> Franks as *validissimos cuneos* (very strong companies) (17. 2. 1). If 600 warriors were considered a large group, then the number at Strasbourg would have been very intimidating.

Despite the lack of manpower in the Gallic army, it was the most powerful force offered by the Roman Empire since the revolts of Magnentius and more recently Silvanus. Prior to Julian's arrival, the Germans had free access to raid in Gaul as there was little opposing force, if any. An imperial figure was sent to Gaul in order to create a strong leader for the army and to strengthen the province. Although Julian's army was expected to exert the power of the central empire, Julian was not given a strong army by his senior emperor. It is clear from the *Res Gestae* and other ancient sources that Julian was sent to Gaul without a new imperial army (aside from the *comitatus*) to replace the old one. He was instead required to reorganize the dismembered army and to enlarge it with recruits. Because Gaul had been so devastated there was a shortage of manpower and so Julian accepted many of his recruits from defeated Germanic tribes. The precarious state of Gaul

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<sup>28</sup> Rosen, 1970, p. 113; Delbrück, 1990, vol. II, p. 262 and 267 - 268; Nischer, 1927, p. 399, Elliot, 1983, p. 80 - 81.

<sup>29</sup> Libanius writes that there were 1000 Franks (*Or.* 18. 20).

had also created a shortage of agrarian workers. The lack of grain during Julian's Gallic campaign has been illustrated by Ammianus and several other authors. Ammianus gives us details that indicate that Julian made attempts to increase the supply, by clearing the route from Britain and by returning agrarian workers to Gaul and making it safe for them. Food was a necessary resource and the lack of it could lead to mutiny or starvation, as nearly happened to Julian in 358. On the other hand, if the army had to wait upon supplies, it would lose its strategic advantage. A steady supply of grain would increase the stability and strength of the army, which in its turn would restore the peace in Gaul.

Once Julian had established an army in Gaul, it was not immediately perceived by the barbarians as strong enough to guard the entire frontier. Ammianus demonstrates that the Franks felt that they could safely raid in Lower Germany in the winter of 357-8, in districts unprotected by garrisons, because they thought that Julian was away fighting the Alamanni (17. 2. 1). As soon as the Franks were confronted by Julian's army they became fearful and protected themselves in two strongholds the best that they could. It was not possible for Julian to guard the entire frontier with his army alone, nor was it necessary. He began to refortify the frontier and deploy garrisons at strategic points. Although it may be that Julian's army was not large enough for large-scale engagements with the enemy, most of the engagements with the Germans were on a small scale. With the garrisons established along the frontier, his army could concentrate in certain areas of Gaul without leaving other areas vulnerable. This was how Julian, with a small but organized army, could stop the marauding bands of Germans from raiding Gaul and impose order in

a devastated region. In order for Gaul to remain secure and well-defended, it required a sufficient amount of attention from Roman administrators and a coordinated army. The fortifications needed to be strong and given decent garrisons. Julian did accomplish these things in Gaul, but in 361 he turned his attention and manpower away from Gaul. Julian took most of the *comitatenses* from Gaul first to fight Constantius and then the Persians. As has happened in the past, the defences were left weak and Gaul later suffered from attacks (Ammianus 26. 5. 7; 27. 1. 1). Order would not be restored until another emperor, Valentinian, returned to the region and strengthened it once again.



### Chapter Three: Julian's Strategy to Free Gaul from the German Threat

Ammianus' account of Julian's campaign in Gaul follows the movements of the Gallic army under the Caesar. He often writes of the motivations behind the campaigns and demonstrates that he had a knowledge of the military situations that he describes.

Ammianus does not offer an analytic and detailed summary of the overall strategy used by the Romans to regain control of the Rhineland and to maintain that control. Nor, by his own admission, does he include every minor encounter with the enemy but only mentions engagements which he feels were notable (27. 2. 11). Ammianus is concerned with the *res gestae* (the deeds of men). This chapter will look at the coherence of Julian's strategy, as told by Ammianus. The author of this history was an admirer of Julian and this bias had an influence on his work. On occasion Ammianus portrays Julian as the heroic warrior who followed his own impulses. He attributes Julian's successes in Gaul to his genius<sup>1</sup> rather than explaining the planning and circumstances behind them. This makes it more difficult to connect Julian's decisions to an overall strategy. Despite this, the details found in the *Res Gestae* make it possible to understand the movements of the army in the context of their immediate objectives. However, long-term strategies are not always made entirely clear and additional information has to be taken into account. Although each individual episode can appear to be without a coherent connection to any general strategy, a progression of movements can be discerned. Each battle season concentrates on areas or

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<sup>1</sup> However, the disastrous Persian campaign of 363 failed due to the impulsiveness and rashness of the Emperor Julian; cf. Gregory Nazianzen, *Or.* 5. 1 - 15.

aspects of an overall plan. But it can also be seen that at certain points the engagements are not dictated by strategic planning but by immediate problems and new situations.

From the Caesar's arrival in Gaul until the end of the campaign, the encounters with the barbarians on Roman soil reduced in number as the Roman presence established itself. The movements of the army towards the goal of eliminating the Germans from the left side of the Rhine are accurately described by Ammianus. Starting in 356 from his winter headquarters in Vienne in the southern part of Gaul, far from the lands taken over by the Germans, Julian moved north through Autun, Auxerre and Troyes to Rheims. He initiated his campaign in a region where the barbarians had not taken possession of the lands nor destroyed the cities, but were threatening the area<sup>2</sup>. When the threat had been eliminated, the army marched to the Upper Rhine and reoccupied cities there. In the next years, efforts were made to regain the territories just west of the Rhine that had been occupied by the barbarians, including the combined effort of Barbatio's and Julian's armies on the Upper Rhine in 357, and later wars on the Lower Rhine. Wars in the territory east of the Rhine were instigated to weaken the Germans, to re-establish Roman dominance and to acquire necessary items from pacified tribes, i.e. recruits, agrarian workers and building materials. In addition, treaties were made to reestablish the important grain route from Britain. Julian also repaired damaged forts along the Rhine which would strengthen and maintain the defence system. After the campaigns of 360, Julian marched down the length of the Rhine, surveying and improving the strength of the defences which had been

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<sup>2</sup> Crump, 1975, p. 37.

restored during the previous years' campaigns. Julian, thinking or hoping that the newly restored defence system would maintain Roman dominance in the area, then turned his attention towards a new opponent, Constantius.

Julian began his Gallic campaign in 356 from Vienne. Ammianus tells us that while there, Julian heard that the old, decaying walls of Autun were being attacked by barbarians and that they were being defended by veterans because the garrison there was paralysed (16. 2. 1). It would appear that the siege of Autun dictated the initial movements of the Gallic campaign. Cities were the centres of Roman administration and control; to lose a centre like Autun would mean that the province would become more isolated from the Empire and weaker against the Germans. Ammianus writes that by the end of June Julian and his army had arrived at Autun with the intention of attacking barbarians whenever they had the chance (16. 2. 2). It seems likely that Julian and his army arrived in the vicinity of Autun and began to attack individual groups of Alamanni who were swarming the area. Libanius (*Or.* 18. 44) stated that it was the young men of the town and the veterans who relieved the assault of Autun and that they did not see Julian, but knew that he was nearby. Ammianus does not claim that Julian actually saved Autun, but he leaves out the details concerning the actions of the young men of Autun. Ammianus' work concentrates on the activity of Julian, which in this instance was the expulsion of the roving barbarians from the area stretching from Autun to Reims (16. 2. 2-8). Details of the actions of others were not necessary. From Autun, Julian and his chosen troops made their way along the same road used by Silvanus to reach Auxerre. Although not reported by Ammianus, it is likely

that they encountered the enemy as they passed through forests which, he wrote, made the roads more dangerous (16. 2. 4). Also, Ammianus' concern that the cuirassiers and the crossbowmen alone were not sufficient protection for a general indicates that he perceived a real threat (16. 2. 5). Between Auxerre and Troyes we are told that the Romans were attacked repeatedly by roving Germans (16. 2. 6-7). Julian feared that they might group together in a large force, but as Ammianus does not indicate that this occurred, it can be assumed that they remained in small raiding groups. The examples of Germans coming together in large groups are few at this time. Had it happened, Ammianus would not have considered this irrelevant and he would not have omitted it from his history. The small marauding groups did not offer the dramatic elements that were appropriate for his rhetorical history, but he would not have ignored large engagements with the enemy, especially if it gave him occasion to laud Julian.

The people remaining in the city of Troyes itself were fearful of the Germans in the surrounding area. They hesitated to open their gates to the Romans in case Germans came through them (16. 2. 7). From Troyes Julian made his way north to Reims.

Ammianus does not relate any problems with the enemy during this march. This can be tied to the fact already noted by Ammianus that the army that remained in Gaul had been assembled at Reims (16. 2. 8). The area around this city would have been cleared of German raiders by the army there, while other groups upon hearing of the united army would have left for less protected places, as this is where they had the most success. The troops with the Caesar would have cleared the area around Troyes, leaving the last stage

of the march unthreatened. From Reims the decision was made to attack the Alamanni from Dieuse (Decem Pagi) (16. 2. 9). Dieuse is on the road that passes from Reims to a cross-roads at Metz (Divodurum) and continues through Dieuse until it reaches Brumath (Brotomagum) about 30 km away. Ammianus (16. 2. 10) tells us that the Alamanni made an attack on the legions at the rear of the army<sup>3</sup>. Through a fog, the enemy went by way of a cross-road and attacked them from behind. It is likely that they travelled on a road that runs from Mainz to Metz or another road that connects from Worms to the cross-roads at Metz<sup>4</sup> whence they followed the Romans as they marched east. The army was saved by allies who heard their cries for help. Ammianus, through the addition of this episode in his narration, informs his audience that this area, too, was dangerous with barbarians.

Julian heard that the *civitates* of Strasbourg (Argentoratum), Brumath (Brotomagum), Rheinzabern (Tabernae), Seltz (Saliso), Speyer (Nemetae), Worms (Vangiones) and Mainz (Moguntiacum) were being held by the Germans. Ammianus specifically says that they avoided the *oppida* or towns but that they were living off the surrounding lands (16. 2. 12). Since the *civitates* included the area that was controlled by the town as well as the town itself, Ammianus describes a situation where there were islands of Roman control in a sea of barbarians. The inhabitants in the towns survived within their walls, likely living

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<sup>3</sup> Libanius (*Or.* 18. 45) mentions this same episode.

<sup>4</sup> Map from Wightman (1985) where the road from Worms to Metz is considered conjectural. Also, von Elbe (1975, p. 352) refers to this road as passing by Saarbrücken.

off whatever they could grow there<sup>5</sup>. The barbarians were interested in land but not the control of the cities. Also, they were probably aware of how unsuccessful and costly a siege would be for them while the inhabitants were still present to defend it<sup>6</sup>. While Ammianus has properly described the predicament of these *civitates*, he has not made clear Julian's role in consolidating their position. However, details found in Ammianus and information offered by other contemporary writers make it possible to come to conclusions about the purpose of his presence in the Lower Rhineland. It was likely that he was cleaning the barbarians from the immediate vicinity of the cities, as the battle upon the army's approach on Brumath indicates (16. 2. 12 - 13). It is also appears that Julian's responsibilities included cheering up the inhabitants of the area with his imperial appearance and strengthening the defences of the towns.

Ammianus (15. 8. 12 - 14) leads the reader to believe that Julian was in charge of the campaign in 356<sup>7</sup>. There are passages from other contemporary writers which describe Julian's position in Gaul in 356 as subordinate to Constantius and to the generals<sup>8</sup>. Julian himself describes his role in Gaul in 356 as the "puppet" of Constantius. He writes (*Ep.*

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<sup>5</sup> Libanius (*Or.* 12. 44; 18. 35) describes this type of sustenance occurring in Gaul when Julian arrived there in cases where the *civitates'* farmlands were being occupied by Germans

<sup>6</sup> Ammianus (16. 4. 2) wrote that the barbarians stopped their siege on Sens after a month thinking that they had been foolish to try in the first place.

<sup>7</sup> Elliot, 1983, p. 76; Crump, 1975, p. 17 - 18.

<sup>8</sup> Libanius, *Or.* 18. 42; Zosimus, 3. 2. 2; Eunapius, *Suda* E 1771; Socrates, 3. 1; Sozomen, 5. 2.

*ad Ath.* 277 d - 278 a) that he was not sent to Gaul as the commander but that he was subordinate to the generals there. He also says that Constantius had both said and written that he was not sending the Gauls a king but someone who would convey to them his image and that Constantius had him carefully watched in case he should revolt. Ammianus puts Julian in the role of the commander of the army from the beginning of the campaign until the end. As the author of a *Res Gestae* and a great admirer of Julian, he would want to emphasize the Caesar's role in the successful battles of 356. If Ammianus portrayed Julian as almost powerless, he would have taken away from the image of the great general that he wanted to impart. Although Julian (*Ep. ad Ath.* 278 c - d) writes that in certain circumstances he did influence decisions, there is little doubt that he was not actually the true leader. Julian had, until recently, been a student in Athens. He had no military experience, and it would have been an unwise decision to put the power of a provincial army into his hands<sup>9</sup>. The more experienced generals, Ursicinus and Marcellus, would have taken the major strategic decisions. Ursicinus had replaced Silvanus until he himself was replaced by Marcellus, and although he seems to have kept his rank of *magister militum per Orientem* while in Gaul, he was instructed to remain there (15. 5. 21 - 22; 16. 2. 8). Ursicinus' position was undefined by Ammianus, but no doubt he was put into an advisory role<sup>10</sup>. The inaccuracy of Ammianus' description of Julian's position in 356 contributes to the uncertainty concerning the reasons for Julian's actions in the area that

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<sup>9</sup> Socrates (3. 1) and Sozomen (5. 2) say that because of Julian's youth, Constantius gave the authority to experienced generals.

<sup>10</sup> Crump, 1975, p. 27 - 8.

stretches from Strasbourg to Mainz. It appears from Ammianus' account that Julian was the commander of the Gallic army and busily engaged in reducing the Germanic threat in that area. However, if one connects his narration of the movements of the army in 356 and 357 with his descriptions of the area immediately west of the Upper Rhine and of the activities of the Germans there, a clearer picture can be seen.

Ammianus (16. 2. 12) writes that Brumath was the first city to be occupied by Julian. No doubt Julian or the generals chose this one first because the road leading from Dieuze went directly to Brumath. It was likely that he would have then made a trip south to Strasbourg and thereafter moved north as far as the city of Mainz, while entering the cities on the way. Ammianus only refers to two encounters (already mentioned above) with the Alamanni while the army was in this area. The first one occurred while on the road travelling east. The second occurred while approaching Brumath when a band of Germans attacked the army (16. 2. 12 - 13). The band was apparently easily defeated and no more fighting is mentioned during the recovery of the six other cities. It is possible that Ammianus omitted battles he would have considered too insignificant to write about. If this is so, the bands encountered would no doubt have been small bands of raiders fighting against the Roman presence in this territory. Certainly if Julian had battled with a large band of Germans or if he had cleared Lower Germany of barbarians, Ammianus would have written about it. As this appeared not to have been the case, the actions taken by Julian and his army appear to not have been very aggressive. As Julian did not concentrate on clearing this region of barbarians in 356, his role may have been a dual one.



It is conceivable from the description of Julian as the puppet of his Augustus that he would have marched through this area in order to display Constantius' power. This action would have let the civilians, soldiers and the enemy know that the imperial presence had returned to Gaul. His other role may have been to strengthen the cities (*oppida*) by imposing garrisons and perhaps taking grain from unresisting Alamanni for the towns and the army. When Ammianus wrote that the Romans occupied Brumath, he was probably referring to the *oppidum* and not the *civitas*. There is no indication that Julian took the lands back from the Germans. Julian's role would have been to assume imperial responsibility for the defence of the *oppidum*. New garrisons may have been installed or, if one was still there, he would have taken it under his control. Once the cities (*oppida*) were stronger and again under imperial control, the whole area would receive a stronger imperial presence.

The reasons for strengthening the towns while leaving the Germans on the outlying land can be deduced from Ammianus' work. The first clue concerns a description of a long-term strategy that connects Julian's actions with those of Constantius. While discussing the situation just prior to the battle of Strasbourg in 357, Ammianus (16. 12. 15 - 16) refers back to the strategy of the previous year. Constantius had been attacking the enemy from Raetia, and Julian, who had been nearby, was preventing the Germans from escaping into Gaul. It seems from this description that Constantius was pressuring the Alamanni north-west towards Gaul, where they would encounter Julian and his army who were

marching east<sup>11</sup>. This clue is especially helpful if it is accepted that Ammianus altered the details in order to glorify Julian. There is no suggestion in Ammianus that Julian had encountered any barbarians who were intent on crossing into Gaul while he was marching down the Rhine. There was also no mention of any battles with a significant number of Alamanni. It can, therefore, be assumed that Julian did not encounter any barbarians who had been pushed towards Gaul by Constantius. It is possible that Ammianus wrote that he prevented them from entering Gaul, so that Julian appeared to have been more active during 356 than he actually was. However, Ammianus' description of Julian's role in 356 would be more accurate if it was applied to the action taken against the Alamanni in 357. Ammianus (16. 11. 2 - 3) indicates that the dual effort in coordination with Barbatio in 357 had been planned and carefully arranged beforehand to eliminate the threat of the Alamanni who were ranging farther into Gaul than was customary (the enemy's increased presence in Gaul will be discussed in the next paragraph). The plan had been that the two separate armies "*forcipis specie*" ("with the appearance of pincers") would squeeze the enemy into a narrow space to be surrounded and killed by the Romans. The only movements recorded by Ammianus concern the positioning of the two armies at the beginning of the campaign; Barbatio's march to Augst and Julian's march to Reims. It can then be assumed that each army's starting point was in the vicinity of those two cities. The area where the barbarians were to be attacked would include the areas west of the seven cities recently reclaimed by Julian. We know that Ammianus states that the plan for the previous year, 356, consisted of Constantius' army pressuring the Alamanni from

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<sup>11</sup> Austin, 1979, p. 54 - 55.

Raetia with Julian stopping those who tried to cross into Gaul. Even though this dual effort was not exactly what occurred in 356, it seems likely that the actions of Constantius had been intended to push the Alamanni into one area. The Germans tended to behave as small raiding bands, spread out over a large area. It was less effective and time consuming for the Roman army to attack these small bands. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Julian, with his limited manpower, had to rely on small-scale encounters with the enemy, while Constantius, who had more resources at his disposal, would have preferred to engage the enemy in a large mass and finish the job quickly. Libanius (*Or.* 18. 49) writes that Constantius sent Barbatio for this large-scale movement because Julian's army alone was too small. So the combined movements of Constantius and Julian in 356 may have served to move the Alamanni in a position where they might be defeated *en masse*.

This strategy would also explain why Julian strengthened the cities on the Upper Rhine but left the barbarians on the surrounding lands. If Julian removed the barbarians from the area where the pincer movement was meant to take place, then they could not be defeated during this large-scale movement that was designed to eliminate a large part of the German threat with one battle. These Germans would have moved elsewhere and would no doubt have reverted to raiding Gaul, banded together in the small groups that were difficult to destroy. The reason why the Alamanni were raiding into Gaul farther than usual in early 357 was likely the result of Constantius' pressure from Raetia which would have pushed the Germans into a certain area. Because the *civitates* from Strasbourg to Mainz were to be in the midst of the pincer movement, it was important that the *oppida* be

strengthened and garrisoned until the Germans were removed from the surrounding area. Perhaps the line of cities on the Rhine was meant to create a barrier for the Germans who were in Roman territory, so that they would be squeezed between the Roman soldiers and the Rhine during the pincer movement in 357. It is also possible that Julian may not have had the manpower required to remove the barbarians from the Upper Rhine area in 356, so he may have been waiting for the reenforcement of Barbatio's army to arrive at which point the set up was complete. It was important that the towns in this area receive sufficient protection as it was expected that a large number of barbarians would be arriving in their vicinities.

Ammianus writes that once Julian had marched from Strasbourg to Mainz in 356 and had strengthened the cities, he decided to recapture Cologne because he was receiving no opposition from the enemy (16. 3. 1). Here we see the portrayal of Julian as the heroic warrior who takes action independently according to his own instincts. In this instance he had no enemy to fight so he moved on to his next brave and ingenious task. From Ammianus' description, the recovery of Cologne does not appear to have been directly connected with the actions just taken, but, rather, Julian took advantage of the situation. Julian left the area which he had previously been restoring and marched 130 km north into the Lower Rhineland. Perhaps as he found no opposition from the enemy in the area around Mainz (the capital of Upper Germany), he may have felt that another area should be secured. However, he did not extend the security of the region where he had previously been, ignoring the situation of the river valley between Mainz and Cologne.

Ammianus (18. 2. 4) writes that in 359 Julian did recover and refortify the cities along that stretch of the river, but in the meantime there were large gaps in the defences. Ammianus himself (16. 3. 1) describes Cologne as being without nearby strongholds. Julian's decision to recover Cologne in particular at this point may have been prompted by several considerations. Cologne was the capital of Lower Germany and, once recovered, it could exert more Roman influence in the area and the garrisons there would prevent raiders from entering Gaul by the two roads which lead west from Cologne. No doubt Julian saw this as an opportunity to restore a stronghold in the most abandoned area of the Rhineland which would advantage future campaigns in the area. Most importantly, the city could once again become a military base. After the death of Silvanus, the army there had dissolved. Many of his supporters were Franks, who may have deserted the army and even returned to their native territories after the assassination of their leader. Other soldiers from Silvanus' army would have scattered around Gaul. The reestablishment of Cologne under a new general would bring many of these troops back together. This was important in terms of Julian's strategy to reassemble and recruit troops. Silvanus' usurpation and assassination had already been recounted by Ammianus (15. 5). Perhaps it was evident to his readers that Julian was trying to reconstitute the army that had once been stationed there. Ammianus (16. 3. 2) writes that Julian made peace with the Franks whom he encountered at Cologne. It is very possible that these were the Franks who had once provided the manpower for Silvanus' army, but who had become disaffected after his death and had taken over Cologne. Ammianus does not mention that Cologne's walls

needed repairs<sup>12</sup>, which may indicate that the Franks had not broken into the city, as they had once been the troops established there. Ammianus mentions that the recovery of Cologne was very advantageous to the state. Presumably he is referring to the recovery of part of Silvanus' army, amongst other things. Ammianus does indicate that Julian was given only a few troops for the campaign, so the organization of existing manpower was a priority. This would explain the importance to the Romans of recovering Cologne as soon as the opportunity arose. In addition to this, the recovery of a major centre like Cologne would signal the effectiveness of the Roman return to Gaul and spread Julian's fame around the Empire. Julian himself (*Ep. ad Ath.* 279 c), while trying to justify his usurpation, boasted of this as one of his achievements. Despite the fact that there were numerous advantages found in the recovery of Cologne, Ammianus' account does not directly connect it to any particular strategy. However, other details in Ammianus indicate that it could have served as part of the planned strategy for the year 356, as well as part of the overall strategy to increase manpower. Julian may have marched north when he did in order to recover Silvanus' army and to increase his forces for the pincer movement of the following year.

From Cologne Julian went to winter at a place called Senonae, which was "*tunc opportunum*" ("then convenient") (16. 3. 3). This town has often been identified as Sens, which is far away from the action. But it has also been associated with the village of

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<sup>12</sup> Von Elbe (1975, p. 186) writes that the walls of Cologne which existed since 50 AD. did not suffer any serious damage for almost thousand years.

Senon<sup>13</sup>. The enemy besieged the town because they had heard that Julian had only a small number of troops with him since the army had been distributed around Gaul in various towns in order to be more easily provisioned (16. 4. 1). These winter arrangements imply that by the end of 356 Julian had a substantial force. This supports the idea that one of the main reasons for taking control of Cologne was to regroup the forces that had once been stationed there. The ambit of the walls of the Bourge de Senon is small and would not have been large enough to accommodate Julian's entire army. It is also located within the area which the pincer movement concentrated upon and which, as already mentioned above, Ammianus (16. 11. 2 - 3) tells us was experiencing German raiders. The siege lasted a month because Julian had insufficient troops on hand to attack the besiegers successfully, nor had his general Marcellus sent him any reinforcements (16. 4. 2 - 3). Marcellus was later replaced by Severus (16. 10. 21), whom Ammianus describes as good subordinate and general (16. 11. 1). Ursicinus was sent back to the east with Ammianus before the battle season of 357 began (16. 10. 21). Julian now possessed more control over the army than he had previously. He himself (*Ep. ad Ath.* 278 d - 279 a) writes that Constantius gave him the command of all the forces in the early spring of 357<sup>14</sup>. From Senon Julian marched to Reims, with Germans surrounding him, to begin the campaign of 357 (16. 11.1).

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<sup>13</sup> Simpson (1974, p. 940 - 942) identifies Senonae with the Bourge de Senon, a *castellum* west of the village of Senon on the road between Metz and Verdun.

<sup>14</sup> Libanius (*Or.* 18. 48 - 49) and Zosimus (3. 3) support this claim. Elliot (1983, p. 77) thinks that it was unlikely that Julian was in charge of the campaign of 357 because the plan for that year was Constantius' and because he had only half the number of troops that Barbatio had. In addition, he did not seem to have any control over Barbatio.

Although Ammianus does not give a clear description of the long-term strategy leading to the pincer movement, it is possible to map it out from the details in the *Res Gestae*. He also describes the failure of the pincer movement, but the reasons that he gives for the failure are suspicious. He blames it on Barbatio, who he says was trying to deprive Julian of military success. According to Ammianus, before the two armies had moved into the planned position, the Laeti passed between the two camps and attacked Lyon (Lugdunum) (16. 11. 4). In order to control this situation, Julian sent three squadrons of light cavalry to watch the roads on which he suspected the Laeti might travel (16. 11. 5). Ammianus (16. 11. 6 - 7) blames Barbatio for allowing the Laeti to pass by the ramparts of his camp. Julian's army then continued its advance on the Germans who were living on the left side of the Rhine. Some began to block the roads with trees while others fled to the islands which are scattered along the course of the Rhine (16. 11. 8). With the intention of attacking the Germans on these islands, Julian asked Barbatio for seven of the ships which had been prepared ahead of time for building bridges. According to Ammianus, Barbatio burned those ships in order to avoid giving aid to Julian. The fact that ships had been built ahead of time makes it seem likely that once the pincer movement had succeeded in removing the Alamanni from Roman territory, the continuation of this strategy would be to cross the Rhine with the purpose of further weakening the Alamanni. Ammianus (16. 11. 12) continues to describe the destructive actions of Barbatio when he writes that he took some of the supplies intended for Julian's army and burned the rest. Ammianus portrays the failure of the pincer movement and the destruction of the ships and supplies as the result of bad intentions towards Julian on the part of Barbatio. However, there are



other explanations which seem logical when taken into account with that year's strategy<sup>15</sup>. It is possible that Barbatio allowed the Laeti to pass by his soldiers because he (and so Constantius), disapproving of the action taken by Julian to stop the Laeti as it was jeopardizing the pincer-movement, did not cooperate. It is also possible that Barbatio destroyed the ships and supplies to keep them from falling into enemy hands. Julian, who was delayed by the Laeti, may have arrived too late and found the ships destroyed. Libanius (*Or.* 18. 50) gives a different description of these events than Ammianus does. He writes that just prior to the convergence of the two armies, Constantius became concerned that Julian would share in the victory and ordered Barbatio not to converge but to cross the river alone. While he was building a pontoon bridge, the Alamanni destroyed the ships. This differs from Ammianus' description of events in that he entirely blames Barbatio's hostility towards Julian as the reason for the failure of the pincer movement while Libanius blames Constantius, but attributes the destruction of the ships to the enemy, which would seem more likely. This relates to Ammianus' statement (16. 11. 14 - 15) that Barbatio was chased as far as Augst by the enemy, where he settled into winter quarters. At this point it is evident that any cooperation between Barbatio and Julian was over.

The chronology concerning Barbatio's retirement to winter quarters and Julian's next actions are uncertain from Ammianus' description. It is not clear that Barbatio actually

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<sup>15</sup> Rosen, 1970, p. 84f; Crump, 1975, p. 17-20.; Elliot, 1988, p. 77-79.; Matthews, 1989, p. 299-300.

retired to winter quarters at this point because he is soon afterwards described as fighting the Juthungi who had been raiding in Raetia (17. 6). When exactly Barbatio was fighting in Raetia is not known, although it appears to have been sometime in late 357 or early 358. The placement of this event in Ammianus' narrative is after Julian has settled for winter quarters (17. 2. 4) but sometime before July of 358. Barbatio's activities in Raetia are also placed between two digressions, one on obelisks and hieroglyphics (17. 4) and the other on the various ways that the earth shakes (17. 7), which adds to the confusion of where his campaign belongs in the chronology of events. Ammianus also has a very short chapter concerning Barbatio's Raetian campaign, giving it very little attention. Therefore, the chronology, due to Ammianus' placement of Barbatio's campaign in Raetia in his History, has been obscured. It seems unlikely that Barbatio went into winter quarters at August and remained there for the entire season, while Julian still had the time (as discussed below) to attack the enemy on the Rhine islands, repair the fortress of Saverne, engage in the battle of Strasbourg and venture ten miles into the territory east of the Rhine before he himself headed for his winter quarters in November<sup>16</sup>. This indicates that the break up of the pincer movement occurred early on in the season<sup>17</sup>. It would appear, therefore, that Julian's decision to interrupt the pincer movement contributed to, if not caused its failure.

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<sup>16</sup> Ammianus (17. 2. 2) states that while Julian was returning to winter quarters, he spent fifty-four days in the months of December and January attacking 600 Franks who were occupying two strongholds on the Maas.

<sup>17</sup> Both Ammianus (16. 11. 11) and Libanius (*Or.* 18. 52) write that the crops from the barbarians' fields were being collected by the Roman soldiers while Julian was repairing the fort at Saverne. This may indicate that it was August (cf. Delbrück 1990, p. 262) and so the pincer movement had broken up early in the campaigning season..

His inability to concentrate on the task at hand (the pincer movement) shows that he was easily distracted by the barbarians' activities which may even have been undertaken for the purpose of distracting the army. At this point, Barbatio or Constantius may have decided to abandon the pincer movement because of Julian's inability to make it work. In addition, the fact that Julian abandoned a large-scale and well-organized movement in order to relieve Lyon of barbarian pressures could have been seen by Constantius and his supporters as a political move on Julian's part. By winning the favour and support of Lyon, Julian would have a geographically advantageous base for turning against Constantius. In fact, he did move to Vienne, near Lyon, to pass the winter of 360-361 before moving east against Constantius (20. 10. 3). Therefore, it may have been early on in the season when the pincer movement was abandoned and Barbatio subsequently began an independent campaign. While acting individually, Barbatio may have burned the boats for his own reasons (as mentioned above), but Ammianus conveys to the readers that he did it out of spite for Julian. Also, Ammianus gives a very short chapter to the activities of Barbatio in Raetia and he surrounds this chapter with digressions. Perhaps he was trying to obscure the chronology of the events so that it would not appear that Julian ruined the pincer movement early on in the season and that Barbatio continued to campaign that year without Julian. Certainly, it appears that Julian, in allowing himself to be distracted by the Laeti and perhaps by chasing the barbarians to the Rhine islands (16. 11. 9 - 10), broke the coordination of the movement. Ammianus attributes it instead to the jealousies and ambitions of Constantius and Barbatio, leaving Julian's image as a great general untouched.

The strategy adopted by Julian in 357 after the failure of the pincer movement was an *ad hoc* one<sup>18</sup>. After Julian had turned to attacking the islands in the Rhine without the ships and had driven the Germans back into their own territory, he then turned his attention to the fortress of Saverne (Tres Tabernae), which had recently been destroyed. Once repaired it would hinder the Germans from moving into the interior of Gaul (16. 11. 11). While Julian was repairing the fortress, seven kings of the Alamanni gathered their forces and approached the city of Strasbourg in the belief that Julian had retired for the winter out of fear (16. 12. 1 - 3). Once they learned that Julian was still in the area with only a small number of men (13,000), they demanded that Julian leave the lands which they had won. Ammianus omits mentioning information found in Libanius (*Or.* 18. 52) that the Alamanni presented a letter to Julian stating that Constantius had granted them the land<sup>19</sup> (possibly given to them for their involvement in the war against Magnentius) where Julian's troops were now gathering crops. Presumably, the Alamanni had previously been growing their crops there and were suffering from a food shortage because of the Roman reoccupation of the land. As discussed previously, the Romans had also reoccupied other lands belonging to cities on the Upper Rhine which the Germans had been cultivating, further reducing their food supply. Julian "*fastus barbaricos ridens*" ("laughing at the Germanic arrogance") (16. 12. 3), continued his work on the fortifications. Julian was not concerned with making a treaty with this group of Alamanni, but would engage in battle with the enemy once his preparations were complete. This attitude of Julian's supports

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<sup>18</sup> Austin, 1979, p. 59.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Sozomen, 5. 2.

the idea that the Germans could only be pacified by military defeat, a strategy that contrasts with Constantius' "generally quietist policy"<sup>20</sup>. Ammianus seems to have played down Constantius' role in planning and executing the pincer movement to further heighten the difference. In addition, the defeat and withdrawal of Barbatio, Constantius' general, served to heighten the contrast between the two figures.

King Chonodomarius was causing disturbances in the area, feeling confident after, among other successes, his recent defeat of Barbatio (16. 12. 4 - 5). The confrontation at Strasbourg, as described by Ammianus, was initiated by the Alamanni. The combined Roman forces may have induced the Alamanni to unite, and the defeat of Barbatio<sup>21</sup> caused them to assemble together at Strasbourg against Julian's army. Due to the failure of the pincer movement and the departure of Barbatio's army, Julian's forces had to contend with this large threat alone. Ammianus expresses Julian's concern over his separation from Barbatio's army and the small number of his troops (16. 12. 6). Despite his army's numerical disadvantage (if it actually existed) Julian could not turn away from the chance to confront the Alamanni while they were gathered in one force. It was to the Romans' advantage to battle with the enemy in a large group, especially as the opportunity did not arise frequently. The preference for this strategy was shown by Ammianus (16.

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<sup>20</sup> Rosen, 1970, p. 127 - 131.

<sup>21</sup> Ammianus attributes the gathering of the seven Germanic kings to the news of the flight of Barbatio's army (16. 12. 1).

12. 14) after Julian cautiously suggested that the troops rest overnight before they begin the battle. The troops and the praetorian prefect disagreed and wanted to begin the battle while the Alamanni were grouped together and had not yet broken up<sup>22</sup>. If the enemy dispersed, the Roman troops would become so angry that they might mutiny. The battle was then begun and the Romans defeated the Germans who experienced heavy losses. The battle of Strasbourg as portrayed by Ammianus is generally thought to be a rhetorical set-piece and to have been given too much importance in the *Res Gestae*. However, this view can be countered by the fact that the battle did have very positive results for Gaul<sup>23</sup>. The barbarians who had been occupying Gallic territories in the Upper Rhine region were expelled from there after one battle. The alternative would have meant a long process of smaller skirmishes. The battle of Strasbourg could be portrayed as a prominent and important battle in the *Res Gestae* because it in fact was. The other encounters with the enemy that Ammianus describes were small-scale and did not individually have significant results. It would have taken a large number of these small-scale battles to achieve the result of the battle of Strasbourg. It was an appropriate climax at which to end Book 16 as it was at this point that Julian's army succeeded in clearing the Germans from the Roman side of the Upper Rhine and in weakening their forces.

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<sup>22</sup> The confidence of the Roman soldiers tends to support view that the Romans were not badly outnumbered.

<sup>23</sup> Claudius Mamertinus (Latin Panegyric II/3, 4. 3) states that Julian defeated the whole of Germany in one battle. This is was an exaggeration made in praise of Julian, but the battle of Strasbourg was a considerable victory for the Romans.

Once this had been accomplished and, as it was likely still not very late in the campaigning season, Julian and his army followed the Alamanni into their own territory in order to weaken them further. From Saverne, Julian and his army went to Mainz where they intended to build a bridge and cross the Rhine (17. 1. 2). This step was chosen, according to Ammianus, because there were no Alamanni left in Roman territory to assault. This was the goal that the pincer movement had been expected to achieve. As mentioned above, it seems likely that after the success of the pincer movement, the intention was for the armies to cross the Rhine and to carry on the assault there. As it turned out, Julian's army alone had cleared Upper Germany of the barbarian threat and now crossed the Rhine to carry out this plan. After crossing the Rhine Julian, with 800 soldiers, sailed a few miles up the Rhine in the night. Julian used the advantage of surprise and confusion on the part of the Alamanni to make his army more effective. They attacked the Germans with the cavalry on one side and the infantry on the other and destroyed and burned all that they could (17. 1. 4 - 7). The Romans continued into the enemy's territory for about ten miles until they came to a forest where they heard that the Germans were hidden and intended to attack (17. 1. 8 - 10). They were barred from advancing by felled trees, and snow was beginning to fall on the mountain tops at this time. Julian then took on the task of repairing a fort that Trajan had built<sup>24</sup> and placed in it a temporary garrison with supplies (17. 1. 11). When the enemy saw this stronghold of Roman power in their midst they came to Julian to ask for peace because they feared the alternative (17. 1. 12 - 13).

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<sup>24</sup> The location of this place is difficult to determine. It appears to have been a fort situated on the long-abandoned *limes* (Austin, 1979, p. 59).

Ammianus agrees with Julian's decision to grant peace for ten months, one of the reasons being that the fortress required artillery on the walls and additional military equipment if it was to stand amongst hostile tribes. The peace treaty demanded that the Germans leave the fortress untouched (thus allowing it to stand) and that they would supply it with grain, making it possible for the temporary garrison to remain. The fact that Julian gave the peace treaty a duration of ten months may be reflected in the fact that he could not normally begin the campaigning season until July. This treaty was probably made later than September because, as Ammianus (17. 1. 10) mentions, the autumnal equinox had already passed, there was snow on the mountain tops and Julian seems to have been about to leave the area for winter quarters. In addition, it seems that the crops had already been reaped (note 17). This means that the treaty would still hold until after Julian had begun to campaign in the following year. The destruction of the homes, cattle, crops and farms of the Germans would have weakened them. They were now in a desperate situation for supplies. They might have once considered raiding Gaul in order to replenish them, but they were now too weak to attack the improved defences in the Upper Rhineland.

Once Julian had done all that he could for that season in Germany, he decided to return to winter quarters. On the way there, he found that Severus, the master of horse, who was passing by Cologne and Juliers (Iuliacum) on his way to Reims, had encountered 600 Franks who were plundering areas that were unprotected by garrisons (17. 2. 1). The Franks thought that they would be unopposed as Julian's army was occupied by the Alamanni. Once faced with the imperial army, the Franks defended themselves in two



abandoned fortresses on the banks of the Maas. Ammianus (17. 2. 2) then notes Julian's concern for this novel act and that he did not want to allow a precedent to be set.

Normally the Germanic tribes raided cities and strongholds in Gaul but settled in rural villages. In this instance, the Franks fortified themselves and kept the Romans at bay for fifty-four days. This situation differed from the Frankish occupation at Cologne discussed earlier (if it actually happened). In that case, the Franks who had been part of the Roman forces had been left inside Cologne after the fall of their leader. They did not take the city and barricade themselves inside of it, but they had found themselves inside the walls as part of the Roman forces and did not prevent Julian from entering when he arrived. If this more hostile pattern of Frankish behaviour repeated itself, the barbarians would be establishing strongholds for themselves in Gaul<sup>25</sup>. This would make Roman control more difficult to win back, requiring siege equipment and more manpower. The Franks were eventually forced out due to hunger and fatigue (17. 2. 3). Although this incident was not part of any overall plan, but a response to acute danger, Ammianus indicates the long-term damage that a Frankish stronghold could have in Gaul. It then became an important part of Julian's strategy for the recovery of Gaul to ensure that this did not occur.

Ammianus (17. 8. 1) wrote that Julian, while wintering in Paris (357-8), was making efforts to forestall the Alamanni, who had not yet gathered again in one group. They were acting in a hostile manner as a result of the battle of Strasbourg. However, Julian did not begin the campaign season against the Alamanni, but against the Franks. Julian could not

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<sup>25</sup> Crump, 1975, p. 117.

normally begin the battle season until July because he had to wait for the grain supply to arrive from Aquitania. He decided instead to use the advantage of surprise and to attack the barbarians before the usual time (17. 8. 2). He took a grain allowance for twenty days and set off. Julian first went to the place where the Salian Franks lived in Toxandria (17. 8. 3). When he reached Tongeren (Tungri) he was met by a delegation from the Salii who were offering peace on the terms that they might remain quietly in their territories. The Franks left Julian's court believing that he would remain where he was until they returned with a response to some odd conditions made by the Caesar. However, Julian followed them, with Severus at one side of them and he on the other, and routed them (17. 8. 4). The Salii surrendered to Julian along with their property and children. He next went after the Chamavi who had also approached the Romans with peace offerings (17. 8. 5). He killed some of them, took others into captivity and allowed others to escape lest his soldiers tire from the chase. The Chamavi later sued for peace and Julian permitted them to go back to their territory undisturbed. This action against the Franks was part of Julian's strategy, which was discussed in the previous chapter, to improve the supply of grain into Gaul. Also discussed in the previous chapter were Julian's efforts to increase both agrarian manpower, by settling tribes on unused Roman land, and military manpower, by recruiting troops from allied and conquered peoples. These tribes lived near the mouth of the Rhine, on either side of the river. The grain ships could not pass safely through the Rhine without their cooperation. The Franks had been used as recruits by the Romans before other barbarians had. These two peoples were already accustomed to one another. The Romans would more readily settle Franks in their territory than they would settle

Alamanni.

Once the Salii and Chamavi had been subjected to Roman control, Ammianus tells us that Julian turned his attention to refortifying Lower Germany (17. 9. 1). Three forts on the river Maas (Mosa) had been destroyed by the Germans, no doubt after the garrisons had deserted them<sup>26</sup>. The repairs made to these forts would protect the interior of Lower Germany as well as the passage of the grain ships up the Rhine. The forts would stop the Germans from penetrating into Roman territory once they had crossed the Rhine or the Waal. At this time, Julian had not yet refortified the fallen forts that were on the Rhine opposite the Maas; only the walls of Cologne stood. The forts would have been near or in the territories of the Salian Franks and would have been necessary to maintain their cooperation. Also, the garrisons could keep an eye on the Chamavi and take immediate action should they hinder the progress of the grain ships. Julian had made the safety of the Lower Rhine his priority for 358. This was important to his overall strategy because if he had an ample supply of grain, he could undertake campaigns at any time. The restriction that he had previously faced when he was required to wait until July for the grain from Aquitania hindered the success of the campaigns. Frequently, Julian relied on the element of surprise to make his army more effective in battles. If he had to wait until July he would lose that advantage. Also, a food shortage could result in mutiny, as almost happened to Julian when the Romans found that they could not find sustenance from the

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<sup>26</sup> These forts were probably those at Cuijk, Grubbenvorst-Lottum and Maastricht (or possibly Rossum), as will be discussed in Chapter Four.

crops of the Chamavi (17. 9. 2 f.). Julian had taken a risk when he began the campaigns before the supplies had arrived. One of his main concerns as a general was that his troops should be supplied. It was important that a system be established to ensure that the soldiers had provisions. If this was not done then the troops would be rendered either useless or dangerous. This was the sort of risk that he needed to eliminate.

Once Julian had assured a safe passage for the grain ships from Britain, he turned his attention to the Alamanni. From Ammianus, it appears that Julian was concerned that they would assemble in a large group, and so he began his campaign before July in order to prevent them from doing so (17. 8. 1 - 2). The Romans built a pontoon bridge across the Rhine at a location that is not made clear by Ammianus (17. 10. 1). The first group that Julian encountered across the Rhine was that of the king Suomarius. We know from Ammianus (18. 2. 7 - 8) that Suomarius' territory was across the Rhine from Mainz. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Romans crossed at Mainz. Ammianus writes that the king met the Romans by his own initiative (17. 10. 3) which could mean that these Alamanni had travelled away from their territory in search of Julian. Ammianus says that Suomarius had once intended on harming the Romans, but at this time he was interested in maintaining his territory. As Suomarius' lands were likely despoiled in 357 after the battle of Strasbourg when Julian with his army had crossed the Rhine at Mainz, it is likely that his kingdom was so weakened that the only way he could retain his lands was by begging for peace. A similar situation took place when the Romans invaded the territory of the king Hortarius (17. 10. 5 f.). The Alamanni had blocked the way with

felled trees but the Romans made their way through and destroyed crops and livestock and killed the people. Once the king saw his situation he also begged for peace. Ammianus (17. 8. 1) had previously stated that the Germans were angry and destructive because of the battle of Strasbourg. Perhaps this was the view of the Romans or perhaps the Germans had initially intended to fight the Romans but once they realized that they did not have the strength, especially after the destruction in their own territory, they sued for peace.

Julian's accomplishments for the year 358 were important in terms of forwarding the Roman objective of restoring the security of Gaul and their own power there. First Julian secured the important grain route from Britain by taking the Franks under his sway. Next he pacified two Alamannic kingdoms that he feared might act aggressively against the Romans. These tribes, once pacified would pose less of a threat to the interior of Gaul. They had been initially weakened by the battle of Strasbourg and then by raids into their own territory by the Romans. The first Alamannic king, Suomarius, was granted peace on the condition that he return his prisoners and supply food to the soldiers when necessary. The second Alamannic king, Hortarius, was also ordered to return his prisoners but he could not supply food as his crops had been devastated. However, he was obliged to supply the building material needed to rebuild the places that the Alamanni had destroyed. From these two kingdoms Julian received a supply of grain that was urgently required and he secured the building materials that were necessary for the rebuilding of the fortifications and so the security of the frontier. The return of prisoners would increase the morale of

the soldiers and it also contributed towards Julian's strategy to restore the manpower in Gaul.

The goals for the battle season of 359 were to continue the pacification of the barbarians and to consolidate the Lower Rhine frontier. According to Ammianus (18. 2. 1) Julian wanted to follow the pacification policy that he had used in his dealings with the kings Suomarius and Hortarius. Some of the Alamannic tribes were still hostile, and it was feared that they would act aggressively against the Romans. Julian decided to send Hariobaudes, a tribune who knew the language of the Alamanni, to Hortarius (18. 2. 2). He would ostensibly be an envoy, but would in fact act as a spy. From Hortarius' territory he could easily go to the frontiers of the unpacified tribes and discover their plans. In the meantime, Julian gathered his troops together and started on a task which, according to Ammianus, he considered to be his priority (18. 2. 3). This task was to regain and refortify the cities that had long since been destroyed and abandoned. Ammianus also mentions that the granaries were to be restored in order to accommodate the supplies that were now regularly brought from Britain. The cities that were reoccupied were Castra Hercules (Druten), Qualburg (Quadriburgium), Xanten (Tricensima), Neuss (Novaesium), Bonn (Bonna), Andernach (Antennacum) and Bingen (Vingo) (18. 2. 4). Once these had been reoccupied it was necessary to repair the walls (18. 2. 5). The Alamannic brought building material to the Romans as the peace treaty of the previous year had dictated and the auxiliaries were given the work of rebuilding (18. 2. 6). Libanius (*Or.* 13. 30) writes that the cities of Gaul had risen once again by the labour of the barbarians.

It has been argued that Julian's motive in consolidating the frontier in 359 was to secure Gaul so that he could declare war on Constantius<sup>27</sup>. Julian did turn his attention in 359 to rebuilding forts and granaries on the Lower Rhine and consolidating the frontier, but this action logically followed the achievements of the previous campaigns<sup>28</sup>. In 358 Julian had pacified the Sali and Chamavi so that grain could be imported from Britain. The restoration of the granaries in the year following this would indicate the realization of the strategy to reestablish supplies in Gaul. Also, these tribes had been pacified and Julian was encountering no opposition from the enemy. Julian (*Ep. ad Ath.* 279 d) says that by the third year of the campaign the barbarians had been driven out of Gaul, the cities had been recovered and a whole fleet of ships had arrived from Britain. This allowed him to take on the very important task of rebuilding the fortifications. In addition to this, he had in the previous year also conquered tribes who were obliged to bring him the necessary supplies. After the rebuilding, Julian attacked Germans across the Rhine who were perceived to be still posing a threat (as described in the following paragraph). This action was not dissimilar to the crossings made during the two previous battle seasons.

Upon Hariobaudes' return from gathering information concerning the Germans' intentions against the Romans, the army hastened to Mainz (18. 2. 7 f.). Julian objected to the suggestion that they cross the river at that junction because he feared that the behaviour of

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<sup>27</sup> Müller-Seidel, 1955, p. 225 - 44, argues that Julian turned from an aggressive military policy to a more defensive one, in order to establish a power-base in the west from which he could attack Constantius.

<sup>28</sup> Matthews, 1989, p. 95.

his soldiers might offend Suomarius and so destroy their peace treaty. As discussed in Chapter Two, the peace treaties with the Germans were an important aspect of the consolidation of the frontiers. The Germans united across the river from Mainz in order to stop the Romans from crossing. It was dangerous for the Romans to build a bridge in an area with so much opposition, so they chose to cross at a different point. The Germans followed them as they marched along the Rhine on the opposite bank and stopped when the Romans halted to build a camp. In the dead of night forty scouting boats were filled with Roman soldiers who sailed down the stream as quietly as possible. The Romans crossed the Rhine with no opposition as the enemy was still watching their campfires upstream. This is when the Romans encountered Hortarius' dinner guests and slaughtered the slaves of the visiting kings (as discussed in Chapter Two). This incident must have been how the news of the Roman river crossing became known to the Germans. They hastened to move themselves and their families far away from the Romans. They were dreading what would happen to them once the bridge was built and the remaining forces crossed over to the other side of the Rhine. The crossing was done quickly and the soldiers passed peacefully through the lands of Hortarius (18. 2. 14). However, once they were in the lands of hostile kings, they burned and pillaged everything (18. 2. 15). Ammianus tells us that the Romans destroyed many huts and killed many Germans until they came to the place where the boundary stones marked the frontier between the Alamanni and the Burgundians. The Romans intended at this point to capture two kings, Macrianus and Hariobaudes, but they surrendered out of fear and were granted peace (18. 2. 15 - 18). These kings were followed by another king, Vadomarius, who had with him a



letter of recommendation from Constantius, as he had long ago become an ally of the Empire (18. 2. 17). Vadamarius was also asking for peace on behalf of three other kings, Urius, Ursicinus and Vestralpus, but peace was not granted immediately. Treaties were meant to be agreed upon personally between the leaders. Julian would want the kings to ask for peace in person (or through personal envoys). In addition, the concern was that the Germans who, Ammianus says, are of unstable loyalty, might betray the treaty once the Romans departed. In order to prevent this from occurring, the Romans burned their houses and harvests and killed many of their people. Those three kings then sent the Romans envoys who begged for peace. They were granted peace on the same terms as the other tribes with the emphasis made on the return of prisoners (18. 2. 19).

The refortification of the seven cities on the Lower Rhine restored an integral part of the defence system of the frontier. At that point of the campaign, Julian had already secured the cities on the Upper Rhine, from Strasbourg to Mainz. In 359 he was busy extending that fortified area starting from Bingen, which is near Mainz, down to the mouth of the Rhine. Julian had succeeded in clearing the Gallic Rhineland of the Germanic presence and was now continuing the consolidation the frontier in order to block any further threats. Once the defence system had been reestablished in 359, the army crossed the Rhine again to deal with tribes that were still hostile to Rome. Julian intended to weaken the German forces further despite the reestablishment of the frontier defences. The fortifications on the frontier put the Germans on notice that the Roman presence had been reestablished and that future campaigns in their territory were possible. This would also

help in keeping the Germans peaceful and faithful to their treaties. These defences would be more effective if they received no threats in the first place. We can see from Ammianus' words concerning Julian's reluctance to grant peace to the tribes of the kings Vodomarius, Urius, Ursicinus and Vestralpus (18. 2. 18) that the Romans distrusted the barbarians. It was important that the German forces be reduced to a point of ineffectiveness before peace was granted. Ammianus (27. 10. 5) writes that in 368 Valentinian attacked the Alamanni because they had recovered their numbers since the previous attacks. He says that the soldiers did not trust them because they could be submissive one moment and hostile the next. This process was also applied to Julian's overall treatment of the Germans throughout the campaign. He weakened them to ensure that they would not attempt to cross into Gaul and devastate it as they had previously done. The treaties, the diminished Germanic strength, the restored Roman army and the reestablished defences were all conditions necessary to secure the frontiers.

This strategy was taken up again in 360 against the Atthuarian Franks in the Lower Rhine region. Ammianus tells us that after his proclamation as Augustus by the troops, which took place in Paris during the winter of 359/360 (20. 4), Julian was pleased with the confidence that he inspired in them (20. 10. 1 f.). In order to maintain his good standing with the soldiers, he approached the city of Xanten with the intention of crossing there and with the equipment necessary for campaigning. Julian did not want to be accused of negligence in the defence of Gaul. The Atthuarii were overrunning the frontiers and he could not ignore his duty as the commander in Gaul even in the face of an upcoming civil

war. In fact, it was essential that Julian secure the Gallic frontiers at this point in his career because he was about to turn his attention from the Germans towards Constantius. According to Ammianus, the Atthuarii were surprised by the attack as they were protected by difficult roads and had no memory of a previous invasion by an emperor. Many were captured or killed, while the survivors begged for peace. Julian, as part of his usual strategy, granted them this on his own conditions. Although not specified by Ammianus, they no doubt included the return of prisoners and a provision of supplies. Julian then went up the river and carefully examined and strengthened the defences of the frontier until he arrived at Augst. From there he went to winter quarters, this time to Vienne. Vienne was chosen because it was a convenient location to begin his attack against Constantius, an indication that Julian was altering his military objectives<sup>29</sup>.

However, by the spring of 361, Julian would be distracted from this goal by the Alamanni from Vadamarius' canton (opposite Augst) who were devastating the areas bordering on Raetia (21. 3. 1 f.). Julian sent the count Libino to deal with the raiders, but he was almost immediately killed by them. The Romans were put to flight by a large number of the enemy. This was a potentially serious threat to the safety of the region, one which Julian would have to eliminate before he could move east against Constantius. Ammianus (21. 3. 4 - 5) informs us that the intention of these Alamannic raids was to hold Julian in Gaul as, if rumour is to be believed, they had been instigated by Constantius for this

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<sup>29</sup> Crump, 1975, p. 132.

purpose<sup>30</sup>. A letter from Vodomarius to Constantius was intercepted in which the king appeared to side with the emperor against Julian. Ammianus tells us that Constantius had asked Vodomarius, with whom he had previously made a peace treaty (16. 12. 17), to pretend to break the peace on occasion so that Julian would be unable to leave the Rhine frontier<sup>31</sup>. This strategy appears to have been a favourite of Constantius as it had been used previously by him against Magnentius. Ammianus (21. 4. 1 - 6) recounts Julian's plan to capture Vodomarius, which, he says, was necessary for the safety of the provinces and for his own security. The king was taken prisoner at a dinner party and sent to Spain, so that once Julian had left Gaul he would not longer be able to threaten the stable condition of the province. Julian next decided to attack the raiders during a surprise nighttime attack (21. 4. 7). The Romans killed many of them but the rest were granted peace when they asked for it and promised to remain peaceful. This episode in Ammianus shows that until the Germans were weakened and pacified Julian could not leave Gaul, and that this fact was used tactically against him by Constantius. The first concern of the Gallic campaign was to reintroduce a leader and an effective army in the province in order to secure it. It was necessary that the German forces be weakened and that the frontiers be protected. Julian could not leave Gaul until these conditions were satisfied. It is possible to see a trend in Julian's strategy which worked gradually to attain these conditions.

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<sup>30</sup> Julian, *Ep. ad. Ath.* 286a; cf. Libanius, *Or.* 13. 35; Sozomen, 5. 1; 5. 2.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Libanius, *Or.* 18. 107 - 108.

From Ammianus' description of the movements of the imperial army in Gaul during the years 356 until 361, it is possible to identify a pattern designed to clear the Germans from Roman territory and to secure the frontiers from their return. Initially, Julian concentrated on the area from Autun to Reims in the interior of Gaul which was being threatened by the barbarians. He eliminated this menace and moved east to strengthen the *oppida* on the Upper Rhine where the Germans were occupying and living off the *civitates'* farmland. In the following battle season, he cleared those barbarians from the occupied land (initially with the help of Barbatio's army) and ended up defeating a large number of Alamanni at the battle of Strasbourg. Julian then crossed the Rhine to weaken the German forces so that they would become ineffective as enemies. This policy was repeated in the years 358 until 361. Once the Upper Rhine was secure, Julian concentrated on the Lower Rhine. He conquered the Salii and Chamavi in order to secure the grain route from Britain. Julian also repaired three forts on the Maas to ensure its safety. In 359 he repaired the fortifications of seven cities on the Lower Rhine. In 360 Julian assured himself of the strength of the frontiers so that he would be able to leave Gaul and fight Constantius. At this point he had secured Gaul; the barbarians were no longer occupying or threatening Roman Gaul, the frontier was well-fortified and the Germans had been weakened so that they would pose no great threat. Except for the interruption in 361 caused by raiders from Vadamarius' tribe, Julian was able to continue to move against Constantius, his new enemy.

Ammianus has arranged his narrative in such a way that it is possible to map out the

strategy taken by Julian to clear the Germans from Roman territory and to keep them peacefully in their own territory across the Rhine. However, because of Ammianus' admiration for Julian and his need to praise him in his writing, some details have been obscured or even falsified. For example, it is possible that Ammianus was aware, as Libanius was, that the Alamanni had burned the ships after the failure of the pincer movement in 357, or that Barbatio had burned the ships and supplies because he did not want them to fall into enemy hands. It is also possible that he made it appear that the defeated Barbatio had retired to winter quarters when he may have embarked on a new campaign. In addition, Julian's actual position in the army in 356 was hidden by Ammianus because he wanted to attribute the successes of that year to his idol. This made Julian's activities in the Upper Rhine region in that year unclear as Ammianus does not state the purpose of his activities there. According to other sources, including Julian, it was to parade around Constantius' image. Once this detail, that was omitted in Ammianus' work, is incorporated with the information that he does give us, it becomes possible to see a strategy that is not clear from Ammianus alone. As the writer of a *Res Gestae*, Ammianus would have made a great effort to highlight the deeds of his hero Julian, but Ammianus was also a military historian with a good understanding of military affairs. Throughout his descriptions of Julian's activities in Gaul a clear overall strategy is shown, unless details are contrived for the purpose of enhancing Julian's image.

## Chapter Four: Julian's Work on the Frontier Defences

In his narrative of Julian's activities in Gaul, Ammianus describes Julian's efforts to reestablish the defences of the Rhine frontier. The Rhine itself did not act as an unpassable barrier to keep the Germans out of Roman land, but represented the boundary between Roman and German territory. Forts had been established along this boundary to control the passage of the Germans into Roman territory. However, in the 270's AD they were no longer able to keep the Germans at bay. Aurelian recovered Gaul in 273 but then died in 275. Thereafter a second wave of invasions came that lasted two years. Before these disturbances, the towns in the interior of Gaul were unwalled and so they were vulnerable to the raiding barbarians. The reconstruction of Gaul is attributed to Probus (275 - 282)<sup>1</sup>. It is between 270 and 320 that the construction of most of the town walls in Gaul is placed<sup>2</sup>. With the need to build city walls in the interior of Gaul came the need to strengthen the frontier fortifications. Earlier Roman forts had been built with less defensive purposes in mind: the dominance and control of the countryside. They served as places to control frontier trading, kept the barbarians in check and reminded the enemy of the power and organization of the Romans. During the Later Empire, old frontier forts were repaired, rebuilt or altered. The designs of forts which were built from the time of Probus began to resemble those of medieval castles. The walls were now thicker (up to three or four metres) and higher, and had projecting bastions so that the *ballistae*,

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Julian, *Convivium* 314b.

<sup>2</sup> Grenier, 1931, p. 487, vol. 1.

bowman and other defenders would be able to spot and assault a wider range of attackers. The walls of the third and fourth centuries were built under the assumption that they would be approached by an enemy and so the towers were needed to watch the walls as well as having a fuller view of the surroundings.

We know that in 356, the year of Julian's first campaign, a precarious situation had been created in Gaul after the garrisons of the Rhine forts were unable to stop the flow of raiders. Many of the walls of the Gallic cities had been destroyed or their farmlands were being occupied by the barbarians. As discussed in Chapter Two, the barbarians did not generally besiege fort walls. The Germans were not usually able to take a walled town unless the occupants and garrison were too weak or absent. They did not have the organization or preparation for a such long-term assault. Food shortages or disease often forced them to give up and they were usually unable to starve out a garrison. They also did not have the equipment to bombard the walls<sup>3</sup>. Walls were necessary for keeping the *oppida* safe as the barbarians were frequently sallying out into Roman territory.

Ammianus demonstrates the need for town walls in the interior of Gaul (or for 'defence in depth') when he writes about the sieges at Autun, Auxerre, Troyes, Senon and Lyon. The frontier defences had to be restored in order to prevent the Germans from raiding in Gaul and consequently isolating the cities from their farmlands and from each other. Reliable garrisons in the frontier zone could control minor incursions and hinder major raids by

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<sup>3</sup> Southern and Dixon, 1996, p. 127.



protecting supply bases and creating strong points along the lines of communication<sup>4</sup>.

These would slow down the enemy, as they would be short of food supplies, and would protect the civilian population until the mobile army arrived in the area. In better conditions, this would have been the set-up that Julian found in Gaul when he arrived there with his *comitatus*. However, Gaul had been left for too long without a field army. The garrisons were only able to hold some of the fortresses and were not able to stop the Germans' from raiding. Due to the abandonment and destruction of many forts, strongpoints needed to be rebuilt in order to reestablish a coherent defensive system.

The founders of new forts are usually more easy to identify than the builders who conducted repairs. The traces of repair work are easily blended in with earlier and later building. But it can also be difficult to identify the founders of forts. Because certain emperors (Diocletian, Constantine I and Valentinian I) are depicted in ancient literature as being active builders, modern scholars tend to attribute works to these emperors when the archaeological evidence even remotely matches the historical context<sup>5</sup>. This has caused some uncertainty in attributing building phases to Julian. Many of the fortifications that Ammianus says Julian repaired seem to have previously been rebuilt by Constantine. Valentinian was an active builder in the Rhineland only ten years after Julian had been working on the fortifications. Ammianus (28. 2. 1) describes how in 369 Valentinian fortified the entire Rhine from Raetia to the ocean with great earthworks, fortresses,

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<sup>4</sup> Tomlin, 1987, p. 119 - 129.

<sup>5</sup> Southern and Dixon, 1996, p. 128.

*castella* and towers at frequent intervals. The historian does not name specific cities or places as having been fortified as he does with Julian. As Julian is the most prominent figure in the *Res Gestae* and Books 14 - 25 are more detailed than 26 - 30, it seems natural that Ammianus would enter into more detail during the narration of Julian's activities in Gaul than Valentinian's. Ammianus does, however, divulge details of the actual building work that was done under Valentinian which are not found in his descriptions of Julian's building activities. Ammianus (28. 2. 2 - 4) describes Valentinian's efforts in diverting the river Neckar (Nicer) away from a fortress that he had built that might be threatened by the stream. He also describes (28. 2. 5f) his attempt to build a fortress in German territory, although the soldiers who were sent to do the work were all killed, except for the one left to tell the tale. Possible reasons why Ammianus omitted such details from his account of Julian's Gallic campaign are that the stories surrounding these building activities of Valentinian are dramatic and original enough to be included in his literary work, or that perhaps the building activity of Julian was insignificant next to Valentinian's since the Caesar had to repair what he could with restricted resources. Ammianus (28. 2. 2) refers to Valentinian as finding men skilled in hydraulic work to divert the Neckar. There is no mention of any engineers or building specialists during Julian's campaign, although the legions would have had them before they had broken up. We know that in Gaul Julian had limited manpower and financial resources (17. 9. 6). This would not have been the case during Valentinian's Gallic campaign. He would have had control and access to more resources. It is then possible that Julian's works leave little trace in the archaeological finds because his work was restricted to repairs, and, at

times, quick repairs.

During Julian's campaign of 356, Ammianus says that Julian seized (*occupavit*) Brumath, Strasbourg, Saverne, Seltz, Speyer, Worms and Mainz (16. 2. 12). As discussed in Chapter Three, there were still defenders behind these walls, which we can then assume were intact at that time. Ammianus did not refer to the army as making any repairs, saying only that they moved on to Cologne when they found no more opposition in that region (16. 3. 1). Julian did not engage in building activities there either. Ammianus states that he recovered (*recuperandam*) Cologne. The walls of Cologne were built around AD 50 and did not suffer any serious damage for almost a thousand years<sup>6</sup>. These walls had been repaired and strengthened by extra towers under Gallienus<sup>7</sup>. For the city of Cologne to be reintegrated into the Roman defence system, Julian only had to take the city back into his power and out of the hands of the Franks who had taken it over after the death of Silvanus (as discussed in Chapter Three).

In 357, after the failure of the pincer movement, Julian turned to repairing (*reparandas*) the fort at Saverne which had not long before been destroyed by a barbarian attack (16. 11. 11), the establishment (*aedificato*) of which would protect the interior of Gaul from barbarian raids. Saverne lay on the main road connecting Metz and Strasbourg.

Archaeologically, Saverne does not offer much evidence for a building phase under Julian,

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<sup>6</sup> Von Elbe, 1975, p. 186.

<sup>7</sup> *CIL* 13. 8261; Butler, 1959, p. 35.

although some finds dating from the mid-fourth century have been found<sup>8</sup>. Modern scholars have attributed a building phase to Julian based on Ammianus' narrative<sup>9</sup>. It seems likely that Ammianus recorded this fact correctly, as Saverne blocked the path of raiders into Gaul and it could only do so once it had been repaired and reestablished as a strong-point. It is the first and possibly only instance where he fortified Gaul behind the frontiers. The defence was necessary at this time before the battle of Strasbourg and after the failure of the pincer movement because the barbarians might still attempt incursions into Gaul. The cities on the Upper Rhine near Strasbourg had strong walls but the Alamanni were still threatening the area, so a strong defensive fort at Saverne would hinder their movement to the west.

Ammianus (17. 1. 11), when referring to Julian's activities of 357, informs us that he repaired (*reparatum est*) a fort that had been built by Trajan in the territory of the Alamanni. The location of this fort is difficult to determine<sup>10</sup>. Julian, in this instance, extended his defence of the frontiers to include a strong-point inside the Germans' territory. The Romans were then able to watch the Germans before they broke into Roman territory. This strategy appears to have functioned more as a preventative measure than as a defensive reaction. The peace treaty that was made also indicates efforts to prevent the occurrence of raids into Gaul (17. 1. 12 - 13).

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<sup>8</sup> Johnson, 1986, p. 167.

<sup>9</sup> Op.cit, p.167; Butler, 1959, p. 37; Blanchet, 1979, p. 131.

<sup>10</sup> Austin, 1979, p. 59.

Ammianus (17. 9) writes that in 358 Julian repaired three forts on the Maas river. He says that these forts had long been destroyed by enemy attacks. The findings at the forts of Cuijk (Ceuculum), Maastricht (Traiectum) and Grubbenvorst-Lottum are not inconsistent with Ammianus' description<sup>11</sup>. These three forts were situated on the left side of the Maas, bordering the eastern side of the territory of the Salian Franks. Not only was this an effective way of preventing the Franks from disturbing the progress of the grain boats from Britain up the Rhine, but it deepened the line of defence against the Germans who might try to make inroads into Gaul. The archaeological evidence that backs up Ammianus' claim that Julian rebuilt these forts on the banks of the river Maas is not that strong, although Cuijk does offer some compelling evidence.

At Cuijk<sup>12</sup>, occupation began during the reign of Claudius (41 - 54) when an auxiliary fort of wood and earth was built to guard the river crossing. Cuijk was on the road from Nijmegen (Noviomagus, 13 km north of Cuijk) to Tongeren in Belgium. The bridge at Cuijk formed a connecting link between Nijmegen, Maastricht and Tongeren. The first fort existed until ca. 100. It is possible that in the fourth century, the *limes* in Holland moved from the Rhine to the Waal and that the crossing at Cuijk again became

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<sup>11</sup> Professor J.K. Haalebos of the Catholic University of Nijmegen during an interview, informed me that he considers these three sites to have possibly been the ones that are discussed by Ammianus.

<sup>12</sup> Bogaers and Ruger, 1974, p. 84 - 86; Stillwell et al., 1976, p. 253; Johnson, 1983, p. 146; information from the Cuijk Museum.

strategically important<sup>13</sup>. Bogaers found that there were three building phases in the fourth century<sup>14</sup>. According to coin finds these took place between the reigns of Constantine I and Valentinian I. The first was an earth and timber fort probably built by Constantine. This would correspond with his efforts to rebuild the fortifications in the Rhineland. During the third building phase a stone wall was built on the outer side of the rampart. Semi-circular projecting towers were placed at intervals along the length of the wall. Coin finds indicate that the stone wall was built during the reign of Valentinian. This agrees with Ammianus' statement that Valentinian fortified the entire Rhine from Raetia as far as the Ocean (28. 2. 1). The second, intervening building phase seems to have consisted of repairs to the inner side of the rampart, especially to the timber work. On the south and west sides of the fort traces of a trench were found that ran parallel with the rampart on the inner side containing a number of posts. Ammianus uses the words *"munimenta tria recta serie superciliis imposita fluminis Mosae, subversa dudum obstinatione barbarica, reparare pro tempore cogitabat, et ilico sunt instaurata, procinctu paulisper omisso"* ("he planned to repair (as time would permit) three forts situated in a straight line along the banks overhanging the river Maas, which had long since been overthrown by the obstinate assaults of the savages; and they were immediately restored, the campaign being interrupted for a short time")<sup>15</sup> to describe Julian's rebuilding activities on the Maas. Twice he mentions time factors which indicate that Julian did not

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<sup>13</sup> Bogaers, 1971, p. 79; Stillwell et al., 1976, p. 253; Maxfield, 1987, p. 169.

<sup>14</sup> Bogaers, 1971, p. 82 - 83; cf. Bogaers and Ruger, 1974, p.84.

<sup>15</sup> Translation Rolfe, 1935 (Loeb).

spare a lot of time on the rebuilding efforts, which would explain the small amount of evidence pointing to his repairs. Despite this, there are additional remains which may point to Julian's presence at Cuijk. During the 1980's sports divers in the Maas found remains of the fourth century bridge from Cuijk<sup>16</sup>. The results of dendrochronology (the dating of wood) indicated that it was possible that a building phase of the fort occurred during the reign of Julian because it was assumed the building phases of the bridge coincided with those of the fort. One of the building phases of the bridge has been determined to have been between 334 and 357. This could easily be attributed to Constantine only, but as the later date is so close to the date when Julian was in the area, it is possible that the bridge may have also received repairs at that time. The chronological placement of the second building phase, between the reigns of Constantine and Valentinian, the strategic placement of the fort, and Ammianus' description of Julian's building work on the Maas, all indicate that Cuijk was very likely one of the three forts that Julian repaired in 358.

The fort at Grubbenvorst - Lottum<sup>17</sup> does not have any remains which indicate that Julian was present there during his Gallic campaign. It was perhaps an auxiliary fort in the second and third centuries and a *burgus* of the fourth century. The finds include ceramics of the second through to the fourth centuries AD and coins of Claudius and Valentinian I. In Bogaers and Ruger, there is a supposition that this fort may be connected to the

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<sup>16</sup> This information comes from the Cuijk Museum and from a conversation with Professor Haalebos.

<sup>17</sup> Bogaers and Ruger, 1974, p. 88-89.

building activities of Julian in 358 because of information found in Ammianus (17.9). It is difficult to verify Ammianus' claim by using this supposition because the argument then becomes circular. However, what is known concerning this site indicates that it is not impossible that Julian was at this fort in 358. It is also likely that there was some sort of occupation here during the late period, as shown by the archaeological remains.

The archaeological evidence at Maastricht pointing to Julian's activities in 358 is very scarce. Johnson<sup>18</sup> has attributed this fort to the refortification efforts of Julian because there are commonalities in its design with other forts constructed by Julian; Saverne, Andernach, Boppard and Koblenz. While Saverne (discussed above) and Andernach (mentioned below) are probably forts which experienced building under Julian, Johnson himself warns of the dangers of dating forts by typology, as it is becoming apparent that in the Later Roman period no particular shape of tower or gate was being used in any particular time<sup>19</sup>. It thus becomes difficult to group Maastricht together with other forts built by Julian. Also, it is not certain that the forts of Boppard and Koblenz did receive repairs during Julian's campaign in Gaul. Boppard had been thought of as having a building phase under Julian<sup>20</sup>. More recently, it has been determined that as there is no

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<sup>18</sup> Johnson 1986, p. 167.

<sup>19</sup> Op.cit, p. 56.

<sup>20</sup> Von Petrikovits, 1971, p. 183 -184 found that the absence of a group of jugs of Constantinian date indicated that the building of this fort was post-Constantinian. He then links the fort to Julian because of the details concerning his building efforts found in Ammianus.



coin evidence to indicate a building phase later than the reign of Constantine I, there was no building period under Julian<sup>21</sup>. Nor does Ammianus mention Boppard as one of the cities in the same region that were refortified by Julian in 359. Ammianus also did not say that Koblenz had its walls repaired or rebuilt by Julian. No archaeological evidence has been found at Koblenz to give a definite date to the fort. It has been determined by other scholars that the walls of this site were probably built under Constantine or possibly Julian<sup>22</sup> or even Maximianus (286 - 305) when he restored the safety in Gaul<sup>23</sup>. There is no evidence (archaeological or literary) that directly connects any building phase at Koblenz to Julian. It is not likely then that Koblenz and Boppard should be grouped typologically with Saverne and Andernach to show a similar building period with Maastricht. So Johnson's argument about typology does not prove that Maastricht belongs to any building activities of Julian. In addition, as we know from Ammianus, Julian spared little time for the repairs on the forts along the Maas, so it does not follow that he influenced the style of the forts there. He would only have repaired the existing designs and would therefore have had no influence over the design. However, the site of Maastricht itself shows there was a bridge built in the fourth century and that the centre of

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<sup>21</sup> Dr. Horst Fehr of the Koblenz Office of the Department of Archaeological Conservation, while interviewed on the subject, indicated that he found no evidence to indicate any building activity during Julian's Gallic campaign. His written work on the subject was in progress at the time of this interview (October 1997).

<sup>22</sup> Von Elbe, 1975, p. 180 attributes the building of the walls to Constantine, but does not state why; von Petrikovits, 1971, p. 184 wrote that due to brick-stamp dating, the wall was built either during the reign of Constantine or Constantius II (i.e. Julian).

<sup>23</sup> Stillwell et al., 1976, p. 8.

the inhabited area was fortified by a wall at that period<sup>24</sup>. Also, Maastricht was the spot where the highway from Cologne to Tongeren crossed the Maas, indicating that it was a strategic point in terms of movement from the frontier into Gaul.

I would like to suggest that in the place of Maastricht as one of the three forts repaired by Julian in 358, the fort at Rossum should be considered. In many ways it is similar to the fort at Cuijk, which appears to have been one of the forts repaired by Julian in 358. The fort at Rossum was situated on a very narrow strip of land that separated the Maas and the Waal so it was able to protect the grain route from Britain which Julian had just restored. It was also important because it was a place where both the Maas and the Waal could be crossed and it can be assumed that there was a road-junction here<sup>25</sup>. Rossum also seems more likely than Maastricht because the latter is situated relatively far from the Rhine. Julian did not practice a policy of defending Gaul in depth, except at Saverne under unique circumstances (as discussed above). In addition, there is a road running west from Cologne to Maastricht. Cologne had just been restored in 356, and the garrison there would have been responsible for the protection of this road into Gaul. Since the repairs made by Julian to the three Maas forts were only meant to be a short interruption in the campaign, it seems more likely that he would have concentrated on the more strategic fort at Rossum as it relates directly to his reestablishment of the grain route. This could be done more effectively from Rossum than from Maastricht. However, like Maastricht there

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<sup>24</sup> Stillwell et al., 1976, p. 539.

<sup>25</sup> Bogaers, 1971, p. 79.

are no archaeological findings at Rossum indicating a building phase at this time. Coins from the first century BC to the fourth century AD have been found and it is supposed that there was a late Roman fort here<sup>26</sup>.

Ammianus writes that in 359 Julian regained and fortified (*receptasque communiret*) seven cities while he was in Lower Germany (18. 2. 3 - 6). These cities are Druten, Qualburg, Xanten, Neuss, Bonn, Andernach and Bingen. The most northerly of these sites is Druten which has been determined by archaeologists to be a fort with a building phase under Julian<sup>27</sup>. However, this was not based on the archaeological finds, but by the existing literature; Ammianus mentions *Castra Herculis* (which is presumed to be Druten) as a fort repaired by Julian and Libanius (*Or.* 18. 87) writes that Julian went right down to the coast and restored a “πόλιν δὲ Ἡράκλειαν, Ἡρακλέους ἔργον” (“a city called Heraclea, a labour of Heracles”)<sup>28</sup>.

The site of Qualburg shows that there was activity from AD 270 - 300, again up until ca. 340 and then between 350 and 380. This was determined from the ditch around Qualburg that has consecutive layers dating from different periods according to the coins, pottery

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<sup>26</sup> Bogaers and Ruger, 1974, p. 74.

<sup>27</sup> *Op. Cit.*, p. 72.

<sup>28</sup> Translation Norman 1969. At note b on page 335, he indicates that Libanius makes a play with the name (*Castra Herculis*) which is also mentioned in Ammianus (18. 2. 4).

and other materials that they contained<sup>29</sup>. This does not conflict with Ammianus.

The date for the construction of Xanten is difficult to determine, but coins dating later than 268 were found in much higher numbers in the inner, defended area as opposed to the rest of the site. As the concentration of the settlement in this area must have occurred in the late third century, then this may also indicate the date of the construction of the walls<sup>30</sup>. The dates of the coins found here stop abruptly at the revolt of Magnentius. This is likely because the fort collapsed as a result of the raids that occurred at this time. This agrees with Ammianus' statement (18. 2. 3) that these forts had long been destroyed and abandoned. It appears that at the time that Julian was repairing the forts on the Lower Rhine, Xanten was in need of repairs. It seems logical that he would repair this fort which was in a strategic location. Ammianus (20. 10. 1) says that in 360 Julian went to Xanten to cross the Rhine and campaign against the barbarians.

The site at Neuss seems to have been an auxiliary fort until the second half of the third century<sup>31</sup>. Neuss may have become a fortress again when Constantine restored the frontier forts along the Rhine and it seems to have been destroyed during the Frankish invasions of

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<sup>29</sup> Bogaers and Ruger, 1974, p. 196; Johnson, 1983, p. 146. However, Johnson does not offer 350 - 380 as dates for the site, but on a map on page 256 he indicates that Qualburg was a site repaired by Julian. Bogaers and Ruger also suppose this, giving Ammianus as their source.

<sup>30</sup> Johnson, 1983, p. 146 - 148.

<sup>31</sup> Von Elbe (1975, p. 289 - 290) attributes the abandonment of the fort to the Frankish invasions in 276, while Johnson (1986, p. 148) suggests that it occurred in the 260's.

the fourth century<sup>32</sup>. Several modern scholars have considered that Neuss had a building phase during Julian's Gallic campaign because of the information in Ammianus, which concurs with the small amount of evidence at the site (some fourth century finds, including coins of Constantius and a few late Roman ceramics)<sup>33</sup>. Von Petrikovits has suggested that the fort at Neuss was the work of Julian because the external rectangular towers do not belong the Principate<sup>34</sup>. However, these towers would more likely belong to the reign of Constantine, as suggested above. It is not likely that Julian designed and built these towers. He was only engaged in repairs, and so he may have only repaired the external towers, a type that had begun to spring up in the area after the third-century invasions.

The last building period for the fort at Bonn was either in the third or fourth century, and a legion still existed there in the fourth<sup>35</sup>. The construction date of this fort is uncertain but it was probably in use during the reign of Constantine<sup>36</sup>. Alamannic raids in the 350's evidently affected the site as a buried hoard of gold rings and coins belongs to this period<sup>37</sup>. From such evidence it is possible to suggest that the fortifications of Bonn had

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<sup>32</sup> Von Elbe, 1975, p. 289 - 290.

<sup>33</sup> Bogaers and Ruger, 1974, p. 139 - 140; von Petrikovits, 1971, p. 184; von Elbe, 1975, p. 289 - 290; Johnson, 1986, p. 148.

<sup>34</sup> Von Petrikovits, 1961, 475ff and again reargued in 1971, p. 184.

<sup>35</sup> Bogaers and Ruger, 1974, p. 196 - 198.

<sup>36</sup> Johnson, 1986, p. 150.

<sup>37</sup> Op. Cit. p. 150.

already been damaged when Julian was in the area. It seems likely that he would have then repaired them, as his intention had been to refortify the Lower Rhine and he had been engaged in repairing other cities there.

The archaeological evidence uncovered at Andernach does not indicate whether the fortifications are of Constantinian origin, nor whether Julian engaged in repairs. The Roman remains are 4 - 5 metres underground and will only be discovered if the foundations for large buildings are built and this happens rarely. A new city hall was built in 1980 but only finds of the first century fortification were found<sup>38</sup>. Fourth-century finds, such as ceramics, indicate a possible mid-fourth century date for the fort<sup>39</sup>. Modern scholars have also attributed a building phase to Julian in 359 based on Ammianus' words<sup>40</sup>. Andernach lay at a T-junction of the road which led from Andernach to Trier and the road that ran along the Rhine. A fort here would block the access of the Germans into the interior of Gaul, which was one of Julian's goals. Ammianus' words, taken together with Andernach's strategic position and the fourth-century finds, indicate a likelihood that this was one of the forts repaired by Julian in 359.

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<sup>38</sup> This information comes from an interview with Klaus Schäfer of the Stadtmuseum Andernach in October, 1997.

<sup>39</sup> Johnson, 1986, p. 167; von Petrikovits (1971, p. 187) indicates that Andernach was a late Roman fort but that it cannot be closely dated by the evidence.

<sup>40</sup> Von Petrikovits, 1971, p. 185; von Elbe, 1975, p. 21 - 22; Johnson, 1986, p. 167; cf. Blanchet (1979, p. 96) writes that the walls were restored under Julian and it can be assumed that he decided this based on Ammianus.

Finally, Bingen, like Andernach, lay at an intersection of the road leading along the Rhine and the road to Trier. The evidence for dating the wall at Bingen is scarce. Von Petrikovits argues that bricks found at Bingen with Constantinian brick-stamps may have been used either during Constantine's or Julian's reign. Ceramics from other sites indicate that these brick-stamps may have been used after Constantine, so there was possibly a building phase under Julian<sup>41</sup>. Ausonius (10.2) in his poem *Mosella* refers to the ramparts that had recently been given to Bingen. This poem was not written before 371<sup>42</sup>. He may be referring to the walls that had been restored by Julian at least twelve years earlier or walls that had been put up by Valentinian. Despite this uncertainty, modern scholars have determined that a building phase did occur under Julian because of Ammianus<sup>43</sup>. The evidence for a Julianic building phase for these seven sites is not strong. The evidence that does exist, however, does not disagree with Ammianus.

Ammianus (20. 10. 3) very vaguely refers to Julian in 360 as "*praesidiaque limitis explorans diligenter et corrigens*" ("diligently examining and improving the defences of the frontier") from the Lower Rhine down to Augst. Ammianus does not refer to any specific places as having any work done to the fortifications. This contrasts with the naming of Saverne and the seven cities that were repaired in 359. These were all

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<sup>41</sup> Von Petrikovits, 1971, p. 183 - 4.

<sup>42</sup> White, 1961, p. xvii (Loeb).

<sup>43</sup> Von Petrikovits, 1971, p. 184. Von Elbe (1975, p. 61) writes that after the Germanic invasion of 353/355 Bingen was turned into a walled fortress by Julian in 359 because of its strategic position. No doubt this conclusion is derived from Ammianus.

important posts on the frontier and it can be assumed that Ammianus refers to them by name not only because they were repaired by Julian but because so many important cities were restored for the Empire under his command. This fits with the rest of Ammianus' efforts to extol Julian's greatness in his history. When he writes about the three cities on the Maas, Ammianus does not mention them by name. The reason for this omission is not clear. However, the Maas cities were not important frontier posts as were the Rhine cities. These names were probably less recognizable to Ammianus' audience and did not carry the same importance as the cities restored in 359. It is also possible that Ammianus' source for 358 did not offer him the names of the three forts. It can then be suggested that the work undertaken by Julian on the frontier in 360 did not include any great restoration works as had occurred in the previous year. This portion of his fortification works is unknown because of the absence of details in Ammianus' narrative. Since Ammianus only refers to the fortification works that Julian personally supervised, other works may have been carried out through subordinates<sup>44</sup>. It is possible, but not yet determined, that Julian was responsible for building phases in other Rhineland towns.

During his Gallic campaign, Julian started the work of rebuilding the destroyed forts on the Rhine frontier. His achievements were so significant that Gaul suffered no Germanic attacks while he was still alive<sup>45</sup>. However, this cannot be attributed to the fortifications

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<sup>44</sup> Crump, 1975, p. 118.

<sup>45</sup> 25. 4. 14; at 30. 7. 5 Ammianus suggests that the news of Julian's death instigated renewed raiding into Gaul.



alone because they failed to hold back the barbarians after his death (26. 4. 5; 26. 5. 7 and 9; 27. 1. 1). Ammianus (27. 1. 1) says that the Germans were able to attack Gaul because they had somewhat recovered their strength after the defeats and losses that they had suffered during Julian's campaigns against them. It was, then, the victories in the field that mostly contributed to his recovery of Gaul, while his work on the fortifications was only to begin the task that would be completed by Valentinian<sup>46</sup>. Crump suggests that Julian restored the forts and cities that had been damaged in the 350's, while Valentinian reorganised the defences along the entire Rhine<sup>47</sup>. After Valentinian's death in 375, only small improvements were made to the defences<sup>48</sup>. The frontier defensive system reestablished by Julian and Valentinian was the last one on the Rhine before it was completely overthrown in the early fifth century. Ammianus' descriptions of Julian's strategy to refortify the Rhine are simple and informative. The sites that he names appear to have suffered damage during the raids of the early 350's. The sites that he does not name, but refers to by their position (on the Maas), demonstrate Julian's goal of securing the grain route from Britain, as well as creating a Roman presence in the Waal region (at Druten and possibly Cuijk and Rossum), which had also become a frontier. Julian strove to restore the frontier fortifications just as he strove to restore the peace in Gaul. His aim was to repair the damage that had been done during the civil turmoil in the years just before his elevation as Caesar.

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<sup>46</sup> Crump, 1975, p. 119.

<sup>47</sup> Op. Cit., p. 114.

<sup>48</sup> Schönberger, 1969, p. 186.

## **Conclusion: Ammianus as a Guide to Julian's Gallic Campaign**

By examining Ammianus' work on Julian's Gallic campaign, we have been able to follow a strategy to restore Gaul after the Germanic invasions of the 350's. The first concern was to reorganize the army under the leadership of an imperial figure. This was done when Constantius appointed Julian as Caesar in the west. Julian was then sent to Gaul with a very small *comitatus* with the purpose of increasing the size of the army through new recruits and through the disbanded soldiers. That this task was fulfilled has been demonstrated by Ammianus. We know that when Julian began his campaign in 356 he had an army that was larger than the 360 men that had been sent with him. The rest of the army, under the command of Ursicinus and Marcellus, had been gathered together at Reims. Julian's decision to reclaim Cologne at the first opportunity may have been based on the need to reorganize Silvanus' army that had once been stationed at Cologne. In addition, during the following years the series of peace treaties and the settlement of Franks on Roman soil no doubt gave the Romans an important source of recruits, even though this practice is not explicitly mentioned by Ammianus. At the same time these peace treaties helped to increase the supply of grain which had been lacking. The treaties with the Franks made the grain route from Britain possible again. A condition of other treaties was that grain be provided to the army. In 359 Ammianus describes Julian's efforts to rebuild the granaries on the Lower Rhine in order to store the new provisions. In addition, the improved conditions of Gaul would allow agriculture to flourish, creating a source of grain close to the Rhine. The return of prisoners from defeated and pacified

barbarians would to a small degree increase the agrarian manpower in Gaul, as would the settlement of Franks on Roman soil which would otherwise remain untilled. Ammianus does not explicitly discuss these issues, but the details in his work are such that it is natural to conclude that they were a part of Julian's overall plan. Contemporary sources also indicate that there was a strategy to increase the military and agrarian manpower available. In some cases, the information is more explicit than that found in Ammianus, giving a fuller view of what occurred.

The *Res Gestae* also follows the movements of Julian's army for each battle year, making it possible for the student of Ammianus to piece together a coherent strategy for the elimination of the Germanic threat. Initially, Julian cleared the areas far west of the Rhine of the raiding barbarians. Once he had met up with Ursicinus and Marcellus and the rest of the army at Reims, he seems to have only played a subordinate role. Julian's role at this time seems to have been to display Constantius' image, as he himself tells us that he was his "puppet". The army then went to the Upper Rhine region where the hinterlands of seven *civitates* were being overrun and occupied by the Germans. The army then strengthened the *oppida*, by taking them under Roman control and possibly increasing the garrisons. This action on the Upper Rhine may have been taken in order to prepare the Upper Rhine area for the pincer movement of the following year. The *oppida* were strengthened so that they could withstand the Germans who were still overrunning the area outside the walls. The *oppida* may also have been acting as a second barrier to the line of soldiers to their west, and so trapping the Germans into a confined area during the

pincer movement. Ammianus makes it clear that the soldiers preferred to encounter the barbarians while they were assembled together in large groups. The alternative was that a large army would have to endlessly find and attack small, often nocturnal, raiding bands. From Ammianus' history, it has been possible to discern that perhaps in 356 Constantius had been driving the Germans west from Raetia as part of the preparations for the pincer movement. This would further group them together, and so offer the Romans the opportunity to eliminate the raiders with one coordinated effort. Ammianus directly and indirectly indicates that the pincer movement had been planned far in advance.

After the failure of the pincer movement and the departure of Barbatio from the area, Ammianus continues to depict the following strategies. The army, now under Julian, eliminated the barbarians from the left side of the Rhine, first by slaughtering them on the Rhine islands and then through the only large-scale battle that occurred (at Strasbourg) during Julian's Gallic expedition. Ammianus perhaps gives it too much attention because it is his only opportunity to depict a battle in the dramatic and rhetorical style of ancient historiography. Despite this, the battle of Strasbourg eliminated the German occupation of Upper Germany. Then, as would be repeated during the remaining years of the Gallic campaign, Julian crossed the Rhine and weakened the Germans' agrarian and military resources through destructive attacks and, once the enemy was in a weakened condition, he granted them peace. This strategy, as depicted by Ammianus, shows that the Romans did not trust a treaty with the Germans unless they had been weakened to a point at which they would not be able to break it. In the following year (358) Julian concentrated on

securing the grain route from Britain by pacifying the Franks in the Lower Rhine region and on further weakening the Alamanni in their own territory. In 359, now that Lower Germany was safe, he restored the fortifications on the Rhine in order to maintain that peace and reestablish Roman dominance.

In 360, after his proclamation as emperor, Julian had to contend with the problem of the Atthuarian Franks who were overrunning the frontier. Once that was taken care of, he examined the fortifications along the length of the Rhine and went to Vienne for the winter. A change in strategy has been shown by Ammianus. Julian was securing the frontier so that it would stand after he left Gaul with the bulk of the Gallic army. In 361 Constantius tried to thwart Julian's attack against him by inducing the Alamanni to raid the areas bordering on Raetia. Julian could not leave Gaul with the army while the area was still being threatened. The neglect of distant frontiers for the sake of civil war had led to waves of barbarian invasions and, even at times, regional usurpations. This, however, was not the case with Julian. Ammianus tells us that as long as he was alive, the barbarians did not breach the frontier. This cannot be attributed to the fortifications alone because, as Ammianus writes, the news of Julian's death caused them to break the peace that he had established with them.

The fortifications, though, were an important part of his overall strategy. Their establishment meant the return of Roman occupation and control. Julian repaired fortifications which helped him carry out his overall strategy. First of all, he repaired the

fort of Saverne in Upper Germany which would block the Germans from raiding into Gaul. Julian did this before the battle of Strasbourg in 357 when the threat in that area had not yet been calmed. The three forts repaired on the Maas in 358 were intended to maintain the peace that had just been established with the Franks, allowing the restoration of the grain route from Britain. Also, these forts could watch the Franks who had just been settled in Roman territory. In 359 Julian reestablished the fortifications on the Lower Rhine, once again creating a boundary between Roman and barbarian land. Ammianus' descriptions of Julian's fortification works seem to have been accurate. The archaeological records show that it is not impossible that these sites did have a building phase under Julian. In fact, the view that these sites were repaired during Julian's campaign is based almost solely on Ammianus' words (except in the case of Druten, or Castra Herculis, about which Libanius seems to comment). It has also been possible to surmise about which three sites are the forts that Ammianus says Julian repaired on the Maas.

As I have discussed on the previous pages, Ammianus has made it possible to study in detail the strategies of Julian's Gallic campaign. Ammianus had an interest in military affairs and he was familiar with the workings of the army, having been a soldier himself. One of the favourite quotations concerning Ammianus is this one from Gibbon: "it is not without the most sincere regret that I must now take leave of an accurate and faithful guide". Ammianus was as accurate and faithful a guide as could be expected from an ancient historian. His partiality towards Julian caused him to obscure details in order to

boost his image. This confusion of facts has made it difficult to determine the exact strategies of the Romans, particularly in 356 and 357. The writings of Ammianus' contemporaries are helpful in determining that in 356 Julian was merely a figurehead and not a great general leading the army to victory. Ammianus gives the impression that Julian was cutting down the Alamanni whom Constantius had been pushing in his direction from Raetia, when in fact this was probably connected to the strategy of the following year. In addition to this, Ammianus also blames the failure of the pincer movement on the evil intentions of Barbatio. It seems more likely that it failed early on in the campaigning season because of Julian's inability to concentrate on the task at hand. Ammianus also insists that the ships and supplies were burned by Barbatio, out of these same malicious intentions, just to keep Julian from having any success. It seems more logical, especially in light of information found in Libanius, to conclude that either the Alamanni burned the ships or that Barbatio burned the ships as well as the supplies to keep them out of German hands. In addition, Ammianus describes Barbatio as being routed by the Germans after trying to cross the Rhine and then, as if he had been victorious, retiring to winter quarters. This may also have been falsified by Ammianus. It is possible that Barbatio was campaigning in Raetia later that same year, an indication that the retreat was not the result of a rout, that the battle season was not near the end and that Julian had ruined the pincer movement almost as soon as it had started. Ammianus strove to contrast the two figures, making Barbatio seem malicious and cowardly, while Julian retains his image of the ideal leader. Ammianus' history seems to have two foremost influences; the first was his military background and knowledge and the second was his desire to laud Julian. The first

influence is pervasive throughout his narrative of Julian's campaigns. However when confronted with the second influence, it can be compromised. Although Ammianus was a superior historian, his ability was occasionally overwhelmed by the use of rhetorical devices for the purpose of glorifying Julian.



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





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