

**A Study of Three Federal Government Programs that Financed
Economic and Business Development Projects in Communities of
Northern Manitoba With Substantial Aboriginal Populations**

by

Neil E. Loughran

A thesis presented to the University of Manitoba in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Interdisciplinary Studies

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**A STUDY OF THREE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS THAT FINANCED
ECCNOMIC AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN COMMUNITIES OF
NORTHERN MANITOBA WITH SUBSTANTIAL ABORIGINAL POPULATIONS**

BY

NEIL E. LOUGHRAN

**A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University
of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree
of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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ABSTRACT:

This dissertation investigates the environment, activities and outcomes of three economic development programs delivered by the Government of Canada to communities of rural, northern Manitoba having substantial Aboriginal populations. These programs, delivered by different sections of essentially one evolving agency, operated over a 19 year period from 1971 to 1989. The research contains both exploratory and quasi-experimental components. Government and client socioeconomic environments are described qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitative data collected through review of administrative files reveal processes of program design, operational patterns and change. Qualitative and quantitative data from nearly 1,600 applications for business financing are used to generate descriptive and analytical statistics concerning characteristics of applicants; the project intent of applicants; program response processes, decisions, and outputs; and project outcomes. Activity flows and attrition rates are explored within a causal systems model. Measures of applicant capacity, and outcome effectiveness and efficiency are applied to project data. Strengths, weaknesses and crucial tradeoffs in program design, given pressures and constraints imposed by the programs' environment, are uncovered. Project and program activity characteristics associated with higher business and employment payoffs are differentiated from project and program activity characteristics associated with lower business and employment payoffs. Points-of-interest and propositions are formulated from literature in the fields of economic development, public policy, and organizational structure and operation. Study findings are brought to bear on the not-testable, points-of-interest. Propositions are tested as formal hypotheses against descriptive and analytical statistics.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background Summary

Until the early 1970's northern and Aboriginal development had been largely neglected by Canadian society, governments and academia. Attention was placed on nation building, settlement, the Great Depression, war and recovery. National recovery and international political stability during the post-war years allowed the country to renew nation building. The north and the conditions of Aboriginal people were two elements of nation building that heretofore had been neglected. As well, there came to be widespread acceptance of a much larger state role in social and economic development, management and stability. As a consequence, from the early 1970's through the late 1980's federal and provincial governments alike substantially increased their efforts at northern and Aboriginal development.

Was the resource base adequate to support these social projects? Certainly the material and financial resources were there for Canada had entered that select tier of wealthy, developed nations. Knowledge about the north and Aboriginal peoples, however, was largely restricted to the fur trade and the processes through which the Indian treaties, registered Indian status and the system of Indian reserves were established. Heady development of the social sciences coupled with the vast increase in the number of trained social scientists and the much greater fiscal capacity of the state combined to make the effort plausible. Despite the Cold War this was an optimistic, development-oriented, period for the western world, particularly for Canada and the United States.

By the early 1970's among the provinces Manitoba was at the forefront of northern and Aboriginal development. The provincial economy was reasonably strong, and the Province's political orientation during most of the 1960's was symbolized by the relatively progressive, Conservative governments of Duff Roblin and Walter Weir. During most of the next two decades, the study period, the province was governed by the social

democratic governments of Premiers Edward Schreyer and Howard Pawley. The north has played an unusually prominent role in Manitoba's social and economic fabric (Map 1-1)(Province of Manitoba 1973, Rothney and Watson 1975, Tough 1987). As defined by the soil and climatic limits of agriculture the north comprises over two-thirds of the Province's land area. The northern fringe is less than two hours driving time from most of the populated south. By the early 1970's mineral, forestry and hydro-electric developments were arguably more widely dispersed across Manitoba's north than across the non-agricultural portions of any other province. Although large-scale northern and Aboriginal development initiatives had attenuated rather abruptly by the end of the 1980's in all provinces, Manitoba had seen the most intensive and sustained initiatives.

The author has been intimately involved in Manitoba Aboriginal and northern development initiatives. His involvement commenced in the early 1970's with work describing northern conditions, and suggesting a method of targeting infrastructural investments for the Planning and Priorities Committee of the Manitoba Cabinet. It continued through a short stint as policy advisor to the federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion and seven years as Director of Program Development and Coordination for Manitoba Northern Affairs. By the end of the study period the author had spent nine years as a professional consultant, much of his work focused on northern and Aboriginal development in Manitoba and Saskatchewan.

This set of circumstances and personal experiences generated the desire to undertake a more distant, reflective and rigorous analysis of what happened. It also provided the author with knowledge of, and credibility to access, data and information largely stored in the administrative files and minds of those who had been involved in these initiatives. The University of Manitoba's graduate Interdisciplinary Studies program and the presence of Dr. John Loxley, who, as Secretary to the Economic and Resource Development Committee of Cabinet in the Government of Manitoba, had spearheaded the Manitoba Government's "Northern Plan" exercise during the late 1970's, at the University of Manitoba created an ideal venue for the author to undertake this study.

There exist few rigorous analyses of large scale, publicly sponsored, business development initiatives in the underdeveloped urban or rural areas of Canada. In the north such work virtually does not exist. A few semi-rigorous analyses exist within government sponsored program evaluations and policy informing documents. These works suffer from absence of theoretical grounding, generally weak research design, administrative focus, closeness in time to their subjects and impaired independence of the researchers. Thus, there is an opportunity to lay a first brick in theory building and testing.

Purpose

This dissertation investigates the operations and effectiveness of the Department of Regional Economic (later Industrial) Expansion. This Department was the principal regional development agency of the federal government involved in the financing of rural and Aboriginal-owned northern businesses over the period 1971 through the end of March, 1989.

Study design is rooted in the presumption that the structure, operation and effects of the programs delivered by this organization were largely driven by the organization's full environment. As a consequence, the structure, operation and effectiveness of the organization's programs are conceived as components of an interactive social system that includes the economy, target population, program clients, and federal and provincial governments. There are two principal implications of this conception of program operation and effects. The first implication is that these programs were not solely, or even largely, driven by an abstract, instrumental, and internalized output or impact rationality directed by, or at least unleashed by, their government "owner". The second implication is that management and staff of the programs did not have *de facto* control of the programs. Neither program management nor staff were selected or programmed to either be totally responsive to the environment or to pursue instrumental rationality. Nor were the programs largely driven by discretionary actions derived from idiosyncratic personal qualities and interests of management and staff.

In particular, it is proposed that the nature and magnitude of the impacts of these programs can be predicted from the interactions among variables from four components of a socioeconomic and organizational cause-and-effect system. These components are:

- the policy, resource and institutional environment within the senior governments, especially the federal government;
- the limits of knowledge concerning the service environment and service production;
- performance of the national and provincial economies; and
- community socioeconomic and institutional conditions.

This dissertation investigates the relationships among such independent environmental variables, and dependent internal variables concerning program structure and operation, outputs and impacts.

The study contains both developmental and experimental elements. It is developmental in that existing theories of development based in the disciplines of business administration, economics, public administration, sociology and business development are not well integrated. As well, existing theory tends to have more to say about the macro- and micro-level behaviour albeit often with gaps in explaining the means by which micro-level actions get translated into macro-level effects, and macro level actions get translated into micro level effects. Since most development theory has been formulated through the study of less-developed nations the applicability of existing theory to less-developed regions of developed nations should be ascertained. The study also contains experimental aspects as the comprehensive data base allows for testing of certain hypotheses. Most of these hypotheses are derived from existing discipline-based theories while some hypotheses have been suggested by persons active in service delivery or applied research.

Structure

The presentation begins, in Chapter 2, with description of the research design, methodology, and data base. Included is a description of the causal systems model which structures data collection, analysis and presentation. Chapter 3 is a review of the salient literature from the disciplines of business administration, economics, public administration, sociology and business administration. This literature is the source of most of the propositions to be tested as formal hypotheses. It is normal, especially for quasi-experimental research, to discuss the literature before the methodology. In this case, however, availability of data is the principal limiting factor and the analysis is largely exploratory. Therefore, it would have been very inefficient (and not true to the approach taken) to discuss a large quantity of literature which could not be addressed given data limitations. Chapter 4 presents the environmental aspects of the causal model. This chapter describes national and provincial economic conditions, socioeconomic conditions within northern Manitoba, and relevant government policy and political conditions. It also includes an overview of the most important complementary, senior government operated, economic and business development programs active in the study area.

Chapter 5 addresses the first consequences of interaction among the environmental variables presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 describes in sum detail parameters and operational styles of the case study programs. Quantitative research concerning program operations begins in Chapter 6. This chapter describes and analyzes the source and characteristics of business development applications put to the programs. Chapter 7 follows with description and analysis of the programs' final decision responses to these applications. Chapter 8 addresses the consequences of the causal model in terms of project financing, project operations, and project outcomes. Findings are synthesized in Chapter 9, the Conclusion, and the propositions generated in Chapter 3 are addressed as formal hypotheses. Policy implications and possible directions for further research also are included in Chapter 9.

Substantial effort went into generating statistical evidence for study

findings. As a result, over 100 tables are included in support of the text. To facilitate reading, most tables have been placed at the end of each chapter. These tables are numbered using a chapter-table number sequence (e.g. Table 5-1, 5-2, etc.). Long statistical tables that were used to generate community specific environmental data and other tables of secondary importance are relegated to the Appendix. Appendix tables are numbered by relevant chapter in the same manner as the end-of-chapter tables are numbered, but are preceded with the designation "Appendix" (e.g. Appendix, Table 4-1; Appendix, Table 4-2; etc.). The few figures and lists are integrated into the table numbering system.

Definitions of Basic Terms

In order to minimize confusion some basic terms require definition. These terms are listed below. Many of them are described and defined more fully in the text. As well, other less frequently used terms are defined in context.

"Northern Manitoba" is the entire portion of Manitoba located north of the southern boundary defining the municipal jurisdiction of the Manitoba *Northern Affairs Act*. The "northern Manitoba fringe" is that area located immediately adjacent to the southern boundary of northern Manitoba.

The "in-area" north is the part of northern Manitoba relevant to this study; that is, the study area (see "study area" below). The "out-area" north is the remaining part of northern Manitoba. "Ex-north" includes all locations outside of northern Manitoba.

"Aboriginal" includes residents of Canada who are registered Indians (also frequently referred to as "Treaty" or "Status" Indians), non-registered Indians (also "non-Treaty" or "non-Status" Indians), Metis or Inuit. A "registered Indian" is an Indian who is registered as an Indian under the *Indian Act* of Canada. The term "other Aboriginal" will define all Aboriginal people who are not registered Indians. The designation "Aboriginal" has largely supplanted the earlier "native" because of perceived negative connotations

attached to "native" and because "native" is often equated with the Metis and non-registered Indian sub-groups only.¹

"Status" refers to one of three categories of racial and legal identity: registered Indian, other Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal.

A "community" is a relatively densely settled area which is "governed" by a named, local, political entity. This local political entity may be an incorporated municipal government (an "organized community"), it may be an unincorporated local political entity under the Manitoba *Northern Affairs Act* (an "unorganized community"), or it may be an Indian reserve under the *Indian Act* of Canada (an "Indian reserve").

A "northern Manitoba Aboriginal community" is a community that is located within northern Manitoba or the fringe area bordering northern Manitoba which, through the period 1971-1991, has maintained a population having a weighted mean of at least 25% percent of the people being of Aboriginal ancestry.

The "study area" includes all northern Manitoba Aboriginal communities and the adjacent lands used by residents of these communities.

"Development" is the unfolding process by which the residents of an area or community utilize their human and non-human resource base relatively more fully and efficiently, given available knowledge and technology, to achieve collective and individual goals as determined through their internal decision-taking processes.

A "less developed" area or community is an area or community whose residents show concentrated, substantially lower levels of well-being compared to the vast majority of residents of the larger polity in which they reside. These areas or communities (1) contain few or poor-quality human or

1. For example, the Native Council of Canada is a national lobby group for Metis and non-registered Indians.

non-human resources, or (2) their residents utilize their human and non-human resource base much less fully and efficiently given available knowledge and technology. As a result, an unusually high proportion of residents and institutions within a less developed area or community require abnormally high subsidization from the larger polity.

The term "program" without an adjective will only refer to one of the three case study programs.

A "complementary program" or "other program" is one of the other business and economic development programs, operated by senior governments, active in the study area.

"Senior government" is a generic term denoting the Government of Canada or Government of Manitoba.

"Local government" is generic term denoting a constitutionally subordinate level of government to the federal or provincial governments. These subordinate governments include cities, towns, villages, rural municipalities and local government districts under the jurisdiction of *The Municipal Act* of Manitoba; communities under the jurisdiction of *The Northern Affairs Act* of Manitoba; and Indian reserves under the jurisdiction of *The Indian Act* of Canada.

A "non-government collective" organization is any non-government, membership organization. These include identity-based and non-identity based provincial, regional and community organizations such as clubs, societies, cooperatives or corporations.

The "study period" covers commencement of program operations in 1971 through termination of the programs at the end of March, 1989.


The terms "business" or "project" are used interchangeably to denote the intended or operating object of an application to the programs.

"Existing business" is an operating business that made application to a program. If the application was successful, the existing business becomes the owner of the new, expanded or revitalized business.

"Applicant" or "owner" refers as a unit to the one or more individual persons or legal entities that made application to a program or that own a financed project.

Acronyms

A number of acronyms are used in place of organizational names and other terms that occur frequently in the text, tables and lists. These acronyms are identified in List 1-2.



MAP 1-1
 NORTHERN MANITOBA
 ● EXCLUDED COMMUNITY

Department of Natural Resources
 MANITOBA

Kilometres 20 0 100 Kilometres

**LIST 1-2
ACRONYMS IN THE STUDY**

CBDB	Canada (Federal) Business Development Bank. An agency of the Government of Canada.
CEDF	Communities Economic Development Fund. An agency of the Government of Manitoba.
CU	Commercial undertaking. The commercial program under the Canada-Manitoba Special ARDA Agreement.
DREE	Department of Regional Economic Expansion, Canada.
DRE/IE	Departments of Regional Economic (or Industrial) Expansion, Canada.
DRIE	Department of Regional Industrial Expansion, Canada.
EBITDA	Net earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization.
EIC	Department of Employment and Immigration Canada.
IEDF	Indian Economic Development Fund. An agency of the Government of Canada.
INAC	Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada.
IR	Indian reserve.
LGD	Local Government District.
NDA	Canada-Manitoba Northern Development Agreement.
NDA2	Canada-Manitoba Northern Development Agreement. Program #2: Resource Opportunity Development.
NEDP	Native Economic Development Program. A program of the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion, Canada.
NEDP3	Native Economic Development Program. Element III: Special Projects.
OC	Organized community or area.
SARDA	Canada-Manitoba Special Agricultural and Rural Development Agreement.
UC	Unorganized community or area.

CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY

Scope

The scope of this research is circumscribed by four key terms: northern Manitoba, Aboriginal communities, senior government business development assistance program, and business development. Further definition of these key phrases generates more precise delineations of geographic area, included programs and the nature of business project assistance services.

Geographic Area

The geographic study area is demarcated by the conjunction: northern Manitoba and Aboriginal communities.

Northern Manitoba is, for the purpose of this study, defined as the area adjacent to, or north of, the southern boundary of the area over which the Manitoba *Northern Affairs Act* establishes municipal authority (Map 1-1).¹ According to this *Act*:

"'Northern Manitoba' means all that part of Manitoba north of the northern boundary of township 21 that is not included in

(a) a wildlife management area or refuge designated as such under *The Wildlife Act*,

(b) a provincial forest designated as such under *The Forest Act*,

1. This is not the only definition of northern Manitoba used by senior governments. Different departments and agencies utilize (ever changing) northern administrative boundaries. In general, if another department's or agency's administrative boundaries of northern Manitoba differ from the Northern Affairs' boundary the difference is that the other department or agency does not include some of the southern portion of the Northern Affairs area (in particular, some part of the area south of the 53th parallel - approximately the latitude of Grand Rapids) in its northern administrative district.

(c) a municipality or local government district, or

(d) any area designated by the Lieutenant Governor in Council for the purposes of this Act." (Legislative Assembly of Manitoba 1988:Chapter N100 pg. 3)

This *Act* enables the provincial government to provide municipal services to, and to promote the development of nascent local government within, that part of Manitoba often referred to as the "unorganized" north. The southern boundary of this sparsely populated area is largely coterminous with the northern boundary of the province's agricultural zone. Since at least the early 1970's this area has been known in Manitoba as "northern Manitoba" or just "the north." As well, the provincial and federal governments have used this boundary when defining northern Manitoba for the purposes of federal-provincial agreements. Federal government agencies generally consider this area part of Canada's "mid-north."

With the exception of the major population centres that have developed around base-metal mines, hydro-electric generating stations, integrated pulp-and- paper mills and the Pasquia agricultural area near The Pas, this area is viewed as, in lay language, poor or "undeveloped". A conjunction of historical, geophysical, climatic, and cultural factors have challenged business and economic development within the area. Even the developed population centre with the most diverse economic base, The Pas, located in the west-central part of northern Manitoba, has an economy that is affected by the volatile forest industry.¹

In the years from 1970 through 1991 there existed 107 communities within northern Manitoba. The phrase "there existed" is used because a substantial number of communities in northern Manitoba, perhaps more so than communities in the southern part of the Province, are created or cease to exist within relatively short periods of time. There are three reasons for this volatile lifespan of northern communities: changes in the economics or

1. The reader is reminded that Chapter 3 includes a summary of the historical development of northern Manitoba and Chapter 4 describes the socioeconomic characteristics of northern Manitoba communities.

reserve life of exploitable natural resources, socio-political fracturing within communities such that one or more subgroups of the population leave to establish new communities, and changes in the local government status of an existing community (i.e. a non-Indian reserve community becomes an Indian reserve).

The second part of the conjunction defining the geographic study area is that a northern Manitoba community be substantially populated by Aboriginal people. A community is considered substantially Aboriginal if it has a population that is at least 25% Aboriginal over most of the study period. The proportion of the community population that is Aboriginal is based on reasonably reliable data buttressed, where necessary, by the opinion of a person independent of the community who is considered knowledgeable because his or her work frequently concerns the community. Of 107 communities, 96 meet the criterion of "substantially Aboriginal." These 96 communities, in turn, are grouped into 25 local areas. The process used to generate the 96 communities and 25 local areas, and the distribution of communities by type is described in Chapter 4.

Included Programs

To be included the primary purpose of a program must be the development of businesses in northern Manitoba Aboriginal communities and the program must be operated a senior level of government.¹ From 1971 through 1989 eight federal and provincial organizations operated business development programs with substantial clienteles located in northern Manitoba Aboriginal communities. These eight organizations include both line departments and Crown corporations. The Governments of Canada and Manitoba each controlled four of these organizations. Listed below are these organizations and the programs operated by each organization that had a

1. Senior governments may take actions other than purposely designed programs to promote business development. For example, the government may purchase the product of a business to indirectly provide cash flow to the business. Such actions are not within the scope of this study.

substantial clientele located in northern Manitoba Aboriginal communities. The nature of these organizations, and the services and size of each program are further described in Chapter 4.

One of the four federal government business development organizations was the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE)(renamed during the latter part of this period as the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE)).¹ This Department (henceforth, the continuing organization will be referred to by the acronym DRE/IE) operated the following programs: Special ARDA Commercial, the Native Economic Development Program, and Programs #1 and #2 of the Canada-Manitoba Northern Development Agreement. The second federal organization was the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC). INAC operated an Economic Development Branch and the Indian Economic Development Fund. The third federal organization was the Canada Business Development Bank (CBDB). The fourth federal organization was Employment and Immigration Canada (EIC). EIC operated the Local Employment Assistance Program, the Local Employment Assistance Development program, and, at the very end of the study period, the Community Futures program.

The first of the four principal provincial business development organizations was the Communities Economic Development Fund (CEDF). CEDF operated a single northern Manitoba business financing program throughout the period. The second organization, the Department of Northern Affairs, operated the Special ARDA Primary producer program and an Economic Development Branch. The third organization, the Department of Cooperative Development provided financing and organizational advice to producer and consumer cooperatives. A fourth provincial organization, the Department of Industry, Trade and Technology included a Community Development Branch that focussed on broader based community initiatives.

This study addresses the northern Manitoba business development programs of the DRE/IE. The particular DRE/IE programs of interest are:

1. This Department no longer exists.

Special ARDA Commercial (SARDA), the Native Economic Development Program Element 3 (NEDP3), and Program #2 of the Northern Development Agreement (NDA2). This set of three programs has been selected for a number of reasons:

- These programs are, in essence, the set of business financing programs targeted at northern Aboriginal communities by a single, continuing, organizational and policy stream within the federal government.
- The records of this organizational and policy stream span the period from inception of large-scale programming of this type through the full expansion and denouement of such programming.
- This set of programs represent, by far, the highest level of expenditure on business development for Aboriginal communities within a defined geographic region of the Province.
- Finally, and not least in importance, the author was able to gain access to the program and project files of this program set.

Inclusion of data concerning the operations and outputs of certain of the other programs would certainly have added further insight and greater power to the findings. Preliminary feelers to senior personnel responsible for or within these programs indicate, however, that access to data from these other programs would involve legal difficulties, problematic records storage, or extensive travel. As well, the more than one year it took to negotiate access to the DRE/IE records, the nearly one year spent collecting file data, and the many months required to clean and code data suggest that inclusion of these other programs would not have been possible within the time available in the doctoral program.

Relevant Business Applications

The research focuses on business development. A set of decision criteria were used to determine which business applications should be studied. Definition of the geographic community set, as described above, plus proposed businesses to be located in a non-community area of unorganized northern Manitoba determine the *potential* set of relevant

business applications. A second criterion is that the proposed business must intend to benefit owners or employees resident in a northern Manitoba Aboriginal community. Intent to benefit owners or employees resident in a community exists if at least one of the prospective owners of a business project is resident in such a community *or* if the majority of prospective full-time-equivalent jobs in the business are destined for residents located in such a community.

A final criterion is that the applicant intends, according to his or her project application, to operate a business. A "business" is an organizational component of economic development.

Economic development is, of course, only one aspect of the broader process of development. Whether proceeding in a balanced or an uneven manner this broader development process includes related social, political, and cultural aspects of development. For the purpose of this study, economic activities are defined as those activities intending to create or maintain well-being by adding value to a good or service. The intended monetary value, according to generally accepted accounting standards, of the good or service when transferred to a purchaser, whether the purchaser is within or outside the community, must be greater than the monetary value of the sum of inputs used in producing the good or service. This value-added, in turn, is distributed to the factors of production as profits, wages and depreciation. A business is defined as an organization whose primary purpose is to structure and control a set of economic activities so as to realize, over the medium term, sufficient value-added to maintain its existence.¹ For the purpose of this study the medium term within which intended self-sufficiency must occur is within and up to five years.² A

1. Unless a region or community "benefits" from external transfers, to develop it must generate value-added and such value-added must come through organization. It must be recognized, however, that not every value-added activity of a business organization necessarily is a net increment to the region's or community's development.

2. A five year horizon has been chosen because there are a number of cases where applicant or program three-year pro-formas show net losses, but the program accepted the application or approved financing on the basis of a non-quantified prediction of viability.

business "project" is a set of such prospective or actual activities that is mutually accepted, explicitly or by implied action, as a unit to be adjudicated or negotiated for receipt of assistance, by both an applicant to a government program offering financial or other assistance, and the government program that received such application. The applicant may be an existing or prospective business organization, or it may be a third party proponent.

These definitions have profound implications for the scope of this study. Firstly, applications that entail sets of "for-profit" activities or sets of local social service activities that are to be self-sufficient through the "sale" of services are included in the study. Secondly, applications that entail planning, training, and other activities intended to create and directly support business projects are not included unless they are to be self-sufficient "for profit" activities. Thirdly, excluded are applications which entail activities that are to be short-term; to be make-work; to provide or maintain community infrastructure; or to provide social, health or cultural services, but that do not meet the criteria of a set of economic activities. As a consequence, a large number¹ of applications to the programs are not included in this study.

Issues and Hypotheses to be Addressed

The dissertation is primarily exploratory in that it investigates public policy issues, and sets of cause and effect linkages concerning business development in northern Aboriginal communities. Investigation involves: (1) uncovering attributes that define analytically useful and empirically supportable conceptual categories, and (2) determining the relative strength of possible relationships among variables defining elements in a causal model of a public-service driven, business development system.² Exploratory analysis is conducted in the spirit of grounded theory development. In their

1. But certainly less than 100 (or less than 6% of the applications studied).

2. This causal model is described below.

seminal discussion of the development of grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss (1967) stress the importance of "saturation" and richness in the generation and description of conceptual categories. They point out the usefulness of constructing comparison groups to explore the properties of such categories. To inform the generation of substantive theory they suggest examining relationships among categories at various levels of generality.

The study is experimental in the spirit of Popper's classic metascientific method (Wisdom 1987A:73-85). It seeks explanation through tests, of stated, falsifiable, hypothetical relationships derived from the literature. These tests are conducted from a critical, skeptical position. Surviving a test of falsification provides corroboration to the relationship, not confirmation. It also is experimental in the spirit of logical-positivist metascience; that is, the building of theory from observation (Wisdom 1987B: 42-43). Following this metascience the study contains tests of hypotheses, at various levels of generality, among various sub-categories, and under different conditions, of hypotheses. The metasciences of both Popper and logical-positivism utilize the propositional form for experimental design.

The exploratory approach also addresses a number of public policy issues regarding northern Aboriginal community business development.

The Primary Public Policy Issues

The public policy issues to be explored are listed below. Each issue demands description of the concepts at play and examination of a set of possible systematic relationships. Each issue has, as its foundation, hypothetical cause-and-effect linkages. These cause-and-effect relations, in turn, are embedded in a social production model of broad-scale, publicly sponsored, business development services.

1. How did the programs obtain their policy, resource, structural and operational attributes? In particular, to what extent is the nature of the programs related to attributes of the:
 - A. government environment?
 - B. programs' self-awareness of their relationship to their environment and their performance?
2. To what extent are characteristics of the applicants related to attributes of the:
 - A. programs?
 - B. government environment?
 - C. community environment?
 - D. larger economic environment?
3. To what extent are the kinds of business projects proposed by applicants related to attributes of the:
 - A. program applicants?
 - B. programs?
 - C. government environment?
 - D. community environment?
 - E. larger economic environment?
4. To what extent is the nature of assistance requested by applicants related to attributes of the:
 - A. proposed project?
 - B. applicant?
 - C. programs?
 - D. government environment?
 - E. community environment?
 - F. larger economic environment?
5. To what extent are decision outcomes for applications related to attributes of the:
 - A. applications?
 - B. applicants?

- C. programs?
 - D. government environment?
 - E. community environment?
 - F. larger economic environment?
6. To what extent are the performances of business projects that received assistance related to attributes of the:
- A. decision outcomes?
 - B. application?
 - C. applicant?
 - D. program?
 - E. government environment?
 - F. community environment?
 - G. larger economic environment?

Included in program attributes are the findings of post-assistance project monitoring.

7. To what extent is the impact efficiency of the programs related to attributes of the:
- A. project?
 - B. applicant?
 - C. program?
 - D. government environment?
 - E. community environment?
 - F. larger economic environment?

Impact efficiency is defined by three ratios: cost per year of project lifespan, cost per surviving project, and cost per person-year of employment created.

Testing Hypotheses

The dissertation will be experimental in that it will test hypotheses derived from the literature. Propositions underlying the hypotheses are generated in Chapter 3. These propositions are transformed into operational hypotheses and are rejoined in Chapter 9.

Chapter 1 notes the dearth of analyses of broad-scale, publicly-sponsored, business development initiatives in northern Canada. The data gathered for, and the analysis of, the above noted public policy issues generates much descriptive information that may be of interest to those who design, manage or work in, or wish study such initiatives.

The Causal Model of the Service Production System

The general method pursued by this investigation will be to test a causal model of the social system in which the business development programs are embedded. The generic characteristics of the model are derived from systems theory.

A causal relationship, X causes Y, must satisfy the following conditions (Asher 1976:11-12, Heise 1975:16):

1. X cannot be existing prior to the period of the experiment.
2. There must be an operator responding to X that generates Y.
3. The operator must be present when X occurs.
4. Time must elapse between the occurrence of event X and event Y.
5. There must be covariation between X and Y.

The causal social system that is the subject of this study can be visually portrayed by a path diagram. The path diagram facilitates structured analysis and presentation. It also facilitates interpretation by focussing attention on substantive cause-and-effect links. According to Asher

(1976:33) a causal-path model must meet three conditions:

1. no causal path may pass through the same variable more than once;
2. no causal sequence may go backward on itself after a later causal sequence in the path has gone ahead; and
3. no causal path may pass through an unanalyzed correlation between exogenous variables more than once.

The strength of a causal link, the causal effect, is expressed as a probability or regression coefficient. A causal effect will be direct, indirect or spurious.

A spurious effect means one or more causal linkages are not included within the model. An overdetermined, recursive model has left out one or more causal linkages. In correctly specified models:

- the probability of an effect between two variables is the sum of the products of the probabilities of each set of paths linking the two variables, and
- the correlation between any two variables is equal to the sum of the correlations of the simple and compound paths linking the two variables (Asher 1976:34).

A causal model has been designed to give analytical structure to this study - especially to the exploratory aspects of the study. This overall causal model is presented in Figure 2-1. There are eight components of the model. The overall causal action flow among these components is that a service "supply" flow combines with a service "demand" flow, to form an interactive service "production" flow, producing as output a system "results" flow. The program service "supply" flow is displayed in Figure 2-2. The government-economy-community service "demand" flow is displayed in Figure 2-3. The service "production" flow is displayed in Figure 2-4. The service "results" flow is displayed in Figure 2-5. Before describing these causal flows the elements "A"-"O" embedded in the eight components are described briefly.

Component #1: The external government environment consists of two elements:

- a. the policy and expenditure patterns of those aspects of the federal and provincial governments that are relevant to this study, and
- b. the policy, resources and outputs of programs other than the case study programs whose client target included the Aboriginal communities of northern Manitoba and who provided substantial services to this area.

Component #2: Program organization includes three elements:

- c. the formalized policy or intent of the program,
- d. the monetary and staff resources of the program, and
- e. the structure of the program describing how policy and staff were organized for service production.

Component #3: Program self-awareness has only one element:

- f. program self-awareness operations describing the documented findings of cogitation, done by of for program staff, concerning the program environment or program performance.

Component #4: The external economy also contains one element:

- g. the performance of the national and provincial economies.

Component #5: The community environment contains two elements:

- h. select community socioeconomic conditions and
- i. existing businesses in the communities.

Component #6: Program-project interaction contains four elements:

- j. project applicants to the programs,
- k. applications to the programs as submitted by applicants,
- l. program operations and decisions with respect to applications received, and
- m. the resulting outputs to the projects from the programs.

Component #7: Project capacity contains one element:

- n. the resulting resources available to projects.

Component #8: System outputs also contains a single element:

- o. project performance.**

The inter-element linkages of the "service supply" causal path begin with external government policy and expenditures. In time period #1 the model suggests that government policy determines a program's formalized policy. Government expenditures affect the amount and characteristics of program resources. In time period #2 the model suggests that program policy and resources, knowledge of the policies and resources of other programs, and self-awareness of operations are combined to create a program operating structure.¹ The "service supply" path does not account for the possibility that elements of the community environment and state of the external economy may affect elements of the government environment.

The inter-element linkages of the "service demand" causal path also begin at time period #1. Health of the external economy affects community socioeconomic conditions and existing community businesses. In time period #2 community socioeconomic conditions influence the number and nature of community businesses. In time period #3 other programs, performance of the external economy, community socioeconomic conditions, and existing community businesses stimulate project applicants. Applicants generate service applications. The "service demand" path does not account for the possibility that elements of the government environment directly affect elements of the community environment, or the possibility that the program operating structure directly generates or influences the nature of client demand.

The inter-element linkages of the "service production" path begin at time period #4. In response to applications and the level of project support offered by other programs, program operations commence service administration and decisions, and produce service outputs.

1. The processing of applications in time period #4, and the occurrence of service outputs and project outcomes in time periods #5 and #6 of round #1 feed self-awareness back to the program operating structure in time period #2 of round #2.

The inter-element linkages of the "service results" path begin in time period #5. Program outputs and the outputs of other programs jointly affect characteristics of project resources. In time period #6 characteristics of project resources together with performance of the external economy and community socioeconomic conditions affect project, and therefore system, performance.

Variables

Each element of the causal model is described by a set of variables. Each variable set should be sufficient to efficiently drive required analyses. As well, each variable set should be unambiguous in meaning and have at least face validity.

The specific variables on which empirical data were gathered are listed in the chapter in which they are initially used. There are 314 individual variables in the model. The nature of these variables per component of the causal model is summarized in Table 2-6.

The Data

The Policy, Research and Advocacy Branch of Aboriginal Economic Programs, Industry Science and Technology Canada in Ottawa, the successor organization to the DRE/IE Aboriginal economic programs, kindly offered access to its Manitoba program and project files. Most of these files are stored in the federal government's Winnipeg Records storage facility (Appendix: Table 2-1), certain policy files may be held by Aboriginal Economic Programs in Ottawa. A formal request for access to files was submitted and formal approval of access with conditions was received.

Two conditions of access constrain the study. One condition requires that information concerning individual businesses remains confidential. Therefore, names of applicants, proposed owners, and business names are not given. As well, since it may be possible to identify an applicant, owner,

or business by knowledge of recent community history, whenever data from project applications, approvals or performance is presented in conjunction with community socioeconomic data the results are grouped so as to virtually eliminate the ability to identify projects. The second condition of access is that there be no contact with applicants, owners, businesses or local residents concerning projects or the programs. These constraints were necessary in light of recent court judgments regarding confidentiality of commercial files held by the federal government.

With approval of the Ottawa headquarters of the Aboriginal Economic Program the author was able to review, in advance of commencement of data collection, a variety of program "project" files. Most files were closed between 1977 and 1990, although some remained open as of 1994. All files were opened during the 1970-1989 study period. As well, expectations as to the nature and quantity of file data were verified with a number of individuals who had previously worked as managers or staff of the programs. From these reviews the project variable set was revised so as to be consistent with data that would likely be available. Dimensions of the expected projects data-base were estimated and data collection instruments were drafted. It was also verified that all administrative files pertaining to the programs were stored in the same location as the project files.

Of 314 variables, 241 contain original data and 73 are derived from the original data. Data on 27 variables come from program administrative files, data on 148 variables come from project files and data on 66 variables come from other sources (primarily data on the external economy and community socioeconomic conditions).

Data at the level of aggregate summaries of activity and expenditures in program administrative files were generally weak or difficult to interpret. Such data appear rather piecemeal with changing categorizations to fit the demands of (frequently changing) administrative reporting systems rather than to meet the need for organizational performance control. As well, as a source for information from introspective analyses by the programs the administrative files were surprisingly weak. The description and analysis of program documents in Chapter 5 in large measure compensates for the

weakness of aggregate descriptive and analytical documents and, perhaps, explains the weakness.¹

The nature of project file records and the demands of analysis require data from the universe of projects addressed by the programs. Project file records list, by program and period in which the project file was closed, only the project name. It was not possible to establish in advance the project universe because a substantial number of the project files pertained to projects located outside the study area as well as projects that were not intended to become viable businesses. A substantial proportion of the project files contain partially duplicate, but also partially complementary, data in two sets of records. These partially duplicate files were closed at differing times and not all of the duplicate files had the same project names. As well, the number of cell entries had to be sufficient to support statistical requirements for disaggregate analysis of cross-tabulation tables. This issue became more salient when it was found that some of the data that were supposed to be included in project processing forms and analyses were not present in many, and in certain cases most, files.

Much of the required data from project files was not succinctly summarized. Required data are usually buried among sometimes hundreds of short documents, predominately correspondence and financial calculations. The order of data appearing in a file is not consistent. Thus, direct entry on an electronic spreadsheet proved to be most efficient. This method allowed for easy scrolling, back and forth, through sets of related variables. As well, since groups of data often repeated (such as the names, residences and status of applicants) the spreadsheet facilitated copying among cells upon entry. Since spreadsheet space was required for multiple entries on some of the project files, additional data entry columns were required per project

1. The reader will find that there is much more information available on SARDA than on NDA2 or NEDP3. In summary, there are four reasons for this. SARDA was the first northern rural small business financing program. Therefore this program broke new ground during the first years of its life. SARDA operated twice as long as the other two programs. NDA2 was designed to put money out quickly, and to minimize analysis and other operational costs. The cogitative attention of NEDP was placed on the creation of local financial institutions not on direct business financing through NEDP3.

record. Data was entered and saved, and certain analyses were done on Borland *Quattro-Pro 4.0* spreadsheets. Spreadsheet data were converted to ASCII files, then imported into a Borland *Paradox 3.5* database and SPSS Inc.'s *SPSSPC* for manipulation and analyses.

The size of the original project data spreadsheets makes them very unwieldy. Therefore, project spreadsheet files were grouped into units that are both analytically useful and that correspond to the primary components of a project's original paper file. These units contain data that are pertinent to the initial "screen" application, to the "full" follow-up application, to the resulting program decision, and to program outputs and project performance.

Data concerning the longevity of assisted projects were obtained from, in addition to the DRE/IE project files, the Manitoba Telephone System's annual provincial phone books, a publication of Manitoba Industry, Trade and Technology, INAC and Manitoba Northern Affairs *Community Profiles*, an unpublished printout from INAC, provincial tourism directories, and a publication from a private firm called *Arrowfax*.

Non-project data come from a variety of primary and secondary sources. Data concerning the external economy were obtained from Statistics Canada and Manitoba Natural Resources published sources, and from unpublished Manitoba Hydro records and documents. Generation of an aggregate picture of the northern Manitoba economy was difficult. Data from differing sources had to be pieced together, and an elaborate estimation algorithm had to be developed for one important source, Manitoba Hydro. The limitations of this data are explained, as appropriate, in conjunction with their presentation and use.

Data concerning community socioeconomic conditions were procured from published, unpublished and custom tabulation sources within INAC, the Manitoba Bureau of Statistics, Manitoba Northern Affairs, and Statistics Canada. Data concerning non-assisted community businesses come from Manitoba Telephone System's provincial phone books. Collection of community socioeconomic data was fraught with problems taking an excessive amount of time to work through. Statistics Canada, the primary

source, does not publish data at the census subdivision level on individual unorganized communities. This problem was overcome, in part, through Manitoba Northern Affairs published data and available custom tabulations from Statistics Canada. As well, Statistics Canada's published data at the census subdivision level from the 1976 census only covered a limited number of variables.¹ Additional data on the unorganized communities could have been gathered by purchasing enumeration-area custom tabulations from Statistics Canada. As well, certain 1971 and 1976 data could have been collected by purchasing custom tabulations from Statistics Canada. These custom tabulations would have cost in the order of \$500 each. The author purchased a number of documents including a custom tabulation from the Statistics Canada's 1991 *Aboriginal People's Survey*, but the prospect of paying over \$2,000 for custom tabulations whose utility was not known and highly suspect because of small area data suppression became excessive. The limitations of this data are also explained, as appropriate, in conjunction with their presentation and use.

All dollar amounts, unless otherwise noted, have been translated into 1990 constant dollars. Revaluation is based on changes to the consumer price index for Canada (Table 2-7).

Analytical Tools

Statistical analysis utilized *SPSSPC Base* and *Advanced Statistics* programs. In addition to basic statistical descriptors, two analytical statistical techniques are utilized. These are multiple linear regression for continuous interval and dummy variables, and logistic regression for testing the association of a dichotomous dependent variable with categorical and continuous independent variables.

1. The Winnipeg office of Statistics Canada lost the only apparent copy of an unpublished microfiche containing census subdivision data from the 1971 census.

FIGURE 2-1
OVERVIEW OF THE CAUSAL MODEL





FIGURE 2-2
THE CAUSAL MODEL: CAUSAL LINKS CONCERNING SERVICE SUPPLY



**FIGURE 2-3
THE CAUSAL MODEL: CAUSAL LINKS CONCERNING SERVICE DEMAND**




FIGURE 2-4
THE CAUSAL MODEL: CAUSAL LINKS CONCERNING SERVICE PRODUCTION




FIGURE 2-5
THE CAUSAL MODEL: CAUSAL LINKS CONCERNING SERVICE RESULTS




TABLE 2-6
VARIABLES DEFINING COMPONENTS OF THE CAUSAL MODEL, A SUMMARY

Variables Concerning the External Government Environment

- senior government northern business and economic development policy
- purposes, services and capacity of complementary programs

Variables Concerning Program Organization

- defining and structuring aspects including controlling government, purposes, service area and services
- monetary and staff resources available and expended
- resources for service production including organizational structure, location, and inter-program relations
- processes used to control service production

Variables Concerning Program Self-Awareness

- documentation concerning project services and performance

Variables Concerning the External Economy

- provincial economic performance (production and employment)
- performance of select industries important to the northern economy (commercial fishing, forestry and trapping, hydro development and mineral production)

Variables Concerning the Community Environment

- demographics including Aboriginal status
- income and employment
- accessibility
- level of education
- culture
- community legal status
- existing community businesses

TABLE 2-6 (Cont.)
VARIABLES DEFINING COMPONENTS OF THE CAUSAL MODEL, A SUMMARY

Variables Concerning Project Applicants

- number and status of persons involved
- current residence
- current location if an existing business
- current ownership and legal status of existing businesses
- current products and markets if an existing business
- number and nature of previous applications
- assistance previously received, if any

Variables Concerning Project Applications

- applicant's goal
- proposed ownership and legal status
- proposed location(s)
- proposed products and markets
- proposed 3 year financial plan
- proposed employment
- assistance requested from target and other programs

Variables Concerning Program Processing of Applications

- decisions and decision times
- go, no go, withdraw, or revise decisions
- approved goal
- approved ownership and legal status
- approved startup date
- approved location(s)
- approved product(s) and market(s)

TABLE 2-6 (Cont.)
VARIABLES DEFINING COMPONENTS OF THE CAUSAL MODEL, A SUMMARY

- approved 3 year financial plan
- approved employment creation
- approved program assistance

Variable Concerning Program Outputs

- assistance provided

Variables Concerning Project Resources

- assistance actually provided by the target program
- assistance actually provided by other programs

Variables Concerning Project Performance

- project ownership
 - project location(s)
 - product(s) and market(s)
 - three year financial performance
 - employment created
 - information on project problems from monitoring
 - project lifespan
-
-

**TABLE 2-7
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR CANADA
(\$1990 = 100)**

Year	Index
1970	25.9
1971	26.7
1972	27.9
1973	30.1
1974	33.4
1975	37.0
1976	41.4
1977	42.9
1978	46.8
1979	51.0
1980	56.2
1981	63.2
1982	70.0
1983	74.1
1984	77.3
1985	80.3
1986	83.7
1987	87.4
1988	90.9
1989	95.4
1990	100.0

Sources:

1994 from "Table 4. Consumer Price Index for Canada, All-items (Not Seasonally Adjusted), 1969-1994, 1986 = 100." Statistics Canada 1995(Jan.):18.

1969-93 from "Table 8. Consumer Price Index for Canada, All-items (Not Seasonally Adjusted), 1969-1993, 1986 = 100." Statistics Canada 1994:22.

CHAPTER 3 THE LITERATURE

Introduction

Program and project data collected to flesh-out the causal model provide an opportunity to test various hypotheses or explore certain concepts explicitly or implicitly present in the interdisciplinary literature on development. Some of this literature provides either (1) propositions amenable to restatement as hypotheses subject to testing by the data collected or (2) concepts amenable to exploration using the data collected. This literature is summarized below.

The propositions and points-of-interest to be explored are itemized to facilitate analytical focus. Propositions are restated and answered in hypothesis form in Chapter 9, the Conclusion.

The literature concerning the economic and socio-political aspects of development is discussed first. This is followed by discussion of the literature on government program design and operation.

Available literature concerning the study area and programs is largely descriptive, much of it is not published. This literature is discussed primarily in Chapters 4 and 5, the Environment and Case Study Program Parameters, respectively. Some of this work is brought into later chapters when relevant. Literature concerning Aboriginal-controlled business development is both sparse and dominated by descriptive case studies not well informed by business development, economic development or organizational theory. Therefore, this literature is not discussed.

Perspectives on Development

Economic Aspects of Development

Development economists have proposed various models of economic development. A primary typology of these models might be: the capitalist, free-market model (the "neoclassical" model); the socialist, command-economy model; the capitalist, mixed-economy model; and the "independentist" model. Each of these models is an "ideal" abstraction that magnifies or concentrates its distinguishing feature. The economy of northern Manitoba clearly is not a socialist, command-economy; therefore, this model will be dropped from further discussion. Because of a relatively high level of senior and local government involvement in the economy and businesses within the region, however, the northern Manitoba economy contains components of each of the other three "ideal" models.

A key feature of the neoclassical model of development is, of course, minimalist government. Adherents to this approach hold that government should not intervene in the economy other than to ensure the existence of competitive markets for goods, services and factors of production, the free flow of resources, the rule of criminal and contract law, the safety of citizens and private property from external or internal threats, low levels of uncertainty and the maintenance of a stable currency. They argue that if such conditions exist the economy will develop its optimum pattern of output, given resource constraints. Comparative advantage, competition and trade are the forces to bring about this result.

A thoroughgoing neoclassical economist will argue that societies are materially poor because either one or more of the above conditions are absent¹, or because of resource limitations.

Advocates of the neoclassical model are suspicious of government

1. Because of restraints on trade, lack of a civil society, lack of democracy, inept monetary management, or an externally generated shock such as a natural disaster or war.

involvement in the economy. They argue that government, responding to immediate political pressure or because of blundering, will inevitably block any one or more of the conditions of growth (except externally generated shock). They are also likely to be suspicious of non-government, collective organizations in the economic sphere. Such collective organizations are thought to distort, or bring too many local sociocultural constraints into, the decision rationale for exchange within the organization, and trade between the organization and its environment.¹

This neoclassical model suggests the following propositions:

- *Business development will be more successful in areas with fewer political constraints to the exchange of goods, services and resources.*
- *Business development will be more successful in areas where government is least involved in activities outside the limited sphere specified by this model.*
- *Businesses that are not owned or controlled by governments or other collectivities will be more successful than those businesses that are owned or controlled by governments or other collectivities.*

The neoclassical model also suggests the following proposition:

- *Business development will be more successful in areas with fewer social constraints to the exchange of goods, services and resources.*

Resource limitations may be geographic, geophysical, biological or human. The following propositions are suggested:

1. There is a rich literature on the effects of culture on organizations. For example, see Ajifervke and Boddewyn 1970, Aldrich and Pfeffer 1975, Child 1972, Child and Tayeb 1983, Hessling 1973, Hofstede 1981, Inzerilli 1981, Negandhi and Reiman 1972, Sjoberg, Vaughn and Williams 1984, and Stinchcombe 1985; also see the various articles in England, Negandhi and Wilpert 1979, Lammers and Hickson 1979, and Negandhi 1970. For an unpublished elaboration of this argument and application of it to community based economic development organizations within developed economies see Loughran 1985 and for an unpublished further elaboration of this argument and its application to Aboriginal organizations see Loughran 1990.

- *Business development will be more successful in areas with greater non-human resource endowment.*
- *Business development will be more successful in areas with better educated, more experienced, human resources.*

Most economists accept the premise that uncertainty and volatility are not good for business. Uncertainty and volatility place a risk premium on investment in plant, equipment and labour. As well, with higher risk a proportionally greater amount of resources, especially capital, must be held in less productive, highly liquid form as in extra territorial cash deposits (Hirschman 1958:21-22). Difficulties in applying the accounting rationale for business planning and operational performance under conditions of uncertainty also limit the potential benefits from, and the ability to prepare, a strategic plan and management control system.¹ This discussion suggests the following propositions:

- *Business development will be more successful in areas where there is greater personal safety.*
- *Business development will be more successful in areas where there is greater safety of private property.*
- *Business development will be more successful in areas where there are lower levels of economic, social or political uncertainty.*

The appropriate form of mixed economy is seen to be a consequence of pragmatic choice. This economy contains private and public ownership, and it contains some competitive markets while other markets are restricted by government. Government has major role in the provision of public goods, and in maintaining a stable and encouraging political, social and economic environment. Externally resident, non-government agents participate as important economic agents.

Most proponents of mixed-economy models of development stress the importance of encouraging close, dense links among businesses. Broad interpretations of such links include the exchange of products, services, and

1. The importance of universalist, accounting for productive rationality and efficiency will surfaces again when Weberian bureaucracy is discussed later in the chapter.

business ideas and "culture" among businesses.¹² Prominent in the literature is discussion of the flow of "intermediate" goods and services³. A forward linkage is, from the standpoint of a selling business, the sale of an intermediate good or service it produces to another business which, in turn, uses the intermediate good or service as an input. Likewise, a backward linkage is, from the standpoint of a purchasing business, the intermediate input it bought.

Hirschman argues that linkage effects induced by changes to economic activity in one business can induce entrepreneurial activity in other businesses (1958:27-28,40-44,100-104). Hirschman also argues that producers stimulate local production of the intermediate inputs they require, and induce additional uses and purchasers of their products. According to Klaassen and Paelinck (1974:39-44) minimizing distance to suppliers of inputs is an important factor to the success of development projects.

Perroux's growth poles are broader in scope, they extend into the political, social and administrative spheres. His growth poles are innovative, propulsive industries that become concentrated in dominant action spaces⁴. There are spread or linkage effects radiating from these growth poles and their axes. "...The pole of development is a set that has the capacity to engender a dialectic of economic and social structures whose effect is to increase the complexity of the whole and to expand its multidimensional return" (Perroux 1988:49). His general theory of active units allows actors to have the power to change their environment, these actors "...create their own, abstract spaces of decision and operation..." (Perroux 1988:51-52).

1. Economic linkages also have their corollaries in management and administrative theory. These corollaries are discussed later in the chapter.

2. The meaning of "culture" is also discussed later in this chapter.

3. Intermediate goods and services are goods and services not moving to final consumption or export. They are used as inputs in a later stage of production or service provision.

4. Perroux's growth poles are not geographical spaces, they are abstract activity spaces.

The image of the economic system is one of economic space and territorial space created by agents according to their degree of efficiency and their powers. The most powerful are economic space-makers. Unequal agents making decisions about unequal units and unequal structured subsets (industries) exercise asymmetric effects upon one another, the most favourable of which (from the point of view of development) being propulsive effects.

There are primary and secondary poles, liaison effects exist at the extremes of transportation lines and lateral liaison effects at the axes, and there are "conjunctive effects" between techniques. Policy choice has to do with "...the choice of the motor and the management of the environment in which it is to exert its propulsive effects" (Perroux 1988:56). The intent is "...to increase the number and thrust of the active, dynamic elements, and to stimulate the diffusion of their influences throughout the economic and social entities that are acted upon" (Perroux 1988:67).

According to Perroux a development area is created when multiple growth poles are linked. Like Klaassen and Paelinck, Perroux argues that businesses should face minimal spatial and psycho-social distances to suppliers of inputs. Neo-classical economists also agree that, other things being equal, the cost-distance to suppliers of inputs and markets should be minimized.

There is a counter argument to this positive view of improved access. Proponents of the protection of infant industries or of outright autarky claim obstructions to accessibility can improve economic development by limiting "destructive" competition, and by increasing internal expenditure multipliers (Thomas 1974). The infant industry and autarky policies are, however, advocated for nation states. Restrictions to accessibility in smaller areas within developed countries, such as advocated by the Manitoba Government's "Northern Plan," do not restrict accessibility *per se*, but restrict it to certain economic *opportunities* such as the geographic sources of ownership or labour (Loxley 1981).

The following propositions can be derived from the work of Hirschman, Klassen and Paelinck, and Perroux as summarized above:

- *Denser linkages among businesses within a less developed area will improve business success.*
- *More attempts will be made to create businesses if there are denser linkages among businesses within a less developed area.*
- *More attempts will be made to create businesses as a result of backward linkages from existing businesses seeking intermediate inputs than as a result of forward linkages from existing businesses seeking potential customers.*
- *Businesses created as a result of backward linkages from existing businesses seeking intermediate inputs will be more successful than businesses created as a result of forward linkages from existing businesses seeking potential customers.*
- *More attempts will be made to create businesses, other things being equal, in locations that are more accessible to primary locations of customers or suppliers.*
- *Businesses will be more successful, other things being equal, in locations that are more accessible to primary locations of customers or suppliers.*

Import substitution as a strategy for economic development emerged in Latin America when economic development as a field of study was still in its infancy.¹ This strategy entails the substitution of local manufactures for products already being imported. Advocates of import substitution argue that this strategy utilizes the facts that a sufficient market exists, that the characteristics of most such products are known and that many of these products could be manufactured within the less developed country, and that local manufacture could both reduce transport costs and offset the high costs of manufacturing in a developed country. Import substitution harnesses existing demand and production capabilities, but does not induce structural change in the less developed economy. Therefore, along with export enhancement, import substitution has been one of the two principal thrusts of regional and community development in Canada. The efficacy of import substitution can be tested through the proposition:

1. Meier (1984:3888-394) contains a concise summary and critique of this strategy.

- *New businesses engaged in the manufacture or provision of goods or services for the local market into which goods or services had been hitherto imported are more successful than other new businesses selling into local markets.*

Hirschman (1958) argues that business development in less developed areas can only start either with industries that directly convert primary resources into final demand, or with industries that put the "final touches" on imported semi-manufactured goods. These are both forms of import substitution. Hirschman's proposition can be divided into two operational propositions:

- *Most proposals for business creation in less developed areas will be for businesses that convert primary resources into final demand, or for businesses that place the final, value-added elements on imported goods.*
- *In areas with few businesses, new businesses will be more successful if they either convert primary resources into final demand, or if they place the final, value-added elements on imported goods than if they do neither of these functions.*

Many development economists and public policy analysts have suggested that the public sector can reduce market risk and uncertainty by instituting long-term purchase contracts with businesses in less developed areas.¹ This is a local variant of the precept that governments of less developed countries should support and protect their infant, national industries. Purchase contracts, however, differ from tariff protection, the more common means used to protect infant industries at the national level, in that a purchase contract may be used to secure a loan from a financial institution. This idea might be reflected by the following proposition:

- *Assuming that the public sector is interested in promoting or maintaining businesses in a less developed area, those businesses that have the public sector as an important customer will be more successful than those businesses that do not have the public sector as an important customer.*

Many economists argue that low levels of incomes common to less

1. See Rosenstein-Rodan (1960) for an early presentation of this argument.

developed areas are not sufficient to drive development. Low levels of income will not support sufficient demand for consumption goods. As well, low levels of income will not generate sufficient savings to invest in productive capital assets even if sufficient demand were present¹. One possible scenario to break this impasse might be to couple government-driven demand with investment sourced from government². Another possible scenario to break this impasse might be to couple export-driven demand (that is not tied to the low level of local demand)) with a high level of externally sourced investment. Four propositions derived from this discussion are:

- *Businesses that are not export oriented, but primarily sell direct to government, and have a high level of externally-sourced investment will be relatively successful.*
- *Businesses that are export-oriented with a high level of externally-sourced investment will also be relatively successful.*
- *Businesses that are not export-oriented, that do not primarily sell directly to government, and that do not rely on external sources of capital will be more successful if they sell into areas with high levels of income than if they sell into areas with low levels of income.*
- *Least successful will be businesses that are not export-oriented, that make minimal use of direct government demand and external sources of capital, and that sell into areas with low levels of income.*

Hirschman (1958:) discusses the interaction between adequacy of public infrastructure (or "social overhead") and economic development. He notes that social overhead can not only initiate the development of business by providing a foundation for lower costs or higher productivity, but also that business development can force the supply of social overhead. Businesses will either put pressure on public authorities to produce those social overheads required by the businesses, or businesses may produce the social overhead themselves. This suggests three propositions:

1. For example, through export demand.
2. Or, to couple government-driven demand with investable capital squeezed from the economy through savings "forced" by government policy.

- *More attempts will be made to create businesses in areas having higher levels of social overhead than in areas having lower levels of social overhead.*
- *Businesses will be more successful in areas having higher levels of social overhead than in areas having lower levels of social overhead.*
- *Business development will force the placement of social overhead in circumstances where other factors are favourable to business success and the cost of additional social overhead is not prohibitive.*

Genesis of the "independentist" model of economic development has its roots in frustrated attempts to promote economic development in less developed capitalist economies of Africa, Asia and, especially, Latin America. One of the earliest "independentist" responses was the argument that the developed metropolis and less developed hinterland are two outcomes of a single process (Frank 1970). As initially elaborated by its advocates, this argument anchors both metropolis and hinterland in geographic space. It then ties other development-inhibiting economic, political and social forces to geographic locations. Metropolis and hinterland are presented as a cascading series of exploiter - exploited geographic area relationships. Elias (1975:11), in fact, portrayed one of the study area's regional centres (Churchill), as the hinterland of an unidentified metropolis.¹ Frank claims "...the regions which are the most underdeveloped and feudal seeming today are the ones which had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past"(1970:13). He goes on to say this "...contradicts the generally held thesis that the source of a region's underdevelopment is its isolation and its pre-capitalist institutions."

Two propositions flowing from this metropolis-hinterland argument might be:

- *Businesses located in those communities which had, in the past, the closest ties to the larger and more economically powerful metropoli will be less successful than businesses located in those communities which had, in the past, weaker ties to the larger and more economically powerful metropoli.*

 1. Although this typology seems beside the point given his attempt to interpret the Churchill population in terms of Marxian classes.

- *Businesses located in those communities which are now less institutionally separated from larger and more economically powerful metropoli will be less successful than businesses located in those communities which are now more institutionally separate from larger and more economically powerful metropoli.*

The "independentist" model of economic development uses public policy to direct development initiatives towards an economy where local human and natural resources can be used to supply local needs through local, especially government or other collective, control. Economic independence, self-reliance and self-governance are all seen as dimensions of this economic convergence. As Thomas points out in his critique of the causes of "underdevelopment" (1974: 20-120):

...The measure of structural dependence, underdevelopment, and economic backwardness of the process of production...is on the one hand, the lack of an organic link, rooted in an indigenous science and technology, between the pattern and growth of domestic resource use and the pattern and growth of domestic demand, and, on the other, the divergence between domestic demand and the needs of the broad mass of the population. (pg. 59)

To address this situation Thomas (1974:123-142,250-271) proposes two rules for transforming an "underdeveloped" economy into a developed economy:

1. Domestic resource use by a society must be converged with demand for resources by *that* society. The process of attaining convergence involves modifying both demand and resource availability simultaneously in order to achieve a most efficient, bounded solution.
2. Domestic demand must be converged with domestic needs. "Needs" in are to be read as the basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, safety before proceeding to satisfy "higher" level social needs. Again, the process of attaining convergence involves modification to both needs and demand, although in the area of basic needs it may well be demand that must "bend" the most.

As well, many development economists suggest that the quantity, quality and sources of production that meet basic local needs play a special role in economic development (Streeten 1981, Streeten and Burki 1978).

Thomas does not predict that businesses organized according to his guidelines will be more successful than businesses not organized according to his guidelines. His purpose is to lay the foundation for transforming the rationale for, and structure of, an economy. It would be useful to know, however, the relative success rate of those northern Manitoba business projects financed by government that have characteristics similar to Thomas' specifications other than the requirement of government or collective ownership. Therefore, the following proposition is suggested:

- *Relatively successful projects will be those that do not export their product, that produce a basic good, that use a high proportion of resources supplied from local sources and that are locally owned.*

Institutional structure and ownership, of course, takes action through decision-taking and the disposition of resources.

Business planning and decision-taking relies on an appropriate financial model to portray and analyze outcomes. The basic form of generally accepted accounting for a business as a unit of analysis is to model its financial state of well-being and financial flows on an annual basis. This information is usually summarized in two pro-forma financial statements. The financial state is summarized in the balance sheet, a statement of assets and liabilities, as of the end of the fiscal year. Changes in the balance sheet from year to year reflect changes to the capacity of a business. The relative volumes of financial flows are summarized by the income statement, a statement of income by source and expenses by object. The relative volumes within a year and changes in the relative volumes from year to year reflect the application of business capacity.

Within the balance sheet are a number of important basic facts. One set of facts is the amount invested in the business, and the proportions invested as equity and as debt. The other set of facts is the net value of the business found by deducting liabilities from assets. One of the important facts within the income statement is net earnings. A second important fact is the cash flow. Cash flow is a particularly good indicator of the continuing ability of a business to operate. If a business can generate positive cash

flow it will be able to meet variable operational costs, and hence continue to operate, until capital reinvestment is required to replace used-up capital or until debts come due. In addition, most capital items excluding buildings and building improvements are, for tax purposes, depreciated according to the declining balance method. While this method may reasonably reflect declining market value of the asset; in many cases, especially where "leading-edge" technology is not crucial, use-value of the asset declines at a more uniform rate. In such cases, declining balance tax depreciation generates a stated financial cost that is artificially high in the early years of a business. Financial projections for such projects would show more negative net income results during the first few years of operation than reality might otherwise dictate.¹

Insufficient access to capital at a reasonable price is regularly cited in the literature and by practitioners of development as an obstacle to business development. Indeed, it is explicitly, or by implication, usually given as one rationale for establishing government business financing programs. Additional startup capital may come directly from the owner(s), or it may be raised in the form of debt through financial institutions and markets. Two testable propositions are:

- *A large proportion of business proposals were rejected or business projects failed because the prospective owners could not provide sufficient equity.*
- *A large proportion of business proposals were rejected or business projects failed because the projects could not raise sufficient debt financing from non-government sources.*

1. Cash flow would, however, be unaffected.

Socio-Political Aspects of Development

In the last chapter a "business" was defined as "...an organization whose primary purpose is to structure and control a set of economic activities so as to realize over the medium term, sufficient [monetary] value-added to maintain its existence." A business, therefore, is a *social instrument* for the creation of exchange-value, that is *financially constrained* and is used instrumentally by its owner or controller for the purposes chosen by that owner or controller. The consequences of this definition are to separate "businesses" from other organizations that have as their primary purposes: social integration, redistribution, consumption or social expression.

Business organizations do not, of course, exist in a vacuum. There has been considerable debate about the nature and magnitude of environmental impacts on organizations. Early on, organizational research was generally limited to internal structural and management issues except for the requirements of capitalization and sales (or funding and client service in the case of public sector organizations). During the 1960's the open-systems perspective took hold. This perspective places organizations within a web of interactions with the cultural, social, economic and political elements of their environments. Such an open systems approach especially flourished during the high period of so-called developmental administration¹

The literature on the relationship between organization and environment suggests that organizations may be influenced by a host of environmental factors such as:

- The culture(s) of the organization's owners, managers, employees, participants and its clients.
- The history of the area(s) in which the organization operates as that history is perceived by area residents.
- The mode of production or form of economy of the area(s) within which the organization operates.

1. For example, see issues of the journal *Administration and Society* from the 1960's and 1970's.

- The social structure of the area(s) within which the organization operates.
- The degree to which the organization is considered to be legitimate by the elite and residents of the area(s) within which it operates.
- The legal parameters within which the organization is expected to operate.
- The attributes of, and the organization's dependency on, its sources of funds.
- The economic conditions facing the organization's principal stakeholders - the owners, managers, employees, participants and clients.

Since these environmental factors interact, the order in which they will be discussed does not connote order of importance or causality.

Culture is the system of meanings infused in a social system (Parsons 1973, Kroeber and Parsons 1958). It is an ideational system that gives the individual a "...theory of what his fellows know, believe, and mean, his theory of the code being followed, the game being played..." (Keesing 1974). Culture orients members of a social system or organization. It is a form of social programming transmitted through institutions, the organization of production and exchange, and technology.¹ Culture contributes to efficient social reproduction in two ways. It reduces the amount of interpersonal communication required to achieve many outcomes.² It also ensures a smoother flow of such communications.³

Culture is infused into organizations through institutionalized norms (Kiggundu *et al* 1983, Inzerilli 1981, Hofstede 1981, Heller and Wilpert 1979, Hofstede 1979, Lammers and Hickson 1979A and 1979B, Hesseling 1973, Ajiferduke and Boddewyn 1970, Braibanti 1966). These

1. Such "programming" is promulgated by carriers such as formal education and advertising.

2. In particular, culture reduces the need to clarify context, and to issue orders and ensure behavioural compliance.

3. By way of shared understanding of words, symbols, and actions.

institutionalized norms are not static. They are continually reproduced by domestic processes¹ and organizational processes². Culture is infused into an organization: through its economic relations with other social units, through the political and legal systems which regulate its form and behaviour, its need for social legitimation³ and through the values and behavioural patterns brought into the organization by its owners and employees.

Cultural parameters limit the distribution of power, alternatives considered and choices made, systems of effective communication, use of reward and sanction systems, compliance of non-elites, support given to competing elites, and pressures that non-members can exert on the organization (Hofstede 1981). Organizations whose values and operational patterns conflict with cultural parameters *and* that are unable to control the input of such factors from the environment, are likely to pay a high price in efficiency (Lorsch 1969). Crozier (1970) considers the impact of culture on an organization to be "dysfunctional." He sees culture as a force that moves an organization away from its rational, instrumental purpose.

Interwoven with culture is a society's mode-of-production. A mode-of-production is a coherent and pervasive set of economic, social, psychological and political processes within a society that coordinate social labour in a cohesive manner to achieve purposes functional to the society's material, human and social reproduction. Examples of different modes-of-production are kinship hunting-gathering, feudalism, slavery, mercantilism, capitalism and socialism. The articulation of modes-of-production is the operational linkage of two or more different modes-of-production. Usually, but not necessarily, one mode of production is dominant in the sense of directing and restricting the other mode(s) of production.

1. In particular, through the family.
2. Such as formal education and advertising.
3. To ensure the support of stakeholders and the general public.

The mode, or articulated modes, of production or form of economy of the less developed area within which an organization operates may place restrictions on the structure and operation of that organization. For example, in an environment where the prevalent mode-of-production is not capitalist or socialist it may be difficult to structure or operate an organization according to universalistic, rational principles. "Universalistic" behaviour by members of an organization or social group entails actions taken on the basis of categorical norms, standards, categories or rules. "Particularistic" behaviour by members of an organization or social group entails actions are taken primarily on the basis of the personal attributes of the parties to a transaction within very specific conditions.

Vaughan and Sjoberg (1984) discuss the tension between the self as defined by non-organizational social relationships and the self as defined by organizational relationships. The magnitude of this tension will depend on the juxtaposition of culture, social structure, and organizational structure and operation. A sweeping generalization regarding the "best fit" among these variables is not possible. Implicit in their work, however, is the suggestion that a high degree of dissonance between the self as defined by non-organizational social relationships and the self as defined by organizational relationships will generate psychological and behavioural effects inimical to organizational performance.

A proposition flowing from this summary of culture and mode-of-production might be:

- *Business development and business success is inhibited in locations where there is greater cultural dissonance; that is, in locations where earlier forms of non-capitalist, particularistic culture are relatively strong.*¹

One possible measure of attachment to a prior, northern, Aboriginal hunting and gathering culture might be the extent of hunting and fishing for

1. This proposition is the converse of the proposition derived from the metropolis-hinterland hypothesis to the effect that such separation keeps the development-inhibiting forces of the metropolis at bay.

domestic production. The degree to which this is a surrogate variable for business development inhibiting cultural norms can be tested via the following propositions:

- *Communities in which there is a higher rate of domestic hunting and fishing will have a lower propensity to start businesses.*
- *Communities in which there is a higher rate of domestic hunting and fishing will also have a lower rate of successful businesses.*

It is often asserted that the use of an Aboriginal language means that people will have difficulty functioning in the business environment. For some, this may be a straightforward observation that the dominant languages of business are English and French, and that Aboriginal languages do not have a suitable business lexicon. For others, use of an Aboriginal language may be a surrogate for lack of formal education. For still others, language may be a surrogate for cultural clash wherein Aboriginal culture is thought to inhibit business because of its presumed emphasis on some complex of separatism, communalism, extended family, place, particularism, the domestic economy, anti-materialism, victimization or dependency. Indeed, in an unpublished paper the author argues that autonomy from particularistic sociopolitical pressures appears to improve an organization's chances of success (Loughran 1985). This suggests the following propositions:

- *Communities in which there is a higher rate of use of an Aboriginal language in the home will have a lower propensity to start businesses.*
- *Communities in which there is a higher rate of use of an Aboriginal language in the home will also have a lower rate of successful businesses.*

Development literature recognizes that there are constraints on a society's capacity to absorb new investment. These constraints include: "...lack of knowledge of resources and technology, lack of skills, lack of management expertise, institutional limitations such as civil disorder and cumbersome and inefficient government bureaucracies, and cultural and social constraints which induce an unwillingness to accept industrial

discipline and supervision" (Eckaus 1973:81). New investment projects face absorptive constraints until these constraints are overcome through operations, and the higher the rate of new investments the more restricting will be the absorptive capacity. The speed of adaptation by management and labour will depend on previous experience which may on the one hand be wasted without continuing investment, but which on the other hand also contributes to diminishing returns to incremental investment. Possible tests of this might be framed by the following propositions:

- *There is a secular reduction in either the number of potentially viable new businesses being proposed, or if there is no decline in the number of new businesses being proposed, there is a secular reduction in the predicted profitability of additional new businesses. The latter reduction will be especially pronounced during periods in which very large numbers of new businesses are being proposed.*
- *There is a secular decline in the success of financed businesses.*

There are a number of arguments to the effect that business generation is self-perpetuating, because of non-economic cause-and-effect linkages, at an increasing rate until an economy becomes developed. Hirschman (1958) argues that businesses generate demands for rationality, discipline and achievement needed for development. Perroux points to support agents who create economic space, stimulate diffusion of the influence of innovative agents, and minimize distances to social, economic and political supplies. Kanter (1980) points out the crucial nature of lines of supply, support and information as the bases for power within an organization and, by implication, the power of an organization within its environment. Klaassen and Paelinck (1974:39-44) stress the importance of social and political support, and intermediate inputs from the public sector to the success of development projects. They also suggest minimizing distance to sources of these supports and inputs.

As well, it is often argued, in the context of northern and Aboriginal development, that improved access expedites assimilation into the dominant industrial culture. Such assimilation presumably promulgates values and inter-social unit training-by-example and cooperation that are more supportive of business such as less restrictive commerce, income and profit

as social and psychological goals, greater division of labour, investment, individuality and a materialistic-scientific world-view. The proposition, concerning access to supplies and markets put forth above, also addresses the social and institutional dimensions of access.

It is often suggested, and case studies by the author have supported the argument, that significant personal investment by owners or members of an organization is positively associated with success through motivation and commitment (Loughran 1985). This belief is also woven into received wisdom concerning the need for owner equity in a business as an inducement to performance. This suggests the proposition:

- *Among businesses that commence operation, the proportion of total investment that is made by organizational members is positively associated with the probability of business success.*

In that same unpublished paper the author argues that organizations perform better if they have a single goal that is highly specific (Loughran 1985). This suggests:

- *Businesses operated by organizations whose only function is operation of the business will be more successful than businesses operated by organizations that have principal functions other than operation of the business.*
- *Among businesses that commence operation, those businesses that offer a single, focused, product mix will be more successful than those businesses that offer a multiple product mix.*

Two forms of broad-based organizations are often promoted in the context of less developed areas. These are the cooperative and the community development corporation (CDC). In his unpublished paper the author looked at the performance of these two forms of organization in the context of the less developed areas of developed countries (Loughran 1985). A principal finding was that both forms of organization were problematic in a less developed environment because of the high levels of focus, discipline, and complex interpersonal and inter organizational operations required to maintain the ownership function along with administrative and productive efficiency. Case studies indicate that the worker-owned cooperative shows

more promise than the CDC for two reasons. Firstly, the worker-owned cooperative more closely links ownership and investment with more specific objectives and organizational operations; that is, it more instrumentally rational than the CDC. Secondly, the worker-owned cooperative has a firmer ideological or philosophical base for programming coordination among the participants. The CDC form was found to be more environmentally dependent than the cooperative which is more principally bounded by ownership and purpose. This may be indirect evidence that successful organizations in the context of less development either have to be insulated from the local sociopolitical environment or, they have to be so saturated with their local sociopolitical environment so as to converge organizational and social responsibility. A proposition derived from this argument might be:

- *Collectivist forms of business organization that do not entail substantial, direct member or owner investment will be less successful than other forms of business organization that do entail substantial, direct member or owner investment.*

This section has focused on the generation of propositions and points-of-interest concerning the business applicant and business organization components of the causal model. The next section addresses relevant literature concerning government program design and operation.

Perspectives on Government Program Design and Operation

Review and analysis of the design and operation of government business financing programs that are the subjects of this study will be largely exploratory. There are, however, some propositions that can be transformed into testable hypotheses. The reader will note some overlap between concepts in the previous sections, such as cultural consistency, and concepts discussed in this section. This is expected if cultural conditions, economic institutions and organizational patterns are to work well together within a society.

Decision Processes

One can conceive of seven ideal-type decision mechanisms available to a society to address economic development. They are: rational planning, bounded rationality, the competitive free market, disjointed incrementalism, sociopolitical interaction, mixed scanning and coercion (command). As ideal-types none of these mechanisms ever exists in pure form. In reality, they are found in various permutations or, most likely, as a combinations of all seven ideal-types.

Ideal rational planning takes the following approach (Allison 1971):

1. All outcome values are established in transitive order of preference. All combinations and permutations of values have known trade-off rates.
2. The issue or problem is clearly and accurately defined.
3. All alternative means to resolve the issue or problem are specified.
4. For each alternative means, all possible consequences are specified.
5. All consequences are factored by probability, risk and time preference.
6. For each alternative means, all costs are specified.
7. An algorithm is prescribed which has the power to rank all the alternative means by net value outcome.
8. The decision maker chooses the alternative with the greatest net value outcome and is able to implement that alternative.

The demands of rational planning for information and analytical resources are obviously severe. Even if such information is available there is no algorithm to reach a solution. Such rationality also requires separation of means and ends, and the existence of a single social welfare function to which all social members subscribe.

Wildavsky criticizes rational planning for its intellectual and political presumptuousness:

...Planning is defined as current action to secure future consequences; the more future consequences planners control, the better they have planned. Planning, therefore, requires causal knowledge - theories of society to predict the paths of the complex sequences of desired actions and power to sustain this effort. Once conflict is admitted over whose preferences are to prevail..., comprehensive national economic and social planning fails either from intellectual presumption or political persuasion. Planners do not have adequate knowledge or power. (Wildavsky 1979:120)

Backing off from this highly rational mechanism is bounded rationality. The concept of bounded rationality is based on the work of Simon (1976A, 1976B, 1968), March and Simon (1958) and Downs (1967). Bounded rationality is limited by constraints to resources and cogitation; therefore, its decision-making is "satisficing" rather than optimal. The basic components of bounded rationality are summarized below:

- 1. A satisfactory level of performance, establishing reference criteria, is determined.**
- 2. A simplified model of reality is used to guide data collection and analysis.**
- 3. Continuous search processes are undertaken to assess the extent of a performance gap.**
- 4. If an unsatisfactorily high performance gap exists, an intensified search for alternatives commences. This search is necessarily biased and limited by organizational and individual premises, and by the expected net payoff.**
- 5. Search and analysis are factored to social subunits based on criteria of efficiency and effectiveness.**
- 6. Programmed responses and routine are available as low cost alternatives to search and analysis.**
- 7. The intensity of the analysis depends on the expected net impact of the decision, and the character of the analysis is biased by organizational and individual premises.**
- 8. Satisfactory performance criteria are shifted up or down depending on the difficulty of analysis, and depending on the expected net impact of the alternatives generated.**
- 9. Intensive search and analysis ceases when an alternative is found which exceeds the satisfactory performance criteria and satisfies all decision makers whose assent is required.**

10. Search continues at the normal, lower level of intensity.

Unlike highly rational planning, bounded rationality is not paralyzed by excessive information or analytical demands, nor does cogitation necessarily dominate social interaction. Bounded rationality recognizes social, cultural and political limits and biases. It allows decision factoring for improved effectiveness and economy. It integrates search processes into decision-making, costs interact with potential payoffs to influence action and decision premises are necessary. However, bounded rationality begs questions such as: Whose criterion of satisficing will be used? What costs and what ends will be valued? And, how will these costs and ends be valued?

The competitive, free market is a third ideal-type social decision mechanism. Theoretically, a competitive, free market will attain the condition in which no one person can be made better off without making some other person worse off¹ under the following conditions:

1. There are many sellers and many purchasers such that no one seller or purchaser is able to affect the price of exchange.
2. There exists full knowledge of resources, techniques of production, products available, prices, etc. instantaneously available to, and understood by, all participants.
3. There are no physical, cultural, sociopolitical or other constraints on the movement of resources (including human and financial resources) and products.
4. There are no externalities.
5. Full use is made of resources and productive capacity.
6. Consumers are sovereignty.
7. Producers and purchasers are rational maximizers of returns and utility, respectively.
8. The spatial dimension does not exist.

Staunch proponents of the market mechanism assert that a market

1. In economic theory, this is known as a Pareto Optimum.

economy moves towards this optimum *as if* the above conditions exist, whether or not such conditions exist in reality (Friedman 1981).¹ Whatever the merits of this argument with respect to a developed economy such as the Canadian national economy, the obstructions to market functioning within northern Aboriginal communities are daunting:²

- Knowledge of products and productive processes is very limited.
- There are cultural, racial, educational and legal (with respect to registered Indians and Indian reserves, in particular) barriers to the free flow of resources.
- Human and material resources are vastly underutilized.
- Because of the small size of most communities and large distances between communities, competition is minimal.
- Most sellers and purchasers are not anonymous; in fact, clientelism and particularism are common.
- External economies exist (especially social and psychological externalities because of the isolation brought about by ethnic, lifestyle and distance barriers; the absence of strong overarching authority and the use of loosely-structured organizations may well be means of reducing the impact of frequent, negative externalities).
- There are great inequities in income among residents that are reflected in demand and, hence, production.
- Because of sociopolitical commitment and pressure, market participants are neither sovereign nor independent.
- Because of the coexistence of various modes-of-production, many if not most residents may not be individual utility maximizers (Bherer *et al* 1990:138-146,163; Landa 1969; Sahlins 1974:41-148).
- It is questionable whether revealed market choices are rational or consistent (the high consumption of expensive candies and soda pop under conditions of poverty; and concurrently high rates of obesity, diabetes and dental diseases).

1. For a critique of this position see Nagel (1981).

2. See Higgins (1988B) for a more general critique of the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory.

Obviously, neither the Government of Canada nor the Government of Manitoba has been willing to leave the economic development of northern Manitoba solely to market forces. The less developed state of northern Manitoba has not been politically tenable for its inevitable consequences are large-scale migration of impoverished people and the political embarrassment resulting from a region in dire socioeconomic straits. Instead, senior governments have accepted a mixed-economy decision process. They have used business financing programs, Crown-owned businesses and programs which provide subsidies to businesses to intervene in the market.

Disjointed incrementalism, the fourth ideal type, is an interactive social decision mechanism. In this mechanism the search for alternatives is limited to "...only those policies...whose known or expected consequences differ incrementally from the status-quo and which can be practically achieved (Braybrooke and Lindbloom 1963:85,94). Disjointed incrementalism moves away from problems rather than towards goals. It involves attacking, serially, parts of a problem by many social participants. Compared to rational planning, the information and analytical demands of incrementalism are minimal. This is because:

- the area of change is highly constrained and related to the past,
- the cost of error is minimized as small risks are taken while a balance of differentiated sociopolitical forces acts as a check on erroneous action,
- incrementalism offers much opportunity for learning through doing, and
- incrementalism allows objectives and costs to interact and, therefore, to be converged.

Incrementalism, however, requires that a multitude of small sociopolitical agreements be made continuously and rather smoothly. It therefore requires, above all, widely accepted values and norms of behaviour, and stability. Incrementalism is conservative because it assumes that past conditions are generally satisfactory and it assumes continuity in problems and means. While this mechanism still requires the planning of objectives and means, and a way to evaluate accomplishment, these functions are assigned to

micro-level social units. Micro-level goals are always tentative, costs and results loop back to recast goals.

Wildavsky describes a fifth social interaction decision mechanism related to disjointed incrementalism and bounded rationality. It is social interaction informed by retrospective rationalization and policy analysis. Wildavsky argues that sociopolitical decisions are never correct, they can only be true when they are acceptable by the society (i.e. they are accepted as legitimate) (Wildavsky 1979:116). In retrospective rationalization:

Rationality is like a rocker that goes forward and back, it tries by intention and is saved by rationalization. One acts first and makes sense of it later. We rewrite history from present motives. By attributing new motivational meaning to what we have done, we try to learn what we ought to be doing. We get three strikes before we're out, the first by acting in the present, the second by interpreting the past into the present, and the third by imagining the future as if it had occurred already so that we can correct and control it before it happens. (Wildavsky 1979:136-137).

Policy analysis "...helps...bring intelligence to interaction, by rationalizing movement to a different pattern that may lead to improved future outcomes" (Wildavsky 1979:139).

In this system:

Various devices are employed to simplify calculations. Important values are omitted entirely; others are left to different authorities to whose care they have been entrusted.... Sensitivity analysis...provides an empirical basis to justify neglect of some values. Means and ends are hopelessly entwined.

The real choice is between different mixes of means and ends. Analysis proceeds incrementally by successive limited approximations. It is serial and remedial as successive attacks are made on problems. Rather than waiting upon experience in the real world, the analyst tries various moves in his model and runs them through to see if they work. (Wildavsky 1966:307)

Problem solving occurs by converging socially worthy problems with solutions (Wildavsky 1979:388-393). Solution convergence is attained by

ensuring that only problems solvable with available resources are addressed, and that the prospective solution solves the problem. Intended outcomes can be altered by seeking them directly, by redesigning the rules of social interaction or by changing the frame of reference (Wildavsky 1979:1077,125). However, such convergent solutions often are temporary and, in turn, the solutions cause new problems because they carry new constructs of values and social relations (Wildavsky 1979:395-396). As well, once a policy or program is operational with a life of its own, it creates unintended positive and negative impacts.

Solution errors are inevitable, but are used as the engine of change (Wildavsky 1979:404). The convergent solution process is, above all, error reducing. In addition to its focus on the correction of social errors, this process is strong on social learning and on social reliability. Reliability is enhanced through: social criticism, diversity of interventions (social tests), redundancy of interventions and analytical modeling¹ (Wildavsky 1979:122,125,131-134). Some economy and consistency are necessarily sacrificed in the process.

Etzioni's mixed scanning is the sixth social decision process. Mixed scanning involves contextual decisions which "...are made through an exploration of the main alternatives seen by the actor in view of his conception of his goals, [but]...details and specifications are omitted..." (Etzioni 1968:283). Contextual decisions are focused on goals and issues. They are concerned with fundamental questions. They are relatively broad and long term. Contextual decision making tends towards the rational model, but it limits the alternatives analyzed and the details considered. In this manner it is a venue for bounded rationality.

The other component of mixed scanning is the "bit" decision. "Bit decisions are made incrementally, but within the context set by fundamental decisions" (Etzioni 1968:283). Bit decisions are made more frequently than contextual decisions, but are less important (Etzioni 1968:288,292). They

1. Which reduces the need for experience.

tend to be instrumental, specific and short-term. However, a series of bit decisions may set the stage for a contextual decision.

Mixed scanning involves the following steps (Etzioni 1968:287-288):

1. List all the strategic alternatives to an issue.
2. Cull the strategic alternatives by determining whether or not means of implementation are available, and by evaluating the alternatives against the normative values of decision makers and political objections until only one alternative remains (i.e. the contextual decision).
3. Fragment implementation into a series of bit decision steps with the more costly and less reversible steps appearing later.
4. Monitor feedback at key points during implementation.
5. Scan the issue environment on a semi-encompassing level at progressively longer intervals so long as no problems appear.
6. If problems are identified, scan more encompassingly to locate the problem and to identify any additional (related) problems.
7. When the problem is located, scan deeply at that location.
8. Use a rule for allocating resources and time to scanning.

Mixed scanning can be a flexible and efficient decision process.

Mixed scanning is neither idealistic nor reactionary, it contains a means of generating issues, it places contextual and bit decisions on a real continuum, and it avoids the problem of separating means and ends. Mixed scanning is less demanding of information than rational planning or continuous bounded rationality, but it is more demanding than disjointed incrementalism.

Coercion is the final ideal-type social decision mechanism. Coercion may take the direct form of a command backed, threat. Or, it may be indirect, using fear of sanction only. Coercion may take such forms as actions forced by command, threatened loss of well-being, forced migration, social pressure including ideological indoctrination by the state, or political decisions taken to restrict economic actions. The latter is, of course, the accepted role of the state in western democracies. There are, however,

some homogeneous, tightly knit or otherwise "total"¹ communities within western democracies in which coercion is more frequently used by local civic or civic - religious authorities.

Given this summary of social decision systems it would be interesting to know:

- *To what extent did the organizations and programs that are the subject of this study behave in a manner that is primarily consistent with any of the seven social decision processes summarized above?*

Decision models are, of course, embedded within social and organizational structures. Since this summary of the literature is to provide theoretical context for analyzing the structure and operations of the case study programs the literature concerning public sector organizations is discussed next.

Organizational Structure

A government business financing program, of course, operates through an organizational structure. This structure results, at least in part, from explicit and implicit policies, some of which have no clear connection to the task-at-hand. Whatever the genesis, structure directs and constrains decisions and actions. An explicit operational policy structure generates desirable and unexpected consequences and, analogous to machinery, it represents sunk investment that may be expensive and time-consuming to change.

There are four basic ways of conceptualizing organizations (Keeley 1980:337-344). The first sees the organization as a rigidly defined and bounded, mechanical structure that acts according to centrally determined

1. "Total community" as used here is similar to Goffman's description of the prison as a "total institution" (1961). The word "total" describes this type of institution or community as a singular controlling source of resources, place of living, and referent for activity.

directives. This "structural" concept of organizations is a hallmark of the classical management school¹ and adherents to the Weberian image of bureaucracy. The second views the organization as a less rigid, but bounded organic entity that acts as a collective whole (e.g. Barnard, Selznick). The third regards the organization as a less well defined pattern of social interaction, as an interactive coalition whether in internal cooperation or in conflict (Downs 1966:76-77, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978:27-32). The fourth way of conceptualizing organizations is through the phenomenological theory of organizations. This theory holds that the organization is a creation of viewers (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 260-273). On account of its solipsistic consequences this latter way of conceptualizing the organization is not utilized in this study.

There is considerable debate in the literature as to the nature and magnitude of environmental impacts on organizations. There was a time when organizations were treated as largely closed systems except for the requirements of capitalization and sales² (Burrell and Morgan 1979:154-160, Scott 1983:156). Not surprisingly, those working within this closed system approach limited their research to internal structural and management issues. Only later did organizational research take an open systems perspective, placing organizations within a web of interactions with the cultural, social, economic and political elements of their environments.³ There also has been a long-standing debate among advocates of the radical political economy, contingency and strategic choice paradigms of organization-environment interaction (Child and Tayeb 1983, Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976, Child 1972).

The radical political economy and contingency paradigms are determinist. The radical political economy paradigm argues that organizations are fully determined by their economic environment. There are two variations of the contingency paradigm, both of which take a natural

1. As epitomized by the work of Fayol, Mary Parker Follett, Gulick, Taylor and Urwick.

2. Or funding and client service in the case of public sector organizations.

3. For a succinct summary of this contingent model of organizational analysis see Burrell and Morgan (1979:1677-168).

selection approach to the evolution of organizations. One version argues that organizational structure and operation are determined by the contingencies of the external and internal attributes facing an organization. The other version argues that organizational structure and operation are fully determined by the contingencies of the external environment only, including but going beyond the economic environment.

The strategic choice paradigm accepts the ideas that political economy, and other external and internal contingencies may have an impact on organizations. This paradigm, however, goes further; it gives the "dominant coalition" within the organization latitude to make strategic choices within cultural, economic, social, political and technical parameters. It asserts that these parameters are themselves open to much greater modification than the aforementioned paradigms allow. Then again, circular reasoning is a problem here. Economic and socio-cultural factors will affect both membership in the dominant coalition and degree of compliance by the non-dominant group.

It is worth investigating, therefore,:

- *To what extent do the organization and programs that are the subject of this study fit the determinist or strategic choice conceptions of organizations?*

Organizational structure is defined as the prescribed roles and procedures of an organization (Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood (1985:3)). The more traditionally defined structural "core" of organizations can be described by the following attributes:

- Extent of segmentation.
- Extent of differentiation.
- Degree of hierarchy.
- Extent of centralization.
- Prevalence of rules or other forms of behavioural programming.
- Span of control.

These elements require further elaboration.

Segmentation¹ and differentiation are two methods of structuring organizations. Emphasis on segmentation results in a replicated, flatter hierarchy. A highly segmented organization is more able to focus on its employees, and products or clients as wholes. Therefore, the segmented organization appears to be more functional to more particularistic environments and to environments torn by factionalism. Because it requires less coordination and because it is not likely to be functionally rigid, the highly segmented organization also appears to be more suitable to unstable environments.

Emphasis on differentiation generally requires greater coordination and, therefore, a taller hierarchy. Blau *et al* (1966) claim that small, undifferentiated organizations operate at high costs because functional efficiencies of differentiation are not possible, and because administrative costs cannot be spread over a high volume of production or service. Beyond this minimum size threshold, efficiencies of coordination and administration are generated, but at a decreasing rate, as the differentiated organization increases in size (Blau 1970, Loughran 1985). Differentiation, therefore, can bring functional or task efficiency. As well, lower cost labour can be used to perform simplified tasks. Larger, more differentiated organizations, however, incur greater rigidities because of the high degree of financial and human investment in methods of coordination (Schaffer 1969). These organizations, therefore, demand stability; and they require longer and more uniform product or service runs to recoup the investment. The highly differentiated organization, therefore, would seem to demand universalistic relations with its employees and clients.

Downs (1966:57-58, 123-124) specifies five factors affecting the shape of organizational hierarchy:

1. And divisionalization, which is segmentation at the level of a larger group.

1. More complex and detailed inter-dependencies among activities demand a taller hierarchy for coordination.
2. Greater uncertainty demands a flatter hierarchy since a flatter hierarchy gives each official greater authority and enhances horizontal relationships.¹
3. A flatter hierarchy is more appropriate under the condition of greater staff occupational homogeneity since greater occupational homogeneity reduces internal conflict.
4. Flatter hierarchies are more appropriate when communication leakages through hierarchy impose a major cost.
5. Flatter hierarchies are more appropriate for routine activities that can be monitored by objective instruments for control purposes.

A flatter hierarchy also is more likely to occur when employee socioeconomic backgrounds are relatively homogeneous. Blau (1967-68:446) calls the flat, centrally controlled hierarchy an "old-fashioned bureaucracy." He says it is common in small organizations where top management is able to exert tight control over activities.²

Centralization and decentralization are alternate means of achieving control or adaptability; that is, they are alternate ways of responding to uncertainty. Organizational control may be centralized if the central authority is more capable than lower levels of the organization of understanding environmental demands and of translating those demands into action. An organization may be monitored through centralization of control if the central authority wants the organization to resist those environmental demands that are likely to be felt strongly by lower levels of the organization (via employees or clients). Decentralized organizational control may be preferred when lower levels are thought to be more sensitive to, or able to control, environmental demands; when lower levels are able to translate those demands into action; and when satisfaction of environmental demands

1. Negandhi and Reiman (1972) in a study of 30 manufacturing firms in India, found a positive relationship between market stability and degree of hierarchy.

2. It may well be that most such small organizations cannot afford to invest in programmed control systems.

felt by lower levels is considered important.¹

Degree of centralization of authority should not be confused with level of hierarchy, or degree of differentiation or segmentation. A flat, segmented organization can be as much, or more, centralized than a tall, highly differentiated hierarchy. In particular, a flat hierarchy can be functional to patrimonial control while the tall hierarchy of an organization with highly educated and skilled employees may be designed so as to achieve functional coordination of control signals flowing down, up and across levels of the organization (Blau 1967-68). White *et al* (1969) point to the difficulty of achieving coordination among budgeted agencies compared to either for-profit agencies or to self-sufficient, revenue generating, non-profit agencies. Central control is one, albeit inadequate according to White *et al*, means of coordinating services among budgeted agencies so as to achieve higher level, inter-organizational rationalism.

Rules and procedures are a programmed means of achieving centralized control in an organization. The nature of, and degree to which, rules and procedures are used by an organization are related to the reasons for asserting centralized control. Pervasive use of formalized rules and procedures assumes that employees are sufficiently educated to understand the rules and procedures. If, however, rules and procedures are programmed into machinery, centralized control can be maintained with employees who are not well-educated. Indirect means of control through rules, procedures and monitoring imply that abstract, universalistic standards (including ideology) are being applied, rather than a particularistic approach (Blau 1967-68). The use of machinery as a universalistic means of controlling employees also reduces the need for personalized control by management (Blau 1957).

The managerial span of control adopted by an organization will depend on a number of factors. Blau (1970) found that the span-of-control of

1. Professionalization and decentralization of decision-taking authority are an example of such decentralization.

managers is positively related to the occupational homogeneity of subordinates. Span-of-control may be positively related to:

- Environmental stability as the need for tight, central control is likely to be less within a stable environment.
- The extent of subordinate interdependence (so long as the subordinates are not highly differentiated) because horizontal communication will be facilitated among horizontally arrayed peers.
- The difficulty of finding managers, whether because of an inadequate education system, lack of experience within the population, or inadequate financial resources within the organization to pay for managers.
- Less role differentiation.

The span-of-control outcome of the above factors depends on their relative weights in a concrete example.

High rates of change or levels of uncertainty generated by the environment are likely to cause an organization to make major efforts to minimize sensitivity to the detrimental effects of change or uncertainty. The organization has two basic means of controlling for such change or uncertainty:

1. To try to control the environment; that is, to try to adapt the environment to the organization.
2. To control the organization so as to flexibly adapt to the environment.

The organization may control for change or uncertainty by attempting to control impinging external factors through political lobbying, through gaining monopoly or monopsony power, through the design of a controlling internal culture¹, through geographical or social means of separating the labour force from impinging external factors, or through linkages to more stable elements of the environment. Sensitivity to the detrimental effects of change or uncertainty also may be reduced by minimizing long term fixed investment in

1. For example, by way of an organizational or occupational elite.

facilities and equipment and organizational social rules and programming¹, through the use of organizational control and feedback mechanisms², and the undertaking of organizational research and experimentation.

The organization can foster flexibility through its facilities, equipment, structure and operation. Structural and management flexibility may entail the use of a flat hierarchy containing more segmented generalists. Such a structure can minimize communications costs, maximize responsiveness to directives from above, or it can maximize adaptability to changes in clientele and product delivery requirements. Segmentation may be preferred to differentiation in that segmentation orients the organization to the product or client whereas differentiation orients the organization to the functions of production.

According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), organizations may adopt a loosely-coupled structure and management system in order to be efficient while maintaining social and political legitimation. The loosely-coupled organization makes use of public or formal ceremonial elements within the structure and management system to meet the need for social and political legitimation while making use of more rational, informal elements to meet the need for efficiency. Loose-coupling can be achieved through decentralization, goal and structural ambiguity, elimination of output data, and professionalization.

It would be interesting to know:

- *How were the case study organizations structured in terms of segmentation, differentiation, hierarchy, centralization, prevalence of rules and span-of-control?*
- *Why was(were) this(these) structure(s) used?*
- *To what extent did the case organizations utilize loose-coupling? If loose-coupling was used, what was its function?*

1. Such as by way of training and creating an appropriate organizational "culture".

2. Through the use of hierarchy and management information systems.

Lipsky (1980:81-156) introduces another level of, and reason for, loose-coupling. Lipsky's proposition is that, under conditions of high client need and low or nil service cost to the client, street-level (or field delivery) employees of tall, rational, bureaucratic organizations must devise personal coping schemes. These coping schemes entail substantial particularization of supposedly universalistic services.¹ Such particularization can, of course, seriously distort organizational performance. Therefore, another point-of-interest is:

- *Did conditions within the case programs result in the use of performance distorting, personal coping schemes by street-level staff?*

Perrow (1973) argues that effective bureaucratic organization requires separation from the socio-political environment. Sjoberg *et al* (1984:448) claim "most of the underclass lack the elemental knowledge and values associated with bureaucratic organizations." Bureaucracies require relatively sophisticated access to, and packaging of, their universalistic, but focused, products and services. Similarly, Merton (1940) notes the attributes of interpersonal relations demanded by bureaucratic organizations: conformity, self-discipline, reliability and depersonalization. Such interpersonal relations are difficult for those raised in cultures emphasizing adaptive and holistic interpersonal relations.

Weber (1952:24) asserted that the monocratic, or "ideal" rational, bureaucracy is technically capable of the highest efficiency of any form of organization, that "it is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability." The defining elements of Weber's organization that is both a bureaucracy (items #1-4 below) and rational (items #5-9 below) include (Udy 1959 and 1962):

1. Hierarchy.
2. Division of labour (role differentiation).

1. Particularization can occur by limiting access to, or the usefulness of, a service.

3. Universalism.
4. Differentiated reward structure.
5. Limited or focussed objectives.
6. Use of rules and procedures.
7. Emphasis on performance.
8. Employment based on limited agreement.
9. Rewards given by those in authority.

Friedrich (1952), however, notes that Weber's bureaucracy is neither "ideal" nor built on empirical evidence. There are no end-points to the defining factors, the relationship among the factors and relative importance of each of these and other possible factors are unknown. As a consequence, it may be difficult to unambiguously apply the concept of bureaucracy.

In a study of 34 organizations, from 34 non-industrial countries, that were engaged in the production of material goods, Udy (1962) found the rational organization to be relatively independent of its environment. He concluded that the rational organization requires an area of discretion free from social constraints within which it can practice focused, instrumental planning and action. A non-rational bureaucracy (the first four defining elements listed above) is much less dependent on its environment.

The discussion of bureaucracy reveals potential points of conflict between the rather narrow, efficiency-oriented, universalistic rule dominated organization with its instrumental focus, and the needs and culture of its clients, especially when those clients come from a less developed area not densely populated by large, complex organizations. It would be interesting to know, to the extent that the case organization and its programs had bureaucratic characteristics:

- *To what extent did the programs utilize bureaucratic structures?*
- *If the programs utilized bureaucratic structures, how well did these structures mesh with the nature of the target population?*

Following Weber it has been received wisdom that the bureaucratic form of organization is particularly functional within societies that pursue formal, instrumental rationality, and that place a high relative value on standardization and equality of service. One of the differentiating characteristics of Western-style democracies, when compared to earlier political forms, is their relative emphasis on equality-of-opportunity and service from the state. Indeed, government is often criticized for its delivery of standardized services through bureaucratic mass production. As noted above, this issue is targeted by Lipsky in his book. Therefore, it might be asked:

- *If the programs utilized bureaucratic structures, how well did the structures mesh with demands for relative equity generated by the political process?*

CHAPTER 4 THE ENVIRONMENT

Action within the causal model presented in Chapter 2 begins at the external government, external economic and community environments (Table 2-1). Conditions within these three environments are assumed to generate the initial design and later operational attributes of the programs being studied. These environments are described in this chapter. The links between conditions in these environments and design and operation of the programs are discussed in Chapter 5.

The Community Environment - A Historical Perspective

Prior to European contact a generally westward movement of indigenous peoples occurred in the Canadian Shield area of what is now Northwestern Ontario and northern Manitoba (Ray 1972:45,55-56; Sharrock 1974:99). The Ojibwa moved from directly north of what is now Sault Ste. Marie into the area north and northwest of Lake Superior. Woodland Cree, who had inhabited Northwestern Ontario and eastern northern Manitoba, moved into most of central and western northern Manitoba. A few Chipewyan inhabited the northern extreme of the boreal forest.

Until the arrival of the fur trade these indigenous peoples reproduced within a hunting-gathering kinship mode-of-production. Important food and other resources were derived from game and fish resources that were mobile over large areas of land, available in low densities per unit of land¹ or both. As a result, indigenous society was structured so as to maintain a mobile labour force. A mobile labour force is able to exploit such resources and take advantage of suitably located shelter for the long, cold winters (Ray 1972:63-67,82; Turner 1977:64-65,69). The socio-political organization compatible with the mobile labour force and low levels of biological

1. Such as caribou, elk and moose.

productivity per unit of land was small hunting groups affiliated in loose band structures (Bishop 1973:62-64, Dunning 1959:45-46, Fisher 1969:15; Rogers 1965:71,77,266-269).

Land-based resources were the subject rather than the object of labour. *In situ*, these resources did not support two social attributes crucial to our concept of private property: they were not negotiable in trade, and they were not subject to territorial claim in the sense that other bands or hunting groups could not enter when in need (Bishop 1970:10-11, Chance 1968:20).¹ There is evidence, however, that tools of production, the result of applied labour, were allocated and controlled in a manner suggestive of private property (Trudeau 1966:24). Generalized trade and circulation did not appear to take place (Nekich 1974:2). Rather, the limited trade that did take place entailed the exchange of items not necessary to normal social reproduction.

Holden's work on the James Bay Cree indicates that there had been little need for a hierarchical decision structure (1968:78). Leaders had respected abilities, but had no power to command (Trudeau 1966:23-24). Decisions were taken at the individual or family level. Social control within the Cree family operated through the necessity of cooperation, parental authority, the individual's internal cognitive patterning and the absence of alternatives (Chance 1968:21, Trudeau 1966:126). Indeed, spiritual life, integrated as it was with the acquisition of knowledge and with daily behaviour towards others and the environment, was highly individualistic (Chance 1968:21, Mallory 1983:178). Such a loosely structured, non-hierarchical, fragmented, flexible and mobile social structure was appropriate to a harsh and erratic environment.

Articulation of European mercantalism with the hunting-gathering mode-of-production occurred between the mid-seventeenth century and late

1. That land-based resources were not held as private property does not mean that these resources were collectively owned. The concepts of private or collective ownership or control are not appropriate as descriptors of the boreal hunting and gathering mode-of-production.

1800's. During the early fur trade period, when the Hudson Bay Company and the North West Company competed for furs and before fur and other resources became depleted, indigenous people and traders interacted to achieve mutually advantageous results. Indigenous people became independent producers of furs which they traded for useful manufactured goods. Over time, however, the fur trade depleted the stock of fur bearers and big game (Bishop 1970:11, Dunning 1959:47-48, Ray 1972: 120,125). As a consequence, indigenous people came to depend more on a mixture of middleman trading, domestic production of fish and small game, production of certain wild foods for the fur trade companies, and emergency food rations supplied by the companies (Bishop 1973:63,66,73; Friesen 1984:26,29; Ray 1972:54,114). Trapping of furs, trading relations, domestic production of small game, dependency on emergency food rations all made stability of location more important (Bishop 1970:11, Dunning 1959:47-48). Increasingly, specialization of labour supplanted application of the generalized skills of domestic production. As domestic production was restricted trade commodities became more important to the well-being of indigenous people (Ray 1972:100, Rogers 1963:78). In the summer many males left their families to trade (Ray 1972:85).

In the latter eighteenth century the Hudson Bay Company's inland posts cut off the Cree middlemen (Ray 1972:139-140). The Cree, therefore, moved further west to the Lake Winnipeg area in order to establish themselves as providers of pemmican (Fisher 1969:13, Ray 1972:55-57). By the late 1700's, the Ojibwa, who were more skilled at trapping than the Cree, moved into the east-central and northeastern areas of Manitoba vacated by the Cree (Dunning 1959:41; Ray 1972:57,137). As a result of the Hudson Bay Company and North West Company merger in 1821, however, terms-of-trade shifted against Ojibwa trappers (Dunning 1959:47). English-speaking Metis initially arose near the HBC coastal trading posts and French-speaking Metis appeared along the inland Nor'Wester trade routes. The Metis supplied a large share of the labour force required to operate canoes and carts, and to supply wild foods to the companies (St. Onge 1985:154).

During the classic fur trade period the family hunting group and

loosely-structured band summer group continued as the basic social organization of the Cree and Ojibwa. Two changes in the structure of social organization occurred. Firstly, hunting group leaders gained greater territorial power by defending the group's territory and allocating that territory among married males (Rogers 1965:273-274). Social hierarchy was also reinforced through the elevated status of brigade leader who had economic sanctions at his disposal. Secondly, sometime around 1750 the term *okima*, or chief, was transferred from the Indian leader to the fur trader suggesting that the trader had become the recognized authority (Rogers 1965:271).

Assumption of political power in the Northwest by Canada in 1867 paved the way for settlement of the Prairies. The Government of Canada negotiated treaties with the Indians in order to free land for settlement and resource extraction. The Indians bargained hard during treaty negotiations, but again and again they were forced to compromise because of current or threatened starvation, the inevitable onslaught of settlers, and the governments ability to split the leadership (Friesen 1984:136-146). The "numbered" treaties with the Cree and Ojibwa were signed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These treaties *per se* did not establish reserves. The treaties did give the Crown title to all the land used and occupied by the Indians in exchange for a set amount of yet-to-be-determined land for each family, a set financial annuity, protection, aid in case of famine and the promise of support for agricultural development (Friesen 1984:148-149, Lithman 1984:34-35). Most often, the land received by Indians was located near a trading post, near a traditional fishing camp or near previously game-rich land. While much of this land fit the Indians' hunting-gathering mode of production, most of it was not suitable for supporting independent development within the emerging capitalist mode-of-production. As well, the treaties not only prevented the Indians from using their "homelands" to produce use-values and commodities for exchange, but also from receiving rent from industrial ventures (Loxley 1981:158).

Despite the failure of Indian agriculture, during the early reservation period the Indian economy did become more diversified through a mixture of subsistence production, fishing, hunting, forestry, trapping and wage labour

(Tough 1985:12). A boom in commercial fishing and forestry also created a labour market for Indians.

Articulation with mercantalism and, later, capitalism promoted hierarchy and cleavages among Aboriginal peoples. This racial and treaty hierarchy includes the: European, non-Metis registered Indian, Metis who became a registered Indian, Metis and not-registered Indian¹ (Boisvert and Turnbull 1985:138, Lithman 1984:36-37). The hierarchy among these groups had its base in differential economic power depending on access to resources, mode-of-production, differential treatment through the treaties and the Indian Act, and economic and social linkages to the dominant Europeans. The racial hierarchy came to be cross-cut by a class hierarchy which gave a few Aboriginal persons, particularly some non-registered Metis business persons and non-registered Metis workers, greater access to power and benefits than their race or status would itself imply.

Only later was the idea of "civilizing" the Indians through the creation of reserves formalized as policy through the Indian Act. The purpose of the reserves was to isolate Indians so they could learn the dominant culture at their own pace, only *after* this was achieved could integrated begin (Friesen 1984:158, Tobias 1976:17-20). The 1880 Indian Act established the Department of Indian Affairs and an election process for the selection of band government. Until very recently detailed day-to-day administrative power over band affairs remained with INAC (Lithman 1984:45).

The reserve system did not accomplish its "civilizing," integrating goal (Ray 1972:220, Shimpo and Williamson 1965:109, Spaulding 1967:93, Tobias 1976:22-24).

1. Also commonly referred to as a "non-status Indian."

The ability of many Indians living in Manitoba and the old North-West Territories to use their old form of livelihood, hunting and fishing, was particularly irksome to the government, for it was regarded as a drawback to the Indian's adopting a more "civilized" economic base, farming. Besides, the hunting Indian was retarding the "civilization" of his children, because he took them into the bush, which meant they did not attend school. (Tobias 1976:22-24)

The dependent, subsistence economy of the reserve system was perpetuated by INAC staff, by missionaries, by local business elites who wanted land held aside for development and by farmers who could rent unused Indian land cheaply (also see Lithman 1976:43).

The Indian Act of 1906 was designed to force Indians off the reserve by removing much of the protection provided by the reserve. On-reserve day schools were another means to "civilize" the Indian. These early day-schools were undermined by attendance problems, interruptions and conflict with the home culture (Shimpo and Williamson 1965:87-91). The residential school, replete with strict rules, was seen as a better means to destroy Indian culture. Children could be removed from the influence of family and reserve.

Over the period from roughly 1800 to 1950 churches and fur trade posts became the anchors of Aboriginal communities (Rogers 1963:79-81). Construction of permanent homes and schools contributed to locational stability. Churches, traders and Indian agents not only provided much local governance, but these mostly non-Aboriginal governing organizations regulated day to day personal and family life to a degree that would have not been acceptable in most of the rest of Canada (Chance 1968:26, Dunning 1959:117, Landa 1969, Legasse 1959:151, Trudeau 1966:64).

Domestic food production continues to a significant extent in most northern Aboriginal communities. Although, like many rural residents, non-Aboriginal northerners derive a portion of their food from domestic production, the proportion of food derived by Aboriginal people from the bush is likely to be higher because remote locations gives better access to game, because registered Indians are excluded from many hunting and fishing regulations so long as the purpose of hunting and fishing is

subsistence production, because subsistence hunting and fishing often occurs as an activity complementary to commercial trapping and fishing, because of high food prices, and because of low incomes (Trudeau 1966:43-44).¹ In a survey of domestic production by Manitoba Indian bands the Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research Centre of Manitoba Inc. estimated that the 7,233 residents of seven northern Manitoba population "clusters" harvested over \$2 million (\$1983) in food (Wagner 1985:49-50, 74-83). This translates to over \$2.8 million in 1991 dollars or over \$390 per capita. The value of this domestic production² is nearly 18% of the \$2,200 \$1991) 1981 per capita income for reserve communities within the study area as reported by Statistics Canada.

Petty primary production, a continuation of the fur-trade type of economy, provides employment and income to Aboriginal people (Brecher *et al* 1985:33). These activities generally return a low net income to producers (Spaulding 1967:97, also see Table 4-6). Petty commodity production continues because of government subsidies designed to maintain employment and incomes from sources other than social assistance. To a limited extent petty commodity production also occurs because it is a minimal cost source of food.³ Employment and incomes in these industries are not stable, dependent as they are on unstable resource availability and volatile external markets. These conditions are not conducive to the development of profitable, local production through experiential management and skill development, familiarity with organizational culture, surplus retention and technical progress.

During this century four significant factors further changed the economic, political and social fabric of northern Manitoba. These factors

1. The proportion and value of food generated through domestic production in the rural south, however, may be much higher than in northern Aboriginal communities because of the prevalence of agriculture and gardening in the rural south, and because of the dependency psychology afflicting many northern Aboriginal residents.

2. Excluding the value of domestic production of firewood.

3. The value of petty commodity production to domestic consumption is generally minimal. This is substantiated later in this Chapter.

are, roughly in chronological appearance, capitalist encroachment through natural resource industries, substantial state involvement in the welfare of Aboriginal people, the delegation of increasing local governing and administrative powers to representative Aboriginal dominated organizations, and the encouragement of Aboriginal, non-agrarian capitalism.

Statistics Canada data, as presented in the Manitoba Government's 1971 *Regional Perspectives*, shows that as of 1911 the population of northern Manitoba was almost entirely distributed among small, remote communities and Indian reserves (Government of Manitoba 1973:56-57). As of 1921 a substantial population had developed around the agricultural and forestry base of The Pas, by 1931 a substantial population had settled in the mining town of Flin Flon, and by 1951 around one-half of the population of northern Manitoba lived in The Pas and the port town and administrative centre of Churchill. In 1971 roughly 50% of the population lived in mining based and hydro-electric development based towns, and over 80% lived in these mining and hydro-electric development towns plus The Pas and Churchill. The Pas and Thompson became northern service centres for the provincial and federal governments.

The problems Aboriginal northerners face with respect to wage labour are similar to the problems of petty commodity production: too few jobs available; lack of skills for many of the better paying, more secure jobs; loss of home social supports; loss of financial subsidies which especially affected on-reserve registered Indians; and discrimination (Hlady and Poston 1959, Trudeau and Chance 1963). Trudeau and Chance (1963:53-54), and Hobart (1982:55-58) note the cultural conflicts that added to the difficulties faced by many northern Aboriginal persons in the labour force: pressures to engage in domestic production while trying to maintain a full time job, inadequate maintenance and care of equipment not personally owned, insufficient acculturation to working closely and jointly with others who are not of one's immediate family, and the stress of working for people from another culture.

Many registered Indians, especially those living within reserve communities, believe that, through the treaties and the Indian Act, the rest of Canada has made a special commitment to ensure their economic and

social well-being for all time. As Lithman observes, to the Indians of Maple River reserve, a pseudonym for a reserve located on the southern fringe of northern Manitoba, the only real welfare is cash welfare, other subsidies and support payments are seen as Indians' entitlement (1984:133,177). These funds and services are viewed as collective compensation for damages sustained as a result of ostensible deceit and exploitation by Canadian society, funneled through Chief and Council, to which every Indian is equitably entitled. Distribution of benefits is not so much connected to need or merit as it is to fairness in overall distribution, political power and prevention of the accumulation of economic or political capital (Lithman 1984:136-137,149). Indeed, Shimpo and Williamson argue that the absence of retail stores on reserves:

...can be understood by the 'logic' of formal equality. If some band member were to open a store on the reserve, there is no doubt that other band members would enjoy the service, and use it by obtaining credit. Most probably, they would not pay their debts, because the band members expect that those who have more should share so as to be equal with the rest. The only predictable result would be bankruptcy of the enterprise, and everybody knows it; so nobody dares to undertake such a venture. (1965:227)

Landa (1969) documents how such behavioural norms caused the failure of a cooperative store in Easterville, a mixed registered Indian and Metis community in northern Manitoba. Similar frustrations can be heard from Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal economic development workers across northern Manitoba. Shimpo and Williamson (1965:227-228), Sindell (1968:88-89), Spaulding (1967:111), and Zentner (1967:119-122) describe various facets of northern Aboriginal social norms whose effect is to inhibit or excuse negative interpersonal social behaviour.

During the 10 years just prior to the study period (1959-1969) INAC expenditures grew three times as fast as federal government expenditures as a whole (Canada Department of Finance 1969 and 1960). Indian special status coupled with Indian poverty and a high rate of population growth¹,

1. Especially since the 1950's.

was clearly creating a financial problem for the federal government.

Election of the Pearson Liberal Government in 1963 roughly coincided with creation of the so-called modern or capitalist "welfare state." In mid 1968 a majority Liberal Government was elected with Pierre Trudeau as Prime Minister. This Government, in its early years, pursued its policy of a "Just Society."

Consistent with its universalist, liberal individualism and its concern about expenditures on Indians and about Indian dependency on government, this Government, in 1969, issued its *Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969*, known as the "White Paper" on Indian policy (Weaver 1981). This *Statement* announced three policy proposals: speedy settlement of Indian treaty and Aboriginal claims, termination of the federal Indian Affairs Branch and the elimination of Indian special status. Within a year, in the face of a strong, negative reaction from Indian leaders, provincial governments and the general public, the Prime Minister formally withdrew the policy. This episode soured relations between Indian leaders and the Government. It also indicated to the Government that if greater integration with Canadian society was to occur and the future drain on federal finances was to be capped, the socioeconomic conditions of Indians had to be improved, but that in doing so Indian - government relations had to be recast so as to undo, or to avoid creating or reinforcing, special dependencies on government.

As election of the Pearson Government coincided with inception of the welfare state at the federal level, the Roblin and Weir Governments in Manitoba brought in the welfare reforms at the provincial level. The Roblin Government passed the first *Northern Affairs Act* in 1966. Under this *Act* a Commissioner of Northern Affairs was appointed. The Commissioner was responsible for building and maintaining a basic level of municipal services to the small, non-reserve communities not heretofore organized under *The Municipal Act*. The Manitoba New Democratic Party Government, first elected as a minority government in 1969, took three of five northern seats. As a majority government after the 1973 general election it held all five northern seats. Powerful forces propelled this Government into an activist

northern policy: (1) the Party was connected a labour movement with a strong base in northern forestry and mining towns; (2) the Government pursued construction of northern hydro-electric generating stations and water diversion systems seen to be in the long term economic interests of the Province and which also provided a substantial number of unionized construction jobs; (3) the Government was interested in garnering the northern Aboriginal vote to build a larger core of seats in the Legislature; and (4) the Party had traditionally presented itself as interventionist in the social, if not economic, spheres.

The importance the 1969 NDP Government placed on northern Manitoba is apparent in the *Regional Perspectives* volume of its remarkably comprehensive and coherent *Guidelines for the Seventies* policy statement (Government of Manitoba 1973). Over 31% of the pages in that volume are devoted to the north¹, whereas only one more page was devoted to the Party's stronghold in urban Manitoba and only 22% of the pages were devoted to rural Manitoba. In 1972 this Government created a full-fledged Department of Northern Affairs² which made vast improvements to the local infrastructure of small northern communities, and improved the representative structure and governing powers of the unorganized, non-reserve communities. In its first years this Government also launched a major expansion and upgrading of the northern transportation and communications network; and it created a series of programs to improve the health, employability, employment and incomes of residents of the unorganized communities. It gained a national reputation for activist, innovative, northern programming. The NDP governed the Province for some 11 of the 17 years of the study period, Progressive Conservative Governments held power from late 1977 through late 1981 and from early 1988 through the end of the study period.

As noted above, band councils as formal institutions representing

1. By comparison, in 1971 northern Manitoba, as defined in the *Guidelines for the Seventies*, contained only some 7% of the province's population.

2. With substantial financial assistance from the federal government.

registered Indians have been in existence since the Indian Act of 1880. Manitoba's provincial Indian organization was created in the 1930's and the provincial Metis organization was created in the 1960's (Boisvert and Turnbull 1985:139, Sawchuk 1978:46-47). The two principal organizations have been the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood, now named the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, and the Manitoba Metis Federation. During the 1980's INAC encouraged the development of tribal councils, comprised of a number of Indian bands in an area sharing linguistic group lines. Tribal councils provide technical, planning and coordinating services to member bands and represent the specific interests of bands located in particular areas¹. In their roughly 25 years of existence most of the northern tribal councils have had problems with inadequate political (owner) coherence, factionalism, internal management problems and organizational instability, and the creation of splinter organizations in response to racial and area-based interests.

Sawchuk, writing about the Manitoba Metis Federation, and Burke, writing about the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood, attest to the power that government subsidy-granting programs have had over Aboriginal organizations (Burke 1976, Sawchuk 1978:66). Aboriginal leaders act as brokers competing for program and project funding (Dunning 1959:17, Chance and Trudeau 1963:15, Holden 1968:77, Rogers 1963:277-280, Trudeau 1966:36). Governments can make or break leaders through allocation of funds. Landa (1969), Lithman (1984:129-161), Rogers (1963:74), Shimpo and Williamson (1965), and Trudeau (1966) describe fierce political competition, among the leadership of Aboriginal communities, over the distribution of government funding. Election or selection for senior governmental or interest group positions within Aboriginal organizations is itself highly rewarding under conditions of high unemployment and low incomes (Burke 1976, Spaulding 1967:108-110). Coupled with this factional leadership, highly dependent as it is on external resources, is a relative absence of community-wide formal or informal organizations. All this is exacerbated by a divided jurisdictional environment.

1. Most northern Manitoba Indian bands were members of tribal councils during the 1980's.

The Jurisdictional Environment and Its Legal Consequences

The study area includes three types of local governing jurisdictions. These jurisdictions are municipal governments under *The Municipal Act*, municipal governance of unorganized areas under *The Northern Affairs Act* and local governance of Indian reserves under *The Indian Act*. For ease of exposition locally governed geographic areas are generically called "communities," local geographic areas governed under *The Municipal Act* are generically called "organized communities", locally governed geographical areas under *The Northern Affairs Act* are called "unorganized communities," local areas under *The Municipal Act* plus local areas under *The Northern Affairs Act* are called "non-reserve communities," and locally governed areas under *The Indian Act* are called "reserves." Each relevant settlement name and the name of its local government is listed in the Appendix, Table 4-1.

Four of the communities within the study area are organized communities. One of these organized communities (The Pas) is an incorporated town. Three local government districts (Churchill, Grand Rapids and Consul¹) are administered through an administrator formally appointed by Manitoba Municipal Affairs. The administrator acts in consultation with an elected advisory committee. Businesses within these organized communities operate in a municipal environment essentially the same as that of businesses in southern Manitoba.

Businesses within unorganized areas under Manitoba Northern Affairs operate in a municipal environment with important differences from that of southern Manitoba. As a consequence of less development, construction and operation of local infrastructure has been heavily subsidized by the provincial government and tax mill rates imposed on assessed property for municipal and school taxes have been kept extremely low. Indeed, the perception of inequities in levels of municipal infrastructure coupled with subsidization has sparked resentment and demands for equal treatment from

1. The LGD of Consul abuts the Town of The Pas.

within Grand Rapids and parts of the L.G.D.'s of Consul and Mountain¹. From 1971 through to the late 1970's levels of municipal infrastructure within unorganized communities were generally lower than those in the organized communities, from the late 1970's through the end of the study period levels of municipal infrastructure within unorganized communities were generally equal to or higher than those found in comparable-sized settlements within the organized communities.

The jurisdictional environment on Indian reserves has been strikingly different from that of the organized or unorganized communities. The following is a summary of those aspects of the jurisdictional environment generally applicable to on-reserve Indians during the period of study. This information was obtained from Hurley (1990), Opekokew (1990) and Sanders (1976).

Under the *Indian Act* reserve lands are held in trust by the Government of Canada. Band members receive, from the band council or Minister of Indian Affairs, the right to use parcels of reserve land, but they cannot be owners in fee simple. A band member who receives the right to use land on a reserve does not have discretion to dispose of the land, and his use of the land could be terminated by the band council or Minister of Indian Affairs with little or notice. Reserve lands could not be seized, and Indian attitudes and INAC policy generally prohibit the sale (but not lease) of reserve lands even by band councils. Incorporated Indian owned businesses, not being Indian persons under *The Indian Act*, cannot occupy Indian land without band approval followed by conditional surrender (or "designation"), through lease or permit arrangements, by way of the Crown in right of Canada (INAC). At the end of the conditional surrender the land usually reverts back

1. But not from within Churchill. The federal and provincial governments intervened there to fund a substantial upgrading of the infrastructure in the early to mid 1970's. These improvements were put in place to ameliorate the impacts resulting from closure of the large military base.

The Town of The Pas also received a substantial and subsidized upgrading of municipal infrastructure in the early 1970's as a designated area under the Canada-Manitoba ARDA IIIB Agreement.

to the Crown in trust for the band. Prior to 1988, however, the Minister required that a band be at an advanced stage of development before self-management of conditionally surrendered land was allowed. Tangible or intangible personal property of band members located on a reserve (*in situ*) cannot be seized. Unincorporated Indian or band interests¹ located on reserve land are generally exempt from provincial taxation including income taxes². As well, the federal government does not impose direct or indirect taxes on unincorporated Indian or band on-reserve interests. Although Indian-owned, on-reserve corporations are taxable, these corporations could use the tax exempt status of their Indian or band owner(s) to distribute profits to them. Whether or not Indian bands had the power to tax Indian lands or band members is not clear, apparently very few bands across the country have instituted taxing by-laws.

In general, the courts have said that general provincial legislation is applicable to Indians on reserves provided that the legislation neither targets Indian reserves nor overlaps a field of federal legislation. Provincial zoning, health and safety, environmental legislation do not apply on reserves. Provincial legislation concerning forms of economic organization, commerce, and labour and employment standards, however, do apply on reserves.

As in unorganized communities, the level of infrastructure on reserves during the early years of the study period was generally very poor. While substantial improvements occurred during the 1970's, because of the initially low quality of infrastructure, because of the greater population of many reserves, and perhaps because of a range of other factors concerning the remoteness of some reserves and the technical and management capabilities of INAC and the bands, reserve infrastructure as a whole was not upgraded as quickly as was the infrastructure of the unorganized communities. As a consequence of the federal government's fiduciary role respecting registered Indians and, in particular, its fiduciary role respecting

1. Indian bands are not legal entities.

2. With the exception of consumption taxes which are passed on to persons who were not band members.

registered Indians living on reserves coupled with the extreme poverty of many reserves, construction and operation of nearly all local infrastructure has been funded by the federal government.

The essence of the above discussion is that, in comparison to businesses not located on a reserve, *ceteris paribus*, Indian-owned businesses located on reserves had important potential cost advantages. These advantages are greater for unincorporated businesses than for incorporated businesses. As well, businesses located in unorganized communities would have had, *ceteris paribus*, a cost advantage compared to businesses located in organized communities.¹

As final points-of-interest, therefore, it would be instructive to know:

- *What impact does the unique conjunction of mostly negative historical circumstances, a dependent but unitary governing institution and tax benefits have on the volume and source of proposals to locate businesses on Indian reserves?*
- *What impact does the unique conjunction of mostly negative historical circumstances, a dependent but unitary governing institution and tax benefits have on the rate of success of businesses located on Indian reserves?*

The next section describes social and economic conditions within study area communities.

1. Although this advantage has not been as large as that enjoyed by Indian owned businesses located on reserves.

Demographic Conditions

There are 106 distinct communities¹ grouped into 57 local areas located within the study area (Appendix, Table 4-3).² More than one community are grouped by local area only if residents of any one community would expend minimal out-of-pocket money and time to travel to the other communities within the area in order to make purchases or to take employment or active ownership of a business within one of the other communities within the area. Indeed, most grouped communities abut one another, and most abutting community sets include a reserve community and an unorganized community. Non-abutting communities within a local area are mutually accessible by all-weather road and/or skiff and snowmobile. In many, if not most, unorganized and reserve communities privately owned all-terrain vehicles, skiffs and snowmobiles are more common than privately owned automobiles.

1. Comprising the 109 named communities less the 3 communities - God's River, Pauingassi, and York Landing - whose jurisdictional status changed during the study period.

2. During the study period five reserves were created within the study area (Appendix, Table 4-1). Fox Lake Band members lived in the out-of-scope organized community of Gillam prior to establishment of the Bird Reserve #2 in 1985. God's River Band members separated from the God's Lake Band and received a reserve in 1988. Prior to becoming a reserve, God's River was an unorganized community that received administrative and infrastructure funding from Indian Affairs Canada. In the late 1970's the Barrens Land Band, whose members had separated from the Northlands Band around 1973, moved to a new unorganized community of Lac Brochet. The Lac Brochet community became a reserve in 1980. Prior to 1988 members of the Little Grand Rapids Band inhabited two places on the shores of Fishing Lake: the Little Grand Rapids Reserve and the unorganized community of Pauingassi. This unorganized community received administrative and infrastructure funding from Indian Affairs Canada. In 1988 the Pauingassi community became a reserve. Since the close of the study period residents of Pauingassi separated from the Little Grand Rapids Band to become the Pauingassi Band. York Landing had been settled as an unorganized community that received administrative and infrastructure funding from Indian Affairs Canada prior to the study period. In 1990 York Landing was designated as a reserve. Since the benefits of income tax exemption did not apply until the reserve was legally designated, communities settled prior to becoming a reserve will be grouped with other unorganized communities.

The reader should also be aware that the unorganized communities of Baden, Rock Ridge and Spence Bay were created by schisms in nearby pre-existing communities during the study period.

Since this is a study of government financed business development within northern communities with substantial Aboriginal populations the operational criterion is to include only those communities whose grouped population was over 25% Aboriginal ancestry over most of the study period. Data concerning total population and Aboriginal population within each local area and community collected from published and unpublished data are displayed in the Appendix, Table 4-2. While Jean Legasse's landmark 1959 *Study of the Population of Indian Ancestry Living in Manitoba* predates the study period, it supplements the limited data available for the beginning of the study period. The Manitoba Northern Affairs and Statistics Canada sources are accepted as having a relatively high level of reliability. Indian Affairs Canada on-reserve registered Indian counts are generally considered less reliable, but are used in conjunction with Statistics Canada data to establish the minimum on-reserve registered Indian population. Individual unorganized communities are not census subdivisions¹; therefore, except for the statistic "total population," Statistics Canada census data are not published for these communities. Even so, the populations of certain unorganized communities have been too small to be published and enumeration problems have caused the populations of other larger unorganized communities to be not published in certain years.

Table 4-2 in the Appendix also presents for each local area, community and census division derived estimates of the:

- total population;
- minimum number of Aboriginal persons and on-reserve registered Indians; and
- the estimated minimum proportions of Aboriginal persons, on-reserve registered Indians and other than on-reserve registered Indians² within the total community population.

1. Each individual reserve and sometimes each separate parcel of a reserve, however, is a census subdivision.

2. That is, Metis, not registered Indians and off-reserve registered Indians.

Minimum estimates are derived for the latter two groups because 25% Aboriginal population is set as a minimum criterion, because the Aboriginal ancestry numbers for 1981 are single ancestry¹, and because it is a widely held belief among those who work on northern and Aboriginal issues that most regular surveys materially under-report counts of Aboriginal ancestry (Hull:1984).

The current geographic structure for census divisions in northern Manitoba was set for the 1976 census. As a consequence, except for aggregating data for the few organized communities, comparable census division aggregates are not available for 1971. As well counts on other socioeconomic variables for the organized community and reserve subdivisions prior to 1976 are not available in published form.

Based on the data in Appendix, Table 4-2 and a set of decision rules local areas, organized, unorganized and reserve communities are identified as to whether or not the population at each census year was above 25% Aboriginal ancestry or above 50% Aboriginal ancestry, respectively. The 25% proportion is considered indicative of substantial "Aboriginal characteristics" (whatever these characteristics really are) in the population. The 50% or more proportion is, of course, a majority of "Aboriginal characteristics" in the population. In the absence of numerical evidence for a given census year, the following decision rules are applied:

1. If the community is an Indian reserve it is deemed to contain over 50% residents of Aboriginal ancestry.
2. For entire local areas, a "yes" or "no" decision may be implied by data available for a subset of the communities within the local area that has sufficient numerical strength to force the aggregate proportion into one of the population proportion categories.

1. The count of a person who is of mixed Metis *and* Ojibwa, or mixed Cree *and* Ojibwa ancestry is not published for that year.

3. In the absence of extenuating circumstances such as the opening or closure of an industry or socio-political fission, a strong numerically-based decision for a location at a census year that is not at the study period boundaries is extrapolated to the previous and following census years if numerical data is not available for one or both of those years. Under such conditions a strong field expert-opinion based decision is extrapolated to the previous census year only.
4. In the absence of numerical data and known extenuating circumstances, decisions are interpolated for census years that are sandwiched between those census years that support decisions based on numerical, implied or reserve status data.¹

The last two columns of Appendix, Table 4-3 present the decision as to whether or not to include a local area and, by implication, the communities within the local area, in the study. Eleven (11) local areas comprising 11 communities do not meet the minimum 25% Aboriginal population criterion.² This leaves 95 distinct communities which existed during some portion of the study period that meet the 25% criterion and, by coincidence, the 50% criterion as well. These communities comprise 46 local areas. Two local areas³ comprising five distinct communities, meet the 25% or more Aboriginal population criterion, but do not meet the 50% or more Aboriginal population criterion. As a result, most of the communities (44 local areas comprising 90 distinct communities) existing during at least some portion of the study time frame meet the 50% or more Aboriginal population criterion. Therefore, the vast majority of the communities can be said to be strongly Aboriginal.

Certain communities did not exist for the full 1971-1991 time frame of the study and others changed from unorganized communities to reserve communities. Applying the criteria discussed above gives the numbers of local areas and communities existing at each of the census years shown in

1. Interpolation is not, however, layered onto of extrapolated decisions.
2. These local areas (and communities) are: Bissett, Cranberry Portage, Dawson Bay-Overflowing River, Flin Flon, Gillam, Herb Landing, Homebrook and Peonan Point, Leaf Rapids, Lynn Lake, Snow Lake and Thompson.
3. Churchill and The Pas.

Table 4-1. The table also shows, for each census year, the numbers of places included and not included at the 25% and 50% Aboriginal ancestry criteria, and the number of places for which data are not sufficient to adjudicate inclusion.

The total population of the relevant communities in 1981, the midpoint of the study period, was about 42,000 persons (Table 4-2). Approximately 11,000 persons (25%) resided in the organized communities, 11,000 (26%) resided in the unorganized communities and 20,000 (48%) resided on Indian reserves.

The Aboriginal population has had a relatively high birth rate compared to the population of the province as a whole. This high birth rate generates large families (Statistics Canada 1983). In 1981 the average size of a census family in Manitoba was 3.9 persons. In comparison, the average size of a census family in the organized communities was 4.2 persons, in the unorganized communities it was 5.2 persons and in the Indian reserves it was 5.9 persons. Over the study period, however, the birth rate of the Aboriginal population fell and there has been substantial emigration of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. As a consequence, in the 15 year period from 1976 through 1991 the study area population increased at a compound rate of only 0.2% (Table 4-2). The population of the organized and unorganized communities, however, decreased: only -0.7% per year for the organized communities, but -2.3% per year for the unorganized communities. The population of Indian reserves in the study area increased 1.7% per year, reflecting the higher birth rate and lower level of emigration from these communities. This combination of relatively high birth rates and lower levels of emigration from Indian reserves, exacerbated by many poor quality, if not alarmist, population projections, done by senior government and other regional and local organizations with a self-interest in promoting their need for services or funding, frightened senior governments.

The population of each status group can be roughly estimated from data, derived from the 1986 Census (Manitoba Bureau of Statistics 1989)(Table 4-3). If the reasonable assumption is made that the "North American Indian Only" population in Table 6 of that study is close to the

registered Indian population, data from that table can be used to estimate the study area population by status group. These calculations give a total Aboriginal population of just over 33,000 of which almost 25,000 (75%) are registered Indians.

Economic and Business Conditions

Measures of household and per capita income per community for the years 1981, 1986 and 1991 can be calculated from census data (Appendix, Table 4-5). These measures of income per type of community are summarized in Table 4-4.¹ While the residents of the organized communities have, on average, done well, residents of the unorganized communities are somewhat poorer than Manitobans as a whole and residents of Indian reserves are much poorer than Manitobans as a whole. For example, in 1981 median household income in the organized communities was \$39,500, in the unorganized communities it was \$22,400 and on Indian reserves it was \$18,500. For Manitoba as a whole 1981 median household income was \$29,900 (Statistics Canada 1983). In 1981 per capita income in the organized communities was \$11,900, in the unorganized communities it was \$6,300, and for Indian reserves it was only \$3,600. For Manitoba as a whole 1981 per capita income was \$12,000. As a consequence, residents of unorganized communities are somewhat more dependent, and residents of Indian reserves are much more dependent, on income from government transfer payments than the average Manitoban. In 1986 residents of organized communities derived 88% of their income from sources other than transfer payments, residents of unorganized communities derived 77% of their income from sources other than transfer payments while residents of Indian reserves derived only 56% of their income from sources other than transfer payments. By comparison, in 1986 residents of Manitoba derived 88% of their income from sources other than transfer payments (Statistics Canada 1988).

1. Unless otherwise noted, all references to values are in 1990 dollars. The constant 1990 value is calculated by factoring current dollars by Statistic Canada's national annual average consumer price index (Table 2-7).

Patterns of inter-census change in the 1981-1991 period among measures of community income are presented in Table 4-5. Total household income (or, potential aggregate demand for business products and services, assuming a stable tax regime) continued to increase in the organized and Indian reserve communities, while it gradually fell in the unorganized communities. Over the entire period median household income declined in the organized communities, but increased in the unorganized and Indian reserve communities. These changes diverge substantially in direction and/or magnitude of change from the secular increase in Manitoba gross domestic product (GDP). Changes in total household and median household incomes in the organized and unorganized communities are similar in direction with the mostly negative changes in estimated employment income in northern Manitoba over the entire 1981-1991 period and with the relative decline in estimated employment income experienced in the mid-1980's (Table 4-6). The fact that changes to income for Indian reserves appear not to follow the patterns of Manitoba GDP or estimated northern employment income suggests that on-reserve incomes were boosted by some mixture of transfer payments and employment income from the local public sector which, in the case of Indian reserves, is financed by transfers from senior governments.

This study assumes that health of the northern Manitoba economy is tied to health of the national and provincial economies in general, and to the health of those industries important to northern Manitoba in particular. The major industries that generate income and employment in the study region from exports are, in order of importance: mining, generation and transmission of electricity, forestry, commercial fishing and commercial trapping. Estimated income accruing during the study period to producers and employees of these industries¹ for all of Manitoba is shown in Table 4-6. Data are not available for the entire study period on income and employment flowing from the northern operations of Manitoba Hydro so estimates have been generated by piecing together Hydro reports and records (Appendix, Table 4-6). Not surprisingly, income and employment

1. Largely operated within northern Manitoba.

created by these industries are highly variable. For the years in which estimates are possible comparison of the total wage and salary equivalent income shows that in 1975, the year of highest income, total income was 137% of income in 1983, the year of lowest income. Excluding the mining and Hydro industries which are concentrated in non-Aboriginal, organized communities excluded from the study, this variation is 118% with the year of highest income being 1980 and the year of lowest level of income being 1991.

The author has attempted to relate northern income levels to the performance of Manitoba's GDP and performance of the principal northern industries. All combinations of:

1. change in Manitoba GDP relative to change in total income per type of community, and
2. change in the value of wage and salary income for each of the northern industries relative to change in total income per type of community

for the three periods 1981-86, 1986-91 and 1981-91 have been calculated (Appendix, Table 4-7). For each type of community and period the three strongest associations between change in total income and economic performance are noted. For the organized communities change in total income, over the 1981-1991 period, shows the strongest association with change in provincial GDP plus Hydro-sourced income.¹ For both the unorganized and Indian reserve communities change in total income shows the strongest association with change in commercial fishing-sourced income for all three periods: 1981-1986, 1986-1991 and 1981-1991.

There were more than 25,000 persons in the potential labour force of the relevant communities as of the midpoint of the study period (Table 4-7). This potential labour force in 1981 was some 68% of the population of the organized communities, some 62% of the population of the unorganized

1. For the period 1986-1991, however, total income was most strongly associated with commercial fishing-mining-logging.

communities and some 56% of the population of the Indian reserves. By comparison, in 1981 the potential labour force, similarly defined, of Manitoba was 76% of the population. By implication, study area communities, especially Indian reserves, have unusually large age-dependent populations.

Estimates of the potential labour force per status group are shown in Table 4-8. Additional labour force data for northern Manitoba are summarized in Table 4-9. These data indicate that, except for the unorganized communities from 1986 to 1991, labour force participation rates rose for all types of communities. In fact, from 1981 the participation rate within the unorganized communities surpassed the rate within the organized communities. The participation rate within reserve communities, although increasing, remained much lower than in organized and unorganized communities. Employment as a percentage of those participating rose throughout the study period in the unorganized and reserve communities.¹ In the organized communities, however, employment as a percentage of those participating fell slightly through the study period.

While labour force conditions in the organized communities are similar to those of Manitoba as a whole, conditions in the unorganized communities and Indian reserves are very different. In 1981 for example, the participation rate for all of Manitoba was 65% and the employment rate was 95% (Statistics Canada 1983). The unorganized communities and Indian reserves appear to adjust differently to weak labour markets, but both adjustments result in relatively much smaller portions of the adult population being employed. The 1981 participation rate for the unorganized communities was similar to that of Manitoba as a whole, but the employment rate was much lower. The 1981 participation rate for the Indian reserves was much lower than that of Manitoba as a whole, but the employment rate was only slightly lower.

1. The unusually large increase in the participation rate within the unorganized communities between the years 1976 and 1981 is offset by a corresponding decline in the employment rate. It appears, therefore, that these anomalies were generated within the enumeration process or by data categorization.

Data on employment by industrial sector shows that in all types of communities the largest proportion of the employed labour force was employed within the services sector while relatively small proportions of the labour force were employed within the construction, finance, insurance and real estate sectors (Statistics Canada 1994B, 1994C, 1988, and 1983). In addition,

- the organized communities had relatively small proportions of the population employed in the primary sector;
- the unorganized communities had relatively large proportions of the population employed in the primary sector, but low proportions employed in the manufacturing, trade and finance, insurance and real estate sectors; and
- the reserve communities had relatively small proportions employed in all sectors except the primary, services and public administration sectors. In reserve communities the proportion employed in public administration was especially high.¹

Published data from the 1991 census provides employment data for component sub-sectors of the primary sector. These data indicate that none of the sub-sectors were very important generators of employment in the organized communities.² As well, these data confirm that the fishing and trapping, and logging and forestry sub-sectors were the principal generators of primary sector employment in the unorganized and reserve communities.

Data show small net percentage job gains (+1% to +4%) in the organized and unorganized communities during both the 1981-1986 and 1986-1991 periods, and large net job gains in the reserve communities for both periods (+32% and +34%, respectively)(Statistics Canada 1994B, 1994C, 1988 and 1983). These data also indicate volatility in employment among industry sectors for the two periods, especially in reserve

1. This finding is consistent with the suggestion, made above, that local public sector employment plays an unusually large role in changes to total household income within Indian reserves.

2. Although manufacturing based on primary production would be important to The Pas because of the Repap Inc. forest products mill located in that community.

communities. The reader is cautioned, however, that the relatively small size of the employed labour force in many of these industries exacerbates the magnitude of percentage changes.

Social Conditions and Access

One often cited indicator of the degree to which a community retains a traditional Aboriginal culture is the relative proportion of the population engaged in fishing and trapping. Usher (1981), Landa (1969) and Tanner (1968) discuss the importance of domestic production to the well-being of northern Aboriginal people. The Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research Centre of Manitoba undertook a survey of domestic production in select Indian reserves within Manitoba (Wagner 1984). The findings from that work which pertain to seven communities within the study area are presented in Table 4-10. The per capita value of domestic production varies from \$120 to \$270, or \$550 to \$1,090 for an average-size (1986) family in each of the communities. Dividing these values by 1986 median household income in each of the seven communities from Appendix, Table 4-5 implies that domestic production contributed roughly three to seven percent of real family income (weighted mean = 4.6%). This result indicates that while domestic production may be an important cultural artifact in northern Manitoba Aboriginal communities, such production makes only a small contribution to material well-being.

Data concerning highest level of education attained, presented in Table 4-11, show low levels of educational attainment among adult residents of the unorganized and Indian reserve communities. For example, in 1981 when 51% of adult residents of unorganized communities and 53% of adult residents of Indian reserves had less than grade 9 education, only 22% of adult Manitobans had less than grade 9 education (Statistics Canada 1983). As well, in 1981 18% of adult Manitobans, but only 15% of adults from unorganized communities and 12% of adults from Indian reserves, had a trade certificate or some post-secondary or university education.

Over the study period, for all types of communities, the proportion of

the population with less than grade 9 education fell and the percentage with at least some university or post-secondary education rose. The decrease in the proportion of the population with less than grade 9 education was most pronounced in the reserve communities while the increase in the proportion with at least some university or post-secondary was most pronounced in the organized communities. Due to migration, the organized communities show a decrease in the proportion of the population with a secondary certificate while both the unorganized and reserve communities show substantial decreases, followed by slight increases, in the proportion of the population with a secondary certificate. Both the organized and unorganized communities show decreases in the proportion of the population with trade certificates while the reserve communities show a decrease, followed by an increase, in the proportion holding a trade certificate.

The proportion of population that most often speaks an Aboriginal language at home may be another indicator of the degree to which a community retains a traditional Aboriginal culture. Data presented in Table 4-12 indicate that in 1991 while only 2% of the population of the organized communities most often spoke an Aboriginal language at home, 13% of the population of the unorganized communities and 57% of the population of the reserve communities most often spoke an Aboriginal language at home. Although Statistics Canada did not publish data concerning use of each of the three main Aboriginal languages spoken in northern Manitoba¹ prior to 1991, it is assumed that these percentages have been declining over time and that the relative percentages among communities have remained the same during the study period.

Accessibility may be an important factor affecting business development in the north. The highest level of access for each community within the study area as of 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1991 has been determined (Appendix, Table 4-10). Access has improved for the

1. Chipewyan, Cree, Ojibwa.

unorganized and Indian reserve communities.¹ Whereas in 1976 54% of all communities had all-weather road access and 14% had winter road only access, by 1991 62% of all communities had all-weather road access and 9% had winter road only access. Although access has improved, a substantial minority of communities did not have all-weather road access as at the end of the study period and inter-community transport links continue to follow a more rigid hub-and-spoke pattern without a subsidiary grid system². This makes it more difficult to establish and manage inter-community or regional businesses. As well, the 1991 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada access zone designation is noted for each community. Although INAC applies these access zones designations to reserve communities only, the designations can be extended to other nearby communities. INAC uses the designations to produce cost inflation factors for funding infrastructure capital and maintenance. Zone designations, therefore, are indicators of 1991 transportation costs.

Regional Development Policy

The use of regional economic development as a specific national government policy began during the Diefenbaker government.³ The Pearson government built upon this foundation. In 1969 the first Trudeau government consolidated regional development initiatives in the newly created Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE).

This new Department designed a three-part strategy that included

1. In 1971, all of the organized communities had all-weather road access except Churchill which had air, rail and sea access. As of 1991 this situation had not changed.

2. As is common to the more densely populated south.

3. This summary is drawn from the works of Aucoin and Bakvis 1983, Russell n.d., and the author's government and consulting experience concerning the application of federal regional development policy in Manitoba.

industrial incentives¹, infrastructure assistance for regional growth poles², and social adjustment and rural economic development³. During these first few years DREE's approach was highly centralized. In 1972 a DREE internal review reported that spending on regional development had doubled over four years. This review led to a shift in emphasis from removing barriers to development to exploiting opportunities, greater cooperation with the provinces and relocation of a majority of DREE's staff from Ottawa to regional offices. As well, the Department backed away from its use of centralized directives in the face of political pressure from the provinces - especially from Manitoba, Quebec and Prince Edward Island.

After 1973 DREE shifted to the use of 10-year General Development Agreements (GDA's) and multi-year "subsidiary agreements" with the provinces and territories. Through these agreements DREE was to coordinate its activities with the developmental activities of other federal departments⁴ and the provincial or territorial governments. These agreements were supposed to mobilize more comprehensive, multidimensional attacks on regional disparities. The Canada-Manitoba Northlands Agreements (1974-1982) and Northern Development Agreements (1982-1989) are examples of such subsidiary agreements. Substantial decision-taking power was decentralized to DREE's regional ADM's and provincial directors-general. Provincial input was encouraged through joint, regional policy and administrative committees, and through provincial involvement in defining the foci of subsidiary agreements.

Russell's summary of regional policies of the federal government over

1. These were formally called Regional Development Incentives. They were offered throughout the study period.
2. Such as The Pas Special Area in northern Manitoba operational during the early 1970's.
3. Such as ARDA and the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration. These programs were to be phased-out by the later 1970's, but continued in Manitoba to the end of the study period.
4. DREE did not have, in general, sufficient financial clout nor organizational power to perform this coordination.

the study period attests to a secular reduction of the use of criteria concerning geography, poverty and unemployment, and job creation for directing regional economic development assistance. During the early and mid-1980's exploitation of economic opportunities in all regions of the country, and the re-tooling and restructuring of industries in response to international competition overwhelmed the (already tattered) focus on regional disparities. The 1982 creation of the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE) through the merger of DREE and the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce was the organizational validation of this trend. The GDA's were replaced by Economic and Regional Development Agreements. As well, the federal government began to seek greater visibility for its own activities and spending than had occurred through the GDA's and subsidiary agreements. In 1987 DRIE ceased to exist. Its responsibilities were split into three new organizations: the Department of Industry, Science and Technology¹, the Office and then Department of Western Economic Diversification, and the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Council.

Foundations of the Case Study Programs

This study focuses on three programs delivered through the federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion and its successor, the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion. The three programs are Special ARDA Commercial (SARDA), the Northern Development Agreement Program #2 (NDA2) and the Native Economic Development Program #3 (NEDP3). While each of these programs became operational on different dates, all three programs expired as of 31 March, 1989 (Aboriginal Economic Programs 1990:1).

1. Aboriginal economic development activities went to this Department.

Special ARDA

According to Illingworth (1992:2), aside from the economic development activities of the federal Indian Affairs department, the economic development program targeted on Aboriginal people having the longest operational run was SARDA. Two SARDA programs operated in Manitoba: SARDA Commercial and SARDA Primary Producers.

The federal *Agriculture and Rural Development Act* (ARDA) of 1970 provided the legislative base for SARDA. This *Act* enabled the federal government to enter into general ARDA rural- and agriculture-oriented agreements with the provinces. In 1971 and 1972 Canada signed SARDA agreements with British Columbia, Alberta,¹ Saskatchewan and Manitoba (Illingworth 1990:5). In 1977 and 1978 SARDA Canada-N.W.T. and Canada-Yukon agreements were signed. SARDA agreements were designed to direct development assistance to Aboriginal people² who were not, as a whole, integrated into rural economies or benefiting from the infrastructure of rural areas. Illingworth (1990:7-8) notes that, because SARDA assistance was in the form of grants, the Program did not overlap or compete with other government and private financing agencies. Illingworth also claims that SARDA's "...sustained high volume of activity over a long period and its focus on small business development provide[d] the only mature program experience for assessing current and future challenges in the field."

The initial five-year Canada-Manitoba SARDA agreement, signed in July 1971, was retroactively effective from 1 April, 1971 to 31 March, 1975 and extended by amendment to the end of March, 1977. A successor five year agreement was effective from 9 March, 1977 to 31 March, 1982, and extended by three amendments to 31 March, 1989.³

1. The agreement with Alberta was never implemented.
2. Whether they were residing in the mid-northern parts of the provinces, the northern territories or the southern portions of the provinces.
3. The amendments covered the periods: June 1982 through 31 March, 1984; 4 June, 1984 through March 1987; and 1 April, 1987 through 31 March, 1989.

A program document titled "Special ARDA Program Profile" (circa 1985:2) written to describe the 1977 Agreement identifies "three crucial background factors responsible for prompting the program's creation:"

1. "The 1969...White Paper on Indian Policy which proposed that Indian Affairs be phased out and other federal departments including DREE begin to assume some of the responsibility for the economic development of Indian people."
2. "A recognition that DREE's existing programs did not fit the special needs of native peoples."
3. "DREE's industrial incentives were limited to secondary industry; did not apply to tertiary or resource processing activities; and did not apply universally in geographic areas where many Indian and Metis lived."

Ginsberg, in a program review done for the Special ARDA Committee circa 1978, notes that Regional Development Incentives Act (RDIA) financing was limited to secondary industry and that it was delivered in a manner that effectively excluded less developed rural and northern regions (circa 1978:1-2). SARDA was said to be an extension of the RDIA approach in which incentive grants were tied to new capital investment to encourage investment in designated regions. This approach was carried over into Special ARDA "...and then evolved under pressure of implementation" (pg. 4). Ginsberg says that the potential usefulness of RDIA for less developed areas was limited by design features that excluded the funding of pre-development work, and post-funding management and operational support.

The 1971 Canada-Manitoba SARDA Agreement enabled the two governments to cost-share assistance or services so that "disadvantaged" "...people who have previously had little or no access to regular earnings and employment opportunities...", of whom "many are of Indian ancestry", could receive "...special action to ensure that they are able to benefit from rural development programmes and projects..." (Canada, Department of Regional Economic Expansion; *Agreement Between The Government of Canada and...*, 1971). "Special actions" included: the establishment or improvement of recreational facilities; the provision of counseling, training services or facilities (referred to as "social adjustment measures" or "SAM's"); the

development of primary producing activities ("PPA's"); and the establishment, expansion or modernization of commercial undertakings ("CU's"). Those aspects of the SAM component not directly related to an approved PPA or CU were never implemented (Illingworth 1990:12).

The 1977 Agreement placed more emphasis on local entrepreneurship (*Canada-Manitoba Special Rural Development Agreement, 1977*). One of the clauses in the introductory section of this Agreement states: "...Canada and the Province wish to support initiatives which broaden community participation in development ventures and increase the degree of local ownership of undertakings by encouraging the development of local resources by local people..." (pg. 1). This Agreement also added "...the provision of related infrastructure to facilitate the viability of projects...", the SAM "special relocation assistance for residents who move their immediate families...if such moves will enhance their prospects for employment..." as reasons for expending money under SARDA (pg. 4). Funding recreational facilities was not continued under this Agreement. A labour standards section concerning rates of pay was also added with the proviso that, where they are higher, provincial standards shall apply where applicable (pg. 7).¹

Northern Development Agreement Program #2 (NDA2)

This program was initiated through the "Canada-Manitoba Subsidiary Agreement on Northern Development" (henceforth the Northern Development Agreement or NDA). The full name of this program is "Resource Opportunity Development." Because the NDA contained 18 programs, those involved generally referred to the program as simply "Program 2."

The NDA was a subsidiary agreement to the Canada-Manitoba General

1. There were no substantive changes in the Agreement extensions of 1982 and 1984 (*Amendment to Canada-Manitoba Special Rural Development Agreement, 1982; Amendment No. 2, Canada-Manitoba Special Rural Development Agreement, 1977, March 9, 1977*).

Development Agreement dated 5 June, 1974. Through the General Development Agreement the two governments agreed:

...to encourage socioeconomic development in the northern portion of Manitoba to provide the people of the area with real options and opportunities to contribute to and participate in economic development, to continue their own way of life with enhanced pride and purpose and to participate in the orderly utilization of natural resources.... (Canada-Manitoba General Development Agreement 1974:5)

The NDA's objectives, as specified in the agreement, were:

- (a) to develop locally-based income and employment opportunities;**
- (b) to increase participation of the northern labour force in employment opportunities, particularly in major resource sectors; and**
- (c) to facilitate increased participation of individuals in northern development by removing physical barriers to human and economic development. (Canada-Manitoba Subsidiary Agreement on Northern Development:5)**

The first NDA was signed some eight years later, on 29 November, 1982.¹ It was to have effect for five years until 31 March, 1987; however, on the 17th of November, 1987 it was extended to 31 March, 1989. Signatories to the Agreement on behalf of Canada were the Minister of State for Economic Development; Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce and Regional Economic Expansion²; Minister of Employment and Immigration; and the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Signatories on behalf of Manitoba were the Ministers of Northern Affairs³, Labour and Manpower, and Finance. NDA programs were initiated in four sectors: community economic development, human development, community

1. Between 1974 and 1982 two Canada-Manitoba Manitoba Northlands Agreements were implemented. Neither of these Agreements contained business development programming.

2. Who was the "principal federal minister."

3. Who was the "principal provincial minister."

improvement, and management and consultation. The total cost of all programs over the life of the Agreement was in the order of \$186.2 million (\$1987).¹

The inclusion of economic development programming, reflecting Canada's emphasis on this subject, is one of three principal features distinguishing the NDA from its predecessor Canada-Manitoba Northlands Agreements. The economic development sector includes five programs: "Program 1: Community/Regional Economic Development Planning," "Program 2: Resource Opportunity Development," "Program 3: Northeast Manitoba Development", "Program 4: Resource Development," and "Program 5: Local Government Development." Program 1 funded general and project-specific, economic and business development, analysis and planning. It "...is to assist local and regional groups and organizations in the identification and development of new employment opportunities [by] provid[ing] for the costs of undertaking project analysis and feasibility studies, market research, business development services, organizational development and support, and technical and professional services necessary to develop sound economic development projects at the local and regional level" (Canada-Manitoba Subsidiary Agreement on Northern Development: Schedule A, pp. 5-6). Program 2 funded economic and business project development. The program "...is to stimulate and respond to locally developed economic development projects which create new income and employment opportunities....[by] provid[ing] financial assistance to local groups to establish and operate organizations for the purpose of initiating and managing local economic development projects; capital and other assistance to projects which can demonstrate the creation of new employment opportunities based on resource utilization; and technical and financial support to projects until they reach...self-sustaining operations." Program 3 is a pot of money for activities for the especially impoverished, largely on-reserve registered Indian population of northeastern Manitoba. "[This program] will provide for planning and implementation of special

1. A substantial portion of the total cost of the NDA, probably over one-half by the author's reckoning, consisted of expenditures that the two governments would have made in the absence of the Agreement.

development measures for Northeast Manitoba....[while]...provid[ing] supplementary emphasis on the unique socioeconomic conditions of this area." Program 4 funded activities concerning the general development and management of natural resources. It "...is to undertake development activities relating to northern resources....[by]...improving utilization and management of natural resources while providing employment opportunities for northern residents." Program 5 was forced into the economic development sector so that the province could have a public presence in the sector. It is "...to enhance local government capabilities" by "...provid[ing] information services, training programs, and other developmental assistance to residents of remote communities under the jurisdiction of the Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs...."

The total cost of community economic development sector programs was around \$47.5 million (\$1987), or \$42 million after subtracting Program 5 which had little to do with economic development. Canada, through DRE/IE, arranged and paid for 100% of the implementation of Program 2 (around \$12 million) and Program 3 (around \$2.5 million). Canada arranged for the implementation of Program 1 (around \$2.5 million), but shared its cost 60%-40% with Manitoba. Manitoba arranged and paid for 100% of the implementation of Program 4 (\$25 million) and Program 5 (\$5.5 million). Both of these programs operated within provincial constitutional jurisdictions: natural resources and local government. Canada's insistence on public visibility and control over certain programs was a second principal feature distinguishing the NDA from the preceding Northlands Agreement.

Human Development Sector programs addressed employment training, employment referral services, affirmative action, relocation support services and youth services. Community Improvement Sector programs funded local infrastructure and remote airstrips. Management and Consultation Sector programs were concerned with Agreement management, public relations, overall Agreement and program specific evaluations, and institutionalized means of consulting regional interest groups on Agreement activities. The fact that a number of programs in the human development and community improvement sectors were to be implemented and funded by other federal departments, particular Employment and Immigration Canada and Indian and

Northern Development Canada, is the third feature distinguishing the NDA from the Northlands Agreements.

Native Economic Development Program - Element III (NEDP3)

The Native Economic Development Program (NEDP) was established under DRIE in April, 1984. The Program was "...to assist the development of economic self-reliance..." of Registered and Non-registered Indians, Metis and Inuit (Government of Canada, Regional Industrial Expansion, *The Native Economic Development Program Proposal Development Guide*, n.d.).

The NEDP was designed to respond to economic and business development proposals (Government of Canada, Regional Industrial Expansion, *The Native Economic Development Program...*, n.d.). Proposals were to be judged against four overall objectives:

- To increase and strengthen Aboriginal projects at the community level which have a strong economic focus, increase economic self-reliance and have the potential to be commercially successful.
- To increase the number of Aboriginal enterprises, including financial and economic institutions, which have the potential to be commercially viable and which enhance Aboriginal management skills and economic opportunities for Aboriginal people.
- To increase the access of Aboriginal people to existing economic development resources in the private and public sectors.
- To increase the public awareness of the contributions to the Canadian economy made by Aboriginal enterprise." (pg. 3)

NEDP was a unilateral federal government program operating across the country. The Program was allocated \$345 million for operations and project financing. The national office was located in Winnipeg. Regional operations offices were located in Montreal, Winnipeg and Vancouver.

NEDP contained four categories of activity (Government of Canada,

Regional Industrial Expansion, *The Native Economic Development Program Proposal Development Guide*, pp. 4, 5, 8, 11, 14). Element I - Native Financial and Economic Institutions was to develop the capital base of Aboriginal controlled financial and economic development institutions. Element I was the most significant policy change introduced through NEDP; it initiated a process, continuing to this day, of transferring business financing away from line departments. Element II - Community-Based Economic Development was to support community animation and planning of economic development, and to support the development of projects resulting from such animation activity. Element III - Special Projects was an institutionalized means of responding to "special opportunities" that "...will have a significant positive impact on Native economic development." Element IV - Coordination consisted of research and information, advocacy, and the generation of recommendations to any federal minister concerning native economic development. An Aboriginal-controlled Advisory Board provided advice to the Minister on program policy and Aboriginal economic development in general, and recommended specific proposals for financing. In comparison to SARDA and NDA2, the NEDP represents a broadening of federal government intervention in Aboriginal economic development into the institutional and community-wide planning spheres.

The volume of NEDP activity, at the national or Manitoba level, is not known. It is known, however, that the program took years to become operational to the point of financing projects. For this it was severely criticized by Aboriginal leaders. This slow startup combined with its relatively abrupt demise in March, 1988 meant that very few projects were financed in northern Manitoba. NEDP was both the last initiative of the Trudeau Liberal Government and a program that provided a bridge between SARDA- and GDA-derived Aboriginal and northern economic development programs, and the new Aboriginal Economic Program announced by the Conservative Government at the end of the 1980's. As such, NEDP operated in a period of reassessment, change and policy vacuum.

Other Programs

Complementing the three case study programs in the study area were other government business financing and support programs. The seven important programs from the standpoints of focus on business development and longevity were the Canada-Manitoba Northern Development Agreement Program #1, the Communities Economic Development Fund, the Department of Cooperative Development, the Federal Business Development Bank, the Indian Economic Development Fund, the Local Employment Assistance Program and Local Employment Assistance Development initiatives, and Manitoba Northern Affairs' Development Services Branch.

From November 1982 to March 1989 DRIE delivered the Community/Regional Economic Development Planning Program (Program #1) of the Canada-Manitoba Northern Development Agreement. This program was to assist applicants in northern Manitoba "...in the identification and development of proposals..." to improve economic, employment and income generating circumstances (Canada/ Manitoba Northern Development Agreement "Project Authorization Form"). Although this Program provided support to many activities that were not designed to be viable businesses, it also provided assistance for the identification, analysis and planning of viable businesses including some projects analyzed in this study. A budget of \$2.5 million was allocated to this Program for its six and one-half years of operation. Services were provided through DRIE's Northern Development Office in Thompson.

The Communities Economic Development Fund (CEDF) was established through the 1971 *The Communities Economic Development Fund Act* of the Legislature of Manitoba. This Fund was established by the recently elected New Democratic Party as an element of that Government's policy thrusts concerning northern development, greater equity in well-being, and improvement in its electoral position within northern and strongly Aboriginal constituencies. The *Act* enabled the provincial government to establish an arm's length organization and capital fund "...to assist in the establishment of new economic enterprises and the development of existing economic enterprises" (*Statutes of Manitoba* C155: 2-4). Assisted business

initiatives were to promise viability. The *Fund* was to have three foci: northern Manitoba, the commercial fishing industry and Aboriginal people outside the City of Winnipeg. Financial assistance could take the form of a loan for fixed or working capital¹, a loan guarantee, or it could take the form of purchasing equity in a corporation. The financial assistance required, however, could not otherwise be available to the applicant. In addition to the provision of financial assistance the CEDF provided business information and advice; training for directors, managers and employees of businesses; and promoted good management practices.

A study of CEDF published by Wanamaker in 1981 notes that regulations under the *Act* limited loans to less than 20% of business assets (pp. 24-25). The program was quite active, in its first slightly more than eight years of operation Wanamaker found that CEDF had received 1,034 applications 793 (77%) of which pertained to northern Manitoba and 524 (66%) of these concerned the non-urban communities of northern Manitoba²(pp. 27, 32-38, 81). As of 1980 128 (24%) of the applications from an area roughly equivalent to our study area had been accepted for a total authorized loan value of slightly more than \$5 million (\$1990) and over \$600,000 (\$1990) in loan guarantees.³ The level of CEDF loan activity throughout Manitoba and in the north, that is the broader north encompassing all of Manitoba north of the Northern Affairs' boundary, during the study period is displayed in Table 4-13. During most of the study period services were provided from Winnipeg, in later years services were also provided from Thompson.

Throughout most, if not all, of the study period the Manitoba Department of Cooperative Development provided assistance for the organization, financing and operation of cooperatives (Economic and Manpower Program Information 1975). This Department operated the

1. Including bridge financing.

2. That is, the area roughly equivalent to the area of this study.

3. Only six loans worth less than \$100,000 and one loan guarantee worth less than \$10 thousand were approved for Indian reserve only projects.

Cooperative Association Loans and Loans Guarantee Board. Most cooperatives in the study area were engaged in resource harvesting although a few were engaged in retailing. The data base for this study indicates that this Department was involved in relatively few projects during the study period. Most of these actions occurred when Manitoba was governed by New Democratic Party governments: as resource harvesting projects in the early to mid 1970's and as fuel retailing projects during the mid 1980's.

The Canada Business Development Bank (CBDB)¹ provided business development assistance primarily to small businesses from 1985 through the end of the study period (Manitoba Northern Affairs 1984:18-22). Services included entrepreneurial and management training, loan financing at commercial rates and loan guarantees, and management and technical advice (through "Counselling Assistance to Small Enterprises" - CASE). Loan financing and guarantees were offered when other sources of these resources were either not available or not adequate. As a result of its orientation to a generally better prepared clientele² and its Winnipeg and Brandon office locations, the Bank was much less active in the study area than the other programs described in this section. Indeed, there are few, if any, examples of CBDB financing or other assistance in project files reviewed for this study. As a result of its relative inactivity within northern Manitoba during the study period the author recalls frequent expressions of frustration being leveled at the Bank by the provincial government and various northern interest groups.

Throughout the study period INAC operated the Indian Economic Development Fund (Weaver 1986:40-41) along with an Economic Development Branch. The purpose of the Fund and Branch was to assist the development and expansion of viable businesses owned by registered Indians (Indian Economic Development Fund 1971). The Fund offered financial assistance in the form of loans, loan guarantees and grants. As well, the Branch and Fund offered, directly or through purchase, managerial,

- 1. Now known as the Business Development Bank of Canada.**
- 2. That is, better educated and experienced, and having greater financial capacity.**

professional and technical services for business planning, start-up and aftercare. Required financing could not be available from other sources "...under reasonable terms" (pg. 4). According to Weaver the size of the Fund declined almost 65% from the early 1970's to the mid 1980's as more and more of INAC's expenditures were directed to social services and infrastructure and as the federal government expected the increasingly self-sufficient reserve communities to approach other economic and employment development programs for finances and support services. Data are not available on the level of program activity in northern Manitoba during the study period. From his work experience concerning northern Manitoba and according to data from DRE/IE project files collected for this study, the author understands that IEDF was very active in northern Manitoba reserve communities, but that the Fund was not very active in servicing registered Indians not living in reserve communities. Services to all Manitoba reserve communities were provided from Winnipeg.

The Local Employment Assistance Program (LEAP) and Local Employment Assistance Development (LEAD) initiatives were essentially operated as job creation and development programs by Employment and Immigration Canada (Voss, personal communication; 19 July, 1996¹). LEAP commenced operations in northern Manitoba in the mid-1970's, was transformed into LEAD in 1982, and LEAD was replaced by the Community Futures program in 1987-88. LEAP and LEAD were to promote skill and experiential development through the provision of up to three years of capital funding to potentially viable projects. Information from DRE/IE project files collected for this study indicates that these initiatives provided grants to a number of new, restructuring and expanding businesses within the study area. Since at least the late 1970's LEAP's and LEAD's northern Manitoba services were delivered from an office in Thompson. From 1982 to 1989, with implementation of the Canada-Manitoba Northern Development Agreement, many of the services of EIC's Thompson office² were formally

1. Mr. Voss joined the EIC Thompson office in the late 1970's and later became EIC's NDA coordinator

2. Canada Employment Services - Program 7 of the NDA.

provided through, or coordinated with, that Agreement. LEAP and LEAD program activities were coordinated with the Community/Regional Economic Development Planning and Resource Opportunity Development Programs of the Agreement. As well, funds provided through other EIC training programs improved the net earnings of projects. There is no documentation available concerning the outputs of LEAP and LEAD in northern Manitoba.

Finally, Manitoba Northern Affairs operated a Development Services Branch through its Agreements Coordination Division. Two staff from this Branch provided general information on economic development, promoted local discussion of economic development and assisted in the review of financing sources for local projects (Memo from Kustra to Jolson and Morrisseau; 13 June, 1983). Data concerning outputs of this Branch were not available.

Summary of Findings

The study area contains a relatively small population distributed among some 100 communities. There are a few larger size communities based on large-scale export industries: mining, forestry and hydroelectric. Residents of these communities are mostly non-Aboriginal. Average family size and educational levels are similar to Manitoba as a whole. Labour force participation and employment rates are relatively high, and income levels are also relatively high. There are many small, predominantly Aboriginal, communities. The economies of these communities are generally limited to marginal commodity production; a minimal, commercial, basic service sector; and a local government services sector. Overall, aggregate purchasing power increased in the study area. Aggregate purchasing power increased greatly within reserve communities, but decreased slightly within the unorganized communities.

Northern community populations are not well integrated. Legal, racial and cultural distinctions divide communities and groups within communities.

As a result of the historical context and current economic, social and

legal circumstances, the Aboriginal population - and the population living on Indian reserves especially - exhibits the usual indicators of a dispossessed population: poor education, social maladjustment and institutional dependency, low levels of employment, low incomes and high levels of economic dependency.

Labour force conditions in the organized communities are similar to those of Manitoba as a whole; however, conditions in the unorganized communities and Indian reserves are very different. While the unorganized communities and Indian reserves adjust differently to weak labour markets, both adjustments result in relatively much smaller portions of the adult population being employed compared to Manitoba as a whole. Weak labour markets are compounded by low levels of educational attainment among adult residents of the unorganized and Indian reserve communities.

During the study period the Canadian public assumed that the national economy would continue to grow. Canadians also accepted a large state role in continued nation building, economic development, and the design and maintenance of a social safety net.

As a result of conditions within the Aboriginal population governments feared a social and political debacle in the making. These legitimate fears were exacerbated by self-serving studies and assertions promulgated by many government agencies and regional, local and identity-group organizations.

The conjunction of this historical context and current circumstances with a widely-accepted political *ethos* led senior governments to intervene in the north on a broad range of issues. These interventions included a set of special programs concerning economic and business development. Well over \$50 million in current dollars were allocated to these activities.

**TABLE 4-1
NUMBER OF NORTHERN MANITOBA PLACES THAT MEET
ANCESTRY CRITERIA AT EACH CENSUS YEAR**

Type of Place	Census Year				
	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991
Local Areas					
No. Places Existing	43	45	45	46	46
Meet 25% Criterion					
Yes	40	44	44	46	46
No	0	1	1	0	0
Insufficient Data	3	0	0	0	0
At 50% Criterion					
Yes	37	43	42	43	44
No	3	2	2	3	2
Insufficient Data	3	0	1	0	0
Organized Communities*					
No. Places Existing	5	5	5	5	5
At 25% Criterion					
Yes	3	2	3	4	3
No	1	2	2	1	2
Insufficient Data	1	1	0	0	0
At 50% Criterion					
Yes	1	0	1	1	1
No	2	3	3	4	4
Insufficient Data	1	2	1	0	0
Unorganized Communities					
No. Places Existing	51	51	51	53	52
At 25% Criterion					
Yes	33	49	49	50	48
No	0	1	1	2	2
Insufficient Data	18	1	1	1	2
At 50% Criterion					
Yes	31	46	46	47	46
No	1	3	4	2	4
Insufficient Data	19	2	1	4	2

**TABLE 4-1 (Cont.)
NUMBER OF NORTHERN MANITOBA PLACES THAT MEET
ANCESTRY CRITERIA AT EACH CENSUS YEAR**

Type of Place	Census Year				
	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991
Indian Reserves*					
No. Places Existing	29	32	32	33	36
At 25% Criterion					
Yes	29	32	32	33	36
No	0	0	0	0	0
Insufficient Data	0	0	0	0	0
At 50% Criterion					
Yes	29	32	32	33	36
No	0	0	0	0	0
Insufficient Data	0	0	0	0	0
All Communities*					
No. Places Existing	85	88	88	91	93
At 25% Criterion					
Yes	65	83	84	87	87
No	1	3	3	3	4
Insufficient Data	19	2	1	1	2
At 50% Criterion					
Yes	61	78	79	81	83
No	3	6	7	6	8
Insufficient Data	20	4	2	4	2

* Of those communities that are located within local areas which are included overall.

Source: Appendix, Table 4-4.

**TABLE 4-2
POPULATION OF RELEVANT COMMUNITIES BY TYPE OF COMMUNITY**

Type of Community	Census Year					Percent Change Per Annum			
	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976-81	1981-86	1986-91	1976-91
Organized	8425	11220	10648	10340	10035	-1.0	-0.6	-0.6	-0.7
Unorganized* Data	Unk.	11238	10953	8750	7919	-0.5	-4.4	-2.0	-2.3
Calculated	Unk.	Unk.	8965	9004	7498	Unk.	0.1	-3.6	Unk.
Indian Reserve	Unk.	19844	20170	23290	25690	0.3	2.9	2.0	1.7
Total									
With Unorg. Data	Unk.	42302	41771	42380	43644	-0.3	0.3	0.6	0.2
With Unorg. Calc.	Unk.	Unk.	39783	42634	43223	Unk.	1.4	0.3	Unk.

* All amounts except "Unorganized Data" are the sums of individual community populations.
 "Unorganized Data" is the sum of the populations for the unorganized areas of Census Divisions 19, 21, 22 and 23.
 Source: Appendix Table 4-3.

**TABLE 4-3
POPULATION BY STATUS GROUP, 1986**

Status Group	Population	Percent
Registered Indian	24905	59
Other Aboriginal	8225	19
Not Aboriginal*	9250	22
Total	42380	100

* Residual.
 Sources: "Table 6" in Manitoba Bureau of Statistics 1989, and Table 4-2

**TABLE 4-4
MEASURES OF COMMUNITY INCOME AND INCOME GENERATED BY
THE MANITOBA ECONOMY AND INDUSTRIES IMPORTANT TO NORTHERN MANITOBA (1)**

Measure of Income	1981				1988				1991			
	Location				Location				Location			
	Organized	Unorganized (2)	Indian Reserve	All	Organized	Unorganized (2)	Indian Reserve	All	Organized	Unorganized (2)	Indian Reserve	All
Total household income(3)	126.5	69.4	73.3	269.2	135.0	68.8	100.3	289.7	146.8	68.6	127.6	343.1
Median household income(4)	39.5	22.4	18.5	26.9	41.2	25.4	19.3	28.0	38.8	23.6	20.1	26.6
Ave. household income(4)	41.3	28.4	22.5	30.8	40.1	30.4	23.1	30.5	42.1	29.3	23.6	30.5
Per capita income (4)	11.9	6.3	3.6	6.5	13.1	7.9	4.3	7.2	14.6	8.7	4.6	7.5
Proportion earned+other(%)	-	-	-	-	88	77	58	71	89	75	54	69
Manitoba GDP (5)	-	-	-	20.7	-	-	-	22.0	-	-	-	22.3
Empl. equiv. income (3)												
All	-	-	-	247.6	-	-	-	273.3	-	-	-	254.0
Excl. minerals	-	-	-	55.9	-	-	-	119.7	-	-	-	74.2
Excl. minerals & hydro	-	-	-	55.9	-	-	-	41.3	-	-	-	27.3

1. Data concerning income are not available at the level of census subdivision prior to 1981.
2. As reported for the whole unorganized portions of Census Divisions 19, 21, 22 and 23.
3. In \$millions, \$1990.
4. In \$thousands, \$1990.
5. In \$billions, \$1990.

Sources: Appendix, Tables 4-5 and 4-6.

TABLE 4-5
CHANGES TO COMMUNITY INCOME AND CHANGES TO INCOME GENERATED BY
THE MANITOBA ECONOMY AND INDUSTRIES IMPORTANT TO NORTHERN MANITOBA

Measure of Income	% Change 1981 - 1986				% Change 1986 - 1991				% Change 1981 - 1991			
	Location				Location				Location			
	Organized	Unor- ganized	Indian Reserve	All	Organized	Unor- ganized	Indian Reserve	All	Organized	Unor- ganized	Indian Reserve	All
Total household income	6.7	-0.8	33.2	11.7	8.7	-0.2	30.3	13.4	16.1	-1.0	73.6	26.6
Median household income	4.3	13.4	4.3	4.8	-5.8	-7.1	4.7	-5.3	-1.8	5.4	9.2	-0.7
Average household income	-2.9	7.0	3.2	-0.3	5.0	-3.6	3.9	0.7	1.9	3.2	7.2	0.3
Per capita income	10.1	25.4	19.4	12.3	11.5	10.1	7.0	4.1	22.7	38.1	27.8	16.9
Proportion earned + other	-	-	-	-	1.1	-2.6	-3.6	-2.8	-	-	-	-
Manitoba GDP	-	-	-	6.3	-	-	-	1.4	-	-	-	7.7
Empl. equiv. income												
All	-	-	-	10.4	-	-	-	-7.1	-	-	-	2.6
Excl. minerals	-	-	-	114.1	-	-	-	-38.0	-	-	-	32.7
Excl. minerals & hydro	-	-	-	-26.1	-	-	-	-33.9	-	-	-	-51.2

Source: Table 4-4.

TABLE 4-6
INDICATORS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MANITOBA ECONOMY AND SELECT INDUSTRIES IMPORTANT TO NORTHERN MANITOBA
 (all values in \$millions except GDP in \$billions)

Year	Manitoba MB GDP(1)		Commercial Fishing(2)		Commercial Trapping (3)		Logging-Forestry (4)		Mineral Industries (5)		Manitoba Hydro (6)		Northern Manitoba				
	Income Based	Percent Annual Change	Total Empl'd	Landed Value	No. of RTL Trappers	RTL & Open Areas, Value of Prod.	Total Empl'd	Wages & Salaries	No. of Workers	Wages & Salaries	Peak Northern Project Employment	Wages & Salaries	All Number Empl'd	All Indust.	Wages & Salaries Excluding Minerals & Hydro	Minerals	Hydro
1970	14.081	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1971	14.787	5	2653	7.9	2334	6.3	432	13.1	6217	215.4	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	27.3	
1972	15.659	6	2757	8.6	2408	9.5	520	18.3	6047	205.4	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	36.4	
1973	17.292	10	3987	15.6	2584	12.1	563	21.3	6379	226.1	2099	82.9	15612	358.0	131.9	49.0	
1974	18.461	7	3805	15.6	2223	8.3	693	28.4	6553	211.2	3355	137.8	16629	401.3	190.1	52.3	
1975	18.630	2	3594	14.6	2334	7.0	769	33.2	6418	247.6	3217	143.9	16332	446.4	198.7	54.8	
1976	18.988	1	3364	14.3	2680	10.3	670	23.4	5882	216.9	2267	125.0	14863	389.8	173.0	47.9	
1977	19.354	2	2953	17.7	2879	12.9	567	21.0	5683	241.4	1706	103.9	13788	396.9	155.5	51.6	
1978	19.675	2	3170	18.8	2975	10.8	578	20.5	4937	208.8	741	43.0	12401	302.0	93.1	50.1	
1979	20.233	3	3161	16.9	3238	15.5	500	18.8	4858	217.1	512	Unk	12269	Unk	Unk	51.1	
1980	19.907	-2	3213	22.8	3627	17.1	527	19.8	5196	219.0	0	0.0	12563	278.7	59.6	59.6	
1981	20.714	4	3659	22.0	3425	13.0	578	20.9	5220	191.6	0	0.0	12882	247.6	55.9	55.9	
1982	19.867	-4	3767	24.4	3187	7.9	449	14.0	4511	166.6	0	0.0	11914	212.9	46.4	46.4	
1983	19.955	0	3826	18.1	3110	5.8	446	15.5	4168	149.2	0	0.0	11550	188.7	39.4	39.4	
1984	21.230	6	3737	21.2	2927	4.9	586	18.0	4180	168.8	108	Unk	11538	Unk	Unk	44.1	
1985	22.047	4	3811	23.7	2974	5.9	423	15.3	4012	164.6	598	17.8	11818	227.3	62.7	44.9	
1986	22.006	-0	3660	21.4	2917	6.0	352	13.9	3598	153.6	1824	78.4	12351	273.3	119.7	41.3	
1987	22.302	1	3609	26.5	2745	9.2	444	16.5	3715	151.6	2006	89.4	12519	295.1	143.6	54.2	
1988	23.796	7	3594	31.1	2993	5.9	445	16.4	4114	189.7	1511	73.2	12657	316.4	126.7	53.5	
1989	24.022	1	3638	24.7	2498	2.4	432	15.5	4223	198.9	1066	63.4	11857	305.0	106.0	42.6	
1990	23.852	-1	3689	18.1	2219	1.6	457	16.6	3985	192.1	853	57.1	11203	285.5	93.4	36.3	
1991	22.279	-7	3457	14.2	1730	1.1	337	12.0	3765	179.7	753	46.9	10042	254.0	74.2	27.3	

TABLE 4-6 (Cont.)
INDICATORS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MANITOBA ECONOMY AND SELECT INDUSTRIES IMPORTANT TO NORTHERN MANITOBA

- 1 Sources:
 1981-1991 from "Table 1. Provincial Gross Domestic Product - Income Based, Manitoba." in Statistics Canada 1993
 1976-1980 from "Table 1. Provincial Gross Domestic Product, Manitoba." in Statistics Canada 1989:16.
 1970-1975 from "Table 1. Provincial Income and Provincial Gross Domestic Product, Manitoba." in Statistics Canada 1986:16.
 2 Data are for the 1 April - 31 March year. Sources:
 1970-71 from "Harvest in Pounds and Value in Dollars of Fish Taken by Commercial Fishermen in Manitoba Waters" in Province of Manitoba 1972:114.
 1972-73 [Etc.] from "Harvest in Pounds and Value in Dollars of Fish Taken by Commercial Fishermen in Manitoba Waters" in Province of Manitoba 1972 etc.
 1975-76 from "Harvest in Pounds and Value in Dollars of Fish Taken by Commercial Fishermen in Manitoba Waters" in Province of Manitoba 1976:79-84.
 1976-82 from "Harvest in Pounds and Value in Dollars of Fish Taken by Commercial Fishermen in Manitoba Waters" in Province of Manitoba 1983:77.
 1982-90 from "Table F1. 8. Commercial Fishing Products (Round Kg) Total Value and Employment (Licenced Fishermen Plus Hired Men) 1982-83 to 1991-92" in Province of Manitoba 1993:28-29.
 3 Data cross calendar years. Sources:
 1970-79 from "Table 52: Estimated Value of Wild Fur Production to Manitoba Trappers, 1955/56 to 1978/79 Fur Years (October to September 30)" in Province of Manitoba 1979:159.
 1982-83 from "Number of Open Area and Registered Trappers and the Estimated Value of Manitoba Wild Fur Production for the 12 Month Period ending August 31 Province of Manitoba 1983:92.
 1983-93 from "Table W1. 9. Number of Open Area and Registered Trappers and Estimated Value of Wild Fur Production for the Fur Year Ending August 31, 1993" in Province of Manitoba 1993:112.
 4 Sources:
 1970 in "Table 6. Principal Statistics - Logging Industry 1963-1970." Statistics Canada 1972:10.
 1971-72 in "...1963-1972" ...1972....1970:10.
 1973-74 in "...1963-1974." ...1976....1974:10.
 1975-76 in "...1970-1976." ...1978....1976:23.
 1977-78 in "...1975-1978." ...1980....1978:25.
 1979-80 in "...1975-1980." ...1982....1980:16.
 1981-82 in "...1977-1982." ...1984....1982:22.
 1983-84 in "...1979-1984." ...1986....1984:22.
 1985-86 in "...1981-1986." ...1989....1986:21.
 1987-88 in "...1987-1988." ...1991....1988:23.
 1989-90 in "...1989-1990." ...1993....1990:23.
 5 Sources:
 1970-74 from "Table 12. Principal Statistics of the Mineral Industries, By Province, 1971-1975." Statistics Canada 1994E[1979]:27
 1975-78 from "Table 7. Principal Statistics of the Mineral Industries, By Province, 1975-78." Statistics Canada 1994E[1982]:18
 1979-83 from "Table 7. Principal Statistics of the Mineral Industries, By Province, 1979-83." Statistics Canada 1994E[1986]:18
 1984-87 from "Table 7. Principal Statistics of the Mineral Industries, By Province, 1979-83." Statistics Canada 1994E[1991]:19
 1988-90 from "Table 7. Principal Statistics of the Mineral Industries, By Province, 1988-1992." Statistics Canada 1994E:19
 6 Appendix, Table 4-6.

**TABLE 4-7
POPULATION AGE 15 AND OVER BY TYPE OF COMMUNITY**

Type of Community	Census Year			
	1976	1981	1986	1991
Organized	7410	7250	7345	7365
Unorganized*	6895	6745	5750	5345
Indian Reserve	12375	11371	12845	15253
All Types	26680	25366	25940	27963

* Using Statistics Canada census division totals for unorganized areas. Small portions of CD#19 unorganized and CD#21 unorganized are not included in the area relevant to this study. Therefore, if aggregated by enumeration area there would be roughly 500 fewer people.

Source: Appendix, Table 4-8.

**TABLE 4-8
ESTIMATED POPULATION AGE 15 AND OVER BY STATUS GROUP, 1986**

Status Group	Age 15 and Over	
	Number (1)	Percent (2)
Registered Indian	14818	59
Other Aboriginal	5379	65
Not Aboriginal	7310	79
Total	27508	65

1. Status group population times age 15 and over factor from Manitoba Bureau of Statistics. This approach over estimates the total population age 15 and over by 6%.
2. Percent of status group population.

Sources:

"Table 3" in Manitoba Bureau of Statistics: 19-20.
Table 4-3.

**TABLE 4-9
THE NORTHERN MANITOBA LABOUR FORCE**

Type of Community	Rate (%) of		Actively Employed*
	Participation	Employment	
Organized			
1991	73	89	65
1986	72	89	64
1981	71	94	67
1976	66	95	62
Unorganized			
1991	77	56	43
1986	79	50	39
1981	74	50	37
1976	40	91	37
Indian Reserve			
1991	44	69	30
1986	40	62	25
1981	32	81	26
1976	25	70	18
All Types			
1991	52	64	34
1986	52	56	29
1981	48	64	30
1976	31	80	25

* Participation rate times the employment rate.

Source: Appendix, Table 4-8.

TABLE 4-10
VALUE OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION FOR SELECT INDIAN RESERVES

Community	Value of Production		
	Per Capita		Per 1986 Economic Family
	\$1984	\$1990	\$1990
Berens River IR	120	155	869
Cross Lake IR	110	142	768
Hollow Water IR	140	181	869
Pine Creek IR	210	272	Unk.
Pukatawagan IR	140	181	1087
Split Lake IR	120	155	838
The Pas IR	95	123	552

Sources: Wagner 1984.
 Statistics Canada 1987.
 Appendix, Table 4-3.

**TABLE 4-11
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF THE POPULATION AGE 15 AND OVER**

Type of Community	Percent Attaining				
	Less Than Grade 9	Secondary Certificate	Trade Certificate	Some Post-Second or University	Trade Certificate or Some Post-Secondary or University
Organized					
1991	15	7	4	43	47
1986	18	6	3	42	44
1981	23	6	4	22	25
1976	25	20	18	16	35
Unorganized					
1991	31	7	3	23	26
1986	36	5	2	23	25
1981	51	3	1	15	15
1976	49	10	7	7	15
Indian Reserves					
1991	44	4	4	18	22
1986	52	2	1	11	12
1981	53	2	1	11	12
1976	105	5	3	4	7
All Types					
1991	41	4	4	19	23
1986	47	3	1	15	16
1981	52	2	1	13	13
1976	85	7	4	5	10

* Totals for the first three columns may not add to 100 as a result of factoring of rounded data from Statistics Canada.

Source: Appendix, Table 4-9.

**TABLE 4-12
USE OF ABORIGINAL LANGUAGE, 1991**

Type of Community	Percent Speaking Aboriginal Language Most Often
Organized	2
Unorganized	13
Indian Reserves	57

Source: Appendix, Table 4-10.

TABLE 4-13
CEDF, NUMBER OF LOAN APPROVALS PER YEAR

Fiscal Year Ending In	Total	North (1)
1971	4	4
1972	70	50
1973	38	27
1974	9	6
1975	14	11
1976	28	25
1977	29	25
1978	12	9
1979	20	15
1980	13	11
1981	34	-
1982	46	-
1983	31	25
1984	49	-
1985	63	-
1986	43	25
1987	66	50
1988	70	50
1989	22	19

1. North of the Manitoba Northern Affairs southern municipal boundary.
This includes some large northern "urban" communities excluded from the study area.

Sources:

Communities Economic Development Fund.
"Table 4. Geographic Distribution of Program Efforts Over Time" in Wanamaker 1981:108.

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY PROGRAM PARAMETERS

Each case study program became operational on a different date, but all three expired on 31 March, 1989 (Aboriginal Economic Programs 1990:1). According to Illingworth (1992:2), aside from the general economic development activities of INAC, the economic development program targeting Aboriginal people that had the longest operational run was SARDA.

This chapter looks into two aspects of the programs. Firstly, it describes the formal purposes, procedures, structures and resources of each program. Since these were multi-year programs and since the three programs can be seen as the sequential efforts of a single organization, the chapter traces the evolution of these formal attributes. To the extent that evidence permits, the rationale underlying each formal attribute or changes to each attribute is presented. Secondly, and often closely linked with the rationale for, and evolution of, program attributes, information uncovered from program and project files is utilized to describe critical issues faced by each program and the extent to which these issues were addressed.

According to the causal model illustrated in Chapter 2 (Table 2-2), program attributes originate from, and are principally derived through, the program service "supply" flow. The model suggests that government policy determines each program's formal policy, and government expenditures determine the amount and characteristics of each program's resources. A program's own policy and resources, along with knowledge of the policies and resources of complementary programs, yield a formal program structure. In response to applications and the nature and magnitude of support offered by complementary programs to projects, case program service administration and decision-taking commence. Service "production" produces outputs (Figure 2-4). Service "production" and project outcomes, in turn, feed self-awareness into an evolving structure and operations.

Discussed below are the attribute categories of program objectives,

administrative flow, organization structure and resources, and interaction with complementary programs, respectively. Discussed in sequence, within each attribute category, are the three programs: SARDA Commercial, NDA2 and NEDP3, respectively.

Objectives and Scope

Special ARDA

According to the 1971 Canada-Manitoba SARDA Agreement assistance could be directed to the establishment, expansion or modernization of commercial undertakings (CU's) in the primary resource, processing, manufacturing or service sectors (Canada, Department of Regional Economic Expansion; *Agreement Between The Government of Canada and...*, 1971). The commercial undertaking, however, must be

- (i) ...expressly organized so that at least two-thirds of those employed are disadvantaged people who have previously had little or no access to regular earning and employment opportunities; and
- (ii) there is adequate provision for such counselling, training and other adjustment measures as are necessary to the employment of disadvantaged people in the undertaking. (pg. 3)

Furthermore, the undertaking must be located in an area, approved by Canada, that would be appropriate "...by reason of the fact that the requirements of rural development include, to a significant extent, improved earning and employment opportunities for disadvantaged people of Indian ancestry" (pg. 3).

The 1971 SARDA Agreement stipulates that, for CU's, the project owner must contribute equity in an amount at least equal to 20% of the expected capital costs (Canada, Department of Regional Economic Expansion, *Agreement Between the Government of Canada and...*, 1971:4-6). Computation of equity, however, "...may include the value...of any work

done by disadvantaged people in the preparation for and construction of the undertaking...." CU costs eligible for government grant assistance include: (1) the costs of studies, including feasibility studies, and project planning and preparation; (2) capital costs; (3) the cost of initial working capital; (4) costs of counselling and training disadvantaged people "...before the undertaking begins operation...;" and (5) "...any abnormal operating costs that...arise from the counselling and on-the-job training of disadvantaged people...less the equity provided..., and less also any financing that is available for the undertaking through other federal and provincial programs and through borrowings from commercial sources." Of project costs net of equity and other sources of financing, Canada could fund all of (1) the study costs if the organization incurring the costs is an "organization of people of Indian ancestry;" 50% of (2) capital and (3) working capital; and 50% of (4) counselling and training and (5) abnormal operating costs if the persons directly served are not registered Indians; or 100% of (4) and (5) if the persons directly served are registered Indians. By implication, the Province was expected to fund the residual net of the equity contribution and other sources of financing.

Section 7 of the 1971 Agreement specifies that Canada will pay up to 100% of the administrative costs incurred by Manitoba for projects that relate primarily to Indian lands (Canada, Department of Regional Economic Expansion, *Agreement Between the Government of Canada and...*, 1971:6). Again by implication, Manitoba would be expected to pay the administrative costs for all other projects. The Agreement provided for an alternative which Manitoba chose. At the request of Manitoba, Canada was willing to pay 50% of all the administrative costs incurred by Manitoba, including administrative costs for projects that relate primarily to Indian lands, so long as Manitoba made a "substantial" contribution to projects on Indian lands.

According to Illingworth, the SARDA CU component initially took job creation to be its principal *raison d'etre* (1990:13,42,46,49-51). Illingworth quotes Terry Forth, who was Director-General of DRE/IE's Northern and Special Programs Branch from 1980 to 1986 which had policy responsibility

for SARDA¹, to the effect that by 1975 CU policy placed greater emphasis on the development of businesses and entrepreneurs while retaining the importance of job creation. Illingworth cites four circumstances as having prompted government involvement in SARDA-type business funding (1990:13-14):

- Aboriginal people lacked capital for equity.
- Aboriginal people lacked management skills and experience.
- The relative absence of financial institutions in remote areas.
- More strict lending practices by financial institutions.

Al Stubbs, Western Regional Manager of SARDA wrote the western Directors-General in 1975 that bridge financing for SARDA projects had become a problem (5 December, 1975). His background paper reveals the program action Manitoba took to reinforce SARDA (also see Rural Communities Resource Centre 1981:25-26):

Following approximately three years of operation, the lack of interim and/or bridge financing for native owned and operated enterprises was identified as being the major problem experienced by the Special ARDA Program. All program managers have indicated that obtaining bridge financing for native projects through regular commercial sources was almost impossible unless government guarantees were available. Efforts have been made in the past to obtain the support of commercial lenders and, in this respect, the Bankers Association was contacted at national and regional levels and bank managers were contacted locally. Little success has been achieved to date, however, as commercial lenders were reluctant to provide interim financing based on a conditional letter of offer and are particularly sensitive of being involved in collection procedures when the native cause has such a high political profile.

When the SARDA Agreements were originally negotiated, it was anticipated that the provincial governments would provide

1. As well as NDA and NEDP.

development services and interim and long-term financing where such services and loans were not available commercially or from other federal agencies. The Province of Manitoba cooperated by organizing a SARDA development section and by setting up the Communities Economic Development Fund. It was reported in 1974 that this fund was almost completely exhausted due to the large proportion of the funds used for SARDA projects. It was suggested then that, unless some method of making advance or progress payments by SARDA was implemented, CEDF would no longer provide such financing.

Stubbs went on to say that increasing use of progress payments had become widespread in the Western Region and that use of progress payments had increased in Manitoba as a result of the decrease in CEDF financing. An anonymous Manitoba staff person, however, disagreed with Stubb's understanding of the frequency that interim payments were being used in Manitoba. In the margin of the copy from which the above quote was obtained, this staff person wrote "not all that great." Ginsberg notes that several Committee members told her circa 1978 that applicants have a problem arranging for bridge financing, waiting for matching grants and loans, and generally meeting the various criteria of other government support agencies (circa 1978:49).

According to a report by the Rural Communities Resource Centre (1981:25-26):

C.E.D.F. in a letter dated October 31, 1972, informed Special ARDA that future bridge financing would depend on the commercial and economic viability of projects existing without a Special ARDA grant. The Fund's intent was to avoid situations in which its loan funds were lost due to Special ARDA's decision to not advance an approved grant. The detailed criteria set forth in Special ARDA initial letters of offer fueled C.E.D.F. fears that they were not involved in classic bridge financing but in pure high risk loans. [That bridge financing would be conditional on potential viability without a SARDA grant is supported in a letter from M.D. Hanley to *Baker Zivot, Wolchock and Company*, Winnipeg dated 2 November, 1972.]

Again in 1987 Resource Initiatives Ltd. reported that most SARDA clients regarded the 20% holdback as the most negative part of the Program (1987:36-37). In addition to the demand for interim payments generated by

the holdback, Resource Initiatives said the holdback created obstacles to securing loans, added interest costs from bridge financing and was not an effective tool for assuring compliance with the letter-of-offer.

The 1977 Agreement changed the employment requirement for CU's from two-thirds disadvantaged people to "...a majority of those employed are residents of Indian ancestry who have previously had little or no access to regular earning and employment opportunities..." (Canada-Manitoba Special Rural Development Agreement, 1977:4). Furthermore, "...recruiting of labour shall, where practicable, be conducted through the Canada Manpower Centres..." (pg. 7). This Agreement reduced the equity requirement to not less than 10% of capital costs (pg. 5). While this Agreement precisely set Canada's CU contribution for capital and working capital at 50% of expected costs, it enabled the Ministers to establish guidelines concerning Canada's contributions to the costs of feasibility studies and project planning, and to the costs of abnormal operating expenditures for counselling and on-the-job training. Section 6 states that Canada is to be responsible for CU's except for counselling and training related to the CU's, and Manitoba is responsible for all other projects (pg. 6).

Northern Development Agreement Program #2

The purpose of NDA2 is described within the 1982 Canada-Manitoba Subsidiary Agreement on Northern Development (pg. 5):

The objective of this program is to stimulate and respond to locally developed economic development projects which create new income and employment opportunities, particularly those utilizing local and regional resources. To achieve this objective the program will provide financial assistance to local groups to establish and operate organizations for the purpose of initiating and managing local economic development projects; capital and other assistance to projects which can demonstrate the creation of new employment opportunities based on resource utilization; and technical and financial support to projects until they reach the point of generating sufficient cash flow to ensure self-sustaining operations. (Schedule A, pg. 5)

This objective implies that financial, technical or other assistance may be available for the development and operation of local economic development organizations, for resource based projects that create jobs, and for projects intended to or that may become self-sufficient. The "Committee Guidelines for the Program Advisory Committee..." appear to broaden the objective. According to these "Guidelines" northern residents and organizations can also receive assistance to:

...strengthen northern economic networks and systems (for instance marketing, resources harvesting) and enhance talent and skills to increase income and employment generating opportunities...[and] increase opportunities for seasonal employment.... (Northern Development Agreement, Committee Guidelines, pg. 1)

Page 10 of the Committee Guidelines, however, says "projects which might meet normal commercial criteria or are indicated to be viable will be referred to other appropriate programs." Presumably, and consistent with the other findings discussed in this chapter, "normal commercial criteria" and "viability" were to be adjudicated on a pre-assistance basis.

These "Guidelines" speak of short-term and long-term foci (pg. 2). The short-term focus will be to "...build on the existing organizational base...help pinpoint problem areas and provide advice on potential solutions." The longer term focus will be to "...orient community groups and individuals toward self-sustaining projects and increased community economic development capacity." Although none of this is very specific or targeted, it is clear that the Program is to stress two things: (1) building absorptive capacity through institutions, communications and skills; and (2) identifying long-term, self-sustaining opportunities to which this greater capacity can be applied. It is noteworthy that NDA Programs #1 and #3 reinforce this capacity-building approach (Canada-Manitoba Subsidiary Agreement on Northern Development, Schedule A:5). Program #1, "Community/Regional Economic Development Planning," is "...to assist local and regional groups and organizations in the identification and development of new employment opportunities" through the use of "...project analysis and feasibility studies, market research, business development services,

organizational development and support, and technical and professional services...;" and Program #3, Northeast Manitoba Development," is to "...provide for planning and implementation of special developmental measures for Northeast Manitoba."

NDA2 offered advance, progress and final grant payments to approved projects. Advance payments could be made prior to the project incurring costs for which the payment is to be made whereas progress and final payments would be made after costs incurred are documented. As well, the Program could pay up to 100% of project costs (if no other government agency was to contribute funding) although usually some equity contribution was required of the client. Apparently the advance payment and offer of up to 100% funding were based on the rationale that the Program would be assisting projects that were high risk and not considered commercially viable without such funding (M.E. Heinicke to R. McKenzie; 24 February, 1987; and R. McKenzie to M.E. Heinicke; 26 February, 1987).

There is no definition of "northern Manitoba" within the Agreement. The Program Advisory Committee "Guidelines," however, refer to three priority areas (Northern Development Agreement Committee Guidelines...:9):

Priority 1 - proposals from the area within the Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs boundary;

Priority 2 - proposals from eligible applicants in communities adjacent to, but south of, the Department of Northern Affairs boundary line (8 mile fringe);

Priority 3 - proposals from eligible applicants residing within Local Government Districts which are contiguous with the Department of Northern Affairs boundary line.

Any individuals or organizations, including those based outside the priority areas, were eligible except for Crown corporations not in a joint venture arrangement with an individual or organization. Applications from local governments were to be referred to an appropriate minister before further processing.

Native Economic Development Program - Element III

Given the focus of this study on direct government financing of businesses in rural northern Manitoba, it is the Native Economic Development Program's Element III: Special Projects (NEDP3) which is of interest. According to the eligibility criterion for NEDP3 "any individual, association, partnership, cooperative, profit or non-profit corporate body, or other legal entity that is representing an eligible project, is eligible for assistance..." (Government of Canada, Regional Industrial Expansion, *The Native Economic Development Program...* n.d.:11). NEDP "conditions," however, state that the project must not be "...eligible for other [federal or provincial] Government support, or [be] otherwise unable to take advantage of such programs." As well, without NEDP financial support the project would not be economically viable nor undertaken, and the project would benefit many persons rather than a few.

In addition to activities likely tied to potentially viable projects involving "product or process innovation," "marketing," and "projects and enterprises," there are activities directed at "scholarships and specialized training" for increasing applied expertise, and "special studies" on Aboriginal business issues (Government of Canada, Regional Industrial Expansion, *The Native Economic Development Program...* n.d.:12). The "projects and enterprises" activity is described as follows: "The Program may contribute to establishing, acquiring, expanding or modernizing a community-based economic development project, or a Native-owned and controlled enterprise, or both, where such project or enterprise is of high priority in relation to Native Economic Development Program objectives." The list of NEDP3 eligible activities is not entirely consistent with the contribution "conditions" if the conjunction "and" linking the "conditions" means all conditions are necessary.

An asterisk placed with the "projects and enterprises" activity refers to the following notes appearing at the bottom of the same page:

1. Eligible costs include capital costs, and eligible infrastructure.

2. 'Acquiring' includes a purchase of the assets of an existing facility if:
 - a) at the time of the application, commercial production in the facility has ceased or is about to cease;
 - b) the cessation or imminent cessation of commercial production in the facility is dictated by circumstances beyond the control of the vendor of the assets;
 - c) the purchase of the assets is a *bona fide* arm's length transaction and has not been contrived for the purpose of an application under the Native Economic Development Program; and
 - d) the purchase price of the assets for the purposes of assistance under this section is not in excess of the appraised fair market value of the asset.
3. For "expanding" and "modernizing," contributions may be made for the eligible costs of:
 - a) machinery or equipment which modernizes or increases significantly the productivity of the commercial operation; or
 - b) expanding existing facilities of a commercial operation.

These notes indicate continuing concern about the benefit-to-cost ratio of financing acquisitions.

NEDP3 approval criteria include: the economic development objectives and benefits flowing to Aboriginal people from the project; management's "demonstrated" capacity and expertise; potential for business success; quality of accounting procedures and practices; amount of support from the Aboriginal community; a business plan with objectives, proposed activities and expected measurable results, a phased and costed work plan, and an identified market; "the relationship of the project to federal government national and regional strategies and priorities;" the extent to which other financing will be available to the project as a result of NEDP financing; amount of other financing obtained; and, for projects involving new products or processes, available scientific and technical information.

Organization Structure and Resources

Special ARDA

Central administration of Manitoba SARDA was taken place in Ottawa until early 1974 (A. Stubbs to Directors-General (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia; 5 December, 1975). Central administration was then transferred to the DREE Western Region office in Saskatoon.

In May, 1972 SARDA staff prepared a rationale for staffing (GRC). This document implied that current SARDA staff included a manager, secretary and two program officers. In this document SARDA estimated that it takes 6 hours to screen each application and 63 hours to serve each client whose application has been deemed eligible, or a total of 69 hours to service each eligible application. The screening estimate includes 10 hours for visiting the client in 40% of cases or 4 hours, the remaining 2 hours are allocated to phoning and writing. The estimated time requirement for eligible projects includes 3 hours to discuss the project idea and to give assistance in preparing the Part 1.¹ As well, 12 hours were allocated for assisting the client with the Part II and 14 hours were allocated to checking application content with other agencies. Based on the 176 applications received as of that date it was estimated that 35% of applications would be not eligible. For each program officer it was estimated that 1,380 person-hours would be available for project work out of a total of 1,950 available person-hours per year. The remaining 570 person-hours would be devoted to vacation, sickness, training and administration. It was also estimated that DREE's operational cost per application would be \$48,700. As a consequence, a seven person permanent organization was proposed: four program officers, a manager, an administrative officer and one secretary. By implication, this organization was designed to handle 128 applications annually: 45 which proceed only to the screen stage and 83 which proceed to the full

1. This preparatory work might more appropriately have been included in the estimate for screening time

application stage.¹ It is important to note that in this design no time was allocated per project to post-approval monitoring or inspection. Also by implication, DREE's operational cost was estimated at over \$6.2 million per year.

The Rural Communities Resource Centre, in its 1981 report on SARDA, states that up to the end of March, 1980 SARDA had received 904 CU applications and granted 266 approvals (223 of these had been accepted by the applicants) with a financial commitment of \$9.7 million (pp. 38,40). This implies that the annual case load was slightly more than 100 applications, that 29% of applications had been approved and that an average annual 30 approvals resulted in an expenditure commitment of over \$36,000 per approval. The level of applications was below the planned level; however, these data cannot be used to assess the planned level of staffing because an unknown proportion of the applications that were not approved may have proceeded into the full application stage.

In 1987 Resource Initiatives Ltd. reported data on SARDA CU activity levels from 1975 through 1987 (1987:Table 1). This data is reproduced in Table 5-1. Comparison of planned staffing to these actual activity levels indicates that, except for the 1984-87 period, SARDA staffing should have been adequate given that SARDA's estimate of staff time allocation was accurate and so long as staff were not heavily involved in post-approval project monitoring and support.

How large was the SARDA staff complement? A DRE/IE document titled "Special ARDA Program Profile" written circa 1985 (pp. 10-11) shows a staff of eight person-years devoted to SARDA in each of 1980-81 and 1981-82, nine person-years in 1982-83, eight person-years again in 1983-84 and 7.5 person-years in 1984-85. Although SARDA staff were based in Winnipeg, by mid-1976 there was a DRE/IE Thompson office (R.E. Simpson to Applicant; 13 August, 1976).

1. $(0.35 * 6 * x) + (0.65 * 63 * x) = 1380 * 4.$

One issue was the adequacy of the SARDA staff skill and experience base. In late 1972 the DREE Manager of Industrial Incentives noted that SARDA was generally understaffed given its large caseload (D. Lennie to W. Hagan; 3 April, 1974). Illingworth says the initial SARDA staff, often transferred from other government agencies, understood Aboriginal economic development issues, but did not have a practical understanding of business development. He quotes Herb Schultz, Manitoba SARDA Manager from 1978 to 1985, as saying: "These people had a good understanding of the social and economic milieu of Native people...but absolutely no clue as to how to put together a business plan...."(1990:67). According to the Rural Communities Resource Centre, Bossen, in her 1974 report on SARDA, said that during the winter of 1972-1973 when SARDA was undergoing severe "birth pains" a nearly complete turnover of program staff took place (1981:27). The Resource Centre also said their field investigation concerning SARDA found "a recurrent comment...that existing and previous Special ARDA field staff understood communities but they lacked any specific industry expertise" (1981:69).

The document "Special ARDA Program Profile," circa 1985, lends support to the adequacy of the initial staffing plan given minimal post-assistance monitoring and support. This "Profile" asserts that "a full complement of trained staff, which should be accomplished this year [1985-86, when activity levels dramatically increased], will likely result in a significant increase in activity." Not surprisingly in 1987 Resource Initiatives Ltd. pointed to the problem SARDA staff was having with an increasing volume of applications: "In order to cope with the situation, the SARDA unit tends to spend the majority of its time in conducting analysis of project proposals received from clients and much less time in dealing directly with clients for purposes of gaining an insight into their aspirations and capabilities and assessing the market within which business is proposed to operate" (1987:4). This firm found most staff-client contact occurred by phone and most clients interviewed found the relationship to be helpful (pg. 31).

The Special ARDA Agreement provided for the appointment, jointly by the Ministers, of an advisory Committee ("Special ARDA Committee,

Manitoba, Terms of Reference," Draft, dated around the 4th of January, 1972). The SARDA Agreement stipulates that this Committee is to recommend on the disposal of applications to the Ministers (Canada Department of Regional Economic Expansion, *Agreement Between The Government of Canada and...*, 1971:4).¹ Despite its formal advisory role, this Committee was treated as a project decision taking body in the internal activity pattern and in external public relations. The Chairman of the Committee was the senior manager of Manitoba DRE/IE and the Vice-Chairman was a senior provincial official. The Committee's Secretary was the DRE/IE Manager of the SARDA Program and the Committee's Advisor managed the provincial SARDA Primary Producer Program. Voting members included the Chair and Vice-Chair plus two members representing Manitoba Indian organizations, two members representing Manitoba Metis organizations and two members representing the Northern Association of Community Councils². Decisions were taken by majority vote of Committee members except in the case of projects to be located on Indian lands when no financial assistance was to come from Manitoba ("Special ARDA Committee, Manitoba, Terms of Reference," Draft, dated around the 4th of January, 1972). In such cases, a decision could be taken by the Committee members representing Canada and the Indians, but such a decision cannot be made by a simple majority.³

Committee meetings were generally held once a month in Winnipeg. Proceedings and decisions were recorded in minutes that were approved at the subsequent meeting. All projects were to be referred to the Committee and all rejections, but interestingly not necessarily all approvals, were to be

1. In cases where a project is located on Indian land and the province contributes no assistance, recommendations can be made by Committee members representing Canada and the Registered Indians without a decision by the other members of the Committee. In general, it appears that Manitoba normally contributed assistance to such projects. As a consequence, representatives of the Province and the other organizations would participate in the Committee decision.

2. That is, the councils of communities under the municipal jurisdiction of Manitoba Northern Affairs.

3. No explicit statement of decision requirements in such cases was found.

approved by the Committee. As well, the Committee was to "...ensure that...funds are as equitably distributed as possible between Treaty Indians and Metis." The Committee's terms of reference also suggest that the Committee may provide advice to government on SARDA and other programs that may affect native people. Illingworth points out that in the mid 1980's SARDA staff began to bring policy papers to the Committee (1990:62). Illingworth also notes that almost all policy deliberations of SARDA Committees were in response to issues brought to them by SARDA staff.

According to a later SARDA program manual there were five federal and provincial government representatives on the SARDA Committee in addition to the six representatives from Aboriginal organizations ("Special ARDA Program Officer Manual," n.d. but post 1987:1).

Notes from a 1976 SARDA Committee seminar confirm that the three Aboriginal organizations with representatives on the SARDA Committee "...lack [outreach and communication] resources sufficient to extend their present function beyond contributing in the Committee and following up on 'selected problems'" (R.L. Carter to J.D. Collinson; 15 November, 1976). In 1981 the Rural Communities Resource Centre, in its review of SARDA, said:

from the beginning the Committee functioned more politically and lobbied for changes in a manner not foreseen by the program model....The Committee undertook to improve Special ARDA, particularly by removing some of its tougher obstacles to project approval. In view of the participation of political leaders from the native organizations as members of the Committee it is hardly a surprise that they defined their role in a fairly political manner. (pg.32)

Further on in its report the Centre notes criticism of the Committee that it does not adequately reflect regional concerns and that it does not have members who are expert business analysts. The Centre responded to these criticisms by asserting

The Special ARDA Committee, both formally and informally, was intended as a mechanism for participation by native organizations. Its role was never conceived as one of the expert business analyst. (1981:74)

According to Illingworth, the Committee was designed to involve Aboriginal people so that the government would be insulated from attacks that it was not listening to Aboriginal people, so that it could more effectively sell the Program, to stabilize sometimes strained federal-provincial relations and to avoid accusations of favouritism towards one Aboriginal group over another (1990:58-59). Illingworth also notes that from the

...very beginning [of SARDA], many of the Committees functioned politically and lobbied for changes in a manner not foreseen in the program model. Far from restricting itself to a role as a venting agency for projects, the committee undertook to improve Special ARDA, particularly by removing some of its tougher obstacles to project approval. (1990:23)

The Aboriginal representatives on the Committee circa 1978 told Ginsberg that they operated almost like a mini-caucus (circa 1978:48). Although these groups may have had disagreements, they avoided bringing such disagreements into the Committee. She found "the weakest aspects of the Committee's operation tend to be the attendance of some of the representatives and the near constant turnover of members" (circa 1978:63). Resource Initiatives Ltd. said the Committee contributed knowledge of applicants, the community environment and, through government members, coordination with other support programs (1987:4). As for the Aboriginal representatives, Resource Initiatives Ltd. found their knowledge of business management and marketing limited, they relied on SARDA staff for this expertise. Illingworth notes that representatives of Aboriginal organizations on the SARDA Committees typically had little or no business knowledge (1990:63).

Northern Development Agreement Program #2 (NDA2)

For the initial Northern Development Agreement DREE allocated \$12 million for the five year total cost of Program #2 (Canada-Manitoba

Subsidiary Agreement on Northern Development, Schedule B-1:39). Manitoba made no allocation to this Program. As at the end of the Agreement total expenditures not including remaining project commitments were \$18.9 million on 198 projects (Table 5-2)(Canada and Manitoba, *Northern Development Agreement Progress Report 1989/90*:13-18). The NDA General Manager had project approval authority up to \$5,000 subject to concurrence of the Agreement Co-Managers (Northern Development Agreement Committee Guidelines...:6).

According to the introduction to the description of NDA Sector A programs Canada would establish a Canada Northern Development Office in Thompson (Canada-Manitoba Subsidiary Agreement on Northern Development, Schedule A:4-5). The Canada Northern Development Office was, among other Agreement wide and public relations tasks, "...to coordinate northern economic development programs under this Agreement with complementary federal and provincial economic development programs such as Special ARDA, the Indian Economic Development Fund, the Federal Business Development Bank and the Communities Economic Development Fund...." According to the initial Manager of this Office there were five staff: the Manager, two program officers for Programs #1 and #2, a program officer for Program #3 and a secretary (McKenzie, personal communication; 26, September, 1994). Although two program officers worked on Programs #1 and #2 the workload was such that Program #2 operated on one person-year plus a portion of the Manager's and secretary's time (130 projects were approved under Program #1 while, as noted above, 198 projects were approved under Program #2; Canada and Manitoba, *Northern Development Agreement Progress Report 1989/90*:7-18).

Also according to the introduction to the description of NDA Sector A programs, a program advisory committee, comprised of representatives of the federal and provincial governments and northern and native organizations, would be established (Canada-Manitoba Subsidiary Agreement on Northern Development, Schedule A:4). This committee, co-chaired by senior officials of DRIE and Manitoba Northern Affairs, was to "...review and advise on projects and programs in this sector." According to the "Committee Guidelines" the Committee's role was restricted to Programs #1

and #2 (Northern Development Agreement Committee Guidelines...:2). With respect to these two programs the Committee was to "review and recommend proposals to the members of the [Agreement Management] Board who have a direct financial interest and responsibility for [the two programs]." Since those responsible members were federal departments, this was a federal government program advisory committee. As well, and in addition to or despite the role of the Canada Northern Development Office, "the Program Advisory Committee is intended to ensure effective co-ordination with government departments and agencies with complementary program funding, technical resources or jurisdictional responsibility." Representation from northern and native organizations was "...to ensure that the [sic] program delivery takes into account community circumstances...."

There were to be 14 voting members and 1 non-voting member on the Program Advisory Committee (Northern Development Agreement Committee Guidelines...:3-4). Eight (8) of the 14 voting members were to represent northern and native organizations: 2 members from each of the Manitoba Keewatinowi Okimakanak, the Manitoba Metis Federation and the Northern Association of Community Councils; and 1 member from each of the First Nations Confederacy and the Brotherhood of Indian Nations. Government voting members were to represent (1 member per agency) Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, INAC, Manitoba Natural Resources, CEDF, DRIE (a co-chair) and Manitoba Northern Affairs (a co-chair).¹ The non-voting Secretary, who also was the Manager of the Canada Northern Development Office, was to be provided by DRIE. To ensure an effective Committee, members were to "...be involved in native and northern economic development in a significant way and be knowledgeable of the broad socio-economic environment in which the program is designed to operate." A quorum was to require an overall majority of members and a majority of members representing northern and native organizations. Committee members could be directly involved in

1. By the end of the Program term, because of regional political changes representation from the Brotherhood of Indian Nations was changed to representation from the Interlake Tribal Council (Canada and Manitoba, *Northern Development Agreement Progress Report 1989/90:3*).

assisted projects so long as conflict of interest guidelines were adhered to.
Native Economic Development Program - Element III (NEDP3)

The previous chapter noted that the NEDP Central Regional Operations office in Winnipeg serviced Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Northwestern Ontario and the central Northwest Territories. There was no separate delivery structure for Manitoba or northern Manitoba. The Central Region office had nine staff: the director, a secretary, one financial clerk, one administrator, one policy analyst and four project analysts ("Briefing Book, Assistant Deputy Minister - Native Programs"; Schulz, personal communication; 16 September, 1996). These staff served clients of both Elements II and III. According to the Director of the Central Region, there were few Element II projects and there were very few Element III projects from Manitoba. Most of the Region's work came from Northwestern Ontario and Saskatchewan. Manitoba generated few projects because SARDA Commercial addressed most of the demand for project assistance from this province.

An Aboriginal controlled Advisory Board was established to provide advice to the Minister on program policy and Aboriginal economic development, and to recommend specific proposals for financing. This Board was composed of representatives of Aboriginal organizations and certain industries and large businesses. The former Director of the Central Region says disputes between representatives of certain industries and large businesses, and other Board members sometimes made for difficult Board deliberations (Schulz, personal communication; 16 September, 1996).

Project Administrative Flow

In all three programs project administrative and decision flow can be summarized by the following steps:

1. Initial (Screen) Applications
2. Full Applications
3. Staff Analysis and Recommendation

4. Full Application Decision Taking
5. Offer and Agreement
6. Inspections and Payments

These steps are described below for SARDA, NDA2 and the NEDP3, respectively.

Special ARDA

Much of the description of Special ARDA's administrative flow is drawn from the document: the "Special ARDA Procedure Manual" dated 30 October, 1975. In order to reduce the clutter of citations, unless otherwise cited, reference is the "Special ARDA Procedure Manual."

Step #1: Initial (Screen) Applications

Special ARDA utilized a two-stage application process. The first stage involved application through a Part I application form. The "note to applicants" which covers this form informed the applicant that Part I would be used to determine eligibility. The "note" also states:

Part 2 of the Special Arda application is included in the general information kit which is available.... Part 2 can be completed either when filling out the Part 1 section or once the basic eligibility of your project has been determined.

As well, attached to the Part 1 form is a page titled "Part II - Project Information" which describes 11 pieces of information required for a Part II application. Since it has no program identification moniker, address or phone number this page was obviously designed to be attached to the Part 1 application. Given that the principal function of the Part 1 is to adjudicate eligibility, it is odd that the applicant would be invited to simultaneously prepare a Part 2. Part 2 (described below) requires a substantial investment in cogitation and time and, should outside expertise be utilized, cost.

SARDA was willing to risk facing applicants who could have substantial personal investment in project proposals that may not be eligible for consideration.

Signed by the applicant, the Part I application was to provide the following basic information in check-off or very brief summary format: name and address of the applicant, type and nature of the proposed project, estimated number of jobs to be created, seasonal nature of the project, expected start date, existing agreements or commitments, expectations of financial assistance from other government agencies, estimated total cost and the "form" of equity. The Part I, or screen application form, concludes with a "Declaration by Applicant" that the information contained therein is accurate, that an offer of assistance will be a "...significant factor in the decision to proceed with the project...", that further information will be required in the Part II application, and that program agents may have access to the project site and records.

As of 1987 Resource Initiatives Ltd. reported general agreement among SARDA staff and Committee members that the Part I provided little information other than an indication that someone has applied, it was of little help in establishing eligibility or suitability (1987:34,39). The Part I only enabled SARDA to keep a list of clients. The firm suggested revisions that would generate information concerning the proposed project, the business relevant background and experience of the applicant, the number of jobs to be created and benefits to the community. The firm also suggested that the applicant submit three letters-of-reference which would address the applicant's business experience, training, general and financial management ability, and ability to relate to people. It suggested that if the Part I were appropriately revised and if, on the basis of the new format, an application was deemed eligible, SARDA staff time could be more efficiently focused on worthy Part II's. By the late 1980's the Part 1 demanded more information. In particular, it asked for the names of the expected owners; the percentage of owners and managers that would be of native ancestry; how many full-time, part-time or seasonal jobs there will be; the market area and the names of similar businesses in the market area; the applicants employment history; letters of reference from persons outside the family; letters from local native

organizations which "...must be signed by the chief or chairman as well as by all councillors or executive members;" and completion of a net worth statement summarizing assets and liabilities.

Resource Initiatives Ltd. reported that most SARDA applicants completed their own Part I's (1987:32).

On receipt, Part 1 applications were to be date stamped and given a file number. Within two days, according to the Procedures Manual, a clerk was to write a letter of acknowledgement. Within four weeks the program officer was to complete an "Eligibility Check List" and, if the project is deemed eligible, the program officer was to inform the applicant in writing. If there was a training element copies of the eligibility letter were to be sent to Canada Manpower and provincial SARDA. Provincial SARDA would design and ensure delivery of project specific training. If the project was not eligible, the applicant was to be contacted by phone or letter and was asked to submit a letter-of-withdrawal. If a letter-of-withdrawal was not received the program officer was to prepare a "Summary and Approval" sheet and a brief resume with a recommendation to the SARDA Committee, then inform the applicant of the decision of the Committee.

In later years, the program officer was to enter the project name, applicant name(s) and other application data into the DRIE "PRISM" data base ("Special ARDA Program Officer Manual," n.d. but post 1987:1). This data base was to provide the program officer with any historical data concerning the project and applicant(s).

The "Eligibility Report," as the "Check List" was titled, contains four sections. The first section asks assurance that the project would "a. provide transportation, communication, or recreational facilities or services," "b. provide identifiable earning and employment opportunities," "c. improve...the general income level of people engaged in a primary producing activity," or "d. establish, expand, or modernize a commercial undertaking" in a rural area. A "yes" to any one of these criterion was required for eligibility. A "yes" to criterion "a", "b", or "c" would result transfer of the application to the SARDA infrastructure, training, or primary producer programs,

respectively. Only an application that received a "yes" to criterion "d" would potentially be eligible for assistance from SARDA Commercial. If criterion "d" received a "yes" the program officer would proceed to "Section D" of the "Eligibility Report." Section D questions ask if a majority of employees will be disadvantaged people of native ancestry, if the project will take place within the geographic scope of the SARDA Agreement, if the applicant has made contractual commitments prior to making application, if the project will create the required number of jobs and if the project will result in income opportunities for disadvantaged native people. There is no statement to the effect that all Section D criteria must be met for the project to be eligible although the questions imply this to be the case. Procedure "3b", however, then states "the guidelines covering the minimum number of jobs may be disregarded by the Special ARDA Committee and the Program Manager when the project is considered to be worthwhile and meeting the objectives of the program." Such reasons had to be fully documented.

If the application was deemed eligible, it was to be referred to the Manager of the provincial SARDA program for comment and it may be referred to other agencies for comment on their interests (Procedure 4). The program officer was advised to refer the application to the SARDA Committee "...for information and preliminary review and opinion...." A "Report on Large or Sensitive Cases" was to be sent to the regional office so that the Assistant Deputy Minister would be informed, and the Department would, in turn, be able to inform the SARDA Committee of its recommendations (Procedure 4b).

According to a later program manual, if the project was not viable or if it was otherwise ineligible "...the Program Officer will advise the applicant that on the basis of the information available, the proposal cannot be recommended for assistance" ("Special ARDA Program Officer Manual," n.d. but post 1987:3). No reference is made in this manual to any requirement for consent of the program manager or the Committee before taking such action.

Illingworth suggests that with 100% capital funding available from the NDA2 some applicants reduced the proforma viability of their proposals

in order to avoid SARDA in favour of NDA2's loser, 100% grant, up-front funding (1990:44).

Step 2: Full Applications

Eligible Part I applicants were to receive a letter of acknowledgement ("Special ARDA Program Officer Manual," n.d. but post 1987:1-4a and 1-4b). This letter asks the applicant to complete the Part II application, to list his expected equity contribution, to provide information concerning competition and to provide copies of any signed contracts. If the Part I indicates that the project involves purchase of an existing business additional questions ask for financial statements from the past 3 years, for an appraisal, for a description of the effect loss of the business might have on the community, why the vendor wishes to sell and for a copy of an accepted offer-to-purchase subject to approval of SARDA assistance.

In its 1981 review of SARDA the Rural Communities Resource Centre concluded that:

In cases where applicants were forced to seek letters of support from local organizations in communities other than their home, problems resulted. Inter-community rivalry and jealousy biased the process. As a result some potential applicants were unable to apply or had great difficulty in applying. As well, this problem acts as a barrier to applications in communities without local organizations. (1981:71-72)

SARDA staff could provide advice or assistance to applicants concerning development of their proposals or the completion of the Part II application (Procedure 5). If the applicant was acting on behalf of two or more people of Indian ancestry, he could receive an advance of up to \$300 per day to cover travel or consulting services.

In 1978 DREE signed a contract with Aboriginal owned *WT Campbell Consulting Services* of Winnipeg to provide developmental assistance to applicants (H. Schultz to Applicant, General Delivery, Sherridon, Manitoba; 2 October, 1978). It is noteworthy that, although this

consulting service was Aboriginal-owned, it was based in Winnipeg, not in SARDA's target area. Applicants were informed, through Part I acknowledgements, that they would be contacted by this service to assist them. Program officer assignments were not changed and applicants were informed of this as well.

Procedure 5a contains a description of the suggested information to compile in a full application as of the mid-1970's. Compilation of this information, with appropriate documentation for estimates, would give SARDA a well rounded picture of the proposed project. The format asks for extensive descriptive information and three-year proformas of working capital, income and expenses, the balance sheet, and source and application of funds. The "Part II" sheet attached to the Part I application form used in the late 1980's describes the information sought for a full application in the later years of the Program. The introduction to this sheet, however, is not very clear:

To permit you the greatest possible flexibility in providing what you consider to be the important facts about the project, you may provide this information in narrative form on a separate attachment. You are, however, requested to provide certain specific information as indicated under each of the following headings.

Since no other format is included, the applicant must provide the information in the format of his choice to be attached to the Part 1 application.¹ The descriptions of the 11 items of information are themselves not adequate for soliciting a fully thought through project proposal. For example, the "operations" item requests information on the activity to be carried out and the adequacy of raw materials supply. It does not ask for a description of the technique or process to be used, and the ability of local infrastructure to support such a technique. The "marketing or service area" item asks for the volume of sales and the market, but it does not ask for information on expected pricing or how the market is to be tapped. The "land, building and

1. This was true in the post 1987 period as well, see the "Special ARDA Program Officer Manual" (n.d. but post 1987: "III. The Application").

equipment" item does not ask about title to, or availability of, the land; and it does not mention the word "equipment." The "financial" item asks for proforma income statements for the first three years of operation, but balance sheets are requested for the year before operation and the first two years of operation. These items do not ask for a listing of owners, how ownership will be exercised, the management and organizational structure, or how management control will be executed. In 1987 Resource Initiatives Ltd. recommended that the Part II application be revised so as to generate a fuller picture of project financial viability (1987:34-35).

It is noted above that SARDA staff could provide advice or assistance to applicants concerning development of their proposals or the completion of the Part II application. During the last years of SARDA program officers had an outline to follow when assisting applicants with preparation of the Part II ("Special ARDA Program Officer Manual," n.d. but post 1987: "Evaluation Outline, Special ARDA - Commercial Projects"). This "Outline" is confusing. In the "Introduction" are two successive, inconsistent sentences. The first sentence says "this format is intended to be used as a guide in preparing an application for assistance under the Special ARDA Program." The next sentence says "it is provided to give you an understanding of the information required and the review process in preparing a project evaluation for submission to the Special ARDA Committee." Item #3, titled "Recommendation and Special Considerations," begins with "write a brief statement of the type and level of financial assistance recommended." The "Outline" blends the conflicting roles of preparation and analysis of applications. If this is preparation of an application, one would have to wonder if the applicant would hold any ownership in the content. While the "Outline" does cover most issues, as a document for analysis it utilizes break-even analysis rather than discounted cash-flow and return-on-investment. This "Outline" is followed, in the "Special ARDA Program Officer Manual," by two documents - "Basic Requirements for Project Initiation and Analysis" and "Detailed Requirements for Project Analysis" - that, as outlines for the analysis of applications, are not fully consistent with the "Evaluation Outline."

Information provided in the section concerning program resources

reveals that program staffing was based, in part, on providing to each applicant an estimated 12 hours for assisting with the Part II application. By the post-1987 period the Program was explicitly relying on the applicants, local or regional economic development officers, and other government agencies to provide the bulk of resources for developing business proposals and Part II applications ("Special ARDA Program Officer Manual," n.d. but post 1987:"I. Project Initiation").

Resource Initiatives Ltd. reported in 1987 that most SARDA clients required assistance to complete the Part II (1987:32). This report, however, did not provide data on the number or proportion of Part II applicants who received help from SARDA, or from other public or private support services.

Step 3: Staff Analysis and Recommendation

The program officer was to acknowledge receipt of the full application, gather additional information if required, request a training cost estimate from provincial SARDA if required, complete an evaluation for program management, prepare a final "Summary and Approval" sheet, prepare a resume for the Committee and prepare a draft letter-of-offer. Six weeks was allotted to these actions prior to preparation of the final "Summary and Approval" sheet, and one week was allocated for actions thereafter.

Requirements for the analyses of full applications by program officers were set forth in Procedure 6. In general, this Procedure asks the program officer to ensure that all items and costs, including pre-operating and "abnormal" operating (such as training) costs, are included and are reasonable; that the proposed operation is technically feasible; that sales projections are attainable; that management is capable; that adequate financing is included and that "...the project will achieve adequate economic and social benefits for the area and for disadvantaged people."

Draft "Special ARDA Program Functional Steps in the Assessment and Review of Applications" issued February 6, 1974 declare that the

assistance required must not replace or duplicate other federal or provincial assistance, that the cost per job (based on capital cost, but not including pre-operating, abnormal and working capital costs) will not exceed \$30,000, and "that costs of operation for five years have been calculated..." (W. Hagan to G.T. Hirniak). This cost-per-job criterion, however, is contested in the "Special ARDA Agreement Revised General Operating Guidelines and Administrative Procedures" prepared for the SARDA Committee and dated the same month as the above "Functional Steps." These "Guidelines" say "at the maximum...the total of all assistance to be provided under the program will in no circumstances exceed \$30,000 per permanent job created in the project" (28 February, 1974:6). According to Illingworth the \$30,000 per job criterion was carried over from RDIA (1990:43). This criterion remained in effect until the demise of SARDA in 1989 (C.T. Soulodre to the Special ARDA Committee; 24 August, 1988). It was only in August, 1988 that SARDA formally adopted the requirement that the \$30,000 criterion was to be based on full-time equivalent employment¹ instead of being based on a "job."

Procedure 6a contains a "Project Evaluation Report" which "...should be completed in detail...although only the relevant items should be dealt with..."² As well, "the procedure should not be regarded as a set of rigid criteria which must be met...." The introduction to this "Report" notes that "...the officer should work closely with the applicant so that the proposal can be properly developed." In general, the "Report," if it is used both to summarize information and to suggest avenues of information collection and analysis, presents a sound foundation for project development and analysis. At this point the reader should note that the Employment section refers to number of "jobs" not to more precise measures such as full-time equivalents or person-months. On the financial side the program officer was to generate: a three-year proforma balance sheet, a three-year proforma

1. Deemed to be 50 - 40 hour weeks of work per year.

2. This same "Report" appears in "Appendix VI - Proposed criteria and guidelines for approving projects under the 1975 Special ARDA agreements - British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba as sent to SARDA staff on 26 January, 1975.

statement of operations (or income statement as it is more commonly known), and a three-year source and application of funds. He was to apply six financial ratio tests against Dun & Bradstreet industry averages; and calculate return-on-equity, payback¹, discounted cash-flow return-on-investment and discounted cash-flow return-on-equity. As well, the program officer was to discuss the project's economic and social "benefits."

A number of major criticisms can be made of the "Project Evaluation Report." The proformas only go out through year three, a short time horizon for new businesses. There was no requirement for tests of financial sensitivity to changes in sales, volume of production, operational costs and interest rates. Finally, neither the proposed organizational structure nor the proposed management control system were addressed.

In actual practice program officers prepared financial analyses in a format that would be appended to their report to the SARDA Committee. This format separates project costs by purpose², by eligibility and source³, and by amount of SARDA assistance by purpose. This format also was used to calculate cash-flow. Cash-flow, in turn, was used to generate six measures of project quality: simple rate-of-return-on-investment with and without financial assistance, number of years to payback with and without financial assistance, and discounted cash-flow with and without financial assistance. Simple rate-of-return-on-investment is the average profit rate divided by the one-half of the capital assets plus working capital. Payback is the number of years it would take for the net cash flow to repay the capital invested. Discounted cash-flow is the internal discount rate which will discount all future cash flows to a sum equal to the total initial capital cost.

Although the cash-flow format was designed for a 10 year projection, program officers modified it so as to support two, 5-year

1. Called "payout" by DRE/IE staff.
2. That is, pre-operating capital, capital, working capital and training.
3. That is, equity, grant or loan.

projections (one with financial assistance and one without financial assistance). This parallel 5-year projection and analysis method was more consistent with the practice presented at a Special ARDA Program Workshop" that took place in Ottawa in September, 1971 ("Special ARDA Program Workshop, Ottawa; 30 August - 1 September, 1971; Illustrative Case - Derivation of Projected Rates of Return"). According to the example prepared for this Workshop cash-flow was to be calculated with and without assistance over a 10-year horizon. Discounted cash-flow with and without grant, and payback without grant were to be calculated on a 10-year horizon. The simple rate-of-return-on-investment and the payback with assistance were to be calculated on the first 5 years only.¹ This Workshop also suggested that annual net cash-flow was to be calculated after both taxes and depreciation were included. Depreciation was to be calculated according to tax rules; that is, depreciation was to be calculated only on non-grant financed, capital assets. Since real depreciation would occur to non-grant financed capital assets, use of tax rule depreciation generated a bias toward optimistic income statement proformas (real depreciation would not have been subtracted from operating earnings) and pessimistic cash flow projections (real depreciation would not have been added back to operating earnings to get cash flow). Payback, however, was to be properly calculated on net earnings before depreciation; if it was calculated after depreciation the payback of capital would be double counted.

Given the nature of SARDA, methods of financial analysis that might be used to choose the best project alternative or to rank all possible project investments were not appropriate. SARDA had to either accept a project if simple rate-of-return-on-investment or discounted cash-flow was positive², if simple rate-of-return-on-investment or discounted cash-flow was above a set floor, or if the payback was positive or shorter than a set number of years. In this context discounted cash-flow analysis is preferable

1. The rationale for showing a 5 year simple rate of return on investment is not known; however, a 5 year payback analysis was used because full payback with assistance occurred within 5 years.

2. That is, if discounted net returns are greater than total investment.

to either simple rate-of-return-on-investment or payback. Simple rate-of-return-on-investment as used by SARDA uses average investment as the denominator. Simple rate-of-return-on-investment has a shortcoming relative to discounted cash-flow, since it does not reflect the time pattern of cash-flow the value of revenues in the first years are undervalued. Payback analysis casts the project in the role of a one-time investment the principal goal of which is to recover the initial investment. The analyst is to determine how long it will take to achieve payback. Because of these reasons both simple rate-of-return-on-investment and payback imply more conservative investment decisions than discounted cash-flow.

As noted above program officers did not generally prepare the lengthy 10 year cash flow evaluations envisaged by the "Project Evaluation Report." As well, both three-year proformas and five-year cash flow projections often appear to have been done rather mechanically. Projects were generally to be operational in roughly one year, to be profitable in the first full year of operation, and to increase sales and profit by a certain percent in each the remaining years. Cogitation and data upon which these projections and proformas were based may or may not have been done by project officers, but generally they were not well documented formally or in the notes within project files. In particular, project officers often did not appear to adequately address place or personality dependent items such as construction and equipment purchase and setup time, marketing and market penetration, the management-employee learning curve, or employee turnover.

Procedure 7 contains the "Project Resume and Recommendation" format that the program officer was to use when submitting the proposed project to the SARDA Committee *after* the program officer's analysis had been approved by the Program Manager. This format should have been easy to use once the "Project Evaluation Report" was complete. As well, program officers prepared a "Project Summary and Approval Sheet" summarizing the project description, recommended cost and SARDA financial assistance, draft Committee recommendations, and recommended terms and conditions - all on one page. The "Project Summary and Approval Sheet" also contains spaces for signature by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee,

the Provincial Minister and the Federal Minister. Until the late 1980's this format was normally followed in full. As noted above, the "Project Resume and Recommendation" was normally packaged with the financial analyses and the "Project Summary and Approval Sheet." A "Special ARDA Program - Project Information Sheet" which normally covered the "Project Summary and Approval Sheet" highlighted some of the information within the "Project Summary and Approval Sheet." Worth noting is the fact that the "Project Information Sheet" contained six cells for allocating total number of jobs and number of native jobs by full-time, part-time or seasonal.

By the late 1980's program officers normally generated a "Project Summary" statement. The "Project Summary" was a more condensed, quick-to-fill-in form summarizing most of the important information referred to in the "Project Evaluation Report." This "Summary" contained a five-year financial statement and a five-year discounted cash-flow. Employment data was categorized into four cells, by number of jobs created or maintained, and whether these jobs would be full- or part-time. Assistance was calculated on the basis of full-time job equivalents.

SARDA set forth algorithms for calculating the type and level of financial assistance available to applicants. This is shown in the document "Terms and Conditions: Commercial Projects, Canada/Manitoba Special ARDA Agreement" (5 December, 1975). Twenty percent (20%) of capital cost must be an equity investment although this equity could take the form of work done by disadvantaged owners. "Approved capital costs" included the value of eligible capital assets installed and used no later than 36 months after the business commenced operation. "Eligible assets" included assets not to be charged against income in the year they are acquired, excluding assets acquired before receipt of the application unless approved by the Minister, and goodwill. Furthermore, "every offer of development assistance shall specify the date by which the construction or installation of the fixed assets of the project must begin and the date by which the project must be brought into commercial operation." Equity must be invested before assistance is paid. Assistance could be provided for the purchase of the assets of an existing business if all of the following were true: the operation had ceased or was about to cease, the purchase was to be *bona fide* arm's-

length and the purchase price was at fair market value. If, within 36 months following commencement of operations, less than 50% of the capital assets on which payment had been made ceased to be used, "...the applicant shall be ineligible to receive any further payments..for those capital assets not in use and an equivalent proportion of the approved working capital may be withheld...." If, within 36 months of commencement of operations, the business was sold, the Minister could demand repayment unless the business was to continue substantially as originally planned and the successor carried out the terms and conditions of the assistance. Eighty percent (80%) of the approved assistance for capital assets could be paid after a project commenced operation, 20% was to be paid after both 36 months of operation and a final audit. Interim payments for capital assets could only be made if, because of location or extenuating circumstances, other financing was not available. Payments for working capital could be made at the discretion of the Minister.

SARDA operational guidelines are also documented in the "Special ARDA Agreement General Operating Guidelines and Administrative Procedures" prepared for members of the Special ARDA Committee (28 February, 1974). These "Guidelines" say that a remote rural community must be either north of the 53rd parallel, "...except for that portion of the Province lying east of Lake Winnipeg and north of the Winnipeg River, or "...in an area agreed to jointly by the Ministers...because the requirements of rural development in an area include, to a significant extent, the need to create or improve access to employment opportunities and increase standards of living for disadvantaged people of Indian ancestry living in the area" (pg. 4). As well, the population of the community "...must be less than 3,000 or so of whom 50% are people of Indian ancestry, or such other population percentage of Indian ancestry as the Ministers may subsequently agree; and it must not be within reasonable access by normal means of transportation and communication to another community with adequate public service...or where employment opportunities are available or will become available in the near future." The "Guidelines" require that, "to qualify as a project, a majority of the persons to be employed or assisted in the project should be persons who, by personal statement or by official record, establish themselves to be of Indian ancestry...(pg. 5)."

Furthermore,

Assistance under this program is intended to supplement, but not replace or duplicate, the assistance provided under other federal and provincial programs. Assistance for projects under this program will, therefore, be made available when adequate support is not available for such projects under these other programs.

As for the criterion of job creation assessment should consider the "total cost per man-year" of direct employment and "...the total of all assistance to be provided under the program will in no circumstances exceed \$30,000 per permanent job created..." (pg. 6). The viability criterion required that the project "...generate sufficient income to meet its financial obligations for a period of at least five years; that jobs with a minimum income of \$2,500 annually per job are created for at least three persons within a three-year period, or for projects owned by people of Indian ancestry and in which three persons are engaged, the total net annual income (including net profit, salaries, wages or fees) will be at least \$10,000..."(original underlined, pg. 7). Finally, the "retroactivity" criterion stated that, "except under extenuating circumstances determined by the Ministers, no assistance will be provided under this program to projects initiated prior to the acknowledgement of the formal receipt of the application" (pg. 8).

Manitoba considered the original SARDA criteria overly strict. A 1981 review reports that the province was unhappy about the three-job requirement, the \$2,500 income minimum, the Program's unwillingness to fund provincial Crown corporations,¹ and its treatment of co-operatives as normal commercial businesses (Rural Communities Resource Centre 1981:26). These concerns were expressed in a quoted letter from the Secretary of the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet to the Deputy Minister of DREE:

1. In particular, natural resource harvesting corporations established through *The Manitoba Natural Resources Development Act* (Manitoba 1970) and quasi-commercial construction operations operated by Manitoba Northern Affairs.

'The development of rules and regulations...has resulted in a situation in which the Special ARDA Program has little applicability to opportunities as proposed by Indian and Metis people. The paradox of a permissive involvement type agreement for native people together with application of efficiency type rules compatible with urban-industrial orientation augers poorly for any progress being made.'

According to the Rural Communities Resource Centre similar objections were made by the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood and the Manitoba Metis Federation. A 1972 memorandum from the Manitoba DREE Director supports these claims (R.L. Carter to E.C. Aquilina; 5 January, 1972). The Director wrote that the SARDA Committee was unanimous in its criticism of the guideline concerning three family heads and \$2,500 income per head, and that the Committee was angry because

[It] felt that it was capable of making sensible judgments in the light of the intent of the Agreement, believed that the 'Guidelines' should indeed be guidelines, felt that DREE was giving tight interpretations to statements it said were flexible, and believed that the province had agreed to them as guidelines, not as regulations....

...I think I express their views when I say that they feel hurt that DREE finds it necessary to spoon-feed them, and offended when apparently we judge them incapable of making decisions within the terms of the Agreement and a few general rules.

Under this criticism DREE relented. At a Special ARDA workshop held in October, 1972 it was noted that DREE agreed:

...to amend the \$2,500 minimum income per job guideline for commercial undertakings so that native people in the north can be engaged in employment for as little as three months provided the project creates economic impact of at least \$10,000 in the area. This concession has been made to both Manitoba and Saskatchewan. (E.W. Oliver to J.A. Edwards, W.B. Herringer, A.A. Stubbs and F. McCallum; 14 November, 1972:2)

The Rural Communities Resource Centre reports that at the time the three-job criterion was changed:

...to allow a less rigid adherence to the head of families notion. One family head and two persons beyond school leaving age were accepted as compliance with the rule. (1981:27)

A DREE internal discussion paper written in late 1974 confirms that modifications to the SARDA operating guidelines have been effected through an exchange of letters between Ministers (DREE, "Departmental Discussion Paper - Future of Special ARDA Program;" 6 September, 1974:2). As well, this document affirms that grant payout procedures were modified so as to reduce the need for bridge financing when access to or the cost of such financing might be an obstacle to project success (DREE, "Departmental Discussion Paper - Future of Special ARDA Program;" 6 September, 1974:2).

At the above noted workshop it was also stated that a commitment made after receipt of an application would not, "at least in the immediate future," disqualify an application (pg. 5). As of late 1972 cash-flow and return on investment formats were being sent to field offices (pp. 5-6). The notes point out that by showing the timing of capital expenditures and the timing of financial assistance "...any inherent cash shortages will be highlighted and the need for interim financing indicated." A cost overrun of 15% was allowed on all expenditures except working capital (pg. 9). Shortfalls of 15% were to be possible on the number of jobs created and the \$2,500 per job wage criterion (pp. 9-10).

Yet again, at a SARDA Committee seminar in 1976 the three-job rule was discussed (R.L. Carter to J.D. Collinson; 15 November, 1976). According to these notes that Committee was concerned that the three-job rule biases project funding away from projects with a higher probability of long term success. As well, the Committee apparently stressed the "serious problem" of early funding to reduce the need for project financing, the need for regular project monitoring and assistance¹, and good management training and assistance before, during and after the project commences.

The author found, during his review of project files, that during the early 1970's there existed a joint Manitoba Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet - DREE advisory committee which vetted many projects. As well,

1. "The performance of the staff cannot be monitored unless there is frequent evaluation of the performance of the project."

some project files contained formatted Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet staff commentaries on project applications.¹

The Rural Communities Resource Centre quotes from Henderson's 1976 report on SARDA to the effect that SARDA's growing pains were

'...unusually tortuous, largely because delivery field staff had to rely heavily on Ottawa's interpretations. The impossibility of this situation is apparent when it is recalled how the program as operated from Ottawa differed from the program perceived by the client group.' (1981:27-28)

Follows this quote is a statement that:

The 'overselling' of the program's potential, relative to the initial reality of it, produced serious credibility problems in the early period. The expectations of Ottawa and the expectations of the client group differed greatly. Some of this disagreement on goals persisted through the decade.

A SARDA procedures manual from the later years of the Program specified the criterion for viability: "A project is considered to be viable if the financial analysis indicates that the income from operations is sufficient to pay all operating costs, debt amortization and to make provision for the replacement of depreciating assets when required" ("Special ARDA Program Officer Manual," n.d. but post 1987:2-3). The reader should note that viability was to be determined by operational financial flows, and was to include depreciation or replacement of depreciating assets if depreciation according to income tax rules was not adequate for reinvestment.

SARDA Committee guidelines published in 1984 created a new category of assistance: "revitalization" for expansion or modernization. This category of assistance could be tapped if an assisted business faced financial difficulties so long as the project was "basically sound," the project "...has significant economic and social impact on its owners and the

1. This is interesting in that one would not expect the staff of this Committee of Cabinet to be oriented to the technical analysis of business project proposals, but one would expect staff of this organization to be sensitive to local political issues and provincial government policy.

community...," "there is evidence it can be successfully revitalized," and "the financial difficulties encountered are not due to poor management decisions" (H. Schultz; 30 August, 1984:Item D(9)). By 1987 it appears that a reaction had set in because of a widely held belief that the ability of SARDA to refinance businesses was being abused. Resource Initiatives Ltd. reported a "strong feeling" by most people the firm spoke to that a minimum of four to six years should elapse before SARDA should entertain an application for refinancing (1987:36-37).

By some point in 1987 DRIE had become aware of the pitfalls of expecting a program officer to be both project developer and analyst. It was noted that:

the analysis and evaluation report is usually done by staff other than those involved in assisting the applicant prepare his application....[If the developer and analyst are one] it is important to remember that the evaluation process is a separate function and a great deal of objectivity is required. ("Special ARDA Program Officer Manual," n.d. but post 1987:"Evaluation Process - A").

At a point prior to a decision on the application the provincially operated SARDA program developed a training program in consultation with the program officer, the applicant and a training consultant or institute (Ginsberg, circa 1978: Appendix V). Approval by the applicant appeared to be necessary. The provincial program then prepared a "Training Program Summary." This "Summary" noted the number of expected trainees, the goal and objectives of the training, the specific skills and knowledge to be developed, how and where the training was to occur, the expected cost and the dollar value of training assistance recommended for funding by SARDA. In general, these training packages appeared to be targeted at required practical, usually management, skills. They were, however, specific, short-term training packages; they were not intended as ongoing or long-term management advisory services.

Step 4: Full Application Decision Taking

The "Project Resume and Recommendation" contains a section wherein the program officer was to recommend acceptance, conditional acceptance or rejection of the application. It was to be signed by the program officer and his supervisor (presumably this would be the Program Manager). This document then went to the SARDA Committee or, if the financial requirements exceed the authority of the provincial Director-General or if interdepartmental or interprovincial consultation was required, it went to the Regional Office.

Ginsberg commented on the conflict of interest between a program officer's development and analyst roles (circa 1978:38). In 1987 Resource Initiatives Ltd. reported that SARDA clients saw SARDA staff in a developmental role, that they did not appreciate staff acting in both developmental and assessment roles (1987:35). This firm believed that each role required different skills. It therefore recommended that the private sector supply the developmental role while SARDA would focus its resources on the analyst and evaluator roles.

Procedure 8 explained the Committee's review criteria. In general, these criteria indicate that the Committee would assess: project "desirability and feasibility," the capability of management, effects on other proposed and existing businesses, and acceptance by people of the area in which it is to be located. The Committee also was to ensure that the proposal was fully developed and that viability, cost estimates, financial analyses, job generation and training requirements were adequately forecast. As noted earlier, all projects were to be referred to the Committee and all rejections, but not necessarily all approvals, were to be approved by the Committee ("Special ARDA Committee, Manitoba, Terms of Reference," Draft, dated around the 4th of January, 1972; see also Committee guidelines adopted in August, 1984 (H. Schultz, "Special ARDA - Manitoba," 30 August, 1984)). These guidelines allowed Committee members to apply for assistance "...so long as the guidelines dealing with conflict of interest are adhered to" (Item "C(1)"). The guidelines explicitly stated

...expressions of support from local Native organizations are required for all projects. Where letters of support are *not* available, the project review and analysis will be completed and submitted to Committee noting the absence of support. The Committee would then have the responsibility to provide a recommendation on whether or not to proceed.... (Italics in original, Item C(3)(c))

These guidelines also pointed out that normally a project would be addressed at the first meeting at which it is introduced, but that if circumstances warrant the vote could be delayed until the following meeting (Item C(3)(e)). The Committee could ask the applicant or his representative to appear at the review, but this would not normally be expected (Item C(4)). The Committee was to recommend acceptance, rejection, clarification or revision (Item C(5)). If an application was accepted, the Committee was to also recommend the level and conditions of assistance. Item D(3) states: "Applicants applying for assistance for commercial undertaking projects should establish that the business can generate sufficient income to meet its financial obligations over a period of at least three years...." It is not clear from this statement if the project must show viability *within* three years or if the project must show viability *over* a period of three years. These guidelines also indicate a softening in SARDA's position regarding acquisitions (Item D(6)). Instead of requiring that the project would otherwise have ceased, applications must now "...demonstrate that the acquisition...will result in significant economic and social benefits which pertain to native people residing in a community as a whole and will increase or maintain the degree of local ownership..." As well, "...where required, every effort should be made to allow the applicant to buy into a business over a reasonable period of time to allow him to become familiar with the business and preserve continuity."

Although all projects were referred to the Committee and most projects that received final approval were approved by the Committee, projects that were withdrawn either by applicants or by the Program, were generally given to the Committee as information only. Review of the minutes of many of these meetings indicates that there were attentive, serious discussions of many projects although discussion did not generally focus on the technical and financial attributes of the applications. Rather,

discussion often dealt with the general appropriateness of the project; market competition; personal characteristics of the proponent; and community or regional social and political dynamics. Attendance by member-representatives of Aboriginal and regional groups was uneven in terms of both the individuals and full representation by each organization. SARDA clients told Resource Initiatives Ltd. that they felt the Committee members from Aboriginal organizations were political people who made project decisions based on the political persuasions or activities of the individuals involved rather than on the attributes of the proposed business (1987:35-36).

Procedure 9 says the Committee's "decision" is to be recorded in the minutes and on a "Project Summary and Approval Sheet." A revised "Sheet" included an explicit statement that cost overruns are not to exceed 25%. Approvals are then submitted for approval by, or on behalf of, the provincial Minister and the DRE/IE Minister.

Approvals recommended by the Committee required final approval by DRE/IE. A signed "Project Summary and Approvals Sheet" was legal authority to make an expenditure (A.A. Stubbs to Directors General (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, BC); 5 December 1975). At least until December, 1975 the Manitoba Director-General was able to authorize expenditures not exceeding \$75,000, the assistant deputy minister \$150,000 and the deputy minister \$250,000 for any one SARDA project. Projects over \$250,000 required Treasury Board approval. The SARDA Manager noted that these requirements caused problems for the Program. He pointed out that project costs had escalated such that costs often exceeded the regional signing authority, and the existing procedures for obtaining signed approval take excessive time. With DREE regionalization the SARDA Western Regional Manager recommended that Directors-General have signing authority up to \$150,000 and that the regional program managers receive authority to sign letters-of-offer.

Ginsberg refers to problems SARDA had in becoming operational (circa 1978:4). She says that as late as February, 1972 no applications had been approved by the Program. That she regards this as negative only a few

months after the first Canada-Manitoba agreement was signed speaks reams about the either naive or low quality expectations concerning program setup and business development in less developed areas of the province.

A "Draft" memo from the SARDA Committee Secretary to Committee Members dated 17 April, 1985 discusses problems that the Program was having with a rapid increase in the number of applications for assistance with business acquisitions, particularly hotel acquisitions. This memo notes that the amount of assistance provided for acquisitions had increased from 29% of funds committed to commercial undertakings in 1983-84 to 51% of funds committed in 1984-85. Funds committed to hotel acquisitions was up from less than 1% of committed funds in 1983-84 to 34% in 1984-85. Furthermore, while the average cost for non-acquisition projects was almost \$26,000, the average cost per acquisition was over \$85,000, and the average cost per hotel acquisition was almost \$186,000. This concerned SARDA management because it pulled funds away from other types of projects. As well, it was thought that in a majority of the recent applications for assistance with acquisitions the applicant was "...looking for an investment opportunity with personal income being of lesser concern." After three years the applicant would be able to sell the business and realize a significant profit. There could be "...the possible loss of jobs to people of native ancestry [following] resale of the business at the end of the control period." The memo notes that "lodges generally are not affected since the local labor force is predominantly of native ancestry." The memo admits that "currently no specific criteria are available under the program to address [these] areas...."

Step 5: Offer and Agreement to Assist

If the final decision was rejection, the program officer was to write a letter of rejection. During their field research the Rural Communities Resource Centre found "...bewilderment, a sense of personal failure and loss of self-esteem deriving from Special ARDA rejections" (1981:70). The Centre noted that many people suggested that a more constructive and informative rejection process be instituted. If, however, the decision was

acceptance, once the signed "Summary and Approval" sheet was received from program management, the program officer was to prepare a final letter-of-offer for management's signature.

In general the letter-of-offer described the amount of financial assistance being offered, how and when payments would be made, the criterion that the activity being assisted will be substantially the same as that approved by the Committee and DRE/IE senior management, and any other special and all standard conditions of offer. It was to be signed by the Director-General and the applicant had to accept the offer within 90 days of the effective date. Here are the clauses normally included in the letter-of-offer: the Program cannot pay anything under the offer if the applicant had made a contractual commitment to establish the business before the Program received his application, before the business opens the applicant must contribute his equity, the applicant must arrange to have sufficient money to operate the business for the first year before the first SARDA payment can be expected, if the applicant receives any other government grant or subsidy SARDA may not pay the whole amount of the offer, if the applicant fails to operate the business for at least three years the applicant "...must pay back a prorated portion of any money...paid under the offer," the applicant must start construction (or commence operation or make the acquisition if no construction is required) by a specified date, sufficient insurance must be carried to cover the amount of financial assistance, a majority of persons hired must be of Indian ancestry, and a specified number of persons must be hired. Letters-of-offer during the later years of SARDA became more elaborate. If training was required the program officer was to request a copy of a training contract, signed by the applicant and the Province, from provincial SARDA. The program officer also was to send copies of applications and approval documents to provincial SARDA, and to the DRE/IE regional office, to the DRE/IE financial section and to program management.

The notes for a DRIE Audit Workshop (Audit Workshop, n.d., since the notes refer to DRIE the notes would have been written in the mid- to late 1980's) refer to the problem of writing and enforcing conditions for Summaries and Approval Sheets, and letters-of-offer.

If you are too specific you lock yourself in....Conditions must be enforceable and auditable. They should not be included just in case it may be useful. Ask yourself if you would withhold payment if the condition were not met.

As a grant agency SARDA was not a secured creditor to its projects. In the event of business failure, misappropriation or fraud, secured creditors and employees had access to project assets before SARDA. A public program with equity-oriented rules, and checks and balances faces greater constraints to the tailoring of financing procedures than a private financier.

At this point Provincial SARDA would send a training contract to the applicant for signature. Once signed, copies were sent to DRE/IE's local and regional offices.

It has been noted a number of times that SARDA experienced problems with the amount of time that elapsed in various of the application and approval steps. Resources Initiatives Ltd. reported in 1987 that a major complaint of clients and staff was the time required to process applications (1987:31-32).

Step 6: Inspections and Payments

The principal file formats were to be sent to the Regional Audit Leader who would use this information for future project inspections.

When the applicant was ready for an inspection in order to determine the first payment to be made by SARDA, or one month before commencement of construction, the program officer was to ensure compliance to-date with the letter-of-offer. If the commencement date could not be met the applicant was to inform the Program, give reasons for the delay and request an extension of time. The program officer was to acknowledge a request for extension with a letter of acceptance, including conditions if appropriate, or rejection. The applicant was to give SARDA notice one month prior to commencement of operation so that at that time or when the project was ready for its first payment the applicant could fill-in

a "Request for Audit" or "Request for Project Inspection" form. According to Procedure 13 SARDA staff were to visit the applicant to ensure that the project is ready for inspection. By 1976 this requirement appears to have been relaxed. A memorandum from the Manager of SARDA to SARDA staff says the SARDA program officer "...will receive the [joint payee and request for inspection] forms [from the client] to ensure that they have been correctly filled out by the applicant" (22 December, 1976). No mention is made of a program officer visit to the project in the sequence of procedural memorandums contained in a SARDA "Operations Manual" not dated, but containing memorandums from as late as 1983. The DRE/IE regional and Winnipeg offices then established a date for the Initial Audit.

Notes to a DRIE Audit Workshop (n.d.) indicate that "materiality" or "complex or potential political issues" were the two criteria to be used to determine if an audit is requested instead of, what appears to have been the normal action, an internal site inspection. These two criteria for an independent audit are also noted in the DRIE-period "Special ARDA Program Officer Manual" (n.d. but post 1987:5-6). This Manual states that although independent audits may be necessary in certain cases, "in most cases, it would appear to be more expedient and economical to do in-house inspections...." Since these documents were prepared during the DRIE period, they suggest that internal site inspections had replaced audits by the Audit Services Bureau as the normal means of testing project compliance. Therefore, at this point in time site inspection requirements became more demanding, they were to cover the items normally expected of an audit.

Procedure 15 states that the audit visit is to include the auditor and a SARDA staff member. A typical audit report includes verification of the date of commencement of operations; determination of working capital, pre-operating or training costs, contributed equity, and jobs created; and compliance with conditions of the letter-of-offer. In particular,

The actual capital costs claimed should be compared to the approved capital costs in detail, including a review of books and records as well as invoices and/or cancelled cheques....Any additional capital costs claimed for items that were not included in the approved eligible capital costs should be noted and their

inclusion in the project explained. Any excess eligible capital costs on approved items should be noted and explained, as cost overruns of up to 25% may be subsequently approved by the Department. A physical inspection should also be performed to ensure that the assets are in place and in use for the purposes intended and were acquired within the control period.

The draft February, 1974 document titled "Special ARDA Program Functional Steps in the Inspection and Payment of Claims" indicates that at this point in time there was a 11% cap on capital cost overruns (W. Hagan to G.T. Hirniak). By December 5, 1975, in a loosening of funding parameters, this cap had increased to 25% (Anon., "Final Draft, Terms and Conditions: Commercial Projects, Special ARDA Agreement;" 5 December, 1975).

Audit reports, when conducted by the Department of Supply and Services Audit Services Bureau were as thorough as available information allowed. Frequently, however, applicants were not prepared for the auditor and the program officer seldom accompanied the auditor. In many cases the initial audit uncovered breach of one or more conditions of the letter-of-offer. Breaches of conditions concerning purpose or amount of expenditure, or whether or not the business was operating could result in suspension of the first payment. Breaches of conditions concerning such performance items as employment, organizational legal status and insurance, as well as apparently poor sales or profit performance did not, typically, result in suspension of payment.

The 25% overrun cap was put in place through RDIA regulations. Projects approved before that date had to stay within a 15% overrun on capital costs (Procedure 19). Once an audit report was received by the Winnipeg office, the program officer had to prepare comments and recommendations for the SARDA Manager and he had to prepare a letter from the SARDA Manager to the regional audit office. Prior to May, 1983 the Western Region office of DREE reviewed the auditors' comments, this requirement was dropped at that time (T.R. Johnston to SARDA Staff; 30 May, 1983).

By 1989 SARDA was using a "SARDA Program File Index" and "Aboriginal Economic Programs Payment Calculation/Checklist" to deal with prepayment assessments. The "SARDA Program File Index" listed the general project elements to be addressed and gave each element a numerical or letter identifier. Project files contain such number and letter identified sheets interspersed with other project correspondence and notes. Each identified sheet or sheets contains information relevant to an element of the assessment. The "Aboriginal Economic Programs Payment Calculation/Checklist" shows the particular payment control items that should be known and/or present (blanks for "yes," "no," "comments," and dollar amount or date where required). The right-hand margin of the "Calculation/Checklist" usually contains references to the number or letter identified detailed or backup material contained elsewhere in the file.

In a memorandum the SARDA Secretary noted that:

historically, during periods of economic downturn, projects have been unable to meet or maintain the job creation levels specified in the individual letters of offer. To hire the number of employees required to meet the requirements would mean overstaffing of the operation and eventual bankruptcy. (C.T. Souldre to Special ARDA Committee; 24 August, 1988)

In the same memorandum the Secretary admitted that:

in the past, the program has had no written policy as to how this assessment [as to whether or not the employment requirement in the letter-of-offer had been met] was to be performed. This has resulted in confusion leading to disputes with claimants as to whether or not they have met the requirements of the letter of offer.

The Secretary points out that in some cases the necessary number of jobs were created, but not maintained until the end of the three year control period. In other cases the necessary number of jobs were never created within the control period, but the cost per actual job was lower than \$30,000. The Secretary recommended that it should be possible to amend a letter-of-offer within one year of the termination of the control period depending on the reason for non-compliance, the variance in jobs created and cost per job, and the skill level of jobs created. He also recommended

that a minimum of 75% of the jobs stated in the letter-of-offer must be created. So long as the 75% job creation and \$30,000 per job criteria are met the SARDA holdback should be paid, but that the holdback be prorated. The Secretary did not, however, explain how such prorating would be calculated¹ and documentation does not indicate if his recommendation was adopted².

Payment required a letter from the SARDA Manager to the DRE/IE Director-General, concurrence by the Director-General and a letter of authorization from the SARDA Manager to DRE/IE's finance section. Cheques were to be delivered by hand or a signed letter of transmittal had to be returned. SARDA staff were to prepare a memo to the Regional Audit Group describing the final disposition of the auditor's comments.

Many SARDA clients and staff who spoke to Resource Initiatives Ltd. in 1987 were concerned because grants for working capital were being paid after SARDA had received invoices showing that the working capital expenditures had been made (1987: 37-38). These people noted that working capital is needed to purchase initial inventory, but that the businesses often do not have the requisite cash or credit record to purchase inventory.

SARDA Committee guidelines published in 1984 show a loosening of the initial holdback provisions (Item D(7) in H. Schultz, "Special ARDA - Manitoba;" 30 August, 1984). The 20% holdback "...is held back for a period of up to three years from the date of commencement of operations...." The holdback could be released before the end of the control period if:

- (a) The project is a single asset or family owned and operated business...

1. That is, would the prorating be based solely on the percentage of jobs created or on the percentage of jobs times some variance from \$30,000 in the cost per job?

2. The program closed only seven months later.

- (b) The jobs and income to native people are for all practical purposes, accruing to the owner or immediate family members.
- (c) The project has been in operation for at least one year and is beginning to show financial stability.
- (d) Loans and debts have been paid on a regular basis and are essentially up-to-date.
- (e) The business has demonstrated it should meet the projections on income, jobs and revenue....
- (f) The applicant is in compliance with our letter of offer....
- (g) In other special instances where significant direct financial benefits may accrue to community residents and not solely to those engaged by the project.

Furthermore, progress payments would now be explicitly possible if (Item D(8)):

- (a) Long term and bridge financing is not obtainable at reasonable cost without our participation.
- (b-d) [The proposal is sound and will proceed according to the plan approved by SARDA.]
- (e) Proper documentation and on site inspections are made in support of progress payments.

Procedure 18 was a "procedure for projects not requiring inspection." This procedure required that the principal documents concerning application and analyses be on file and that invoices support eligible expense claims. The procedure appears to apply to feasibility study, organizational, training and abnormal operating costs only.

Notes for a DRIE Audit Workshop (Audit Workshop, n.d.) refer to the potential conflict of interest between the project development role of a program officer and his payment adjudication role:

Concerns have been raised [that a project's program officer, the 'developing officer'] also performs the site inspection and payment analysis. The reasons provided are that:

- provides good relations with clients.
- it is counterbalanced by the number of signatures on the request for payment (officer, assistant manager, manager, director).
- Audit Services Bureau does charge by the hour and is expensive.

The Audit Workshop notes specify that "requests for audits should be made once more than 50% of costs have been incurred and after project start-up." Furthermore, "responses are required for all items on the report."

After the audit, periodic checks were to be made to ensure that the project is operating and annual financial statements over three years are to be requested from the client.

Procedure 19b says that if the project is no longer viable,

...the offer should be withdrawn and the project terminated. Alternatively, the project could be restructured and processed in the same manner as a new application.

A "Special ARDA Data Input Form" was utilized to summarize essential project descriptive attributes and SARDA payments.

Early into SARDA's existence inadequate levels of project aftercare were noted. At a SARDA seminar it was pointed out that: "CEDF's view is that every project should have a loan component, and this loan is 'entry' for that agency to insist on a good record system, watch performance, provide advice, etc., the objective being to make a project successful" (R.L. Carter to J.D. Collinson; 15 November, 1976). Several Committee members told Ginsberg circa 1978 that SARDA-funded projects require more post-approval operational support (circa 1978:50). The SARDA review done in 1981 by the Rural Communities Resource Centre recommended:

Followup on the application, start-up and ongoing phases of projects is expected, wanted and needed by clients. It should be more than an audit....At present many successful applicants feel abandoned once their business is in operation. Lacking the support systems present in larger or urban centres, they flounder and experience losses without understanding them.

(original underlined, 1981:69)

The DREE document titled "Special ARDA Program Profile" written circa 1985 (pg. 10) noted that in 1985 a full complement of staff would be attained to handle an increased level of activity. This document also pointed out that from that point in time "the major thrust...will be towards active monitoring [of projects]...." Again in 1987, however, a majority of clients contacted by Resource Initiatives Ltd. said they needed an enhanced level of business support services during a two to three year period after receiving project approval (1987:37). Most new owners said that they had to cope with so many things that they were acting on a trial-and-error basis.

Illingworth claims that SARDA's operational policies were set within each national region, that this allowed "prompt, accurate adjustments" to conditions within the region (1990:66).

Northern Development Agreement Program #2

Step 1: Initial (Screen) Applications

NDA2 had its own "Application for Assistance." Like SARDA this Program used a Part A application for determining eligibility and a Part B as the full application. As in SARDA, applicants were able to submit the Part B with the Part A. Staff of the Canada Northern Development Office were available to help applicants organize their proposals. Indeed, one of the two Thompson Office staff spent much of his time traveling among northern communities working on applications to NDA1 (Community/Regional Economic Development Planning) and NDA2 (R. McKenzie, personal communication, 26 September, 1994; Northern Development Agreement, Committee Guidelines: workflow attachment).

Part A of the "Application for Assistance" gathered identifying information on the applicant, the proposed organizational form, project

location, the general type of project¹ and type of activity(ies) to be undertaken by the project², a brief description of the project, estimated start-up and completion dates, a project cost estimate and the applicant's equity contribution, other sources of assistance, an indication of any prior assistance given by DRE/IE, prior commitments made by the project, and the names and skills or experience of the project manager(s) and professional or technical advisors.

Step 2: Full Applications

Differing from the SARDA Part II, the NDA2 Part B of the "Application for Assistance" was a mixture of fill-in-the-blank questions concerning project background, anticipated economic and social benefits, community land use plans, community infrastructure, and public environmental standards that might be affected. The second section of the Part B does not use the fill-in-the-blank form, it is more directive and explicit than the SARDA Part II. It asks for details concerning supply and raw material inputs; the market; land, building and equipment; financial plans and requirements; and employment and employees' needs for assistance. As in SARDA, however, information concerning management and ownership structure, the production/service process, marketing and pricing was not requested. Part B also differs from the SARDA Part II in that itemized formats were included as appendices for gathering the following information: (1) real assets and capital items; (2) a three year statement of income and expenses; and (3) the weekly and annual cost for full time, part time and seasonal labour, the number of employees per job that are part-time or full-time, and which positions might be filled by local labour.

1. For example, resource harvesting, construction, or manufacturing.

2. For example, research, human development, acquisition of materials, or purchase of real property and equipment.

3. Staff Analysis and Recommendation

The NDA2 program officer prepared a "Project Proposal." This document summarized the project background; specified the purpose of the project; described the expected economic and social benefits explicitly stating the number of jobs to be created or maintained; summarized the expected community impact; named the project manager and summarized his training and experience; and described the market area. The financial requirements and plans section contained a proforma balance sheet, income and expense statement, and sources and application of funds statement. The income statement usually covered only two years. No financial analysis was done. Land, building, equipment and infrastructure were briefly described; potential suppliers, regulators and other government financing agencies contacted by the program officer were listed; and letters of support were noted. All of this information was briefly summarized in two legal-size pages or less. Attached was a one-page breakdown of "Approved Costs by Category" of expenditure¹. The program officer then summarized the information contained in the "Project Proposal" on a one legal-size page, "Project Evaluation Report." Most of this "Report" was dedicated to the "recommendation," suggested "terms and conditions" of approval, and "support conclusions." The program officer then prepared a one-page "Project Approval Resume" that was similar in format and content to the SARDA "Project Resume and Recommendation." The listed contribution per category coupled with a "Cash Disbursement Schedule" provided the bases for Departmental cash-flow planning and expenditure control.

Applications in which "...clearly identified deficiencies exist or where lack of tangible activity and interest on the applicant's part is known to occur" could be rejected by Program staff (Northern Development Agreement, Committee Guidelines...:8).

1. For example, organizational, working capital, real property and equipment, or related infrastructure.

4. Full Application Decision Taking

NDA2 used the "Project Approval Resume," backed by a "Project Summary," to solicit recommendations from the Program Advisory Committee. The "Project Summary" had to be recommended, in writing, by the Committee Secretary. This package of material was submitted, by the Secretary, to Committee members one week in advance of the monthly meeting (Northern Development Agreement, Committee Guidelines...:5).

All project assessment work was done by the Canada Northern Development Office (Northern Development Agreement, Committee Guidelines: workflow attachment).

The Committee recommended disposition of all projects screened and submitted to it by NDA staff. The Committee was to "...ensure that all submissions are consistent with the [broad] provision of the Agreement and meet the basic objectives of facilitating community/regional economic development for northern residents" (Northern Development Agreement, Committee Guidelines...:5-6). Published "Committee Guidelines" include a list of eligible activities¹ and eligible costs incurred through the following activities: obtaining expertise, research or information; developing entrepreneurial skills and human development activities; acquisition of materials; "other specific activities for accessing resources and skills not generally possessed by northern community residents;" venture capital; public infrastructure; premiums for bids and bid bonds; and "funding for items not generally available to community groups for reasonable cost" (Northern Development Agreement, Committee Guidelines...:12-13). These items could be funded up to 100% of their cost, however, "total funding shall be in keeping with the likely revenue, income generated or similar economic benefit and applicants will be encouraged to contribute equity to the project." If the Committee recommended that assistance be provided it also had to recommend the magnitude and conditions of assistance. If the

1. That is, resource harvesting, resource processing, construction of facilities, manufacturing and service industries, or other local or regional resource-based activities.

Committee rejected an application it had to specify its reasons.

Committee decisions were recorded in minutes. The Committee also received, at each meeting, a statement of proposals received, under development, and accepted, deferred or rejected by staff. Review of many Committee minutes indicates good participation among Committee members and substantive discussion of most items; however, there appears not to have been much discussion about the organizational or financial aspects of project proposals. Committee members took decisions by vote and, although most votes were unanimous, vote splits often did occur.

Program management informed applicants of approvals and rejections. Those applications requiring final approval required signatures from the federal and provincial co-chairpersons, and the federal and provincial ministers responsible for the Agreement, on the "Project Approval Resume."

5. Offer and Agreement

The NDA2 letter-of-offer was, in both format and substance, the same as the letter-of-offer SARDA used during the last years of that Program. Section 1 presented total and eligible project costs and stipulated that costs should not change without program approval. Section 2 described the amounts and timing of the advance, progress and final payments; stipulated that the client had to open a commercial business account and specified the method of dealing with a possible overpayment. Section 3 enabled DRE/IE to terminate the letter-of-offer if the client did not carry out his obligations or meet his targets, or if he was able to be successful without further assistance. Section 4 required that a majority of the persons who are to benefit are residents of northern remote and Aboriginal communities. Section 5 set the project start and completion dates, and required that the project be insured and that project accounts, records and facilities be made available for inspection. Section 6 demanded that the project adhere to the public information protocols of the Agreement. Section 7 generally protected DRE/IE from losses or damages incurred by the

project, and prevented members of the House of Commons or Manitoba Legislative Assembly and employees of the federal or provincial governments from having direct involvement in the project. The letter-of-offer was signed by a DRE/IE senior officer and had to be accepted in writing by the client.

6. Inspections and Payments

A "Claim for Payment of a Contribution" form had to be completed before advance, progress or final payments were made by NDA2. This form specified the type of payment claimed, current and prior costs claimed, and costs claimed by category of expenditure. A claim for a progress payment had to be accompanied by documentation supporting all costs. A claim for final payment had to be preceded by an inspection report or audit.

It was noted above that advance payments were to enable high-risk, not commercially viable projects to circumvent the need for bridge financing (R. McKenzie to M.E. Heinicke; 26 February, 1987). This, however, created problems for DRIE (M.E. Heinicke to R. McKenzie; 24 February, 1987). The first problem was that by paying in advance for costs that the project expects to incur DRE/IE would be assuming a higher risk than other financiers of the project, the project could fail soon after DRE/IE made a payment. The second problem was that DRE/IE lost some expenditure control, actual appropriate costs could be less than the advance and it would be difficult to use the payment process to ensure that this did not occur.¹

File documentation indicates that, as of early 1987, most or all projects had received audits prior to release of the final payment (M.E. Heinicke to R. McKenzie; circa February 1987). The DRE/IE Director of Regional Programs complained to the Manager of the Thompson Office that several request for final payments were recently received without a formal

1. Recall the reference to CEDF's use of a loan component for monitoring of, and leverage on, the entrepreneur.

audit as

...required by Treasury Board terms and conditions....
Monitoring [by other federal or provincial departments] is not a formal audit conducted by a qualified auditor.

The Director of Regional Programs also noted "...we should not be waiting until the final payment request in order to call for an audit, given that, by that time, it is usually too late to correct any deficiencies the auditor might encounter and there is normally an urgency on making the final payment in order to avoid further financing costs." Instead, she suggested the audit should take place when two-thirds or three-quarters of the project costs were expended, and a staff inspection should be adequate for the "remaining items."

Native Economic Development Program Element III(NEDP3)

1. Initial (Screen) Applications

NEDP3 did not utilize an initial or screen application.

2. Full Applications

One set of formats and guidelines for making application to NEDP for all program elements appear in the "Proposal Development Guide" (Government of Canada, Regional Industrial Expansion, *The Native Economic Development Program...* n.d.:16-24). Formats included the "Basic Information Form" and the "Suggested Proposal Format." As well, there were guidelines for "Essential Proposal Information."

Completion of the "Basic Information Form" was required for all applications. This Form had to be attached to all proposals. The form was similar to the SARDA Part I in that it asks for identification; information on

who to contact and how to make contact; the form and status of the business; the element to which application is being made; a brief description of the activity; and the cost, expected NEDP contribution, expected equity contribution, and other expected sources of finances. The applicant had to attest to the accuracy of information and give assurance that financial assistance from NEDP would be a "significant" factor in the decision to proceed with the proposed project.

The "Suggested Proposal Format" was a brief outline that the applicant "should use" "where practical." This outline is reproduced below:

- Brief summary description
- Applicant background
- Business plan
 - a) Project description
 - b) Investment requested from NEDP
 - c) Ownership and management
 - d) Market and clientele
 - e) Commercial viability
 - f) Financing
 - g) Risks
 - h) Project work plan
- Employment
- Participation by native women
- Community support
- Social and economic costs and benefits
- Land, infrastructure, and other requirements
- Other relevant information

The purpose of describing the "Suggested Proposal Format" is not clear because the "Essential Proposal Information" only gives substance to the "Suggested Proposal Format." The "applicant background" section requested details concerning: history of the project, goals and legal framework of the project, the market, ownership and corporate structure including degree of Aboriginal ownership and control, financial statements

from the past three years, and government assistance received. Interestingly, it did not ask for background information on any applicant that was not an existing project, nor did it ask for information pertaining to management or employee skill and experience for existing projects.

In the "business plan" section the "investment requested from NEDP" asked what specific use will be made of NEDP financing and asked for details on the product and production process, but it did not ask the amounts being requested at each point in time. The "ownership and management" section of the business plan asked for: a description of the corporate structure and ownership including Aboriginal ownership and control; a description of the management structure and organizational systems; the names, background and experience of the managers with resumes to be attached; the roles of any external specialists; and the accounting practices to be used. The "market and clientele" section of the business plan asked for: identification of the client and client need; the marketing plan; the volume of product to be sold; location of the market; the main competitors; and expected market penetration. The "commercial viability" section of the business plan asked for: five-year proforma statements of income and expense, balance sheets, and source and application of funds statements. These proformas had to be monthly for the first year, quarterly for the second year and annual for the third to fifth years. The "financing" section of the business plan requested that the need for NEDP financing be substantiated; and that the sources, amounts and terms of all financing be detailed. The applicant had to list major risks and problems, and he was to explain any plan to reduce such risks.

In the final aspect of the business plan section the applicant was to submit a detailed action plan accompanied by a time schedule. The "employment" section asked how many jobs will be created, whether the jobs will be temporary or permanent, full or part-time, and their income levels, the potential to fill these jobs with Aboriginal people, and training requirements and how such training will be obtained. The "social and economic costs and benefits" section listed possible benefits that might be described and asked the applicant to outline any environmental implications or social or economic costs. Finally, the "land, infrastructure and other

requirements" section asked for a description of additions or changes required to existing infrastructure, and extent of compliance with local zoning and other legal requirements.

A second application form was titled "Instructions for Completion of Application for Business Enterprises and Special Projects." This more highly formatted application form was utilized in mid 1988. Why it and the format described above were simultaneously utilized is not clear.

The second application form integrated the "Basic Proposal Format," the "Suggested Proposal Format" and the "Essential Proposal Information" of the previously described format. Aspects of the second application form that were more highly formatted include: the form of organization, previous financial assistance received, type of project, projected project costs and percent of project costs per category of expenditure, amount and percentage of financing by source, other government financing applied for or received, project start and completion dates, and number of full and part-time jobs created or maintained. This formatted section was followed by a list of 14 items to which the applicant was to respond "where applicable and if available." Some of these items, however, differ from the information requested by the previous formats. For example, this form asked for only three years of balance sheets and income statements for existing businesses; it asked for only three-year proformas if less than \$1 million was being requested from NEDP but it asked for five-year proformas if more than \$1 million was being requested from NEDP; it did not ask for any information on ownership and management structure, external specialists to be used, or accounting practices. Some items are ambiguous or confusing such as a "statement of work outlining the objectives and outputs of the project," and "evidence of community support *and/or* compliance with local regulatory authorities and a listing of the potential impacts...on the community;" and "market *and/or* feasibility information for the product or service to be provided..."(my italics). What does community support have to do with regulatory compliance? What is the relationship between market information and feasibility information? In general, the order of items is neither logical nor entirely coherent.

3. Staff Analysis and Recommendation

To analyze an application NEDP prepared two documents that, at least in comparison to SARDA and NDA2, were quite extensive. The program officer completed these forms and the forms eventually went to the Program Advisory Committee. The first document was the highly structured, four-page "Native Economic Development Program Project Summary." Through this form the program officer identified, and briefly described, the project; recommended disposition; summarized project costs and financing; described who the shareholders are; listed any affiliated companies; noted any previous government financial assistance; presented a condensed five-year proforma balance sheet and income statement; summarized job creation, the market, and material sourcing; computed program cost per job, return-on-investment with and without assistance and the payback period; presented a rationale for assistance if assistance was recommended; and commented on other important factors. The form has space for the Chairman of the Program Advisory Committee to sign the recommendation and for the Minister to sign his approval. Attached to this form was a more lengthy explanatory piece that included a profile of the applicant; a project description concentrating on costs and financing; and an assessment stressing market prospects, commercial viability, ownership and management, and risks. Attached as appendices to this explanatory piece were to be a year-one monthly cash-flow, a five-year cash-flow, a five-year statement of income and a five-year balance sheet. In general, review of NEDP files pertaining to northern Manitoba indicates that, in comparison to SARDA or NDA2, this Program conducted much more thorough analyses of applications. Areas of analysis that remained weak because relevant information was not requested concern the capacity of Boards of Directors; structural relationships among ultimate owners, the Board and senior management; and the intended system of management control.

4. Full Application Decision Taking

NEDP project analysts developed the project proposal in conjunction with the client (H. Schulz, personal communication; 16 September, 1996).

The proposal was then submitted to the Regional Director who reviewed the proposal for its "economic dimensions" and for consistency with NEDP policy. If the proposal was acceptable to the Regional Director he would forward it to the Executive Director in Ottawa. The Executive Director also conducted an informal review although his primary function was to ensure that interest group and political pressures on Regional Directors would not have an undue influence on project decisions.¹ If the Executive Director accepted the project he conveyed the proposal to the Secretary of the Advisory Board who, in conjunction with the Assistant Deputy Minister, placed the proposal on the Board's agenda. Regional Directors presented project proposals to the Board. Proposals accepted by the Board were recommended to the Minister. File data indicate that the Minister seldom overrode decisions of the Board, nor did he independently inject project approvals into the Program. Regional project analysts were then responsible for implementing project support.

5. Offer and Agreement

Like SARDA and NDA2, NEDP3 utilized a draft program-client agreement as the offer-of-assistance. Consistent with the forms utilized in the analysis of applications, these agreements with clients were much more detailed than those of SARDA and NDA2. These agreements specified the dates for project commencement and commercial operation; total eligible costs as detailed in an appendix; the value of the contribution and the nature and timing of accountable advances² and non-advance payments; conditions of agreement including a plan for the employment of Aboriginal women, other financing to be obtained and requirements to maintain client equity; requirements for the filling of specific key positions to the satisfaction of the Minister; requirements for progress reports, annual audited statements and status reports, and access to the premises and books of the client; public announcements; the definition of default including Ministerial declaration that

1. Apparently, this was a major problem for Regional Directors.
2. These were often used in NEDP3 financing.

the business has ceased to function or that there has been a "material adverse change in risk" or that the client has not met a condition of contribution, and possible default procedures; and general conditions respecting prohibitions on the sale of assets, on "significant" changes in ownership, management, location, financing, scope, and on assignments of assets without Ministerial approval. A clause in the general conditions gives the Minister power to appoint an *ex officio* member to the project Board.

6. Inspections and Payments

As noted above, advance payments were often used by NEDP3. These could be frequent and required prior receipt of a statement of cash-flow covering the period including, and beyond, the period during which the advance is to be used. Advances also required progress claims detailing actual expenditures.

NEDP3 project audits were done by Supply and Services Canada's Audit Services Bureau. There were interim audits to support interim payments as well as the final audit. As in SARDA audits, the audit was to cover: the accuracy of financial records so as to present the correct project expenditures, financial assistance received and contributed equity. The auditor was to assess project performance against the project agreement. Audits were sent to the program officer who summarized the audit report, and commented on discrepancies noted and significant findings. This summary was then sent to the regional program director who co-signed the summary.

Program officers utilized the "Native Economic Development Program Pre-Payment Review Checklist" and the "Native Economic Development Program Contribution Payment Checklist" to adjudicate payments. The "Pre-Payment Review Checklist" lists 32 items for which the program officer should ensure performance as per the terms of the project agreement or as per the administrative policies of the Program. Each item is followed by "N/A", "Y", and "N" checkoff blanks. If the response to an item is "no," an "action" section directs the program officer to, depending on the

item, delete the claim, explain, correct the error or gather additional information. The items generally fall into two groups. The first group of items asks questions of fact: are claims accurate, were transactions at arm's length, were subcontracts approved, were financial statements received, was equity maintained, etc. The second group of items asked if the program officer is "satisfied" with project progress; with the actions of project management concerning cash-flow projections, record keeping, control and use of assets; and with the quality of audits. This form was to be signed by the program officer. When reviewed, copies were usually co-signed by the regional program director although the format does not require such co-signature.

The formatted "Contribution Payment Checklist" largely comprised two lists. One list contained generic items included in most financing agreements. Each item is followed by "yes", "no", and "N/A" checkoff blanks. The list contained items to ensure that documentation supporting payment was received, that audited financial statements were received and that reported costs were within expectations. Interestingly, the checklist did not explicitly ask about the success or health of the project or about project employment. This list was to be signed by the program officer. The second list was in part an administrative check of the program officer list. It also was designed to ensure that financial coding is correct, that payment procedures were proper and that program cash-flow is adequate to meet the payment. Each item is again followed by "yes", "no", and "N/A" checkoff blanks. This list was signed by an administrative clerk in DRE/IE finance.

As noted above, clients also were to provide annual, audited financial statements and annual progress reports.

Interaction with Other Programs

Special ARDA

As a general rule primary producer applications, if received by the federally operated commercial undertaking program, were transferred to the

provincially operated SARDA Primary Producer Program. Ginsberg points out that the SARDA agreements never defined primary producer (circa 1978:12-13, 47-48). She also says the Northern Affairs SARDA Primary Producer Program told her that there was sometimes an artificial distinction between a PPA and a CU. The separation of CU's and PPA's was done by staff such that CU's were defined as projects that had job creation and viability dimensions whereas PPA's were defined as resource harvesting projects under the aegis, or organizational control, of a group of Aboriginal people the focus of which was improved incomes. Still, there could be no a clear dividing line, as stated, between group control and income focus on the one hand, and commercial viability on the other hand. Review of project files uncovered a number of applications that had been forwarded directly from the provincial Primary Producer Program to the federal CU program. A revealing example is the response by SARDA to an application from a Manitoba Crown-owned construction company to the effect that the "applicant could be more suitably handled" by the federal program, not because this is a Crown organization or that the organization is involved in projects other than resource harvesting, but because the provincial program is not involved in commercial undertakings (L.D. MacDonald to J. Benoit; 9 July, 1975).

Project files from the early 1970's indicate frequent interaction between SARDA staff and staff from INAC, CEDF, the Department of Cooperative Development and the provincial Special Native Northern Employment Program. Apparently this frequent staff interaction was not sufficient to effectively coordinate actions among the programs. According to notes from a November, 1976 SARDA Committee seminar:

1. C.E.D.F is to be an observer at Special ARDA Committee meetings. Special ARDA is to have the same status with C.E.D.F Board. The representative will contribute to discussion of projects.
2. There will be joint analysis of proposals which involve funding from DIAND, C.E.D.F. or both." (R.L. Carter to J.D. Collinson; 15 November, 1976)

Circa 1978, however, SARDA Committee members and case study

applicants told Ginsberg that there was little coordination, at both a service strategy level and a specific client level, among SARDA, other government agencies including the Canada Business Development Bank and commercial banks (circa 1978:19,23). In her recommendations section she says:

The relationships between [SARDA, CEDF, IEDF and other lenders] are not as close as they might be. This is to the detriment of the morale of analysts in all agencies and adds to the inconvenience and frustration of our mutual clients. Higher costs are incurred directly because of the lengthy wait that is now becoming routine for these mutual applicants. (pg. 57)

The SARDA review conducted by the Rural Communities Resource Centre in 1981 also notes early friction between SARDA and CEDF (1981:57). This review says some of the friction between these two agencies concerning bridge financing was reduced by informal arrangements among staff of the two agencies.

A 1974 SARDA discussion paper indicates that the federal government saw the Western Northlands agreements as a tool to enable the provinces to expand economic development services in a manner that would assist the Program (DREE, "Departmental Discussion Paper - Future of Special ARDA Program"; 6 September, 1974:2-3). This paper also notes that INAC was placing greater emphasis on its economic development advisory services.

The author found numerous project specific conflicts between SARDA and INAC. SARDA's sentiments were well summarized in a 1976 statement by the program manager that SARDA is concerned about often being:

...brought in at the last minute by DIAND in the past and often [being unable] to respond as suggested by them. In particular, we do not appreciate getting a proposal which tells us ahead of time how much we will provide. We do our own analysis. (R.E. Simpson to E. Campbell; 14 July, 1976)

Illingworth says that across the country SARDA often had problems dealing with INAC (1990:66). He says this resulted from two, conflicting roles of

INAC: the role of funding registered Indian applicants and the role of broker between the Indian applicant and SARDA. Ginsberg noted that INAC's Indian Economic Development Fund provided bridge financing to some of SARDA's registered Indian clients (circa 1978:25). She also said that INAC offered a management assistance program to SARDA clients for a nominal fee.

Northern Development Agreement Program #2

As noted in discussion of the Program Advisory Committee one of the functions of that Committee was coordination with complimentary agencies. Many of the most important collateral governmental agencies, Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, INAC, Manitoba Natural Resources, CEDF and Manitoba Northern Affairs, had representatives on the Committee. In fact, the only important agency not included was the Canada Business Development Bank. As noted in the discussion of the full application decision process, the program officer, in the summary of his project analysis, was to list contacts made with other government agencies.

Review of Committee minutes indicates that there was good input from the Committee members representing these collateral agencies. They brought policy and technical information from their agencies, and from time to time they had their agencies prepare short background studies relevant to certain applications.

Native Economic Development Program - Element III

NEDP3 distinguished itself from SARDA with respect to financing CU's by directing projects requiring less than \$250,000 to SARDA (G.F. Morgan to Applicant; 29, June, 1987).

Program Monitoring and Evaluation

Special ARDA

According to Procedure 20 a province-specific "Report on Special ARDA Activity" was to be submitted each month. This report was to tally numbers of offers by status of offer, financial commitments and payments, and the number of full-time and part-time jobs created.

Ginsberg, in her circa 1978 review of SARDA, found the training program to be "weak" although she found little data to measure the delivery of training (pp. 20,56). She said:

Information on failures [of training] is scanty. Predictably in every case, extenuating circumstances are given as the reasons for the failure. Both Committee members and staff want to see more time available to follow up with each individual project in order to avert any subsequent failures.

Later in her report, however, she says that to-date 75% of SARDA-created jobs had training attached to the project through which the jobs were created and that "all projects to date for which some training is considered by the Development Officer or Committee, have actually received training or have been involved in plans to get training going" (pp. 23 and 27-30). She claims that very little training has occurred: "The bulk of authorized training has either been terminated in advance of being completed or is still pending." Apparently, at least part of the problem was the payment of training allowances, which were often used as a wage subsidy, coupled with lack of control over implementation of the Manitoba-client training agreement. In addition, Ginsberg says since Audit Services Bureau did not allow training allowances to be paid with wages during the first month after which a business became operational, training had to take place either before the business became operational or after the first month of operations. In 1981 Rural Communities Resource Centre reported that as of the end of March 1979 over one-half of the 167 CU's approved were to receive training assistance (pg. 45). However, only one-quarter of these projects had completed the requisite training "...while another quarter of the projects had

the training cancelled or terminated for various reasons...." More bluntly, three-quarters of all projects had not received any training.

As stated, Ginsberg produced, for SARDA, a review of the SARDA program circa 1978. This study covered all components of the SARDA agreement not just the CU activity. Many comments and findings, however, are specific to the SARDA CU component. In 1981 the Rural Community Resource Centre produced, again for SARDA, a study of the socioeconomic impacts of the SARDA Program (Rural Community Resource Centre 1981). This study also covered all components of the SARDA agreement. Certain comments and findings are specific to the SARDA CU component. The Rural Community Resource Centre study lists three studies that had, as of late 1981, been conducted of the PPA component but no studies of the CU component. The Rural Community Resource Centre study cites two other studies of Special ARDA: a November, 1974 study by M. Bossen and Associates (*The Special ARDA Program: A Preliminary Evaluation*; November, 1974), and a March, 1976 internal study done by W.J. Henderson (*A Preliminary Internal Program Analysis of Special ARDA in Manitoba*; March 1976).

Northern Development Agreement Program #2

Certain NDA2 expenditure, output and impact data were reported annually in the *Northern Development Agreement Progress Reports*. Actual annual expenditures, current forecast expenditures and the current balance were reported on per project, aggregate annual and to-date formats. Outputs were reported in terms of names and numbers of projects funded and amount of funding. The only impact data reported was per project, aggregate annual and to-date total short-term and total long-term jobs. Project survival data were not reported.

An extensive evaluation of NDA Programs #1 and #2 was completed in April 1987, only one month after the Program expired (Stevenson Kellogg Ernst & Whinney 1987). This evaluation was done for the Planning and Analysis Branch of DRE/IE Winnipeg by a consortium of

consulting companies. It investigated program activities, and program impacts and effects. Because NDA2 had only been in operation for not quite four and one-half years at the time of the evaluation it was not possible to assess the commercial success of financed projects.

Native Economic Development Program - Element III

The program monitoring methods used by NEDP3 are not known. Since this Program was operational for such a short period and had so few projects in the study area monitoring methods and feedback to operations are not relevant to this study. There is no evidence in program files or the holdings within the Aboriginal Economic Program library of an evaluation of NEDP3 or NEDP as a whole.

Summary of Findings

Regarding the causal model that underpins this study, the discussion in this Chapter and Chapter 4 show the connections between

- * the causal factors of the rise of the Canadian welfare state, continued nation building, the institution of regional development initiatives, the ill-fated 1969 White Paper on Indian Policy and concern about rapid population growth of impoverished Aboriginal communities; and
- * and the resulting creation of SARDA, NDA2 and NEDP3.

Within the broader range of government programming emanating from this political environment SARDA, NDA2 and NEDP3 were to focus on business development, job creation and training, and the building of local and regional organizations.

The response-orientation of these programs indicates that the governments were, with the exception of a handful of government operated commercial or commercial-like organizations, not willing to directly intervene in the creation and operation of the commercial economy or value-added

economic ventures. Governments did not implement any plan for substantially restructuring the study area's economy. They expected to receive project proposals that would fill-in what were seen as undeveloped opportunities.

The first program, SARDA, was introduced with apparently minimal prior analysis of the environment or of performance of similar programs in other environments, or review of pertinent academic literature. Neither did SARDA conduct a pilot test of its formats and procedures. SARDA commenced operation with two formal goals that do not easily fit together: (1) the creation of employment for disadvantaged people, especially *disadvantaged* Aboriginal people, *within* (2) new or expanded businesses. Conflicts between these goals coupled with pressure from the provincial government and regional interest groups caused the Program, early on, to make subtle, but important policy and operational changes. The Program was reoriented towards new or expanded businesses as the first priority to which creation of employment for local, mostly Aboriginal people (not necessarily those that were *disadvantaged*) was to be an important adjunct. Furthermore, naive expectations of the ability of local people to develop new or expanded businesses in a difficult environment were sufficiently shattered to cause the Program to substantially soften (or confuse) the stringency of the original operational guidelines. Governments also backed away from expectations of the level of pre- and post-operational, non-financial project development assistance that they would provide.

NDA2 almost avoided cogitation. This Program had a minimalist focus and minimalist operational guidelines. Responsiveness, preferably positive, to proposals became the chief goal of SARDA and NDA2. NEDP expanded on this with its openness to almost any proposal with its mixture of minimalist or confusing criteria and guidelines, and expectations of reams of project data. NEDP also added regional capital organizations and large-scale projects to the range of project possibilities.

The programs had sufficient political backing to receive, collectively, dramatically increased amounts of public funding over the study period.

The programs relied on bureaucratic, procedural-bound operating frameworks. Such procedures ensured efficient volume through-put and relatively equitable treatment, but the procedures did not ensure system efficiency or effectiveness against formal goals. Understanding within the programs of the economic and financial conditions in specific business environments, the link between such business environments and business opportunities, and the link between the characteristics of applicants and expectations of positive outcomes appears to have been minimal. The programs tried not to give negative responses to applicants, and if a financed business got into trouble the programs often did not (or did not want to) know. If they did know they often did not use such knowledge to minimize further public expenditure on the project.

Each program was delivered by a small organization consisting of a manager and one or a handful of similar program officers working out of a single office. These segmented structures encouraged staff-client alignment, but discouraged the use of coordinated specialization. All three programs had few staff with strong technical backgrounds. Separated staff-client interactions coupled with lack of, or confusing, criteria and procedures injected a disjointed looseness in formalized and actual organizational behaviour. Emphasis was placed on volume of through-put and avoidance of controversy, rather than on the quality-effectiveness nexus.

Program self-awareness appears to have been focused on the generation of proposals, and the ability to respond positively to large numbers of inadequately prepared clients and proposals. There were no inquiries into the medium or long term effectiveness or impacts of the programs. There was no apparent internal generation of predictive algorithms based on the operational experience of these or complementary government programs.

Intra- and intergovernmental program coordination was poor. Interactions among programs, especially involving programs of different departments and agencies, tended to force each program to give more positive responses and to make additional expenditures. As well, programs often worked at cross purposes.

**TABLE 5-1
LEVEL OF SARDA ACTIVITY**

Period	Number of Projects Per Year	Grants (\$000's)	
		Total	Average
1971-74	37	550	14.9
1975-77	54	600	11.1
1977-82	38	1500	39.5
1982-84	99	4320	43.6
1984-87	106	5550	51.9

Source: Resource Initiatives 1987:Table 1.

**TABLE 5-2
NDA2 PROJECT EXPENDITURES AND
NUMBER OF PROJECTS APPROVED PER YEAR**

Fiscal Year	Total Expended* (\$ millions)	Number of Projects Approved
1983/84	1.473	16
1984/85	1.910	24
1985/86	2.768	38
1986/87	2.096	36
1987/88	2.183	21
1988/89	4.962	63
1989/90	3.432	0

- Total expended each year includes expenditures on some projects approved in previous years.

Source: .Canada and Manitoba, Northern Development Agreement Progress Report 1989/90: 13-18.

CHAPTER 6

THE GENERATION OF PROPOSALS FOR BUSINESS FINANCING

As noted in Chapter 5, all three DRE/IE programs utilized a two-step application process. To standardize terminology the two steps will be called the "screen" and "full" application steps. The first section of this chapter discusses data drawn from the screen applications. The second section discusses data drawn from the full applications. Discussion of the screen applications begins as of the date applicants dated their applications and ends as of the date the program took an eligibility decision based on information provided by the screen application. Discussion of full applications begins as of the date the first version of the full application was received. Unlike screen eligibility decisions, however, program decisions following receipt of full applications were not made in direct response to full applications. Instead, these second stage decisions were made in direct response to business plans prepared by program officers, not in direct response to the business plans contained in the full applications. Therefore, program decisions following receipt of full applications are discussed as part of decisions and outputs in Chapter 7. Discussion of full applications is confined to the characteristics of the applicant¹ and the substance of the proposed business.

The relevant portion of the causal model to be addressed in this chapter is the "causal links concerning service demand." This portion of the model is depicted in Figure 2-3. The model shows four categories of factor determinants of applicants to the programs and two categories of factor determinants of program applications. The four categories of factor determinants of applicants are: (1) the policies, resources and outputs of complementary programs; (2) performance of the external economy; (3) community socioeconomic conditions; and (4) the nature and quantity of community businesses. The two categories of factor determinants of applications to the programs are: the applicants and program operating

1. The singular "applicant" will generically apply to one, or more than one, applicant who generated an application. Unless more specifically defined, the "applicant" may be a natural person or an organization, be it incorporated or not incorporated.

structure.

Both the screen, and full, applications sections of this chapter commence with description of the properties of the relevant database. Statistical description of the data and analysis of causal relationships follow. Discussion of propositions and points-of-interest derived from the literature and other theoretical implications, where appropriate, occurs within the analyses of causal relations.

Screen Applications and Decisions

Properties of the Database

The screen application database contains data on all projects within the parameters of the study that were found in archives files. No additional project records were generated from post-screen application stages of program implementation.

To be included as a record, data from a least one stage of the application and approvals process must show the intended operational location of the project was to be within the study area. As well, projects are excluded if the operational location through all stages was consistently a non-community or unknown location in northern Manitoba *and* if the head office location was consistently outside the study area. The operational location of a project is coded to an in-area community only if project data indicates either that: (1) the project was to be located within the community, or (2) that a majority of personnel to hold operational jobs in the project were to reside in that community. These rules exclude projects that appear to have no, or minimal, connection to the resident population of the study area.

There are 1,596 applications in the screen applications database. The earliest dated screen application was sent in 1971 and the last application was sent in 1989.

Each record in the screen applications database consists of 63 original variables (excluding the record number and DRE/IE file number). These 63 variables describe 18 different dimensions of each screen application; that is, 45 variables record possible multiple occurrences of certain variable dimensions. These possible multiple occurrence variable dimensions are: applicant characteristics, the nature of prior financing received by existing businesses and intended products. Variables and assigned values per screen application variable are shown in Table 6-1. The full list of community and product codes appears in the Appendix, Tables 2-2 and 2-3.

The properties of data collected for specific variables are discussed when relevant to their use.

Characteristics of the Screen Applications

The number of screen applications received per year¹ by all programs trended upwards over the 19 year study period (Table 6-2). In part this trend went hand-in-hand with penetration of the welfare state and market economy into the study area. Penetration of the welfare state and market economy increased effective aggregate demand. Annual changes in number of applications were, however, erratic. Annual increases, in percent, were particularly large from 1975 through 1977, and in 1979, 1983, 1984 and 1987. With the exception of the run-down of the programs during 1988 and the first three months of 1989, large percentage decreases in applications received only occurred in 1973 and 1986. The erratic nature of these annual changes appears to be more related to political factors in Ottawa and, to a lesser extent Winnipeg, than the health of the Manitoba or northern Manitoba economies.

1. In this section describing the characteristics of screen applications, application dates are, for most applications, the date the applicant dated the application. Only when that date was not available is the application dated according to the date the application was received by the program. For almost all screen applications that had both dates the difference between the two dates was seldom more than a couple of weeks. The writer judged that the gain in information overwhelms the minimal effect on the presentation of applicant flow over time.

Pronounced year-over-year increases from 1975 through 1977 followed re-election of the federal Liberal Party in 1974. The federal Liberals had embarked on their great expansion of regional development programming and were still attempting to recover from their disastrous *Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969*, the so-called "Termination" White Paper.¹ Also during this period Manitoba was governed by the New Democratic Party. This was an activist government, dedicated to northern development and improvement in the well-being of Aboriginal people (Government of Manitoba 1973). This Party eventually came to hold all five northern constituencies after the 1977 provincial election (*Canadian News Facts, 1969-1990*). The New Democratic Party government spent heavily on northern hydroelectric, infrastructure and employment programs. In 1971 this government created the CEDF to finance small business development particularly in the smaller northern communities (Province of Manitoba, "Chapter C155, The Communities Economic Development Fund Act":1987). As discussed in the previous chapter, CEDF encouraged applications to SARDA by offering crucial bridge financing to SARDA applicants. This was also a period of increasing provincial GDP (Table 4-6). The 58% year-over-year increase in applications occurred during 1977, a federal election year ("Canada: General Elections, Dates and Results", *Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1991:475,478-479*). As a result of the election in May of that year the incumbent Liberal Party lost to the Progressive Conservative Party. During the first year of this Government the number of screen applications fell even though the New Democratic Party governed Manitoba until 1979 ("Manitoba: Previous General Elections and Previous Administrations", *Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1991:589,621*). In 1979, however, the year the governing Progressive Conservative Party lost the election following defeat in a surprise non-confidence vote, there was a large 40% year-over-year increase in number of screen applications.

The years 1980 through 1982 saw three consecutive year-over-year decreases in number of screen applications. The Liberals were again in power in Ottawa. From 1977 through 1981 Manitoba was governed by a

1. See Weaver (1981) for a full discussion of the unfolding of this White Paper.

fiscally conservative Progressive Conservative Party that had relatively less support from study area voters. This Party held only one of five northern constituencies. The nature of this Government did not, however, appear to affect the total number of CEDF loan approvals (Table 4-13). The years 1980 through 1983 were, overall, also a period of economic stagnation in Manitoba and northern Manitoba (Table 4-6). Despite these negative factors the two years run-up to the September, 1984 federal election, saw 42% and 28%, respectively, year-over-year increases in number of screen applications. 1986 saw a precipitous 45% year-over-year decline in applications. One factor possibly related to this unusual decline was the 1986 Manitoba general election. A New Democratic Party provincial government went into an election while the Progressive Conservatives, who were also the Opposition in the Manitoba Legislature, were in power in Ottawa. Another possible factor was a stagnant Manitoba, but not northern Manitoba, economy.

The nature of cause-and-effect links between these political events and numbers of screen applications is not clear. Certainly there were the substantial medium-term, application-promoting, northern community development activities of the activist federal Liberal Governments of the 1970's, the NDP governments of 1969-1977 and 1981-88, and the federal Progressive Conservative Party from 1984 through the end of the study period. The processes involved in the election-associated surges in number of applications, however, are not known.

The first screen applications were received by SARDA in 1971. NDA2 did not receive its first applications until 1983. The first applications to NEDP3 were received two years later in 1985. Neither NDA2 nor NEDP3 ever eclipsed SARDA in number of commercial applications received per year from the study area.

Over the study period 1,851 individual and organizational applicants were involved in generating screen applications (Table 6-2). An overwhelming 87% of all applications were submitted by a single applicant, another 11% were submitted by two applicants while only about 2% were submitted by three to six applicants (Table 6-3). Over the study period there

were no substantial changes in the ratio of number of applications received from multiple applicants to number of applications received from single applicants.

As well, again over the study period, by far most known applicants were prospective single proprietors (almost 84% of all applicants)(Table 6-4). Next most frequent as applicants were Indian Bands (8%), followed by non-government collectives (4%),¹ private corporations (2%), and organizations owned by the federal or provincial governments (1%). One trend over time was the increasing proportion of Indian Bands as applicants, the proportion of known applicants who were Indian Bands more than doubled over the study period. This resulted from the collectivist governing structure of most Indian reserves, the very weak economies of most reserves at the start of the study period,² and the increasing capability and assertiveness of Indian bands and tribal councils over the study period. In particular, INAC and EIC provided substantial resources to bands and tribal councils enabling these organizations to both employ economic development staff or consultants, and to form public-sector social and economic development organizations. Another trend was the decreasing number of applications received from private corporations. The proportion of known applicants per year that were private corporations fell by more than two-thirds over the study period. The fact that overall 98% of applicants were either single proprietors, non-government collectives, or Indian Bands and local governments attests to the paucity of private business corporations resident in the study area.

The increase in the proportion of applications from Indian reserves is strikingly apparent in Table 6-5. As a proportion of applicants of known location, Indian reserve originated applicants steadily increased from 12% in

1. These were equally split between for-profit and goal not known organizations each accounting for just over 2% of total applications.

2. This small base meant there were few existing businesses to place applications and there were few models of operating businesses in the communities. It also meant that numerical increases would translate into large proportionate changes.

1971-1973¹ to 55% in 1989, a more than four-fold increase. Also increasing over time was the proportion of applicants located in the out-of-area north. This could have resulted from expansion of federal and provincial government economic development programs into the so-called "urban" north² and "fringe" north,³ and improved accessibility between the "urban" north and most study area communities. Concurrently, there were steady decreases in the proportions of applicants of known location from organized communities, unorganized communities, other in-area north locations and external-to-the-north locations.

The population estimates in Table 4-7 are used to determine the approximate rate of screen application or "low level" (as compared to full application or "high level") entrepreneurship from the study area during the 1979-83 and 1984-88 periods (Table 6-6). For the study area as a whole the rate of "low level" entrepreneurship during 1979-83 period was 18.3 per thousand persons age 15 or over, and for the 1984-86 period this rate was much higher, 31.1 per thousand. For the two periods combined the unorganized communities had the highest overall rate of 26.7 per thousand followed by Indian reserves with 25.4 per thousand. The organized communities, having a relatively higher proportion of non-Aboriginal persons in their populations, not surprisingly placed a distant third at 13.0 per thousand. The finding that there was not much difference in the overall rate of "low level" entrepreneurship between the unorganized communities and Indian reserves is not consistent with the proposition that entrepreneurship on Indian reserves is stifled by reserve environmental conditions.

1. Most of the descriptive statistics are presented for five study periods (1971-73, 1974-78, 1979-83, 1984-88, and 1989), for a "no date" group, and for the entire study period. Each of the study periods is designed to relate to a census year by covering the two years on one or both sides of that census year. A duration of time written in the form "year-year", 1989, or "No date" will always refer to one of the standard study periods. Durations of time that are not one of these standard study periods are described in other ways, such as "from 'year' through 'year'."

2. That is, Flin Flon, Leaf Rapids, Lynn Lake, Snow Lake and Thompson.

3. The area just south of the southern border of Manitoba Department Northern Affairs' municipal jurisdiction (Map 1-1).

The relatively low rate of applicants from organized communities is not surprising. These programs emphasized Aboriginal ownership and employment, and the organized communities contained a relatively lower proportion of Aboriginal people. More interesting is the early response to the programs from the unorganized communities in comparison to the response from Indian reserves. Also interesting is the fact that this differential in response became minimal as of the 1984-88 period. This narrowing differential also is not consistent with the proposition that entrepreneurship on Indian reserves is hampered by environmental factors. Recall, however, that Indian bands comprised a substantial proportion of applicants from Indian reserves, but that local governments in the organized and unorganized communities placed few applications. A comparative measure of non-governmental entrepreneurship can be found by subtracting Indian band and local government applicants from the total number of unorganized community and Indian reserve applicants. When this is done the rate of non-government entrepreneurship for reserves drops substantially to an overall 20.9 per thousand persons and the rate for unorganized communities drops only slightly to an overall 26.2 per thousand persons. Thus, the rate of non-governmental entrepreneurship from unorganized communities was 25% higher than the corresponding rate from reserves. Indian band entrepreneurship almost compensated for the lower level of non-government entrepreneurship from Indian reserves. Therefore, only when applied to non-governmental entrepreneurship are the "low level" data on entrepreneurship consistent with the proposition that entrepreneurship on Indian reserves is stifled by environmental conditions.

Association between community socioeconomic variables and incidence of "low level" entrepreneurship is tested by application of stepwise multiple linear regression. The best conditions for application of this technique exist for the large number of records for 1984-88 and socioeconomic data from the 1986 *Census* (Table 6-7). Prior to this period there were relatively few records per *Census* or *Census* data were too limited. Even from the 1986 *Census* sufficient data are available for only 32 communities. Of these communities: 27 are Indian reserves, 4 are organized communities and only 1 is an unorganized community. The dependent variable "incidence of screen entrepreneur-events" (SA*) was regressed on

12 independent variables:

- 1. whether or not the community is an Indian reserve (CTR)(coded as an indicator variable with "1" as an Indian reserve),**
- 2. total community population (TOP),**
- 3. adult (age 15 or over) population (ADP),**
- 4. proportion of the total population that is Aboriginal (PAB),**
- 5. proportion of the total population that uses an Aboriginal language at home most of the time (PAL),**
- 6. median household income (\$000's)(MHY),**
- 7. per capita income (\$000's)(PCY),**
- 8. proportion of total income that is earned plus investment income (PEY),**
- 9. proportion of the adult population that is employed (PEM),**
- 10. proportion of the population that has less than grade 9 education (PG9),**
- 11. proportion of the population that has at least some post secondary, trade, or university education (PTP), and**
- 12. whether the community has direct or nearby road access (ACC)(coded as an indicator variable with "1" as no road access).**

Three stepwise regressions were run. The first model (#1) regressed all "low level" entrepreneur-events on the 12 independent variables. Since it is reasonable to assume that government and collective entrepreneurship, especially in an environment where local governments are almost totally dependent on transfers from senior governments and where collective organizations are almost totally dependent on transfers from senior and local governments, has limited causal relation with the set of independent variables a second model (#2) regressed all non-government and non-collective entrepreneur-events on the 12 independent variables. Finally, since only one of the 32 communities is an unorganized community, a third model (#3) was run for non-government - non-collective entrepreneur-events using data for the same 12 independent variables collected from the 1991

Census enabling five unorganized communities to be added to the analysis¹ (Table 6-8). The validity of results from model #3 is based on the (untested) assumption that relative circumstances among these 35 communities were unchanged from the 1986 *Census*. Since the number of entrepreneur-events per community is not a sample it can be argued that statistical significance is not relevant.² Absence of any minimum level of significance, however, would eliminate sensitivity to the contribution of each value of a variable to the level of association. Therefore, 0.05 is used as a criterion for entry of variables and 0.01 for removal of variables, but output is shown for variables not remaining in the model. To guard against multicollinearity among independent variables the "tolerance" is set at 0.01. Regressions were run on *SPSSPC+ Version 5.0* (SPSS Inc. 1992).

In Table 6-9 the following information is provided for each of the three models: the adjusted coefficient of determination (R^2) and standard error of Y (SEY), degrees of freedom at the last step, and the value and significance on the *F* distribution. Displayed for each independent variable in each model are: the regression coefficients (B's), standard error of the regression coefficients (SEB's), the standardized regression coefficients (BETA's) and the test of significance on the *t* distribution. Variables rejected by the model are listed along with their (BETA's), partials and tests of significance on the *t* distribution.

After four steps model #1 (all entrepreneur-events) generates an R^2 of 0.81 and a SEY of 6.5. The R^2 is strong, so the linear model fits the data reasonably well. The SEY, however, is relatively high given the number of "low level" entrepreneur-events in most of the communities. Therefore, as a whole the model has rather low explanatory power for frequency of "low

1. The five unorganized communities are: Camperville, Duck Bay, Cross Lake, Norway House, and Wabowden. Two communities in regressions #1 and #2 had to be dropped because of insufficient data in the 1991 *Census*: Brochet Indian reserve and Little Black River Indian reserve.

2. As well, it might be argued that data from these records are but a sample from a larger environmental space and time. There are two problems with this argument. Firstly, this hypothetical space and time universe would need to be specified. Secondly, even if this space and time universe was specified, the sample could not have been randomly drawn.

level" entrepreneur-events. Four independent variables: total population (TOP), proportion of the population that is Aboriginal (PAB), per capita income (PCY) and proportion of the population that normally speaks an Aboriginal language at home (PAL), in order of predictive power (Beta) for the number of "low level" entrepreneur-events (SA1), remain in the model. TOP, PAB, and PCY all show a positive association with SA1. PAL shows a negative association with SA1. One variable not remaining in the model, accessibility (ACC) has a moderate level of significance and is negatively associated with SA1.

Also after four steps model #2 (all non-government, non-collective entrepreneur-events) generates an R^2 0.82 and a better SEY of 5.5. Again, the R^2 is strong, and the model has greater ability to explain the number of "low level" entrepreneur-events. In this model the adult population (ADP), proportion of the population that is Aboriginal (PAB), per capita income (PCY), and proportion of the population that speaks an Aboriginal language at home (PAL) remain, in order of predictive power. ADP, PAB, and PCY show positive association, PAL shows a negative association.

After three steps, model #3 (all non-government, non-collective entrepreneur-events, but including five unorganized communities and using 1991 *Census* data) generates a somewhat lower R^2 of 0.74 and a higher SEY of 6.4. Three variables remain. In order of predictive power and with the direction of association they are: ADP (+), PAB (+), and PAL (-). The proportion of adults employed (PEM) almost remains in the model with a significance of 0.057 and a positive association with SA1. Two other variables not remaining in the model have moderate levels of significance. The proportion of the population with less than grade 9 education (PG9) has a significance of 0.152 and a negative association with SA1. PCY has a significance of 0.164 and a positive association with SA1.

Model #2 shows, overall, the best ability to predict. The involvement of local governments and government-sponsored collective organizations (model #1), both highly dependent on revenue from senior governments rather than local sources, appear to slightly confound the relationship between community socioeconomic conditions and "low level" entrepreneur-

events. The fact that adult population and proportion of the population that is Aboriginal show relatively strong explanatory power is not surprising, the programs effectively focussed on their target. Neither is it surprising that higher per capita income, but not higher median household income, is positively associated with number of "low level" entrepreneur-events. The existence of a less equal income distribution, so long as most of those with low incomes meet some minimal threshold of income, may generate more "low level" entrepreneurs that are not directly or indirectly governments. Source of income as measured by the proportion of earned-plus-investment income, also shows no association with number of "low level" entrepreneur-events. That the proportion of population that normally speaks an Aboriginal language at home is negatively associated with the number of entrepreneur-events is interesting and consistent with indications from other, not published, analyses that this proportion is negatively related to a variety of socioeconomic conditions generally perceived as an improvement. The author has suggested, in papers not published, that maintenance of behavioral and value patterns from an earlier mode-of-production, which may be reflected and perpetuated in language, inhibits the adoption of behavioral and value patterns appropriate for a new mode-of-production. Neither type of community nor access remain in any of the models. This implies that propositions suggesting the reserve environment or more difficult access inhibit the development of "low level" entrepreneurship are not supported.

The volume of applicants by applicant status indicates the proportion of known applicants who were registered Indians rose from 20% of known applicants to 65% of applicants over the study period (Table 6-10). The proportions of non-Aboriginal applicants and, especially, the proportion of Aboriginal applicants who were not registered Indians fell through the study period. That the proportion of non-registered Indian Aboriginal applicants dropped so markedly, from 34% in 1974-78 to only 6% in 1989, is surprising. No doubt this was due in part to the increasing relative advantage of the supported entrepreneurial capability of reserve-based

applicants.¹ Perhaps it also was due, as reputed, to increasing favouritism of DRE/IE towards Indian reserves over the study period. The writer heard assertions by provincial officials during the mid-1980's that DRE/IE wanted to give the reserves "their turn." No statement supporting such an assertion was found in the files.

Data on the number of screen applicants per status group can be applied to the estimated number of persons per status group in 1986 (Table 4-8) to generate rates of applicants per thousand persons age 15 and over for the 1984-88 period. The overall rates so calculated are: 30.0 for registered Indians, 27.1 for other Aboriginals, and 10.8 for non-Aboriginals. After subtracting Indian band and local government applicants the rates become: 24.0 per thousand for registered Indians and 26.4 per thousand for other Aboriginals. This 10% higher rate for other Aboriginals compared to registered Indians is much smaller than the 25% higher rate for unorganized communities compared to Indian reserves. These comparative differences are consistent with the proposition that there exist non-income, environmental limitations to non-governmental entrepreneurship on Indian reserves.

Not surprisingly given the poor economic conditions within the study area, 70% (473) of applicants of known business state were submitted by existing businesses (Table 6-12). This proportion shows no clear trend over the study period. Of existing businesses 30% had received previous government financing, 29% had received previous government financing from a federal government source, and 17% had received previous financing from a DRE/IE source (Table 6-13). The large and persistent difference between the proportion of businesses that received previous financing from any federal source and the proportion that had received previous financing from a DRE/IE source reflects the substantial involvement of INAC and EIC in government-sourced business financing. The fact that so few applicants had received financing from non-federal government and non-government

1. While band and tribal council support was largely, but not totally, focused on reserve-based entrepreneurs INAC also provided support to many off-reserve registered Indians

sources belies the purported importance of CEDF for bridge financing. It also is consistent with assertions by federal government officials that Manitoba did not provide an appropriate level of financing to DRE/IE supported projects.¹ Three factors contributed to Manitoba's relative absence from DRE/IE financed projects: CEDF's withdrawal from bridge financing in 1974 because of its dispute with SARDA; Manitoba's wariness of substantial responsibilities respecting Indian reserves; and availability of grants and bridge financing from INAC, IEDF, EIC and NDA2.

The proportions of existing businesses that had received previous financing from each of the three source categories increased markedly over the study period. The proportions that had received any government and any federal government financing more than doubled over the study period while the proportion that had received previous financing from any DRE/IE source went from nil to 27%. The fact that the proportions which had received financing from any government and any federal government source were nearly the same for each study period implies that provincial sources did not play a major role in financing these businesses independent of complementary federal government financing. Indeed, throughout the study period it had been normal practice for one government to press for a complementary share of program funding and project financing from the other government. This was especially so with respect to initiatives such as DRE/IE that were not exclusive to Indian reserves. This process of inter-departmental and inter-governmental risk-sharing added to the public sector's and the entrepreneur's administrative costs. It also may have increased total available financing as each department and government argued the benefits of funding "leverage."² Inter-governmental risk-sharing also increased

1. Most of the data on previous financing of existing businesses came from audits of DRE/IE projects done by Supply and Services Canada auditors. These audits list all sources of project financing. For example, equity and private financing were shown for most DRE/IE financed projects.

2. Measures of financial leverage in project submissions or discussions came into vogue within the federal government during the 1980's. Accounts of leverage were often perverse with each of agency of the federal government citing its ability to "leverage" money from other involved agencies. It also resulted in multiple-counting of the same dollars from non-governmental sources.

effectiveness-inhibiting complexity. Administrative and project files are replete with tussles and confusion over roles and contributions with applicants often caught in the middle. Not only inter-governmental coherence and coordination, but also within-government, inter-departmental coherence and coordination were an unremittingly and often unsuccessful struggle for those involved. This occurred despite the intergovernmental and interdepartmental composition of program committees and the Thompson delivery office.

A striking finding is that, overall, 63% of the existing business applicants had negative net income¹ for their previous fiscal year (Table 6-14). This situation, however, improved over time. The proportion of existing businesses with negative net income declined steadily from 77% to 50% over the study period. While data that might enable comparison of the proportion of all businesses in the study area (i.e. including those that did not apply to the case programs) with negative net income to the proportion of applicant businesses with negative net income were not collected, the fact that such a high percentage of existing businesses were in financial trouble before placing an application challenged the longer term effectiveness of the programs.

As well, over the study period 84% of businesses that had previously received government financing were in financial trouble. This finding does not speak well of the longer term effectiveness of the then-existing government business financing programs (Table 6-15). These data also indicate a secular deterioration in the financial condition of existing business applicants that had previously received financing from government sources, until this trend was finally reversed in the 1984-88 period. Over the study period, businesses that had received all or at least part of their non-equity financing from DRE/IE showed slightly better financial performance than

1. Net earnings after depreciation and amortization, but before income taxes. Since the financial statements of proprietorships do not show wage-equivalent payments to the owner-operator these data substantially understate the frequency of negative net incomes. Net income was calculated from financial statements. In some cases when financial statements were not available, it was based on a statement by the program officer that the business was "profitable" or "losing money" etc.

businesses that had received financing from only non-DRE/IE government sources. The proportion of existing businesses that had previously received financial assistance from DRE/IE programs and had negative net income was around five percentage points lower than the proportion that had previously received assistance from other federal or provincial sources. This finding is not surprising. Information in the program and project files indicates excessive looseness in financing decisions, and lax control in the provision of funding and financing by two important government sources - EIC and INAC.

The goal of the majority of applications was to create a new business establishment (Table 6-16). In order of overall proportion of applications, the goal "new establishment" (62% of applications that had a known goal) is followed by the goal "expand business" establishment (19%), the goal "purchase business" (13%) and the goal "maintain business" (6%). These proportions reinforced the already difficult circumstances facing the programs. Most applicants had little or no business experience, those that did were more often than not in financial trouble. In terms of changing proportions of applicants by goal over time, the goal "new establishment" remained relatively constant, the goal "purchase business" increased dramatically, the goal "expand business" declined and the goal "maintain business" increased. The fact that the overall proportion of applicants with the goal "new establishment" remained relatively constant implies that overall (and, as noted above, in particular on Indian reserves) prospective entrepreneurs continued to find available business niches despite years of government assistance to many new projects. That the conjunction of many more existing businesses and the availability of government financing would generate demand for financing purchases of existing businesses, which more than doubled as a percentage of applications, is to be expected. As well, to promote local, Aboriginal ownership and in response to this demand DRE/IE loosened its policy concerning the financing of purchases. The decrease in the proportion with the goal "expand business" establishment is interesting. Does this decrease imply that, although prospective entrepreneurs saw possible business niches, most of vacant niches were suitable for greenfield small business units, but not expansions? Such an implication befits the small, relatively isolated markets extant within most study area communities. The increase in the percent of applications by existing businesses with the

goal "maintain business" may be an indication that increasing numbers of businesses were having financial problems.

Over the study period 97% of screen applications said the head-office would be located within the study area (Table 6-17). The most frequent intended location was an Indian reserve, followed by unorganized communities or areas, and organized communities. Neither "metropolitan" areas, rural southern Manitoba, nor northern "urban" centres were often listed as head-office locations. This finding is not consistent with a crude version of the "metropolis-hinterland theory of underdevelopment" which would have predicted frequent head-office locations in "metropolitan" or more highly developed locations.¹ Over time the relative standing of in-area, head-office locations did change. During 1971-78 the unorganized communities were the most frequent intended head office location. The relative balance dramatically shifted to Indian reserves during 1979-83. This shift is consistent with the increasing proportions of applications from Indian reserves, registered Indians, and Indian bands.

Data concerning intended location of operations mirrors the findings about intended location of head office (Table 6-18). Ninety-eight percent (98%) of the locations of business operations were to be in the study area. The relative proportions per operational location-period combination for in-area locations are within a few percentage points of the relative proportions of the same head-office location-period combinations. This implies that for the vast majority of projects, head-office and operations were to be located together. This is expected given the typical features of these proposed businesses: relatively small size; mostly proprietor, collective, or local government ownership; and output to satisfy final demand. As well, the relative proportions per location-period combination for in-area locations are also within a few percentage points of the relative proportions of applicant locations. This reinforces the finding that, for the vast majority of prospective businesses, owner residence, head-office and operations were to

1. More sophisticated versions of this theory consider flow of commodities and finance, location of value-added, etc.

be in the same location.

Association between community socioeconomic variables and incidence of proposed operational location is also tested by application of stepwise multiple regression using records for 1984-88, and the socioeconomic data for 32 communities from the 1986 *Census* and 35 communities from the 1991 *Census* that were used in the regressions concerning "low level" entrepreneurship. The dependent variable "incidence of screen operational location" (ST*) was again regressed on the 12 independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, and ACC.

Three stepwise regressions were run. The first model (#1) regresses operational location for all entrepreneurs on data for the 12 independent variables generated by the 1986 *Census*. The second model (#2) regresses operational location for non-government, non-collective entrepreneurs on data for the 12 independent variables generated by the 1986 *Census*. The third model (#3) regresses operational location for all non-government, non-collective entrepreneurs on data for the 12 independent variables collected from the 1991 *Census* with the five unorganized communities added. Table 6-19 presents the output from the three models.

In four steps model #1 (all entrepreneurs, 1986 *Census* data) generates an R^2 of 0.79 and a SEY of 5.7. Again, the linear model fits the data relatively reasonably well, however, the SEY is relatively high given the low number of operational locations targeted at many communities. Therefore, as a whole the model has moderate ability to explain the number of operational locations per community only for those communities that attracted larger numbers of operational locations. Four independent variables: total population (TOP), proportion of the population that is Aboriginal (PAB), per capita income (PCY), and proportion of the population that speaks an Aboriginal language at home (PAL), in order of power to predict ST1, remain in the model. All the variables except PAL all show a positive association with ST1. In addition, three variables not remaining in the model, proportion of the population with less than grade 9 education (PG9), accessibility (ACC) and proportion of the population with a trade or at

least some post secondary education (PTP) have moderate levels of significance. PTP has a positive association with ST1, and PG9 and ACC have negative associations with ST1.

In four steps model #2 (all non-government, non-collective entrepreneurs; 1986 *Census* data) generates a higher R^2 0.80 and an improved SEY of 4.7. In this model adult population (ADP), PAB, PCY, and PAL, remain in the model, in order of predictive power. ADP, PAB, and PCY show a positive association with ST2. PAL shows a negative association with ST2.

Also in four steps, model #3 (all non-government, non-collective entrepreneur-events, but including five unorganized communities and using 1991 *Census* data) generates an adjusted R^2 of 0.75, and a slightly higher SEY of 5.1. For variables remain in the model. In order of power to predict ST3 and with the direction of association, they are: ADP (+), PAB (+), PAL (-), and PEM (+). One variable, (MHY) has a moderate level of significance and a negative association with ST2.

Model #2 shows, overall, a slightly improved ability to predict operational location. Involvement of local governments and government-sponsored collective organizations appears to have little effect on the relationship between community socioeconomic conditions and choice of operational location. Adult population shows strong explanatory power regarding choice of operational location as does proportion of the population that is Aboriginal. This is not surprising since entrepreneurs were adults and few chose operational locations outside their home communities. Per capita income shows a reasonably strong positive association with operational location. The profit logic of business would lead one to expect stronger, positive associations between income variables and operational location. Proportion of population that normally speaks an Aboriginal language at home again shows a negative association with strong explanatory power. Again, type of community appears not to be related to choice of operational location. This is not consistent with the proposition that Indian reserves are more hostile to business entrepreneurship. The variable "access" does not remain in any model. Therefore, the proposition that more difficult access

inhibits the development of entrepreneurship receives minimal support.¹

For the purpose of this study, a single product is defined by a list of 15, two- or three-digit products from Statistics Canada's Standard Industrial Code.²³ Over the study period the stated intention of 76% of applications stated intent was to produce a single product or service (Table 6-20). Single products are appropriate for small businesses in less-developed environments. Single product production would, in general, be less demanding of skills, management and capital than multi-product production. It is interesting, therefore, that over time there was a notable shift towards fewer products per application. Did applicants become more informed about the implications of multi-product production; or, were most multi-product niches filled early-on?

The frequency of applications by intended product and product group⁴ are shown in Table 6-21. Over the study period the services, at 49% of applications with known products, were the most frequent intended products whereas the primary products and the non-primary, non-service products each took 20-21% of applications. Services became relatively more frequent in 1984-89. Within primary products logging and forestry related products predominated at 16% of applications with known products (80% of primary product applications wanted to produce logging and forestry related

1. In model #1 ACC does show moderate significance, but does not remain in the model.
2. Of the 19 products listed in Table 6-20, 15 are, for the purpose of this study, defined as single products. The four exceptions are: "logging & forestry," "logging & forestry - manufacturing"; "retail, & food & beverage;" "accommodation - food & beverage," and "cabins, campgrounds, lodges" (a mixture of "accommodation," possibly "food & beverage services," and necessarily "recreational services."
3. This product list in the Appendix, Table 2-3 is designed to focus on products that are most meaningful to those familiar with economic and business development in northern Canada while remaining within three-digits of Statistics Canada's classification system.
4. For example, all primary products; all non-primary, non-service products; and all services.

products).¹ Agricultural, fishing and trapping applications appeared infrequently. Applications for assistance from most such economic operations² were directed to programs such as the SARDA Primary Producers Program or the Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corporation, and provincial employment creation funds. As well, there has been little agricultural production in most of the study area. With respect to non-primary, non-service products, transport (9%) was the most frequent intended product followed by construction (7%), manufacturing (4%) and communications (less than 1%). The relative standing between manufacturing and transportation reversed during the study period: manufacturing was the most frequent of the four products during 1971-73, but was least frequent during 1984-88. A high proportion of applications for transport products involved taxi services. Trucking and remote air service products also appeared frequently. Within the services group retail was by far the most frequent product with 19% of all applications with known products (retail was also the most frequent product overall) and 39% of all service products. Other service products that appeared with notable frequency were: other services (10% of all known products), cabins-campgrounds-lodges (8%), food and beverage services (4%) and accommodation services (2%).

Over time the relative proportion of primary products, in particular logging and forestry related products, was greatest in 1974-78, then fell to 1984-88. The relative proportion of non-primary, non-service products fell slightly. Within this group the relative proportion of manufacturing applications did not change, but the relative proportions of both construction and transportation applications increased. The relative proportion of service product applications increased. This increase was largely a result of

1. Most logging and manufacturing related products involved the integration of logging with small-scale sawmills although a few products involved additional processing into basic furniture and miscellaneous consumer products.

2. Most commercial fishing and trapping within the study area is done by seasonal proprietors generating marginal incomes who are organized through associations and cooperatives. Many of these entities are not businesses according to the definition used in this study.

substantial increases in retail and other service applications. This overall pattern, primary product production being overtaken by non-primary, non-service production, which, in turn, is overtaken by production of services is intriguingly similar to the long term pattern of advancement of national economies. A striking exception, however, was the continued under-representation of manufacturing.

Program Decisions Respecting Screen Applications

Elapsed time from the date an application was stamped as received to the date an explicit eligibility decision was taken has been calculated for those screen applications having an explicit decision and decision date (Table 6-22).¹ On average, it took DRE/IE programs over 250 calendar days to issue an eligibility decision. Two-thirds of a year is a long time to determine project eligibility. Between SARDA and NDA2, SARDA took by far the longest time to come to a decision.² Peak mean elapsed time for SARDA³ occurred during 1979-83. It was during this period that SARDA experienced its highest number of screen applications. The 1971-73 period, when SARDA received a relatively low number of applications, also shows a relatively high mean elapsed time to decision. This was the period in which SARDA suffered great internal upheaval. As well, SARDA consciously used time as a tool to weed-out less motivated or capable applicants (Schultz, personal communication with the writer; 1995). Most applications that did not gain eligibility were dropped because of loss of contact with the applicant. These data suggest the degree to which SARDA was unwilling to declare a project not eligible. Interestingly, during 1984-88, with an 11% decrease in applications received, SARDA's mean elapsed time to decision fell a surprising 47%.

1. A large minority of screen applications did not receive an explicit eligibility decision. This is discussed later.
2. There are too few screen application records with both receipt of application and screen decision dates to comment on the elapsed time to a screen decision for NEDP3.
3. And all programs in aggregate since only SARDA was operational at the time.

In comparison to SARDA, NDA2 shows a very short mean elapsed time to explicit decisions. Chapter 5 explained that, in comparison to SARDA, NDA2 had looser goals and looser decision criteria. Like SARDA, NDA2 considered the screen application step to be a perfunctory process of ensuring reasonable accuracy to the information; to redirect applications that would more appropriately be directed to other programs; to weed-out applicants that were obviously abusing the various programs or that had a poor performance record; and to stop applications that would compete with prior applications or approvals. DRE/IE screen eligibility decisions flowed from a first-past-the-post and "satisficing" strategy, not from a strategy designed to optimize economic or business impacts.

Results of all program eligibility decisions appear in Table 6-23. Over the study period 44% of applications were deemed (explicitly and implicitly) eligible and 54% were deemed not eligible.¹ Even though screen application forms had a place for the reviewing program officer to render, sign and date a decision; 43% of application files did not contain such an explicit decision. In most of these cases (98%), the decision was implied acceptance of the screen application. This is evidenced by absence of an explicit "not eligible" or similar statement in the letter sent by the program to the applicant acknowledging receipt of the application, and by continuation of the application process through to a later full application decision.² In general, most program officers shied away from declaring a project eligible.

As noted above, the most frequent single reason for non-acceptances (i.e. rejections plus withdrawals) was lack of contact with the applicant. A large minority of these no-contact non-acceptances, especially by SARDA, entailed the program officer waiting the best part of a year without further contact from the applicant, then declaring the applicant to have withdrawn.³

1. The outcome is not known for 2% of applications.

2. Not necessarily through to a full application. This is discussed in the full applications section.

3. This was the primary cause of the lengthy mean elapsed time between receipt of applications and screen decisions within SARDA.

As well, an important minority of non-acceptances involved the program officer convincing the applicant that proceeding would not be appropriate then, without having received a written withdrawal, declaring that the applicant had withdrawn. For the relatively more business-focussed SARDA program, especially in the context of the earlier years of the study period, this may have been an appropriate approach. The writer, having seen the poor quality of many screen applications and repeated unsuccessful attempts by program officers to contact applicants, is convinced that during the first two to three periods SARDA faced a very difficult client environment. The general strategy for all programs appeared to be, in order of priority: (1) avoid explicit acceptance, (2) avoid explicit rejection except if there was a clear contravention of program parameters and (3) issue an explicit rejection if there was a clear contravention of program parameters. The explicit-plus-implied acceptance rate rose throughout the study period while the explicit acceptance rate generally fell through the study period.

Program officers in SARDA, the most business-focussed and parameter-bound of the three programs, modified this general strategy by using time as a decision tool. NDA2's vague goals and decision criteria, coupled with its northern office in Thompson, and with its liaison staff continuously traveling to communities and in contact with local and regional economic development officers and collective organizations, in effect quickly "pushed" most applicants along. The vague goals and decision criteria of NDA2 are evidenced by its acceptance rate of nearly 88%, over twice the acceptance rate of SARDA. NEDP was a very different matter, this program's focus on businesses of over \$250,000 (current dollars) of capitalization and the few applications it received meant that it, and generally, its applicants, poured much more resources into the application and approvals processes. Clearly, the substantially increased overall acceptance rate over time was primarily due to the high acceptance rates of NDA2 and NEDP3.¹

1. The SARDA acceptance rate also increased slightly over time, except for the 1979-83 period.

Since screen applications contained minimal information, screen decisions were partly based on general consistency with broad and fluctuating program guidelines such as there being at least some possibility of achieving financial viability, the racial status of prospective owners and employees, and location of the business. Idiosyncratic factors also played a major role in explicit and implicit screen decisions. These idiosyncratic factors are, roughly in frequency of occurrence: (1) the applicant's persistence through the application process, (2) whether or not the applicant received substantial assistance in the past, (3) whether or not the applicant had abused prior assistance, (5) whether or not the applicant appeared to have honest intentions, and (6) whether a prior application with similar intent was already being processed. As a consequence, detailed description and analysis of decisions against most project and community variables would not be relevant. Should the reader be interested, however, a list of acceptance rates, by variable, appears in Table 6-23.

This list does shed light on the relationship between quality of screen applications and characteristics of applicants. This relationship can be examined because many of the factors noted above are indicators of certain relative capabilities among applicants. Such capabilities include: the applicants ability to complete a simple application form, the applicant's ability to conduct an overview of the environment in which the perspective business is to operate, the applicant's ability to understand the basic parameters of the recipient program, the applicant's drive and the applicant's ability to communicate with the program. These capabilities were utilized by applicants attempting to generate an acceptance. Rate of acceptance is, therefore, a direct "low level" indicator of application quality and an indirect "low level" indicator of applicant capacity and resources.¹

Review of the success rates of applicants by type of applicant indicates that screen applications submitted by collective organizations, local governments, and federal or provincial governments were of higher overall

1. "High level" indicators of applicant quality are discussed with respect to the full applications.

quality (i.e. they had higher acceptance rates) than applications from proprietors or for-profit, private corporations. Applications received from Indian reserves and unorganized communities were generally of higher quality than applications received from organized communities. By status group, the highest proportion of quality applications came from non-Aboriginals. Next in terms of proportion of quality applications were registered Indians, other Aboriginal applicants submitted the lowest proportion of quality applications. The fact that the greatest range in proportion of applications accepted occurs by type of applicant and by location of applicant while there is a small range in the proportion of acceptances by applicant status implies that type and location of applicant are more important predictors of "low level" quality.¹

Full Applications

Properties of the Database

According to the parameters of all three programs eligibility of an applicant to proceed through the application process was to be determined on the basis of the screen application. An eligible applicant was assigned a program officer and was allowed to submit a more demanding full application. As explained in Chapter 5, the full application was designed to give the applicant a second chance to specify ownership and other parameters of the intended business, to give the program a fuller understanding of the applicant's intent, to encourage and guide the applicant through the substance of a three-year business plan, and to make it possible for the program to review the proforma financial health of the prospective business. A finding from the discussion above and from Chapter 5 is that there was substantial slippage in specification and application of eligibility criteria.

1. This finding is reinforced by analysis of full application, or "high level", quality in the next section.

Substantial slippage also occurred in the full application step. A total of 704 financing decisions were made respecting the 706 screen applications that received explicit or implicit acceptance.¹ Strict interpretation of the minimal content of a full application entails specification of the intended: owners, office location, operational location, products, markets, capital requirements, equity, proforma income statements and balance sheets for three years, and type and value of financing by source. Against this strict criteria the programs received only 327 full applications. At least partial information was present for 527 "full" applications. Because of this, the designation "full application" will be applied to all 527 post-screen applications that were at least partly complete.² The first year in which a full application was received was 1972, the last year a full application was received was 1989.

The full applications database consists of 80 original variables³ for each application. These 80 variables describe 38 different dimensions of each full application. Therefore, 42 variables per record are available for multiple occurrences within the following dimensions: applicant characteristics, products and markets, proforma financial flows for three years, financing from the case program, and financing from other sources. Variables and assigned values per full application variable are shown in Table 6-24. Again, properties of data collected for specific variables are discussed when relevant to their use.

The next section addresses the substance of full applications, Firstly, a measure of full application quality is presented and this measure is related to variables describing the source of applications. Secondly, relative proportions of full applications with particular attributes per variable are -----

1. Screen application decisions for the remaining two were not explicit, neither were these applications repeated as full applications. Therefore, screen decisions could have been non-acceptance and necessarily no full application to follow, or implicit acceptance and lack of follow-through by the applicants.

2. Lack of completeness of full applications is a problem of quality. This issue will be discussed below.

3. Excluding the record number and DRE/IE file number.

compared to the relative proportions of screen applications that exhibited the same values per variable. Respecting these comparisons, the reader is reminded that screen acceptance placed only minimal constraints on the nature of full applications. Applicants could, and did, make major changes in planned ownership, mix of products, and in some cases even changed the intended location of business operations. In the absence of a clear and generally understood meaning to screen eligibility and acceptance such changes did not normally disqualify full applications. Measures of the propensity and speed of turning screen acceptances into full applications¹ for certain variables describing application source are used to explain temporal variations in the relative proportions of full to screen applications, and to measure relative capabilities of applicants and resources available to applicants. Relationships between application rates and socioeconomic source, and intended location of business operations are again analyzed.

Full Applications

Similar to the flow of screen applications over time, there was a general increase in the number of full applications over time (Table 6-25). Because of the small numbers, year-over-year percentage changes in the number of full applications received, however, were very erratic. From the year 1971 through 1983 there was a gradually increasing, negative difference between the relative proportion of full applications received each year and the relative proportion of screen applications received each year (Table 6-26). This trend generally reversed with the surge in full and screen applications received from 1983 through 1989. The flow of full applications over time was influenced by three factors. The first factor was the flow of screen applications over time. The number of screen applications received per year generally increased through the study period especially through the three large increases in 1979, 1983 and 1984. The second factor was the rate of screen acceptances. The rate of screen acceptances increased then

1. That is, the relative amount of time it takes to turn a screen acceptance into a full application for those screen acceptances that were, in fact, turned into full applications.

decreased, but was generally low from 1971 through 1983. After 1983 the rate of screen acceptances was much higher. The third factor was the time lag resulting from the more demanding, and time consuming, process of preparing full applications following screen acceptance. This time lag generally declined through the study period.

Over the study period, an average 10 calendar days elapsed between the day the first full application was received and the day the last full application was received when those applications of one and only one full application are included (i.e. elapsed time = 0)(Table 7-1). The mean elapsed time between receipt of the first and last full applications was almost twice as long for SARDA as for NDA2 and NEDP3. For those applications that involved more than one full application (ET > 0) mean elapsed time between receipt of the first and last full applications ballooned to 112 calendar days. High standard deviations confirm the great variation in applicant situations faced by the programs. This finding also suggests that SARDA forced more cogitation onto applicants relative to externally supplied support resources than did NDA2 or NEDP3.¹

Interestingly, there were especially large percentage increases in the number of full applications received during three of the four run-ups to federal elections in which were called by the governing party at its discretion.² There were unusually large increases in the absolute number of full applications received in two of the four election run-ups. Leading up to the 1974 election was the year-over-year decrease in 1973, but a 75% increase in 1974 although there were only three more applications received in 1974 than 1973. Leading up to the 1984 election the year-over-year increase was 340% (+ 17 applications) in 1983 and another 150% (+ 33 applications) in 1984. Leading up to the 1988 election the year-over-year

1. In particular, NDA2 and NEDP provided substantial funding for project planning and NDA2 applicants benefitted from the help of regular and contract personnel supplied by the DRIE Northern Development Office in Thompson.

2. Again, the 1979 election followed the unexpected loss of a vote of confidence. The one election not associated with an unusually large increase in the number of full applications received occurred in 1979.

increase was 39% (+ 16 applications) in 1987 and 42% (+ 24 applications) in 1988. The years 1987 and 1988, however, were also near the end of 1984-88 during which there was a large increase in screen applications and, consequently, screen acceptances.

Changes in numbers of applications received do not appear to bear any relationship to the timing of provincial elections.¹ Neither do general volumes of full applications received over periods of time appear to have any connection to the provincial party in power.² These findings suggest that provincial electoral politics and the ideologies of provincial governing parties had minimal influence on the generation of full applications. File information also indicates that provincial northern and business development programs were not often major influences at the point of application development.³

Proportions of full applications going to each program differ from the proportions of screen applications going to each program (Table 6-27). This results from differential acceptance rates for screen applications and differential fall-off rates⁴ in the number of full applications compared to the number of screen acceptances.

NDA2 and NEDP3, both of which produced higher rates of screen acceptances and had lower fall-off rates in the number of full applications compared to screen acceptances,⁵ therefore received relatively higher proportions of all full applications than all screen applications. The

1. Again, as noted in the discussion of screen applications provincial elections occurred in 1973, 1977, 1981, 1986 and 1988.

2. The New Democratic Party was in power from 1969 to 1977, and from 1981 to 1988. The Progressive Conservatives were in power from 1977 to 1981, and from 1988 through the end of the study period.

3. This does not prejudge the amount or value of assistance, if any, provided to applicants by provincial or federal government agents prior to the preparation of full applications.

4. The "fall-off rate" measures the deterioration in follow-through between screen acceptance and full application.

5. The fall-off rate for NEDP3 was in fact much lower than was the fall-off rate for the other two programs.

proportion of full applications going to NDA2 (25%) was much higher than the proportion of screen applications going to that program (11%) while the proportion of applications going to NEDP3 also increased (from 2% to 4%). The SARDA proportion, therefore, dropped substantially (from 86% to 71%). Since NDA2 and NEDP3 commenced in the mid-1980's, the fact that both programs had higher proportions of full applications than screen applications exacerbated the inevitable lag in full applications. As a consequence, 74% of full applications with a known date-received came to the programs in the year 1984 or later whereas only about 50% of screen applications were received in the year 1984 or later. This balance of full to screen applications received after 1984 would have over-run the capacity of the aggregate staff of all programs *if* the staff would have operated according to the 1972 staff time allocation algorithm prepared by SARDA.¹ Obviously a dramatic, but implicit, change in the prioritization of staff time had taken place.

Because they contain more demanding content, the degree of completeness of full applications allows use of the second of two measures of application quality *and* applicant capability² (Table 6-28). As noted above, 27 (62%) of full applications were complete. This implies that 377 (53%) of financing decisions were made without having received full information concerning intent from applicants. Inclusion of applications that contain, in addition to some information on the applicant and product, at least an estimated capital cost plus at least two years sales and operating costs adds 21% more applications. Inclusion of applications containing at least an estimate of capital cost and one year of sales and operating costs, however, only adds a further 10% of applications. Applications tended to one of two poles: complete or nearly complete, or sparse. If sweat equity is included as valued by the programs and grants from other programs³ for equity are excluded, a surprising 16% of applications for which intended

1. This staff time allocation algorithm is described in Chapter 5. It is the only staff time use algorithm or analysis found in program or project files.

2. The second measure is relative accuracy as a predictor of business performance.

3. Most of these grants were provided by two other federal government departments, EIC and INAC.

equity is known¹ showed no intended equity investment.² Clearly, as a whole the programs were dealing with a high level of inadequately prepared applicants.

Terminology needs to be clarified before discussing the completeness dimension of application quality. An application is deemed "complete" if it contains, in addition to information identifying the applicant, the following information: project location; product; expected financing by source; and the following information concerning financial flows: capital required, equity, and three years gross sales, gross operating costs, depreciation and amortization, and financing costs. It is deemed "nearly complete" if it contains, in addition to information identifying the applicant, the following information: project location; product; expected financing by source; and the following information concerning financial flows: capital required, equity, and two years gross sales, and gross operating costs. Applications that were either complete or nearly complete will be said to be "relatively complete."³

Data indicate that NEDP3, the program that focussed on fewer, larger projects, shows the highest rate (100%) of relatively complete applications. Of NDA2 applications (which received a high level of field support), 81% were relatively complete; of SARDA applications, 70% were relatively complete.

Rate of relative completeness differs by person or agent who prepared the application. Applications prepared by non-government staff (e.g. consultants and economic development officers) had the highest rate of

1. Intended equity is known for 451 applications.

2. Investment of equity serves two purposes: building capital and ensuring owner commitment.

3. An application containing an estimate of capital cost plus at least two years of sales and operating costs is also considered relatively complete because an applicant who is either not well versed in program parameters or precedence, or who has engaged him or herself in a game concerning the willingness of others to provide financing, would not state the portions of capital to come from each source including equity. Without such information annual financing costs can not be projected.

relative completeness at 91%. The relative completeness rate for applications prepared by other government agencies was 84%. Relative completeness rates for applicants prepared by case program staff (there were only four such applications) and by applicants were 75% and 71%, respectively. Utilization of specialized resources obviously results in substantial improvement in completeness of applications.

Inclusion of three or more applicants within an application appears to have a negative effect on quality. The relative completeness rate for three or more applicants was 67% while it was 88% for two applicants and 83% for one applicant. Perhaps difficulties coordinating so many applicants takes its toll on quality. As for type of applicant, Indian bands (86%) and proprietors (83%) had high rates of relative completeness. Collectives (76%) and private corporations (75%) show intermediate rates of relative completeness. Local governments (60%)¹, and federal or provincial agencies (50%)² had the lowest rates of relative completeness.

By applicant location, applicants from Indian reserves stand out with the highest rate of relative completeness (91%). In order of declining rate of relative completeness applicants from reserves are followed by applicants from unorganized communities (74%), applicants from organized communities and out-of-area northern Manitoba locations (both at 72%), applicants external to northern Manitoba (70%) and applicants from unknown in-area locations (68%). By status, registered Indians show the highest rate of relative completeness (89%) followed by unknown Aboriginals (87%), other Aboriginals (70%) and non-Aboriginals (67%), respectively. Existing businesses, surprisingly, show a lower rate of relative completeness (78%) than applicants that were not existing businesses. In summary, high rates of relative completeness were achieved by applicants who could benefit from experience and higher quality specialized assistance, and by applicants who did not face the added difficulties of coordinating more than two applicants. Those applicants who benefited most from

1. There were only five of these.

2. There were only two of these.

specialized assistance available during the latter portion of the study period were either Indian bands or lived on Indian reserves.

A logistic regression model was designed to test the relationship between relative completeness, and applicant and proposed project attributes. This model uses the dichotomous variable "relative completeness" ("yes" or "no")(F2-3) as the dependent variable. The set of seven independent variables are:

1. Program (PR*).
2. Agent that prepared the full application (FWH*)
3. Number of applicants (FAP*)
4. Type of applicant (FT*) for at least one applicant.
5. Location of applicant residence (FL*) for at least one applicant.
6. Status group of the applicant (FS*) for at least one applicant.
7. Whether the applicant is an existing business (EBUS).

The logistic regression algorithm was chosen because it tests the association of a dichotomous dependent variable with continuous and categorical independent variables. Case data need not be grouped. The dichotomous dependent variable is estimated as the probability of the event occurring:

$$P(\text{event}) = \frac{e^Z}{1 + e^Z}$$

where e is the natural log and where

$$Z = B_0 + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + \dots + B_tX_t$$

with the B's being the regression coefficients and the X's the values or attributes of the dependent variables.

Logistic regression selects the set of coefficients that maximizes the likelihood of the data.

The regression model was built using forward stepwise testing of main

effects only. It is a reasonable assumption that interaction effects will not be significant in the absence of significant main effects. As well, interaction effects should only be tested if the result can provide substantially meaningful information. The probability of entry was set at 0.05, the probability of removal at 0.10, and termination of iteration at 0.001 and/or a decrease of log-likelihood of 0.01.

Output from the logistic regression model is presented in Table 6-29.¹ Variables that nearly remained in the model are listed along with their "score" statistics and "R's." Variables rejected are listed in order of level of significance.

After only two steps the model shows moderate fit and high significance. Only two variables remain. The results are consistent with the descriptive statistics discussed above. As expected, the variable full applications prepared by the applicant (FWH4) shows a negative association with relative completeness. The variable applications involving at least one entrepreneur located on an Indian reserve (FLRE) shows a positive association with relative completeness. Among variables rejected by the model applications with two applicants (FAP2), applications that propose accommodation products (PRO6) and applications that have at least one collective as an applicant show positive associations with relative completeness, but moderate levels of significance. The moderate likelihood ratio, and the many variables and attributes that did not make it into the model, indicate external factors such as personal and organizational characteristics play a major role in achieving relative completeness.

Over the study period full applications from single applicants again

1. The statistics -2LL and "goodness of fit" are measures of how well the model fits the data. The smaller are -2LL and "goodness of fit" the better the fit. "Model *Chi* square" and its degrees of freedom determine the overall significance ("Sig.") of the model. "B" is the log slope of the coefficient for each attribute in the model, "SEB" is the standard error of "B", "Wald Sig." is the significance of the variable in joint interaction with the other variables based on the Wald statistic, "R" is the strength of the partial association, and "Exp (B)" is the change in log odds resulting from a unit change in the value or attribute of the independent variable.

predominated at 85% of all full applications (Table 6-30). This is nearly the same as the proportion of screen applications received from single applicants. Compared to screen applications there were slight increases in the proportions of full applications with two, and three or more applicants. For applications from two applicants the slight increase is largely attributable to the relatively high acceptance rate for such screen applications. The rate of fall-off in number of full applications compared to number of screen acceptances was similar for applications from one or two applicants, but the rate of fall-off was substantially less for applications from three or more applicants (Table 6-31). Therefore, the slight increase in the relative proportion of full applications compared to the relative proportion of screen applications for applications from three or more applicants was largely due to the much lower fall-off rate in the number of full applications compared to screen acceptances.

Over the study period two substantial changes occurred in the proportions of full applicants by type in comparison to the proportions of screen applicants by type (Table 6-32). The proportion of proprietor applicants fell 9% while the proportion of Indian band applicants rose 7%. There was a precipitous decline in the proportion of proprietor applicants in 1971-73. In part, this relative fall-off in the proportion of proprietor applicants and relative increase in the proportion of Indian band applicants reflects the much higher screen acceptance rates for Indian bands relative to proprietors. It also reflects the ability of Indian bands to turn screen applications into full applications (Tables 6-33 and 6-34).

Review of the proportions of full applications by applicant resident location uncovers a substantial increase in the proportion of applicants coming from Indian reserves while the proportions of applicants coming from other in-area locations fell (Table 6-35). Large increases in the proportions of applicants from Indian reserves occurred during 1971-73 and from 1979 through 1989. These relative increases in the proportions of applicants from Indian reserves to some extent reflect the relatively high screen acceptance rates for Indian bands. They reflect, above all, the ability of Indian reserve applicants to turn screen applications into full applications (Table 6-36). As of the end of 1984-88 Indian reserve applicants show a cumulative percent

follow-through on screen acceptances of 72%, 8 percentage points higher the follow-through shown at the same point in time by applicants from the out-of-area north and 19 percentage points higher than that shown by applicants from unorganized communities. These findings, along with high rate of relative completeness shown by applicants from Indian reserves, highlight the superior capacity to prepare applications within Indian reserves.

Fall-off rates in the number of full applications compared to the number of screen applications were relatively high for applicants from all in-area locations except Indian reserves (Table 6-38). Fall-off rates were relatively low not only for applicants located on Indian reserves, but also for applicants located in out-of-area northern Manitoba and external to northern Manitoba.

The rate of full applicants per thousand persons age 15 and over for organized communities was much lower than the corresponding rates for unorganized communities and Indian reserves (Table 6-38). For the years 1979 through 1988 the rate of full applicants per thousand persons was 8.7 for Indian reserves and 8.0 for unorganized communities. This is the reverse order to the relative rates of screen applicants per thousand persons. It reflects the ability of applicants located on Indian reserves to transform screen applications into full applications.¹ If, however, Indian band and local government applicants are subtracted from the 1979 through 1988 application rates, the rate of "high level" entrepreneurship from unorganized communities falls to 7.8 per thousand persons while the rate for Indian reserves falls to 7.1 per thousand, a rate 9% lower than that of unorganized communities.²

1. From the 1979-83 period to the 1984-88 period, however, the rate of "high level" entrepreneurship for Indian reserves actually fell relative to the rate for unorganized communities.

2. From the 1979-83 period to the 1984-88 period the rate of "high level" entrepreneurship by non-government entrepreneurs per thousand persons for Indian reserves actually fell relative to the rate for unorganized communities. This may be an indicator of organizational saturation. If so, this absorption constraint kicked-in quite quickly.

Association between community socioeconomic variables and incidence of "high level" entrepreneurship is also tested by application of stepwise multiple regression, again using records for 1984-88 and socioeconomic data for 32 communities from the 1986 *Census* and 35 communities from the 1991 *Census*. The dependent variable incidence of full application entrepreneur-events (FA*) was again regressed on the same 12 independent variables.

As was done regarding screen applications, three stepwise regressions were run.¹ The first model (#1) regressed all "high level" entrepreneur-events on the 12 independent variables. The second model (#2) regressed all non-government and non-collective entrepreneur-events on the 12 independent variables. The third model (#3) also regressed non-government, non-collective entrepreneur-events using data for the same 12 independent variables collected from the 1991 *Census* with the five unorganized communities added. Table 6-39 presents regression output from the three models.

In three steps regression #1 (all entrepreneur-events) generates an R^2 of 0.75 and a SEY of 2.9. Therefore, the linear model fits the data relatively reasonably well and the SEY is relatively low given the number of "high level" entrepreneur-events in most communities. Therefore, as a whole the model has reasonable ability to explain the number of "high level" entrepreneur-events. Three independent variables: total population (TOP), proportion of the population that is Aboriginal (PAB) and proportion of the population that has less than grade 9 education (PG9), in order of power to predict frequency of "high level" entrepreneur-events (FA1), remain in the model. TOP and PAB show positive associations with FA1. PG9 shows a negative association with FA1. Three variables not remaining in the model, median household income (MHY), proportion of the population that usually speaks an Aboriginal language at home (PAL), and proportion of income that is earned from employment and investments (PEY) have moderate levels of

1. The reader who wishes to refresh him or herself with the rationale for, and structuring of, the three regression models should refer to section 6.1.

significance. MHY and PEY both show positive associations with FA1, PAL shows a negative association with FA1.

Also in three steps model #2 (all non-government, non-collective entrepreneur-events) generates a slightly higher R^2 of 0.77 and a better SEY of 1.9. The R^2 is strong, and the model's ability to explain the number of "high level" entrepreneur-events also is strong. The variables remaining in this model are, in order of predictive power: total population (TOP), proportion of the population that is Aboriginal (PAB) and per capita income (PCY). All three variables show positive association with FA1. Of variables not remaining in the model, proportion of income that is earned (PEY) and proportion of the population that usually speaks an Aboriginal language at home show moderate levels of significance. PEY has a positive association with FA1, PAL has a negative association with FA1.

In only one step, model #3 (all non-government, non-collective entrepreneur-events, but including five unorganized communities and using 1991 *Census* data) generates a much lower adjusted R^2 of only 0.50, and a higher SEY of 2.9. Only one variable remains in this model. That variable is TOP. It has a positive association with FA1. None of the variables not remaining in the model show even moderate levels of significance.

Model #2 has, overall, the best explanatory power. As with screen applications, involvement of local governments and government sponsored collective organizations interfere with the relationship between community socioeconomic conditions and entrepreneur-events. Curiously, compared to "low level" entrepreneurship total population replaces adult population as the variable with strongest predictive power. As with "low level" entrepreneurship, both proportion of the population that is Aboriginal and per capita income show relatively strong explanatory power. Proportion of income that is earned, however, shows relatively stronger power for "high level" entrepreneurship. Proportion of the population that usually speaks an Aboriginal language at home does not remain in the model whereas it remains in the best model of "low level" entrepreneurship, but the variable still shows a negative association and not high significance. Regression results are not consistent with the propositions that an Indian reserve

environment inhibits entrepreneurship, that remoteness inhibits entrepreneurship, or that low educational levels inhibit entrepreneurship although the directions of these associations are consistent with such propositions.

Over the study period there was a notable increase in the proportion of full applications compared to the proportion of screen applications received from registered Indians (Table 6-40). The proportion of full applications compared to the proportion of screen applications received from Aboriginals who were not registered Indians fell, while the proportion of full applications compared to the proportion of screen applications received from non-Aboriginals rose very slightly. The greatest change in proportions occurred in 1971-73 and 1979-83. Yet again, these findings argue for the superior ability of registered Indians, most of whom were located on reserves, to turn screen acceptances into full applications (Table 6-41). Screen acceptance rates for registered Indians were slightly higher than for other groups, but the application turnaround time was much faster. It is not surprising, then, that the fall-off rate in the number of full applications compared to screen acceptances was lowest for registered Indian applicants (Table 6-42). The fall-off rate also was relatively low for non-Aboriginals. It was highest for Aboriginals who were not registered Indians.

The proportion of full applications relative to screen applications received from existing businesses was slightly higher than the proportion of full applications relative to screen applications received from applicants who were not existing businesses (Table 6-43). This is entirely due to the higher rate of screen acceptances by existing businesses. Surprisingly, existing businesses did not follow through as well as non-business applicants. The fall-off rate for full applications compared to screen acceptances for existing businesses was higher than the fall-off rate for non-business applicants (Table 6-44).

The proportion of full applications relative to screen applications received from existing businesses with positive net incomes was slightly higher than the proportion of full applications relative to screen applications received from existing businesses with negative net incomes (Table 6-45).

As well, screen acceptance rates for existing businesses with positive net incomes were higher than screen acceptance rates for existing businesses with negative net incomes. The fall-off rate for full applications compared to screen acceptances for businesses with positive net incomes was slightly less than the fall-off rate for businesses with negative net incomes (Table 6-46).

There was a positive change in the proportion of full applications from existing businesses that previously received financing from any government compared to their proportion of screen applications. There was a negative change in the proportion of full applications from existing businesses that did not receive previous financing from any government compared to their proportion of screen applications (Table 6-47). These vectors are the same for existing businesses that received previous financing from any federal government source compared to those that did not receive previous financing from any federal government source, and they are the same for existing businesses that received previous financing from any DRE/IE source compared to those that did not receive previous financing from any DRE/IE source. The magnitude of change was slightly stronger for those that received previous financing from any federal government source, but much stronger for those that received previous financing from any DRE/IE source.

These results were largely due to the much higher relative rates of screen acceptances for existing businesses that received previous financing from governments, especially for those that received previous financing from DRE/IE. In fact, the rate of fall-off from screen acceptances to full applications was relatively high for existing businesses that previously received DRE/IE financing while the rates of fall-off for existing businesses that received previous financing from any government or any federal government were lower than for existing businesses that did not receive previous financing from any government or from any federal government, respectively. Existing businesses previously financed by DRE/IE show, for reasons not known, less follow through.

Data on number of full applications by goal over the study period show little change in the relative rates of placing full applications compared

to screen applications (Table 6-49). This finding is unexpected because there is substantial variation in the rates of screen acceptances by goal. The fall-off rate for full applications relative to screen acceptances was higher for applications from existing businesses than it was for applications from non-businesses except in cases which the existing business wants to maintain its business (Table 6-50). In other words, the fall-off rate was higher for existing businesses wanting to make substantial changes by starting another business, purchasing another business or to expanding the existing business than it was for non-businesses. Existing businesses wanting to maintain their business show better follow through.

Changes in the relative rates of full applications compared to screen applications regarding the intended location of the head office and the intended location of business operations are similar (Tables 6-51 and 6-53). These changes entailed a much greater proportion of intended locations on Indian reserves at the expense of almost all other locations, especially organized communities, unorganized communities and other in-area locations. In part, these changes reflect the higher screen acceptance rate for screen applications whose intended location was an Indian reserve compared to those applications whose intended location was an organized community, unorganized community and other in-area location. As well, the fall-off rates in number of full applications relative to screen acceptances were two to three times higher for those whose intended location was an organized community or other in-area location compared to those whose intended location was an Indian reserve (Tables 6-52 and 6-54).

Association between community socioeconomic variables and incidence of proposed operational location (FT*) is again tested by application of stepwise multiple regression using records for 1984-88 and socioeconomic data for the 32 communities from the 1986 *Census* and the 35 communities from the 1991 *Census*. The dependent variable incidence of full application operational location (FL*) was again regressed on the 12 independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, and ACC.

The by-now-familiar three stepwise regression models were run.

Model #1 regresses operational location for all entrepreneurs on data for the 12 independent variables generated by the 1986 *Census*. Model #2 regresses operational location for non-government, non-collective entrepreneurs on data for the 12 independent variables generated by the 1986 *Census*. Model #3 regresses operational location for non-government, non-collective entrepreneurs on data for the 12 independent variables collected from the 1991 *Census* with the five unorganized communities added. Table 6-55 presents regression output for the three models.

In three steps model #1 (all entrepreneurs, 1986 *Census* data) generates an R^2 of 0.63 and a SEY of 2.8. This linear model fits the data only moderately well and the SEY is relatively high given the low number of operational locations targeted at many communities. Therefore, model #1 is rejected.

Also in three steps model #2 (all non-government, non-collective entrepreneurs; 1986 *Census* data) generates a similar R^2 of 0.66 and a much lower SEY of 1.6. This SEY is powerful enough to closely predict most of the frequencies of operational locations. Community socioeconomic variables have slightly more explanatory power when government and collective entrepreneurs are eliminated from the model. In this model the variables TOP, CTR, and PAL remain in the model, in order of predictive power. TOP and CTR show positive associations, PAL again shows a negative association. Four variables not remaining in the model show moderate levels of significance: MHY, PG9, PEY and PAB. PG9 has a negative association, the other three variables have positive associations.

In only one step, model #3 (all non-government, non-collective entrepreneur-events, but including five unorganized communities and using 1991 *Census* data) generates an adjusted R^2 of only 0.28, and a high SEY of only 2.5. Therefore, model #3 is rejected.

There are interesting similarities and differences between the model #2 results and the results for the targeting of "low level" entrepreneurship. Proportion of the population that is Aboriginal again shows relatively strong positive associations with business development, and proportion of the

population that usually speaks an Aboriginal language at home again shows relatively strong negative association with locational targeting. The strong, negative association with locational targeting shown by PAL, but not accessibility, is consistent with the proposition concerning the inhibiting effects of mode-of-production related behaviour and values. Proportion of the population that has less than grade 9 education again shows a negative association, but at a moderate level of significance. There also are some notable differences compared to "low level" entrepreneurship. Location on an Indian reserve becomes strongly associated with business development for "high level" entrepreneurship. This again is not consistent with the proposition that Indian reserves are a hostile environment for non-government, non-collective business development. The fact that total population and median household income gain importance in "high level" entrepreneurship may reflect increased focus on product or service demand. Absence of association with accessibility indicates that limited accessibility does not inhibit entrepreneurial targeting.

Over the study period there was a slight increase in the relative proportion of full applications with three or more intended products and a corresponding slight decrease in the relative proportion of full applications with one intended product compared to the relative proportions of screen applications (Table 6-56). This follows, in part, from the higher rate of acceptance for screen applications with three or more intended products than the rate of acceptance for screen applications with one intended product. It also is due to a far lower fall-off rate in the number of full applications relative to screen acceptances for applications with three or more intended products, especially compared to the high fall-off rate for applications with one intended product (Table 6-57).

Relative rates of full applications per intended product show remarkable stability when compared to the relative rates of screen applications per intended product (Table 6-58). Fall-off rates from screen acceptances, however, show great variation (Table 6-59). The only apparent pattern is the high fall-off rates for applications whose principal product is a primary resource except mining. Particularly noteworthy are the relatively low fall-off rates for higher volume products: retail services and cabins-

campgrounds-lodges.

The 468 applications that provided data on intended job creation said they would create 1,907 net person-years of employment. The mean net person-years of employment to be created generally trended lower through the study period (Table 6-60). This may be an indication of a declining job return to business development; or, it may simply reflect more accurate projections.

The full application format asked applicants for proforma income statements for at least three years. As noted above, most full applications contained sufficient data to enable the calculation of projected net income before taxes for at least one fiscal year. For analysis in this study net income is calculated for the year showing the highest projected net income.¹ All full applications, as defined for this study, contain sufficient data to enable calculation of at least one year's projected net earnings before interest, income taxes, and amortization and depreciation (EBITDA). If data to calculate a project's proforma EBITDA for more than one year are available EBITDA is calculated for the year with the highest net income, or in the absence of data to calculate net income, for the year with the highest EBITDA.²

Data on projected viability of the business establishment sheds light on a number of propositions. One proposition suggests profitability will be higher in locations with higher levels of human and infrastructural capital. Another proposition suggests that, in the absence of major structural changes or quick improvements in human capital, the combination of a limited number of business niches and limited improvement in human capital will lower the profitability of incremental expansions in business (i.e. number and/or size). Two possible measures of projected profitability are proforma

1. In most cases this is the final fiscal year of the proforma statement, but this is not necessarily so.

2. When data are available to calculate EBITDA and net income, EBITDA is always calculated for the same fiscal year as net income. The year showing highest net income is almost always the year showing the highest EBITDA.

net income and proforma EBITDA (Table 6-61).

Results calculated from proforma data are consistent with both propositions. Mean projected net income was highest for those businesses planning to locate in the relatively wealthy organized communities that also have relatively well developed infrastructure. Mean projected net income was lowest for those businesses planning to locate in the relatively poor Indian reserves that have relatively poorly developed infrastructure. As well, the slopes of least-squares regression lines show substantial, continuing, year-over-year decreases in projected net incomes and projected EBITDA for the study area and for each of the three community groups. The relative slope coefficients for the three community groups are fascinating. The reduction in mean EBITDA over time was highest for organized communities and lowest for Indian reserves. Perhaps this is because there were more relatively high-profitable business niches available within Indian reserves since Indian reserves had, going into the study period, the least developed business sectors of the three community groups. Perhaps it is simply a result of changes in the accuracy of, or degree of conservatism in, projection methods over time.

Proforma return-on-total-capital, a measure of the business impact of DRE/IE financing, has been calculated from data in the full applications (Table 6-62). The projected overall rate of return on capital, discounted for inflation, was a credible 15%. The results, however, do not support the propositions stated above. They indicate similar overall rates of return among the different groups of communities. They also indicate little change in return-on-capital for all communities over the study period. There was, however, secular improvement in return-on-capital in the organized communities and secular decline in return-on-capital in the unorganized communities.

Level of household incomes would have enhanced the profits of those businesses located in organized communities that were not entirely export

driven,¹ and limited profits of non-export driven businesses located in unorganized communities and Indian reserves. From 1981 to 1991 changes in median household and per capita incomes could have increased the profitability of non-export driven businesses in the unorganized communities. During the same period the profitability of non-export driven businesses in the organized communities could have benefited from improvement in per capita incomes, but would have suffered from the decline in median household income. The profitability of non-export driven businesses located within Indian reserves could have benefited from substantial increases in both improved median household income and improved per capita income. Population change would have improved profitability on Indian reserves, but reduced profitability in organized and unorganized communities.

Mean EBITDA and mean net incomes have been calculated from proforma data by product sector (Table 6-62). There is great variation among these means. Highest implied mean net incomes were projected for construction, retail and food and beverage, and mining products. Lowest implied mean net incomes were projected for agriculture; logging and forestry related; manufacturing; communications; local government, health and education; food and beverage services; and other service products. As well, return-on-total-capital has been calculated for each product sector. Highest implied returns-on-total-capital were projected for fishing, construction, transportation, and retail and food and beverage businesses. Lowest implied returns-on-total-capital were projected for logging, forestry and manufacturing; mining; manufacturing; communications; local government, health and education; cabins, campgrounds and lodges; and food and beverage services.

Job creation return-on-capital is another important measure of program performance. The implied job creation return-on-capital, in terms of -----

1. An export is defined here as a product or service sold to a location outside the community group. Care must be taken with this definition. Products and services are often provided by the organized communities to the unorganized communities and Indian reserves. Many products and services are provided by certain unorganized communities (e.g. Norway House) to certain adjacent Indian reserves, and products and services are provided by certain Indian reserves (e.g. Peguis) to adjacent unorganized communities.

net new person-years of employment, has been calculated for applications projecting net income and sufficient employment data to calculate net change in person-years of employment (Table 6-64). Capital invested in local government, health and education; logging and forestry; manufacturing; and construction businesses had a relatively high full-time-equivalent projected employment impact. Capital invested in communications, mining, transportation, retail; finance, real estate and business services; accommodation and food and beverage; and cabins, campgrounds and lodges showed a relatively low full-time-equivalent projected employment impact. With the notable exception of construction, therefore, businesses with a high job creation impact per dollar invested had relatively low business viability impact and visa-versa. No wonder DRE/IE program staff found it difficult to navigate between these two primary program objectives.

Summary of Findings

The study's database is built upon 1,596 screen applications. The number of screen and full applications received per year by all programs trended upwards over the study period. This trend followed the increasing penetration of the welfare state and market economy into study area communities. Changes in the number of screen and full applications received per year appear to have been more related to federal elections than to political events in Manitoba, or to the health of the Manitoba or northern Manitoba economies.

An overwhelming majority of screen and full applications were submitted by a single individual. Local governments and collectives each submitted a small minority, few came from private corporations.

Over time an increasing proportion of screen and full applications came from Indian Bands and registered Indians (most of whom lived on reserves). This resulted from the collectivist governing structure of most Indian reserves, the very weak economies of most reserves at the beginning of the study period, and the increasing capacity and assertiveness of Indian bands and tribal councils over the study period. INAC and EIC provided

substantial resources to bands and tribal councils. These resources enabled these organizations to both employ economic development staff or consultants, and to form public sector social and economic development organizations.

There was little difference in the overall rate of "low level" entrepreneurship between the unorganized communities and Indian reserves. This finding is not consistent with the proposition that entrepreneurship on Indian reserves is stifled by the reserve environment. Indian band entrepreneurship nearly offset the substantially lower level of non-government entrepreneurship from Indian reserves and by registered Indians. Therefore, "low level" data on entrepreneurship are consistent with the proposition that entrepreneurship on Indian reserves is stifled by reserve environmental conditions when applied to non-governmental entrepreneurship only.

By applicant type the proportion of full applications by proprietors fell while the proportion of Indian band applicants rose. In part, this relative fall-off in the proportion of proprietor applications and relative increase in the proportion of Indian band applicants reflects the much higher screen acceptance rates for Indian bands relative to proprietors. It also reflects the ability of Indian bands to turn screen applications into full applications. The relative increases in the proportions of applicants from Indian reserves to some extent reflect the relatively high screen acceptance rates for Indian bands. They reflect, above all, the ability of Indian reserve applicants to turn screen applications into full applications.

Over the study period there was a notable increase in the proportion of full applications compared to the proportion of screen applications received from registered Indians. Yet again, these findings argue for the superior ability of registered Indians, most of whom were located on reserves, to turn screen acceptances into full applications. Screen acceptance rates for registered Indians were slightly higher than acceptance rates for other groups, but the application turnaround time was much faster. It is not surprising, then, that the fall-off rate in the number of full applications compared to screen acceptances was lowest for registered

Indian applicants. The fall-off rate also was relatively low for non-Aboriginals. It was highest for Aboriginals who were not registered Indians.

For the years 1979 through 1988 the rate of screen applicants per thousand persons was higher for unorganized communities than Indian reserves; however, the rate of full applicants per thousand persons was higher for Indian reserves than for unorganized communities. This reversal reflects the ability of applicants located on Indian reserves to transform screen applications into full applications. Again, however, if Indian band and local government applicants are subtracted from the 1979 through 1988 application rates, the rate of "high level" entrepreneurship from Indian reserves falls below the rate of "high level" entrepreneurship from unorganized communities.

Regression of the number of "low level" entrepreneurial events onto community socioeconomic variables indicates that the involvement of local governments and government-sponsored collective organizations, both highly dependent on revenue from senior governments rather than local sources, appears to slightly confound the relationship between community conditions and "low level" entrepreneur-events. As expected, given the programs' target, adult population and proportion of the population that is Aboriginal show relatively strong explanatory power. Regression results suggest the existence of a relatively more unequal income distribution, so long as those with higher income meet some minimal threshold of higher income, may generate more "low level" entrepreneurs that are not directly or indirectly governments. The finding that proportion of population that normally speaks an Aboriginal language at home is negatively associated with the number of entrepreneur-events is consistent with indications from other research that this proportion has a negative relationship to a variety of socioeconomic conditions generally perceived as an improvement. It may be that the continuation of behavioral and value patterns from an earlier mode-of-production, reflected and perpetuated in language, inhibits the adoption of behavioral and value patterns appropriate for the current mode-of-production. The propositions that residence in a reserve environment or more difficult access inhibit the development of "low level" entrepreneurship are not supported by regression analysis.

Regression of number of "high level" entrepreneurial events onto community socioeconomic variables also indicates that involvement of local governments and government sponsored collective organizations interfere with the relationship between community socioeconomic conditions and entrepreneur-events. For "high level" entrepreneurship total population rather than adult population is the variable with strongest predictive power. As with "low level" entrepreneurship, both proportion of the population that is Aboriginal and per capita income show relatively strong explanatory power. Proportion of income that is earned, however, shows a stronger positive association for "high level" entrepreneurship. Proportion of the population that usually speaks an Aboriginal language at home does not remain in the "high level" model, but the variable still shows a negative association and not high significance. Strength of regression results are not consistent with the proposition that residence on an Indian reserve inordinately inhibits entrepreneurship, that remoteness inhibits entrepreneurship, or that low levels of education inhibit entrepreneurship although the directions of these associations are consistent with such propositions.

A majority of screen applicants of known business state were submitted by existing businesses and a substantial minority of these had previously received government financing. As well, a majority of existing business applicants had negative net income for their previous fiscal year. The fact that such a high percentage of existing businesses were in financial trouble before making application challenged the longer term effectiveness of the programs. Although there was a notably higher rate of screen acceptances by existing businesses, these businesses did not follow through with full applications as well as those non-business applicants that received screen acceptance unless the goal was to maintain their existing business.

The goal of the majority of applications was to create a new business establishment. In order of overall proportion of applications, this was followed by the goal "expand business" establishment, the goal "purchase business," and the goal "maintain business." These proportions reinforced the already difficult circumstances facing the programs. Most applicants had little or no business experience and those that did were more often than not

in financial trouble.

Almost all screen and full applications projected head-office and operational locations within the study area. For the vast majority of projects projected head-office and operational locations were synonymous. The most frequent intended location was an Indian reserve, followed by unorganized communities or areas, and organized communities. Neither "metropolitan" areas, rural southern Manitoba, or northern "urban" centres were frequently listed as head-office locations. This finding is not consistent with a crude version of the "metropolis-hinterland theory of underdevelopment."

Regression analysis suggests involvement of local governments and government-sponsored collective organizations has little effect on the relationship between community socioeconomic conditions and "low level" choice of operational location. Adult population and proportion of the population that is Aboriginal show strong explanatory power regarding choice of operational location. This is not surprising since entrepreneurs are adults and few chose operational locations outside their home communities. Per capita income shows a reasonably strong positive association with operational location. The profit logic of business would have lead one to expect stronger, positive associations between income variables and operational location. Proportion of population that normally speaks an Aboriginal language at home again shows a negative association with strong explanatory power. As well, type of community again appears not to be associated with choice of operational location. This is not consistent with the proposition that Indian reserves are more hostile environment for business entrepreneurship. The proposition that more difficult access inhibits the development of entrepreneurship receives minimal support.

Regressing the variable "targeting of 'high level' entrepreneurship" onto community socioeconomic variables shows, again, that the proportion of the population that is Aboriginal has a relatively strong positive association with choice of operational location, and the proportion of the population that usually speaks an Aboriginal language at home has a relatively strong negative association with choice of operational location. The strong, negative association with locational targeting shown by

proportion of the population that usually speaks an Aboriginal language at home, but not accessibility, is consistent with the proposition concerning the inhibiting effects of mode-of-production related behaviour and values. Proportion of the population having less than grade 9 education again shows a negative association with business development. There are some notable differences for "high level" compared to "low level" entrepreneurial targeting. Location on an Indian reserve becomes strongly associated with business development for "high level" targeting. This again is not consistent with the proposition that Indian reserves are a problematic environment for non-government, non-collective business development. Total population and median household income gain importance as predictive variables in "high level" targeting. This may reflect increased focus on product or service demand.

Over the study period services, comprising around one-half of screen and full applications with known products, were the most frequent intended products whereas primary products and non-primary, non-service products each comprised around a fifth of screen and full applications.

DRE/IE screen eligibility decisions flowed from a first-past-the-post and "satisficing" strategy, not from an optimization of economic or business impact strategy. Slightly less than half of screen applications were explicitly or implicitly judged as eligible. The most frequent single reason for non-acceptance was lack of applicant contact. In general there was a shying away from eligible designation decisions by program officers.

The vague goals and decision criteria, and traveling advisory/promoting staff of NDA2 are evidenced by its quick response time to screen applications and its acceptance rate of nearly 90%. This is over twice the acceptance rate of the more restrictive and more demanding SARDA. NEDP was a very different matter, this program's focus on large capitalization businesses and the few applications it received meant that it, and generally, its applicants, poured much more resources into application and approvals processes.

Inter-departmental and inter-governmental risk-sharing added to the

public sector's and the entrepreneur's administrative costs, and may have increased total financing. Inter-governmental risk-sharing also may have decreased effectiveness by adding complexity. Both inter-governmental and inter-departmental coherence and coordination were difficult to achieve and maintain once achieved.

On average, roughly 13 months elapsed between receipt of the screen application and the date of the final decision respecting financing. Over eight months elapsed between receipt of a screen application and an eligibility decision. From the date the last full application was received and to the date of a financing decision a further five and one-half months elapsed.

Slightly less than half of the financing decisions on full applications were based on relatively complete full applications.

Full applications prepared by non-government agents had the highest rate of relative completeness. The relative completeness rate for applications prepared by staff of other government agencies was also reasonably high. Applications completed by the applicants were, not surprisingly, least likely to be relatively complete. There were only a handful of applications prepared by case program staff.

By applicant location, high rates of relative completeness were achieved by applicants who could benefit from experience and specialized assistance, and by applicants who did not face the added difficulties of coordinating more than two applicants. Those applicants who benefited most from specialized and qualified assistance available during the latter portion of the study period lived on Indian reserves. Many variables and attributes were too weak to remain in a regression model of relative completeness. This suggests external factors, such as personal and organizational characteristics, play a major role in the achievement of relative completeness.

The volumes of, and balance between, full and screen applications received after 1984 would have far outstripped the capacity of the

aggregate staff of all programs *if* these staff had operated according to the staff time-allocation algorithm prepared by SARDA, the one and only staff time-allocation algorithm prepared any program. This reflects either the absence of organizational planning, the implicit favouring of capital spending at the expense of staff support in project planning or project aftercare, or incorrect assumptions concerning the capacity and abilities of other government and non-government agencies.

Data on projected viability of the business establishment sheds light on a number of propositions. One proposition suggests profitability will be higher in locations with higher levels of human and infrastructural capital. Another of proposition suggests that, in the absence of major structural changes or quick improvements in human capital, the combination of a limited number of business niches and limited improvement in human capital will lower the profitability of incremental expansions in business. Results calculated from proforma data are consistent with both propositions. Mean projected net income was highest for those businesses planning to locate in the relatively wealthy organized communities that also have relatively well developed infrastructure. Mean projected net income was lowest for those businesses planning to locate in the relatively poor Indian reserves that also have relatively poorly developed infrastructure. As well, the slopes of least-squares regression lines show substantial, continuing, year-over-year decreases in projected net incomes and projected EBITDA for the study area and for each of the three community groups.

The overall projected real rate-of-return-on-capital in full applications was a credible 15%. There were similar overall rates-of-return among the different groups of communities and there was little change in the rate-of-return for all communities over the study period. There was, however, secular improvement in the rate-of-return for organized communities and secular decline in the rate-of-return for unorganized communities. These findings are not consistent with the proposition predicting a secular decline in profitability because of absorption constraints.

There was great variation in mean EBITDA, and mean net income and return-on-capital by product sector. Highest implied mean net incomes were

projected for construction, retail and food and beverage, and mining products. Lowest implied mean net incomes were projected for agriculture; logging and forestry related; manufacturing; communications; local government, health and education; food and beverage services; and other service products. Highest implied returns-on-total-capital were projected for fishing, construction, transportation, and retail and food and beverage businesses. Lowest implied returns-on-total-capital were projected for logging, forestry and manufacturing; mining; manufacturing; communications; local government, health and education; cabins, campgrounds and lodges; and food and beverage services.

The job creation return-to-invested-capital is another measure of program performance. Capital invested in local government, health and education; logging and forestry; manufacturing; and construction businesses had a relatively high projected full-time-equivalent employment impact. Capital invested in communications, mining, transportation, retail; finance, real estate and business services; accommodation and food and beverage; and cabins, campgrounds and lodges had a relatively low projected full-time-equivalent employment impact. In general, businesses with a high projected job creation impact per dollar invested had a relatively low projected business viability impact and visa-versa. It is not surprising that program staff found it difficult to navigate between the two primary program objectives: business viability and job creation.

**TABLE 6-1
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, DATABASE VARIABLES**

Code	Description and Values
IDNu	Record number.
Sprg	Program that received the application. 1 SARDA Commercial 3 NEDP3. 6 NDA2.
SFile	DRE/IE file number.
SA_N	Name of applicant (surname, given name or business name). There are up to six applicants per screen application.
SA_T	Type of applicant. There are up to six types per screen application. 1 For profit, privately owned corporation. 2 Not-for-profit organization. 5 For-profit, community owned or membership organization. 19 Indian Band. 20 Local government. 21 Federal or provincial government owned organization. 26 Goal not known, community owned or membership controlled organization 99 Applicant type not known.
SA_L	Residence or head office location of applicant. Up to six locations are possible. See Location Codes, Appendix Table 2-2.
SA_S	Status of applicant. Up to six status groups are possible. 1 Registered Indian. 2 Other aboriginal, not Registered Indian. 3 Aboriginal, status not known. 4 Not aboriginal. 9 Status not known.
SIsB	Current business state. 1 Yes, an existing business. 2 No, not an existing business. 9 Business state not known.
SCCB	Current business name.
SPer	If a current business, current performance as measured by the last fiscal year net income before taxes. 1 Positive net income. 2 Negative net income. 9 Net income not known.
SS_V	If a current business and financial assistance was previously received, value of assistance received. Up to six amounts are possible. (\$000's)
SS_S	If a current business and financial assistance was previously received, source of assistance received. 1 SARDA commercial. 2 SARDA other. 3 Native Economic Developemt Program, Element #3. 4 Native Economic Developemt Program, Element #2. 5 Northern Development Agreement Program #1. 6 Northern Development Agreement Program #2. 8 Communities Economic Development Fund. 10 Indian Economic Development Fund or Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. 12 Employment and Immigration Canada. 13 Federal Business Development Bank. 14 Federal government other. 15 Provincial government employment program. 16 Provincial government other. 17 Commercial financier including regional and aboriginal capital corporations. 18 Charitable financier. 20 Manitoba Co-operative Development. 21 NDA12 (Infrastructure). 22 Aboriginal Economic Program. 99 Source not known.

**TABLE 6-1 (Cont.)
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, DATABASE VARIABLES**

Code	Description and Values
SAD1	Date the applicant(s) signed the application.
SAD2	Date the program received the application.
SGoI	Goal of the applicant(s). 1 Establish a new business. 2 Purchase a business. 3 Expand an existing business. 4 Maintain (revitalize, refinance, subsidize an existing business). 5 Existing business wants to establish a new, different business. 11 Existing business wants to purchase a different business. 99 Goal not known.
SOFL	Proposed location of head office. See Location Codes, Appendix Table 2-2.
SOpL	Proposed location of operations. See Location Codes, Appendix Table 2-2.
SPr_	Proposed products. There are up to four product possibilities. See Product Codes, Appendix Table 2-3.
SDec	Program decision. 1 Explicit yes. 2 No. 6 Implicit yes (application proceeds to full application stage). 99 Decision not known.
ScDD	Date of program decision.

**TABLE 6-2
SCREEN APPLICATIONS BY PROGRAM AND YEAR***

Year	Program			All Programs	Census Period	Annual Change	
	SARDA	NDA2	NEDP3			Number	Percent
1971	36			36		-	-
1972	42			42		6	17
1973	24			24	102	-18	-43
1974	25			25		1	4
1975	34			34		9	36
1976	43			43		9	26
1977	68			68		25	58
1978	66			66	236	-2	-3
1979	91			91		25	38
1980	85			85		-6	-7
1981	88			88		3	4
1982	75			75		-13	-15
1983	99	8		107	446	32	43
1984	108	29		137		30	28
1985	120	32	5	157		20	15
1986	63	19	5	87		-70	-45
1987	160	23	2	185		98	113
1988	116	50	2	168	734	-17	-9
1989	19	16	9	44	44	-124	-74
No Date	17	1	16	34	34	-	-
All Years	1379	178	39	1596	1596	-	-

*As dated by applicant. If applicant did not date, date received by program.

**TABLE 6-3
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICANTS PER APPLICATION**

Number of Applicants	Period						All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Dat	
1 Number	89	200	397	637	35	27	1385
% of Period Known	87	85	89	87	80	79	87
2 Number	9	33	43	81	9	6	181
% of Period Known	9	14	10	11	20	18	11
3-6 Number	4	3	6	16	0	1	30
% of Period Known	4	1	1	2	0	3	2
All Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596

**TABLE 6-4
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICANTS BY TYPE OF APPLICANT**

Type of Applicant	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Proprietor							
Number	93	230	466	696	43	22	1550
% of Period	77	84	93	82	81	51	84
For-Profit Private Corp.							
Number	8	9	4	15	0	5	41
% of Period	7	3	1	2	0	12	2
Non-Gov't Collectives							
Number	13	10	8	46	3	3	83
% of Period Known	11	4	2	5	6	7	4
Indian Bands							
Number	6	19	22	89	7	12	155
% of Period Known	5	7	4	10	13	28	8
Local Governments							
Number	0	3	2	4	0	0	9
% of Period Known	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Federal or Provincial							
Number	1	4	1	3	0	1	10
% of Period Known	1	1	0	0	0	2	1
All Known							
Number	121	275	503	853	53	43	1848
% of Period	99	100	100	100	100	98	100
Not Known							
Number	1	0	1	0	0	1	3
% of Period	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
All Types							
Number	122	275	504	853	53	44	1851

**TABLE 6-5
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICANTS BY LOCATION OF APPLICANT**

Location of Applicant	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Organized Community							
Number	24	32	91	98	8	8	261
% of Period Known	21	12	18	11	15	19	14
Unorganized Community							
Number	46	86	126	207	7	5	477
% of Period Known	39	31	25	24	13	12	26
Indian Reserve							
Number	14	71	184	432	29	22	752
% of Period Known	12	26	37	51	55	52	41
Other In-Study-Area							
Number	21	54	64	71	6	4	220
% of Period Known	18	20	13	8	11	10	12
Out-of-Study-Area North							
Number	0	12	7	19	3	0	41
% of Period Known	0	4	1	2	6	0	2
External to North							
Number	12	20	31	26	0	3	92
% of Period Known	10	7	6	3	0	7	5
Location Known							
Number	117	275	503	853	53	42	1843
% of Period	96	1	1	1	1	1	1
Not Known							
Number	5	0	1	0	0	2	8
% of Period	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
All Locations							
Number	122	275	504	853	53	44	1851

**TABLE 6-6
RATE OF SCREEN APPLICATIONS PER TYPE OF COMMUNITY**

Type of Community	Rate Per Thousand Persons Age 15 And Over		
	1976	1981	1986
Organized	4.3	12.6	13.3
Unorganized	12.5	18.7	36.0
Indian Reserve	5.7	16.2	33.6
All Study Area	9.1	18.3	31.1

Sources: Tables 4-7 and 6-5.

**TABLE 6-7
1986 COMMUNITY SOCIOECONOMIC DATA AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE DATA FOR REGRESSING 1984-88 PROJECT
DATA, SCREEN APPLICATIONS**

Place	Independent Variables												Dependent Variables			
	CTR (1)	TOP (2)	ADP (3)	PAB (4)	PAL (5)	MHY (6)	PCY (7)	PEY (8)	PEM (9)	PG9 (10)	PTP (11)	ACC (12)	SA1 (13)	SA2 (14)	SL1 (15)	SL2 (16)
Hollow Water IR	1	452	260	0.96	0.12	19.8	5.6	0.75	0.38	0.40	0.19	0	9	6	10	6
Berens River IR	1	803	455	0.97	0.68	28.9	5.9	0.64	0.38	0.52	0.15	1	7	7	7	5
Bloodvein IR	1	420	235	0.95	0.50	8.5	2.8	0.77	0.23	0.57	0.09	1	4	3	4	3
Brochet IR	1	251	125	0.98	0.87	28.0	4.0	0.46	0.12	0.84	0.16	1	2	1	1	1
Chemawawin IR	1	441	265	0.98	0.72	22.7	4.8	0.67	0.45	0.62	0.08	0	8	8	7	7
Churchill	0	1217	865	0.41	0.03	42.2	15.6	0.91	0.69	0.20	0.44	1	10	10	9	9
Cross Lake IR	1	1785	1060	0.99	0.78	13.0	3.5	0.52	0.20	0.55	0.11	0	27	18	22	13
Fisher River IR	1	765	510	0.97	0.04	22.6	6.6	0.70	0.30	0.36	0.25	0	36	33	36	31
Garden Hill IR	1	1873	1050	0.99	0.94	19.0	4.5	0.52	0.24	0.50	0.17	1	12	11	11	10
St Theresa Pt & Wasagamack IR	1	2627	1105	0.80	0.98	20.8	3.5	0.43	0.19	0.44	0.12	1	26	15	22	11
God's Lake IR	1	867	510	0.97	0.94	27.4	5.5	0.54	0.26	0.51	0.10	1	8	7	7	6
God's River IR	1	300	155	0.98	0.97	24.4	4.6	0.61	0.35	0.55	0.03	1	5	3	5	3
Grand Rapids, LGD	0	625	425	0.66	0.07	44.2	11.6	0.88	0.65	0.22	0.34	0	10	10	8	8
Grand Rapids IR	1	318	135	0.97	0.96	19.9	6.5	0.65	0.52	0.63	0.11	0	10	8	5	3
Lac Brochet IR	1	428	230	0.99	0.00	23.3	4.7	0.47	0.11	0.87	0.00	1	11	11	10	10
Little Black River IR	1	251	140	0.96	0.14	13.5	4.4	0.73	0.32	0.46	0.07	0	5	4	5	4
Little Grand Rapids IR	1	537	335	0.99	0.80	11.6	3.1	0.71	0.34	0.55	0.10	1	8	7	2	2
Pauiingassi IR	1	299	170	0.99	0.91	9.5	3.4	0.63	0.24	0.62	0.18	1	0	0	1	1
Moose Lake IR	1	252	135	0.97	1.00	19.2	3.7	0.37	0.19	0.56	0.04	0	4	3	4	3
Nelson House IR	1	1112	665	0.99	0.53	20.6	4.2	0.52	0.15	0.61	0.11	0	9	5	9	5
Norway House IR	1	2269	1380	0.98	0.65	24.6	5.1	0.60	0.25	0.45	0.10	0	41	33	32	25
Oxford House IR	1	1268	715	0.98	0.94	19.1	4.6	0.52	0.18	0.55	0.07	1	13	8	11	8
Shoal River(Dawson Bay) IR	1	296	160	0.98	0.75	6.1	2.7	0.50	0.19	0.56	0.09	0	2	2	1	1
Poplar River IR	1	583	350	0.97	0.32	20.6	5.2	0.56	0.27	0.63	0.07	1	5	4	5	3
Pukatawagan IR	1	728	400	0.98	0.38	14.7	2.8	0.42	0.23	0.53	0.06	1	7	3	6	3
Red Sucker Lake IR	1	437	260	1.00	0.96	18.8	4.7	0.50	0.19	0.65	0.04	1	3	0	3	2
Shamattawa IR	1	564	280	0.99	0.86	19.2	3.0	0.51	0.21	0.75	0.05	1	5	3	5	3
South Indian Lake	0	743	490	0.98	0.50	25.9	4.7	0.61	0.19	0.47	0.09	0	21	14	16	13
Spiit Lake IR	1	976	570	0.99	0.35	21.1	4.6	0.47	0.18	0.53	0.10	0	11	9	10	9
The Pas, Town	0	6283	4495	0.19	0.02	41.5	13.4	0.90	0.64	0.15	0.48	0	71	66	54	51
The Pas, LGD	0	1940	1370	0.36	0.02	43.9	12.6	0.90	0.66	0.20	0.41	0	0	0	0	0
The Pas IR	1	1767	1050	0.90	0.16	19.1	4.9	0.75	0.38	0.40	0.22	0	33	22	34	23

TABLE 6-7 (Cont.)
1986 COMMUNITY SOCIOECONOMIC DATA AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE DATA FOR REGRESSING 1984-88 PROJECT DATA, SCREEN APPLICATIONS

1. CTR = 1-Indian reserve community, 0-not an Indian reserve.
2. TOP = Total population of community.
3. ADP = Adult population (15 yrs. or more) of community.
4. PAB = Proportion of community population that is Aboriginal.
5. PAL = Proportion of community population that speaks an Aboriginal language at home.
6. MHY = Median household income of community.
7. PCY = Per capital income of community.
8. PEY = Proportion of community income that is earned income.
9. PEM = Proportion of adult population (15 yrs. or more) of community that is employed.
10. PG9 = Proportion of the community population with less than grade 9 education.
11. PTP = Proportion of the community population with some post secondary, trade, or university education.
12. ACC = Road accessibility of community. 1-road, 2- no road.
13. SA1 = Number of separate entrepreneur-entrepreneurial events in screen applications.
14. SA2 = Number of separate entrepreneur-entrepreneurial events that are not governmental or not collective in screen applications.
15. SL1 = Number of entrepreneurial events that targeted community for location of project operations in screen applications.
16. SL2 = Number of entrepreneurial events by non-government and non-collective entrepreneurs that targeted community for location of project operations in screen applications.

TABLE 6-8
1991 COMMUNITY SOCIOECONOMIC DATA AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE DATA FOR REGRESSING 1984-88 PROJECT DATA*
SCREEN APPLICATIONS

Place	Independent Variables												Dependent Variables			
	CTR (1)	TOP (2)	ADP (3)	PAB (4)	PAL (5)	MHY (6)	PCY (7)	PEY (8)	PEM (9)	PG9 (10)	PTP (11)	ACC (12)	SA1 (13)	SA2 (14)	SL1 (15)	SL2 (16)
Hollow Water IR	1	427	260	0.96	0.12	23.2	5.6	0.70	0.35	0.27	0.33	0	9	6	10	6
Berens River IR	1	700	420	0.97	0.68	25.4	5.9	0.55	0.36	0.52	0.07	1	7	7	7	5
Bloodvein IR	1	432	255	0.95	0.50	18.6	4.5	0.46	0.20	0.61	0.00	1	4	3	4	3
Camperville	0	579	375	1.00	0.08	10.5	4.8	0.58	0.20	0.44	0.11	0	17	17	14	13
Chemawawin IR	1	551	330	0.98	0.72	23.6	6.1	0.65	0.33	0.56	0.16	0	8	8	7	7
Churchill	0	1143	845	0.41	0.03	37.4	15.2	0.90	0.66	0.20	0.38	1	10	10	9	9
Cross Lake	0	401	235	0.66	0.22	22.2	7.6	0.77	0.36	0.26	0.17	0	3	3	2	2
Cross Lake IR	1	2605	1520	0.99	0.78	22.7	5.0	0.59	0.29	0.47	0.21	0	27	18	22	13
Duck Bay	0	427	280	1.00	0.11	13.7	5.5	0.59	0.20	0.46	0.13	0	9	8	9	8
Fisher River IR	1	850	580	0.97	0.04	18.3	6.9	0.66	0.47	0.27	0.38	0	38	33	36	31
Garden Hill IR	1	1711	965	0.99	0.94	18.2	4.6	0.48	0.24	0.50	0.22	1	12	11	11	10
St Theresa Pt & Wasagamack IR	1	2116	1135	0.80	0.98	22.0	4.8	0.54	0.26	0.38	0.21	1	26	15	22	11
God's Lake IR	1	809	450	0.97	0.94	19.0	4.2	0.51	0.31	0.51	0.09	1	8	7	7	6
God's River IR	1	299	160	0.98	0.97	18.2	3.3	0.66	0.44	0.34	0.13	1	5	3	5	3
Grand Rapids, LGD	0	506	345	0.66	0.07	34.8	12.9	0.85	0.57	0.20	0.49	0	10	10	8	8
Grand Rapids IR	1	374	220	0.97	0.96	19.5	5.7	0.61	0.45	0.32	0.30	0	10	8	5	3
Lac Brochet IR	1	489	270	0.99	0.00	18.2	3.6	0.40	0.15	0.69	0.04	1	11	11	10	10
Little Grand Rapids IR	1	481	285	0.99	0.80	9.5	2.4	0.32	0.12	0.77	0.04	1	8	7	2	2
Paungassi IR	1	280	160	0.99	0.91	9.8	2.9	0.57	0.19	0.75	0.06	1	0	0	1	1
Moose Lake IR	1	420	250	0.97	1.00	16.7	4.0	0.55	0.18	0.52	0.16	0	4	3	4	3
Nelson House IR	1	1409	860	0.99	0.53	25.5	5.6	0.61	0.33	0.40	0.25	0	9	5	9	5
Norway House	0	507	325	0.71	0.08	35.0	10.5	0.85	0.60	0.18	0.34	0	18	18	16	16
Norway House IR	1	2818	1745	0.98	0.65	26.1	6.0	0.62	0.33	0.34	0.37	0	41	33	32	25
Oxford House IR	1	1351	805	0.98	0.94	25.0	5.3	0.54	0.30	0.55	0.09	1	13	8	11	8
Shoal River(Dawson Bay) IR	1	427	230	0.98	0.75	13.3	4.1	0.49	0.20	0.48	0.11	0	2	2	1	1
Poplar River IR	1	441	255	0.97	0.32	15.6	4.2	0.56	0.31	0.51	0.16	1	5	4	5	3
Pukatawagan IR	1	676	355	0.98	0.38	21.5	4.6	0.59	0.28	0.48	0.14	1	7	3	6	3
Red Sucker Lake IR	1	358	225	1.00	0.96	17.9	5.0	0.58	0.27	0.60	0.09	1	3	0	3	2
Shamattawa IR	1	486	270	0.99	0.66	27.1	5.2	0.56	0.31	0.54	0.11	1	5	3	5	3
South Indian Lake	0	732	420	0.98	0.50	19.6	4.7	0.51	0.29	0.46	0.12	0	21	14	16	13
Split Lake IR	1	1090	690	0.99	0.35	27.8	6.2	0.55	0.23	0.40	0.15	0	11	9	10	9
The Pas, Town	0	6166	4585	0.19	0.02	39.0	14.9	0.89	0.65	0.13	0.50	0	71	66	54	51
The Pas, LGD	0	1892	1335	0.36	0.02	41.0	13.7	0.89	0.68	0.18	0.46	0	0	0	0	0
The Pas IR	1	1632	1060	0.90	0.16	20.9	6.5	0.69	0.40	0.27	0.42	0	33	22	34	23
Wabowden	0	546	350	0.84	0.02	36	10.4	0.83	0.46	0.30	0.07	0	22	21	16	17

**TABLE 6-8 (Cont.)
1991 COMMUNITY SOCIOECONOMIC DATA AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE DATA FOR REGRESSING 1984-88 PROJECT DATA*
SCREEN APPLICATIONS**

• The reserve communities of Brochet and Little Black River had to be dropped because of insufficient data for 1991.
The unorganized communities of Camperville, Duck Bay, Cross Lake, Norway House and Wabowden have been added.

1. CTR = 1-Indian reserve community, 0-not an Indian reserve.
2. TOP = Total population of community.
3. ADP = Adult population (15 yrs. or more) of community.
4. PAB = Proportion of community population that is Aboriginal.
5. PAL = Proportion of community population that speaks an Aboriginal language at home.
6. MHY = Median household income of community.
7. PCY = Per capital income of community.
8. PEY = Proportion of community income that is earned income.
9. PEM = Proportion of adult population (15 yrs. or more) of community that is employed.
10. PG9 = Proportion of the community population with less than grade 9 education.
11. PTP = Proportion of the community population with some post secondary, trade, or university education.
12. ACC = Road accessibility of community. 1-road, 2- no road.
13. SA1 = Number of separate entrepreneur-entrepreneurial events in screen applications.
14. SA2 = Number of separate entrepreneur-entrepreneurial events that are not governmental or not collective in screen applications.
15. SL1 = Number of entrepreneurial events that targeted community for location of project operations in screen applications.
16. SL2 = Number of entrepreneurial events by non-government and non-collective entrepreneurs that targeted community for location of project operations in screen applications.

TABLE 6-9
COMMUNITY CONDITIONS AND THE GENERATION OF "LOW LEVEL" ENTREPRENEUR-
EVENTS, RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS #1 - #3

Model #1: All Entrepreneurs, 1986 Census Data

Cases: 32.
 Dependent variable: SA1.
 Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.
 Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.
 4 steps to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.8083. Std. err. Y = 6.5387.
 DF: regression = 4, residual = 27. F = 33.6689. Sig F = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
TOP	0.0158	0.0016	1.2178	0.0000
PAB	70.3488	17.4177	0.9552	0.0004
PCY	2.0673	0.9368	0.4430	0.0360
PAL	-10.2374	3.9563	-0.2511	0.0154
Constant	-72.1358	21.4753	-	0.0023

Variables not in model:

	Beta	Partial	Sig. "t"
ACC	-0.1353	-0.3004	0.1204
PEY	0.1651	0.2469	0.2052
PG9	-0.1579	-0.2249	0.2498
CTR	-0.1286	-0.1640	0.4042
PEM	0.1277	0.1541	0.4336
PTP	0.1508	0.1502	0.4454
MHY	-0.0802	-0.0901	0.6485
ADP	0.2421	0.0840	0.6709

Model #2: Non-Government, Non-Collective Entrepreneurs, 1986 Census Data

Cases: 32.
 Dependent variable: SA2.
 Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.
 Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.
 4 steps to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.8224. Std. err. Y = 5.5010.
 DF: regression = 4, residual = 27. F = 36.8853. Sig F = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
ADP	0.0201	0.0020	1.2271	0.0000
PAB	59.8506	14.5143	0.9297	0.0003
PCY	1.8218	0.7719	0.4466	0.0258
PAL	-7.1039	3.3210	-0.1994	0.0416
Constant	-62.2292	17.7801	-	0.0016

Variables not in model:

	Beta	Partial	Sig. "t"
ACC	-0.0834	-0.1910	0.3302
PG9	-0.1211	-0.1809	0.3568
PEY	0.1143	0.1786	0.3631
PEM	0.1148	0.1446	0.4629
PTP	0.1363	0.1412	0.4737
TOP	0.2834	0.1059	0.5916
MHY	-0.0574	-0.0673	0.7338
CTR	-0.0174	-0.0232	0.9067

**TABLE 6-9 (Cont.)
COMMUNITY CONDITIONS AND THE GENERATION OF "LOW LEVEL" ENTREPRENEUR-
EVENTS, RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS #1 - #3**

Model #3: Non-Government, Non-Collective Entrepreneurs, 1991 Census Data

Cases: 35.

Dependent variable: SA2.

Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.

3 steps to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.7442. Std err. Y = 6.3716.

DF: regression = 3, residual = 31. F = 33.9852. Sig F = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
ADP	0.0155	0.0018	0.9794	0.0000
PAB	22.4305	8.3873	0.3514	0.0118
PAL	-11.8029	3.3903	-0.3526	0.0015
Constant	-12.9555	7.7582	-	0.1050

Variables not in model:

	Beta	Partial	Sig. "t"
PEM	0.2827	0.3401	0.0569
PG9	-0.1782	-0.2595	0.1515
PCY	0.3309	0.2523	0.1635
PEY	0.1612	0.1988	0.2754
CTR	-0.1468	-0.1964	0.2813
PTP	0.1114	0.1622	0.3750
TOP	-0.7517	-0.1602	0.3813
ACC	-0.0761	-0.1378	0.4519
MHY	-0.0134	-0.0177	0.9235

**TABLE 6-10
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICANTS BY STATUS OF APPLICANT**

Status of Applicant	Period						All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	
Registered Indian							
Number	18	72	195	445	31	24	785
% of Period Known	20	33	50	59	65	57	51
Other Aboriginal							
Number	17	73	91	146	3	4	334
% of Period Known	19	34	23	19	6	10	22
Aboriginal, Not Known							
Number	33	34	53	90	8	7	225
% of Period Known	37	16	13	12	17	17	15
Any Aboriginal							
Number	68	179	339	681	42	35	1344
% of Period Known	76	83	86	90	88	83	87
Not Aboriginal							
Number	21	37	54	79	6	7	204
% of Period Known	24	17	14	10	13	17	13
Status Known							
Number	89	216	393	760	48	42	1548
% of Period	73	79	78	89	91	95	84
Not Known							
Number	33	59	111	93	5	2	303
% of Period	27	21	22	11	9	5	16
Any Status							
Number	122	275	504	853	53	44	1851

**TABLE 6-11
RATE OF SCREEN APPLICATIONS PER STATUS GROUP**

Status of Applicant	Rate Per Thousand Persons Age 15 & Over
	1986
Registered India	30.0
Other Aboriginal	27.1
Not Aboriginal	10.8

Sources: Tables 4-8 and 6-10.

**TABLE 6-12
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICANTS BY BUSINESS STATE**

Business State	Period						All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	
Existing Business							
Number	37	65	118	230	11	12	473
% of Period Known	37	28	26	31	25	35	30
Not An Existing Business							
Number	62	167	328	503	33	22	1115
% of Period Known	63	72	74	69	75	65	70
State Known							
Number	99	232	446	733	44	34	1588
% of Period	97	98	100	100	100	100	99
Not Known							
Number	3	4	0	1	0	0	8
% of Period	3	2	0	0	0	0	1
Any State							
Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596

**TABLE 6-13
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICANTS FROM EXISTING BUSINESSES
THAT PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED GOVERNMENT FINANCING**

Government Source	Period						All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	
Any Government							
Number	6	17	28	79	6	6	142
% of Period Known	16	26	24	34	55	50	30
No Government							
Number	31	48	90	151	5	6	331
% of Period Known	84	74	76	66	45	50	70
Any + No Government							
Number	37	65	118	230	11	12	473
Any Federal Government							
Number	6	15	27	77	6	4	135
% of Period Known	16	23	23	33	55	33	29
No Federal Government							
Number	31	50	91	153	5	8	338
% of Period Known	84	77	77	67	45	67	71
Any DRE/IE							
Number	0	4	13	56	3	3	79
% of Period Known	0	6	11	24	27	25	17
No DRE/IE							
Number	37	61	105	174	8	9	394
% of Period	100	94	89	76	73	75	83

TABLE 6-14
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF EXISTING BUSINESSES BY NET INCOME

Net Income	Period						
	1971 -73	1974 -78	1979 -83	1984 -88	1989	No Date	All Periods
Positive							
Number	3	3	9	36	1	1	53
% , Period Known	23	23	39	41	50	17	37
Negative							
Number	10	10	14	51	1	5	91
% , Period Known	77	77	61	59	50	83	63
Net Income Known							
Number	13	13	23	87	2	6	144
% of Period	35	20	19	38	18	50	30
Not Known							
Number	24	52	95	143	9	6	329
% of Period	65	80	81	62	82	50	70
All							
Number	37	65	118	230	11	12	473

TABLE 6-15
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF EXISTING BUSINESSES THAT RECEIVED PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT FINANCING

Exist. Bus. Rec'd Prev. Finan. From	Period													
	1971-73		1974-78		1979-83		1984-88		1989		No Date		All	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Any Gov't														
Net Income+	1	25	1	11	1	8	9	19	1	50	0	0	13	16
Net Income-	3	75	8	89	12	92	38	81	1	50	4	100	66	84
Total	4	100	9	100	13	100	47	100	2	100	4	100	79	100
Fed. Gov't														
Net Income+	1	25	1	13	1	8	9	20	1	50	0	0	13	17
Net Income-	3	75	7	88	12	92	37	80	1	50	2	100	62	83
Total	4	100	8	100	13	100	46	100	2	100	2	100	75	100
DRE/IE														
Net Income+	0	-	0	0	1	14	8	26	0	-	0	0	9	23
Net Income-	0	-	1	100	6	86	23	74	0	-	1	100	31	78
Total	0	-	1	100	7	100	31	100	0	-	1	100	40	100

**TABLE 6-16
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS BY GOAL**

Goal	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
New Business, New Establ.							
Number	68	168	268	406	28	11	949
% of Period Known	67	72	60	56	65	39	60
Exist. Bus. But New Establ.							
Number	3	3	7	16	1	0	30
% of Period Known	3	1	2	2	2	0	2
All New Establishments							
Number	71	171	275	422	29	11	979
% of Period Known	70	73	62	58	67	39	62
Purchase Establishment							
Number	5	17	66	95	5	10	198
% of Period Known	5	7	15	13	12	36	13
Exist. Bus. Purchases Est.							
Number	0	0	1	9	0	0	10
% of Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
All Purchases							
Number	5	17	67	104	5	10	208
% of Period Known	5	7	15	14	12	36	13
Expand Business							
Number	18	42	86	150	4	4	304
% of Period Known	18	18	19	21	9	14	19
Maintain Business							
Number	7	4	16	55	5	3	90
% of Period Known	7	2	4	8	12	11	6
Goal Known							
Number	101	234	444	731	43	28	1581
% of Period	99	99	100	100	98	82	99
Not Known							
Number	1	2	2	3	1	6	15
% of Period	1	1	0	0	2	18	1
All							
Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596

**TABLE 6-17
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS BY
INTENDED LOCATION OF THE HEAD OFFICE**

Location of Head Office	Period					All	
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	Periods
Organized Community							
Number	18	29	72	79	5	3	206
% of Period Known	18	13	17	11	12	10	13
Unorganized Community							
Number	40	79	118	180	6	7	430
% of Period Known	41	34	27	25	14	24	28
Indian Reserve							
Number	15	58	174	376	25	14	662
% of Period Known	15	25	40	52	58	48	43
Other In-Area North							
Number	19	48	59	73	6	4	209
% of Period Known	19	21	14	10	14	14	13
Out-of-Area North							
Number	0	8	5	11	1	0	25
% of Period Known	0	3	1	2	2	0	2
External to North							
Number	6	9	5	2	0	1	23
% of Period Known	6	4	1	0	0	3	1
Location Known							
Number	98	231	433	721	43	29	1555
% of Period	96	98	97	98	98	85	97
Not Known							
Number	4	5	13	13	1	5	41
% of Period	4	2	3	2	2	15	3
All Locations							
Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596

TABLE 6-18
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NO. OF APPLICATIONS BY INTENDED
LOCATION OF OPERATIONS

Location of Operations	Period						All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	
Organized Community							
Number	20	29	70	77	5	2	203
% of Period Known	20	13	16	11	11	7	13
Unorganized Community							
Number	46	87	137	189	7	10	476
% of Period Known	46	38	31	26	16	33	30
Indian Reserve							
Number	15	57	176	365	25	13	651
% of Period Known	15	25	40	50	57	43	41
Other In-Area North							
Number	17	45	58	86	6	4	216
% of Period Known	17	20	13	12	14	13	14
Out-of-Area North							
Number	0	8	4	15	1	1	29
% of Period Known	0	4	1	2	2	3	2
External to North							
Number	2	1	0	1	0	0	4
% of Period Known	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Location Known							
Number	100	227	445	733	44	30	1579
% of Period	98	96	100	100	100	88	99
Other/Not Known							
Number	2	9	1	1	0	4	17
% of Period	2	4	0	0	0	12	1
All Locations							
Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596

TABLE 6-19
COMMUNITY CONDITIONS AND LOCATIONAL TARGETING OF "LOW LEVEL"
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS #1 - #3

Model #1: All Entrepreneurs, 1986 Census Data

Cases: 32.

Dependent variable: ST1.

Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.

4 steps to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.7864. Std. err. Y = 5.6570.

DF: regression = 4, residual = 27. F = 24.6067. Sig F = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
TOP	0.0128	0.0014	1.2109	0.0000
PAB	63.0650	15.0689	1.0446	0.0003
PCY	1.7182	0.8104	0.4492	0.0433
PAL	-11.3448	3.4228	-0.3395	0.0026
Constant	-61.9643	18.5793	-	0.0025

Variables not in model:

	Beta	Partial	Sig. "t"
PG9	-0.2172	-0.2933	0.1299
ACC	-0.1213	-0.2552	0.1900
PTP	0.2660	0.2511	0.1975
PEY	0.1506	0.2134	0.2756
PEM	0.1025	0.1170	0.5526
MHY	-0.0613	-0.0653	0.7414
ADP	-0.1626	-0.0534	0.7871
CTR	-0.0389	-0.047	0.8123

Model #2: Non-Government - Non-Collective Entrepreneurs, 1986 Census Data

Cases: 32.

Dependent variable: ST2.

Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.

4 steps to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.8010. Std. err. Y = 4.7000.

DF: regression = 4, residual = 27. F = 32.1911. Sig F = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
ADP	0.0160	0.0017	1.2133	0.0000
PAB	52.3593	12.4008	1.0077	0.0002
PCY	1.5122	0.6595	0.4593	0.0299
PAL	-8.2444	2.8374	-0.2866	0.0072
Constant	-52.1923	15.1911	-	0.0019

Variables not in model:

	Beta	Partial	Sig. "t"
PG9	-0.1665	-0.2351	0.2285
PTP	0.2191	0.2144	0.2733
ACC	-0.0704	-0.1524	0.4389
TOP	0.3756	0.1326	0.5011
PEY	0.0841	0.1241	0.5292
CTR	-0.0218	-0.0275	0.8895
PEM	0.0214	0.0255	0.8975
MHY	-0.0163	-0.0180	0.9274

TABLE 6-19 (Cont.)
COMMUNITY CONDITIONS AND LOCATIONAL TARGETING OF "LOW LEVEL"
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS #1 - #3

Model #3: Non-Government - Non-Collective Entrepreneurs, 1991 Census Data

Cases: 35.

Dependent variable: ST2.

Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.

4 steps to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.7525. Std err. Y = 5.0645.

DF: regression = 4, residual = 30. F = 26.8359. Sig F = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
ADP	0.0129	0.0015	1.0138	0.0000
PAB	35.7224	9.3643	0.6927	0.0290
PAL	-10.7257	2.7151	-0.3966	0.0004
PEM	23.0674	10.0597	0.3368	0.0290
Constant	-33.4034	11.4845	-	0.0068

Variables not in model:

	Beta	Partial	Sig. "t"
MHY	-0.2075	-0.2391	0.1951
TOP	-0.7900	-0.1738	0.3498
CTR	-0.1053	-0.1454	0.4352
PEY	-0.0763	-0.0635	0.7345
PCY	0.0729	0.0443	0.8129
PTP	-0.0105	-0.0127	0.9461
ACC	0.0037	0.0067	0.9715
PG9	-0.0064	0.0065	0.9725

TABLE 6-20
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF INTENDED PRODUCTS PER APPLICATION

Number of Products	Period						All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	
1 Number	66	165	352	568	40	21	1212
% of Period	65	70	79	77	91	62	76
2 Number	26	61	75	117	3	5	287
% of Period	25	26	17	16	7	15	18
3-4 Number	10	10	19	49	1	8	97
% of Period	10	4	4	7	2	24	6
All, Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596

**TABLE 6-21
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS BY INTENDED PRODUCT**

Intended Product (SIC Code)	Period						All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	
Agriculture (10or20)							
Number	6	5	5	20	1	2	39
% of Period Known	6	2	1	3	2	7	2
Fishing (3*)							
Number	6	2	1	8	0	2	19
% of Period Known	6	1	0	1	0	7	1
Logging & Forestry (40or50)							
Number	5	40	83	85	7	1	221
% of Period Known	5	17	19	12	16	3	14
Logging & Forestry & Mfg. (40or50)&(100-390)							
Number	1	13	7	11	0	2	34
% of Period Known	1	6	2	2	0	7	2
Mining (60-90)							
Number	0	1	2	5	0	2	10
% of Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	7	1
All Primary Products							
Number	18	61	98	129	8	9	323
% of Period Known	18	26	22	18	18	30	20
Manufacturing ((100-390)							
Number	8	12	20	29	2	0	71
% of Period Known	8	5	5	4	5	0	4
Construction (400-440)							
Number	6	11	30	67	2	1	117
% of Period Known	6	5	7	9	5	3	7
Transport (450or470)							
Number	5	20	48	60	1	4	138
% of Period Known	5	9	11	8	2	13	9
Communications (480or490)							
Number	0	1	0	5	0	0	6
% of Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
All Non-Primary, Non-Service							
Number	19	44	98	161	5	5	332
% of Period Known	19	19	22	22	11	17	21
Wholesale (5**)							
Number	1	3	2	1	1	0	8
% of Period Known	1	1	0	0	2	0	1
Retail (6**)							
Number	11	32	78	157	15	4	297
% of Period Known	11	14	18	22	34	13	19
Retail & Food&Beverage (6**&920)							
Number	4	7	8	11	0	1	31
% of Period Known	4	3	2	2	0	3	2

TABLE 6-21 (Cont.)
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS BY INTENDED PRODUCT

Intended Product (SIC Code)	Period						All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	
Finance, Real Estate & Business Services (7**)							
Number	0	1	7	4	1	0	13
% of Period Known	0	0	2	1	2	0	1
Local Gov't, Health & Education Servs.(830or850or860)							
Number	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
% of Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Accommodation (910)							
Number	7	11	6	6	2	0	32
% of Period Known	7	5	1	1	5	0	2
Accom. & Food&Bev. (910&920)							
Number	2	7	7	17	1	0	34
% of Period Known	2	3	2	2	2	0	2
Cabins, Campgrounds, Lodges (910&960 or 910&920&960)							
Number	16	19	29	62	2	6	134
% of Period Known	16	8	7	9	5	20	8
Food & Beverage (920)							
Number	3	7	24	31	1	0	66
% of Period Known	3	3	5	4	2	0	4
Other Services (960-990)							
Number	5	19	45	78	7	1	155
% of Period Known	5	8	10	11	16	3	10
All Services							
Number	49	106	206	373	30	12	776
% of Period Known	49	45	46	51	68	40	49
All Main Products							
Number	86	211	402	663	43	26	1431
% of Period Known	87	90	91	91	98	87	91
Other Combined & Known							
Number	13	24	42	66	1	4	150
% of Period Known	13	10	9	9	2	13	9
All Known							
Number	99	235	444	729	44	30	1581
% of Period	97	100	100	99	100	88	99
Not Known							
Number	3	1	2	5	0	4	15
% of Period	3	0	0	1	0	12	1
All Types							
Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596

**TABLE 6-22
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, TIME ELAPSED FROM DATE APPLICATION
RECEIVED TO DATE OF PROGRAM DECISION**

Period	Program	Applications			
		All #	If ET \geq 0 Mean Days ET	STD Days	If ET < 0 #
1971-73	SARDA	79	306	361	1
1974-78	SARDA	151	231	240	4
1979-83	SARDA	301	328	263	8
	NDA2	1	88	88	0
	All	302	327	263	8
1984-88	SARDA	267	173	149	18
	NDA2	19	288	194	0
	NEDP3	1	21	21	0
	All	287	180	156	18
1989	SARDA	14	53	31	1
	NDA2	3	39	6	0
	NEDP3	0	-	-	-
	All	17	50	28	1
All Periods	All	836	253	248	32

Note: To be counted, an application must show the date received (90% (1433) of all applications show this) and it must show the screen decision date (57% (908) show this). [Of all applications to SARDA, 92% (1267) show the date received and 64% (881) show the decision date. Of all applications to NDA2, 88% (156) show the date received and 15% (26) show the decision date. Of all applications to NEDP3, 26% (10) show the date received and 3% (1) show the decision date.]

**TABLE 6-23
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, VOLUMES AND PERCENT APPROVALS, A SUMMARY**

Volume When Period is Known And Outcome is Known (In Order by Volume)						Percent When Period is Known And Outcome is Known (In Order by Percent Accepted)					
Variable	Yes	Implied Yes	Yes Sub- total	No	Total Known	Variable	Yes	Implied Yes	Yes Sub- total	No	Total Known
Period											
84-88	1	385	386	334	720	89+	0	71	71	29	100
79-83	9	122	131	306	437	84-88	0	53	54	46	100
74-78	30	69	99	131	230	74-78	13	30	43	57	100
71-73	13	20	33	69	102	71-73	13	20	32	68	100
89+	0	29	29	12	41	79-83	2	28	30	70	100
All	53	625	678	852	1530	All	3	41	44	56	100
Program											
SARDA	52	452	504	830	1334	NEDP3	0	96	96	4	100
NDA2	1	151	152	21	173	NDA2	1	87	88	12	100
NEDP3	0	22	22	1	23	SARDA	4	34	38	62	100
All	53	625	678	852	1530	All	3	41	44	56	100
No. of Applicants											
1	46	532	578	755	1333	1	3	66	69	31	100
2	6	74	80	88	168	2	4	44	48	52	100
3+	1	19	20	9	29	3+	3	40	43	57	100
All	53	625	678	852	1530	All	3	41	44	56	100
Type of Applicant											
Proprietor	55	584	639	876	1515	Indian Band	3	70	73	27	100
Indian Band	4	99	103	39	142	Local Gov't	0	67	67	33	100
Collect.	1	40	41	38	79	F/P Gov't	0	56	56	44	100
F-P Corp.	1	10	11	24	35	Collect.	1	51	52	48	100
Local Gov't	0	6	6	3	9	Proprietor	4	39	42	58	100
F/P Gov't	0	5	5	4	9	F-P Corp.	3	29	31	69	100
All	61	744	805	984	1789	All	3	42	45	55	100
Location of Applicant											
Indian Res.	16	365	381	344	725	Indian Res.	2	50	53	47	100
Unorganized	23	196	219	249	468	Unorg. Cmty	5	42	47	53	100
Org. Cmty	12	72	84	165	249	Ex. North	2	40	42	58	100
In-Area NK	8	59	67	147	214	Out-Area NK	0	37	37	63	100
Ex. North	2	35	37	51	88	Org. Cmty	5	29	34	66	100
Out-Area NK	0	15	15	26	41	In-Area NK	4	28	31	69	100
All	61	742	803	982	1785	All	3	42	45	55	100

**TABLE 6-23 (Cont.)
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, VOLUMES AND PERCENT APPROVALS, A SUMMARY**

Variable	Volume When Period is Known And Outcome is Known (In Ordered by Volume)					Variable	Percent When Period is Known And Outcome is Known (In Order by Percent Accepted)				
	Yes	Implied Yes	Yes Sub- total	No	Total Known		Yes	Implied Yes	Yes Sub- total	No	Total Known
Status of Applicant											
Reg. Indian	18	383	401	355	756	Not Aborig.	5	50	54	46	100
Abor. Not RI	21	148	169	157	326	Reg. Indian	2	51	53	47	100
Aboriginal NK	4	70	74	144	218	Abor. Not RI	6	45	52	48	100
Not Aboriginal	9	96	105	88	193	Aboriginal NK	2	32	34	66	100
All	52	697	749	744	1493	All	3	46	49	49	98
Existing Business											
No	36	397	433	638	1071	Yes	4	50	54	46	100
Yes	17	226	243	208	451	No	3	37	40	60	100
All	53	623	676	846	1522	All	3	41	44	56	100
Net Income BT of of Exist. Bus.											
Neg. NYBT	3	58	61	24	85	Pos. NYBT	0	88	88	12	100
Pos. NYBT	0	46	46	6	52	Neg. NYBT	4	68	72	28	100
All	3	104	107	30	137	All	2	76	78	22	100
Prev. Gov't Financing											
No DRE/IE	17	170	187	189	376	DRE/IE	0	75	75	25	100
No Federal	15	136	151	171	322	Fed. Gov't	2	69	70	28	100
Any Gov't	2	88	90	43	133	Any Gov't	2	66	68	32	100
Fed. Gov't	2	90	92	37	131	No DRE/IE	5	45	50	50	100
DRE/IE	0	56	56	19	75	No Federal	5	42	47	53	100
No Gov't	2	8	13	18	31	No Gov't	6	26	42	58	100
All	38	548	589	477	1068	All	4	51	55	45	100
Goal											
New Bus.	38	369	377	544	921	EB Purchase	0	100	100	0	100
Expand	13	137	150	146	296	EB Starts New	0	73	73	27	100
Purchase	2	63	65	117	182	Maintain	0	59	59	41	100
Maintain	0	50	50	35	85	Expand	4	46	51	49	100
EB Starts New	0	22	22	8	30	New Bus.	4	40	41	59	100
EB Purchase	0	10	10	0	10	Purchase	1	37	38	62	100
All	51	650	703	874	1577	All	3	41	45	55	100
Location of Head Office											
Indian Res.	15	319	334	299	633	Indian Res.	2	50	53	47	100
Unorganized	21	167	188	230	418	Ex North	5	41	45	55	100
In-Area NK	8	57	65	136	201	Unorganized	5	40	45	55	100
Org. Cmty	8	55	63	133	196	In-Area NK	4	28	32	68	100
Out-Area NK	0	7	7	18	25	Org. Cmty	4	28	32	68	100
Ex North	1	9	10	12	22	Out-Area NK	0	28	28	72	100
All	53	614	667	828	1495	All	4	41	45	55	100

**TABLE 6-23 (Cont.)
SCREEN APPLICATIONS, VOLUMES AND PERCENT APPROVALS, A SUMMARY**

Volume When Period is Known And Outcome is Known (In Ordered by Volume)						Percent When Period is Known And Outcome is Known (In Order by Percent Accepted)					
Variable	Yes	Implied Yes	Yes Sub- total	No	Total Known	Variable	Yes	Implied Yes	Yes Sub- total	No	Total Known
Location of Operations											
Indian Res.	13	311	324	299	623	Indian Res.	2	50	52	48	100
Unorg. Cmty	20	185	205	255	460	Unorg. Cmty	4	40	45	55	100
In-Area NK	10	64	74	134	208	In-Area NK	5	31	36	64	100
Org. Cmty	8	53	61	133	194	Out-Area NK	0	32	32	68	100
Out-Area NK	0	9	9	19	28	Org. Cmty	4	27	31	69	100
Ex. North	0	1	1	3	4	Ex. North	0	25	25	75	100
All	51	623	674	843	1517	All	3	41	44	56	100
No. of Products											
1	31	467	498	669	1167	3+	5	58	62	38	100
2	19	109	128	150	278	2	7	39	46	54	100
3+	4	49	53	32	85	1	3	40	43	57	100
All	54	625	679	851	1530	All	4	41	44	56	100
Product Group											
Retail	5	114	119	167	286	Communication	0	83	83	17	100
Logging	10	92	102	115	217	L.G.,Health&Ed.	0	67	67	33	100
Other Servs.	3	62	65	86	151	Logging & Mfg	31	31	63	38	100
Other Combs.	5	63	68	77	145	Mining	0	57	57	43	100
Transportation	3	53	56	76	132	Ret & F&B	7	47	53	47	100
Cabins-Lodges	5	45	50	73	123	Wholesale	0	50	50	50	100
Construction	2	44	46	70	116	Accom & F&B	0	48	48	52	100
Mfg.	3	30	33	38	71	Logging	5	42	47	53	100
Food & Bev.	2	26	28	38	66	Other Combs.	3	43	47	53	100
Agriculture	1	14	15	20	35	Mfg.	4	42	46	54	100
Accom & F&B	0	16	16	17	33	Other Servs.	2	41	43	57	100
Logging & Mfg	10	10	20	12	32	Agriculture	3	40	43	57	100
Accomodation	1	8	9	22	31	Fishing	0	43	43	57	100
Ret & F&B	2	14	16	14	30	Transportation	2	40	42	58	100
Fishing	0	6	6	8	14	Food & Bev.	3	39	42	58	100
Fin&RE & BS	0	5	5	7	12	Fin&RE & BS	0	42	42	58	100
Wholesale	0	4	4	4	8	Retail	2	40	42	58	100
Mining	0	4	4	3	7	Cabins-Lodges	4	37	41	59	100
Communication	0	5	5	1	6	Construction	2	38	40	60	100
L.G.,Health&Ed.	0	4	4	2	6	Accomodation	3	26	29	71	100
All	52	619	671	850	1521	All	3	41	44	56	100

**TABLE 6-24
FULL APPLICATIONS, DATABASE VARIABLES***

Code	Description and Values
IDNu	Record number.
FFAD	Date first full application received.
FFAW	Agent that prepared the first full application. 1 The receiving program. 2 Another federal or provincial government agency. 3 A non-government agent. 4 The applicant. 9 Not known.
FLAD	Date final full application received.
FGol	Project goal. Same values and coding as "SGol" screen application code.
FO_T	Type of intended owner. Up to six types are possible. Same values and coding as "SA_T" screen application code.
FO_L	Residence or head office location of intended owner. Six owner locations are possible. See Location Codes, Appendix Table 2-2.
FO_S	Status of intended owner. Six status groups are possible. Same values and coding as screen applications.
FOfL	Intended location of head office. See Location Codes, Appendix Table 2-2.
FOpL	Intended location of business operations. See Location Codes, Appendix Table 2-2.
FPr_	Intended products. Up to five products are possible. See Product Codes, Appendix Table 2-3.
FCap	Proforma gross initial capitalization.
FOEq	Proforma owner's equity.
FGS_	Proforma gross sales for year _. Up to three years may be projected.
FOC_	Proforma gross operating costs for year __. Up to three years may be projected.
FDe_	Proforma depreciation and amortization costs for year __. Up to three years may be projected.
FFC_	Proforma financing costs for year __. Up to three years may be projected.
FFPY	Projected person-years of employment to be created. (Net change if an existing business.)
FS_T	Proposed type of support to be supplied by program. Up to two types are possible. 1 Grant. 2 Non-forgivable loan. 3 Forgivable loan. 4 Loan guarantee. 5 Direct assistance. 7 Purchase of product. 9 Loan subsidy. 99. Not known.
FS_V	Proposed value of support per type to be supplied by receiving program. Up to two values are possible.
FOS_T	Proposed type of support to be supplied by other sources. Up to six types are possible. Values and coding as per FS_T above.
FOS_V	Proposed value of support per type to be supplied by other sources. Up to six values are possible.

**TABLE 6-24 (Cont.)
FULL APPLICATIONS, DATABASE VARIABLES***

Code	Description and Values
FOS_S	Proposed source of assistance per type to be supplied by other sources. Up to six sources are possible. 1. SARDA commercial. 3. NEDP3. 6. NDA2. 7. Other DRE/IE source. 8. FBDB. 9. INAC or IEDF. 10. Other federal government source. 11. CEDF. 12. Other provincial government source. 13. Commercial financier including regional and aboriginal capital corporations. 14. Other source. 99. Source not known.

* In addition to screen application variables. See Table 6-1.

**TABLE 6-25
FULL APPLICATIONS BY PROGRAM AND YEAR(1)(2)**

Year	Program			All Programs	Census Period	Annual Change	
	SARDA	NDA2	NEDP3			Number	Percent
1971	0			0		-	-
1972	8			8		8	-
1973	4			4	12	-4	-50
1974	7			7		3	75
1975	3			3		-4	-57
1976	9			9		6	200
1977	13			13		4	44
1978	6			6	38	-7	-54
1979	8			8		2	33
1980	11			11		3	38
1981	18			18		7	64
1982	5			5		-13	-72
1983	19	3		22	64	17	340
1984	35	20		55		33	150
1985	30	22	5	57		2	4
1986	29	8	4	41		-16	-28
1987	43	14	0	57		16	39
1988	52	27	2	81	291	24	42
1989	11	16	10	37	37	-44	-54
No Date	64	20	1	85	85	-	-
All Years	375	130	22	527	527	-	-

- (1) Date that the final version of the full application was received by the program.
- (2) The programs dealt with 704 project decisions at this stage, 85 decisions were based on some information having been sent by applicants, 177 decisions were made after no information was received from applicants.

**TABLE 6-26
FULL APPLICATIONS COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS BY YEAR**

Year*	Screen Applications		Screen Acceptances	Full Applications		Change in Percent	Screen Acceptance to Full Applications
	Number	Percent	Number	Number	Percent	Screen to Full Applications	Fall-Off Rate (%)
1971	36	2	14	0	0	-2	-100
1972	42	3	10	8	2	-1	-20
1973	24	2	9	4	1	-1	-56
	102	6	33	12	2	-4	-64
1974	25	2	7	7	1	-0	0
1975	34	2	16	3	1	-2	-81
1976	43	3	21	9	2	-1	-57
1977	68	4	32	13	2	-2	-59
1978	66	4	23	6	1	-3	-74
	236	15	99	38	7	-8	-62
1979	91	6	33	8	2	-4	-76
1980	85	5	24	11	2	-3	-54
1981	88	6	23	18	3	-2	-22
1982	75	5	14	5	1	-4	-64
1983	107	7	37	22	4	-3	-41
	446	28	131	64	12	-16	-51
1984	137	9	72	55	10	2	-24
1985	157	10	86	57	11	1	-34
1986	87	5	62	41	8	2	-34
1987	185	12	85	57	11	-1	-33
1988	168	11	81	81	15	5	0
	734	46	386	291	55	9	-25
1989	44	3	29	37	7	4	28
No Date	34	2	28	85	16	14	204
All Years	1596	100	706	527	100	0	-25

* Year screen application was sent (or received if no send date) and year of last date full application was received.

Sources: Tables 6-2, 6-23 and 6-26.

**TABLE 6-27
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCE TO FULL APPLICATION, BY PROGRAM**

Program	Number of		Percent Rate of Change
	Screen Acceptances	Full Applications	
SARDA	518	375	-28
NDA2	165	130	-21
NEDP3	23	22	-4

**TABLE 6-28
FULL, APPLICATIONS, QUALTY OF APPLICATIONS**

Period/ Source Variable	Total Dec'ns	Nil or Minimal Financial Estimate		Cap.Cost + 1Yr Sales & Oper.		Cap.Cost + 2Yrs Sales & Oper.		Cap.Cost, Equity, 3Yrs Sales & Oper., Dep. & Fin.		No Capital Cost Estimate		No Equity Estimate		Equity = 0	
		#	% of Total	#	% of Total	#	% of Total	#	% of Total	#	% of Total	#	% of Total	#	% of Total
All	527	37	7	54	10	109	21	327	62	34	6	76	14	71	13
Program															
SARDA	375	32	9	34	9	75	20	234	62	29	8	62	17	39	10
NDA2	130	5	4	20	15	31	24	74	57	5	4	13	10	28	22
NEDP3	22	0	0	0	0	3	14	19	86	0	0	1	5	4	18
Prepared By															
Case Program	4	1	25	0	0	0	0	3	75	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Gov't Agent	42	3	7	4	10	10	24	25	60	3	7	3	7	5	12
Non-gov't Agent	281	9	3	17	6	56	20	199	71	9	3	23	8	45	16
Applicant	144	13	9	29	20	37	26	65	45	11	8	35	24	13	9
Not Known	56	11	20	4	7	6	11	35	63	10	18	13	23	8	14
No. of Applicants															
1 Applicant	446	30	7	47	11	88	20	281	83	29	7	66	15	62	14
2 Applicants	63	5	8	3	5	18	29	37	59	3	5	6	10	6	10
3+ Applicants	18	2	11	4	22	3	17	9	50	11	61	4	22	3	17
Applicant Type															
Proprietor	388	26	7	39	10	77	20	246	63	23	6	54	14	40	10
Priv. FP Corp.	16	1	6	3	19	4	25	8	50	1	6	5	31	1	6
Collectives	48	3	6	9	19	6	13	30	63	3	6	8	17	12	25
Indian Band	93	7	8	6	6	26	28	54	58	7	8	12	13	21	23
Local Gov't	5	1	20	1	20	0	0	3	60	1	20	2	40	1	20
Fed/Prov Gov'ts	2	1	50	0	0	0	0	1	50	1	50	0	0	0	0
Organization NK	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	2	100
Applicant Location															
Organized Area	47	4	9	9	19	15	32	19	40	4	9	28	60	2	4
Unorganized Area	115	7	6	23	20	28	24	57	50	7	6	16	14	12	10
Indian Reserve	302	14	5	15	5	51	17	222	74	14	5	31	10	51	17
In-Area NK	44	8	18	6	14	10	23	20	45	6	14	13	30	3	7
Out-Area North	11	1	9	2	18	3	27	5	45	0	0	1	9	0	0
Out-Area Ext.	27	5	19	3	11	7	26	12	44	4	15	6	22	2	7
Location NK	5	2	40	0	0	1	20	2	40	1	20	1	20	2	40
Applicant Status															
Registered Indian	315	17	5	16	5	54	17	228	72	16	5	36	11	42	13
Other Aboriginal	89	9	10	17	19	20	22	43	48	8	9	11	12	13	15
Aboriginal NK	47	1	2	5	11	14	30	27	57	1	2	9	19	1	2
Not Aboriginal	75	10	13	15	20	17	23	33	44	9	12	14	19	3	4
Status NK	42	4	10	7	17	15	36	16	38	3	7	6	14	5	12
Existing Business	178	9	5	29	16	40	22	100	56	9	5	28	16	22	12

**TABLE 6-29
 APPLICANT AND PROJECT ATTRIBUTES AND RATE OF RELATIVE COMPLETION OF
 APPLICATIONS, RESULTS OF THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL**

Cases: 291.

Dependent variable: F2-3. Dichotomous.

Independent variables: PRO*, FWH*, FAP*, FT*, FL*, FS*, EBUS. All categorical.

Method: Forward stepwise. Main effects only.

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, BCON (0.001), LCON = 0.01, EPS = 0.00000001.

2 steps to completion. -2LL = 195.480. Goodness of fit = 294.602.

Model chi-squ. = 25.948. Df = 2. Sig. = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	SE B	Wald Sig.	R	Exp (B)
FWH4	-1.0672	0.3910	7.4494	-0.1569	0.3440
FLRE	1.2138	0.4019	9.1235	0.1794	3.3664
Constant	1.6887	0.3318	25.8981	-	-

Variables not in model:

	Score	Sig.	R
FAP2	3.3027	0.0692	0.0767
PRO6	2.7574	0.0968	0.0585
FTCA	1.9722	0.1602	0.0000
PRO3	1.5681	0.2105	0.0000
FAP3	1.5223	0.2173	0.0000
PRO1	1.3989	0.2369	0.0000
FWH3	1.2596	0.2617	0.0000
FAP1	1.1420	0.2852	0.0000
FLUN	0.9064	0.3411	0.0000
FTBA	0.4592	0.4980	0.0000
FWH2	0.3749	0.5403	0.0000
FTPR	0.2067	0.6494	0.0000
FTPF	0.1628	0.6866	0.0000
FSAO	0.1570	0.6919	0.0000
FWH1	0.0552	0.8143	0.0000
FLOR	0.0544	0.8156	0.0000
FTLO	0.0373	0.8469	0.0000
FSRI	0.0198	0.8881	0.0000
FLEX	0.0085	0.9263	0.0000

**TABLE 6-30
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NO. OF APPLICANTS PER APPLICATION**

Number of Applicants	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
1							
Screen Number	89	200	397	637	35	27	1385
Full Number	10	30	59	244	30	73	446
Change	-79	-170	-338	-393	-5	46	-939
% of Screen Period Known	87	85	89	87	80	79	87
% of Full Period Known	83	79	92	84	81	86	85
Change	-4	-6	3	-3	2	6	-2
2							
Screen Number	9	33	43	81	9	6	181
Full Number	2	6	4	38	6	7	63
Change	-7	-27	-39	-43	-3	1	-118
% of Screen Period Known	9	14	10	11	20	18	11
% of Full Period Known	17	16	6	13	16	8	12
Change	8	2	-3	2	-4	-9	1
3 or More							
Screen Number	4	3	6	16	0	1	30
Full Number	0	2	1	9	1	5	18
Change	-4	-1	-5	-7	1	4	-12
% of Screen Period Known	4	1	1	2	0	3	2
% of Full Period Known	0	5	2	3	3	6	3
Change	-4	4	0	1	3	3	2
All							
Screen Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596
Full Number	12	38	64	291	37	85	527

**TABLE 6-31
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCE TO FULL APPLICATION,
BY NUMBER OF APPLICANTS PER APPLICATION**

Number Of Applicants	Number of		Percent Rate of Change
	Screen Acceptances	Full Applications	
1	600	446	-26
2	85	63	-26
3 or More	21	18	-14

**TABLE 6-32
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICANTS BY TYPE OF APPLICANT**

Type of Applicant	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Proprietor							
Screen Number	93	230	466	696	43	22	1550
Full Number	6	42	56	258	31	78	471
Change	-87	-188	-410	-438	-12	56	-1079
% of Screen Period Known	77	84	93	82	81	51	84
% of Full Period Known	43	88	82	74	66	77	75
Change	-34	4	-10	-7	-15	26	-9
For Profit Private Corp.							
Screen Number	8	9	4	15	0	5	41
Full Number	5	2	2	1	1	5	16
Change	-3	-7	-2	-14	1	0	-25
% of Screen Period Known	7	3	1	2	0	12	2
% of Full Period Known	36	4	3	0	2	5	3
Change	29	1	2	-1	2	-7	0
Non-Gov't Collectives							
Screen Number	13	10	8	46	3	3	83
Full Number	1	1	1	25	3	3	34
Change	-12	-9	-7	-21	0	0	-49
% of Screen Period Known	11	4	2	5	6	7	4
% of Full Period Known	7	2	1	7	6	3	5
Change	-4	-2	-0	2	1	-4	1
Indian Bands							
Screen Number	6	19	22	89	7	12	155
Full Number	2	2	9	60	12	12	97
Change	-4	-17	-13	-29	5	0	-58
% of Screen Period Known	5	7	4	10	13	28	8
% of Full Period Known	14	4	13	17	26	12	16
Change	9	-3	9	7	12	-16	7
Local Governments							
Screen Number	0	3	2	4	0	0	9
Full Number	0	0	0	3	0	2	5
Change	0	-3	-2	-1	0	2	-4
% of Screen Period Known	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
% of Full Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	2	1
Change	0	-1	-0	0	0	2	0
Federal or Provincial							
Screen Number	1	4	1	3	0	1	10
Full Number	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
Change	-1	-3	-1	-3	0	0	-8
% of Screen Period Known	1	1	0	0	0	2	1
% of Full Period Known	0	2	0	0	0	1	0
Change	-1	1	-0	-0	0	-1	-0

**TABLE 6-32 (Cont.)
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICANTS BY TYPE OF APPLICANT**

Type of Applicant	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
All Known							
Screen Number	121	275	503	853	53	43	1848
Full Number	14	48	68	347	47	101	625
Change	-107	-227	-435	-506	-6	58	-1223
% of Screen Period	99	100	100	100	100	98	100
% of Full Period	100	100	97	100	100	99	100
Change	1	0	-3	0	0	1	-0
Not Known							
Screen Number	1	0	1	0	0	1	3
Full Number	0	0	2	0	0	1	3
Change	-1	0	1	0	0	0	0
% of Screen Period	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
% of Full Period	0	0	3	0	0	1	0
Change	-1	0	3	0	0	-1	0
All Types							
Screen Number	122	275	504	853	53	44	1851
Full Number	14	48	70	347	47	102	628

**TABLE 6-33
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCE TO FULL APPLICATION
BY TYPE OF APPLICANT**

Type of Applicant	Number of		Percent Rate of Change
	Screen Acceptances	Full Applications	
Proprietor	655	471	-28
For-Profit, Private Corp.	16	16	0
Non-Gov't Collectives	44	34	-23
Indian Band	115	97	-16
Local Government	6	5	-17
Federal/Provincial Gov't	6	2	-67

TABLE 6-34
SPEED OF TURNING SCREEN ACCEPTANCES INTO FULL APPLICATIONS
BY TYPE OF APPLICANT

	Number of Screen Acceptances	Number of Full Applications	Cumulative Percent Follow- through
Proprietors			
1971-73	28	6	21
1974-78	98	42	38
1979-83	135	56	40
1984-88	355	258	59
1989	23	31	62
For-Profit, Private Corps.			
1971-73	4	5	125
1974-78	2	2	117
1979-83	3	2	100
1984-88	2	1	91
1989	0	1	100
Non-Gov't Collectives			
1971-73	3	1	33
1974-78	5	1	25
1979-83	0	1	38
1984-88	30	25	74
1989	3	3	76
Indian Bands			
1971-73	3	2	67
1974-78	9	2	33
1979-83	12	9	54
1984-88	72	60	76
1989	7	12	83
Local Governments			
1971-73	0	0	-
1974-78	2	0	0
1979-83	0	0	0
1984-88	4	3	50
1989	0	0	50
Federal/Provincial Gov'ts			
1971-73	0	0	-
1974-78	1	1	100
1979-83	1	0	50
1984-88	3	0	20
1989	0	0	20

**TABLE 6-35
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICANTS BY LOCATION OF APPLICANT**

Location of Applicant	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Organized Community							
Screen Number	24	32	91	98	8	8	261
Full Number	1	7	13	23	0	12	56
Change	-23	-25	-78	-75	-8	4	-205
% of Screen Period Known	21	12	18	11	15	19	14
% of Full Period Known	8	15	19	7	0	12	9
Change	-13	3	1	-5	-15	-7	-5
Unorganized Community							
Screen Number	46	86	126	207	7	5	477
Full Number	3	10	14	86	6	22	141
Change	-43	-76	-112	-121	-1	17	-336
% of Screen Period Known	39	31	25	24	13	12	26
% of Full Period Known	23	21	21	25	13	22	23
Change	-16	-10	-4	1	-0	10	-3
Indian Reserve							
Screen Number	14	71	184	432	29	22	752
Full Number	3	13	36	206	33	42	333
Change	-11	-58	-148	-226	4	20	-419
% of Screen Period Known	12	26	37	51	55	52	41
% of Full Period Known	23	28	53	59	70	42	53
Change	11	2	16	9	15	-11	13
Other In-Area North							
Screen Number	21	54	64	71	6	4	220
Full Number	3	7	3	17	6	11	47
Change	-18	-47	-61	-54	0	7	-173
% of Screen Period Known	18	20	13	8	11	10	12
% of Full Period Known	23	15	4	5	13	11	8
Change	5	-5	-8	-3	1	1	-4
Out-of-Area North							
Screen Number	0	12	7	19	3	0	41
Full Number	0	3	0	6	1	3	13
Change	0	-9	-7	-13	-2	3	-28
% of Screen Period Known	0	4	1	2	6	0	2
% of Full Period Known	0	6	0	2	2	3	2
Change	0	2	-1	-0	-4	3	-0
External to North							
Screen Number	12	20	31	26	0	3	92
Full Number	3	7	2	9	1	11	33
Change	-9	-13	-29	-17	1	8	-59
% of Screen Period Known	10	7	6	3	0	7	5
% of Full Period Known	23	15	3	3	2	11	5
Change	13	8	-3	-0	2	4	0

**TABLE 6-35 (Cont.)
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICANTS BY LOCATION OF APPLICANT**

Location of Applicant	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Location Known							
Screen Number	117	275	503	853	53	42	1843
Full Number	13	47	68	347	47	101	623
Change	-104	-228	-435	-506	-6	59	-1220
% of Screen Period	96	100	100	100	100	95	100
% of Full Period	93	98	97	100	100	99	99
Change	-3	-2	-3	0	0	4	-0
Not Known							
Screen Number	5	0	1	0	0	2	8
Full Number	1	1	2	0	0	1	5
Change	-4	1	1	0	0	-1	-3
% of Screen Period	4	0	0	0	0	5	0
% of Full Period	7	2	3	0	0	1	1
Change	3	2	3	0	0	-4	0
All Locations							
Screen Number	122	275	504	853	53	44	1851
Full Number	14	48	70	347	47	102	628

**TABLE 6-36
SPEED OF TURNING SCREEN ACCEPTANCES INTO FULL APPLICATIONS
BY LOCATION OF APPLICANT**

	Number of Screen Acceptances	Number of Full Applications	Cumulative Percent Follow- through
Organized Community			
1971-73	10	1	10
1974-78	10	7	40
1979-83	19	13	54
1984-88	45	23	52
1989	0	0	52
Unorganized Community			
1971-73	14	3	21
1974-78	37	10	25
1979-83	43	14	29
1984-88	121	86	53
1989	4	6	54
Indian Reserve			
1971-73	5	3	60
1974-78	35	13	40
1979-83	69	36	48
1984-88	248	206	72
1989	24	33	76
Other In-Scope			
1971-73	3	3	100
1974-78	18	7	48
1979-83	11	3	41
1984-88	31	17	48
1989	4	6	54
Out-of-Scope North			
1971-73	0	0	
1974-78	7	3	43
1979-83	1	0	38
1984-88	6	6	64
1989	1	1	67
External to North			
1971-73	5	3	60
1974-78	10	7	67
1979-83	7	2	55
1984-88	15	9	57
1989	0	1	59

**TABLE 6-37
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCES TO FULL APPLICATIONS
BY LOCATION OF APPLICANT**

Location of Applicant	Number of		Percent Rate of Change
	Screen Acceptances	Full Applications	
Organized Community	90	56	-38
Unorganized Community	224	141	-37
Indian Reserve	402	333	-17
Other In-Area	69	47	-32
Out-of-Area North	15	13	-13
External to North	39	33	-15

**TABLE 6-38
RATE OF FULL APPLICATIONS PER TYPE OF COMMUNITY**

Type of Community	Rate Per Thousand Persons Age 15 And Over		
	1976	1981	1986
Organized	0.9	1.8	3.1
Unorganized	1.5	2.1	15.0
Indian Reserves	1.1	3.2	13.5
All Types	1.4	2.6	11.9

Sources: Tables 4-7 and 6-37.

TABLE 6-39
COMMUNITY CONDITIONS AND THE GENERATION OF "HIGH LEVEL" ENTREPRENEUR-
EVENTS, RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS #1 - #3

Model #1: All Entrepreneurs, 1986 Census Data

Cases: 32.
 Dependent variable: FA1.
 Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.
 Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.
 3 steps to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.7539. Std. err. Y = 2.9121.
 DF: regression = 3, residual = 28. F = 32.6469. Sig F = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
TOP	0.0057	0.0006	1.1137	0.0000
PAB	26.6073	4.7324	0.9191	0.0000
PG9	-15.9842	5.3617	-0.4269	0.0059
Constant	-15.9822	3.7100	-	0.0002

Variables not in model:

	Beta In	Partial	Sig. "t"
MHY	0.2060	0.2705	0.1558
PAL	-0.1474	-0.2549	0.1820
PEY	0.1841	0.2414	0.2072
PCY	0.2133	0.1734	0.3684
PTP	-0.1067	-0.0859	0.6579
ACC	0.0445	0.0847	0.6623
PEM	0.0413	0.0465	0.8108
ADP	-0.1234	-0.0391	0.8408
CTR	-0.0170	-0.0190	0.9220

Model #2: Non-Government - Non-Collective Entrepreneurs, 1986 Census Data

Cases: 32.
 Dependent variable: FA2.
 Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.
 Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.
 3 steps to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.7715. Std. err. Y = 1.9427.
 DF: regression = 3, residual = 28. F = 35.8852. Sig F = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
TOP	0.0044	0.0004	1.2527	0.0000
PAB	20.6167	5.1685	1.0286	0.0004
PCY	0.6914	0.2695	0.5444	0.0160
Constant	-23.4353	6.3329	-	0.0009

Variables not in model:

	Beta In	Partial	Sig. "t"
PEY	0.1887	0.2687	0.1587
PAL	-0.1302	-0.2322	0.2255
CTR	0.1768	0.2033	0.2902
PG9	-0.1555	-0.2018	0.2938
MHY	0.1053	0.1075	0.5789
ADP	0.3170	0.1015	0.6005
PTP	0.1096	0.0995	0.6075
ACC	0.0325	0.0688	0.7230
PEM	0.0521	0.0567	0.7701

TABLE 6-39 (Cont.)
COMMUNITY CONDITIONS AND THE GENERATION OF "HIGH LEVEL" ENTREPRENEUR-
EVENTS, RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS #1 - #3

Model #3: Non-Government - Non-Collective Entrepreneurs, 1991 Census Data

Cases: 35.

Dependent variable: FA2.

Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.

1 step to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.4991. Std err. Y = 2.9003.

DF: regression = 1, residual = 33. F = 34.8776. Sig F = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
TOP	0.0026	0.0004	0.7168	0.0000
Constant	1.1063	0.6729	-	0.1097

Variables not in model:

	Beta In	Partial	Sig. "t"
PAL	-0.1298	-0.1846	0.2961
PAB	0.1552	0.1785	0.3125
PG9	-0.1134	-0.1496	0.3983
PEY	0.0604	0.0824	0.6432
MHY	0.0485	0.0619	0.7281
PEM	0.0441	0.0589	0.7406
ACC	-0.0387	-0.0544	0.7599
PTP	0.0187	0.0227	0.8985
PCY	-0.0092	-0.0119	0.9469
ADP	0.0353	0.0064	0.9712
CTR	0.0016	0.0022	0.9901

TABLE 6-40
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICANTS BY STATUS OF APPLICANT

Status of Applicant	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Registered Indian							
Screen Number	18	72	195	445	31	24	785
Full Number	4	13	37	214	35	44	347
Change	-14	-59	-158	-231	4	20	-438
% of Screen Period Known	20	33	50	59	65	57	51
% of Full Period Known	36	31	62	64	76	47	59
Change	16	-2	12	6	12	-10	9
Aboriginal, Not Reg. Indian							
Screen Number	17	73	91	146	3	4	334
Full Number	1	11	6	57	2	20	97
Change	-16	-62	-85	-89	-1	16	-237
% of Screen Period Known	19	34	23	19	6	10	22
% of Full Period Known	9	26	10	17	4	22	17
Change	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	0	-0
Aboriginal, Not Known							
Screen Number	33	34	53	90	8	7	225
Full Number	2	3	4	28	6	10	53
Change	-31	-31	-49	-62	-2	3	-172
% of Screen Period Known	37	16	13	12	17	17	15
% of Full Period Known	18	7	7	8	13	11	9
Change	-0	-0	-7	-3	-4	-6	-5
Any Aboriginal							
Screen Number	68	179	339	681	42	35	1344
Full Number	7	27	47	299	43	74	497
Change	-61	-152	-292	-382	1	39	-847
% of Screen Period Known	76	83	86	90	88	83	87
% of Full Period Known	64	64	78	90	93	80	85
Change	-0	-0	-8	0	6	-4	-2
Not Aboriginal							
Screen Number	21	37	54	79	6	7	204
Full Number	4	15	13	33	3	19	87
Change	-17	-22	-41	-46	-3	12	-117
% of Screen Period Known	24	17	14	10	13	17	13
% of Full Period Known	36	36	22	10	7	20	15
Change	0	0	8	-0	-6	4	2
Status Known							
Screen Number	89	216	393	760	48	42	1548
Full Number	11	42	60	332	46	93	584
Change	-78	-174	-333	-428	-2	51	-964
% of Screen Period	73	79	78	89	91	95	84
% of Full Period	79	88	86	96	98	91	93
Change	0	0	8	7	7	-4	9

**TABLE 6-40 (Cont.)
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICANTS BY STATUS OF APPLICANT**

Status of Applicant	Period						All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	
Not Known							
Screen Number	33	59	111	93	5	2	303
Full Number	3	6	10	15	1	9	44
Change	-30	-53	-101	-78	-4	7	-259
% of Screen Period	27	21	22	11	9	5	16
% of Full Period	21	13	14	4	2	9	7
Change	-0	-0	-8	-7	-7	4	-9
Any Status							
Screen Number	122	275	504	853	53	44	1851
Full Number	14	48	70	347	47	102	628

**TABLE 6-41
SPEED OF TURNING SCREEN ACCEPTANCES INTO FULL APPLICATIONS
BY STATUS OF APPLICANT**

	Number of Screen Acceptances	Number of Full Applications	Cumulative Percent Follow- through
Registered Indian			
1971-73	7	4	57
1974-78	38	13	38
1979-83	74	37	45
1984-88	256	214	71
1989	26	35	76
Other Aboriginal			
1971-73	6	1	17
1974-78	42	11	25
1979-83	27	6	24
1984-88	92	57	45
1989	2	2	46
Unknown Aboriginal			
1971-73	3	2	67
1974-78	5	3	63
1979-83	16	4	38
1984-88	46	8	24
1989	4	6	31
Not Aboriginal			
1971-73	14	4	29
1974-78	17	15	61
1979-83	23	13	59
1984-88	51	33	62
1989	0	3	65

**TABLE 6-42
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCES TO FULL APPLICATIONS
BY STATUS OF APPLICANT**

Type of Applicant	Number of Screen Acceptances	Number of Full Applications	Percent Rate of Change
Registered Indian	422	347	-18
Aboriginal, Not Reg. Indian	173	97	-44
Unknown Aboriginal	79	53	-33
Not Aboriginal	111	87	-22

TABLE 6-43
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NO. OF APPLICATIONS BY BUSINESS STATE

Business State	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Existing Business							
Screen Number	37	65	118	230	11	12	473
Full Number	8	10	27	97	12	24	178
Change	-29	-55	-91	-133	1	12	-295
% of Screen Period Known	37	28	26	31	25	35	30
% of Full Period Known	67	27	42	33	32	28	34
Change	29	-1	16	2	7	-7	4
Not An Existing Business							
Screen Number	62	167	328	503	33	22	1115
Full Number	4	27	37	193	25	61	347
Change	-58	-140	-291	-310	-8	39	-768
% of Screen Period Known	63	72	74	69	75	65	70
% of Full Period Known	33	73	58	67	68	72	66
Change	-29	1	-16	-2	-7	7	-4
State Known							
Screen Number	99	232	446	733	44	34	1588
Full Number	12	37	64	290	37	85	525
Change	-87	-195	-382	-443	-7	51	-1063
% of Screen Period	97	98	100	100	100	100	99
% of Full Period	100	97	100	100	100	100	100
Change	3	-1	0	-0	0	0	0
Not Known							
Screen Number	3	4	0	1	0	0	8
Full Number	0	1	0	1	0	0	2
Change	-3	-3	0	0	0	0	-6
% of Screen Period	3	2	0	0	0	0	1
% of Full Period	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Change	-3	1	0	0	0	0	-0
Any State							
Screen Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596
Full Number	12	38	64	291	37	85	527

TABLE 6-44
FALL-OFF RATE, SCREEN ACCEPTANCES TO FULL APPLICATIONS BY BUSINESS STATE

Business State	Number of		Percent Rate of Change
	Screen Acceptances	Full Applications	
Existing Business	252	178	-29
Not Existing Business	452	347	-23

**TABLE 6-45
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF EXISTING BUSINESS APPLICANTS BY NET INCOME**

Net Income	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Positive Net Income							
Screen Number	3	3	9	36	1	1	53
Full Number	2	0	6	17	1	5	31
Change	-1	-3	-3	-19	0	4	-22
% of Screen Period Known	23	23	39	41	50	17	37
% of Full Period Known	67	0	60	35	33	38	39
Change	0	-0	0	-0	-0	0	0
Negative Net Income							
Screen Number	10	10	14	51	1	5	91
Full Number	1	1	4	32	2	8	48
Change	-9	-9	-10	-19	1	3	-43
% of Screen Period Known	77	77	61	59	50	83	63
% of Full Period Known	33	100	40	65	67	62	61
Change	-44	23	-21	7	17	-22	-2
State Known							
Screen Number	13	13	23	87	2	6	144
Full Number	3	1	10	49	3	13	79
Change	-10	-12	-13	-38	1	7	-65
% of Screen Period	35	20	19	38	18	50	30
% of Full Period	38	10	37	51	25	54	44
Change	0	-0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Known							
Screen Number	24	52	95	143	9	6	329
Full Number	5	9	17	48	9	11	99
Change	-19	-43	-78	-95	0	5	-230
% of Screen Period	65	80	81	62	82	50	70
% of Full Period	63	90	63	49	75	46	56
Change	-2	10	-18	-13	-7	-4	-14
Any State							
Screen Number	37	65	118	230	11	12	473
Full Number	8	10	27	97	12	24	178

**TABLE 6-46
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCES TO FULL APPLICATIONS BY NET INCOME**

Net Income	Number of		Percent Rate of Change
	Screen Acceptances	Full Applications	
Positive	47	31	-34
Negative	66	48	-27

TABLE 6-47
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF EXISTING BUSINESSES THAT PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED GOV'T FINANCING

Source of Financing	Period					All	
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	Periods
No Government							
Screen Number	31	48	90	151	5	6	331
Full Number	5	7	20	59	5	11	107
Change	-26	-41	-70	-92	0	5	-224
% of Screen Period Known	84	74	76	66	45	50	70
% of Full Period Known	63	70	74	61	42	46	60
Change	-21	-4	-2	-5	-4	-4	-10
Any Government							
Screen Number	6	17	28	79	6	6	142
Full Number	3	3	7	38	7	13	71
Change	-3	-14	-21	-41	1	7	-71
% of Screen Period Known	16	26	24	34	55	50	30
% of Full Period Known	38	30	26	39	58	54	40
Change	21	4	2	5	4	4	10
Federal Government							
Screen Number	6	15	27	77	6	4	135
Full Number	3	2	7	38	7	13	70
Change	-3	-13	-20	-39	1	9	-65
% of Screen Period Known	16	23	23	33	55	33	29
% of Full Period Known	38	20	26	39	58	54	39
Change	21	-3	3	6	4	21	11
DRE/IE							
Screen Number	0	4	13	56	3	3	79
Full Number	0	1	3	23	4	9	40
Change	0	-3	-10	-33	1	6	-39
% of Screen Period Known	0	6	11	24	27	25	17
% of Full Period Known	0	10	11	24	33	38	22
Change	0	4	0	-1	6	13	6
All							
Screen Number	37	65	118	230	11	12	473
Full Number	8	10	27	97	12	24	178

TABLE 6-48
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCES TO FULL APPLICATIONS
FOR EXISTING BUSINESSES THAT PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED GOV'T FINANCING

Receipt of Gov't Financing	Number of		Percent Rate of Change
	Screen Acceptances	Full Applications	
No Government	154	107	-31
Any Government	95	71	-25
Federal Government	95	70	-26
DRE/IE	58	40	-31

TABLE 6-49
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS BY GOAL

Goal	Period						All No Date Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
New Business							
Screen Number	68	168	268	406	28	11	949
Full Number	6	31	33	159	21	42	292
Change	-62	-137	-235	-247	-7	31	-657
% of Screen Period Known	67	72	60	56	65	34	60
% of Full Period Known	55	82	52	55	58	49	56
Change	-13	10	-8	-0	-7	15	-4
Exist. Bus. Starts New Bus.							
Screen Number	3	3	7	16	1	0	30
Full Number	1	1	1	8	1	4	16
Change	-2	-2	-6	-8	0	4	-14
% of Screen Period Known	3	1	2	2	2	0	2
% of Full Period Known	9	3	2	3	3	5	3
Change	6	1	0	1	0	5	1
Purchase Business							
Screen Number	5	17	66	95	5	10	198
Full Number	0	1	6	32	3	15	57
Change	-5	-16	-60	-63	-2	5	-141
% of Screen Period Known	5	7	15	13	12	31	12
% of Full Period Known	0	3	10	11	8	18	11
Change	-5	-5	-5	-2	-3	-14	-2
Exist. Bus. Purchase Bus.							
Screen Number	0	0	1	9	0	0	10
Full Number	0	0	0	4	0	3	7
Change	0	0	-1	-5	0	3	-3
% of Screen Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
% of Full Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	4	1
Change	0	0	-0	0	0	4	1
Expand							
Screen Number	18	42	86	150	4	4	304
Full Number	4	5	21	58	5	14	107
Change	-14	-37	-65	-92	1	10	-197
% of Screen Period Known	18	18	19	21	9	13	19
% of Full Period Known	36	13	33	20	14	16	21
Change	19	-5	14	-0	5	4	1
Other Goal							
Screen Number	7	4	16	55	5	7	94
Full Number	0	0	2	26	6	7	41
Change	-7	-4	-14	-29	1	0	-53
% of Screen Period Known	7	2	4	8	12	22	6
% of Full Period Known	0	0	3	9	17	8	8
Change	-7	-2	-0	2	5	-14	2

**TABLE 6-49 (Cont.)
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS BY GOAL**

Goal	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
All Known							
Screen Number	101	234	444	731	43	32	1585
Full Number	11	38	63	287	36	85	520
Change	-90	-196	-381	-444	-7	53	-1065
% of Screen Period	100	100	100	100	100	89	100
% of Full Period	92	100	98	99	97	100	99
Change	-8	0	-2	-1	-3	11	-1
Not Known							
Screen Number	0	0	0	3	0	4	7
Full Number	1	0	1	4	1	0	7
Change	1	0	1	1	1	-4	0
% of Screen Period	0	0	0	0	0	11	0
% of Full Period	8	0	2	1	3	0	1
Change	8	0	2	1	3	-11	1
All Goals							
Screen Number	101	234	444	734	43	36	1592
Full Number	12	38	64	291	37	85	527

**TABLE 6-50
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCES TO FULL APPLICATIONS BY GOAL**

Goal of Applicant	Number of		Percent Rate of Change
	Screen Acceptances	Full Applications	
New Business	387	292	-25
Exist. Bus. Starts New Bus.	22	16	-27
Purchase Business	74	57	-23
Exist. Bus. Purchase Bus.	10	7	-30
Expand	153	107	-30
Other Goal	52	41	-21

TABLE 6-51
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS BY INTENDED LOCATION OF THE HEAD OFFICE

Location of Head Office	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Organized Community							
Screen Number	18	29	72	79	5	3	206
Full Number	1	4	12	18	1	8	44
Change	-17	-25	-60	-61	-4	5	-162
% of Screen Period Known	18	13	17	11	12	10	13
% of Full Period Known	8	13	19	6	3	10	9
Change	-10	-0	3	-5	-9	-0	-5
Unorganized Community							
Screen Number	40	79	118	180	6	7	430
Full Number	3	8	14	70	4	21	120
Change	-37	-71	-104	-110	-2	14	-310
% of Screen Period Known	41	34	27	25	14	24	28
% of Full Period Known	25	25	23	24	11	26	23
Change	-16	-9	-5	-1	-3	2	-4
Indian Reserve							
Screen Number	15	58	174	376	25	14	662
Full Number	3	11	33	181	26	42	296
Change	-12	-47	-141	-195	1	28	-366
% of Screen Period Known	15	25	40	52	58	48	43
% of Full Period Known	25	34	53	62	72	52	58
Change	10	9	13	10	14	4	15
Other In-Area North							
Screen Number	19	48	59	73	6	4	209
Full Number	2	6	2	18	4	9	41
Change	-17	-42	-57	-55	-2	5	-168
% of Screen Period Known	19	21	14	10	14	14	13
% of Full Period Known	17	19	3	6	11	11	8
Change	-3	-2	-10	-4	-3	-3	-5
Out-of-Area North							
Screen Number	0	8	5	11	1	0	25
Full Number	0	1	0	2	1	1	5
Change	0	-7	-5	-9	0	1	-20
% of Screen Period Known	0	3	1	2	2	0	2
% of Full Period Known	0	3	0	1	3	1	1
Change	0	-0	-1	-1	0	1	-1
External to North							
Screen Number	6	9	5	2	0	1	23
Full Number	3	2	1	1	0	0	7
Change	-3	-7	-4	-1	0	-1	-16
% of Screen Period Known	6	4	1	0	0	3	1
% of Full Period Known	25	6	2	0	0	0	1
Change	19	2	0	0	0	-3	-0

**TABLE 6-51 (Cont.)
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS BY INTENDED LOCATION OF THE HEAD OFFICE**

Location of Head Office	Period						All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	
Location Known							
Screen Number	98	231	433	721	43	29	1555
Full Number	12	32	62	290	36	81	513
Change	-86	-199	-371	-431	-7	52	-1042
% of Screen Period	96	98	97	98	98	85	97
% of Full Period	100	84	97	100	97	95	97
Change	4	-14	-0	1	-0	10	-0
Not Known							
Screen Number	4	5	13	13	1	5	41
Full Number	0	6	2	1	1	4	14
Change	-4	1	-11	-12	0	-1	-27
% of Screen Period	4	2	3	2	2	17	3
% of Full Period	0	19	3	0	3	5	3
Change	-4	17	0	-1	0	-12	0
All Locations							
Screen Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596
Full Number	12	38	64	291	37	85	527

**TABLE 6-52
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCES TO FULL APPLICATIONS
BY INTENDED LOCATION OF THE HEAD OFFICE**

Location of Head Office	Number of		Percent Rate of Change
	Screen Acceptances	Full Applications	
Organized Community	65	44	-32
Unorganized Community	194	120	-38
Indian Reserve	338	296	-12
Other In-Area North	67	41	-39
Out-of-Area North	7	5	-29
External to North	11	7	-36

TABLE 6-53
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS BY INTENDED LOCATION OF BUSINESS OPERATIONS

Location of Operations	Period						All No Date Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Organized Community							
Screen Number	20	29	70	77	5	2	203
Full Number	3	7	11	14	1	8	44
Change	-17	-22	-59	-63	-4	6	-159
% of Screen Period Known	20	13	16	11	11	7	13
% of Full Period Known	25	18	17	5	3	10	8
Change	5	6	2	-6	-9	3	-4
Unorganized Community							
Screen Number	46	87	137	189	7	10	476
Full Number	5	11	15	73	4	25	133
Change	-41	-76	-122	-116	-3	15	-343
% of Screen Period Known	46	38	31	26	16	33	30
% of Full Period Known	42	29	24	25	11	30	25
Change	-4	-9	-7	-1	-5	-4	-5
Indian Reserve							
Screen Number	15	57	176	365	25	13	651
Full Number	3	9	34	180	25	39	290
Change	-12	-48	-142	-185	0	26	-361
% of Screen Period Known	15	25	40	50	57	43	41
% of Full Period Known	25	24	54	62	68	46	55
Change	10	-1	14	12	11	3	14
Other In-Area North							
Screen Number	17	45	58	86	6	4	216
Full Number	1	10	3	20	5	12	51
Change	-16	-35	-55	-66	-1	8	-165
% of Screen Period Known	17	20	13	12	14	13	14
% of Full Period Known	8	26	5	7	14	14	10
Change	-9	6	-8	-5	-0	1	-4
Out-of-Area North							
Screen Number	0	8	4	15	1	1	29
Full Number	0	1	0	4	2	0	7
Change	0	-7	-4	-11	1	-1	-22
% of Screen Period Known	0	4	1	2	2	3	2
% of Full Period Known	0	3	0	1	5	0	1
Change	0	-1	-1	-1	3	-3	-1
External to North							
Screen Number	2	1	0	1	0	0	4
Full Number	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Change	-2	-1	0	-1	0	0	-4
% of Screen Period Known	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
% of Full Period Known	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Change	-2	-0	0	-0	0	0	-0

**TABLE 6-53 (Cont.)
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS BY INTENDED LOCATION OF BUSINESS OPERATIONS**

Location of Operations	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Location Known							
Screen Number	100	227	445	733	44	30	1579
Full Number	12	38	63	291	37	84	525
Change	-88	-189	-382	-442	-7	54	-1054
% of Screen Period	98	96	100	100	100	88	99
% of Full Period	100	100	97	100	100	100	100
Change	2	4	-3	0	0	12	1
Not Known							
Screen Number	2	9	1	1	0	4	17
Full Number	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Change	-2	-9	1	-1	0	-4	-15
% of Screen Period	2	4	0	0	0	12	1
% of Full Period	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
Change	-2	-4	3	-0	0	-12	-1
All Locations							
Screen Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596
Full Number	12	38	65	291	37	84	527

**TABLE 6-54
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCES TO FULL APPLICATIONS
BY INTENDED LOCATION OF BUSINESS OPERATIONS**

Location of Operations	Number of		Percent Rate of Change
	Screen Acceptances	Full Applications	
Organized Community	63	44	-30
Unorganized Community	212	133	-37
Indian Reserve	337	290	-14
Other In-Area North	77	51	-34
Out-of-Area North	10	7	-30
External to North	1	0	-100

TABLE 6-55
COMMUNITY CONDITIONS AND LOCATIONAL TARGETING OF "HIGH LEVEL"
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS #1 - #3

Model #1: All Entrepreneurs, 1986 Census Data

Cases: 32.

Dependent variable: FT1.

Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.

3 steps to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.6252. Std. err. Y = 2.7531.

DF: regression = 3, residual = 28. F = 18.2352. Sig F = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
PAB	22.9955	4.4741	1.0369	0.0000
TOP	0.0039	0.0006	1.0121	0.0000
PG9	-14.3483	5.0690	-0.5002	0.0085
Constant	-12.7029	3.5074	-	0.0011

Variables not in model:

	Beta In	Partial	Sig. "t"
PAL	-0.2327	-0.3263	0.0841
CTR	0.2891	0.2614	0.1707
PEY	0.2045	0.2173	0.2575
MHY	0.1726	0.1838	0.3400
PCY	0.2654	0.1748	0.3645
ADP	-0.6552	-0.1682	0.3830
PEM	0.0994	0.0908	0.6397
ACC	0.0472	0.0728	0.7074
PTP	0.1059	0.0691	0.7219

Model #2: Non-Government - Non-Collective Entrepreneurs, 1986 Census Data

Cases: 32.

Dependent variable: FT2.

Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.

3 steps to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.6560. Std. err. Y = 1.5861.

DF: regression = 3, residual = 28. F = 20.7072. Sig F = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
TOP	0.0020	0.0002	0.8668	0.0000
CTR	4.1167	0.9655	0.5616	0.0002
PAL	-2.0869	0.9079	-0.2827	0.0292
Constant	-1.5260	0.9314	-	0.1125

Variables not in model:

	Beta In	Partial	Sig. "t"
MHY	0.2827	0.3059	0.1065
PG9	-0.2710	-0.2969	0.1179
PEY	0.2041	0.2491	0.1925
PAB	0.3244	0.2464	0.1976
PCY	0.1796	0.1650	0.3925
PTP	0.1311	0.1299	0.5020
PEM	0.0906	0.1162	0.5484
ADP	0.1171	0.0300	0.8774
ACC	-0.0006	-0.0010	0.9960

TABLE 6-55 (Cont.)
COMMUNITY CONDITIONS AND LOCATIONAL TARGETING OF "HIGH LEVEL"
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS #1 - #3

Model #3: Non-Government - Non-Collective Entrepreneurs, 1991 Census Data

Cases: 35.

Dependent variable: FT2.

Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.

1 step to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.2849. Std err. Y = 2.4765.

DF: regression = 1, residual = 33. F = 14.5442. Sig F = .0006.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
TOP	0.0015	0.0004	0.5531	0.0006
Constant	1.6989	0.5746	-	0.0057

Variables not in model:

	Beta In	Partial	Sig. "t"
PAL	-0.1891	-0.2251	0.2006
PG9	-0.1816	-0.2006	0.2554
PEY	0.1713	0.1955	0.2679
MHY	0.1380	0.1475	0.4052
PEM	0.1283	0.1435	0.4181
PAB	0.1187	0.1143	0.5199
PTP	0.0991	0.1008	0.5706
ACC	-0.0537	-0.0632	0.7225
PCY	0.0568	0.0611	0.7315
CTR	0.0169	0.0201	0.9101
ADP	0.0850	0.0130	0.9420

**TABLE 6-56
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF INTENDED PRODUCTS PER APPLICATION**

Number of Products	Period						All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	
1							
Screen Number	66	165	352	568	40	21	1212
Full Number	6	23	43	219	34	49	374
Change	-60	-142	-309	-349	-6	28	-838
% of Screen Period Known	65	70	79	77	91	62	76
% of Full Period Known	50	61	67	75	92	58	71
Change	-15	-9	-12	-2	1	-4	-5
2							
Screen Number	26	61	75	117	3	5	287
Full Number	3	9	16	46	2	19	95
Change	-23	-52	-59	-71	-1	14	-192
% of Screen Period Known	25	26	17	16	7	15	18
% of Full Period Known	25	24	25	16	5	22	18
Change	-0	-2	8	-0	-1	8	0
3 - 5							
Screen Number	10	10	19	49	1	8	97
Full Number	3	6	5	26	1	17	58
Change	-7	-4	-14	-23	0	9	-39
% of Screen Period Known	10	4	4	7	2	24	6
% of Full Period Known	25	16	8	9	3	20	11
Change	15	12	4	2	0	-4	5
All							
Screen Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596
Full Number	12	38	64	291	37	85	527

**TABLE 6-57
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCES TO FULL APPLICATIONS
BY INTENDED NUMBER OF PRODUCTS**

Number of Products	Number of		Percent Rate of Change
	Screen Acceptances	Full Applications	
One	515	374	-27
Two	132	95	-28
Three or More	60	58	-3

**TABLE 6-58
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS PER INTENDED PRODUCT**

Product Sector*	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Agriculture							
Screen Number	6	5	5	20	1	2	39
Full Number	2	0	1	6	0	1	10
Change	-4	-5	-4	-14	-1	-1	-29
% of Screen Period Known	6	2	1	3	2	7	2
% of Full Period Known	17	0	2	2	0	1	2
Change	11	-2	0	-1	-2	-5	-1
Fishing							
Screen Number	6	2	1	8	0	2	19
Full Number	1	0	0	1	0	1	3
Change	-5	-2	-1	-7	0	-1	-16
% of Screen Period Known	6	1	0	1	0	7	1
% of Full Period Known	8	0	0	0	0	1	1
Change	2	-1	-0	-1	0	-5	-1
Logging & Forestry							
Screen Number	5	40	83	85	7	1	221
Full Number	0	10	5	35	5	11	66
Change	-5	-30	-78	-50	-2	10	-155
% of Screen Period Known	5	17	19	12	16	3	14
% of Full Period Known	0	26	8	12	14	13	13
Change	-5	9	-11	0	-2	10	-1
Logging & Forestry, & Mfg.							
Screen Number	1	13	7	11	0	2	34
Full Number	1	0	1	8	0	1	11
Change	0	-13	-6	-3	0	-1	-23
% of Screen Period Known	1	6	2	2	0	7	2
% of Full Period Known	8	0	2	3	0	1	2
Change	7	-6	0	1	0	-5	-0
Mining							
Screen Number	0	1	2	5	0	2	10
Full Number	0	0	0	4	0	1	5
Change	0	-1	-2	-1	0	-1	-5
% of Screen Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	7	1
% of Full Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Change	0	-0	-0	1	0	-5	0
Manufacturing							
Screen Number	8	12	20	29	2	0	71
Full Number	1	0	3	11	2	4	21
Change	-7	-12	-17	-18	0	4	-50
% of Screen Period Known	8	5	5	4	5	0	4
% of Full Period Known	8	0	5	4	5	5	4
Change	0	-5	0	-0	1	5	-0
Construction							
Screen Number	6	11	30	67	2	1	117
Full Number	0	1	6	23	0	7	37
Change	-6	-10	-24	-44	-2	6	-80
% of Screen Period Known	6	5	7	9	5	3	7
% of Full Period Known	0	3	10	8	0	8	7
Change	-6	-2	3	-1	-5	5	-0

TABLE 6-58 (Cont.)
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS PER INTENDED PRODUCT

Product Sector*	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
Transport							
Screen Number	5	20	48	60	1	4	138
Full Number	1	2	8	23	3	3	40
Change	-4	-18	-40	-37	2	-1	-98
% of Screen Period Known	5	9	11	8	2	13	9
% of Full Period Known	8	5	13	8	8	4	8
Change	3	-3	2	-0	6	-10	-1
Communications							
Screen Number	0	1	0	5	0	0	6
Full Number	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
Change	0	-1	0	-2	0	0	-3
% of Screen Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
% of Full Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Change	0	-0	0	0	0	0	0
Wholesale							
Screen Number	1	3	2	1	1	0	8
Full Number	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
Change	-1	-2	-2	-1	0	0	-6
% of Screen Period Known	1	1	0	0	2	0	1
% of Full Period Known	0	3	0	0	3	0	0
Change	-1	1	-0	-0	0	0	-0
Retail							
Screen Number	11	32	78	157	15	4	297
Full Number	1	5	9	61	16	13	105
Change	-10	-27	-69	-96	1	9	-192
% of Screen Period Known	11	14	18	22	34	13	19
% of Full Period Known	8	13	14	21	43	15	20
Change	-3	-0	-3	-1	9	2	1
Retail & Food&Beverage							
Screen Number	4	7	8	11	0	1	31
Full Number	1	2	2	6	0	2	13
Change	-3	-5	-6	-5	0	1	-18
% of Screen Period	4	3	2	2	0	3	2
% of Full Period	8	5	3	2	0	2	2
Change	4	2	1	1	0	-1	1
Finance, R.E. & Bus. Servs.							
Screen Number	0	1	7	4	1	0	13
Full Number	0	0	2	2	0	1	5
Change	0	-1	-5	-2	-1	1	-8
% of Screen Period Known	0	0	2	1	2	0	1
% of Full Period Known	0	0	3	1	0	1	1
Change	0	-0	2	0	-2	1	0
Local Gov't, Health & Ed.							
Screen Number	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
Full Number	0	0	0	4	0	0	4
Change	0	0	0	-2	0	0	-2
% of Screen Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
% of Full Period Known	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Change	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

TABLE 6-58 (Cont.)
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS PER INTENDED PRODUCT

Product Sector*	Period					All	
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989	No Date	Periods
Accommodation							
Screen Number	7	11	6	6	2	0	32
Full Number	0	1	0	2	1	2	6
Change	-7	-10	-6	-4	-1	2	-26
% of Screen Period Known	7	5	1	1	5	0	2
% of Full Period Known	0	3	0	1	3	2	1
Change	-7	-2	-1	-0	-2	2	-1
Accom. & Food&Beverage							
Screen Number	2	7	7	17	1	0	34
Full Number	0	1	4	2	0	4	11
Change	-2	-6	-3	-15	-1	4	-23
% of Screen Period Known	2	3	2	2	2	0	2
% of Full Period Known	0	3	6	1	0	5	2
Change	-2	-0	5	-2	-2	5	-0
Cabins, Campgrounds, Lodges							
Screen Number	16	19	29	62	2	6	134
Full Number	1	7	5	23	1	18	55
Change	-15	-12	-24	-39	-1	12	-79
% of Screen Period Known	16	8	7	9	5	20	8
% of Full Period Known	8	18	8	8	3	21	10
Change	-8	10	1	-1	-2	1	2
Food & Beverage Servs.							
Screen Number	3	7	24	31	1	0	66
Full Number	0	1	3	11	0	1	16
Change	-3	-6	-21	-20	-1	1	-50
% of Screen Period Known	3	3	5	4	2	0	4
% of Full Period Known	0	3	5	4	0	1	3
Change	-3	-0	-1	-0	-2	1	-1
Other Services							
Screen Number	5	19	45	78	7	1	155
Full Number	0	2	5	33	6	4	50
Change	-5	-17	-40	-45	-1	3	-105
% of Screen Period Known	5	8	10	11	16	3	10
% of Full Period Known	0	5	8	11	16	5	10
Change	-5	-3	-2	1	0	1	-0
All Main Known							
Screen Number	86	211	402	663	43	26	1431
Full Number	9	33	54	258	35	74	463
Change	-77	-178	-348	-405	-8	48	-968
% of Screen Period Known	87	90	91	91	98	87	91
% of Full Period Known	75	87	86	89	95	87	88
Change	-12	-3	-5	-2	-3	0	-2
Other Combined & Known							
Screen Number	13	24	42	66	1	4	150
Full Number	3	5	9	33	2	11	63
Change	-10	-19	-33	-33	1	7	-87
% of Screen Period Known	13	10	9	9	2	13	9
% of Full Period Known	25	13	14	11	5	13	12
Change	12	3	5	2	3	-0	2

**TABLE 6-58 (Cont.)
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS,
NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS PER INTENDED PRODUCT**

Product Sector*	Period					No Date	All Periods
	1971-73	1974-78	1979-83	1984-88	1989		
All Known							
Screen Number	99	235	444	729	44	30	1581
Full Number	12	38	63	291	37	85	526
Change	-87	-197	-381	-438	-7	55	-1055
% of Screen Period	97	100	100	99	100	88	99
% of Full Period	100	100	98	100	100	100	100
Change	3	0	-1	1	0	12	1
Not Known							
Screen Number	3	1	2	5	0	4	15
Full Number	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Change	-3	-1	-1	-5	0	-4	-14
% of Screen Period	3	0	0	1	0	12	1
% of Full Period	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Change	-3	-0	1	-1	0	-12	-1
All Types							
Screen Number	102	236	446	734	44	34	1596
Full Number	12	38	64	291	37	85	527

* For the definition of products in terms of standard industrial codes see Table 6-21.

**TABLE 6-59
FALL-OFF RATE FROM SCREEN ACCEPTANCES TO FULL APPLICATIONS
BY INTENDED PRODUCT**

Product	Number of Screen Acceptances	Number of Full Applications	Percent Rate of Change
Agriculture	17	10	-41
Fishing	8	3	-63
Logging&Forestry	103	66	-36
Logging&For.-Mfg.	22	11	-50
Mining	6	5	-17
Manufacturing	33	21	-36
Construction	47	37	-21
Transportation	60	40	-33
Communications	5	3	-40
Wholesale	4	2	-50
Retail	121	105	-13
Retail-Food&Beverage Servs.	17	13	-24
Finance, Real Estate & Business Services	5	5	0
Local Gov't, Health & Education	4	4	0
Accommodation	9	6	-33
Accommodation-Food& Beverage Services	16	11	-31
Cabins,Campgrounds,Lodges	54	55	2
Food & Beverage Services	28	16	-43
Other Services	66	50	-24
Other Combined Products	72	63	-13

**TABLE 6-60
FULL APPLICATIONS,
PROJECTED NET* PERSON-YEARS OF EMPLOYMENT**

Period	Applications With Projections	Person-Years Total Projected	Per Application
1971-73	7	50	7.1
1974-78	33	228	6.9
1979-83	59	246	4.2
1984-88	264	901	3.4
1989	35	127	3.6
No Date	70	335	4.8
All Periods	468	1907	4.1

* Net of existing employment.

TABLE 6-61
FULL APPLICATIONS, PROJECTED BUSINESS VIABILITY
BY THOSE APPLICATIONS THAT PROJECTED NET INCOME AND GROSS MARGIN
(\$000's 1990)

Year	Projected Highest Net Income		Projected Highest Gross Margin									
	# Rept	Mean	All		Organized		Unorganized		Ind. Reserve		Other	
			# Rept	Mean	# Rept	Mean	# Rept	Mean	# Rept	Mean	# Rept	Mean
1972	4	208	7	170	2	137	4	98	1	-24	0	-
1973	1	38	3	212	1	465	1	60	1	111	0	-
1974	4	84	5	141	1	123	3	178	0	-	1	49
1975	1	11	2	119	0	-	0	-	2	119	0	-
1976	4	55	7	75	1	169	1	19	0	-	5	67
1977	4	141	12	152	3	231	4	48	3	57	2	381
1978	3	33	4	51	0	-	1	87	2	26	1	65
1979	4	97	8	96	3	72	2	236	2	28	1	26
1980	8	22	11	71	1	79	3	93	6	67	1	21
1981	9	46	17	83	3	42	2	301	12	57	0	-
1982	4	7	5	60	2	91	1	34	2	41	0	-
1983	11	22	18	34	1	20	6	44	10	30	1	32
1984	33	17	53	32	3	16	14	20	32	36	4	54
1985	32	44	55	87	1	10	18	61	27	120	9	47
1986	29	42	40	56	3	-25	5	37	28	66	4	69
1987	40	21	57	32	2	8	14	32	37	36	4	12
1988	62	22	78	43	4	35	20	53	53	34	1	344
1989	29	49	37	64	1	108	4	24	25	31	7	196
All	282	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
B (1)		-4.8		-7.6		-14.8		-4.6		-0.6		3.3
St.err		45.5		33.1		90.6		79.0		39.4		127.7

1. Slope of a linear least-squares regression line.

Related statistics concerning highest projected net income:

	No.	Mean
By Operational Location:		
Organized communities	18	62
Unorganized communities	69	44
Indian reserves	210	34
By Program:		
SARDA	234	29
NDA2	72	73
NEDP3	19	181

TABLE 6-62
FULL APPLICATIONS, PROJECTED BUSINESS RETURN ON CAPITAL
BY THOSE APPLICATIONS THAT PROJECTED CAPITAL REQUIRED AND NET INCOME

Year	Projected Percent Return for Year of Highest Net Income									
	All		Organized		Unorganized		Ind. Reserve		Other	
	#	Return	#	Return	#	Return	#	Return	#	Return
1972	4	0.03	1	0.01	3	0.37	0	-	0	-
1973	1	0.20	0	-	1	0.20	0	-	0	-
1974	4	0.17	0	-	3	0.19	0	-	1	0.01
1975	1	0.06	0	-	0	-	1	0.06	0	-
1976	4	0.11	1	0.02	0	-	0	-	3	0.22
1977	4	0.55	2	0.64	1	0.38	1	0.14	0	-
1978	3	0.09	0	-	1	0.05	1	0.15	1	0.14
1979	4	0.48	1	1.27	2	0.41	1	0.79	0	-
1980	8	0.08	1	0.16	2	0.14	5	0.05	0	-
1981	9	0.19	0	-	0	-	9	0.19	0	-
1982	4	0.03	2	0.03	0	-	2	0.04	0	-
1983	11	0.11	0	-	2	0.06	8	0.13	1	0.09
1984	33	0.07	0	-	5	0.07	27	0.07	1	0.26
1985	32	0.11	1	0.01	8	0.08	17	0.13	6	0.03
1986	29	0.14	1	0.02	5	0.17	22	0.15	1	0.05
1987	40	0.22	1	0.31	8	0.09	29	0.29	2	0.12
1988	62	0.10	2	0.74	14	0.04	45	0.13	1	0.04
1989	29	0.18	1	0.71	2	0.00	19	0.14	7	0.21
All	325	0.15	18	0.20	69	0.14	210	0.16	28	0.14
B (1)		-0.00		0.01		-0.02		-0.00		0.00
Std.Err		0.14		0.44		0.10		0.20		0.09

1. Slope of a linear least-squares regression line.

Related statistics concerning best projected return on capital:

By Program:		
SARDA	234	0.15
NDA2	72	0.11
NEDP3	19	0.24

**TABLE 6-63
FULL APPLICATIONS, PROJECTED BUSINESS VIABILITY
BY PRODUCT (1)(2)
(\$000's, 1990)**

Product	Gross Margin		Net Income	
	# Rept.	Mean Projected Highest	# Rept.	Mean Projected Highest
Agriculture	7	2	2	11
Fishing	3	40	3	37
Logging & Forestry	59	36	35	17
Log.&For. & Mfg.	10	31	5	9
Mining	5	120	4	77
Manufacturing	19	27	8	5
Construction	34	152	23	153
Transportation	37	88	29	49
Communications	3	14	2	10
Wholesale	2	352	0	-
Retail	98	47	70	30
Retail & Food&Beverage	11	136	6	143
Fin.,Real E.&Bus. Servs.	5	55	3	59
Loc.Gov't, Health & Ed.	4	80	3	6
Accommodation	4	40	2	25
Accomm. & Food&Bev.	10	97	7	44
Cabins, Camp., & Lodges	51	81	29	35
Food & Beverage Servs.	16	36	14	13
Other Services	49	28	32	18

1. Main products only, not including other combined products.
2. For those applications that projected an annual gross margin or net income only.

TABLE 6-64
FULL APPLICATIONS, PROJECTED BUSINESS RETURN ON CAPITAL
BY THOSE APPLICATIONS THAT PROJECTED CAPITAL REQUIRED AND NET INCOME
BY PRODUCT (1)(2)

Product	Projected Percent Return For Year of Highest Net Income	
	#	Return
Agriculture	2	0.14
Fishing	3	0.45
Logging & Forestry	35	0.20
Log.&For. & Mfg.	5	0.02
Mining	4	0.08
Manufacturing	8	0.03
Construction	23	0.42
Transportation	29	0.27
Communications	2	0.07
Wholesale	0	-
Retail	70	0.15
Retail & Food&Beverage	6	0.26
Fin.,Real E.&Bus. Servs.	3	0.10
Loc.Gov't, Health & Ed.	3	0.03
Accommodation	2	0.19
Accomm. & Food&Bev.	7	0.10
Cabins, Camp., & Lodges	29	0.06
Food & Beverage Servs.	14	0.09
Other Services	32	0.17

1. Main products only, not including other combined products.
2. For those applications that projected an annual gross margin or net income only.

TABLE 6-65
FULL APPLICATIONS, PROJECTED JOB CREATION RETURN ON CAPITAL
BY THOSE APPLICATIONS THAT PROJECTED CAPITAL REQUIRED AND NET INCOME
AND FULL-TIME JOB CREATION BY PRODUCT (1)(2)

Product	Projected Full-Time PY's Per Dollar of Capital Required At Year of Highest Net Income	
	# Reporting	PY's Per \$000's
Agriculture	0	-
Fishing	3	0.02
Logging & Forestry	35	0.03
Log.&For. & Mfg.	5	0.02
Mining	3	0.01
Manufacturing	8	0.03
Construction	21	0.03
Transportation	25	0.01
Communications	2	0.00
Wholesale	0	-
Retail	64	0.01
Retail & Food&Beverage	5	0.01
Fin.,Real E.&Bus. Servs.	3	0.00
Loc.Gov't, Health & Ed.	3	0.04
Accommodation	2	0.02
Accomm. & Food&Bev.	7	0.01
Cabins, Camp., & Lodges	24	0.01
Food & Beverage Servs.	14	0.02
Other Services	32	0.02

1. Main products only, not including other combined products.
2. For only those applications that projected annual net income, capital required, and net jobs created that could be converted to equivalent full-time person-years.

CHAPTER 7

FINAL DECISIONS

This chapter addresses the decisions taken by the programs as to whether or not assistance would be provided to projects. It also addresses the characteristics of assistance offered and provided.

Discussion begins with presentation of the additional variables brought into the analysis. This is followed by a summary of the flow of projects by event from the screen application stage through to the approvals stage. Examination of elapsed time between receipt of full applications and program decisions is next. Decision outcomes are analyzed in three steps. The first step links decision outcomes to characteristics of the applicants and their proposed projects. The second step explores the reasons given for rejections. The third step compares the programs' expectations for approved projects with the project plans submitted by applicants. A measure of the quality of analyses of project applications by programs is applied in this third step.

The portion of the causal model relevant to this discussion is the "links concerning service production" (Figure 2-4). These "links" suggest three categories of factors determine project decisions. The program operating structure sets the information that is allowed to enter the decision process, sets the framework for analyzing the application and sets the criteria for decision-taking. The nature of applications circumscribes much of the information available to the decision process. The involvement of other programs, and their willingness to provide assistance to the proposed project, act as levers in the decision process. Project decisions, in turn, largely determine the nature and magnitude of outputs to the project - the subject of Chapter 8.

The Database

The database for this chapter contains 704 projects (Table 7-1). These are comprised of the 527 full applications discussed in the previous chapter plus the 177 projects that were preceded by screen applications, but did not meet the criteria for having placed a full application.

Original variables utilized in this analysis include four variables from screen applications (program, existing business, performance of existing business, previous government financing), all the variables brought into play in Chapter 6 and the additional variables listed in Table 7-2. Many of these additional variables, such as type, location and status group of intended owner, have similar properties to their counterparts in the screen and full application databases. One of two variables with new properties is the "number of different full applications approved" for a given project. In other words, some projects received approvals for incremental assistance¹ after having received a first approval. Values available to the variable "source of assistance per type expected from other sources" differ slightly from the values available to its counterpart in Chapter 6 (see Table 6-24). The range of available values is reduced to focus on the principal sources of assistance.

Decision Flows and Timing

The 527 full applications are derived from 522 screen acceptances, 3 screen rejections and 2 screen applications for which the screen decision is not known (Table 7-3). Of 522 full applications that followed screen acceptance, 324 (62%) were recommended for approval and 176 (34%) were recommended for rejection by program officers. Of 855 projects rejected at the screen decision step not one is known to have been recommended for approval.² Of 35 projects for which the decision at the

1. Incremental in quantity, or incremental in type and quantity.

2. The nature of the program officer's recommendation for one project rejected at the screen step is not known.

screen step is not known, 2 were recommended for acceptance by program officers.

As noted above, the 704 projects subject to a final decision were comprised of the 527 full applications discussed in Chapter 6 plus 177 projects that were preceded by screen applications, but did not meet the criteria for having placed a full application. Therefore, 25% of final decisions were taken despite absence of a full application as defined in this study. Of the 704 projects 470 (67%) received final approval, 216 (31%) were rejected and the final decisions for 18 (3%) are not known. These data indicate the programs' tendency to outrun or "force" the ability of the environment to supply well-developed project opportunities.

Only 2% (15 of 674) known recommendations of program officers were reversed by final decisions. Of these reversals, 14 recommended approvals (3% of recommended approvals) were rejected and 1 recommended rejection (less than 1% of recommended rejections) was approved. Of the 30 proposals with unknown recommendations, 9 (30%) were approved and 5 (17%) were rejected.¹ As well, the data show very few inconsistencies between the recommendations of program officers and the recommendations of program advisory committees. By implication, there were very few inconsistencies between these recommendations, the recommendations of program advisory committees and the nature of final decisions. There is, therefore, no evidence that political factors entered into decision processes at the program advisory or final decision points with the exception of a few particular projects. In retrospect, this finding is not a surprise. Particularistic political interference does not sit well within Weberian bureaucratic processes. However, given the weaknesses in program application documents, loose program criteria, weaknesses in staff resources and a tendency to "force" the environment there also was ample opportunity to provide or take away discretionary assistance in the process of application generation, and little need to interfere at later points in the process.

1. Sixteen (53%) of the final decisions are not known.

Program officers often had to contend with more than one full application per project. Some applicants, before receiving any substantive response from a program officer, would submit one or more updated versions of the full application. Changes were often substantial, especially concerning product mix and financial proformas. This was particularly a problem with many applications from Indian bands and collective organizations owned by Indian bands. The nature, speed and frequency of changes suggest a proclivity to complete the full application before fully working through, or committing to, the substance of the proposed project. This is further evidence consistent with the proposition that the programs directly and indirectly "forced" the ability of the environment to generate quality projects.

Once the last full application was received, it took, for all programs over the study period, an average of nearly five months before a program officer completed an analysis and made a recommendation (Table 7-1). Interestingly, this mean elapsed time was the same for SARDA and NDA2, but was substantially longer for NEDP3. Therefore, while conditions were such as to facilitate the preparation of full applications to NDA2 and NEDP3 in comparison to SARDA, these conditions did not extend to the capacity of NDA2 and NEDP program officers to arrive at a recommendation. The sole NDA2 program officer addressed far more full applications than did each SARDA or NEDP3 program officer. Therefore, cogitation and purposeful "screening-out" time within SARDA was sufficiently longer than NDA2 as to offset SARDA's much greater staff resources.¹ Government resources were distributed so as to have a greater impact on the ability to generate applications² rather than to improve, or at least keep in pace, the ability to assess applications. NEDP3, in particular, was roundly criticized by Aboriginal organizations for the time it took to arrive at a decision. Once a

1. NEDP3 Central Region staff served a much larger area than Manitoba. The author has no information concerning the number of full applications received by that Region.

2. For example, NDA Program #1, NDA's Thompson-based field staff, development staff of Manitoba Northern Affairs and Manitoba Business Development's field staff, and the many community development staff employed by local organizations, especially Indian bands and tribal councils, that were financed by senior governments.

recommendation was made by a program officer, it took only an average of 18 calendar days for the programs to get an advisory committee recommendation and to take a final decision that had the Minister's approval.¹

Decisions Respecting Full Applications

Programs took decisions predominantly on the basis of project plans contained in the full applications.² Information contained in full applications was supplemented by some independent collection of information and generation of projections by program officers before recommendations were made and decisions taken. If a full application, as defined in this study, did not exist, much of the project plan (especially the financial proformas) was generated by a program officer. Thus, program officers spent substantial time planning projects because the environment was not able to do the work.

This section relates final program decisions to information contained in the full applications. The substance of approved project plans is compared to the substance of full applications later in this chapter. As an aid to understanding the relevancy of relating final decisions to the substance of full applications the reader is informed, prior to presentation of the data, that there were very few differences between the substance of final approvals and the substance of full applications except in the area of financial proformas. As well, program officers did not produce project analyses and plans for most rejected full applications. As will be shown, most rejections were made on the basis of factors that are not apparent from data contained in the full applications database.

1. There were a few cases in which program officer recommendation dates and/or final decision dates preceded the date the last full application was received. There were also a few cases in which final approval dates preceded the dates of program officer recommendations. The causes of these few anomalies are not known.

2. If a full application existed, that is.

Systems utilized by the three programs for analyzing and taking decisions were structured, therefore, so as to limit attrition and cogitation. Such systems are symptomatic of economical Weberian bureaucratic processing rather than processes that would generate highest overall system efficiency or greatest effectiveness in attaining stated client impacts. In Chapter 6 it was noted that processes using minimal resources were utilized to winnow-out screen application non-acceptances. Program staff did not pursue many applicants with whom they lost contact. As well, most non-acceptance decisions were taken by program officers. Only those screen applications that were not withdrawn, were explicitly accepted or were not explicitly rejected proceeded up the organizational hierarchy. Similarly, it was, in general, only those full applications that were not withdrawn or explicitly rejected which received detailed analysis and a program-produced project plan to be submitted up the organizational hierarchy. Allocation of government resources to achieve greatest efficiency in generating fewer, high quality, project proposals would require less independent information collection and analysis. Allocation of resources to achieve greater impact through ultimately successful projects would have necessitated a very different allocation of resources. Such allocation of resources would have been in conflict with the political imperative of minimal government involvement in business, political processes that generate and support dreams, and the provision of equal opportunity to receive government services.

Of the 527 full applications, the decision outcome is known for 510 (Table 7-4). Of these 510, 62% were approved and 38% rejected. The rate of approvals relative to rejections shows no clear trend over time. Measured by the rate of approvals, the environment did not produce relatively higher proportions of acceptably high-quality project proposals over time. These data either call into question the amount of learning from experience that occurred among those engaged in project development, or they suggest that available business niches were deteriorating over time so as to offset the experiential learning that took place.

Over the study period NDA2 had the highest approval rate (75%); and NEDP3 had the lowest approval rate (39%) (Table 7-5). This finding is as

expected, NDA2 had the loosest criteria, SARDA the most strict.

In terms of number of applicants per application, the highest approval rate was achieved by applications from three or more applicants (69%)(Table 7-6). Applications from two applicants also had a slightly higher approval rate (63%) than applications from a single applicant (61%). Although coordination problems among multiple applicants may have lowered the rate of screen acceptances and lengthen application turnaround times, no such problems are apparent when full application success is measured.

Highest approval rates by type of applicant¹ were generated by applications with a least one applicant that is a government (Table 7-7). Indian band applicants had the highest approval rate (75%), private corporations had the lowest approval rate (60%). The high Indian band approval rate may have resulted from the greater capacity of Indian bands to produce acceptable quality proposals, a "warmness" shown towards these organizations by the federal government during most of the study period or the ability of Indian bands to mount political pressure. The only notable trend per type of applicant is the continued improvement in the approval rate for Indian bands from the beginning of the study period through 1988. This finding is consistent with the improving success rates for screen applications, improving quality and improving turnaround times for Indian band applications discussed in Chapter 6.

Interestingly, the highest approval rates were garnered by applicants from unorganized communities (68%) and organized communities (66%), while the second lowest approval rate went to Indian reserves (61%)²(Table 7-8). If full applications from Indian bands are subtracted from full applications from Indian reserve applicants the approval rate for applications with at least one applicant from an Indian reserve falls to 59%.³ The

1. That is, when at least one applicant of a given type is involved in the application.
2. The lowest rate, not surprisingly, went to applicants from external areas (58%).
3. $(193-56)/(317-83) = 0.59$.

enhanced capability of applicants from Indian reserves to generate applications did not extend to relatively higher approval rates for applicants from Indian reserves, other than Indian band applicants, compared to the approval rates garnered by applicants from other in-area locations.

The rate of approval by community group location is shown in the Table 7-9). As expected, given the emphases of the programs on Aboriginal-owned businesses and the non-organized north, for the combined 1979-83 and 1984-88 periods the rate of approvals per 100 persons age 15 and over was much lower in the organized communities. As well, given the above discussion, it is not surprising that the overall approval rate for Indian reserves was higher than the approval rate for unorganized communities. Again, if approvals of applications from Indian bands are subtracted from approvals of applications from Indian reserve applicants the approval rate per 100 adults for applications with at least one applicant from an Indian reserve falls to 0.11 in 1981 and 0.69 in 1986.¹ Subtracting approvals of applications from local governments from the unorganized totals yields equivalent measures of 0.09 in 1981 and 1.01 in 1986.² Net of applications from these governments, the approval rate per 100 adults from Indian reserves deteriorated relative to the approval rate per 100 adults located in unorganized communities. For the 1979-83 and 1984-88 periods combined, the rate of fall-off in approvals per 100 adults, when these governments are included, relative to the number of full applications per 100 adults was greatest for applicants from Indian reserves (-40%) and nearly the same for applicants from organized and unorganized communities (-33% and -34%, respectively).

These findings regarding relative fall-off rates support the proposition that the enhanced capability of applicants from Indian reserves to generate applications did not extend to relatively higher approval rates for applicants from Indian reserves, other than Indian band applicants, compared to the

1. $((18-6)/(113.71/100))$ and $((127-38)/(12845/100))$, respectively.

2. There were no approvals of applications from local governments in 1981. The rate for 1986 is derived from $((61-3)/(5750/100))$.

approval rates garnered by applicants from other in-area locations. The findings regarding relative fall-off rates may indicate that the large increase in applications from Indian reserves relative to other community groups coupled with the relatively less prepared socioeconomic start point caused the business development process to encounter greater organizational absorptive problems on Indian reserves. This may have been especially a problem for non-band entrepreneurs. Perhaps the effort to generate applications got ahead of ability to follow-through.

Data on rates of approval by status group indicate similar rates of approval for all groups except registered Indians (Table 7-10). The approval rate for registered Indians was 7 to 11 percentage points lower than the approval rate for other groups. Since the approval rate for Indian bands was relatively high and given that Indian band applicants generated 25% of the full applications from registered Indians in which the decision outcome is known, the approval rate for registered Indians who are not Indian bands must be only 59%.¹ Again, the enhanced capability of applicants from Indian reserves to generate applications did not extend to relatively higher approval rates for registered Indian applicants, other than Indian band applicants, when compared to the approval rates for applications from other status groups.

Using the population data in Table 4-8 the 1984-88 rate of approvals per 100 adults are calculated for each of the three status groups (Table 7-11). This rate of approvals was highest for registered Indians (90%), lower for other Aboriginal persons (76%) and, as expected because of the emphases placed by the programs on Aboriginal beneficiaries and the non-organized north, much lower for non-Aboriginal persons (40%). The order of rate of fall-off in approvals per 100 adults compared to full applications per 100 adults, however, is the converse of the order of rate of approvals. Applications with at least one registered Indian show the highest rate of fall-off (-38%), followed by applications with at least one other Aboriginal (-30%) and applications with at least one non-Aboriginal (-12%). Again, these

1. $(202-56)/(331-83) = 0.59$.

data attest to problems of follow-through especially for registered Indian applicants, but also for other Aboriginal applicants.

Not surprisingly, applicants that were an existing business had a higher approval rate (67%) than applicants that were not an existing business (59%)(Table 7-12). Also, applicants that were an existing businesses with a positive net income show a higher approval rate (87%) than existing businesses that had a negative net income (73%)(Table 7-13). Experience and well-being, if in existing business, appear to have translated into positive decisions. Finally, existing businesses that had received previous government financing show a higher approval rate (75%) than existing businesses that had not received previous government financing (62%)(Table 7-14). The latter rates change minimally when existing businesses that had received financing from any federal government or DRE/IE source are compared to existing businesses that had not received previous financing from any federal government or DRE/IE source, respectively. It is only for existing businesses that had received previous financing from DRE/IE sources that the approval rate for full applications relative to the approval rate for screen applications fell.

Given the findings regarding approval rates for existing businesses it is not surprising that, by goal, the highest approval rates were received for existing businesses purchasing businesses (100%), existing businesses starting new businesses (80%), projects that were to maintain an existing business (75%) and business expansions (68%)(Table 7-15). Even the approval rate for purchases of businesses by new entrepreneurs (65%) is higher than the approval rate for entirely greenfield initiatives (56%). There is no evidence that formal risk assessment played a role in program decision-taking other than in a few instances. Both the experience of existing entrepreneurs and the ability to generate higher quality applications from existing businesses, however, implicitly injected risk assessment into decision making. Both factors were associated with an increased rate of approval.

The highest approval rate went to applications with an intended head office location in the organized communities (88%)(Table 7-16). This is

followed by the rate of approval for applications with an intended head office in an unorganized community (68%) and the rate of approval for applications with an intended head office on an Indian reserve (61%). For unorganized communities and Indian reserves rates of approval by intended location of the head office were similar to rates of approval by applicant location. The rate of approval for applications with an intended head office in an organized community, however, was much higher than the rate of approval for applications with an applicant from an organized community (65%).

As expected, the approval rates for applications with intended operations in the unorganized communities, Indian reserves and other in-area locations are nearly the same as the approval rates for applications with intended head offices in these locations (Table 7-17). As noted in Chapter 7, this is largely due to the absence of geographical separation between head office and operations for these proposed small businesses. The highest approval rates were achieved by applications with operations to be located in unorganized communities and other out-of-area northern locations. Interestingly, data show a much lower approval rate for applications with operations to be located in organized communities (59%) than for either applications with operations to be located in any other in-area location *or* applications with head office to be located in an organized community (88%). The former difference can be attributed to the programs' geographic priority being the non-organized north, the latter difference may reflect a socioeconomic environment more conducive to quality business development in the organized communities.

For reasons that are not apparent there was a much higher approval rate for applications intending to produce two products (97%)(Table 7-18). The rates of approval for applications intending to produce one product or three or more products are very similar (64% and 63%, respectively).

There is no obvious pattern to approval rates by common underlying characteristics of intended products be they broad sector, notions of "traditionalness" or metropolis-hinterland commodity flows. Approval rates of 70% or higher were attained by applications (for those products with larger numbers of applications) intending to produce the following products:

agriculture, retail, and retail and food & beverage services. Approval rates of 60-69% were attained by applications planning to produce the following products: logging & forestry; manufacturing; construction; transport; communications; and finance, real estate & business services. The combined approval rate for primary products strictly defined¹ was 65%, for non-primary - non-service products strictly defined² it was 59%, and for service products only it was 60%. As a result, factors other than intended product appear to have had a greater impact on approval decisions.

Project files contain no systematic recording of reasons for rejecting full applications. Sufficient commentary, often only in the form of a short phrase, was, however, available on 163 of the rejected files to generate a coding scheme to record counts per reason (Table 7-20). The reader is cautioned that there are numerous windows through which one can accurately describe the reasons for rejecting an application. An application could have been rejected because it would not be viable, but it might not be viable because of insufficient land or space, and that land or space problem might have resulted from the activities of inadequate management. As well, an application could be rejected a multiple grounds such as owner-management problems and the fact that government assistance was not necessary to complete the project.³

The reasons for rejection listed in Table 7-20 are a best shot at remaining true to the expressions in the files while extracting maximum, but separable-yet-as-comprehensive-as-possible, meaning. In general, reasons 1-3 are problems with the local environment in which the project is to be located. Reasons 4-8 are problems flowing from actions of the applicant. Reasons 9 and 10 are problems with the substance of the project. Reasons 11-17 expresses transgression of program operating rules or guidelines. Reasons 18 and 19 express other, miscellaneous factors. In Table 7-20

1. Agriculture, fishing, logging & forestry, and mining.

2. Manufacturing, construction, transportation, and communications.

3. No reason was given for 18 rejections, 1 reason was given for 163 rejections, 2 reasons were given for 26 rejections, and 3 reasons were given for 9 rejections.

these counts have been transformed into rates of incidence relative to the number of rejections per variable. Again, the reader is cautioned when interpreting the Table, there was more than one reason given for rejecting 35 (16%) of the rejected applications.

Abandonment and viability especially were problems for applications to SARDA. NEDP3 applications had difficulties with program rules, but this was largely due to the expiry of NEDP3. Generally the incidence of problems in the environmental, applicant, project substance and program rule categories was much higher in the first two study periods. Applicants and the programs appear to have reduced the incidence of problems over time although this reduction was very uneven over time and among categories. The incidence of applicant and program rule difficulties was higher when non-government agents and applicants rather than government staff prepared applications. There was a higher rate of problems with project viability when other government agencies prepared applications. Either resource quality or quality control was weak in this largely federal-government-operated area of the larger economic development system within which the programs were situated.

For reasons not known, applications with three or more applicants show a much higher rate of transgression of program rules and guidelines. By type of applicant, private corporations more often ran into local opposition¹ and applicant abandonment problems. Collective organizations had problems with completing appropriate quality proposals, related problems with market size and also had a high incidence of transgressing program rules. As frequent applicants, Indian bands had relatively low rates of all problems leading to rejections. Problems related to EIC and INAC staff-prepared applications must have been most prevalent when staff of these departments assisted individuals and collective organizations. For reasons not known, out-of-area northern applicants had unusually high rates of applicant abandonment and transgressions of program rules. By status

1. This is an example of the opposition that the programs would have faced had they intervened to a much greater degree in the selection of program management.

group, registered Indian applicants often had trouble with program rules, other Aboriginals had a high rate of viability problems and non-Aboriginal applicants ran into difficulties regarding land-space, local opposition and transgression of program rules.

There are two noteworthy findings regarding incidence of problems by applicant goal. One is the higher incidence of applicant problems, especially abandonment, for new entrepreneurs and existing businesses wanting to purchase a new establishment. These applicants would have been doing project development work in unfamiliar territory. A second, and related, finding is the higher incidence of viability problems for new entrepreneurs. Projects intending to operate in organized communities more frequently ran into local opposition and, for reasons not known, they often suffered from applicant abandonment. As well, for reasons not known projects intending to produce two products had the highest rates of local opposition and viability problems while projects intending to produce one product had more frequent problems with program rules. More expected is the higher rate of applicant problems stemming from the complications of producing multiple products.

By product, for reasons not known, retail and food & beverage, and accommodation and food & beverage projects tended to have more problems with local opposition. High rates of applicant problems, mostly abandonment, are associated with logging & forestry and manufacturing, communications, local government-health-education, cabins-campgrounds-lodges, and food & beverage service projects. Project substance, predominantly viability, problems are associated with agriculture, logging & forestry and manufacturing, manufacturing, transportation, and accommodation and food & beverage projects. Fishing; manufacturing; transportation; wholesaling; finance, real estate & business service; accommodation; and other service projects tended to often run afoul of program rules. In summary, projects involving manufacturing, food & beverages, and accommodation services (cabins-campgrounds-lodges include accommodations and, often, food & beverage services) are particularly prone to problems of quality.

Before comparing the programs' expectations for approved projects with the plans submitted by applicants, it is instructive to look at the quality of the programs' own analyses of project applications. At the point of putting forward a recommendation regarding assistance to a project program officers generally understood the substance of a project except with regard to four critical areas. The first of these areas was the personnel to be employed including, sometimes, senior management. Since most of the proposed businesses were very small they were to be owner-managed. While alignment between ownership and management often stimulates management effort, in an environment with a largely poorly-trained and inexperienced labour force in which government is "pushing" business development many potentially sound business proposals were inextricably tied to weak owner-management. With some of the larger projects, especially those projects owned by collective organizations, Indian bands and local governments, management had to be hired. With regard to most of these larger projects the programs were not able to play a forceful role in the selection of management.¹ The programs were severely limited by lack of training and inexperience within the local labour force, insufficient time and resources to perform the necessary training, and intense political pressure from regional and local interest groups to use local people, especially local Aboriginal persons, to manage projects. The second and third areas in which program officers often had limited understanding, the nature of a marketing plan and the management control system to be utilized, also floundered because of poorly trained and inexperienced labour, inadequate program resources and resistance by applicant-owners to government interference.

The fourth critical area was proforma financial projections. In Chapter 6 it is noted that 62% of full applications were complete.² Chapter 5 noted that program operational guidelines implied the need for 3, 5 or 10-year

1. There were some cases in which the Letter-of-Offer specified a particular manager who had been agreed to by the applicant and the program. Most such cases did, in fact, involve collective organizations and Indian bands.

2. A "complete" application includes specification of: intended ownership, office location, operational location, products, markets, capital requirements, equity, proforma income statements and balance sheets for three years, and type and value of financing by source.

financial proformas. What did the programs do with respect to their own financial analyses? The writer cannot recall one instance in which a program officer produced a proforma with more than a 5-year horizon. As discussed in Chapter 5, 10-year projection formats were often used to prepare two, 5-year projections - one without financial assistance and one with financial assistance. Projections with horizons of 3 years were common and even 1 year projections were not uncommon. There was profound confusion as to whether or not projections should be based on tax rules or real financial flows. In particular, some program officers regularly included depreciation of all capital, including capital funded by program grants, while other program officers did not depreciate capital funded by grants. Some program officers who included depreciation of funded capital for projects to be placed in locations other than Indian reserves did not include depreciation for projects located on Indian reserves. Some of these program officers claimed depreciation was not relevant in such cases because reserve-based projects could not be taxed, even if the project was to operate as a corporation. Decisions based on projected cash-flow would be suspect if (1) depreciation was subtracted or (2) if depreciation was not subtracted, but the projection had only a few years horizon.¹ Decisions based on projected net income would be suspect if deductions from revenue did not include depreciation. Projections generated without knowledge of depreciation present a false picture of the long term viability of the business. How was replacement of physical plant and equipment to be financed? There was, and still is, political and legal confusion concerning taxation of income flowing to reserve-based entities; however, it is difficult to see how consistent program decision-taking could occur given this confusion. More serious for project viability over the short run, in some cases financing costs were not included, just revenues and operating costs.

Measures of the information contained in program officers proformas are presented in Table 7-21. Of these proformas, 83% meet the "less-than-

1. Replacement of capital, occurring, say, after year 3, would not be shown as a cash outlay. Thus, the business would appear to be more viable than longer term reality would dictate.

complete-picture" standard of three-years EBITDA¹. In order to generate the most accurate picture of the financial health of projects, when that health is measured against project parameters established by program officers and when that health is measured using information specified by program officers within and outside of their proformas, "most-complete-picture" three-year financial proformas have been generated for all approved projects. To do this the following steps were required. Where necessary, depreciation and financing costs per year were based on the program officers' statements about depreciation rates per asset class and interest rates on debt. Revenue and operational costs are those generated by program officers. Using this more complete information, high quality, three-year proformas have been generated for 66% of approved projects. The actual proportion of high quality, three-or-more-year proformas produced by program officers would have been much lower. NDA2 had the lowest rates of both "lower standard" and "higher standard" proformas. The proportion of NDA2 proformas meeting the "high standard" would be still lower if depreciation and financing costs generated for this study were not included. This is a major reason why NDA2 was able to address a large number of proposals with one or two program officers. Again, Weberian process efficiency was achieved with little regard for effectiveness or larger system efficiency. This is further evidence of excessive "pushing" of projects in a less-than-ready environment.

As noted in Chapter 5 program guidelines identified the need for equity. In operation, however, a notable minority of projects were approved without a requirement of additional equity, including sweat equity (Table 7-22). By the curious thinking of DRE/IE and, especially, INAC, a grant from another (usually federal) government agency to an applicant for the purpose of making an equity contribution was considered equity. Since these were conditional grants this process destroyed the rationale for equity investment - that the owner has a substantial stake at-risk in the business as a performance incentive. Projects approved by NDA2; projects to be owned by collective organizations, Indian bands, local governments, or registered

1. Earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization and depreciation.

Indians; and projects located on Indian reserves were especially likely to not require "real" equity. This too is evidence of excessive "pushing" of projects in a less-than-ready environment.

Program approvals were faithful to the non-financial aspects of full applications. Few changes were made except in two areas: the number of owners by type and projected full-time-equivalent employment (Table 7-23). Program officers reduced the number of instances in which private corporations, collective organizations and local governments would be involved as owners. These changes did not result in more frequent ownership by other types of owners, rather they came as a result of reducing the number of different owners involved in a project. Program officers also reduced the aggregate number of projected full-time person-years by a hefty 27%.

Program officers made greater changes in the financial area. It is possible to compare the highest projected annual net income for 151 full applications and approvals (Table 7-24). Readers who have some familiarity with venture capital and loan agencies will be amazed to find an almost even balance between the number of projects in which the programs increased the highest projected net income, and the number of projects in which the programs decreased the highest projected net income. As well, the mean proportionate change in projected net income for projects in which the programs increased the projected net income was +178% while the mean proportionate change in projected net income for projects in which the programs decreased projected net income was -64%. However, in aggregate, for projected increases and decreases combined, projected net income fell an average of over \$40 thousand, a large proportionate change. Full application net income projections for projects for which net income was decreased were so excessive to program officers that the absolute magnitude of a 64% decrease in net income for these projects overwhelmed the small absolute (but high percentage) increase in net income projected for those projects that were expected to increase net income. Projected mean project net incomes, including owner-operator draws, were tight, in the order of \$10 to \$20 thousand, even though all these projections had up to three-year horizons. Not surprisingly, NDA2 was the only program more likely to

increase expected net income. As well, the programs were more likely to increase expected net income during the later years of the study period. This is further evidence of the extent of project "pushing" by the programs as the absorptive capacity of the environment became more of an obstacle.

Projected net income was more likely to be increased when the application was prepared by a non-government agent, but the amount of the proportionate increase was greatest for applications prepared by government, especially other government, staff. The amount of, and average, proportionate decrease, for those projects that had their net income decreased, was greatest for projects prepared by other government staff and applicants. This is further evidence, therefore, that there were quality problems with applications prepared by other government agencies (especially EIC and INAC).

For reasons not known, the degree of proportionate change in the projected net income of applications with two applicants was less than the proportionate change for one, or three or more applicants. By type of applicant, there was a notable negative skew to changes in the projected net incomes of Indian band applications, but the extent of the proportionate changes by type have few instances and no apparent pattern. Applications from registered Indians also show, except for the two applications from collective organizations, the greatest reduction in average projected aggregate net income. By applicant location, Indian reserve applications had the greatest decrease in aggregate net income, but applications from applicants located in the organized communities suffered greater average decreases in projected net income. Otherwise there are either too few instances or no apparent pattern to changes in projected income by applicant location. By status group, projects from other Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal applicants had high ratios of increased net income to decreased net income projects. Non-Aboriginal applicants were the only "pure" status group to show an increase in aggregate net income for all projects. Applications from registered Indians had the greatest reduction in projected aggregate and average net income. Interestingly, a higher ratio of existing businesses had their projected net income reduced and the amount of average aggregate reduction was much greater than for applicants that were not existing

businesses. This aggregate reduction was largely due to the aggregate reduction for businesses that had negative net income. It appears that businesses with negative net incomes greatly inflated projected net income in order to qualify for assistance to help bail them out of difficulties.

Projects to be located in organized communities were more likely to have their projected net income increased, but projects to be located in unorganized communities and Indian reserves had larger decreases in average aggregate net income. An interesting story unfolds when changes to projected net income are tallied by full application expected net income. The greatest positive shift in the ratio of number of projects with an expected net increase to number of projects with an expected net loss occurred for projects with a full application expected net loss. As well, the greatest change in aggregate net income, a large positive change, occurred to those projects that had full application expected net losses. The next greatest positive shift occurred to those projects that had full application net incomes of \$0 to \$24,999. This is strong evidence of "pushing" projects that otherwise would not merit assistance.

By product, forestry, transportation, cabins-campgrounds-lodges, and other services show positive ratios of the number of projects with expected net increases to number of projects with expected net losses. All of these products, except other services, also had positive changes in aggregate net income. Construction and retail product projects show negative ratios of the number of projects with expected net increases to number of projects with expected net losses. Construction and retail projects also had the greatest negative changes in aggregate net income, respectively. The average aggregate decrease for construction projects was particularly large. Construction projects, many of which were to be located on Indian reserves, presented a particular problem. A substantial share of the revenue projections made by applicants were often based on "blue sky" estimates of grants and compensation payments to be received from governments.

Summary of Findings

Of the initial 1,596 screen applications, 704 projects were the subject of a final decision. Decisions were taken on 25% of the 704 projects despite the absence of a relatively complete full application. Of the 704 project decisions 67% were approved and 31% were rejected.

There were few inconsistencies between the recommendations of program officers, the recommendations of program advisory committees and the nature of final decisions. There is no evidence that political factors entered into decision processes at the program advisory or final decision points.

Program officers often had to contend with more than one full application per project. This was particularly a problem with many applications from Indian bands and collective organizations owned by Indian bands. The nature, speed and frequency of changes suggest many applicants sent full applications before fully working through, or committing to, the substance of the proposed project. This is further evidence consistent with the proposition that the programs directly and indirectly "forced" the ability of the environment to generate quality projects.

It took an average of nearly five months for a program officer to make a recommendation. While conditions facilitated the preparation of full applications to NDA2 and NEDP3 in comparison to SARDA, these conditions did not extend to the capacity of NDA2 and NEDP program officers to arrive at a recommendation. The sole NDA2 program officer addressed far more full applications than did each SARDA or NEDP3 program officer. Therefore, cogitation and purposeful "screening-out" time within SARDA was so much longer than NDA2 as to offset SARDA's much greater staff resources. Government resources were distributed so as to have a greater impact on the ability to generate applications rather than to improve, or at least keep in pace, the ability to conduct a quality assessment applications. This is further evidence consistent with the proposition that the programs directly and indirectly "forced" the ability of the environment to generate quality projects.

Systems utilized by the three programs for analyzing and taking decisions were structured so as to limit attrition and cogitation. Such systems are symptomatic of economical Weberian bureaucratic processing rather than processes that would generate highest overall system efficiency or greatest effectiveness in attaining stated client impacts. In general, it was those full applications that were not withdrawn or explicitly rejected which received detailed analysis and a program-produced project plan to be submitted up the organizational hierarchy. Allocation of government resources to achieve greatest efficiency in generating fewer, high quality, project proposals would have required less independent information collection and analysis. Allocation of resources to achieve greater impact through ultimately successful projects would have necessitated a very different allocation of resources. Such allocation of resources would have clashed with the political imperative of minimal government involvement in business, political processes that generate and support dreams, and the provision of equal opportunity to receive government services.

The environment did not produce relatively higher proportions of acceptably high-quality project proposals over time. Program officers spent substantial time planning projects because the environment was not able to do the work. These findings either call into question the amount of learning from experience that occurred among those engaged in project development, or they suggest that available business niches were deteriorating over time so as to offset the experiential learning that took place.

NDA2, the most loosely structured program, had the highest approval rate. SARDA, the most strictly defined program, had the lowest approval rate.

The high Indian band approval rate may have resulted from the greater capacity of Indian bands to produce acceptable quality proposals, a "warmness" shown towards these organizations by the federal government or the bands' ability to mount political pressure. The enhanced capability of applicants from Indian reserves to generate applications, however, did not extend to relatively higher approval rates for applicants from Indian reserves, other than Indian band applicants. The overall approval rate per 100 adults

was higher for Indian reserves than for unorganized communities. If Indian band and local government approvals are removed, however, the overall approval rate was higher for unorganized communities than Indian reserves. As well, net of applications from these governments, the approval rate per 100 adults from Indian reserves deteriorated relative to the approval rate per 100 adults located in unorganized communities. These findings support the proposition that the enhanced capability of applicants from Indian reserves to generate applications did not extend to relatively higher approval rates for applicants from Indian reserves, other than Indian band applicants. These findings also may indicate that the large increase in applications from Indian reserves relative to other community groups coupled with the relatively less prepared socioeconomic start point caused the business development process to encounter greater organizational absorptive problems on Indian reserves. This may have been especially so for non-band entrepreneurs. Perhaps the effort on Indian reserves to generate applications got ahead of ability to follow-through. The approval rate for registered Indians was lower than the approval rate for other groups. Again, the enhanced capability of applicants from Indian reserves to generate applications did not extend to relatively higher approval rates for registered Indian applicants, other than Indian band applicants.

In 1984-88 the rate of approvals per 100 adults was highest for registered Indians, lower for other Aboriginal persons and, as expected because of the emphases placed by the programs on Aboriginal beneficiaries and the non-organized north, much lower for non-Aboriginal persons. The order of rate of fall-off in approvals per 100 adults compared to full applications per 100 adults, however, is the converse of the order of rate of approvals. Again, these data attest to problems of follow-through especially for registered Indian applicants, but also for other Aboriginal applicants.

Applicants that were an existing business had a higher approval rate than applicants that were not an existing business. As well, applicants that were an existing businesses with a positive net income had a higher approval rate than existing businesses that had a negative net income. Experience and well-being, if an existing business, appear to have translated into positive decisions.

There is no evidence that formal risk assessment played a role in program decision-taking.

There is no obvious pattern to approval rates by common underlying characteristics of intended products be they broad sector, notions of "traditionalness" or metropolis-hinterland commodity flows.

At the point of putting forward a recommendation regarding assistance to a project program officers generally understood the substance of a project except with regard to four critical areas. The first of these areas was the personnel to be employed. The second area in which program officers often had limited understanding was the nature of a marketing plan. The third area in which program officers often had limited understanding was the management control system to be utilized. These three critical areas were especially problematic because of a poorly trained and inexperienced labour force, inadequate program resources and resistance by applicant-owners to government interference.

The fourth critical area was the time horizon of proforma financial projections. Instead of 5 or 10-year proformas, most projections had horizons of 3 years and even 1 year projections were not uncommon. As well, confusion over depreciation and the application of tax law to Indian reserves led to inconsistent decision-taking and likely many long-term business failures. More serious for project viability over the short run, in some cases financing costs were not included in proforma projections. High quality, 3-year proformas were completed for substantially fewer than 66% of approved projects. NDA2 had the lowest rates of both "lower standard" and "higher standard" proformas. This is a major reason why NDA2 was able to address a large number of proposals with one or two program officers. Again, Weberian process efficiency was achieved with little regard for effectiveness or larger system efficiency. This is further evidence of excessive "pushing" of projects in a less-than-ready environment.

A notable minority of projects were approved without a requirement of additional equity. Grants from other government agencies to applicants for the purpose of making an equity contribution often were considered equity.

These conditional grants destroyed the rationale for equity investment. This too is evidence of excessive "pushing" of projects in a less-than-ready environment.

Program approvals were faithful to the non-financial aspects of full applications. Program officers made greater changes in the financial area. There was an almost even balance between the number of projects in which the programs increased the highest projected net income, and the number of projects in which the programs decreased the highest projected net income. Mean proportionate changes to projected net income were skewed towards increasing projected net income. As well, the programs were more likely to increase expected net income during the later years of the study period. This is further evidence of the extent of project "pushing" by the programs as the absorptive capacity of the environment became more of an obstacle. The greatest positive shift in the ratio of number of projects with an expected net increase to number of projects with an expected net decrease occurred for projects with a full application expected net loss. As well, the greatest change in aggregate net income, a large positive change, occurred to projects that had full application expected net losses. The next greatest positive shift occurred to those projects that had positive, but low, full application net incomes. This is strong evidence of "pushing" projects that otherwise would not merit assistance.

**TABLE 7-1
FLOW OF DECISIONS**

Screen Decision		Full Application			Program Officer Recommends			Final Decision			Cumulative Percent		
Decision	Number	Exists	Number	% of Last Step	Recommends	Number	% of Last Step	Decision	Number	% of Last Step			
Accept	706	Yes	522	74	Approve	324	62	Approve	312	96	44.2		
					Reject			11	3	Reject	11	3	1.6
					Not known			1	0	Not known	1	0	0.1
					Approve			1	1	Approve	1	1	0.1
					Reject			176	34	Reject	175	99	24.8
					Not Known			22	4	Approve	2	9	0.3
		No	184	26	Approve	150	82	Approve	147	98	20.8		
					Reject			2	1	Reject	2	1	0.3
					Not known			1	1	Not known	1	1	0.1
					Reject			19	10	Reject	19	100	2.7
					Not Known			7	4	Approve	7	100	1.0
					End Process			8	4				1.1
Reject	855	Yes	3	0	Reject	2	67	Reject	2	100	0.3		
					Not Known			1	33	Reject	1	100	0.1
					End Process			1	0	Reject	1	100	0.1
Not Known	35	Yes	2	6	Approve	2	100	Approve	1	50	2.9		
					End Process			851	100	Reject	1	50	2.9
		No	33	94	End Process	33	100				94.3		
Subtotals	1596		1596	100		1596	100		704	44			
Less End Process			0	0		892	56		0	0			
Net			1596	100		704	44		704	44			

TABLE 7-2
FINAL DECISIONS, ADDITIONAL* DATABASE VARIABLES

Code	Description and Values
A#Ap	Number of different final full applications approved
AS_T	Type of assistance approved by receiving program. Up to two types are possible. Values same as Fs_T above.
AS_V	Value of assistance per type approved by receiving program. Two values are possible.
AOS_T	Type of assistance expected from other sources. Up to four types are possible. Values and coding as per FS_T above.
AOS_V	Value of assistance per type expected from other sources. Up to four values are possible.
AOS_S	Source of assistance per type expected from other sources. There are up to four sources. 1. SARDA commercial. 3. NEDP3. 6. NDA2. 7. Other DRE/IE source. 8. FBDB. 9. INAC or IEDF. 10. Other federal government source. 11. CEDF. 12. Other provincial government source. 13. Commercial financier including regional and aboriginal capital corporations. 14. Other source. 99. Source not known.
AO_T	Type of approved owner. Up to six types are possible. Same values and coding as "SA_T" screen application code.
AO_L	Residence or head office location of approved owner. Six owner locations are possible. See Location Codes, Appendix Table 2-2.
AO_S	Status of approved owner. Up to six status groups are possible. Same values and coding as screen applications.
AOfl	Approved location of head office. See Location Codes, Appendix Table 2-2.
AOpl	Approved location of business operations. See Location Codes, Appendix Table 2-2.
APr_	Approved products. Up to four products are possible. See Product Codes, Appendix Table 2-3.
ACap	Approved proforma gross initial capitalization.
AOEq	Approved proforma owner's equity.
AGS_	Approved proforma gross sales for year _. Up to three years may be projected.
AOC_	Approved proforma gross operating costs for year _. Three years may be projected.
ADe_	Approved proforma depreciation & amortization costs for year _. Three years may be projected.
AFC_	Approved proforma financing costs for year _. Up to three years may be projected.
AFPY	Approved person-years of employment to be created. (Net change if an existing bus.)

* In addition to screen application and full application variables. See Tables 6-1 and 6-24.

**TABLE 7-3
FULL APPLICATIONS, TIME ELAPSED TO FINAL APPLICATION AND PROGRAM DECISIONS**

Period	Program	Date First Application Received to Date Last Application Received					Date Last Application Received to Date Of Program Officer Recommendation				Date Of Final Decision			
		Applications					Applications				Applications			
		All	If ET >=0		If ET >0		All	If ET >=0		If ET <0	All	If ET >=0		If ET <0
		#	Mean	STD	#	Mean	#	Mean	STD	#	#	Mean	STD	#
		Days	ET	Days	Days	Days	ET	Days		Days	ET	Days		
1971-73	SARDA	13	7	24	1	92	9	72	66	1	11	154	131	1
1974-78	SARDA	36	9	46	2	168	33	198	219	1	38	212	210	1
1979-83	SARDA	62	12	53	4	179	58	179	212	0	60	188	180	1
	NDA2	3	8	11	1	23	3	482	337	0	3	734	12	1
	All	65	11	104	5	148	61	193	229	0	63	206	202	2
1984-88	SARDA	186	12	48	18	130	139	135	124	12	184	159	152	8
	NDA2	92	8	27	8	87	87	139	174	5	87	148	167	3
	NEDP3	12	12	30	2	70	4	202	87	0	8	220	96	0
	All	290	11	44	28	113	230	135	145	17	279	157	156	11
1989	SARDA	11	2	6	1	21	4	25	11	0	9	38	16	0
	NDA2	15	0	-	0	-	15	39	14	1	15	51	15	1
	NEDP3	9	0	-	0	-	7	222	100	0	9	220	94	0
	All	35	1	4	1	21	26	88	100	1	33	95	94	1
All Periods	SARDA	308	11	47	26	134	243	148	167	14	302	168	166	11
	NDA2	110	6	22	9	69	243	148	167	6	105	146	178	5
	NEDP3	21	7	23	2	70	11	215	96	0	17	220	95	0
	All	439	10	41	38	112	359	147	170	20	424	165	167	16

**TABLE 7-4
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY PERIOD**

Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
All Periods	316	194	510	17	527	62	38	100	3
71-73	7	5	12	0	12	58	42	100	0
74-78	23	15	38	0	38	61	39	100	0
79-83	33	31	64	0	64	52	48	100	0
84-88	186	97	283	8	291	66	34	100	3
89+	15	16	31	6	37	48	52	100	19
Known Periods	264	164	428	14	442	62	38	100	3
No Date	52	30	82	3	85	63	37	100	4

**TABLE 7-5
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY PROGRAM**

Program/Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
All Programs									
71-73	7	5	12	0	12	58	42	100	0
74-78	23	15	38	0	38	61	39	100	0
79-83	33	31	64	0	64	52	48	100	0
84-88	186	97	283	8	291	66	34	100	3
89+	15	16	31	6	37	48	52	100	16
Known Periods	264	164	428	14	442	62	38	100	3
No Date	52	30	82	3	85	63	37	100	4
Subtotal	316	194	510	17	527	62	38	100	3
SARDA									
71-73	7	5	12	0	12	58	42	100	0
74-78	23	15	38	0	38	61	39	100	0
79-83	31	30	61	0	61	51	49	100	0
84-88	114	71	185	4	189	62	38	100	2
89+	7	3	10	1	11	70	30	100	9
Known Periods	182	124	306	5	311	59	41	100	2
No Date	36	28	64	0	64	56	44	100	0
Subtotal	218	152	370	5	375	59	41	100	1
NDA2									
79-83	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
84-88	67	21	88	3	91	76	24	100	3
89+	6	7	13	3	16	46	54	100	19
Known Periods	75	29	104	6	110	72	28	100	5
No Date	16	2	18	2	20	89	11	100	10
Subtotal	91	31	122	8	130	75	25	100	6
NEDP3									
84-88	5	5	10	1	11	50	50	100	9
89+	2	6	8	2	10	25	75	100	20
Known Periods	7	11	18	3	21	39	61	100	14
No Date	0	0	0	1	1	-	-	-	100
Subtotal	7	11	18	4	22	39	61	100	18

**TABLE 7-6
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY NO. OF APPLICANTS PER APPLICATION**

Number/Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
All Periods									
1	265	166	431	15	446	61	39	100	3
2	40	23	63	0	63	63	37	100	0
3+	11	5	16	2	18	69	31	100	11
1									
71-73	6	4	10	0	10	60	40	100	0
74-78	18	12	30	0	30	60	40	100	0
79-83	32	27	59	0	59	54	46	100	0
84-88	151	85	236	8	244	64	36	100	3
89+	12	13	25	5	30	48	52	100	17
Known Periods	219	141	360	13	373	61	39	100	3
No Date	46	25	71	2	73	65	35	100	3
Subtotal	265	166	431	15	446	61	39	100	3
2									
71-73	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
74-78	4	2	6	0	6	67	33	100	0
79-83	0	4	4	0	4	0	100	100	0
84-88	28	10	38	0	38	74	26	100	0
89+	3	3	6	0	6	50	50	100	0
Known Periods	36	20	56	0	56	64	36	100	0
No Date	4	3	7	0	7	57	43	100	0
Subtotal	40	23	63	0	63	63	37	100	0
3+									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
79-83	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
84-88	7	2	9	0	9	78	22	100	0
89+	0	0	0	1	1	-	-	-	100
Known Periods	9	3	12	1	13	75	25	100	8
No Date	2	2	4	1	5	50	50	100	20
Subtotal	11	5	16	2	18	69	31	100	11

**TABLE 7-7
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY APPLICANT TYPE**

Type of Applicant/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	Yes	No	Subtotal	And All Outcomes NK
All Periods									
Proprietor	286	179	465	6	471	62	38	100	1
For-Profit Private Corporation	9	6	15	1	16	60	40	100	6
Non-Gov't Collective	20	14	34	1	34	59	41	100	3
Indian Band	56	27	83	14	97	67	33	100	14
Local Gov't	4	0	4	1	5	100	0	100	20
Fed./Prov. Gov't	2	0	2	0	2	100	0	100	0
All Known	377	226	603	23	625	63	37	100	4
Not Known	1	1	2	1	3	50	50	100	33
All Types	378	227	605	24	628	62	38	100	4
Proprietor									
1971-73	4	2	6	0	6	67	33	100	0
1974-78	26	16	42	0	42	62	38	100	0
1979-83	27	29	56	0	56	48	52	100	0
1984-88	171	85	256	2	258	67	33	100	1
1989+	13	15	28	3	31	46	54	100	10
Known Periods	241	147	388	5	393	62	38	100	1
No Date	45	32	77	1	78	58	42	100	1
Subtotal	286	179	465	6	471	62	38	100	1
For-Profit Private Corporation									
1971-73	3	2	5	0	5	60	40	100	0
1974-78	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
1979-83	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
1984-88	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
1989+	0	0	0	1	1	-	-	-	100
Known Periods	5	5	10	1	11	50	50	100	9
No Date	4	1	5	0	5	80	20	100	0
Subtotal	9	6	15	1	16	60	40	100	6

**TABLE 7-7 (Cont.)
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY APPLICANT TYPE**

Type of Applicant/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
Non-Gov't Collective									
1971-73	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
1974-78	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
1979-83	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
1984-88	16	9	25	0	25	64	36	100	0
1989+	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
Known Periods	18	13	31	0	31	58	42	100	0
No Date	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
Subtotal	20	14	34	0	34	59	41	100	0
Indian Band									
1971-73	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
1974-78	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
1979-83	6	3	9	0	9	67	33	100	0
1984-88	38	16	54	6	60	70	30	100	10
1989+	3	3	6	6	12	50	50	100	50
Known Periods	49	24	73	12	85	67	33	100	14
No Date	7	3	10	2	12	70	30	100	17
Subtotal	56	27	83	14	97	67	33	100	14
Local Gov't									
1971-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
1974-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
1979-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
1984-88	3	0	3	0	3	100	0	100	0
1989+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Periods	3	0	3	0	3	100	0	100	0
No Date	1	0	1	1	2	100	0	100	50
Subtotal	4	0	4	1	5	100	0	100	20
Fed./Prov. Gov't									
1971-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
1974-78	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
1979-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
1984-88	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
1989+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Periods	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
No Date	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
Subtotal	2	0	4	1	5	50	0	100	20

**TABLE 7-8
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NO. OF APPLICANTS BY APPLICANT LOCATION**

Location of Applicant/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	Yes	No	Subtotal	And All Outcomes NK
All Periods									
Organized	37	19	56	0	56	66	34	100	0
Unorganized	93	44	137	4	141	68	32	100	3
Indian Reserve	193	124	317	16	333	61	39	100	5
Other In-Area	30	16	46	1	47	65	35	100	2
Out-Area North	8	5	13	0	13	62	38	100	0
Out-Area Ext.	15	11	26	2	33	58	42	100	6
All Known	376	219	595	23	623	63	37	100	4
Not Known	2	1	3	0	5	67	33	100	0
All Locations	378	220	598	23	628	63	37	100	4
Organized									
71-73	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
74-78	3	4	7	0	7	43	57	100	0
79-83	8	5	13	0	13	62	38	100	0
84-88	16	7	23	0	23	70	30	100	0
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Periods	28	16	44	0	44	64	36	100	0
No Date	9	3	12	0	12	75	25	100	0
Subtotal	37	19	56	0	56	66	34	100	0
Unorganized									
71-73	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
74-78	9	1	10	0	10	90	10	100	0
79-83	5	9	14	0	14	36	64	100	0
84-88	61	24	85	1	86	72	28	100	1
89+	2	3	5	1	6	40	60	100	17
Known Period	79	38	117	2	119	68	32	100	2
No Date	14	6	20	2	22	70	30	100	9
Subtotal	93	44	137	4	141	68	32	100	3
Indian Reserve									
71-73	1	2	3	0	3	33	67	100	0
74-78	7	6	13	0	13	54	46	100	0
79-83	18	18	36	0	36	50	50	100	0
84-88	127	72	199	7	206	64	36	100	3
89+	13	13	26	7	33	50	50	100	21
Known Periods	166	111	277	14	291	60	40	100	5
No Date	27	13	40	2	42	68	33	100	5
Subtotal	193	124	317	16	333	61	39	100	5

**TABLE 7-8 (Cont.)
FULL COMPARED TO SCREEN APPLICATIONS, NO. OF APPLICANTS BY APPLICANT LOCATION**

Location of Applicant/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
Other In-Area									
71-73	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
74-78	5	2	7	0	7	71	29	100	0
79-83	3	0	3	0	3	100	0	100	0
84-88	14	3	17	0	17	82	18	100	0
89+	2	3	5	1	6	40	60	100	17
Known Periods	26	9	35	1	36	74	26	100	3
No Date	4	7	11	0	11	36	64	100	0
Subtotal	30	16	46	1	47	65	35	100	2
Out-Area North									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
79-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
84-88	5	1	6	0	6	83	17	100	0
89+	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
Known Periods	8	2	10	0	10	80	20	100	0
No Date	0	3	3	0	3	0	100	100	0
Subtotal	8	5	13	0	13	62	38	100	0
Out-Area External									
71-73	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
74-78	3	4	7	0	7	43	57	100	0
79-83	0	2	2	0	2	0	100	100	0
84-88	5	4	9	0	9	56	44	100	0
89+	0	0	0	1	1	-	-	-	100
Known Periods	10	11	21	1	22	48	52	100	5
No Date	5	0	5	1	11	100	0	100	9
Subtotal	15	11	26	2	33	58	42	100	6

**TABLE 7-9
RATE OF APPROVAL PER TYPE OF COMMUNITY**

Type of Community	Rate Per Hundred Persons Age 15 & Over		
	1976	1981	1986
Organized	0.04	0.11	0.22
Unorganized	0.13	0.07	1.06
Indian Reserve	0.06	0.16	0.99
All Types	0.09	0.13	0.72

**TABLE 7-10
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY APPLICANT STATUS**

Status of Applicant/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	Yes	No	Subtotal	And All Outcomes NK
All Periods									
Registered Indian	202	129	331	16	347	61	39	100	5
Other Aboriginal	69	27	96	1	97	72	28	100	1
Aboriginal, NK	34	16	50	3	53	68	32	100	6
Not Aboriginal	58	27	85	2	87	68	32	100	2
All Known	363	199	562	22	584	65	35	100	4
Not Known	15	27	42	1	44	36	64	100	2
All States	378	226	604	23	628	63	37	100	4
Registered Indian									
71-73	1	3	4	0	4	25	75	100	0
74-78	7	6	13	0	13	54	46	100	0
79-83	19	18	37	0	37	51	49	100	0
84-88	133	74	207	7	214	64	36	100	3
89+	14	14	28	7	35	50	50	100	20
Known Periods	174	115	289	14	303	60	40	100	5
No Date	28	14	42	2	44	67	33	100	5
Subtotal	202	129	331	16	347	61	39	100	5
Other Aboriginal									
71-73	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
74-78	10	1	11	0	11	91	9	100	0
79-83	4	2	6	0	6	67	33	100	0
84-88	40	17	57	0	57	70	30	100	0
89+	0	1	1	1	2	0	100	100	50
Known Periods	55	21	76	1	77	72	28	100	1
No Date	14	6	20	0	20	70	30	100	0
Subtotal	69	27	96	1	97	72	28	100	1
Aboriginal, NK									
71-73	2	0	2	0	2	100	0	100	0
74-78	3	0	3	0	3	100	0	100	0
79-83	2	2	4	0	4	50	50	100	0
84-88	20	8	28	0	28	71	29	100	0
89+	3	2	5	1	6	60	40	100	17
Known Periods	30	12	42	1	43	71	29	100	2
No Date	4	4	8	2	10	50	50	100	20
Subtotal	34	16	50	3	53	68	32	100	6

**TABLE 7-10 (Cont.)
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY APPLICANT STATUS**

Status of Applicant/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK
Not Aboriginal									
71-73	3	1	4	0	4	75	25	100	0
74-78	8	7	15	0	15	53	47	100	0
79-83	7	6	13	0	13	54	46	100	0
84-88	29	4	33	0	33	88	12	100	0
89+	1	1	2	1	3	50	50	100	33
Known Periods	48	19	67	1	68	72	28	100	1
No Date	10	8	18	1	19	56	44	100	5
Subtotal	58	27	85	2	87	68	32	100	2

**TABLE 7-11
RATE OF APPROVAL PER STATUS GROUP, 1986**

Status Group	Rate Per Hundred Persons Age 15 And Over
Registered Indian	0.90
Other Aboriginal	0.74
Not Aboriginal	0.40

Source: Tables 4-8 and 7-9.

**TABLE 7-12
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY EXISTING BUSINESS**

Existing Business/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	Yes	No	Subtotal	And All Outcomes NK
All Periods									
Yes	116	57	173	5	178	67	33	100	3
No	199	136	335	12	347	59	41	100	3
Known	315	193	508	17	525	62	38	100	3
Not Known	1	0	1	0	2	100	0	100	0
All	316	193	509	17	527	62	38	100	3
Yes									
71-73	5	3	8	0	8	63	38	100	0
74-78	5	5	10	0	10	50	50	100	0
79-83	17	10	27	0	27	63	37	100	0
84-88	68	26	94	3	97	72	28	100	3
89+	3	7	10	2	12	30	70	100	17
Known Periods	98	51	149	5	154	66	34	100	3
No Date	18	6	24	0	24	75	25	100	0
Subtotal	116	57	173	5	178	67	33	100	3
No									
71-73	2	2	4	0	4	50	50	100	0
74-78	18	9	27	0	27	67	33	100	0
79-83	16	21	37	0	37	43	57	100	0
84-88	117	71	188	5	193	62	38	100	3
89+	12	9	21	4	25	57	43	100	16
Known Periods	165	112	277	9	286	60	40	100	3
No Date	34	24	58	3	61	59	41	100	5
Subtotal	199	136	335	12	347	59	41	100	3

**TABLE 7-13
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY EXISTING BUSINESS BY NET INCOME**

Net Income/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
All Periods									
All	116	57	173	10	178	67	33	100	0.056
Positive	27	4	31	0	31	87	13	100	0.000
Negative	35	13	48	0	48	73	27	100	0.000
Known	62	17	79	0	79	78	22	100	0.000
Not Known	54	40	94	10	99	57	43	100	0.101
Positive									
71-73	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0.000
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	5	1	6	0	6	83	17	100	0.000
84-88	15	2	17	0	17	88	12	100	0.000
89+	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0.000
Known Periods	22	4	26	0	26	85	15	100	0.000
No Date	5	0	5	0	5	100	0	100	0.000
Subtotal	27	4	31	0	31	87	13	100	0.000
Negative									
71-73	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0.000
74-78	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0.000
79-83	3	1	4	0	4	75	25	100	0.000
84-88	24	8	32	0	32	75	25	100	0.000
89+	0	2	2	0	2	0	100	100	0.000
Known Periods	28	12	40	0	40	70	30	100	0.000
No Date	7	1	8	0	8	88	13	100	0.000
Subtotal	35	13	48	0	48	73	27	100	0.000

**TABLE 7-14
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT FINANCING**

Prev. Financing/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
All Periods									
Any Government	51	17	68	3	71	75	25	100	4
No Government	65	40	105	2	107	62	38	100	2
Any Federal Gov't	50	17	67	3	70	75	25	100	4
Any DRE/IE	28	10	38	2	40	74	26	100	5
Any Government									
71-73	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
74-78	3	0	3	0	3	100	0	100	0
79-83	5	2	7	0	7	71	29	100	0
84-88	30	7	37	1	38	81	19	100	3
89+	2	3	5	2	7	40	60	100	29
Known Periods	42	13	55	3	58	76	24	100	5
No Date	9	4	13	0	13	69	31	100	0
Subtotal	51	17	68	3	71	75	25	100	4
No Government									
71-73	3	2	5	0	5	60	40	100	0
74-78	2	5	7	0	7	29	71	100	0
79-83	12	8	20	0	20	60	40	100	0
84-88	38	19	57	2	59	67	33	100	3
89+	1	4	5	0	5	20	80	100	0
Known Periods	56	38	94	2	96	60	40	100	2
No Date	9	2	11	0	11	82	18	100	0
Subtotal	65	40	105	2	107	62	38	100	2
Federal Gov't									
71-73	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
74-78	2	0	2	0	2	100	0	100	0
79-83	5	2	7	0	7	71	29	100	0
84-88	30	7	37	1	38	81	19	100	3
89+	2	3	5	2	7	40	60	100	29
Known Periods	41	13	54	3	57	76	24	100	5
No Date	9	4	13	0	13	69	31	100	0
Subtotal	50	17	67	3	70	75	25	100	4
DRE/IE									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
79-83	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
84-88	18	4	22	1	23	82	18	100	4
89+	1	2	3	1	4	33	67	100	25
Known Periods	22	7	29	2	31	76	24	100	6
No Date	6	3	9	0	9	67	33	100	0
Subtotal	28	10	38	2	40	74	26	100	5

**TABLE 7-15
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY GOAL**

Goal/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
All Periods									
New Business	157	124	281	11	292	56	44	100	4
E.Bus.S.N.Bus.	12	3	15	1	16	80	20	100	6
Purchase Bus.	37	20	57	0	57	65	35	100	0
E.Bus.P.Bus.	7	0	7	0	7	100	0	100	0
Expand	70	33	103	4	107	68	32	100	4
Other Goal	30	10	40	1	41	75	25	100	2
All Known	313	190	503	17	520	62	38	100	3
Not Known	4	4	8	0	7	50	50	100	0
All Goals	317	194	511	17	527	62	38	100	3
New Business									
71-73	3	3	6	0	6	50	50	100	0
74-78	19	12	31	0	31	61	39	100	0
79-83	13	20	33	0	33	39	61	100	0
84-88	91	63	154	5	159	59	41	100	3
89+	9	8	17	4	21	53	47	100	19
Known Periods	135	106	241	9	250	56	44	100	4
No Date	22	18	40	2	42	55	45	100	5
Subtotal	157	124	281	11	292	56	44	100	4
E.Bus.S.New.Bus									
71-73	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
74-78	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
79-83	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
84-88	6	2	8	0	8	75	25	100	0
89+	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
Known Periods	10	2	12	0	12	83	17	100	0
No Date	2	1	3	1	4	67	33	100	25
Subtotal	12	3	15	1	16	80	20	100	6

**TABLE 7-15 (Cont.)
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY GOAL**

Goal/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
Purchase Bus.									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
79-83	5	1	6	0	6	83	17	100	0
84-88	21	11	32	0	32	66	34	100	0
89+	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
Known Periods	28	14	42	0	42	67	33	100	0
No Date	9	6	15	0	15	60	40	100	0
Subtotal	37	20	57	0	57	65	35	100	0
E.Bus.P.Bus.									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
84-88	4	0	4	0	4	100	0	100	0
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Periods	4	0	4	0	4	100	0	100	0
No Date	3	0	3	0	3	100	0	100	0
Subtotal	7	0	7	0	7	100	0	100	0
Expand									
71-73	3	1	4	0	4	75	25	100	0
74-78	3	2	5	0	5	60	40	100	0
79-83	12	9	21	0	21	57	43	100	0
84-88	40	15	55	3	58	73	27	100	5
89+	2	2	4	1	5	50	50	100	20
Known Periods	60	29	89	4	93	67	33	100	4
No Date	10	4	14	0	14	71	29	100	0
Subtotal	70	33	103	4	107	68	32	100	4
Other Goal									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
84-88	22	4	26	0	26	85	15	100	0
89+	1	4	5	1	6	20	80	100	17
Known Periods	24	9	33	1	34	73	27	100	3
No Date	6	1	7	0	7	86	14	100	0
Subtotal	30	10	40	1	41	75	25	100	2

TABLE 7-16
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY INTENDED LOCATION OF HEAD OFFICE

Location/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
All Periods									
Organized	136	18	154	0	44	88	12	100	0
Unorganized	79	39	117	2	120	68	33	100	2
Indian Reserve	174	110	284	12	296	61	39	100	4
Other In-Area	26	14	40	1	41	65	35	100	2
Out-Area North	2	3	5	0	5	40	60	100	0
Out-Area Ext.	5	2	7	0	7	71	29	100	0
All Known	422	186	607	15	513	70	31	100	3
Not Known	4	8	12	2	14	33	67	100	14
All Locations	426	194	619	17	527	69	31	100	3
Organized									
71-73	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
74-78	2	2	4	0	4	50	50	100	0
79-83	7	5	12	0	12	58	42	100	0
84-88	122	6	128	0	18	95	5	100	0
89+	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
Known Periods	132	14	146	0	36	90	10	100	0
No Date	4	4	8	0	8	50	50	100	0
Subtotal	136	18	154	0	44	88	12	100	0
Unorganized									
71-73	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
74-78	7	1	8	0	8	88	13	100	0
79-83	7	7	13	0	14	54	54	100	0
84-88	47	22	69	1	70	68	32	100	1
89+	1	2	3	1	4	33	67	100	25
Known Periods	64	33	96	2	99	67	34	100	2
No Date	15	6	21	0	21	71	29	100	0
Subtotal	79	39	117	2	120	68	33	100	2
Indian Reserve									
71-73	1	2	3	0	3	33	67	100	0
74-78	6	5	11	0	11	55	45	100	0
79-83	17	16	33	0	33	52	48	100	0
84-88	113	61	174	7	181	65	35	100	4
89+	11	12	23	3	26	48	52	100	12
Known Periods	148	96	244	10	254	61	39	100	4
No Date	26	14	40	2	42	65	35	100	5
Subtotal	174	110	284	12	296	61	39	100	4

**TABLE 7-16 (Cont.)
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY INTENDED LOCATION OF HEAD OFFICE**

Location/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
Other In-Area									
71-73	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
74-78	4	2	6	0	6	67	33	100	0
79-83	2	0	2	0	2	100	0	100	0
84-88	11	7	18	0	18	61	39	100	0
89+	2	1	3	1	4	67	33	100	25
Known Periods	20	11	31	1	32	65	35	100	3
No Date	6	3	9	0	9	67	33	100	0
Subtotal	26	14	40	1	41	65	35	100	2
Out-Area North									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
79-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
84-88	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
89+	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
Known Periods	2	2	4	0	4	50	50	100	0
No Date	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
Subtotal	2	3	5	0	5	40	60	100	0
Out-Area External									
71-73	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
74-78	2	0	2	0	2	100	0	100	0
79-83	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
84-88	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Periods	5	2	7	0	7	71	29	100	0
No Date	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	5	2	7	0	7	71	29	100	0

**TABLE 7-17
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY INTENDED LOCATION OF OPERATIONS**

Location/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
All Periods									
Organized	26	18	44	0	44	59	41	100	0
Unorganized	87	43	130	3	133	67	33	100	2
Indian Reserve	168	111	279	11	290	60	40	100	4
Other In-Area	31	19	50	1	51	62	38	100	2
Out-Area North	4	2	6	1	7	67	33	100	14
Out-Area External	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
All Known	316	193	509	16	525	62	38	100	3
Not Known	0	1	1	0	2	0	100	100	0
All Locations	316	194	510	16	527	62	38	100	3
Organized									
71-73	3	0	3	0	3	100	0	ERR	0
74-78	4	3	7	0	7	57	43	100	0
79-83	6	5	11	0	11	55	45	100	0
84-88	9	5	14	0	14	64	36	100	0
89+	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
Known Periods	22	14	36	0	36	61	39	100	0
No Date	4	4	8	0	8	50	50	100	0
Subtotal	26	18	44	0	44	59	41	100	0
Unorganized									
71-73	3	2	5	0	5	60	40	100	0
74-78	8	3	11	0	11	73	27	100	0
79-83	9	6	15	0	15	60	40	100	0
84-88	49	23	72	1	73	68	32	100	1
89+	1	2	3	1	4	33	67	100	25
Known Periods	70	36	106	2	108	66	34	100	2
No Date	17	7	24	1	25	71	29	100	4
Subtotal	87	43	130	3	133	67	33	100	2
Indian Reserve									
71-73	1	2	3	0	3	33	67	100	0
74-78	4	5	9	0	9	44	56	100	0
79-83	17	17	34	0	34	50	50	100	0
84-88	112	61	173	7	180	65	35	100	4
89+	11	11	22	3	25	50	50	100	12
Known Periods	145	96	241	10	251	60	40	100	4
No Date	23	15	38	1	39	61	39	100	3
Subtotal	168	111	279	11	290	60	40	100	4

**TABLE 7-17 (Cont.)
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY INTENDED LOCATION OF OPERATIONS**

Location/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes
						Yes	No	Subtotal	NK
Other In-Area									
71-73	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
74-78	7	3	10	0	10	70	30	100	0
79-83	1	2	3	0	3	33	67	100	0
84-88	13	7	20	0	20	65	35	100	0
89+	2	2	4	1	5	50	50	100	20
Known Periods	23	15	38	1	39	61	39	100	3
No Date	8	4	12	0	12	67	33	100	0
Subtotal	31	19	50	1	51	62	38	100	2
Out-Area North									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
79-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
84-88	3	1	4	0	4	75	25	100	0
89+	1	0	1	1	2	100	0	ERR	50
Known Periods	4	2	6	1	7	67	33	100	14
No Date	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	4	2	6	1	7	67	33	100	14
Out-Area External									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
84-88	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Periods	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
No Date	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-

**TABLE 7-18
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY INTENDED NUMBER OF PRODUCTS**

Number/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Period			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	Yes	No	Subtotal	And All Outcomes NK
All Periods									
1	232	131	363	11	374	64	36	100	3
2	90	43	93	2	95	97	46	100	2
3+	34	20	54	4	58	63	37	100	7
1									
71-73	4	2	6	0	6	67	33	100	0
74-78	14	9	23	0	23	61	39	100	0
79-83	22	21	43	0	43	51	49	100	0
84-88	146	69	215	4	219	68	32	100	2
89+	14	14	28	6	34	50	50	100	18
Known Periods	200	115	315	10	325	63	37	100	3
No Date	32	16	48	1	49	67	33	100	2
Subtotal	232	131	363	11	374	64	36	100	3
2									
71-73	1	2	3	0	3	33	67	100	0
74-78	5	4	9	0	9	56	44	100	0
79-83	8	8	16	0	16	50	50	100	0
84-88	25	19	44	2	46	57	43	100	4
89+	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
Known Periods	80	34	74	2	76	108	46	100	3
No Date	10	9	19	0	19	53	47	100	0
Subtotal	90	43	93	2	95	97	46	100	2
3 And Over									
71-73	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
74-78	4	2	6	0	6	67	33	100	0
79-83	3	2	5	0	5	60	40	100	0
84-88	15	9	24	2	26	63	38	100	8
89+	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
Known Periods	24	15	39	2	41	62	38	100	5
No Date	10	5	15	2	17	67	33	100	12
Subtotal	34	20	54	4	58	63	37	100	7

**TABLE 7-19
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY INTENDED PRODUCT**

Product Sector/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Periods			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
Agriculture	7	3	10	0	10	70	30	100	0
Fishing	1	2	3	0	3	33	67	100	0
Logging&Forestry	46	46	16	62	2	66	74	26	100
Log.&Forest.-Mfg	6	5	11	0	11	55	45	100	0
Mining	1	3	4	1	5	25	75	100	20
Mfg.	13	8	21	0	21	62	38	100	0
Construction	21	13	34	3	37	62	38	100	8
Transport	24	15	39	1	40	62	38	100	3
Communication	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
Wholesale	0	1	1	1	2	0	100	100	50
Retail	72	31	103	2	105	70	30	100	2
Retail-Food&Bev.	9	3	12	1	13	75	25	100	8
Finance, Real Estate & Business Servs.	3	2	5	0	5	60	40	100	0
Local Gov't, Health & Education Servs	2	2	4	0	4	50	50	100	0
Accommodation	2	4	6	0	6	33	67	100	0
Accommodation & Food&Beverage Servs.	6	5	11	0	11	55	45	100	0
Cabins,Campgrounds, Lodges	30	22	52	3	55	58	42	100	5
Food & Beverage	9	7	16	0	16	56	44	100	0
Other Services	28	21	49	1	50	57	43	100	2
All Main Products	282	164	446	15	463	63	37	100	3
Other Combined & Known	33	27	60	2	63	55	45	100	3

**TABLE 7-19 (Cont.)
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY INTENDED PRODUCT**

Product Sector/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Periods			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
Agriculture									
71-73	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
84-88	4	2	6	0	6	67	33	100	0
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Period	6	3	9	0	9	67	33	100	0
No Date	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
Subtotal	7	3	10	0	10	70	30	100	0
Fishing									
71-73	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
84-88	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Period	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
No Date	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
Subtotal	1	2	3	0	3	33	67	100	0
Logging&Forestry									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	9	1	10	0	10	90	10	100	0
79-83	3	2	5	0	5	60	40	100	0
84-88	22	12	34	1	35	65	35	100	3
89+	3	1	4	1	5	75	25	100	20
Known Period	37	16	53	2	55	70	30	100	4
No Date	9	0	9	0	11	100	0	100	0
Subtotal	46	16	62	2	66	74	26	100	3
Log.&Forest.-Mfg									
71-73	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
84-88	5	3	8	0	8	63	38	100	0
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Period	5	5	10	0	10	50	50	100	0
No Date	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
Subtotal	6	5	11	0	11	55	45	100	0
Mining									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
84-88	1	2	3	1	4	33	67	100	25
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Period	1	2	3	1	4	33	67	100	25
No Date	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
Subtotal	1	3	4	1	5	25	75	100	20

**TABLE 7-19 (Cont.)
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY INTENDED PRODUCT**

Product Sector/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Periods			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes
						Yes	No	Subtotal	NK
Mfg. (1)									
71-73	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	3	0	3	0	3	100	0	100	0
84-88	6	5	11	0	11	55	45	100	0
89+	0	2	2	0	2	0	100	100	0
Known Period	10	7	17	0	17	59	41	100	0
No Date	3	1	4	0	4	75	25	100	0
Subtotal	13	8	21	0	21	62	38	100	0
Construction (2)									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
79-83	3	3	6	0	6	50	50	100	0
84-88	13	8	21	2	23	62	38	100	9
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Period	16	12	28	2	30	57	43	100	7
No Date	5	1	6	1	7	83	17	100	14
Subtotal	21	13	34	3	37	62	38	100	8
Transport									
71-73	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
74-78	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
79-83	4	4	8	0	8	50	50	100	0
84-88	16	7	23	0	23	70	30	100	0
89+	1	1	2	1	3	50	50	100	33
Known Period	23	13	36	1	37	64	36	100	3
No Date	1	2	3	0	3	33	67	100	0
Subtotal	24	15	39	1	40	62	38	100	3
Communication									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
84-88	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Period	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
No Date	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
Wholesale									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
79-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
84-88	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
89+	0	0	0	1	1	-	-	-	100
Known Period	0	1	1	1	2	0	100	100	50
No Date	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	0	1	1	1	2	0	100	100	50

**TABLE 7-19 (Cont.)
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY INTENDED PRODUCT**

Product Sector/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Periods			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
Retail									
71-73	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
74-78	2	3	5	0	5	40	60	100	0
79-83	3	6	9	0	9	33	67	100	0
84-88	51	10	61	0	61	84	16	100	0
89+	8	6	14	2	16	57	43	100	13
Known Period	64	26	90	2	92	71	29	100	2
No Date	8	5	13	0	13	62	38	100	0
Subtotal	72	31	103	2	105	70	30	100	2
Retail-Food&Bev.									
71-73	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
74-78	2	0	2	0	2	100	0	100	0
79-83	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
84-88	4	1	5	1	6	80	20	100	17
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Period	7	3	10	1	11	70	30	100	9
No Date	2	0	2	0	2	100	0	100	0
Subtotal	9	3	12	1	13	75	25	100	8
Finance, Real Estate & Business Servs.									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	2	0	2	0	2	100	0	100	0
84-88	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Period	3	1	4	0	4	75	25	100	0
No Date	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
Subtotal	3	2	5	0	5	60	40	100	0
Local Gov't, Health & Education Servs.									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
79-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
84-88	2	2	4	0	4	50	50	100	0
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Period	2	2	4	0	4	50	50	100	0
No Date	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	2	2	4	0	4	50	50	100	0
Accommodation									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
79-83	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
84-88	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
89+	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
Known Period	1	3	4	0	4	25	75	100	0
No Date	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
Subtotal	2	4	6	0	6	33	67	100	0

**TABLE 7-19 (Cont.)
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY INTENDED PRODUCT**

Product Sector/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Periods			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
Accommodation- Food&Beverage Serv.									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
79-83	2	2	4	0	4	50	50	100	0
84-88	0	2	2	0	2	0	100	100	0
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Period	3	4	7	0	7	43	57	100	0
No Date	3	1	4	0	4	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	6	5	11	0	11	55	45	100	0
Cabins,Campgrounds, (3)									
71-73	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
74-78	3	4	7	0	7	43	57	100	0
79-83	3	2	5	0	5	60	40	100	0
84-88	15	7	22	1	23	68	32	100	4
89+	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
Known Period	22	14	36	1	37	61	39	100	3
No Date	8	8	16	2	18	50	50	100	11
Subtotal	30	22	52	3	55	58	42	100	5
Food&Beverage									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	0	1	1	0	1	0	100	100	0
79-83	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
84-88	6	5	11	0	11	55	45	100	0
89+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
Known Period	8	7	15	0	15	53	47	100	0
No Date	1	0	1	0	1	100	0	100	0
Subtotal	9	7	16	0	16	56	44	100	0
Other Services									
71-73	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-
74-78	2	0	2	0	2	100	0	100	0
79-83	1	4	5	0	5	20	80	100	0
84-88	21	12	33	0	33	64	36	100	0
89+	2	3	5	1	6	40	60	100	17
Known Period	26	19	45	1	46	58	42	100	2
No Date	2	2	4	0	4	50	50	100	0
Subtotal	28	21	49	1	50	57	43	100	2
All Main Products									
71-73	5	4	9	0	9	56	44	100	0
74-78	20	13	33	0	33	61	39	100	0
79-83	28	26	54	0	54	52	48	100	0
84-88	170	82	252	6	258	67	33	100	2
89+	14	15	29	6	35	48	52	100	17
Known Period	237	140	377	12	389	63	37	100	3
No Date	45	24	69	3	74	65	35	100	4
Subtotal	282	164	446	15	463	63	37	100	3

**TABLE 7-19 (Cont.)
DECISIONS TAKEN ON FULL APPLICATIONS, BY INTENDED PRODUCT**

Product Sector/ Period	Volume Per Decision					Percent of Periods			
	Yes	No	Subtotal	NK	Total	And Known Outcome			And All Outcomes NK
						Yes	No	Subtotal	
Other Combined & Known (4)									
71-73	2	1	3	0	3	67	33	100	0
74-78	3	2	5	0	5	60	40	100	0
79-83	5	4	9	0	9	56	44	100	0
84-88	16	14	30	2	33	53	47	100	6
89+	1	1	2	0	2	50	50	100	0
Known Period	27	22	49	2	52	55	45	100	4
No Date	6	5	11	0	11	55	45	100	0
Subtotal	33	27	60	2	63	55	45	100	3

- 1 Includes: 1**-5**, 2**-5** or 3**-5** (wholesaling manufactured goods). Each is considered a single product. As well, any mix of mfg. (1**-2**, 1**-3** or 2**-3**) is considered a single product.
- 2 Includes: 400-420 (construction trades within broader construction), or 400-450 (using construction equipment for hauling). Each is considered a single product.
- 3 Because of interest hunting and fishing lodges in northern development product mixes 910-960 & 910-920-960 are separated out.
- 4 Other combinations include: Fishing-Mfg.(1); Logging-Construction(3), -Const-Transport(1), -Mfg-Const(2), &Retail(1); Mfg-Const-Retail(10); Construction-Retail(3) & -Trans-Oth.Servs(1); Transport-Retail(2), -Accom-Food&Bev-Oth.Servs(1), &-Food&Bev-Oth Servs(1);Retail-Oth Servs(9) -Fin RE-Accom-Food&Bev-Oth Serv(1), -Accom-Food&Bev(1), -Accom-Food&Bev-Oth Servs(5), -Accom-Oth Ser(5), & -Food&Bev-Oth Ser(5); Fin RE-Accom-Food&Bev(1), Food&Bev(1), &Oth Serv(1); Accom-Food&Bev-Rec Servs-Oth Servs(1), &-Oth Servs(2); &Food&Bev-Oth Servs(8)

TABLE 7-20
INCIDENCE OF REASONS FOR REJECTING FULL APPLICATIONS RELATIVE TO THE NUMBER OF FULL APPLICATIONS

Coding per Reason for Rejection:

- Environmental
 1 - Infrastructure not adequate.
 2 - Land or space problem.
 3 - Lack of local support or local opposition.
 Applicant
 4 - Problems with owners or management.
 5 - Proforma or project dev't work not adequate.
 6 - Public regulations not met.
 7 - Applicant abandoned.
 8 - Applicant withdrawing, taking other action.
 Project Substance
 9 - Market not sufficient or adequately served.
 10 - Not viable or viability in question.
- Program Rules
 11 - Inadequate socioeconomic benefits.
 12 - Rejected, program expiry.
 13 - Program transferred to another program.
 14 - Assistance not necessary.
 15 - Cost to program too high.
 16 - Not within program parameters.
 17 - Insufficient amounts of appropriate financing.
 Other
 18 - Not sufficient time.
 19 - Rejected for other reasons.

Variable Category & Variable	Incidence of Reasons by Reason Code																								
	Number of Full Apps.	1	2	3	Tot	4	5	6	7	8	Tot	9	10	Tot	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	Tot	18	19	Tot
All	527	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.12	0.00	0.16	0.03	0.06	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.04
By Program																									
SARDA	375	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.13	0.01	0.18	0.03	0.07	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.04
NDA2	130	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.09	0.00	0.11	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.02	0.02
NEDP3	22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
By Final Decision Date																									
1971-73	12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.17	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00
1974-78	38	0.00	0.08	0.08	0.16	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.11	0.03	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1979-83	64	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.27	0.06	0.06	0.13	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.00	0.08	0.06
1984-88	291	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.15	0.02	0.06	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03
1989	37	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.16	0.00	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.32	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03
No Date	85	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.12	0.01	0.16	0.02	0.06	0.08	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.13	0.01	0.04	0.05

TABLE 7-20 (Cont.)
INCIDENCE OF REASONS FOR REJECTING FULL APPLICATIONS RELATIVE TO THE NUMBER OF FULL APPLICATIONS

Variable Category & Variable	Number of Full Appls.	Incidence of Reasons by Reason Code																							
		Environmental			Applicant			Project Substance			Program Rules						Other								
		1	2	3	Tot	4	5	6	7	8	Tot	9	10	Tot	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	Tot	18	19	Tot
By Applicant Status																									
Registered Indian	347	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.10	0.00	0.15	0.02	0.05	0.08	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.13	0.01	0.03	0.04
Other Aboriginal	97	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.12	0.02	0.10	0.12	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.01
Unknown Aboriginal	53	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.08	0.02	0.13	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.02	0.02
Not Aboriginal	87	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.03
Not Known	44	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.20	0.00	0.30	0.05	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.09	0.23	0.00	0.05	0.05
By Exiating Bus.																									
Yes	178	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.15	0.01	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.13	0.00	0.02	0.02
No	347	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.17	0.03	0.06	0.09	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.01	0.03	0.04
Not Known	2	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
By Goal																									
New Business	292	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.16	0.00	0.24	0.03	0.06	0.08	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.01	0.03	0.04
Exist. Bus. Starts New Purchase	18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00
Exist. Bus. Purchase	57	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.02	0.14	0.02	0.09	0.11	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.05	0.05
Expand	7	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maintain	107	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.11	0.02	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.15	0.00	0.02	0.02
Not Known	41	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.02	0.15	0.00	0.05	0.05
	7	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.29	0.14	0.14	0.29	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.14	0.14
By Location of Operations																									
Organized Cmty	44	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.18	0.00	0.20	0.07	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.11	0.00	0.05	0.05
Unorganized Cmty	133	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.17	0.02	0.07	0.09	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.00	0.02	0.02
Indian Reserve	290	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.10	0.00	0.14	0.02	0.06	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.15	0.01	0.03	0.04
Other In-Area	51	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.14	0.02	0.24	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.02	0.02
Out-Area North	7	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.14	0.43	0.00	0.00	0.00
Out-Area External	0																								
Not Known	2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

**TABLE 7-21
MEASURES OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM PROGRAM FINANCIAL PROFORMAS**

Program	Number Done	Lower Standard (1) Capital, Equity, (2) Plus						Higher Standard (3) Capital, Equity, (2) Plus					
		1 Year EBITDA		2 Years EBITDA		3 Years EBITDA		1Yr Net Earnings		2Yrs Net Earnings		3Yrs Net Earnings	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
SARDA	338	312	92	310	92	309	91	266	79	265	78	264	78
NDA2	124	102	82	80	65	76	61	47	38	40	32	38	31
NEDP3	8	7	88	7	88	7	88	7	88	7	88	7	88
All	470	421	90	397	84	392	83	320	68	312	66	309	66

1. Lower standard counts are based on face assessment of the proformas.
2. No proformas were done by the programs with the amount of capital required not known or with the amount of equity required not known.
3. "Higher standard" counts are based on proformas as revised by the writer to include data in the project file concerning interest expense and, especially, depreciation expense. See the text for further explanation.

**TABLE 7-22
NUMBERS AND PERCENT OF PROGRAM PROFORMAS WITH NO EQUITY REQUIRED**

Variable Category and Variable	No. of Proformas	No Equity Required* Number	Percent
By Program			
SARDA	338	18	5
NDA2	124	33	27
NEDP3	8	0	0
All	470	51	11
By Type of Applicant			
Proprietor	229	25	11
Private F-P Corp.	3	0	0
Non-Gov't Collective	11	3	27
Indian Band	53	13	25
Local Gov't	3	1	33
Fed./Prov. Gov't	2	2	100
Not Known	0	0	-
By Location of Applicant			
Organized Community	27	2	7
Unorganized Community	74	8	11
Indian Reserve	175	31	18
Other In-Area	26	5	19
Out-Area North	6	2	33
Out-Area External	11	0	0
Not Known	2	1	50
By Status of Applicant			
Registered Indian	182	36	20
Other Aboriginal	60	8	13
Unknown Aboriginal	30	2	7
Not Aboriginal	50	2	4
Not Known	11	2	18
By Location of Operations			
Organized Community	26	1	4
Unorganized Community	84	8	10
Indian Reserve	169	32	19
Other In-Area	28	9	32
Out-Area North	4	1	25
Out-Area External	0	0	-
Not Known	2	0	0
By Goal			
New Business	152	21	14
Exist.Bus.Starts New Bu	12	2	17
Purchase Business	35	2	6
Exist.Bus.Purchase Bus.	7	0	0
Expand	71	5	7
Other Goal	32	8	25
Not Known	6	2	33

* Equity excludes grants received from the same or another government program for the purpose of applying equity to the project.

TABLE 7-23
PROGRAM APPROVALS COMPARED TO FULL APPLICATIONS*
NON-FINANCIAL ASPECTS

Variable Category and Variable	Number of Full		Change	
	Applications	Approvals	Number	Proportion
Number of Applicants Per Application				
1	262	258	-4	-0.02
2	40	39	-1	-0.03
3	11	10	-1	-0.09
Not Known	0	6	6	-
Type of Applicant				
Proprietor	234	229	-5	-0.02
Private F-P Corp.	8	3	-5	-0.63
Non-Gov't Collective	28	11	-17	-0.61
Indian Band	55	53	-2	-0.04
Local Gov't	4	3	-1	-0.25
Fed./Prov. Gov't	2	2	0	0.00
Not Known	1	0	-1	-1.00
Location of Applicant				
Organized Community	29	27	-2	-0.07
Unorganized Community	73	74	1	0.01
Indian Reserve	176	175	-1	-0.01
In-Area North	28	26	-2	-0.07
Out-Area North	7	6	-1	-0.14
Out-Area External	12	11	-1	-0.08
Not Known	2	2	0	0.00
Status of Applicant				
Registered Indian	183	182	-1	-0.01
Other Aboriginal	62	60	-2	-0.03
Unknown Aboriginal	30	30	0	0.00
Not Aboriginal	50	50	0	0.00
Not Known	15	11	-4	-0.27
Location of Head Office				
Organized Community	26	26	0	0.00
Unorganized Community	79	78	-1	-0.01
Indian Reserve	173	172	-1	-0.01
In-Area North	25	26	1	0.04
Out-Area North	2	3	1	0.50
Out-Area External	4	5	1	0.25
Not Known	4	3	-1	-0.25

TABLE 7-24
PROGRAM APPROVALS COMPARED TO FULL APPLICATIONS
PROJECTED NET INCOME (1)(2)

Variable Category and Variable	Number	Increases in Net Income			Decreases in Net Income			No Change Number	Aggregate Net Inc. Prop.Net Change	Average Aggregate Net Inc. Prop.Net Change		
		Number	Full Appl. Average Net Inc.	Appr'd Average Net Inc.	Prop.Chg Average Net Inc.	Number	Full Appl. Average Net Inc.				Appr'd Average Net Inc.	Prop.Chg Average Net Inc.
Program												
SARDA	118	53	4.7	10.4	1.23	58	41.6	14.3	-0.66	7	-907.0	-7.7
NDA2	27	9	0.7	8.2	10.63	3	457.7	179.7	-0.61	15	-632.0	-23.4
NEDP3	6	1	-5.0	8.8	2.77	3	156.0	47.3	-0.70	2	-243.0	-40.5
All	151	63	3.6	9.9	1.78	64	66.5	23.6	-0.64	24	-1782.0	-11.8
Full Appl'n, Last Rec'd												
1971-73	4	2	6.5	27.3	3.19	2	58.5	41.0	-0.30	0	48.0	12.0
1974-78	10	2	2.0	4.6	1.30	6	53.5	2.7	-0.95	2	-279.0	-27.9
1979-83	18	8	4.3	8.6	0.97	10	30.4	8.7	-0.71	0	-141.0	-7.8
1984-88	90	41	3.9	10.0	1.57	31	53.2	16.1	-0.70	18	-600.0	-6.7
1989+	10	7	4.3	15.6	2.63	2	28.5	19.5	-0.32	1	95.0	9.5
No Date	19	3	1.2	7.1	5.09	13	138.8	60.6	-0.56	3	-905.0	-47.6
Prepared By												
Receiving Program	3	1	0.3	1.3	3.00	1	79.0	68.0	-0.14	1	-8.0	-2.7
Other Gov't Program	16	6	1.9	11.1	4.93	9	45.9	6.7	-0.85	1	-205.0	-12.8
Non-Gov't Agent	84	37	3.7	9.7	1.62	33	48.1	23.2	-0.52	14	-317.0	-3.8
Applicant	26	9	6.1	10.7	0.77	13	33.3	4.4	-0.87	4	-255.0	-9.8
Not Known	22	10	1.7	10.1	4.87	8	184.1	70.1	-0.62	4	-727.0	-33.0
Number of Applicants Per Application												
1	129	53	3.9	9.2	1.36	54	70.6	25.5	-0.64	22	-1757.0	-13.6
2	18	9	7.6	15.2	1.01	7	34.1	20.1	-0.41	2	39.0	2.2
3	4	1	-24.5	11.5	1.47	3	66.7	-2.7	-1.04	0	-64.0	-16.0

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TABLE 7-24 (Cont.)
PROGRAM APPROVALS COMPARED TO FULL APPLICATIONS
PROJECTED NET INCOME (1)(2)

Variable Category and Variable	Number	Increases in Net Income			Decreases in Net Income			No Change	Aggregate Net Inc. Prop.Net Change	Average Aggregate Net Inc. Prop.Net Change		
		Number	Full Appl. Average Net Inc.	Appr'd Average Net Inc.	Prop. Ch Average Net Inc.	Number	Full Appl. Average Net Inc.				Appr'd Average Net Inc.	Prop.Chg Average Net Inc.
Type of Applicant												
Proprietor	115	52	4.3	10.3	1.37	51	36.5	13.0	-0.64	12	-514.0	-4.5
Private F-P Corp.	4	2	-2.8	25.0	10.09	1	167.0	54.0	-0.68	1	-2.0	-0.5
Non-Gov't Collective	12	3	-6.3	7.4	2.19	3	66.7	-2.7	-1.04	6	-44.0	-3.7
Indian Band	25	8	1.7	7.8	3.67	12	196.9	69.8	-0.65	5	-1372.0	-54.9
Local Gov't	2	1	-49.0	23.0	1.47	1	-10.0	-63.0	5.30	0	91.0	45.5
Fed./Prov. Gov't	-1	0	0.0	0.0	-	0	-	-	-	1	0.0	0.0
Not Known	1	0	0.0	0.0	-	1	31.0	11.0	-0.65	0	-20.0	-20.0
Location of Applicant												
Organized Community	8	2	3.0	13.0	3.33	5	66.8	23.6	-0.65	1	-136.0	-17.0
Unorganized Community	28	11	3.5	13.1	2.78	10	31.3	15.9	-0.49	7	116.0	4.1
Indian Reserve	102	46	3.9	9.4	1.43	43	77.2	27.1	-0.65	13	-1590.0	-15.6
In-Area North	11	5	4.2	10.5	1.50	4	19.5	1.5	-0.92	2	-3.0	-0.3
Out-Area North	2	0	0.0	0.0	-	1	43.0	1.0	-0.98	1	-42.0	-21.0
Out-Area External	4	2	-20.8	17.0	1.82	2	83.5	-5.5	-1.07	0	-27.0	-6.8
Not Known	1	0	0.0	0.0	-	1	31.0	11.0	-0.65	0	-20.0	-20.0
Status of Applicant												
Registered Indian	103	46	4.0	9.5	1.39	44	79.5	27.7	-0.65	13	-1713.0	-16.6
Other Aboriginal	22	7	8.2	10.5	0.28	11	43.0	18.3	-0.58	4	-221.0	-10.0
Unknown Aboriginal	17	7	-3.5	11.1	4.20	5	18.4	-7.0	-1.38	5	121.0	7.1
Not Aboriginal	14	7	-3.2	18.6	6.80	4	58.8	5.3	-0.91	3	92.0	6.6
Not Known	5	1	0.2	1.0	4.00	3	52.0	33.0	-0.37	1	-53.0	-10.6
Existing Business												
Yes	45	18	3.2	13.2	3.09	23	116.7	45.4	-0.61	4	-1192.0	-26.5
No	105	45	3.8	8.6	1.30	42	36.9	11.0	-0.70	18	-576.0	-5.5
Not Known	1	0	0.0	0.0	-	1	20.0	6.0	-0.70	0	-14.0	-14.0

**TABLE 7-24 (Cont.)
PROGRAM APPROVALS COMPARED TO FULL APPLICATIONS
PROJECTED NET INCOME (1)(2)**

Variable Category and Variable	Number	Increases in Net Income			Decreases in Net Income			No Change	Aggregate Net Inc. Prop.Net Change	Average Aggregate Net Inc. Prop.Net Change		
		Full Appl. Average Net Inc.	Appr'd Average Net Inc.	Prop. Ch Average Net Inc.	Full Appl. Average Net Inc.	Appr'd Average Net Inc.	Prop.Chg Average Net Inc.					
Perf. of Exist. Business												
Positive	13	7	1.8	9.9	4.38	6	39.5	20.5	-0.48	0	-9.0	-0.7
Negative	10	5	-6.9	7.6	2.10	2	919.5	364.0	-0.60	3	-966.0	-96.6
Not Known	22	11	8.6	17.6	1.04	10	60.9	19.4	-0.68	1	-217.0	-9.9
Location of Head Office												
Organized Community	7	2	3.4	14.9	3.33	4	72.0	24.5	-0.66	1	-110.0	-15.7
Unorganized Community	30	13	5.0	15.4	2.06	10	31.3	15.9	-0.49	7	157.0	5.2
Indian Reserve	102	44	3.2	8.6	1.65	45	75.5	26.6	-0.65	13	-1656.0	-16.2
In-Area North	10	4	3.3	5.7	0.73	4	19.5	1.5	-0.92	2	-48.0	-4.8
Out-Area North	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0.0	-
Out-Area External	1	0	0.0	0.0	-	0	-	-	-	1	0.0	0.0
Not Known	1	0	0.0	0.0	-	1	177.0	52.0	-0.71	0	-125.0	-125.0
Location of Operations												
Organized Community	6	4	1.3	13.3	9.00	1	288.0	98.0	-0.66	1	-118.0	-19.7
Unorganized Community	33	13	4.6	14.0	2.06	13	33.4	7.4	-0.78	7	-27.0	-0.8
Indian Reserve	99	42	3.5	9.1	1.60	45	72.4	26.5	-0.63	12	-1510.0	-15.3
In-Area North	12	5	2.3	6.1	1.61	4	69.0	31.3	-0.55	3	-106.0	-8.8
Out-Area North	1	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	1	0.0	0.0
Out-Area External	-	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0.0	-
Not Known	-	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0.0	-
Full Appl. Net Income												
Less than \$0	11	10	-18.1	22.1	2.22	1	-10.0	-63.0	5.30	0	389.0	35.4
\$0-24,999	88	46	4.9	9.3	0.91	25	13.4	4.3	-0.68	17	162.0	1.8
\$25-49,999	34	5	4.8	5.7	0.18	24	33.8	15.0	-0.56	5	-423.0	-12.4
\$50-74,999	6	1	9.7	24.8	1.57	5	62.0	18.2	-0.71	0	-128.0	-21.3
\$75-99,999	4	1	22.5	24.8	0.10	3	84.7	69.7	-0.18	0	-36.0	-9.0
\$100,000 & Over	8	0	0.0	0.0	-	6	425.5	134.5	-0.68	2	-1746.0	-218.3

**TABLE 7-24 (Cont.)
PROGRAM APPROVALS COMPARED TO FULL APPLICATIONS
PROJECTED NET INCOME (1)(2)**

Variable Category and Variable	Number	Increases in Net Income			Decreases in Net Income			No Change	Aggregate Net Inc. Prop.Net Change	Average Aggregate Net Inc. Prop.Net Change		
		Number	Full Appl. Average Net Inc.	Appr'd Average Net Inc.	Prop. Ch Average Net Inc.	Number	Full Appl. Average Net Inc.				Appr'd Average Net Inc.	Prop.Chg Average Net Inc.
Number of Products												
1	113	49	4.3	8.6	0.99	44	76.4	29.8	-0.61	20	-1571.0	-13.9
2	19	5	1.0	7.8	6.79	11	39.9	11.0	-0.72	3	-189.0	-9.9
3	19	9	1.8	20.3	10.00	9	50.2	8.9	-0.82	1	-22.0	-1.2
Products												
Agriculture	1	0	0.0	0.0	-	0	-	-	-	1	0.0	0.0
Fishing	1	0	-	-	-	1	79.0	68.0	-0.14	0	-11.0	-11.0
Logging & Forestry	22	13	4.4	7.9	0.78	6	14.3	7.3	-0.49	3	34.0	1.5
Logging&For. & Mfg.	3	1	-9.7	23.7	3.45	1	29.0	13.0	-0.55	1	84.0	28.0
Mining	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0.0	-
Manufacturing	2	1	5.5	7.0	0.27	0	-	-	-	1	3.0	1.5
Construction	10	1	9.0	9.9	0.10	8	243.5	97.4	-0.60	1	-1160.0	-116.0
Transportation	15	9	7.5	19.7	1.63	3	20.0	-0.3	-1.02	3	122.0	8.1
Communications	1	1	20.0	22.0	0.10	0	-	-	-	0	2.0	2.0
Wholesale	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0.0	-
Retail	39	14	2.8	6.9	1.45	21	51.8	18.6	-0.64	4	-538.0	-13.8
Retail & Food&Beverage	2	0	0.0	0.0	-	2	13.0	3.5	-0.73	0	-19.0	-9.5
Fin., Real Est., & Bus. Services	1	0	0.0	0.0	-	1	52.0	16.0	-0.69	0	-36.0	-36.0
Local Gov't, Health, & Education	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0.0	-
Accommodation	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	-79.0	-
Accomm. & Food&Bev.	3	0	0.0	0.0	-	2	102.0	27.5	-0.73	1	-10.0	-3.3
Cabins,Campgds,Lodges	13	6	3.4	17.4	4.14	6	39.2	-4.3	-1.11	1	29.0	2.2
Food & Beverage Servs.	6	3	1.3	2.5	0.88	2	14.0	5.5	-0.61	1	-54.0	-9.0
Other Services	14	7	2.8	5.7	1.05	2	7.5	1.5	-0.80	5	0.0	0.0
Other Combinations	18	7	2.1	13.1	5.38	9	45.0	16.9	-0.62	2	0.0	0.0

1. For those approvals that projected net income and that were preceeded by full applications that projected net income.
2. Highest net income projected.

CHAPTER 8

PROGRAM OUTPUTS AND PROJECT OUTCOMES

This chapter describes and analyzes the actions and outcomes subsequent to the final decisions discussed Chapter 7. In terms of the causal model of Chapter 2, it is concerned with the actions determining and flowing from nodes "M. Case Program Outputs," "N. Case Project Resources" and "O. Case Project Performance" (Figure 2-5). The causal model hypothesizes that:

1. program outputs are a direct result of program decisions,
2. project resources are determined by the outputs of case programs and other programs,
3. project performance is determined by project resources, conditions in the external economy and community socioeconomic conditions.

Two dimensions of project performance are discussed: business survival and job creation. Though they varied in relative importance among the three programs and over the study period these were the two primary goals of the programs.

Following the pattern of previous chapters discussion begins with presentation of the additional variables brought into the analysis. This is followed by a summary of elapsed time between the date of the final decision and the date on which projects received their first payment. This flows into a comparative examination of the value of financing projected and approved for projects, and the value of financing received. Next, project operational problems as tallied from project files are described. Then, the two dimensions of project performance are discussed: business longevity and job creation. Finally the costs of obtaining business longevity and job creation are linked to attributes of business plans and business operations.

The Database

The database for this chapter consists of 467 projects. Of these, 419 (90%) received financial assistance from a case program¹ and 48 (10%) for one reason or another never were financed by one of the case programs.

The original variables applied in this chapter include five variables from the screen applications database,² almost all of the variables from the full applications and approvals databases, and the additional variables listed in Table 8-1.

Some of the additional variables such as type, value and source of assistance, and person-years of employment have similar properties to their counterparts in the screen and full applications, and approvals databases. New variables include the amount of financial assistance paid by case programs and the date on which the first payment was sent; incidence of problems as noted in project files; status of the business as of the last available data found within project files, the reason (if any) for that last known business state and the date of the last status datum; and the status of the business as of the last available datum found in other sources and the date of that endpoint status datum.

Elapsed Time Between the Final Decision and First Payment

Obviously relationships among the factors "date of the final decision to provide assistance," "time-flow of project preparation expenses borne by the owner," "the time flow of financing received by the project" and "date the business commenced operation" are important to success of the enterprise. The format and substance of file data, however, make it

1. The amount of financing received from case programs is not known for one of the projects.

2. Program, date the application was received or sent, whether the applicant is an existing business, performance of existing businesses and extent of previous government financing of existing business applicants.

impossible to fully analyze these relationships. On many if not most projects it would be possible, but extremely tedious and time consuming, to pattern the time-flow of project preparation expenses borne by the owner. Data would have to be compiled on all expenditure receipts sent by the owner or manager to the program. It would not be possible to pattern the time flow of financing received by the project except for payments made by the case programs. Project audits and reviews usually note the amounts and sources of other financing, but most often the dates financing was received are not shown. Likewise, the date operations commenced is often not noted. Project audits or reviews just state that the project did or did not commence operating as of a certain date. Project letters-of-offer often contain a target date for operation; but the owner or manager often, if not usually, missed that date due to a myriad of events, some controllable but many not controllable. This is yet another example of the severe weaknesses exhibited by the program-client contract, and management information and enforcement regimes used by the programs.

The first grant payment from the programs normally came before or at commencement of operations.¹ Therefore, elapsed time between two dates, the date of final (i.e. ministerial) approval and the date the first grant payment was sent, has been calculated for the 341 projects for which both dates are available (Table 8-2).

On average, 189 days or just over 6 months elapsed between the date of final approval and the date the first payment was sent. SARDA, the more demanding program, took an average of 224 days (over 7 months) while the least demanding program, NDA2, took an average of 117 days (almost 4 months). Elapsed time became shorter over time in part due to the introduction of NDA2 and NEDP3, in part due to the increased use of advances, and in part due to a loosening of the criteria for making payment and a speed-up in administering the requisition of cheques. This is another indicator of the loosening of operational criteria or the "pushing" of business

1. For SARDA the first grant came more and more frequently over time as an "advancement."

development.

Notably longer mean elapsed times applied to single proprietorships, Indian bands and registered Indian owned businesses. Owners that are collectives, and the federal or provincial governments show relatively short mean elapsed times. As expected existing businesses and existing businesses with positive net incomes show shorter mean elapsed times. Businesses with two products show a much higher mean elapsed time than businesses with one or three or more products. Perhaps this was due to the relatively long gestation periods for two types of two-product businesses: logging & forestry and manufacturing, and retail and food & beverage services. As well, logging & forestry, and food & beverage service businesses, as single-product businesses, had long gestation periods. The products with more than a few examples and short gestation periods are agriculture and manufacturing. Retail and cabins-campgrounds-lodges projects were frequent and had somewhat shorter than average gestation periods.

Mean elapsed time is one indicator of the preparedness, organization and skill of the owner/manager. Timing of the first payment is conditional on the owner/manager having either started the business or, at least, having made substantial progress concerning the procurement of construction and supplies. Given this interpretation, single proprietorships, Indian bands and registered Indian owned businesses, in general, had more problems developing their businesses. Collectives, the federal or provincial governments, existing business and existing business with positive net incomes had, in general, the fewest problems developing their businesses.

Program Outputs and Project Operations

Program outputs were of three types. An output not generally given sufficient weight and not measured in this study is the work put into giving applicants advice and information respecting business development. Without this information and the intervention of program officers many of the businesses that became operational would not otherwise have advanced that

far. Program officers helped applicants think through their businesses, put them in contact with other financiers and suppliers, often facilitated interaction with other financiers and suppliers, and often provided applicants with information generated by the programs' financial reviews.

The other two outputs were financing and provision of direct operational assistance. The most common forms of direct operational assistance were business training, and substitute and counterpart management. Due to weaknesses in file recording and problems measuring direct operational assistance, this study is limited to financing. Financing was, by far, the most important form of assistance.

Case programs expended just over \$39 million (\$1990) on projects within the study area (Table 8-3). All but \$543,000 of this was in the form of grants.¹ Other government programs contributed over \$18 million in grants and over \$19 million in loans. Total government financing, therefore, was just over \$77 million: over \$57 million in grants and over \$19 million in loans. Non-government financiers such as banks, and regional and Aboriginal development and capital corporations contributed almost \$14 million in loans. Total gross costs were almost \$91 million over the roughly 19 years.

Regarding direct project expenditures per year by the case programs four observations are made. Firstly, SARDA and NDA2 were the heavy hitters - each contributed roughly 40% of total direct project expenditures. Secondly, three periods had dramatically different magnitudes of expenditures. Until 1977 there had been no recorded direct project expenditures.² From 1977 through 1981 expenditures climbed, they fell through 1982 and 1983. As of 1984 expenditures ballooned with the addition of NDA2 expenditures and this relatively high level of expenditures

1. NEDP3 issued one loan for \$543,000 in addition to a grant of \$543,000 to one business.

2. Although the first formal SARDA full approval within the study area took place in 1974 it was not until 1977 that the first money recoded in the files flowed to a project within the study area.

continued with the addition of NEDP3 expenditures in 1986 to the end of the study period. Thirdly, NDA2, the least demanding of the three programs, had the highest average annual expenditure at over \$3 million compared to nearly \$1 million for each of SARDA and NEDP3. Even in the relatively high expenditure years of 1984 through 1989 the average annual expenditure of SARDA, almost \$2 million, was substantially less than that of NDA2.

Fourthly, direct project expenditures increased dramatically at the point in time when major improvements had been made to social infrastructure. Massive investments had been made in local and regional physical infrastructure including housing. Levels of education and inflation-adjusted income per capita and median household income had increased substantially. A mix of developmental, technical and financial support organizations, such as regional and community development corporations, tribal councils, IEDF and CEDF, EIC's LEAP and its progeny had been put in place. Large expenditures had been made on schools and job training. For these reasons, absorptive capacity should have increased greatly.

One way to assess the quality of program financial proformas and operations is to compare the value of assistance from all sources expected for projects to the value of assistance from all sources actually received by projects. In most proformas program officers predicted the amount of financing required by type (i.e. grants, loans) and the probable sources for each type of financing. Program officers made predictions based on their professional experience and they often had the resources and/or power to effect coordination of financing sources.¹ In most cases, project success would be severely impacted by a substantial reduction in the value of financing, or by a shift from grant funding to loan financing.

The value of financing expected and received by projects from

1. For example, coordination amongst DRE/IE programs could have been enforced through hierarchical authority. Coordination with INAC could have been enforced through hierarchical authority or through operational interaction. Coordination with CEDF could have occurred through operational interaction. Accuracy of prediction for commercially-sourced financing could have been maximized through operational interaction and professional experience.

program grants, grants from other sources, and loans from other sources is shown in Table 8-4. For all programs and for each separate program the amount received versus the amount expected, and the percent difference, have been calculated for those projects for which the expected and received values by type of financing are known. The validity of this comparison has its limits. Most projects that failed before, or within, roughly three years after startup would not have received the SARDA hold-back. Projects that failed before startup would not have received performance-contingent financing from other sources. SARDA tried to maintain, and generally stayed within, a 10% overrun limit (Table 8-5). Programs often saved money because project costs came in below expectations. NDA2 generally paid its grant in one shot early on, before the business became operational. NEDP had a more sophisticated cash-flow-variance based payment system. In general, then, one would expect total financing to vary from slightly more, to much less, than expected.

Projects of all case programs for which both the expected and received value of all non-equity financing is known, received 15% (\$10.4 million) more aggregate non-equity financing (\$80.7 million) than predicted (\$70.3 million). Given the fact that many projects which received some financing from the case programs either never became operational or ceased to operate before opening or within a short period after opening, this is a surprise. Total financing, even taking into account some overruns, should have been not more, but less than predicted. This implies that many projects which survived through opening or longer received much more financing than predicted. Of the three programs SARDA had the greatest variance (+34%) between amount received (\$51.6 million) and amount predicted (\$38.4 million). NDA2 had only a small (-1%) variance between financing received (\$26.3 million) and financing predicted (\$26.7 million). NEDP's variance (+19%) between financing received (\$6.4 million) and financing predicted (\$5.4 million) was slightly more than half way between the other two programs.

Projects for which both the expected and received value of case program grants and loans are known received, in aggregate and as expected, 13% less than predicted for a savings of over \$4.5 million. The 24% of

projects that received more than predicted, however, received 16% more in grant financing than predicted. Both SARDA and NDA2 had a similar incidence and level of overruns, NEDP3 had a much lower incidence and level of overrun. In terms of grants from other (but all government) sources, 18% of projects received more than expected, but these projects received 302% more grant financing from the case programs than predicted.

In terms of loans, the vast majority of which came from other sources, 52% of projects received an aggregate 127% more financing than predicted. In fact, fully 37% of projects received 50% or more in loans than predicted and 26% received 100% or more in loans than predicted (Table 8-5). This problem mostly afflicted SARDA projects which received 60% more in loans than predicted.¹ There is good reason why SARDA projects in particular show such a large variance. SARDA was more demanding of its clients. As discussed in Chapter 5 SARDA grant hold-backs necessitated the use of loans as interim financing until the hold-back was paid some three years after the business became operational.² As a result, SARDA funded projects, in aggregate, should have received roughly one-third of total non-equity financing in loans. Therefore, assuming SARDA and owner's equity (at roughly 10% of total capital costs) were the only sources of non-loan financing, the \$18 million in SARDA approved grants should have induced loans in the order of \$6 million. Actual approved loans of almost \$17 million were much higher (Table 8-4). This implies that contributions from other financing participants, especially IEDF, substantially reduced the average proportion of all projects funded by SARDA.³ That the value of loans

1. Of SARDA projects, 50% received 50% or more in loans than predicted and 33% received 100% more in loans than predicted.

2. Many projects, however, especially in the latter year of the study period, were paid the hold-back well before the three years elapsed.

3. Another way of looking at this is that SARDA was able to contribute to many more projects than it could have in the absence of this larger amount of other loans. The same consequence flowed from grants from other sources to SARDA projects. All three case programs (and the other government programs as well) were able to spread their contributions among many more projects because of this complementary packaging of financing. The total cost to government, however, likely changed very little because the largest large share of non-government loans came from development corporations funded by

received by SARDA projects was in fact over \$27 million, more than one and one-half times the unexpectedly high value of approved loans, is striking. SARDA proformas, in general, were not very accurate in term of financing. Many projects required much higher levels of financing than predicted. In the face of 10% grant overrun limits, these projects had to be sustained with vastly increased loans. Since much larger loans necessitated substantially higher interest payments compared to SARDA projections, the success of many projects was negatively affected.

The availability of financing, especially by grants and loans but including overruns¹ from other sources, suggests that, contrary to the assertions of many interest groups and commentators, availability of capital, often at no or reduced cost, was not a major obstacle to business development in the study area once these programs were in place. These findings are further evidence of the extent to which the federal government especially, and the provincial government to a lesser extent, were "pushing" business development within the study area. This "pushing", if indeed true, appears to have been operationalized so as to have a perverse effect. The practice of spreading financing among many rather than few projects, and bureaucratic rules concerning levels of financing by type and timing of payments were in conflict with stated goals of business success and long-term job creation.

The all-sources grant financing variance has been calculated by variable (Table 8-6). The programs were not very good at predicting project grant revenue. This is especially striking because all grants came from government sources and most grants came from federal government sources. The incidence of more than 10% variance between financing predicted and financing received for all projects was a substantial 55%.

...Continued...

the federal and provincial governments.

1. The majority of loans to projects came from other government sources. Such loans were often placed with much more flexible repayment terms than normal commercial loans, sometimes they were forgivable and seizure of assets seldom occurred following failure to repay.

Some 18% of projects received more than 10% more in grant assistance from all sources than predicted, 37% received more than 10% less in grant assistance from all sources than predicted. The average percent positive variance (the percent by which all grants received were greater in value than predicted) was 78%, the average percent negative variance (the percent by which all grants received were less in value than predicted) was -29%. The incidence of more than 10% variance was very low for NEDP3 financed projects,¹ but it was similar for SARDA and NDA2 financed projects.

Measured in terms of the total percent of projects experiencing more than 10% variance between received and predicted grant financing, organizational learning did occur over time. The total percentage of projects experiencing receipt of grants more than 10% greater than predicted jumped from 44% for projects which received final approval in 1971-73 to 66% for projects which received final approval in 1974-78, then declined through each subsequent study period to 48% in 1989. Likewise, the average percent positive and negative value variances declined as of the 1974-78 period.

By applicant type the greatest variances occurred for non-government collectives, 75% of these projects experienced a 10% or more variance. As well, 50% of collective projects received 10% or more than predicted and those projects that received more than predicted were over by a large percent (+168%). This is further evidence of the problems collectives had developing and operating projects. Indian band owned projects also often (67%) experienced more than 10% variance between received and expected grant financing. By the location of at least one applicant, applicants from organized communities had both the lowest incidence of 10% or more variance, and a far smaller increase in average grant value variance than applicants from unorganized communities or Indian reserves. Applicants from unorganized communities show the highest value variance. Applicants from Indian reserves experienced the highest percentage of projects with more than 10% variance (61%). By the status group of at least one

1. But one or a few NEDP3 projects resulted in 221% more grant revenue than predicted.

applicant, non-Aboriginals had the lowest incidence of 10% or more variance, however, non-Aboriginals also had the highest average percent increase in grants received compared to grants predicted (+103%). The incidence of 10% or more variance for registered Indians and other Aboriginals was similar.

There was minimal difference in incidence of more than 10% variance between projects that were existing businesses and those that were not existing businesses. Projects that were not existing businesses, however, had a much higher average percentage value of grants received relative to grants predicted than projects that were existing businesses (99% compared to 61%).

As well, there was minimal difference in incidence of more than 10% variance between existing businesses that reported prior positive net income and those that reported prior negative net income. There was wide divergence in the average percent value variance. Those that reported a prior positive net income received an average 79% more in grants than predicted while those that reported a prior negative net income received only an average 21% more in grants than predicted. This is strong evidence that governments were more willing to overrun expenditure predictions to support businesses in trouble in order to maintain the business *per se* or to maintain the jobs linked to the business.

By previous government financing there was a slight, gradual decline in percent of projects with more than 10% variance for projects of existing businesses that did not report previously receiving government assistance to those that did report previously receiving government assistance and as the sources of government assistance were institutionally closer and closer to DRE/IE. Existing businesses that received previous government financing had the highest increase in average grant received, the closer the source of previous financing to DRE/IE the smaller the increase in average grant received. Perhaps some rule-of-thumb similar to the 10% overrun rule limited the overall "extra" take by any given project either on the basis of worthiness, or to ensure that more rather fewer projects received assistance.

By operational location, projects located in organized communities had a much lower incidence of more than 10% variance and a much smaller increase in average grant than projects located in either unorganized communities or Indian reserves. Projects located in organized communities also show lower average percent positive and negative value variances. Incidence of more than 10% variance was highest for projects on Indian reserves. There was a very high average percent positive value variance for unorganized communities. This may have been a consequence of the lower priority placed on business and employment development in the organized communities compared to unorganized communities or Indian reserves. By level of approved grant from case programs, projects that were approved to receive more than \$200,000 show the highest incidence of more than 10% variance, but projects that were approved to receive \$150-149,000 show the lowest incidence of more than 10% variance. The pattern of incidence of variance suggests an increasing incidence of more than +10% variance and a decreasing incidence of -10% variance as the approved grant increased. This asymmetry is puzzling. Were the programs under more pressure to maintain large projects? Changes in average value of this variance show no pattern.

Project files contain much anecdotal information concerning pre-operational project development because capital expenditures had to be documented in order to flow money. Files become surprisingly silent, however, once projects became operational. Clearly, the emphasis was on receiving and taking decisions on applications, facilitating pre-operational development and making payments. Operational monitoring was very weak, this is reflected in the absence of any formalized systems for critically reviewing operational performance. Project inquiries were generally tied to payments only, and most inquiries did not involve site visits. Initial payments, when given as advances, required verification that capital assets were purchased and that the project was operating. Final project audits triggering release of the hold-back were principally concerned with whether the project was operating, whether assets were on site and what financing payments had been received. Even on-site audits became less frequent and less thorough over time. Comments on project problems could only be gleaned from correspondence or handwritten notes, often found in the

margins or on scraps of paper or jotted helter-skelter on worksheets. These were scarce relative to the severe problems faced by many if not most projects. The problems so cited have been grouped into 11 categories (Table 8-7).

The most frequent problem was inadequate management (17% of problems). Next most frequent were problems concerning the market (10% of problems). There was a relatively low incidence of problems concerning receivables, equipment, physical infrastructure, the labour force, material inputs, financing and local politics. Having read through the project files the author has two observations: (1) many more projects had many more problems than cited; and (2) inadequate management was the predominant problem for a large minority, if not the majority, of projects. In fact, it appeared that program officers became so accustomed to the prevalence of poor management that their standard for reporting management problems was near abdication of the management function.

The incidence of problems is lowest for NDA2 because this program had the weakest monitoring system. The relative lack of cited problems concerning NDA2, which commenced operation in 1984, contributes to the decreasing incidence of problems over time. The incidence of all problems was higher for projects in which case program or other government agents prepared the full application and there is little difference in the incidence of all cited problems between projects for which a non-government agent prepared the full application and the applicant prepared the full application. There is no obvious explanation for this curious result. Perhaps program officers took a greater interest in those projects for which they prepared the full application, or perhaps the applicant had greater input when a non-government agent prepared the application.

As expected, there was a higher incidence of all problems for applications receiving subsequent approvals to the initial approval. Subsequent approvals usually reflected problems in a project requiring additional financing. The programs, therefore, were willing to take a higher financial risk to ensure project success. It is curious that projects with two

owners, most of which were incorporated partnerships,¹ had a much higher incidence of problems than projects with one or more than two owners. Perhaps the management function in projects with three or more owners was formally unified as in single-owner projects, but the two-owner partnership often remained an unresolved, dual-headed organization. In terms of owner type, again projects owned by collectives had a relatively high incidence of difficulties especially with respect to management. This finding is consistent with the proposition that because of their disparate goals, collectives are not very successful vehicles for operating businesses.² Projects owned by senior governments and proprietors also had a higher than average incidence of problems.³ For profit, private corporations show the lowest incidence of problems.

Projects with at least one owner from an unorganized community had the highest incidence of problems whereas projects with at least one owner from an organized community had the lowest incidence of problems. It is surprising, therefore, that projects with at least one owner who was non-Aboriginal or who was a registered Indian had a higher incidence of problems than projects with at least one owner who was an other-Aboriginal. By implication off-reserve registered Indians appear to have had a much higher incidence of problems than on-reserve registered Indians. Other Aboriginals from organized communities or Indian reserves must have had a much higher incidence of problems than other-Aboriginals from unorganized communities, and non-Aboriginals in the unorganized communities must have had a very high relative incidence of problems.

1. Most projects became incorporated.
2. There was only one owner-employee cooperate among these collectives. This cooperative had no problems.
3. "Owner type" means the type of organizations involved in owning the business. Owner type is not the same as the type of organization that the business is. Most projects had to incorporate as a condition of financing. Two proprietors could own a business, this would count as one proprietor owned business. Two Indian bands could own a business, this would count as a single Indian band owned business. There were few if any businesses owned by a mix of organization types.

Interestingly, there was little difference in the incidence of problems between those projects that were owned by existing businesses and those that were not owned by existing businesses. There was, however, a somewhat higher incidence of problems faced by existing businesses whose prior net income was negative than those existing businesses whose prior net income was positive. Operational location shows substantial variation of incidence of problems. As suggested above, projects located in unorganized communities had a much higher incidence of problems than projects located in organized communities or Indian reserves. It is likely that the larger population of many Indian reserves coupled with their relatively low level of prior commercial development resulted in fewer market problems for Indian reserve projects than faced by projects located in the generally smaller, unorganized communities that were better serviced commercially. By goal, existing businesses starting new businesses, inexplicably, had the highest incidence of problems whereas existing businesses purchasing a business or expanding had a relatively low incidence of problems.

By quality of the full application, projects that did not submit a full application experienced a higher incidence of problems than projects that did submit a full application. Among projects that submitted a full application, those applications that did not contain at least one year of EBITDA¹ show a much higher incidence of problems, especially management and financing problems. Both the intent to provide, and especially the demand for, a "real"² equity contribution were indicators of a higher incidence of problems. This is a clear overturning of one of the doctrines of business finance. Management problems were especially more frequent when an equity contribution was required by a final approval. In another startling result, incidence of problems shows little relation to whether the highest net income predicted by the full application was above or below the break-even point. In fact, there was a lower incidence of problems for projects for which the case programs' predicted highest net income was negative than for projects

1. EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.

2. As opposed to an equity contribution paid by transferring another conditional government grant.

for which the case programs' predicted highest net income was positive. The former had a much higher incidence of market-related and management problems.

Three variables measure dimensions of project size and complexity: the value of approved case program financing, the number of person-years of labour to be employed as predicted by the case programs and the number of products to be produced according to the case programs. In general, and with the exception of projects whose approved case program financing was between \$150-199,000, the higher the value of case program approved financing the higher the incidence of problems, again with market-related and management problems leading the difference. This gradient is reflected in the incidence of problems by project size as measured by the number of person-years to be employed as predicted by the case programs. Incidence of problems, most strikingly management problems, rose with size in person-years through to a 14 person-year labour force. The five projects with 15 or more predicted person-years of labour, however, had a much lower incidence of problems. Incidence of problems by number of products reinforces the general finding that incidence of problems was directly associated with size and complexity. Again, projects with two or three products had a much higher incidence of management problems than projects with one product.

Among project products with a larger number of project cases, problems were particularly frequent in agriculture, logging-forestry-manufacturing and cabins-campgrounds-lodges projects. Retail and other service projects had a relatively low incidence of problems. Forestry related, manufacturing and construction projects ran into numerous market-related problems. Construction and cabins-campgrounds-lodges projects ran into frequent equipment problems. Agriculture, forestry related, manufacturing, construction, retail related and cabins-campgrounds-lodges projects had frequent management problems. Not surprisingly, given the frequent market-related problems, forestry projects often had trouble arranging financing.

Project Outcomes

There are two sources of data on project outcomes. The first source is the project files. Most data from this source come from the last project financial statements, final project audits and program officers' memos requesting final release of financial assistance. Some data also come from miscellaneous project correspondence. Financial statements and program officer memos were the most informative, project audits were normally useful only by indicating if the project was still operating at the time of the audit. The weakness of project monitoring systems is confirmed by the fact that there is insufficient information in the files to indicate the outcomes of only 26% of all financed projects (Table 8-8). A further 17% of projects were known to be operating, but the well-being of those projects is not noted. This is especially true of NDA2, for which 67% of outcomes are not recorded and only 9% of projects were known to be operating; and of the NEDP3, for which 50% of outcomes are not recorded and only 13% of projects were known to be operating. Again, these data speak to the "looseness" of the NDA2 structure and operations. Since NDA2 and NEDP3 were implemented in the mid-1980's, the data also reveal a secular reduction of interest in project outcomes. As a final comment on the usefulness of these data, a large share of these data, even for operating projects, was generated well before three years elapsed from the start of project operations. Pushing out money and administrative "tying of loose ends" rather than generating organizational knowledge on outcomes, drove project monitoring.

Despite these limitations the data are revealing. Of all financed projects 20% had never, or ceased to, operate within three years of first receipt of case program financing. Another 17% were not profitable. Only, 21% of all financed projects or 33% of projects whose profitability was known¹ were profitable within these first few years.

Given data limitations, the combination of "no longer operating" and

1. 81 of 242 projects.

"never operated" is a severe measure of program failure. Interesting variations in the proportion of early project failures occur with respect certain variables. By program, NDA2 and NEDP3 show lower rates of early failures (13%) than SARDA (22%). As well, projects resulting from screen applications dated later in the study period show lower rates of early failures than projects resulting from screen applications early in the study period. Projects with at least one owner from an organized community show the lowest rate of early failures (15%) while projects with at least one owner from an unorganized community show the highest rate of early failure (30%). The early failure rate for projects with at least one owner from an Indian reserve was 20%. The organized - unorganized community divergence in the rate of early failure appears to be largely a consequence of operational location: the early failure rate for organized communities (11%) was half that of the unorganized communities (22%). The early failure rate for Indian reserves was 20%.

Projects run by existing businesses show a slightly lower early failure rate (18%) than projects not run by existing businesses (21%), but projects run by existing businesses that prior to the screen application had a positive net income show a substantially lower early failure rate (10%) than projects run by existing businesses that had a negative prior net income. Existing businesses that previously received financial assistance from government had a somewhat lower early failure rate (17%) than existing businesses that did not receive previous financial assistance from government (20%), and existing businesses that had received previous financial assistance from DRE/IE had a lower early failure rate (13%) than existing businesses that had received previous financial assistance from any government or any other federal government agency (both show 17% early failures).

Surprisingly, projects that did not submit a full application show a lower early failure rate (17%) than projects that did submit a full application. Of those projects that did submit a full application, however, those that did not predict at least one year of EBITDA show a very high relative rate of early failure (36%) compared to those that predicted one to three years EBITDA (17%), or those that submitted a full three-year proforma (21%). Amazingly, highest net income as predicted by both full application and

program officers' proformas shows a strong negative association with early failure. Projects from the 11% of full applications and 8% of program officer proformas that predicted negative net income suffered early failure while projects from the 23% of full applications and program officer proformas that predicted positive net income suffered early failure. Among products with a reasonable number of cases logging & forestry and manufacturing (40%), and food & beverage service (47%) projects had relatively high rates of early failure, logging & forestry projects had a moderate rate of early failure (22%), and retail projects had a relatively low rate of early failure (16%). Other industry attributes show no clear patterns of early failure.

Numerous non-program, published and not-published, sources comprise the second source of data on project outcomes.¹ These data are presented in two tables of post-financing survival rates and average project lifespan in years (Tables 8-9 and 8-10).

The two tables assume that a project survived continuously to the last date of the last datum showing the project to be operational. If no evidence of existence, or no evidence of further existence, could be found it is assumed the project ceased operation. Some projects underwent known name changes or were sold to new owners. These projects are deemed to have continued to exist even though the new owner may have very different attributes from the original owner. Some projects, especially some very small agricultural, natural resource or "other services" projects, may have continued to exist, but the nature of the business meant that they were never listed in any data source. The names of some projects may have changed sufficiently enough to make tracing impossible for all but local residents. Some businesses were recorded in government publications that

1. These sources include: data from program files regarding never operated or known project failures, annual Manitoba Telephone System *Manitoba* directories, nearly annual INAC and Manitoba Northern Affairs' *Community Profiles*, INAC and Industry Canada databases, a Manitoba Industry, Trade and Tourism listing of Northern Manitoba businesses, Arrowfax Manitoba's irregular publication *Manitoba Aboriginal Directory* of aboriginal owned businesses in Manitoba, annual Manitoba government listings of campgrounds and lodges, and two listings of Manitoba forestry businesses (Bohning and Rounds 1992, and Giles and Bohning 1992).

are known to be out-of-date by the time they are published. Projects listed in annual publications such as telephone books are presumed to have continued to exist to the midpoint of the year (to mid-month for last dates known only as a month and year) from which the original data was generated unless the original source date is known.¹

In all, if the project file data presented in Table 8-8 gives a short-term, overly rosy, picture of outcomes, the survival rates in Tables 8-9 and 8-10 may err on the side of an overly bleak picture of outcomes. The reader should bear in mind that projects surviving through the end of 1994 have the potential to continue to survive many more years. Therefore, if there is only a small variation in project lifespan among the attributes of a variable the survival rate is a more appropriate indicator of project longevity.

Overall, according to Table 8-11, 22% of financed projects survived through to the end date for the survival data (That is, to 31, December 1994. Henceforth, these projects are said to have survived the "full term").² This is a much lower survival rate than the 55% estimated by Price Waterhouse in their study of Aboriginal projects across Canada that received assistance from SARDA, NEDP3 and the federal government's more

1. Telephone listings are accurate for November of the year for which the original data were collected. Since rentals are paid around a month in advance these projects are assumed to exist through to 31, December of that year.

2. This is a much lower survival rate than the 61% for SARDA commercial projects in Manitoba reported by Aboriginal Economic Programs (1990:27). Data for that study are drawn from the *PRISM* database of the federal program that replaced the case study programs supplemented by a telephone survey done by that same program (Aboriginal Economic Programs 1990). The database sample for this survey only captured about 30% of financed businesses. As well, having seen the data related to northern Manitoba, this author knows that the *PRISM* data concerning the case projects are not very accurate (see pp. 10-11 of the study for a critique of the DRE/IE database that understates the problems found by this author). Finally, this author was told by an Aboriginal Economic Programs staff member familiar with the study that the telephone survey was not very productive, it was impossible to either reach most contacts and many contacts did not want to respond (Illingworth, pers. com.).

recent Aboriginal Development Program (1992:7).¹ In a 1992 study produced for Industry, Science and Technology Canada, Price Waterhouse notes that Statistics Canada reported that the average survival rate for all small businesses across Canada that were in existence in 1979, approximately the midpoint of this study period, was 40-45% (Price Waterhouse:8). This information suggests that the survival rate for the study area projects was one-half that of small businesses across Canada.

The mean lifespan for the case projects was about six and one-half years. The median lifespan was six years. By the year in which financed projects received their final approval, the percentage of projects that survived reached relatively high points in 1972 through 1974 and 1982 through 1989. Longest mean lifespans were reached in 1972 through 1974. After 1974 mean lifespan first declined dramatically, then increased slightly followed by a gradual, but uneven, decline to the end of the study period. The slightly increasing survival rate and gradually declining mean lifespan from 1983 to the end of the study period essentially means there was minimal change in the survival rate and mean lifespan when adjusted for number of years remaining to the end of the study period. This implies that, despite financing some 40 or 50 projects per year, socioeconomic circumstances were able to absorb the additional projects with no noticeable decline in the project survival rate or mean lifespan. Neither the survival rate nor mean lifespan appear to be associated with strength of the external or northern Manitoba economies.

As is shown in Table 8-10, the number of businesses that ceased to

1. Some of the reasons for this difference are clear. Certainly the Price Waterhouse study included a substantial number of businesses in more developed areas which presumably would have had a better rate of success. The sample frame was not entirely random: it included all projects which received in excess of \$100,000, a majority of Aboriginal Business Development Program project and all projects "sponsored" by Indian bands and communities as well as representation of private businesses assisted by SARDA and NEDP (Price Waterhouse 1992:2-3). Finally, Price Waterhouse relied on telephone contact to ascertain the current status of the business. Certainly, the latter method is not appropriate, contacts for no longer existing businesses will be (and were) difficult to reach. Only 54% of the sample frame was contacted. Lacking contact, such projects were not included in the database whereas most such businesses likely failed. The net result was to substantially overstate the success rates of the various programs.

exist per year peaked during years four through six. These are the years immediately following the end of the typical proforma period which government analyses and financing were to cover. These also are the years when many non-structural capital assets needed replacement. If a suitable replacement (e.g. depreciation) reserve was not built the business would fail. It was during years three through six when many businesses were sold, sometimes with government assistance going to the purchaser. It also was during these years that some projects received further government financial assistance for "modernization" or "expansion" purposes. This is further evidence of government "pushing" the ability of the environment to sustain businesses. Otherwise there is no evidence of a particular "watershed" survival period.

SARDA projects had the longest mean lifespan (7 years) although the highest survival rate to "full term" was generated by projects from NEDP3 (75%) (Table 8-11). There is not great variation in mean project lifespan among the three programs. There is, however, great variation in the survival rate. The NEDP3 survival rate was two and one-half times the survival rate of the NDA2 projects (30%) and almost four and one-half times the survival rate for SARDA projects. The difference in survival rates between SARDA and NDA2 is largely due to the fact that NDA2 projects were generated during the later years of the study period. The survival rate for businesses from the first two study periods was 12% whereas the survival rate for projects from the last two study periods was 27%, a difference of two and one-quarter times. NEDP3 projects, however, appear to have a staying power beyond the period of first application. As suggested by both Tables 8-9 and 8-11, SARDA project outcomes tended to bifurcate into many projects which failed relatively soon and a few projects which survived for a very long time. The structure of SARDA assistance, the hold-back and the need for other financing, especially loans, would have caused weak projects to fail more quickly and continuing projects to last longer¹ than the largely grant-financed NDA2 and NEDP3 projects. The relatively longer mean

1. Note the relatively high mean lifespan of projects with screen applications from 1971 through 1983, and the mean lifespan of all SARDA projects.

lifespan of projects with screen applications from 1971 through 1983 is consistent with the proposition that the most profitable and stable business niches, or more capable entrepreneurs, were usurped during the first few years of the study period. Certainly the national and regional economic climate¹ was more buoyant during the last half of the study period.

By agent preparing the full application, projects utilizing other government staff for preparation of full applications had a somewhat longer mean lifespan (almost 8 years), but much lower survival rate (only 14%) than projects whose full applications were prepared by applicants (mean lifespan over 6 years, survival rate 27%) or non-government agents (mean lifespan between 5 and 6 years, survival rate 24%), and there is only a small difference between the mean lifespans and survival rates of these two non-government groups.

There was a longer mean lifespan (about 9 years) and higher survival rate (37%) for projects that received a second ("1" supplementary) approval than for projects that did not receive this extra "boost." Perhaps such projects were more worthy (promising?) of supplementary assistance? Certainly receipt of extra assistance should have enabled these projects to operate for a longer period of time.

Mean lifespan and rates of survival by number of owners are not consistent. The longest mean lifespan was achieved by single-owner projects (7 years), but there is minimal variation in mean lifespan by number of owners. The rate of survival for projects with two or more owners (32%), however, was substantially higher than the survival rate for projects with one owner (20%). This result is not consistent with the proposition that multiple, active owners inhibit a businesses' ability to focus effort, create communication problems and generate stresses detrimental to long term survival. By owner type, federal/provincially owned projects (nearly 8 years) and collectives (over 7 years) achieved the longest mean lifespans.

1. Including changes in total and median household income within the unorganized and Indian reserve communities.

Again, however, the variation in mean lifespans by owner type were not large except for the very low relative mean lifespan of local government owned projects.¹ The highest survival rate was achieved by Indian bands (36%).² Private, for-profit corporations (at 13%) and collectives (at 18%) had the lowest survival rates.

By the location of at least one owner, projects with out-of-area ownership had the longest mean lifespan (over 9 years) and the highest survival rate (55%) while projects with Indian reserve ownership show the shortest mean lifespan (between 5 and 6 years) and lowest survival rate (20%). As well, projects with non-Aboriginal ownership had the longest mean lifespan (nearly 8 years) and highest survival rate (42%) whereas projects with registered Indian ownership show the shortest mean lifespan (between 5 and 6 years) and lowest survival rate (21%). Projects located on Indian reserves also had the shortest mean lifespans (nearly 6 years) and lowest survival rate (18%). Survival rates for projects located in unorganized communities (31%) and organized communities (26%) were similar. There is substantial divergence between the performance of Indian band applicants and owners, and non-band Indian applicants and owners. Projects located on Indian reserves with non-band Indian ownership appear to have had particularly severe business difficulties. This finding is consistent with the proposition the Indian reserve environmental conditions produce obstacles to business success. Indian bands, because of their political power and legitimacy can minimize certain political risks. As well, Indian bands are able to generate greater financial inflows through guaranteed markets and flow-through senior government assistance.

Association between community socioeconomic variables and rate of project survival is tested by application of stepwise multiple linear regression. As in Chapter 6, this analytical tool is applied using the large number of records for 1984-88, and socioeconomic data from the 1986 and 1991 *Censuses* (Appendix, Tables 8-1 and 8-2). The dependent variable,

1. But this is based on only two projects.
2. Four local government projects had a 25% survival rate.

incidence of survival rate (SU*), is regressed on the 12 independent variables:

1. whether or not the community is an Indian reserve (CTR)(coded as an indicator variable with "1" as an Indian reserve),
2. total community population (TOP),
3. adult (age 15 or over) population (ADP),
4. proportion of the total population that is Aboriginal (PAB),
5. proportion of the total population that uses an Aboriginal language at home most of the time (PAL),
6. median household income (\$000's)(MHY),
7. per capita income (\$000's)(PCY),
8. proportion of total income that is earned plus investment income (PEY),
9. proportion of the adult population that is employed (PEM),
10. proportion of the population with less than grade 9 education (PG9),
11. proportion of the population with at least some post secondary, trade, or university education (PTP), and
12. whether the community has direct or nearby road access (ACC, coded as an indicator variable with "1" as no road access).

Six stepwise regressions were run.¹ Model #1 regresses all financed projects that operated in this set of communities on 1986 data for the 12 independent variables. Model #2 regresses all financed projects on the 1991 community data. Again assuming that government and collective entrepreneurship has limited causal relation with the set of independent variables, model #3 regresses all financed projects with at least some ownership by non-government and non-collective entrepreneurs using the 1986 community data. Model #4, in turn, regresses all financed projects

1. As in Chapter 6, the minimum probability to enter is set on the *F* distribution at 0.05 and the minimum probability to remove on the *F* distribution is set at 0.10. "Tolerance" at 0.01 guards against multicollinearity.

with at least some ownership by non-government and non-collective entrepreneurs against the 1991 community data. Model #5 runs those financed projects at least partly owned by government and collective agents against 1986 community data. Finally, model #6 runs those financed projects at least partly owned by government and collective agents against 1991 community data.

Table 8-12 provides the following information for each of the models: the adjusted coefficient of determination (R^2) and standard error of Y (SEY), degrees of freedom at the last step, and the value and significance on the F distribution. Displayed for each independent variable remaining in each model are: the regression coefficients (B's), standard error of the regression coefficients (SEB's), the standardized regression coefficients (BETA's), and the test of significance on the t distribution. Variables rejected by the model are listed, along with their BETA'S, partials and level of significance, after the statistics concerning variables in the model.

Models #1, #2 and #5 are rejected because they do not fit the data well. After only one step model #3 (non-government, non-collective entrepreneurs and 1986 *Census* data) generates an inadequate R^2 of 0.29 and a SEY of 0.17. Also after one step model #4 (non-government, non-collective entrepreneurs and 1991 *Census* data) generates an R^2 of only 0.34 and a SEY of 0.18. After two steps model #6 (government and collective entrepreneurs, 1991 *Census* data) generates an improved R^2 of 0.55 and an improved SEY of 0.27, but this model is still weak. The fact that the models are inadequate or weak suggests community conditions were not the most important direct factors in the ability of projects to survive.¹ That the model for government and collective entrepreneurs, and 1991 data is the best model is a switch from the results of previous regressions. Project survival appears to be more associated with community variables for government and collective entrepreneurs than for non-government, non-collective entrepreneurs. It is possible that survival of

1. This is not to say that community socioeconomic conditions were not very important *indirect* factors. Such conditions likely had much to do with the problems of absorption noted throughout this study.

projects under private ownership is more dependent on the idiosyncratic personal factors of the owners whereas government and collective ownership results in an homogenous and bureaucratized, institutional and political pattern. The homogenous stability of such organizations would bring out statistical associations between community characteristics and project survival. Such an institutional pattern could arise from the requirements of senior government funders, from legal prescription,¹ historically or by organizational algorithm-driven (e.g. organizational structure) behaviour, and from longevity. It also indicates that 1991 data may be more reflective of community conditions faced by businesses during the years after they received the first payment in 1984-88 and generally started operations a year or two later, and the final date for ascertaining project survival at the end of 1994.

It is noteworthy that operational location on an Indian reserve has a significant, negative association with survival in models #3, #4 and #6. These results are consistent with the proposition that Indian reserve environmental conditions inhibit business success. It appears, therefore, that location of an entrepreneur on an Indian reserve and even proposing to locate a business on an Indian reserve do not necessarily inhibited entrepreneurial intent, but actual operation on a reserve is negatively affected by a factor or factors other than population, income levels and sources, education, rate of employment, education levels or accessibility. One variable, proportion of the population with less than grade 9 education, does not remain in the models, but nearly has sufficient significance to remain. Proportion of the population with less than grade 9 is positively associated with business survival, a reversal of the type of association this variable has with the entrepreneurship of business development. In model #2, proportion of the population with at least some post secondary education and total population show negative associations with business survival at moderate levels of significance. The negative association of proportion of the population with at least some post secondary education is consistent with the author's finding in a study he co-authored for the *Royal*

1. From, for example, the *Corporations Act*, the *Indian Act*, the *Northern Affairs Act*.

Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Clatworthy, Hull and Loughran 1996:326). It may be that higher education opens, and relatively low levels of education constrain, opportunity or mobility options irrespective of other community variables in a manner that simultaneously promotes entrepreneurship and foils its success. Better educated people are more adept at entrepreneurship when government financing is available, but they also are more likely to cease operations if they find a suitable job. Higher levels of education might, by this reasoning, undermine local businesses. In model #6 proportion of the population that is employed shows a positive, moderate level-of-significance, association with survival. This suggests that it may be opportunities other than local employment that constrain business survival. As well, the cause-and-effect relationship might be reversed: business survival could have increased local employment. The latter explanation is possible, but not likely. There were too few jobs created in most communities by these projects to have significantly changed the rate of employment, especially if the participation rate is highly dependent on the availability of employment.

In order to test the relationship between survival, and a set of full application applicant-owner and project attributes a logistic regression model was run. This model uses the dichotomous variable survival (OEND) as the dependent variable. The following attributes comprise the set of 20 independent variables:

1. Program (PR*).
2. Existence of a full application (ISFA).
3. Number of owners (A#O*).
4. Type of owner (AOT*) for at least one applicant.
5. Location of owner residence (AL*) for at least one applicant.
6. Status group of the owner (AS*) for at least one applicant.
7. Whether the owner is an pre-existing business (EBUS).
8. Goal of the owner (FGL*).
9. Expected location of business operations (AOP*).

10. Number of products (A#P*).
11. Products (APR*).
12. Completeness of the full application (FCP*).
13. Highest net income according to the full application (FBNY).
14. Highest net income according to the program's proforma (ABNY).
15. Whether the applicant expected to contribute "real" equity according to the full application (FOEQ).
16. Whether the program expected the owner to contribute "real" equity (AOEQ).
17. Expected annual person-years of employment according to the program (AFPY).
18. Total grants that went to the project from all sources (GCST).
19. Total actual cost of the project from all known financing sources (TCST).
20. Ratio of grant cost to total cost (G/TC).

The output from this logistic regression model is presented in Table 8-13. After four steps the model shows good fit. The variable AP#3 (three products) had to be suppressed because, despite the criterion for removal, it remained in an earlier run of the model at a 0.72 level of significance. This likely resulted from its contribution to improving the overall goodness of fit of the entire model.¹

Four variables remain in the model. The results are consistent with the descriptive statistics discussed above. Again, they are discussed in order of strength of association. Projects whose goal is a new project show a relatively strong negative association with project survival. Projects of higher total cost also show a relatively strong, positive association with survival, but their coefficient (slope) is very small. Cabins-campgrounds-lodges projects have a moderate, positive association with survival, and they have the strongest "B" coefficient. Businesses producing "other mixed"

 1. AP#3 showed a positive association with survival.

products (not otherwise classified, but more than one product) also show a positive association with survival. The following variables show positive, but moderate level-of-significance, association with survival: SARDA financing, total government cost, NDA2 financing, the ratio of government cost to total cost, manufacturing, the goal of "other" (or "maintain"), the goal of expansion and at least one owner being non-Aboriginal. Cost variables appear under a number of guises while other size variables (number of products, person years) do not. This suggests cost may be a proxy for amount of subsidies. Costs of government and collective owned projects tended to be much higher than non-government, non-collective owned projects, so the higher survival rate of businesses owned by these entrepreneurs may reflect amount of subsidies as much as inherent capabilities.

As with the logistic regression concerning the quality of the full applications, the large number of variables and attributes that do not show strong or significant association with survival says much about the case programs. Attention of the programs was placed on issues that appear to have minimal relation to project survival. The programs did not, except for extent of competition, systematically build community variables such as size, age distribution, income level, language in the home, education etc. into project decision process. In fact, there is no evidence that the programs ever tried to build a set of such criteria. Yet, some of these variables show association with survival. The programs had little, and made minimal effort to collect, information concerning the personal capabilities and characteristics of prospective project owners and managers. The programs devoted relatively few resources to project aftercare. The programs did devote most staff time to taking and acknowledging applications, facilitating the application process, generating proformas and administering payments. Application of community criteria, and tests of owner/manager capabilities and characteristics would have been in conflict with political imperatives from regional and local interest groups and the provincial government and, hence, would have been in conflict with the political imperatives of the programs' political masters. Decision taking that discriminates by person and place does not sit well within an environment of democratic universality *coupled with* an efficient and universalist, Weberian bureaucratic structure.

This institutional behaviour reinforced an output focus at the expense of an impact focus. Indeed, the author found in the study he co-authored for the *Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* evidence that the longer term survival rate for Aboriginal-owned businesses that were primarily financed by banks and other commercial lending institutions was higher than the longer term survival rate for Aboriginal-owned businesses financed by governments (Clatworthy, Hull and Loughran 1996:335-337). Commercial banks, for example, are more able to separate efficient bureaucratic structure from universalistic democratic political imperatives. Their profit focus, however, generally limits their willingness to place capital in high risk situations without charging concomitantly high risk premiums.

New starts, whether by a new business (between 5 and 6 years) or an existing business (between 4 and 5 years) and "other goal" projects (also between 5 and 6 years) had somewhat shorter mean lifespans than projects with different goals. Purchases of existing businesses, whether by non-businesses or by existing businesses, however, had a relatively high survival rate (46%). Other existing business goals had a moderate survival rate (28%) while new business starts had, by far, the lowest survival rate (12%). Completely fresh business starts, therefore, were particularly problematic and best outcomes were achieved by purchases of existing businesses.¹

As expected, the mean lifespan (about 7 years) was slightly longer, and the survival rate (28%) was much higher, for existing businesses than for projects that were not exiting businesses (over 6 years, 18%). Also, there was a slightly longer mean lifespan (7 years) for existing businesses whose net income prior to the screen application was positive than for existing businesses whose net income prior to the screen application was negative (over 6 years). There is not, however, any difference between the survival rate for existing businesses whose net income prior to the screen application was positive and the survival rate for existing businesses whose

1. This may imply that expansions and extensions of existing businesses, existing within the study area or operating external to the study area, may be a more efficient and effective way to achieve a higher rate of project survival. Perhaps, new establishments in the study area could be tied to other existing businesses through holding companies, joint ventures or franchises.

net income prior to the screen application was negative. With regard to having previously received government financial assistance, those existing businesses that had received such assistance had a notably higher survival rate (33%) than existing businesses that had not received such assistance (25%). The survival rate, however, varies little by source of previous assistance. There is minimal variation in mean lifespan among these attributes.

Surprisingly, if a full application was not submitted the project had a longer mean lifespan (nearly 8 years) than if a full application was submitted (5.9 years). Whether or not a full application was submitted, however, appears to have little effect on the survival rate. Among full applications, not providing at least one year of revenues and operating costs is associated with a shorter mean lifespan (almost 5 years) and a much lower survival rate (9%) than providing one or more years of revenues and operating costs (6 years, 24%). Similarly, although there is little difference in mean lifespan, the rate of survival for projects which proposed or were required to contribute "real" equity was some six to seven percentage points higher than the survival rate for projects which did not propose or were not required to contribute "real" equity. This finding is consistent with the business doctrine that equity is important to business success. Differences in survival rates according to whether predicted highest net income was positive or negative are unexpected. Projects in which the full application or program officer's proforma show a negative highest net income had a higher survival rate (37% and 31%, respectively) than projects in which the full application or program officer's proforma show a positive highest net income (18% and 17%, respectively). Projects in which the full application shows a negative highest net income also had a longer mean lifespan (almost 7 years) than projects in which the full application shows a positive highest net income (almost 6 years), but using final approval projections the difference in mean lifespan is minimal. There are three possible explanations: (1) the ability of applicants and program officers to predict was poor, (2) certain projects collected relatively more assistance from all sources because of their problematic outlook, or (3) a negative earnings prognosis prompted owners to superior performance.

The first measure of project size, value of approved assistance, indicates that there are positive associations between capital value of the project and mean lifespan, and between capital value of the project and the survival rate. The second measure of project size, total jobs in person-years, also suggests a generally positive association between size and the survival rate, but the relationship between size and mean lifespan is not clear. The major exception with respect to the survival rate is projects with minimal jobs (less than 0.5 person-years of employment). These projects had a very high relative survival rate, only surpassed by projects with a labour force of 15 or more person-years. Apparently, projects were most successful if employees were few or, alternatively, if the projects were large enough to establish a formalized management structure to control employee activity. The third measure of size and complexity, number of products, shows a much longer mean lifespan (over 9 years) and much higher survival rate (53%) for projects with three or more products, but there was little difference in the mean lifespan (just over 6 years) and survival rate (19%) for projects with one or two products. The relatively long mean lifespan (9 years) and relatively high survival rate (50%) for cabins-campgrounds-lodges projects is the major reason for the relatively long lifespan and survival rate for projects with three or more products. As well, such projects often had relatively high capital costs. Other product lines with a reasonable number of cases that show relatively long mean lifespans (but not an unusually long mean lifespan) were manufacturing (nearly 8 years, but a relatively low survival rate at 18%), retail and food & beverage services (also nearly 8 years), and accommodation and food & beverage services (7 years). The only product line other than cabins-campgrounds-lodges with a reasonable number of cases that shows a relatively high survival rate (but not an unusually long mean relative lifespan) is retail (35%). Other products with a reasonable number of cases that show relatively low survival rates include: agriculture (15%, about 6 years), forestry related (nearly 5 years, 2%), transportation (nearly 6 years, 8%), and other services (5 years, 19%). Construction projects, with a reasonable number of cases, had a moderate relative mean lifespan (nearly 7 years) and relative survival rate (23%).

The second principal project outcome is employment generated. The total person-years of employment ("total employment") has been calculated

for all projects for which the actual employment is known and for which the project lifespan is known (Table 8-14). Actual employment as of the date of the last available employment information has been multiplied by the known lifespan commencing with the date final financing was approved and ending at the last known date the project operated (or 31 December, 1994 for continuing projects). Total employment per project, therefore, is dependent on project size in person-years and project lifespan. As well, the difference between the number of actual full-time, full-year job equivalents (also in person-years) and the number of person-years expected according to program approvals (the "job gap") has been calculated for all projects for which data on both variables exist. The available data apply almost entirely to SARDA, project monitoring by NDA2 and NEDP3 results in only 11 usable cases from these two programs. As well, inconsistencies in data coverage result in anomalous results among categories. For example, while the mean total cost per person-year for all projects was \$30,000, the mean cost by owner type was above \$30,000 and the mean cost by annual number of person-years was less than \$30,000. Obviously, costs shown for categories with relatively fewer projects may be less accurate.

For all operated projects, nearly 20 person-years of total employment per project were created through to the end of 1994. Therefore, 2,990 total person-years were created. This is a respectable amount of job creation within the study area. The case programs, however, were way off in their predictions of the amount of employment to be created.¹ Actual person-years of employment per project² was 1.7 person-years, 40% less than predicted by program approvals. In fact, the smallest job gap occurred for projects for which the full application was prepared by the applicant (-36%) rather than by other government agencies (-50%) or non-government agents (-51%). It appears that other government agencies and non-government agents were either less well equipped to predict employment or they over-

1. This poor predictive power is measured in terms of full-time, full-year equivalent jobs. Most program recording and reporting was done in terms of undifferentiated jobs. Since a large share of predicted jobs were either much less than full-time or seasonal, program reporting seriously exaggerated expected employment generation.

2. That is, total person-years in an average year of operation.

promoted projects; but, in any event, the case programs largely accepted these employment predictions.

Over time, by period of screen application, person-years of total employment created fell and the job gap became larger. Two factors were at work here: decreasing mean project lifespan and an increasing job gap per project.

By number of supplementary approvals, not surprisingly given the discussion concerning mean lifespan and survival rates, total person-years of employment were higher and the job gap was lower for projects with at least one supplementary approval.

By number of owners total employment per project was lowest for projects with two owners (nearly 17 person-years compared to over 20 person-years for projects with one or three owners), but the job gap was lowest for projects with three or more owners (-30% compared to 41% for projects with one or two owners). Generally the larger size and longer-lived non-government collective and Indian band owned projects created much more total employment per project (nearly 47 person-years and over 32 person-years, respectively), but the relative job gap for collectives was extremely high (-80%). By applicant location, the long-lived projects of at least one out-of-area owner and projects owned by at least one resident of an organized community created a relatively high amount of total employment per project (over 65 person-years and over 43 person-years, respectively). While the job gap for projects with owners from organized communities was relatively low (-22%), the relative job gap for out-of-area owners was very high (75%). By status group of at least one owner, non-Aboriginal owned projects show a much higher generation of total employment per project, but also a relatively high job gap (-52%). The reasons for these discrepancies are not clear.

Projects run by existing businesses had only slightly higher total employment per project, but a much higher job gap (-60%), than projects not run by existing businesses. Projects that were run by existing businesses that had prior positive net income show not only a better relative power to

generate total employment per project (over 15 person-years), but also a much lower job gap (-28%) than projects that were run by existing businesses that had prior negative net income. Interestingly, existing businesses that did not previously receive government financing show both the ability to generate more total employment per project (nearly 21 person-years) and a lower job gap (-43%). Projects previously financed by DRE/IE had the lowest total employment per project (between 6 and 7 person-years). Projects previously financed by non-DRE/IE government programs show the highest job gap (-69%).

By operational location, total employment per project in organized communities was relatively high (between 44 and 45 person-years) and the job gap was relatively low (-25%). Total employment per project on Indian reserves was relatively low (over 13 person-years), but the job gaps for Indian reserves and unorganized communities were similar.

Total employment per project for new businesses and expansions was relatively high (20 to 23 person-years) while total employment per project for purchases of businesses by existing businesses and projects with "other goals" was relatively low (about 5 to 7 person-years). By goal, the job gap was relatively high for new businesses started by existing businesses (-64%), businesses purchased by existing businesses (-77%) and, especially, projects with "other goals" (-89%).

Per project, total employment was somewhat higher for projects that did not submit a full application (nearly 23 person-years compared to nearly 19 person-years) and the job gap was lower (-42% compared to -47%). Projects that submitted one or two years of revenue and operating costs show the highest total employment per project (nearly 23 person-years), but the job gap was lowest (-39%) for projects that did not submit at least one year of proforma revenue and operating costs. The job gap was highest (-50%) for projects that submitted a three-year proforma. Projects that intended to invest equity according to their full applications and, especially, projects that were expected to invest equity according to their approvals generated higher total employment per project (over 19 and 21 person-years, respectively, compared to nearly 14 and nearly 6 person-years, respectively,

for projects not intending and not expected to contribute equity). The job gap was also much lower for projects that intended, and were expected, to contribute equity (-46% and -40%, respectively, compared to -57% and -85%, respectively). Projects for which the full application predicted negative net income show a small advantage in total employment per project (nearly 22 person-years) over projects for which the full application predicted positive net income (over 17 person-years). As well, the job gap is much lower for projects whose full application predicted negative net income (-37% compared to -54%). There was minimal difference in total employment per project according to the net income predictions of case programs, but once again the job gap was much lower for projects for which the programs predicted negative net income (-37% compared to -50%). It is possible that expected weak project performance dampened, to more realistic levels, applicants' and program officers' employment expectations.

The first measure of project size and complexity, the value of approved financing, provides additional strong evidence that total employment per project depended on both project size and lifespan. Total employment per project rises by project size as measured by value of approved financing. The job gap, however, also rises by project size in terms of approved financing (to 62-63%) until it falls at a project size of \$150,000 or more. Above that size the job gap drops dramatically (-27% for financing of \$150-199,000 and -50% for financing of \$200,000 or more). The second measure of project size and complexity, approved person-years, also provides strong evidence that total employment per project depended on both project size and lifespan. Total employment per project generally rises by project size in person-years. The job gap, however, also rises by project size in person-years (to -89%) until it falls at a size of 15 person-years or more (to -44%, although there are only 3 projects at this size). It appears that program officer job predictions became less and less realistic as project size in person-years increased. As for the third measure of project size and complexity, total employment per project also rises as the number of products increases, especially at three or more products (jumping from around 16 person-years to nearly 56 person-years). The job gap, however, was similar at one or three or more products (-39 to -42%, but much higher for two products (-73%). All this is further evidence that

extravagant job predictions resulted either from increasingly erroneous professional judgments for larger projects or from political pressure surrounding larger projects.

For products that have a reasonable number of cases, total employment per project was on the high side for retail (nearly 19 person-years), and it was especially high for cabins-campgrounds-lodges (35 person-years). Relatively, total employment per project was very low for logging & forestry (just over 5 person-years) and other services (nearly 8 person-years), and it was on the low side for transportation (just over 15 person-years).

The programs had two goals: to create businesses, and to generate employment. How compatible were these two goals? Table 8-15 lists attributes with relatively high, and relatively low, payoffs in terms of business longevity and employment creation. This table also notes if there is compatibility or at least not incompatibility between longevity payoff and employment payoff. It should not be a total surprise that there is a high degree of compatibility since incremental longevity generates incremental person-years of employment. It is only with respect to attributes of owner type, goal, location of operations and certain products that compatibility between business longevity and employment creation is problematic. Higher labour versus higher capital intensity, more jobs versus less profits, seem, in the end, to be washed-over by the annual person-year generating capacity of long-lived businesses. Of course, magnitude of payoffs is only half of the issue for public policy, the other half is the cost of achieving these payoffs.

Cost per surviving project and per year of project lifespan (per project-year) are estimated using the data on project financing, project survival and average project lifespan (Table 8-16). On average, to achieve a surviving project it cost the case programs about \$450,000 and governments around \$825,000, and required total financing of all types and from all sources of just over \$1 million. Per project-year it cost, on average, the case programs about \$15,000 and governments around \$30,000, and required total financing of all types and from all sources of just over \$35,000. Since the number of surviving projects will decline over time and since average project lifespan will increase over time, cost per surviving project should be seen as

a conservative estimate of cost per long-term surviving business and cost per project-year should be seen as being on the high side of the real long-term cost per project-year.

NEDP3 had the highest case program, government grant, government, and total financing costs¹ per surviving project. SARDA had the lowest case program and government grant costs, but NDA2 had the lowest government (including government loan) cost per surviving project. NDA2 also had the lowest total financing cost per surviving project. Therefore, in terms of government and total financing costs, NDA2 was the most efficient vehicle for generating surviving projects. Since, however, NDA2 did not commence financing projects until 1984 whereas SARDA began paying out financing to projects in 1977, over time NDA2's efficiency advantage over SARDA in terms of financing cost is likely to decline. With a normal staff complement of roughly two compared to SARDA's eight, NDA2's annual non-financing operational costs would have been much lower than SARDA's thereby boosting NDA2's efficiency advantage.

In terms of financing cost per project-year, SARDA was the most efficient vehicle on all measures except loans from non-governmental sources. NEDP3 was the least efficient vehicle on all measures. Given the differences in commencement dates it is not surprising that SARDA was most efficient in terms of cost per project-year compared to NDA2. Since NDA2 and NEDP3 commenced and ended operations in the same period, NDA2 was clearly superior to NEDP3 in terms of efficiency per project-year. It is difficult to predict the longer term cost per project-year for SARDA and NDA2.

Over time, if projects receiving final approval in 1989 are lumped-in with projects that received approval in 1984-88, there was, except for 1974-78, an apparent decline in case program, government grant, total government and total financing cost per surviving business. To an extent,

1. To the extent that loans are not repaid, and given the high failure rate among the case projects, probably a majority of loans had to be written off, the loan losses would become a cost. Total financing costs, therefore, are not far off of total outright costs.

this secular decline should have occurred; businesses financed in years closer to 1994, *ceteris paribus*, should have been more likely to survive through 1994. The average lifespan of around 5.5 years for projects approved in 1984 through 1989 indicates, however, that most such businesses failed prior to 1994. Therefore, cost per surviving project at least did not substantially increase and even may have declined. Absorption costs, therefore, did not appreciably increase after 1974.

In order to reduce the complexity of the following discussion of cost per surviving project and per project-year, the term "all costs" covers at least the three most important cost categories: total grants, total cost and gross government cost. Where differences in program costs or non-government loans are worth noting, these are explicitly stated.

It is intriguing that projects for which other government agents, again mostly INAC, prepared the full application had much higher costs of all types per surviving business. Projects for which applicants prepared the full application show the lowest cost per surviving business of all types except, surprisingly, loans from non-governmental sources. This order of cost per project-year holds for all groups of those who prepared applications except for the case program cost which was highest for projects for which non-government agents prepared the full application and second highest for projects for which applicants prepared the full application. Government involvement in the preparation of applications appears to be associated with lower financing efficiency except for, perhaps, the case program cost.

By number of owners, highest costs of all types, especially cost of grants, per surviving business went to single-owner businesses. Differences in cost per project-year among projects with differing numbers of owners were generally similar and show no pattern. The high cost of single-owner businesses can be traced to the very high relative costs for federal/provincially owned businesses, none of which survived, and to the very high relative cost per surviving collectively-owned business. Costs were also relatively high, but to a lesser extent, for private corporation

owned, and Indian band and local government owned, businesses.¹ Collectively-owned businesses also had the highest cost per project-year, but Indian band owned businesses had a higher cost per project-year than private corporations. Businesses owned by at least one proprietor were the most efficient target of financing on both measures, cost per surviving business and cost per project-year.

Grant, government and total financing cost per surviving business were highest for businesses owned by at least one owner residing in an out-of-area location. Among owners residing within an in-area location, grant, government and total financing cost per surviving business were highest for businesses owned by at least one owner residing on an Indian reserve. Government cost was higher, but non-government cost was lower per surviving business for businesses with at least one owner from an unorganized community than for businesses with at least one owner from an organized community. By residence of at least one owner, the order of cost per project-year is the same as the order per surviving business. All costs per surviving project and all costs per project-year were highest for projects owned by at least one registered Indian. All costs per surviving project and all costs per project-year were higher for projects owned by at least one non-Aboriginal owner than for projects owned by at least one owner who was an "other Aboriginal." Relative costs by owner residence and status group appear to largely flow from relative costs generated by operational location. Indian reserve located projects had, by far, the highest cost of all operating locations per surviving business and per project-year. Projects located in organized communities generally had the lowest cost per surviving project and per project-year. Most projects owned by out-of-area located owners were lodges located in or near Indian reserves or in remote areas. Most lodge projects were relatively expensive, but these projects also had a relatively high survival rate and longer lifespan.

All costs per surviving project were lower for owners who were

1. Collectives and private corporation owned businesses seldom formed partnerships with one or more other owners. Partnerships were most common among proprietors and, to a lesser extent, among Indian bands.

existing businesses than for owners who were not existing businesses. All costs per project-year, however, were lower for owners who were not existing businesses than for owners who were existing businesses. As well, all costs per surviving project and all costs per project-year, except loans from non-government sources, were lower for projects in which the existing businesses had a prior positive net income than for projects in which the existing business had a prior negative net income. In conclusion, it was more efficient, relative to business survival and lifespan, to finance projects run by existing businesses and, especially, projects run by existing businesses that had a prior positive net income.

Regarding project survival, it was least costly on all measures to finance existing businesses that had some previous government financing, but no previous DRE/IE financing. Interestingly, it was most costly, by far, to finance existing businesses that had no previous government financing. Per project-year, however, it was least costly on all measures except loans from non-government sources to finance existing businesses that had no previous government financing. Per project-year it was most expensive on all measures except loans from non-government sources to finance existing businesses that had previous DRE/IE financing.

By project goal, it was least costly per surviving business to finance the purchase of existing businesses by non-businesses, and it was most costly per surviving business to finance either new businesses or projects that had "other goals." Per project-year, it was most costly to finance projects with "other goals." This is because most incidents of "other goals" boiled down to maintaining the business with the, sometimes explicitly stated sometimes not, purpose of preventing the business from failing. It was least costly to finance either the purchase of existing businesses by non-businesses or expansions.

There are four qualities of prediction by which cost per survivor and cost per project-year can be arrayed: existence of a full application, completeness of the full application financial data, equity expectations and expected highest net income. Per surviving project grant, costs were higher, but non-government loans were lower, if the full application was blank than

if it was not blank. Per project-year, all costs were higher, but non-government loans were lower, if the full application was blank than if it was not blank. Regarding completeness of full application financial data, the highest cost per survivor and per project-year were accrued by projects that submitted proformas without at least one year of EBITDA. Projects that submitted proformas with at least one or two years EBITDA and projects that submitted proformas with full three-year proformas had similar costs per survivor and per project-year.

Whether or not the full application showed intent to invest "real" equity appears to have minimal effect on cost per survivor or cost per project-year other than the fact that non-government sources were reluctant to make loans when applicants did not intend to invest equity. Regarding both cost per survivor and cost per project-year, program proformas that had no requirement to invest "real" equity appear to have adversely affected the willingness of other programs to make grants and non-government sources to make loans. The case programs added a sufficient amount of grants to offset the reduced contributions of other grantees, but there were less loan contributions per surviving project and per project-year.

Results concerning highest projected net income show a much higher financing cost per surviving project and per project-year for projects whose full application proformas and program approval proformas predicted negative highest net income. Whether or not projected net income was positive or negative had the strongest effect of any single variable on cost per surviving project and per project-year. In fact, when program officers predicted negative net income the cost per surviving project and per project-year were even higher than if the applicant predicted negative net income.

Data are available to support three measures of project size and complexity: the value of total approved financing, expected annual project employment and expected number of products. The only strong patterns emerge by expected number of products. Per surviving project the higher the value of approved financing the higher the case programs' grant cost, and the lowest costs were for projects with approved case program financing of less than \$25,000. Otherwise, no understandable pattern

emerges. Per project-year, no pattern emerges. Value of approved financing appears not to be related to project success. In terms of expected annual employment in person-years, the only pattern to emerge is that gross government cost (grants plus loans) increased as expected annual employment increased per surviving project. By number of products, single-product businesses had the lowest government costs, but two-product businesses had the lowest total cost per surviving project. Per project-year, one-product businesses were the least costly and three-product businesses were the most costly, except that two-product businesses had the highest cost in non-government loans.

Per surviving project, by product where there were a reasonable number of financed projects, the following had relatively low to very low grant and government costs: fishing, retail, accommodation and food & beverage, and other services. The following had relatively high to very high costs: agriculture, logging & forestry related¹, manufacturing, construction, retail and food & beverage, and cabins-campgrounds-lodges. Food & beverage services had relatively moderate grant and government costs. Per project-year the following had relatively low grant and government costs: fishing, retail, food & beverage services, and other services. The following had relatively moderate grant and government costs: logging & forestry, manufacturing, and accommodation and food & beverage services. Construction had relatively moderate to high grant and government costs. Logging & forestry and manufacturing, retail and food & beverage services, and cabins-campgrounds-lodges had relatively high grant and government costs.

The above discussion is summarized in a table that lists types of projects that had either a relatively high financing cost per surviving project and per project-year, or a relatively low financing costs per surviving project and per project-year (Table 8-16). Discussion of this table follows presentation of data regarding the financing cost per person-year of employment.

1. No logging & forestry and manufacturing projects survived, but total costs were high.

The financing cost per person-year of employment during a project's life is less complicated to discuss because there is only one measure (Table 8-17). Mean person-years of employment generated per project by attribute are taken from Table 8-14. This mean is then extrapolated across all financed projects with a given attribute. Total financing cost per project by attribute is divided by the total person-years of employment calculated so as to arrive at the estimated financing cost per project by attribute. Because amounts of financing by some types of financing are not known for some projects and because the author believes that there were many financings not reported even by source, the financing cost per project by attribute should be read as a conservative estimate. As well, the number of project records that contain data on both financing cost and annual total person-years of employment are limited such that the number of counts against some attributes are too few to be reliable. Finally, there were no project records for projects financed by NDA2 and NEDP3; therefore, all calculations apply to SARDA only.

Over time, financing cost per person-year rose, at first very gradually, but then dramatically in 1984-88 and again in 1989. The especially large increases during the last five years of the study period suggest an increasing cost per incremental person-year. This is consistent with the proposition that there was a rapid, secular deterioration in the number of niches able to support good person-year returns on investment through the development of commercial businesses. Once again, projects whose full applications were prepared by other government agencies were generally high-cost investments per person-year. The jump in cost was in part due to the relatively high cost of other grants. This is indicative of the frequent role of INAC as the agent preparing applications with other grants.

There is only a weak pattern of increased financing cost associated with an increase in number of owners. By type of owner, the highest cost per person-year of employment was for projects owned by at least one private corporation, and projects owned by at least one proprietor had the lowest cost per person-year of employment created. By location of at least one owner, the highest cost per person-year of employment went to projects owned by at least one owner from an Indian reserve or at least one owner

located outside the study area. The lowest cost per person-year of employment was for projects owned by at least one owner from an organized community. Regarding the status group of at least one owner, the highest cost per person-year of employment was for projects owned by at least owner that is a registered Indian. Other Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal owners had a similar cost per person-year of employment. The relatively high cost of financing per person-year of employment when an owner was from an Indian reserve or when an owner was a registered Indian are reflected in the relatively high cost per person-year of employment for projects located on Indian reserves. That projects with at least one registered Indian owner had an even higher cost per person-year of employment created than projects located on Indian reserves (and higher than Indian band owned projects) suggests two factors at work in addition to owner residence in an organized community: registered Indian status and owner location on an Indian reserve.

Financing cost per person-year of employment was similar for owners that were existing businesses and owners that were not existing businesses. If the existing business had a prior negative net income, however, the cost per person-year of employment was many times higher than if the existing business had prior positive net income. As well, the more organizationally distant were the existing business' previous sources of financing from DRE/IE the lower the cost per person-year of employment. There was little difference in cost per person-year of employment between existing businesses that had received previous financing from any government and those that had received previous financing from any federal government.

By goal, existing businesses purchasing businesses and projects with "other goals" had a relatively high financing cost per person-year of employment. Expansions of existing businesses had a relatively low cost per person-year of employment.

Turning to the three measures of the quality of project planning, projects whose full application had not one year of EBITDA show a relatively high financing cost per person-year of employment. Costs per person-year of employment were similar for projects that had no full applications and

projects that submitted a full application. Projects whose full applications contained no "real" equity investment had a higher cost per person-year of employment and projects whose approved proforma had no expectation of "real" equity had a much higher cost per person-year of employment than projects whose full application and approval proforma contained the intent and expectation of "real" equity. Again surprisingly, projects whose full applications and approval proformas showed a negative highest net income had a much lower cost per person-year of employment.

There is no understandable pattern of financing cost per person-year of employment for any of the three measures of project size and complexity other than the obviously higher cost per person-year of employment when no incremental person-years of employment were expected. Cost per person-year of employment appears not to be related to project size and complexity.

By product where there was a reasonable number of cases, logging & forestry, construction, and retail and food & beverage had relatively high financing costs per person-year of employment. Cabins-campgrounds-lodges, food & beverage services, and other services had relatively moderate costs per person-year of employment. Transportation, retail, and accommodation and food & beverage services had relatively low costs per person-year of employment.

The data concerning financing cost per person-year of employment is also summarized in the table that lists types of projects that had either a relatively high cost per surviving project and per project-year of employment, or a relatively low cost per surviving project and per project-year of employment (Table 8-18). This table facilitates comparison of the costs of project longevity and the costs of employment generation.

In general, if project longevity and employment creation have equal priority, projects most worthy of consideration have the following attributes: ownership that includes a proprietor, ownership that includes an owner resident in an organized community, ownership that includes an other-Aboriginal, ownership by an existing business, operational location in an organized community and retailing. Projects to avoid have the following

attributes: a full application prepared by another government agency, ownership located on an Indian reserve or out of the study area, ownership that includes a registered Indian, ownership by an existing business whose prior net income was negative, operational location on an Indian reserve, existence of a full application that does not contain one year of EBITDA, construction products and retail and food & beverage service products. Only 6 of 16 low-cost longevity attributes also offer low-cost employment creation.

In general, if the highest priority goal is project longevity, projects to most worthy of consideration include the following attributes in addition to the attributes listed above: ownership that includes an owner resident in an unorganized community, a project that has previously received financing from the federal government, purchase of a business by a non-business, a proponent that has indicated desire to operate a business but has not prepared a full application, a full application that contains one through three-years EBITDA, projects for which the full application and program proformas predicted positive highest net income, projects whose approved program financing is less than \$25,000, and projects with fishery and other service products.

Summary of Findings

SARDA, the more demanding program, took much more time than NDA2, the least demanding program, to make a first payment. Elapsed time from approval to first payment became shorter over time because of the introduction of NDA2 and NEDP3, the increased use of advancements, and a loosening of the criteria for making payments. This is an indicator of the loosening of operational criteria or the "pushing" of business development.

According to the indicator "elapsed time from approval to first payment," single proprietorships, Indian bands and registered Indian owned businesses were less able to develop their businesses. Collectives, senior governments, existing business and existing businesses with positive net incomes were more able to develop their businesses. Without the help of

program officers, however, many businesses would not have become operational. Program officers helped applicants think through business plans, and helped them communicate with other financiers and suppliers.

The programs spent just over \$39 million on study area projects, nearly all through grants. Total government financing was just over \$77 million. Total gross financing costs were almost \$91 million. Project financing increased dramatically around the time when absorptive capacity of the study area should have increased greatly. SARDA and NDA2 each contributed around 40% of total project financing. NDA2, the least demanding of the three programs, had the highest average annual expenditure at over \$3 million compared to nearly \$1 million for each of SARDA and NEDP3. This also suggests government "pushing" the ability of the environment.

Projects received much more non-equity financing than predicted or expected given the rate of pre-operational project failures. This suggests poor ability to predict financial needs, or it indicates how far governments went to financially support business development. Given grant overrun limits, many SARDA projects were sustained with vastly increased loans. Since larger loans necessitated substantially and unexpectedly higher interest payments, the success of many projects would have been negatively affected. As well, the programs were not very good at predicting project grant revenue. Since all grants came from governments and most grants came from other federal government sources this may indicate weak interagency coordination.

Access to capital, often at no or reduced cost, was not a major problem for business development in the study area once the financing programs were in place. This is further evidence of the extent to which senior governments were pursuing business development. The practice of spreading financing among many rather than few projects, and bureaucratic rules concerning financing conflicted with stated goals of business success and job creation.

The relatively high proportions of collectively-owned and Indian band

owned projects that received much more financing than predicted indicates that these entrepreneurs had problems developing and operating projects. Projects located in organized communities appear to have been more economical in use of financing than projects located in unorganized communities or Indian reserves.

Operational monitoring was weak. This is reflected in both the absence of formalized systems for critically reviewing operational performance and the absence of information concerning the outcomes of a quarter of all financed projects. The files of nearly another fifth of projects known to be operating contain no further information concerning project well-being. Much of the existing data was generated well before three years elapsed from the start of project operations. This is especially true of NDA2 and the NEDP3. These findings attest to the "looseness" of NDA2 structure and operations, and reveal a secular reduction of interest in project outcomes. These findings also suggest that "pushing-out" money and administrative procedures, not the generation of organizational knowledge concerning outcomes, drove project monitoring.

The most frequently recorded problem for projects was inadequate management. The next most frequent problem concerned markets. There were relatively low incidence of problems concerning receivables, equipment, physical infrastructure, the labour force, material inputs, financing and local politics. Projects owned by collectives had a relatively high incidence of difficulties especially with respect to management. This finding is consistent with the proposition that because of their often disparate purposes, collectives are not very successful vehicles for operating businesses.

Projects with ownership based in unorganized communities had the highest incidence of problems while projects with ownership based in organized communities had the lowest incidence of problems. Projects located in unorganized communities had a much higher incidence of problems than projects located in organized communities or Indian reserves. The larger population of many Indian reserves coupled with their relatively low level of prior commercial development likely resulted in fewer market problems for Indian reserve projects than were faced by projects located in

the generally smaller, better serviced, unorganized communities.

Projects that did not submit a full application experienced a higher incidence of problems. Among projects that submitted a full application, those that did not submit at least one year of EBITDA had a much higher incidence of problems, especially management and financing problems. Both the intent to provide, and especially the demand for, an equity contribution were positive indicators of incidence of problems. This conflicts with one of the doctrines of business finance.

In general, the higher the value of financing the higher the incidence of problems. Incidence of problems, especially management problems, generally rose along with predicted annual employment. Incidence of problems by number of products reinforces the general finding that incidence of problems is positively associated with project size and complexity.

Of all financed projects 20% had never, or ceased to, operate within three years of first receipt of financing, and another 17% were not profitable. Only 33% of projects whose profitability was known were profitable within the first few years of operation. Of financed projects 22% survived through to the end date for the survival data. This survival rate was one-half that of small businesses across Canada. The median lifespan for projects was six years.

Socioeconomic circumstances were such that the study area was able to absorb some 40 or 50 projects per year with no substantial decline in the project survival rate or mean lifespan after 1974. This suggests that since the mid-1970's overall absorption capacity was sufficient. Neither the survival rate nor mean lifespan appear to be associated with strength of the external or northern Manitoba economies.

Business failures per year peaked during the fourth through sixth year of project operation. During these years many businesses were sold. During these years some projects received further government financial assistance for "modernizations" or "expansions." These years immediately follow the period generally covered by government analyses and financing. They also

are the years when most non-structural capital assets need replacement. This is further evidence of government "pushing" the ability of the environment to sustain businesses.

SARDA projects had the longest mean lifespan, but the highest survival rate was achieved by NEDP3 projects. Adjusted survival rates for SARDA and NDA2 projects were similar. SARDA project outcomes tended to bifurcate into many short-lived projects and a few very long-lived projects.

The relatively longer mean lifespan of projects with screen applications from 1971 through 1983 is consistent with the proposition that the most profitable and stable business niches, or more capable entrepreneurs, were usurped during the first few years of the study period.

Projects utilizing other government staff for preparing full applications had a somewhat longer mean lifespan, but much lower survival rate than projects whose full applications were prepared by applicants or non-government agents.

There was minimal variation in mean lifespan by number of owners, and the rate of survival for projects with two or more owners was higher than the survival rate for projects with one owner. These findings are not consistent with the proposition that multiple, active owners inhibit business performance. While the variation in mean lifespan by owner type is not large, the highest survival rate was achieved by Indian bands while private corporations and collectives had the lowest survival rates.

Projects with out-of-area ownership had the longest mean lifespan and highest survival rate. Projects with Indian reserve ownership and projects located on Indian reserves had the shortest mean lifespan and lowest survival rate. Projects located on Indian reserves with non-band Indian ownership appear to have faced severe problems. This finding is consistent with the proposition that Indian reserve environmental conditions are an obstacle to business success. Indian bands, however, can minimize certain political risks and they can support projects through guaranteed markets and flow-through senior government assistance.

Weak regression results suggest community conditions were not the most important factors affecting the ability of projects to survive. The comparative fit of models suggests that the survival of privately-owned projects may be more dependent on the personal factors of the owners whereas government or collective ownership results in a more homogeneous and stable, institutional and political pattern. Operational location on an Indian reserve has a significant, negative association with project survival in a number of regression models. This is consistent with the proposition that Indian reserve environmental conditions inhibit business success.

Regression results indicate that projects whose goal is a new project show a strong negative association with project survival. Projects of higher total cost show a strong, positive association with survival. Variables showing a positive, but lower significance, association with survival include: SARDA financing, total government cost, NDA2 financing, the ratio of government cost to total cost, manufacturing, the goals of "other" and expansion, at least one owner being non-Aboriginal, and cabins-campgrounds-lodges and "other mixed" products. While cost variables appear under a number of guises, other size variables do not. Therefore, cost may be a proxy for subsidies. Since the costs of government and collective-owned projects were relatively high, the higher survival rate of such businesses may reflect amount of subsidies as much as capability.

The programs were most attentive to issues that appear to have minimal relation to project survival. The programs did not systematically build community variables into decision processes. They made minimal effort to collect information concerning the personal capabilities and characteristics of prospective owners and managers. Application of community criteria and tests of owner/manager capabilities would have conflicted with local, regional and senior government political imperatives. Few resources were devoted to project aftercare. All this reinforced an output focus at the expense of an impact focus.

Fresh business starts were particularly problematic in terms of longevity and survival. Best outcomes were achieved by purchases of existing businesses.

Not providing at least one year of revenues and operating costs in a full application is associated with a shorter mean lifespan and a much lower survival rate. Although there is little difference in mean lifespan, the rate of survival for projects which proposed or were required to contribute "real" equity was higher than the survival rate for projects which did not propose or were not required to contribute "real" equity. This is consistent with the doctrine that equity is important to business success. Unexpectedly, projects in which the full application or program proformas projected a negative net income had a higher survival rate and a longer mean lifespan than projects in which the full application or program proformas projected a positive net income.

Capital value of a project is positively associated with mean lifespan and rate of survival. As well, there is a generally positive association between project size in annual person-years and the survival rate, but the relationship between size and mean lifespan is not clear. Projects were most successful if there were few employees or if the project was large enough to establish a formalized management structure to control employee activity. Projects with three or more products had a much longer mean lifespan and much higher survival rate than projects with less than three products.

All projects created a net 2,990 person-years of employment. This is a respectable amount of job creation. The programs, however, greatly overestimated the amount of employment to be created. Overestimation was least when the full application was prepared by the applicant. Other government agencies and non-government agents were either less well equipped to predict employment, or they over-promoted projects.

Generally the larger size and longer-lived non-government collective and Indian band owned projects created much more total employment. By applicant location, the long-lived projects with out-of-area ownership and projects with ownership from an organized community created a relatively large amount of total employment. By owner status group, non-Aboriginal owned projects generated much more total employment per project. By operational location, total employment per project in organized communities was relatively high, on Indian reserves it was relatively low.

Total employment per project for new businesses and expansions was relatively high. Total employment per project for purchases of businesses by existing businesses and projects with "other goals" was relatively low.

Projects that submitted one or two years of revenue and operating costs had the highest total employment. Projects that intended to invest equity according to their full applications and, especially, projects that were expected to invest equity generated higher total employment.

Total employment per project rises by project size as measured by both value of approved financing and annual employment, and as the number of products increases. Total employment per project was relatively high for retail and cabins-campgrounds-lodges. Total employment per project was relatively low for logging & forestry and other services, and transportation.

It is only with respect to attributes of owner type, goal, location of operations and certain products that compatibility between business longevity and employment creation is problematic. Variation in the capital-labour ratio, and more jobs versus less profits seem to be washed-over by the employment generating capacity of long-lived businesses.

To achieve each surviving project it cost the case programs about \$450,000 and governments around \$825,000, and required total financing of all types from all sources of just over \$1 million. Per project-year of a surviving project it cost the case programs about \$15,000 and governments around \$30,000, and it required total financing of all types from all sources of just over \$35,000.

In terms of government and total costs, NDA2 was the most efficient generator of surviving projects although NDA2's efficiency advantage is likely to decline over time. In terms of cost per project-year, SARDA was most efficient on all measures except loans from non-governmental sources. NEDP3 was least efficient on all measures.

Since 1974 there was no substantial increase in the cost of case program, government grant, total government and total financing cost per

surviving business. This suggests that the cost of overcoming absorptive capacity did not increase appreciably after 1974.

Projects for which other government agents prepared the full application had the highest cost per surviving business. Projects for which applicants prepared the full application had the lowest cost per surviving business.

Costs were relatively high for businesses owned by private corporations, Indian bands and local governments. Proprietor-owned businesses were efficient users of financing as measured by cost per surviving business and cost per project-year. Cost per surviving project was lower for owners who were existing businesses, but cost per project-year was lower for owners who were not existing businesses.

Indian reserves had the highest cost of all locations per surviving business and per project-year. Projects located in organized communities generally had the lowest cost per surviving project and per project-year.

By project goal, it was least costly per surviving business to finance the purchase of existing businesses by non-businesses, it was most costly per surviving business to finance either new businesses or projects that had "other goals." Per project-year, it was most costly to finance projects with "other goals." "Other goals" often meant maintaining a business to prevent the business from failure. Per project-year, it was least costly to finance either the purchase of existing businesses by non-businesses or expansions.

The highest costs per survivor and project-year accrued to projects that submitted proformas without at least one year of EBITDA. The cost per surviving project and per project-year for projects whose full application proformas and program approval proformas predicted negative net income was higher than those that predicted positive net income.

Per surviving project, products that had a relatively low cost to government include: fishing, retail, accommodation and food & beverage, and other services. Agriculture, and logging & forestry related projects had a

relatively high cost to government.

Value of approved financing appears not to be related to project success. Large increases in financing cost per person-year during the last five years of the study period suggest greater difficulty in securing incremental person-years. This indicates that there was a rapid deterioration in business niches such that person-year return-on-investment fell.

By type of owner, the highest cost per person-year of employment was for projects with private corporation ownership. Projects with proprietor ownership had the lowest cost per person-year of employment. The relatively high cost per person-year of employment when an owner was from an Indian reserve or when an owner was a registered Indian are reflected in the relatively high cost per person-year for projects located on Indian reserves. Financing cost per person-year of employment was similar for owners that were existing businesses and owners that were not existing businesses. If the existing business had a prior negative net income, however, the cost per person-year of employment was much higher. By goal, existing businesses purchasing businesses and projects with "other goals" had a relatively high cost per person-year of employment. Business expansions had a relatively low cost per person-year of employment.

Projects whose full application had not one year of EBITDA show a relatively high cost per person-year of employment. Projects whose full applications did not contain "real" equity and whose approval did not expect "real" equity had a higher cost per person-year of employment.

There is no pattern of cost per person-year of employment for measures of project size and complexity. Logging & forestry, construction, and retail and food & beverage had relatively high costs per person-year of employment. Transportation, retail, and accommodation and food & beverage services had relatively low costs per person-year of employment.

Only 6 of 16 low-cost longevity attributes also offer low-cost employment creation. Harmonizing these two outcomes would not be easy.

**TABLE 8-1
OUTCOMES, ADDITIONAL DATABASE VARIABLES***

Code	Description and Values
OVP3	Value of assistance provided by case program valued at the date that the first assistance was paid in \$1990.
OFFd	Date the first payment from the case program was sent.
OS_T	Type of assistance provided by case programs. Three types are possible. Values same as FS_T and OS_T above.
OS_V	Value of assistance per type provided by case programs. Three values are possible.
OOS_T	Type of assistance provided by other sources. Six types are possible. Values and coding as per FS_T and AS_T above.
OOS_V	Value of assistance per type provided by other sources. Six values are possible.
OOS_S	Source of assistance per type provided by other sources. Six sources are possible. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. SARDA commercial. 3. NEDP3. 6. NDA2. 7. Other DRE/IE source. 8. FBDB. 9. INAC or IEDF. 10. Other federal government source. 11. CEDF. 12. Other provincial government source. 13. Commercial financier including regional and aboriginal capital corporations. 14. Other source. 99. Source not known.
OTPY	Person-years of employment as of date of last available data.
OCom	Business had problem with competition.
OP/D	Business had problem with its product price or demand for its product.
OQ/Q	Business had problem with the quality or quantity of its output.
ORec	Business had problem with receivables.
OEqp	Business had problem with its equipment or facilities.
OInf	Business had problem with local infrastructure.
OMgt	Business had problem with its management.
Oesk	Business had problem with the skills of its employees.
Oeso	Business had problem with the social habits of its employees.
OInp	Business had problem sourcing material inputs.
OFin	Business had problem with its financing.
OLoc	Business had a local political/social problem.
OLSta	Status of business as of the date of last available data from program files.
OLSR_	Reason(s) for status if any. Up to three reasons are possible per business. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Profit after depreciation and interest. 12. Profit after depreciation and interest, but sold. 21. Loss after depreciation and interest. 22. Loss after depreciation and interest, but sold. 23. Under receivership, but operating. 31. Operating, but sold. No further information. 32. Operating, performance not known. 41. No longer operating. 42. Sold, but no longer operating. 51. Never operated. 52. Never operated because owner withdrew or never accepted offer. 53. Offer withdrawn by program. 91. Status not known, sold. 99. No information.
OLStD	Date of last available data from program files.
OESa	Status of business as of the date of last available data from other sources.
OESd	Date of last available data from other sources. Last possible date is 31 December, 1994. This is five years after the last approvals by the case programs.

* In addition to screen and full application, and approvals variables. See Tables 6-1, 6-24 and 7-2.

TABLE 8-2
OUTCOMES, TIME ELAPSED BETWEEN DATE OF FINAL APPROVAL AND
THE DATE THE FIRST PAYMENT OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WAS MADE

Variable	Number(1)	Average Number of Days(2)
All	341	189
Program		
SARDA	217	224
NDA2	104	117
NEDP3	6	192
Period of Decision		
1971-73	0	0
1974-78	8	652
1979-83	53	296
1984-88	232	157
1989	34	128
Number of Applicants		
1	268	198
2	42	129
3 or more	10	138
Type of Applicant		
Proprietor	242	188
F-P Private Corp.	8	148
Non-Gov't Collective	9	105
Indian Band	49	223
Local Gov't	3	166
Federal/Prov. Gov't	2	48
Location of Applicant		
Organized Cmty	32	215
Unorganized Cmty	90	167
Indian Reserve	172	197
Status of Applicant		
Registered Indian	179	201
Other Aboriginal	76	179
Not Aboriginal	42	145
Existing Business		
Yes	127	165
No	200	204
Performance of Exist. Bus.		
Positive Net Income	34	126
Negative Net Income	38	160
Location of Operations		
Organized Cmty	30	204
Unorganized Cmty	95	169
Indian Reserve	171	204
Number of Products		
1	249	184
2	49	234
3 or more	30	154

TABLE 8-2 (Cont.)
OUTCOMES, TIME ELAPSED BETWEEN DATE OF FINAL APPROVAL AND
THE DATE THE FIRST PAYMENT OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WAS MADE

Variable	Average Number Number(1) of Days(2)	
By Product		
Agriculture	11	120
Fishing	4	104
Forestry	53	203
Forestry & Manufacturing	8	216
Mining	2	142
Manufacturing	8	132
Construction	22	157
Transportation	31	165
Communications	3	82
Wholesaling	-	-
Retail	65	171
Retail & Food&Beverage	5	215
Fin.,Real Est.,Bus.Servs.	3	142
Health,Educ.& Local Gov't	2	460
Accommodations	1	245
Accomm. & Food&Bev.Servs.	5	111
Cabins,Campgrounds,Lodges	24	165
Food & Beverage Services	11	254
Other Services	32	234

1. Number showing date of final decision and date first paid.
2. Average does not include those with an elapsed time that is less than zero days. There are 28 that show an elapsed time less than zero days: SARDA-14, NDA2-7, and NEDP3-7.

TABLE 8-3
DIRECT EXPENDITURES PER PROGRAM PER YEAR

Year*	SARDA	NDA2	NEDP3	Expended (\$000's)
1977	32	0	0	32
1978	473	0	0	473
1979	590	0	0	590
1980	948	0	0	948
1981	946	0	0	946
1982	235	0	0	235
1983	81	0	0	81
1984	2119	2291	0	4410
1985	1819	2274	0	4093
1986	2313	884	1918	5115
1987	1442	1820	2611	5873
1988	1166	3001	0	4167
1989	1112	4603	156	5871
No Date	5116	1116	0	6232
All Years	18392	15989	4685	39066

* There were no direct project expenditures prior to 1977.

**TABLE 8-4
VALUE OF ASSISTANCE RECEIVED COMPARED TO VALUE OF ASSISTANCE APPROVED***

Program/ Form of Assistance	Number		\$Amount (\$000's)			Percent
	Percent		Received	Approved	Difference	Difference
I. All Case Programs						
Case Program Grants						
Aggregate	415	100	31878	36446	-4568	-13
If Received-Approved > 0	98	24	13627	11734	1893	16
If Received-Approved < 0	234	56	18251	24712	-6461	-26
If Received-Approved = 0	83	20	-	-	-	-
Grants from Other Sources						
Aggregate	409	100	17410	11319	6091	54
If Received-Approved > 0	73	18	15236	3793	11443	302
If Received-Approved < 0	48	12	2174	7526	-5352	-71
If Received-Approved = 0	288	70	-	-	-	-
Loans*						
Aggregate	386	100	31426	22553	8873	39
If Received-Approved > 0	202	52	26270	11570	14700	127
If Received-Approved < 0	90	23	5156	10983	-5827	-53
If Received-Approved = 0	94	24	-	-	-	-
II. SARDA						
Case Program Grants						
Aggregate	289	100	16181	18018	-1837	-10
If Received-Approved > 0	66	23	6763	5734	1029	18
If Received-Approved < 0	174	60	9418	12284	-2866	-23
If Received-Approved = 0	49	17	-	-	-	-
Grants from Other Sources						
Aggregate	286	100	8290	3411	4879	143
If Received-Approved > 0	53	19	7928	1366	6562	480
If Received-Approved < 0	17	6	362	2045	-1683	-82
If Received-Approved = 0	216	76	-	-	-	-
Loans*						
Aggregate	267	100	27168	16996	10172	60
If Received-Approved > 0	180	67	23294	10384	12910	124
If Received-Approved < 0	71	27	3874	6612	-2738	-41
If Received-Approved = 0	16	6	-	-	-	-

TABLE 8-4 (Cont.)
VALUE OF ASSISTANCE RECEIVED COMPARED TO VALUE OF ASSISTANCE APPROVED*

Program/ Form of Assistance	Number Percent		\$Amount (\$000's)			Percent Difference
			Received	Approved	Difference	
III. NDA2						
Case Program Grants						
Aggregate	118	100	11999	14596	-2597	-18
If Received-Approved > 0	31	26	5777	4914	863	18
If Received-Approved < 0	57	48	6222	9682	-3460	-36
If Received-Approved = 0	30	25	-	-	-	-
Grants from Other Sources						
Aggregate	115	100	10912	7355	3557	48
If Received-Approved > 0	18	16	5749	5749	0	0
If Received-Approved < 0	30	26	5163	1606	3557	221
If Received-Approved = 0	67	58	-	-	-	-
Loans*						
Aggregate	111	100	3409	4744	-1335	-28
If Received-Approved > 0	20	18	2500	981	1519	155
If Received-Approved < 0	17	15	909	3763	-2854	-76
If Received-Approved = 0	74	67	-	-	-	-
IV. NEDP3						
Case Program Grants						
Aggregate	8	100	3833	3697	136	4
If Received-Approved > 0	1	13	1087	1086	1	0
If Received-Approved < 0	3	38	2746	2611	135	5
If Received-Approved = 0	4	50	-	-	-	-
Grants from Other Sources						
Aggregate	8	100	1765	923	842	91
If Received-Approved > 0	2	25	1559	578	981	170
If Received-Approved < 0	1	13	206	345	-139	-40
If Received-Approved = 0	5	63	-	-	-	-
Loans*						
Aggregate	8	100	849	813	36	4
If Received-Approved > 0	2	25	476	205	271	132
If Received-Approved < 0	2	25	373	608	-235	-39
If Received-Approved = 0	4	50	-	-	-	-

* For businesses that received a case program grant. Excludes the value of received or approved direct, non-monetary assistance. Also excludes records in which the amount received is not known or the amount approved is not known.

**TABLE 8-5
NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS THAT RECEIVED MORE OR LESS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE THAN PREDICTED BY THE PROGRAMS**

Variable	Received More Than Predicted						Received Less Than Predicted					
	0-10% # %	11-25 # %	26-50 # %	51-75 # %	76-100 # %	>100% # %	0--10% # %	-11--25 # %	-26--50 # %	-51--75 # %	-76--100% # %	
I. All Case Programs	Total											
Case Program Grants	415	14	28	7	8	2	1	0	1	0	2	0
Grants from Other Sources	409	11	3	1	7	2	6	1	2	0	12	3
Loans	386	4	8	2	32	8	24	6	21	5	101	26
II. SARDA												
Case Program Grants	289	14	20	7	4	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Grants from Other Sources	286	12	1	0	5	2	6	2	1	0	6	2
Loans	267	5	7	3	27	10	23	9	21	8	88	33
III. NDA2												
Case Program Grants	118	14	8	7	4	3	0	0	1	1	1	1
Grants from Other Sources	115	8	2	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	5	4
Loans	111	2	1	1	4	4	1	1	0	0	12	11
IV. NEDP3												
Case Program Grants	8	1	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grants from Other Sources	8	0	0	0	1	13	0	0	0	0	1	13
Loans	8	0	0	0	1	13	0	0	0	0	1	13

* For businesses that received a case program grant. Excludes instances of direct, non-monetary assistance. Also excludes records for which the amount approved is not known or the amount received is not known.

**TABLE 8-6
NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS THAT RECEIVED, FROM ALL SOURCES, MORE,
THE SAME, OR LESS GRANT ASSISTANCE THAN PREDICTED BY THE PROGRAMS***

Variable	Total Number	Receipt of Grant Assistance was Predicted								
		More Than & 10% More Than All Amount Ave.			The Same As		Less Than & 10% Less Than All Amount Ave.			More Than or Less Than 10%
		#	Percent	Percent	#	Percent	#	Percent	Percent	Percent
Program										
All	409	73	18	78	65	16	150	37	-29	55
SARDA	286	55	19	72	47	16	107	37	-34	57
NDA2	115	17	15	66	15	13	43	37	-29	52
NEDP3	8	1	13	221	3	38	0	0	-9	13
Period, Final Approval										
1971-73	9	3	33	84	4	44	1	11	-35	44
1974-78	50	10	20	152	4	8	23	46	-54	66
1979-83	61	13	21	65	10	16	23	38	-26	59
1984-88	242	46	19	73	38	16	79	33	-27	52
1989	33	1	3	8	7	21	15	45	-13	48
Applicant Type, Appr'd										
Proprietor	300	46	15	58	53	18	116	39	-25	54
F-P Private Corp.	7	1	14	141	2	29	2	29	-6	43
Non-Gov't Collective	16	8	50	168	0	0	4	25	-13	75
Indian Band	59	11	19	82	6	10	17	29	-35	47
Local Gov't	3	0	0	-	1	33	2	67	-49	67
Fed./Prov. Gov't	4	1	25	392	3	75	0	0	-	25
Applicant Location, Appr'd										
Organized Cmty	41	7	17	24	7	17	12	29	-20	46
Unorganized Cmty	118	17	14	98	21	18	43	36	-31	51
Indian Reserve	200	40	20	72	29	15	81	41	-30	61
Applicant Status, Appr'd										
Registered Indian	210	43	20	69	30	14	81	39	-31	59
Other Aboriginal	101	16	16	37	20	20	39	39	-25	54
Not Aboriginal	55	7	13	103	9	16	17	31	-19	44
By Existing Business										
Yes	156	32	21	61	25	16	51	33	-25	53
No	252	41	16	99	40	16	98	39	-31	55
By Perf. of Exist. Bus.										
Positive	38	6	16	21	7	18	13	34	-18	50
Negative	45	11	24	79	5	11	13	29	-21	53

**TABLE 8-6 (Cont.)
NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS THAT RECEIVED, FROM ALL SOURCES, MORE,
THE SAME, OR LESS GRANT ASSISTANCE THAN PREDICTED BY THE PROGRAMS***

Variable	Total Number	Receipt of Grant Assistance was Predicted									More Than or Less Than 10% Percent		
		More Than & 10% More Than			All Amount Ave.		The Same As		Less Than & 10% Less Than			All Amount Ave.	
		#	Percent	Percent	#	Percent	#	Percent	Percent				
By Prev. Gov't Financing													
None	88	14	16	58	54	61	34	39	-30	55			
Prev. Gov't	72	18	25	62	11	15	17	24	-21	49			
Prev. Federal	69	17	25	34	11	16	15	22	-20	46			
Prev. DRE/IE	44	12	27	36	6	14	9	20	-13	48			
Oper. Location, Appr'd													
Organized Cmty	38	6	16	32	8	21	12	32	-21	47			
Unorganized Cmty	127	21	17	93	18	14	46	36	-27	53			
Indian Reserve	197	40	20	68	27	14	78	40	-29	60			
Appr'd Amnt From Program													
< \$25	109	8	7	19	30	28	52	48	-34	55			
\$25 - 49	98	16	16	49	12	12	39	40	-32	56			
\$50 - 74	56	13	23	113	7	13	17	30	-25	54			
\$75 - 99	32	4	13	19	4	13	10	31	-33	44			
\$100-149	35	9	26	26	4	11	11	31	-50	57			
\$150 - 200	35	8	23	77	4	11	7	20	-13	43			
> \$200	42	15	36	97	4	10	14	33	-24	69			

* For businesses that received a case program grant. Excludes instances of direct, non-monetary assistance. Also excludes records for which the amount approved is not known or the amount received is not known.

**TABLE 8-7
INCIDENCE OF OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AS NOTED IN PROJECT FILES (1)**

Variable and Value	Number of Projects	All Problems		Nature of Problem (2)																							
		#	%	Competition		Price/Demand		Rec'bles		Equipment				Infra.-structure		Mngment		Employee Skills		Employee Social Issue		Material Inputs		Financing		Local Politics	
				#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Program																											
All (3)	419	174	42	5	1	36	9	3	1	14	3	2	0	71	17	6	1	11	3	3	1	21	5	2	0		
SARDA	290	146	50	5	2	31	11	3	1	11	4	2	1	58	20	4	1	9	3	3	1	19	7	1	0		
NDA2	121	22	18	0	0	3	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	12	10	2	2	1	1	0	0	2	2	1	1		
NEDP3	8	6	75	0	0	2	25	0	0	2	25	0	0	1	13	0	0	1	13	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Period (4)																											
1971-73	9	10	111	0	0	2	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	44	1	11	1	11	2	22	0	0	0	0		
1974-78	51	33	65	1	2	4	8	2	4	0	0	1	2	12	24	1	2	5	10	0	0	7	14	0	0		
1979-83	61	30	49	0	0	10	16	1	2	1	2	0	0	9	15	0	0	1	2	1	2	7	11	0	0		
1984-88	248	63	33	3	1	18	7	0	0	12	5	1	0	36	15	3	1	3	1	0	0	6	2	1	0		
1989	34	8	24	0	0	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	3		
Who Prepared Application																											
Case Program	2	3	150	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	1	50	0	0	0	0		
Other Gov't Agency	28	13	46	0	0	2	7	0	0	0	0	1	4	8	21	0	0	3	11	0	0	1	4	0	0		
Non-gov't Agent	145	49	34	0	0	11	8	1	1	4	3	1	1	23	16	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	3	1	1		
Applicant	77	28	36	1	1	8	10	0	0	3	4	0	0	10	13	1	1	0	0	0	0	4	5	1	1		
No. of Approvals																											
0	397	149	38	0	0	31	8	2	1	12	3	0	0	62	16	6	2	11	3	3	1	20	5	2	1		
1	19	24	126	4	21	5	26	1	5	2	11	2	11	9	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	0	0		
2	1	1	100	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3 or More	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Appr'd, No. of Owners																											
1	343	133	39	0	0	27	8	3	1	10	3	1	0	59	17	5	1	10	3	2	1	14	4	2	1		
2	52	28	54	2	4	5	10	0	0	4	8	1	2	10	19	1	2	1	2	0	0	4	8	0	0		
3 or More	13	5	38	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	3	23	0	0		
Appr'd, Owner Type																											
Proprietor	303	120	40	4	1	24	8	1	0	13	4	2	1	49	16	2	1	5	2	2	1	17	6	1	0		
F-P Private Corp.	8	1	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	13	0	0	0	0		
Non-Gov't Collective	19	21	111	2	11	3	16	2	11	1	5	0	0	7	37	1	5	2	11	1	5	1	5	1	5		
Indian Band	61	17	28	0	0	3	5	0	0	1	2	0	0	11	18	1	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Local Government	4	1	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Federal/Provincial	4	3	75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	25	0	0	1	25	0	0	1	25	0	0		

TABLE 8-7 (Cont.)
INCIDENCE OF OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AS NOTED IN PROJECT FILES (1)

Variable and Value	Number of Projects	All Problem		Nature of Problem (2)																									
		#	%	Compe- tition	Price/ Demand	Rec'vabl	Equipm ent	Infra- structure	Managem	Employee Skills	Social Issue	Employee Issue	Material Inputs	Financing	Local Politics														
Appr'd, Owner Location	41	12	29	0	0	3	7	0	0	2	5	0	0	5	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Organized Cmty	124	64	52	1	1	15	12	1	1	5	4	1	1	23	19	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	11	9	0	0	
Unorganized Cmty	203	71	36	2	1	9	4	1	0	7	3	1	0	37	18	1	0	5	2	1	0	6	3	1	0	0	0	0	
Indian Reserve	14	10	71	1	7	1	7	0	0	1	7	0	0	4	29	0	1	7	0	0	1	7	0	0	1	7	1	7	
Out-Area Known																													
Appr'd, Owner Status	213	85	40	3	1	11	5	1	0	8	4	1	0	41	19	2	1	6	3	2	1	8	4	2	1	8	4	2	1
Registered Indian	106	27	25	0	0	13	12	2	2	2	2	0	0	7	7	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Aboriginal	55	23	42	1	2	7	13	0	0	2	4	0	0	7	13	1	2	1	2	0	0	4	7	0	0	4	7	0	0
Not Aboriginal																													
Existing Business	161	67	42	1	1	14	9	1	1	6	4	0	0	25	16	4	2	5	3	0	0	10	6	1	1	10	6	1	1
Yes	257	104	40	1	0	22	9	2	1	8	3	2	1	46	18	2	1	6	2	3	1	11	4	1	0	11	4	1	0
No																													
Perf. of Exlat. Business	39	12	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	0	0	6	15	1	3	1	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	5	0	0
Positive	47	18	38	0	0	5	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	19	1	2	2	4	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	0
Negative																													
Previous Gov't Financing	343	146	43	5	1	31	9	3	1	13	4	2	1	58	17	4	1	8	2	3	1	18	5	1	0	18	5	1	0
None	76	28	37	0	0	5	7	0	0	1	1	0	0	13	17	2	3	3	4	0	0	3	4	1	1	3	4	1	1
Any Government	73	25	34	0	0	5	7	0	0	1	1	0	0	12	16	2	3	2	3	0	0	2	3	1	1	2	3	1	1
Federal Gov't	47	21	45	0	0	5	11	0	0	1	2	0	0	9	19	2	4	2	4	0	0	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
DRE/IE																													
Appr'd, Oper. Location	38	10	26	0	0	3	8	0	0	2	5	0	0	4	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	1	3	0	0
Organized Community	133	68	51	2	2	16	12	1	1	5	4	1	1	25	19	3	2	3	2	2	2	10	8	0	0	10	8	0	0
Unorganized Community	200	69	35	2	1	11	6	1	1	5	3	1	1	35	18	2	1	4	2	1	1	6	3	1	1	6	3	1	1
Indian Reserve																													
Goal	134	54	40	1	1	10	7	1	1	4	3	1	1	26	19	1	1	3	2	2	1	4	3	1	1	4	3	1	1
New Business	10	6	60	0	0	1	10	0	0	1	10	0	0	1	10	0	0	1	10	0	0	2	20	0	0	2	20	0	0
Exlat.Bus.Sts.New Bus.	34	15	44	0	0	4	12	0	0	1	3	1	3	8	24	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	1	3	0	0
New Purchase	7	2	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Exlat.Bus.Pur.New Bus.	64	20	31	0	0	5	8	0	0	4	6	0	0	7	11	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	5	0	0	3	5	0	0
Expand	30	11	37	0	0	2	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	13	1	3	2	7	0	0	1	3	1	3	1	3	1	3
Other Goal																													

TABLE 8-7 (Cont.)
INCIDENCE OF OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AS NOTED IN PROJECT FILES (1)

Variable and Value	Number of Projects		Nature of Problem (2)														All Problem							
	#	%	Compe- tition	Price/ Demand	Rec'vabl	Equipm ent	Infra- structure	Managem	Employee Skills	Employee Social Issue	Material Inputs	Financing	Local Politics	#	%									
Appr'd, No. of Products	312	39	5	2	25	8	1	0	12	4	1	0	47	15	5	2	6	2	3	1	15	5	2	1
1	65	31	0	0	8	12	2	0	3	0	0	0	14	22	0	0	2	3	0	0	5	8	0	0
2	40	21	0	0	3	8	0	2	5	1	3	10	25	1	3	8	3	8	0	0	1	3	0	0
3 or More																								
Appr'd, Product (5)	13	8	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	0	0	0	5	38	0	0	0	0	1	8	1	8	0	0
Agriculture	6	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	17	0	0	0	0	1	17	0	0	0	0
Fishing	77	38	1	1	10	13	1	1	1	1	0	0	9	12	1	4	5	1	1	8	10	0	0	0
Logging&Forestry	10	7	0	0	1	10	1	10	0	0	0	0	3	30	0	1	10	0	0	0	1	10	0	0
Logging&For.-Mfg.	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	0
Mining	11	6	9	1	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	27	1	9	0	0	0	0	1	50	0	0
Manufacturing	26	14	2	8	4	15	0	0	3	12	0	0	4	15	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction	39	9	3	0	0	0	0	3	8	0	0	3	8	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0
Transportation	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Communications	78	23	0	0	3	4	0	1	1	1	0	0	14	18	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	3	2	3
Retail	10	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	0	0
Retail-Food&Beverage	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fin.,Rt.Est.&Bus.Serv.	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Health,Ed.,Local Gov't	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accommodation	2	3	0	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accom.-Food&Bev.Serv.	7	2	0	0	1	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	14	0	0	1	50	0	0
Cabins,Campg'nds,Lodges	32	37	0	0	3	9	0	0	22	69	1	3	10	31	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Food & Beverage Servs.	11	6	0	0	3	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	9	0	0
Other Services	36	11	0	0	3	8	0	3	8	1	3	4	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

1. Includes only projects that received financing from case programs
2. No were no incidences of product quality or output quantity problems noted
3. Includes all instances of a variable value "not known". Variable counts may not add to these totals
4. Period in which the final program decision was taken.
5. No wholesaling businesses were approved.

**TABLE 8-8
PROJECT OUTCOMES ACCORDING TO PROJECT FILES (1)**

Variable and Value	Number of Projects	Profitable				Not Profitable & Rec'					Operating, Performance Not Known				No Longer Operating				Never Operated					Condition Not Known							
		& Sold		Subtotal		& Sold		ver Subtotal			& Sold		NK Subtotal		No Long.		& Sold		Subtotal		Owner		Offer			& Sold		NK Subtotal			
		#	#	#	%	#	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	
Program																															
All (2)	419	81	5	86	21	69	3	1	73	17	5	65	70	17	66	4	70	17	11	1	1	13	3	2	105	107	26				
SARDA	290	80	5	85	29	55	3	1	59	20	4	54	58	20	56	3	59	20	5	1	1	7	2	2	20	22	8				
NDA2	121	1	0	1	1	12	0	0	12	10	1	10	11	9	9	1	10	8	6	0	0	6	5	0	81	81	67				
NEDP3	8	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	25	0	1	1	13	1	0	1	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	50				
Period, Screen																															
1971-73	9	2	0	2	22	2	0	0	2	22	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	11				
1974-78	51	20	5	25	49	6	0	0	6	12	1	0	1	2	12	1	13	25	2	1	0	3	6	0	3	3	6				
1979-83	61	19	0	19	31	14	0	1	15	25	1	3	4	7	10	1	11	18	0	0	1	1	2	1	10	11	18				
1984-88	248	36	0	36	15	45	3	0	48	19	2	51	53	21	33	1	34	14	7	0	0	7	3	1	67	68	27				
1989	34	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	3	0	9	9	26	4	1	5	15	2	0	0	2	6	0	17	17	50				
Who Prepared Appl.																															
Case Program	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Other Govt Agency	28	7	0	7	25	3	0	1	4	14	1	6	7	25	5	0	5	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	18				
Non-gov't Agent Applicant	145	24	0	24	17	21	1	0	22	15	0	27	27	19	24	0	24	17	6	0	0	6	4	0	42	42	29				
Applicant	77	15	0	15	19	13	1	0	14	18	1	13	14	18	12	2	14	18	0	0	0	0	0	2	18	20	26				
No. of Approvals																															
0	398	76	5	81	20	61	3	0	64	16	5	65	70	18	62	4	66	17	11	1	1	13	3	1	104	105	26				
1	19	5	0	5	26	8	0	1	9	47	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	21	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	5				
2	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-				
3 or More	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	50				
Appr'd, No. of Owners																															
1	343	67	5	72	21	53	3	1	57	17	5	57	62	18	54	4	58	17	8	1	1	10	3	1	83	84	24				
2	52	10	0	10	19	9	0	0	9	17	0	6	6	12	8	0	8	15	2	0	0	2	4	0	17	17	33				
3 or More	13	2	0	2	15	2	0	0	2	15	0	2	2	15	2	0	2	15	1	0	0	1	8	0	4	4	31				
Appr'd, Owner Type																															
Proprietor	303	72	3	75	25	47	3	1	51	17	4	49	53	17	47	4	51	17	7	1	1	9	3	1	63	64	21				
F-P Private Corp.	8	1	0	1	13	1	0	0	1	13	1	0	1	13	1	0	1	13	1	0	0	1	13	0	3	3	38				
Non-Gov't Collective	17	1	1	2	12	4	0	0	4	24	0	2	2	12	5	0	5	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	24				
Indian Band	61	3	1	4	7	10	0	0	10	16	0	12	12	20	8	0	8	13	1	0	0	1	2	0	26	26	43				
Local Government	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	25	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	25	0	2	2	50				
Federal/Provincial	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	75				

TABLE 8-8 (Cont.)
PROJECT OUTCOMES ACCORDING TO PROJECT FILES (1)

Variable and Value	Number of Projects	Profitable				Not Profitable					Operating, Performance Not Know				No Longer Operating				Never Operated					Condition Not Know								
		& Sold		Subtotal		& Sold		Rec' ver Subtotal			& Sold		NK Subtotal		No Long.		& Sold		Subtotal		Owner		Offer			& Sold		NK Subtotal				
		#	#	#	%	#	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%		
Appr'd, Owner Location																																
Organized Cmty	41	13	0	13	32	7	0	0	7	17	0	3	3	7	6	0	6	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	12	29
Unorganized Cmty	124	34	3	37	30	16	0	0	16	13	1	12	13	10	26	2	26	23	3	0	0	3	2	3	0	0	3	2	1	26	27	22
Indian Reserve	203	24	1	25	12	33	3	1	37	18	2	45	47	23	30	2	32	16	7	1	1	9	4	7	1	1	9	4	0	53	53	26
Out-Scope Known	14	1	0	1	7	4	0	0	4	29	2	0	2	14	1	0	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	36
Appr'd, Owner Status																																
Registered Indian	213	24	1	25	12	37	2	1	40	19	2	46	48	23	31	2	33	15	8	1	1	10	5	8	1	1	10	5	0	57	57	27
Other Aboriginal	106	28	3	31	29	17	1	0	18	17	0	9	9	8	20	0	20	19	3	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	3	3	1	24	25	24
Not Aboriginal	55	15	0	15	27	8	0	0	8	15	0	8	8	15	9	0	9	16	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	14	14	25
Existing Business																																
Yes	161	27	1	28	17	32	1	0	33	20	18	0	18	11	25	1	26	16	3	0	1	4	2	3	0	1	4	2	1	51	52	32
No	257	54	4	58	23	37	2	1	40	16	5	47	52	20	40	3	43	17	8	1	0	9	4	8	1	0	9	4	1	54	55	21
Perf. of Exist. Business																																
Positive	39	12	0	12	31	6	0	0	6	15	0	7	7	18	4	0	4	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	9	10	26
Negative	47	1	0	1	2	11	1	0	12	26	0	5	5	11	5	0	5	11	2	0	0	2	4	2	0	0	2	4	0	22	22	47
Previous Gov't Financing																																
None	88	19	1	20	23	14	1	0	15	17	0	13	13	15	15	1	16	18	1	0	1	2	2	1	0	1	2	2	1	21	22	25
Any Government	73	8	0	8	11	18	0	0	18	25	0	5	5	7	10	0	10	14	2	0	0	2	3	2	0	0	2	3	0	30	30	41
Federal Gov't	70	8	0	8	11	17	0	0	17	24	0	5	5	7	10	0	10	14	2	0	0	2	3	2	0	0	2	3	0	28	28	40
DRE/IE	44	3	0	3	7	12	0	0	12	27	0	4	4	9	5	0	5	11	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	19	19	43
Appr'd, Oper. Location																																
Organized Cmty	38	13	0	13	34	8	0	0	8	21	0	2	2	5	0	4	4	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	11	29
Unorganized Cmty	133	34	4	38	29	18	1	1	20	15	2	14	16	12	25	2	27	20	3	0	0	3	2	3	0	0	3	2	1	28	29	22
Indian Reserve	200	26	1	27	14	35	0	2	37	19	1	45	46	23	30	1	31	16	7	0	1	8	4	7	0	1	8	4	0	51	51	26
Goal																																
New Business	134	26	0	26	19	14	1	0	15	11	2	39	41	31	25	0	25	19	4	0	0	4	3	4	0	0	4	3	1	22	23	17
Exist.Bus.Stts.New Bus.	10	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	20	0	2	2	20	1	0	1	10	1	0	0	1	10	1	0	0	1	10	0	4	4	40
New Purchase	34	7	0	7	21	9	1	1	11	32	0	2	2	6	4	2	6	18	1	0	0	1	3	1	0	0	1	3	0	7	7	21
Exist.Bus.Pur.New Bus.	7	2	0	2	29	3	0	0	3	43	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	14
Expand	64	14	0	14	22	9	0	0	9	14	8	0	8	13	13	0	13	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	19	20	31
Other Goal	30	0	0	0	0	6	1	0	7	23	0	3	3	10	3	0	3	10	2	0	0	2	7	2	0	0	2	7	0	15	15	50

TABLE 8-8 (Cont.)
PROJECT OUTCOMES ACCORDING TO PROJECT FILES (1)

Variable and Value	Number of Projects	Profitable & Sold Subtotal		Not Profitable & Rec' Sold ver Subtotal		Operating, Performance Not Know & Sold NK Subtotal		No Longer Operating No & Long. Sold Subtotal		Never Operated Owner Offer WD Subtotal		Condition Not Know & Sold NK Subtotal													
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%												
Quality of Full Appl.																									
Blank	135	32	27	26	0	0	26	19	3	10	13	10	18	2	20	15	2	0	1	3	2	0	36	27	
Not Blank	284	49	17	43	3	1	47	17	2	55	57	20	48	2	50	18	9	1	0	10	4	2	69	25	
Not 1 Yr EBITDA	22	4	4	18	0	0	4	18	0	5	5	23	6	0	6	27	1	1	0	2	9	0	1	5	
1-3 Yrs EBITDA	89	17	19	17	1	0	18	20	1	11	12	13	12	1	13	15	2	0	0	2	2	2	25	30	
3 Yrs Proforma Equity	173	28	16	22	2	1	25	14	1	38	40	23	30	1	31	18	6	0	0	6	3	0	43	25	
Full Appl. = 0	44	4	9	8	0	0	8	18	5	0	5	11	3	2	5	11	3	0	0	3	7	0	19	43	
Full Appl. > 0	202	38	19	30	3	1	34	17	2	41	43	21	36	0	36	18	5	0	0	5	2	0	46	23	
Final Approval = 0	47	3	6	6	0	0	6	13	0	5	5	11	5	0	5	11	3	0	0	3	6	0	25	53	
Final Approval > 0	384	78	23	63	3	1	67	18	5	59	64	18	60	4	64	18	7	0	1	8	2	2	78	21	
Proj'd Highest Net Income																									
Full Appl. > = 0	153	27	18	18	2	1	21	14	1	33	34	22	29	0	29	19	6	0	0	6	4	0	36	24	
Full Appl. < 0	19	1	5	4	0	0	4	21	0	6	6	32	1	1	2	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	32	
Final Approval > = 0	286	58	22	47	3	1	51	19	3	45	48	18	50	3	53	20	7	0	1	8	3	2	45	18	
Final Approval < 0	13	3	3	3	0	0	3	23	1	2	3	23	1	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	23	
Appr'd, Value of Financin																									
Less Than \$25,000	108	21	19	9	2	0	11	10	2	32	34	31	20	0	20	18	2	1	0	3	3	0	20	18	
\$25-49,000	100	24	27	17	1	0	18	18	1	11	12	12	16	2	18	18	3	0	1	4	4	0	21	21	
\$50-74,000	58	12	13	22	7	0	7	12	0	11	11	19	10	1	11	19	0	0	0	0	0	2	14	28	
\$75-99,000	32	3	9	7	0	0	7	22	0	3	3	9	6	1	7	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	38	
\$100-149,000	36	5	5	14	0	0	10	28	0	5	5	14	4	0	4	11	3	0	0	3	8	0	9	25	
\$150-199,000	28	8	8	29	4	0	4	14	2	1	3	11	3	0	3	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	36	
\$200,000 or More	56	8	16	15	0	1	16	29	0	2	2	4	7	0	7	13	3	0	0	3	5	0	19	34	
Appr'd, Total PY's																									
0	50	5	10	5	1	0	6	12	0	5	5	10	7	1	8	16	1	1	0	2	4	0	24	48	
1	59	12	20	12	0	0	12	20	0	17	17	29	5	0	5	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	22	
2-4	168	30	30	18	23	2	25	15	3	38	41	24	21	2	23	14	6	0	0	6	4	1	42	26	
5-9	28	2	7	11	0	1	12	43	0	2	2	7	5	0	5	18	1	0	0	1	4	0	6	21	
10-14	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	14	3	0	3	43	2	0	0	2	29	0	1	14	
15-19	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	33	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	33	
20 or More	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

TABLE 8-8 (Cont.)
PROJECT OUTCOMES ACCORDING TO PROJECT FILES (1)

Variable and Value	Number of Projects	Profitable				Not Profitable				Operating, Performance Not Know				No Longer Operating				Never Operated					Condition Not Know								
		& Sold		Subtotal		& Sold		Rec' ver Subtotal		& Sold		NK Subtotal		No Long.		& Sold		Subtotal		Owner Offer			Subtotal		& Sold		NK Subtotal				
		#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%	#	#	#	%		
No. of Products																															
1	312	64	5	69	22	40	3	0	43	14	3	57	60	19	48	2	50	16	8	0	1	9	3	2	79	81	26				
2	65	9	0	9	14	17	0	0	17	26	1	5	6	9	14	2	16	25	2	0	0	2	3	0	15	15	23				
3 or More	40	8	0	8	20	12	0	1	13	33	1	3	4	10	4	0	4	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	11	28				
Product (3)																															
Agriculture	13	1	0	1	8	1	0	0	1	8	0	1	1	8	2	0	2	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	62				
Fishing	6	1	0	1	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	50				
Logging&Forestry	77	20	4	24	31	11	0	0	11	14	1	13	14	18	16	0	16	21	1	0	0	1	1	0	11	11	14				
Logging&For.-Mfg.	10	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	20	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	40				
Mining	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	50	0	1	1	50				
Manufacturing	11	0	1	1	9	2	0	0	2	18	0	3	3	27	3	0	3	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	18				
Construction	26	9	0	9	35	4	0	0	4	15	1	4	5	19	2	0	2	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	23				
Transportation	39	6	0	6	15	7	1	0	8	21	0	8	8	21	4	0	4	10	0	0	1	1	3	0	12	12	31				
Communications	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	67				
Retail	78	22	0	22	28	11	1	0	12	15	1	12	13	17	9	0	9	12	3	0	0	3	4	1	18	19	24				
Retail-Food&Bev.	10	4	0	4	40	3	0	0	3	30	0	1	1	10	1	1	2	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Fin.,Rl.Est.&Bus.Serv.	3	1	0	1	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	67				
Health,Ed.,Local Gov't	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	50	0	1	1	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Accommodation	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Accom.-Food&Bev.	7	1	0	1	14	3	0	0	3	43	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	14	1	0	0	1	14	0	1	1	14				
Cabins,Camps,Lodges	32	5	0	5	16	10	0	1	11	34	2	4	6	19	2	0	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	25				
Food & Beverage Serv.	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	36	3	1	4	36	1	0	0	1	9	0	2	2	18				
Other Services	36	4	0	4	11	1	1	0	2	6	0	9	9	25	6	1	7	19	2	0	0	2	6	0	12	12	33				

1. "Best case" data are from project files. Includes only projects that received financing from case programs.
2. Includes all instances of a variable value "not known". Variable counts may not add to these totals.
3. No wholesaling businesses were approved.

**TABLE 8-9
PROJECT SURVIVAL RATES AND LIFESPANS BY YEAR FINANCING WAS APPROVED**

Year of Final Approval	Number Financed	Number Survived	Percent Survived	Number Lifespan Known	Mean Lifespan in Years
1971	1	0	0	1	4.2
1972	3	1	33	3	15.3
1973	5	1	20	5	12.9
1974	2	1	50	1	20.8
1975	8	0	0	6	6.7
1976	7	0	0	3	7.0
1977	16	2	13	13	8.9
1978	18	0	0	8	6.7
1979	19	3	16	16	8.6
1980	15	2	13	9	10.4
1981	16	2	13	10	5.9
1982	2	1	50	1	9.1
1983	9	2	22	7	7.6
1984	55	14	25	33	6.2
1985	55	13	24	39	6.1
1986	41	11	27	34	6.1
1987	44	15	34	33	5.6
1988	43	8	19	31	4.0
1989	34	9	26	22	4.0

**TABLE 8-10
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF PROJECTS BY INCREMENTAL YEARS OF SURVIVAL**

Years Survived(1)	Projects Surviving(2)	Percent Discontinued in Year	Cumulative Percent Surviving at End of Year
0	275	-	-
>0 - 1	20	7	93
>1 - 2	19	7	86
>2 - 3	24	9	77
>3 - 4	27	10	67
>4 - 5	29	11	57
>5 - 6	29	11	46
>6 - 7	16	6	40
>7 - 8	29	11	30
>8 - 9	18	7	23
>9 - 10	17	6	17
>10	47	17	-

1. From a start date set at the date final approval was received.
2. Projects for which the final approval and end date are known.
The latest end date for projects continuing to exist is 31 December, 1994.

**TABLE 8-11 (Cont.)
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM SURVIVAL RATES**

Variable and Value	Application		Approved			Financed				Operating					Lifespan In Years Since Final Dec'n							
	Screen	Full								Yes		No			# Known	Mean Years						
	#	#	% of Scr'n	% of Scr'n	% of Full	#	% of Scr'n	% of Full	% of App'd	#	% of Scr'n	% of Full	% of App'd	% of Fin'd								
Owner Location																						
Organized Cmty	261	56	21	48	18	86	41	16	73	85	9	3	16	19	22	32	12	57	67	78	27	7.6
Unorganized Cmty	477	141	30	137	29	97	124	28	88	91	36	8	26	28	29	88	18	62	64	71	83	6.7
Indian Reserve	752	333	44	221	29	66	203	27	61	92	40	5	12	18	20	163	22	49	74	80	133	5.5
Out-Scope Known	114	38	33	20	18	53	11	10	29	55	6	5	18	30	55	5	4	13	25	45	11	9.4
Owner Status																						
Registered Indian	785	347	44	202	26	58	213	27	61	105	44	6	13	22	21	169	22	49	84	79	143	5.5
Other Aboriginal	334	97	29	69	21	71	106	32	109	154	24	7	25	35	23	82	25	85	119	77	64	6.2
Not Aboriginal	204	87	43	58	28	67	55	27	63	95	23	11	26	40	42	32	16	37	55	58	45	7.6
Existing Business																						
Yes	473	178	38	174	37	98	161	34	90	93	45	10	25	26	28	116	25	65	67	72	120	6.8
No	1115	347	31	295	26	85	257	23	74	87	46	4	13	16	18	211	19	61	72	82	155	6.2
Exist. Business Perf.																						
Positive	53	31	58	41	77	132	39	74	126	95	14	26	45	34	36	25	47	81	61	64	27	7.0
Negative	91	48	53	48	53	100	47	52	98	98	17	19	35	35	36	30	33	63	63	64	38	6.2
Prev. Gov't Financing																						
None	331	107	32	100	30	93	88	27	82	88	22	7	21	22	25	66	20	62	66	75	218	6.4
Any Government	142	71	50	74	52	104	73	51	103	99	23	16	32	31	32	50	35	70	68	68	57	6.7
Federal Gov't	135	70	52	71	53	101	70	52	100	99	23	17	33	32	33	47	35	67	66	67	55	6.6
DRE/IE	79	40	51	45	57	113	44	56	110	98	15	19	36	33	34	29	37	73	64	66	35	6.2
Operational Location																						
Organized Cmty	203	44	22	45	22	102	38	19	86	84	10	5	23	22	26	28	14	64	62	74	24	8.1
Unorganized Cmty	476	133	28	148	31	111	133	28	100	90	41	9	31	28	31	92	19	69	62	69	91	7.1
Indian Reserve	651	280	45	220	34	76	200	31	69	91	35	5	12	16	18	165	25	57	75	83	130	5.8
Goal																						
New Business	949	287	30	153	16	53	134	14	47	88	16	2	6	10	12	118	12	41	77	88	79	5.5
Exist. Bus. Stts. New Bus.	30	16	53	12	40	75	10	33	63	83	2	7	13	17	20	8	27	50	67	80	6	4.5
New Purchase	198	57	29	35	18	61	34	17	60	97	15	8	26	43	44	19	10	33	54	56	28	6.5
Exist. Bus. Pur. New Bus.	10	7	70	7	70	100	7	70	100	100	4	40	57	57	57	3	30	43	43	43	6	7.0
Expand	304	107	35	71	23	66	64	21	60	90	18	6	17	25	28	46	15	43	65	72	48	6.7
Other Goal	90	43	48	32	36	74	30	33	70	94	9	10	21	28	30	21	23	49	66	70	21	5.5

TABLE 8-11 (Cont.)
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM SURVIVAL RATES

Variable and Value	Application Full		Approved		Financed		Operating				Lifespan in Years Since Final Dec'n							
	#	% of Scr'n	#	% of Scr'n Full	#	% of Scr'n Full	#	% of Scr'n Full	% of App'd Fin'd	% of Full App'd Fin'd	% of Full App'd Fin'd	#	Mean Years					
Quality of Full Appl.																		
Blank	177	-	154	-	87	135	76	88	27	15	18	20	108	61	70	80	83	7.7
Not Blank	527	-	316	-	60	284	54	90	64	12	20	23	220	42	70	77	192	5.9
Not 1 Yr EBITDA	37	-	28	-	76	22	59	79	2	5	7	9	20	54	71	91	16	4.9
1-3 Yrs EBITDA	163	-	96	-	59	89	55	93	22	13	23	25	67	41	70	75	59	6.1
3 Yrs Proforma Equity	327	-	192	-	59	173	53	90	40	12	21	23	133	41	69	77	117	5.9
Full Appl. = 0	71	-	45	-	63	44	62	98	8	11	18	18	36	51	80	82	34	5.9
Full Appl. > 0	380	-	271	-	71	202	53	75	51	13	19	25	151	40	56	75	158	5.9
Final Approval = 0	-	-	51	-	-	47	-	92	8	-	16	17	39	-	76	83	34	5.8
Final Approval > 0	-	-	412	-	-	364	-	88	82	-	20	23	282	-	68	77	238	6.5
Proj'd Highest Net Income																		
Full Appl. >= 0	294	-	172	-	59	153	52	89	33	11	19	22	120	41	70	78	102	5.9
Full Appl. < 0	31	-	19	-	61	19	61	100	7	23	37	37	12	39	63	63	173	6.6
Final Approval >= 0	-	-	302	-	-	266	-	88	52	-	17	20	214	-	71	80	166	6.6
Final Approval < 0	-	-	168	-	-	13	-	8	4	-	2	31	9	-	5	69	109	6.2
App'd, Value of Financin																		
Less Than \$25,000	-	-	123	-	-	109	-	89	11	-	9	10	98	-	80	90	60	5.2
\$25-49,000	-	-	107	-	-	100	-	93	12	-	11	12	88	-	82	88	57	5.9
\$50-74,000	-	-	68	-	-	58	-	85	13	-	19	22	45	-	66	78	38	6.9
\$75-99,000	-	-	36	-	-	32	-	89	9	-	25	28	23	-	64	72	26	6.5
\$100-149,000	-	-	41	-	-	36	-	88	15	-	37	42	21	-	51	58	26	6.5
\$150-199,000	-	-	31	-	-	28	-	90	10	-	32	36	18	-	58	64	24	7.8
\$200,000 or More	-	-	58	-	-	56	-	97	21	-	36	38	35	-	60	63	44	7.6
Employment, Total PY's																		
0	48	-	48	-	100	47	98	98	21	44	44	45	26	54	54	55	39	5.9
1	71	-	64	-	90	59	83	92	10	14	16	17	49	69	77	83	36	5.7
2-4	242	-	179	-	74	168	69	94	30	12	17	18	138	57	77	82	98	5.3
5-9	64	-	29	-	45	28	44	87	9	14	31	32	19	30	66	68	22	6.2
10-14	27	-	8	-	30	7	26	88	1	4	13	14	6	22	75	86	5	2.3
15-19	5	-	3	-	60	3	60	100	2	40	67	87	1	20	33	33	2	8.7
20 or More	11	-	2	-	18	2	18	100	2	18	100	100	0	0	0	0	1	8.7

TABLE 8-11 (Cont.)
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM SURVIVAL RATES

Variable and Value	Screen		Application Full		Approved		Financed		Operating				Lifespan in Years Since Final Dec'n							
	#	% of Scr'n	#	% of Scr'n	#	% of Scr'n	#	% of Scr'n	#	% of Scr'n	% of Full App'd	% of Fin'd	% of Full App'd	% of Fin'd	# Known	Mean Years				
No. of Products																				
1	1212	374	31	348	29	93	312	28	83	90	59	19	253	21	68	73	81	192	6.1	
2	287	95	33	75	26	78	65	23	68	87	11	4	12	15	17	54	72	83	49	6.2
3 or More	97	58	60	43	44	74	40	41	69	93	21	22	36	49	53	19	44	48	32	9.2
Product																				
Agriculture	39	10	26	14	36	140	13	33	130	93	2	5	20	14	15	11	79	85	7	5.9
Fishing	19	3	16	6	32	200	6	32	200	100	2	11	67	33	33	4	67	67	3	9.8
Logging&Forestry	221	66	30	86	39	130	77	35	117	90	2	1	3	2	3	75	87	97	32	5.0
Logging For. & Mfg.	34	11	32	10	29	91	10	28	91	100	0	0	0	0	0	10	29	91	7	3.6
Mining	10	5	50	2	20	40	2	20	40	100	1	10	20	50	50	1	20	50	2	4.0
Manufacturing	71	21	30	14	20	67	11	15	52	79	2	3	10	14	18	9	43	64	7	7.8
Construction	117	37	32	26	22	70	26	22	70	100	6	5	16	23	23	20	17	54	14	6.8
Transportation	138	40	29	44	32	110	39	28	98	89	3	2	8	7	8	36	26	90	23	5.7
Communications	6	3	50	4	67	133	3	50	100	75	3	50	100	75	100	0	0	0	3	7.2
Wholesale	8	2	25	2	25	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Retail	297	105	35	87	29	83	78	26	74	90	27	9	28	31	35	51	17	49	62	6.5
Retail & Food&Bev.	31	13	42	13	42	100	10	32	77	77	2	6	15	15	20	8	26	62	8	7.7
Fin., RI, Est. & Bus. Serv.	13	5	38	3	23	60	3	23	60	100	0	0	0	0	0	3	23	60	2	6.6
Local Gov't, Health, Ed.	6	4	67	2	33	50	2	33	50	100	1	17	25	50	50	1	17	25	1	8.7
Accommodation	32	6	19	2	6	33	2	6	33	100	1	3	17	50	50	1	3	17	2	4.2
Accom. & Food&Bev.	34	11	32	11	32	100	7	21	64	64	3	9	27	27	43	4	12	36	7	7.0
Cabins, Camps, Lodges	134	55	41	33	25	60	32	24	58	97	16	12	29	48	50	16	12	29	24	9.0
Food & Beverage	66	16	24	15	23	94	11	17	69	73	1	2	6	7	9	10	15	63	9	4.1
Other Services	155	50	32	38	25	76	36	23	72	95	7	5	14	18	19	29	19	58	22	5.0

1. Includes all instances of a variable value "not known". Variable counts may not add to these totals.

**TABLE 8-12
COMMUNITY CONDITIONS AND SURVIVAL OF FINANCED PROJECTS
RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS #1 - #6**

Model #1: All Entrepreneurs, 1986 Census Data

Cases: 24.
 Dependent variable: SU1.
 Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.
 Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.
 No variables were able to enter.

Model #2: All Entrepreneurs, 1991 Census Data

Cases: 29.
 Dependent variable: SU1.
 Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.
 Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.
 No variables were able to enter.

Model #3: Non-Government - Non-Collective Entrepreneurs, 1986 Census Data

Cases: 23.
 Dependent variable: SU2.
 Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.
 Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.
 1 step to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.2865. Std err. Y = 0.1673.
 DF: regression = 1, residual = 21. F = 9.8322. Sig F = .0050.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
CTR	-0.2886	0.0920	-0.5647	0.0050
Constant	0.3500	0.0837	-	0.0004

Variables not in model:

	Beta In	Partial	Sig. "t"
PG9	0.4553	0.4073	0.0599
PTP	-0.3700	-0.3144	0.1542
TOP	-0.2641	-0.2987	0.1769
ADP	-0.2593	-0.8350	0.2010
PAB	0.2699	0.2120	0.3437
ACC	-0.1006	-0.1191	0.5973
PCY	-0.1485	-0.1103	0.6251
PEY	-0.0699	-0.0644	0.7758
PAL	-0.0205	-0.0219	0.9231
MHY	-0.0234	-0.0164	0.9422
PEM	-0.0165	-0.0156	0.9452

**TABLE 8-12 (Cont.)
COMMUNITY CONDITIONS AND SURVIVAL OF FINANCED PROJECTS
RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS #1 - #6**

Model #4: Non-Government - Non-Collective Entrepreneurs, 1991 Census Data

Cases: 28.

Dependent variable: SU2.

Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.

1 step to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.3425. Std err. Y = 0.1751.

DF: regression = 1, residual = 26. F = 15.0634. Sig F = .0006.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
CTR	-0.2749	0.0708	-0.6057	0.0006
Constant	0.3363	0.0584	-	0.0000

Variables not in model:

	Beta In	Partial	Sig. "t"
PG9	0.2694	0.2861	0.1479
TOP	-0.1454	-0.1824	0.3624
ADP	-0.1418	-0.1769	0.3773
PAB	0.1004	0.1044	0.6043
PTP	-0.0844	-0.1035	0.6073
PEY	-0.1064	-0.1030	0.6091
ACC	-0.0821	-0.0946	0.6387
PCY	-0.0820	-0.0781	0.6984
PEM	-0.0643	-0.0712	0.7242
PAL	-0.0456	-0.0453	0.8224
MHY	-0.0318	-0.0371	0.8543

Model #5: Government and Collective Entrepreneurs, 1986 Census Data

Cases: 16.

Dependent variable: SU3.

Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.

No variables were able to enter.

**TABLE 8-12 (Cont.)
COMMUNITY CONDITIONS AND SURVIVAL OF FINANCED PROJECTS
RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS #1 - #6**

Model #6: Government and Collective Entrepreneurs, 1991 Census Data

Cases: 16.

Dependent variable: SU3.

Independent variables: CTR, TOP, ADP, PAB, PAL, MHY, PCY, PEY, PEM, PG9, PTP, ACC.

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, TOL = 0.01.

2 steps to completion. Adjusted R2 = 0.5480. Std err. Y = 0.2680.

DF: regression = 2, residual = 13. F = 10.0913. Sig F = .0023.

Variables in model:

	B	Std. Err. B	Beta	Sig. "t"
ADP	0.0005	0.0002	0.6115	0.0042
CTR	-0.9711	0.2815	-0.6092	0.0043
Constant	0.7760	0.2756	-	0.0146

Variables not in model:

	Beta In	Partial	Sig. "t"
PEM	0.3097	0.4722	0.0882
PAB	0.2671	0.4136	0.1416
TOP	-1.9245	-0.3607	0.2052
PEY	0.2194	0.3336	0.2438
PCY	0.2066	0.3186	0.2668
ACC	-0.1782	-0.2673	0.3556
PAL	-0.1298	-0.2050	0.4821
MHY	0.0611	0.0939	0.7494
PTP	0.0591	0.0868	0.7679
PG9	-0.0313	-0.0493	0.8670

TABLE 8-13
APPLICANT AND PROJECT ATTRIBUTES, AND PROJECT SURVIVAL
RESULTS OF THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL

Cases: 248.

Dependent variable: OEND. Dichotomous.

Independent variables:

Categorical: PRO*, ISFA, A#O*, AO*, ALO*, AS*, EBUS, FGL*, AOP*, A#P*,
 APR*, FCP*, FOEQ, AOEQ.

Continuous: FBNY, ABNY, AFPY, GCST, TCST, G/TC.

Method: Forward stepwise. Main effects only. Suppress AP#3.

Criteria: PIN = 0.05, POUT = 0.10, BCON (0.001), LCON = 0.01, EPS = 0.00000001.

4 steps to completion. -2LL = 48.714. Goodness of fit = 54.649.

Model chi-squ. = 34.387. Df = 4. Sig. = .0000.

Variables in model:

	B	SE B	Wald Sig.	R	Exp (B)
FGL1	-2.3548	0.9373	0.012	-0.2278	0.0949
TCST	0.0041	0.0017	0.0172	0.2104	1.0041
APR8	2.8362	1.3439	0.0348	0.1719	17.0514
APR10	2.4462	1.3541	0.0708	0.1233	11.5441
Constant	-1.5847	0.5380	0.0032	-	-

Variables not in model:

	Score	Sig.	R
PGR1	2.8902	0.0891	0.1035
GCST	2.8321	0.0924	0.1001
PRG6	2.4212	0.1197	0.0712
G/TC	2.4063	0.1209	0.0699
A#P2	2.3635	0.1242	0.0661
FGL4	2.3195	0.1278	0.0620
FGL3	2.2043	0.1376	0.0496
ASNA	1.6456	0.1996	0.0000
A#O2	1.4078	0.2354	0.0000
A#O1	1.3228	0.2501	0.0000
APR3	1.2814	0.2576	0.0000
APR7	1.0941	0.2956	0.0000
AFPY	1.0298	0.3102	0.0000
AOEQ	0.9357	0.3334	0.0000
FOEQ	0.8756	0.3494	0.0000
A#P1	0.7190	0.3965	0.0000
EBUS	0.7073	0.4003	0.0000
APR9	0.6937	0.4049	0.0000
APR5	0.6901	0.4061	0.0000
APR2	0.4574	0.4989	0.0000
AOP4	0.4527	0.5011	0.0000
ABNY	0.4192	0.5173	0.0000
AOFP	0.4120	0.5209	0.0000

**TABLE 8-13 (Cont.)
 APPLICANT AND PROJECT ATTRIBUTES, AND PROJECT SURVIVAL
 RESULTS OF THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL**

Variables not in model (Cont.):

	Score	Sig.	R
ASRI	0.3444	0.5573	0.0000
AOP5	0.3244	0.5690	0.0000
APR4	0.2933	0.5881	0.0000
AOCA	0.2859	0.5928	0.0000
FBNY	0.2846	0.5937	0.0000
AOPC	0.2634	0.6078	0.0000
PRG3	0.2500	0.6171	0.0000
FGL2	0.2134	0.6441	0.0000
AOP3	0.1768	0.6741	0.0000
ASOA	0.1367	0.7116	0.0000
ARIR	0.0787	0.7791	0.0000
AROC	0.0495	0.8240	0.0000
AOLG	0.0288	0.8652	0.0000
AREX	0.0288	0.8652	0.0000
AOP1	0.0253	0.8737	0.0000
AOIB	0.0149	0.9027	0.0000
ARUC	0.0104	0.9186	0.0000
AOP2	0.0042	0.9481	0.0000
AOPR	0.0036	0.9521	0.0000
A#O3	0.0004	0.9831	0.0000

**TABLE 8-14
EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES**

Variable and Value	Total Number of Projects (1)	Impacts						
		Total PY's Created Since Final Dec'n		Actual PY's Per Project Compared to Program Projected PY's Per Project				
		Projects Known	Per Project	Project Known	Mean PY's/Yr Proj'd	Actual	Difference Amnt.	%
Program								
All (2)	419	151	19.8	179	2.9	1.7	-1.2	-40
SARDA	290	140	21.4	168	2.7	1.9	-0.9	-32
NDA2	121	10	0	10	5.0	0.0	-5.0	-100
NEDP3	8	1	0	1	8.0	0.0	-8.0	-100
Period, Screen								
1971-73	9	7	62.1	0	-	-	-	-
1974-78	51	16	45.1	0	-	-	-	-
1979-83	61	24	23.1	17	3.5	2.5	-1.0	-28
1984-88	248	97	13.2	148	2.9	1.8	-1.1	-39
1989	34	7	0.8	13	1.6	0.7	-1.0	-59
Who Prepared Application								
Case Program	2	2	6.3	1	1.0	0.0	-1.0	-100
Other Gov't Agency	28	7	19.1	11	3.1	1.6	-1.5	-50
Non-gov't Agent	145	55	22.3	84	3.1	1.5	-1.6	-51
Applicant	77	32	13.5	39	2.1	1.3	-0.7	-36
No. of Approvals								
0	397	137	16.9	184	2.8	1.7	-1.1	-41
1	19	13	52.5	9	4.8	3.3	-1.5	-30
2	1	0	-	0	-	-	-	-
3 or More	2	0	-	0	-	-	-	-
Appr'd, No. of Owners								
1	343	124	20.3	156	2.8	1.7	-1.1	-41
2	52	19	16.8	29	3.0	1.8	-1.1	-39
3 or More	13	4	20.1	5	5.0	3.5	-1.5	-30
Appr'd, Owner Type								
Proprietor	303	116	12.2	149	2.4	1.5	-0.9	-36
F-P Private Corp.	8	3	5.9	4	8.3	4.8	-3.5	-42
Non-Gov't Collective	19	6	46.9	3	5.0	1.0	-4.0	-80
Indian Band	61	19	31.2	20	5.1	3.4	-1.7	-34
Local Government	4	0	-	0	-	-	-	-
Federal/Provincial	4	0	-	0	-	-	-	-
Appr'd, Owner Location								
Organized Cmty	41	16	43.2	15	2.1	1.7	-0.5	-22
Unorganized Cmty	124	54	17.4	50	3.1	1.6	-1.5	-49
Indian Reserve	203	69	12.9	103	2.9	1.7	-1.2	-41
Out-Area Known	14	3	65.8	3	5.3	1.3	-4.0	-75
Owner Status								
Registered Indian	213	71	12.5	112	2.9	1.5	-1.4	-47
Other Aboriginal	106	43	18.6	46	2.9	1.8	-1.1	-39
Not Aboriginal	55	30	34.7	31	3.3	1.6	-1.7	-52
Existing Business								
Yes	161	65	21.2	374	2.7	1.1	-1.6	-60
No	257	86	18.9	124	3.1	1.9	-1.2	-38
Perf. of Exist. Business								
Positive	39	19	15.2	25	2.1	1.5	-0.6	-28
Negative	47	11	8.9	14	3.8	0.5	-3.3	-87

**TABLE 8-14 (Cont.)
EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES**

Variable and Value	Total Number of Projects (1)	Impacts						
		Total PY's Created Since Final Dec'n		Actual PY's Per Project Compared to Program Projected PY's Per Project				
		Projects Known	Per Project	Project Known	Mean PY's/Yr Proj'd	Actual	Difference Amnt.	%
Previous Gov't Financing								
None	343	128	20.9	173	2.9	1.7	-1.2	-43
Any Government	76	23	13.9	23	3.1	1.0	-2.1	-69
Federal Gov't	73	23	13.9	23	3.1	1.0	-2.1	-69
DRE/IE	47	12	6.5	15	3.1	1.3	-1.8	-59
Operational Location								
Organized Cmty	38	16	44.5	18	2.2	1.7	-0.6	-25
Unorganized Cmty	133	56	20.8	54	3.0	1.5	-1.4	-49
Indian Reserve	200	69	13.3	110	2.8	1.5	-1.3	-47
Goal								
New Business	134	46	20.4	78	2.8	1.8	-1.0	-34
Exist.Bus.Sts.New Bus.	10	3	23.4	3	8.3	3.0	-5.3	-64
New Purchase	34	18	16.4	21	2.1	1.8	-0.2	-12
Exist.Bus.Pur.New Bus.	7	4	6.8	5	4.4	1.0	-3.4	-77
Expand	64	30	21.9	34	2.3	1.0	-1.3	-57
Other Goal	30	6	4.7	11	4.9	0.6	-4.4	-89
Quality of Full Appl.								
Blank	135	43	22.7	42	3.0	1.7	-1.2	-42
Not Blank	284	108	18.7	154	2.9	1.5	-1.4	-47
Not 1 Yr EBITDA	22	8	10.3	11	2.6	1.6	-1.0	-39
1-3 Yrs EBITDA	89	30	22.6	42	3.4	1.9	-1.4	-42
3 Yrs Proforma	173	70	18.0	101	2.7	1.4	-1.4	-50
Equity								
Full Appl. = 0	44	14	13.9	15	3.3	1.4	-1.9	-57
Full Appl. > 0	240	94	19.4	139	2.9	1.6	-1.3	-46
Final Approval = 0	47	11	5.6	18	3.8	0.6	-3.3	-85
Final Approval > 0	372	140	21.0	177	2.8	1.7	-1.2	-40
Proj'd Highest Net Income								
Full Appl. >= 0	153	65	17.4	96	2.7	1.2	-1.4	-54
Full Appl. < 0	131	86	21.7	58	3.3	2.1	-1.2	-37
Final Approval >= 0	266	113	19.6	140	2.7	1.3	-1.4	-50
Final Approval < 0	153	38	20.6	56	3.5	2.2	-1.3	-37
Appr'd, Value of Financing								
Less Than \$25,000	109	42	6.5	76	1.7	1.1	-0.6	-33
\$25-49,000	98	31	9.6	47	2.0	1.0	-1.0	-49
\$50-74,000	56	23	17.7	23	2.6	1.4	-1.2	-47
\$75-99,000	32	10	14.6	9	3.6	1.3	-2.2	-63
\$100-149,000	35	15	20.8	14	5.6	2.1	-3.5	-62
\$150-199,000	35	11	41.8	12	5.5	4.0	-1.5	-27
\$200,000 or More	42	19	58.1	15	7.5	3.7	-3.8	-50
Appr'd, Total PY's								
0	47	15	4.4	18	0.0	0.4	0.4	-
1	59	22	7.5	40	1.0	0.9	-0.1	-10
2-4	168	58	9.6	113	2.5	1.5	-1.1	-42
5-9	24	12	30.5	16	7.1	2.9	-4.3	-60
10-14	5	3	0.0	6	11.7	1.3	-10.3	-89
15-19	3	1	19.9	2	16.0	9.0	-7.0	-44
20 or More	2	1	242.5	1	28.0	28.0	0.0	0

**TABLE 8-14 (Cont.)
EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES**

Variable and Value	Total Number of Projects (1)	Impacts						
		Total PY's Created Since Final Dec'n		Actual PY's Per Project Compared to Program Projected PY's Per Project				
		Projects Known	Per Project	Project Known	Mean PY's/Yr Proj'd	Actual	Difference Amnt.	%
Appr'd, No. of Products								
1	312	105	15.8	154	2.7	1.6	-1.0	-39
2	65	31	16.2	29	3.8	1.0	-2.7	-73
3 or More	40	15	55.8	13	4.1	2.4	-1.7	-42
Appr'd, Product (3)								
Agriculture	13	3	3.3	2	1.5	0.5	-1.0	-67
Fishing	6	2	32.3	0	-	-	0.0	-
Logging&Forestry	77	12	5.2	31	3.0	2.0	-0.9	-32
Logging&For.-Mfg.	10	4	20.6	3	8.7	0.0	-8.7	-100
Mining	2	1	0.0	1	10.0	0.0	-10.0	-100
Manufacturing	11	2	86.8	8	4.5	0.5	-4.0	-89
Construction	26	7	2.2	14	2.1	1.1	-1.1	-50
Transportation	39	16	15.4	25	1.7	1.4	-0.2	-14
Communications	3	0	-	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	-
Retail	78	36	18.8	43	2.1	1.7	-0.4	-18
Retail-Food&Bev.	10	5	13.3	5	3.4	2.0	-1.4	-41
Fin.,Rl.Est.&Bus.Serv.	3	1	29.0	0	-	-	0.0	-
Health,Ed.,Local Gov't	2	1	242.5	2	21.0	18.0	-3.0	-14
Accommodation	2	2	6.8	1	1.0	1.0	0.0	0
Accom.-Food&Bev.	7	5	19.5	4	6.5	1.8	-4.8	-73
Cabins,Campgnds,Lodge	32	11	35.0	10	4.1	2.0	-2.1	-51
Food & Beverage Serv.	11	7	2.6	8	2.8	0.6	-2.1	-77
Other Services	36	14	7.6	18	2.0	0.8	-1.2	-59

1. Includes only projects that received financing from case programs.
2. Includes all instances of a variable value "not known". Variable counts may not add to these totals.
3. No wholesaling businesses were approved.

**TABLE 8-15
COMPATIBILITY OF RELATIVELY HIGH PAYOFF ATTRIBUTES**

Variable	Attributes With High and Low Payoffs		Compatibility of High Payoff
	Re: Business Survival	Re: Employment Generated	
Who Prep. Full Appl.	High - Applicant Low - Prog. & other gov't agents	High - Applicant. non-gov't agents Low - Prog. & other gov't agents	Yes Not incompatible
Number of Approvals	High - 1 Low - 0	High - 1 Low - 0	Yes
Number of Owners	High - 2 Low - 1	High - Min. difference/no pattern Low - Min. difference/no pattern	Not incompatible
Type of Owner	High - Indian band Low - Private for-profit corp. collective	High - Indian band collective Low - Private for-profit corp.	Yes No
Location of Owner	High - Outside study area Low - Indian reserve	High - Outside study area organized community Low - Indian reserve unorganized community	Yes Not incompatible
Status of Owner	High - Not aboriginal Low - Registered Indian	High - Not aboriginal Low - Registered Indian	Yes
Existing Business	High - Yes Low - No	High - Min. difference/no pattern Low - Min. difference/no pattern	Not incompatible
Perf. of Existing Bus.	High - Min. difference/no pattern Low - Min. difference/no pattern	High - Positive net income Low - Negative net income	Not incompatible
Prev. Fin. of Exist.Bus.	High - DRE/IE Low - None	High - None Low - DRE/IE	No
Location of Operations	High - Unorganized community Low - Indian reserve	High - Organized community Low - Indian reserve	Not comp.: org., No : Unorg.
Goal	High - Exist. bus. purchases bus., new purchase Low - New business	High - New business exist.bus.starts new bus. expansion Low - Exist.bus. purchases bus. other goal	Not incomp.: new purchase exist.starts new expansion No:New bus., exis.bus.pur.bus
Quality of Full Applica	High - Min. difference/no pattern Low - Not 1 yr EBITDA	High - Blank application 1-3 yrs EBITDA Low - Not 1 yr EBITDA	Not incompatible Not incompatible
Equity	High - Full appl. & appr'd >0 Low - Full appl & appr'd = 0	High - Full appl. & appr'd >0 Low - Full appl & appr'd = 0	Yes
Highest exp'd net inc.	High - Full appl. & appr'd <0 Low - Full appl. & appr'd >=0	High - Min. difference/no pattern Low - Min. difference/no pattern	Not incompatible

**TABLE 8-15 (Cont.)
COMPATIBILITY OF RELATIVELY HIGH PAYOFF ATTRIBUTES**

Variable	Attributes With High and Low Payoffs		Compatibility of High Payoff
	Re: Business Survival	Re: Employment Generated	
Approved Financing	High - >\$100 thousand Low - <\$49 thousand	High - >\$100 thousand Low - <\$49 thousand	Yes
Expected Employment	High - Min. difference/no pattern Low - Min. difference/no pattern	High - Min. difference/no pattern Low - Min. difference/no pattern	Not incompatible
Number of Products	High - 3 or more Low - Min. difference/no pattern	High - 3 or more Low - Min. difference/no pattern	Yes
Products	High - Fishing	High - Fishing	Yes
	retail accommodation-food&bev. cabins, campgr'nds, lodges	retail accommodation-food&bev. cabins, campgr'nds, lodges	Yes Yes Yes
		logging&forestry-mfg manufacturing transportation retail-food&beverages	No No No Not incompatible
	Low - Agriculture	Low - Construction	
	logging&forestry manufacturing transportation food&beverages	logging&forestry construction other services food&beverages	

**TABLE 8-16
COST PER SURVIVING PROJECT AND PER YEAR OF PROJECT LIFESPAN**

Variable and Attribute	Number of Projects		Regarding Project Survival							Regarding Project Lifespan							
	Financial		Surviving	Cost Per Surviving Project (\$'000's)(1)					Lifespan		Cost Per Year of Project Life (\$'000's)(2)						
	Financed	Data		Program Grants	Other Sources Grants	Total Sources Grant	Other Sources Loans	Total Gov't Cost	Data Count	Mean Years	Program Grants	Other Sources Grants	Total Sources Grant	Other Sources Loans	Total Gov't Cost		
Program																	
All	419	389	91	448	217	665	384	1049	826	275	6.4	15	7	22	13	35	30
SARDA	290	284	49	392	193	586	620	1206	861	189	7.0	9	5	14	15	29	23
NDA2	121	117	36	450	223	673	102	775	707	89	5.3	25	13	38	6	44	41
NEDP3	8	8	6	781	323	1104	205	1309	1256	6	6.8	86	35	121	22	144	136
Period, Final Approval																	
1971-73	9	9	3	565	161	726	1127	1853	1598	9	12.8	15	4	19	29	48	42
1974-78	51	50	5	794	966	1760	1563	3323	2586	31	8.1	10	12	21	19	40	32
1979-83	61	60	10	461	260	721	560	1282	1019	43	8.2	9	5	14	11	26	21
1984-88	248	225	68	346	164	511	230	740	586	170	5.7	17	8	25	11	36	31
1989	34	31	2	1687	24	1710	269	1999	1626	22	4.0	25	0	25	4	29	26
Who Prepared Application																	
Case Program	2	2	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3.5	9	0	9	12	21	32
Other Gov't Agency	28	26	4	609	1160	1769	847	2616	2107	18	7.8	11	21	33	16	48	42
Non-gov't Agent Applicant	145	138	35	458	222	681	285	965	792	98	5.5	20	10	30	12	42	36
Applicant	77	69	21	348	101	449	309	756	591	56	6.3	15	4	20	13	33	29
Appr'd, No. of Owners																	
1	343	322	70	467	250	717	405	1123	891	224	6.5	15	8	23	13	35	30
2	52	43	17	350	122	471	241	712	548	33	5.7	20	7	27	14	41	38
3 or More	13	13	4	453	19	472	386	858	629	10	5.1	27	1	28	23	52	38
Appr'd, Owner Type																	
Proprietor	303	276	62	331	99	430	318	748	584	184	6.2	11	3	14	10	25	21
F-P Private Corp.	8	8	1	1161	98	1259	888	2147	1645	7	5.5	26	2	29	20	49	37
Non-Gov't Collective	19	16	3	1427	1524	2950	1254	4205	3258	15	7.2	31	33	65	27	92	85
Indian Band	61	59	22	552	322	874	311	1186	950	47	6.5	31	18	48	17	66	54
Local Government	4	4	1	670	0	670	44	714	670	2	3.2	53	0	53	3	56	53
Federal/Provincial	4	4	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	7.7	26	55	83	39	122	83
Appr'd, Owner Location																	
Organized Cmty	41	39	9	396	35	431	421	853	659	27	7.6	11	1	12	12	25	20
Unorganized Cmty	124	115	36	297	108	404	305	710	597	83	6.7	13	5	18	13	31	28
Indian Reserve	203	187	40	529	325	854	345	1199	926	133	5.5	19	12	30	12	43	36
Out-Area Known	14	14	6	724	562	1285	466	1752	1384	11	9.4	33	26	58	21	60	63

**TABLE 8-16 (Cont.)
COST PER SURVIVING PROJECT AND PER YEAR OF PROJECT LIFESPAN**

Variable and Attribute	Number of Projects		Regarding Project Survival							Regarding Project Lifespan								
	Financial Financed	Data	Surviving	Cost Per Surviving Project (\$'000's)(1)						Lifespan Data Count	Mean Years	Cost Per Year of Project Life (\$'000's)(2)						
				Program Grants	Other Sources Grants	Total Grant	Other Sources Loans	Total Cost	Gross Gov't Cost			Program Grants	Other Sources Grants	Total Grant	Other Sources Loans	Total Cost	Gross Gov't Cost	
Appr'd, Owner Status																		
Registered Indian	213	195	44	537	310	848	373	1221	959	143	5.5	20	12	32	14	46	39	
Other Aboriginal	106	100	24	270	58	329	328	657	550	64	6.2	10	2	12	12	24	21	
Not Aboriginal	55	51	23	343	81	424	277	701	578	45	7.6	19	4	23	15	38	34	
Existing Business																		
Yes	161	148	45	429	172	602	365	967	748	120	6.8	18	7	25	15	40	33	
No	257	240	46	467	260	727	403	1131	901	155	6.2	14	8	21	12	33	28	
Perf. of Exist. Business																		
Positive	39	34	14	295	121	416	269	686	443	27	7.0	15	6	22	14	35	26	
Negative	47	44	17	466	232	698	245	943	744	38	6.2	27	14	41	14	55	46	
Previous Gov't Financing																		
None	343	80	22	1554	492	2046	1943	3988	3250	218	6.4	16	5	21	20	40	33	
Any Government	76	68	23	476	224	700	250	950	739	57	6.7	21	10	31	11	43	37	
Federal Gov't	73	66	23	455	141	596	190	785	651	55	6.6	22	7	28	9	37	34	
DRE/IE	47	41	15	515	172	687	194	881	705	35	6.2	26	9	35	10	45	41	
Appr'd, Oper. Location																		
Organized Cmty	38	36	10	325	31	356	362	739	547	24	8.1	11	1	12	12	24	19	
Unorganized Cmty	133	123	41	321	138	459	295	754	623	91	7.1	14	6	20	13	33	29	
Indian Reserve	200	184	35	537	323	860	435	1294	995	130	5.8	16	10	26	13	39	33	
Goal																		
New Business	134	122	16	702	534	1236	576	1811	1428	79	5.5	15	12	27	13	40	34	
Exist.Bus.Stts.New Bus.	10	10	2	511	37	548	268	816	710	6	4.5	23	2	24	12	36	31	
New Purchase	34	33	15	259	69	327	214	541	477	28	6.5	18	5	22	14	37	33	
Exist.Bus.Pur.New Bus.	7	7	4	215	148	363	289	652	582	6	7.0	18	12	30	24	53	48	
Expand	64	58	18	368	129	497	284	781	598	48	6.7	15	5	21	12	33	28	
Other Goal	30	28	9	664	343	1007	383	1390	1048	21	5.5	36	19	55	21	76	61	
Quality of Full Appl.																		
Blank	135	127	27	404	153	557	449	1006	780	83	7.7	10	4	14	12	26	21	
Not Blank	284	262	64	467	244	712	356	1068	845	192	5.9	18	9	27	14	41	35	
Not 1Yr EBITDA	22	17	2	1234	1856	3090	2004	5094	2992	16	4.9	23	34	57	37	94	72	
1-3 Yrs EBITDA	89	84	22	353	197	550	358	908	684	59	6.1	14	8	22	15	37	29	
3 Yrs. Proforma	173	161	40	493	201	694	282	976	827	117	5.9	19	8	27	11	38	35	

**TABLE 8-16 (Cont.)
COST PER SURVIVING PROJECT AND PER YEAR OF PROJECT LIFESPAN**

Variable and Attribute	Number of Projects		Regarding Project Survival							Regarding Project Lifespan								
	Financial Financed	Data	Surviving	Cost Per Surviving Project (\$'000's)(1)						Lifespan				Cost Per Year of Project Life (\$'000's)(2)				
				Program Grants	Other Sources Grants	Total Grant	Other Sources Loans	Total Cost	Gross Gov't Cost	Data Count	Mean Years	Program Grants	Other Sources Grants	Total Grant	Other Sources Loans	Total Cost	Gross Gov't Cost	
Equity																		
Full Appl. = 0	44	43	8	589	322	911	236	1147	1020	34	5.9	18	10	28	7	35	32	
Full Appl. > 0	240	185	51	505	292	797	404	1201	791	158	5.9	18	11	29	15	43	37	
Final Approval = 0	47	45	8	545	146	691	116	807	731	34	5.8	16	4	20	3	24	22	
Final Approval > 0	372	336	82	446	222	668	423	1091	826	238	6.5	15	8	23	14	37	31	
Proj'd Highest Net Income																		
Full Appl. >= 0	153	142	33	432	99	531	288	799	660	102	5.9	16	4	19	10	29	26	
Full Appl. < 0	19	18	7	732	671	1404	340	1744	1573	14	6.8	40	37	77	19	95	90	
Final Approval >= 0	266	247	52	467	122	589	442	1031	801	166	6.6	14	4	17	13	31	26	
Final Approval < 0	13	11	4	635	1238	1873	560	2433	1799	10	6.2	32	62	93	28	121	106	
Appr'd, Value of Financing																		
Less Than \$25,000	109	117	11	127	16	143	197	340	303	60	5.2	2	0	3	4	7	5	
\$25-49,000	98	89	12	294	100	394	437	831	593	57	5.9	6	2	8	9	17	14	
\$50-74,000	56	42	13	254	298	553	288	841	539	38	6.9	9	10	19	10	28	24	
\$75-99,000	32	34	9	304	131	435	264	699	623	26	6.5	13	6	19	11	30	25	
\$100-149,000	35	32	15	279	58	337	207	545	391	26	6.5	18	4	22	14	36	28	
\$150-199,000	35	27	10	613	331	944	527	1471	1019	24	7.8	23	12	35	19	54	48	
\$200,000 or More	42	48	21	800	397	1197	547	1744	1716	44	7.6	52	26	78	36	114	98	
Appr'd, Total PY's																		
0	47	3	21	912	130	1042	116	1159	74	39	5.9	69	10	79	9	88	88	
1	59	1	10	1605	366	1971	1481	3452	52	36	5.7	48	11	58	44	102	91	
2-4	168	6	30	1447	327	1773	2108	3882	102	96	5.3	49	11	60	72	132	98	
5-9	24	4	9	703	149	853	661	1514	190	22	6.2	43	9	52	40	92	69	
10-14	5	3	1	1520	835	2355	3218	5573	3180	5	2.3	132	73	205	280	485	461	
15-19	3	0	2							2	8.7							
20 or More	2	1	2	260	0	260	1426	1686	130	1	8.7	30	0	30	165	195	30	

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**TABLE 8-16 (Cont.)
COST PER SURVIVING PROJECT AND PER YEAR OF PROJECT LIFESPAN**

Variable and Attribute	Number of Projects		Regarding Project Survival							Regarding Project Lifespan							
	Financial Financed	Data	Surviving	Cost Per Surviving Project (\$'000's)(1)						Lifespan		Cost Per Year of Project Life (\$'000's)(2)					
				Program Grants	Other Sources Grants	Total Grant	Other Sources Loans	Total Cost	Gross Gov't Cost	Data Count	Mean Years	Program Grants	Other Sources Grants	Total Grant	Other Sources Loans	Total Cost	Gross Gov't Cost
Appr'd, No. of Products																	
1	312	287	59	396	196	592	399	991	716	192	6.1	12	6	18	12	31	24
2	65	63	11	637	332	970	647	1616	1340	49	6.2	17	9	26	18	44	38
3 or More	40	37	21	492	213	705	201	905	815	32	9.2	28	12	40	11	52	50
Appr'd, Product																	
Agriculture	13	12	2	763	560	1343	263	1606	1240	7	5.9	20	15	35	7	42	35
Fishing	6	6	2	76	0	76	71	147	184	3	9.8	3	0	3	2	5	6
Logging&Forestry	77	73	2	2136	1146	3283	3290	6572	4443	32	5.0	11	6	17	17	34	24
Logging&For.-Mfg.	10	10	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	3.6	35	36	71	45	116	115
Mining	2	2	1	262	1821	2083	379	2462	2234	2	4.0	33	229	262	48	309	261
Manufacturing	11	11	2	667	234	901	364	1265	917	7	7.8	15	5	21	8	29	21
Construction	26	24	6	521	245	767	415	1181	810	14	6.8	18	8	26	14	40	30
Transportation	39	32	3	520	57	577	438	1015	622	23	5.7	7	1	8	6	14	10
Communications	3	3	3	162	0	162	11	173	162	3	7.2	22	0	22	2	24	22
Retail	78	70	27	224	111	335	180	515	412	62	6.5	12	6	18	10	27	24
Retail-Food&Bev.	10	9	2	595	697	1292	1054	2346	2047	8	7.7	15	18	34	27	61	59
Fin.,Rt.Est.&Bus.Serv.	3	3	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	8.6	6	0	6	5	11	6
Health,Ed.,Local Gov't	2	2	1	345	227	572	1850	2422	572	1	8.7	20	13	33	107	140	33
Accommodation	2	2	1	263	38	301	400	701	420	2	4.2	31	5	36	48	84	50
Accom.-Food&Bev.	7	7	3	260	79	339	210	549	436	7	7.0	16	5	21	13	33	27
Cabins,Camps,Lodges	32	27	16	487	262	749	217	966	779	24	9.0	27	15	42	12	54	52
Food & Beverage Serv.	11	10	1	455	47	503	263	766	609	9	4.1	10	1	11	6	17	15
Other Services	36	34	7	297	39	335	186	522	424	22	5.0	11	1	13	7	20	17

(1) Cost per surviving project is found by dividing costs per attribute by number of financed projects whose financing costs are known, multiplying that product by the number of financed projects, then dividing by the number of survivors.

(2) Cost per life-year is found by dividing costs per attribute by number of financed projects whose finance costs are known, multiplying that product by the number of financed projects, then dividing by the number of financed projects times mean life years

**TABLE 8-17
COST PER PERSON-YEAR OF EMPLOYMENT CREATED DURING PROJECT LIFE**

Variable and Attribute	Number of Projects		Regarding Cost Per PY Created (1)						
	Financial Financed	Data	Total PY's Created Per Project	Cost Per PY Created (\$000's)(2)					
				Program Grants	Other Sources Grants	Total Grants	Other Sources Loans	Total Cost	Gross Gov't Cost
Program									
All	419	151	19.8	13	6	19	11	30	25
SARDA	290	140	21.4	6	3	9	9	18	14
NDA2	121	10	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
NEDP3	8	1	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Period, Final Approval									
1971-73	9	7	62.1	4	1	5	8	13	11
1974-78	51	16	45.1	5	7	12	11	23	18
1979-83	61	24	23.1	8	5	13	10	23	18
1984-88	248	97	13.2	17	8	25	11	36	31
1989	34	7	0.8	536	7	543	92	635	566
Who Prepared Application									
Case Program	2	2	6.3	5	0	5	7	12	17
Other Gov't Agency	28	7	19.1	17	32	49	24	73	63
Non-gov't Agent	145	55	22.3	12	6	19	8	26	23
Applicant	77	32	13.5	15	4	20	13	33	29
Appr'd, No. of Owners									
1	343	124	20.3	12	7	19	11	29	25
2	52	19	16.8	15	5	21	11	31	29
3 or More	13	4	20.1	23	1	23	19	43	31
Appr'd, Owner Type									
Proprietor	303	116	12.2	13	4	17	13	30	26
F-P Private Corp.	8	3	5.9	65	5	71	50	120	92
Non-Gov't Collective	19	6	46.9	13	14	27	11	38	35
Indian Band	61	19	31.2	20	12	31	11	43	35
Local Government	4	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Federal/Provincial	4	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Appr'd, Owner Location									
Organized Cmty	41	16	43.2	5	0	5	5	11	9
Unorganized Cmty	124	54	17.4	11	4	14	11	25	23
Indian Reserve	203	69	12.9	22	13	35	14	50	42
Out-Area Known	14	3	65.8	22	17	39	14	53	42
Appr'd, Owner Status									
Registered Indian	213	71	12.5	24	14	38	17	55	48
Other Aboriginal	106	43	18.6	8	2	9	9	19	17
Not Aboriginal	55	30	34.7	7	2	9	6	14	13
Existing Business									
Yes	161	65	21.2	13	5	18	11	29	24
No	257	86	18.9	12	7	19	11	30	26
Perf. of Exist. Business									
Positive	39	19	15.2	12	5	18	11	29	22
Negative	47	11	8.9	76	38	114	40	154	130
Previous Gov't Financing									
None	343	128	20.9	3	1	4	4	8	6
Any Government	76	23	13.9	31	14	45	16	61	53
Federal Gov't	73	23	13.9	30	9	39	12	51	47
DRE/IE	47	12	6.5	87	29	115	33	148	136

**TABLE 8-17 (Cont.)
COST PER PERSON-YEAR OF EMPLOYMENT CREATED DURING PROJECT LIFE**

Variable and Attribute	Number of Projects		Regarding Cost Per PY Created (1)							
	Financial Financed	Data	Total PY's Created Per Project	Cost Per PY Created (\$000's)(2)					Gross Total Cost	Gov't Cost
				Program Grants	Other Sources Grants	Total Grants	Other Sources Loans	Total Cost		
Appr'd, Oper. Location										
Organized Cmty	38	16	44.5	4	0	5	5	10	8	
Unorganized Cmty	133	56	20.8	10	4	15	10	25	22	
Indian Reserve	200	69	13.3	19	11	30	15	45	38	
Goal										
New Business	134	46	20.4	11	8	19	9	28	24	
Exist.Bus.Stts.New Bus.	10	3	23.4	15	1	16	8	23	20	
New Purchase	34	18	16.4	13	3	16	11	27	24	
Exist.Bus.Pur.New Bus.	7	4	6.8	32	22	54	43	96	86	
Expand	64	30	21.9	9	3	12	7	19	16	
Other Goal	30	6	4.7	200	103	303	115	418	338	
Quality of Full Appl.										
Blank	135	43	22.7	11	4	15	12	26	22	
Not Blank	284	108	18.7	14	7	21	10	31	27	
Not 1Yr EBITDA	22	8	10.3	23	35	58	38	96	73	
1-3 Yrs EBITDA	89	30	22.6	11	6	17	11	28	22	
3 Yrs. Proforma	173	70	18.0	15	6	20	8	29	26	
Equity										
Full Appl. = 0	44	14	13.9	24	13	36	9	46	42	
Full Appl. > 0	240	94	19.4	11	6	17	9	26	22	
Final Approval = 0	47	11	5.6	68	18	86	14	100	95	
Final Approval > 0	372	140	21.0	11	6	17	11	28	23	
Proj'd Highest Net Income										
Full Appl. >= 0	153	65	17.4	12	3	14	7	22	19	
Full Appl. < 0	131	86	21.7	3	2	5	1	6	6	
Final Approval >= 0	266	113	19.6	10	3	13	10	22	19	
Final Approval < 0	153	38	20.6	3	5	8	2	11	9	
Appr'd, Value of Financing										
Less Than \$25,000	109	42	6.5	6	1	6	9	15	12	
\$25-49,000	98	31	9.6	11	4	14	16	30	24	
\$50-74,000	56	23	17.7	6	7	13	7	20	17	
\$75-99,000	32	10	14.6	20	9	29	17	46	38	
\$100-149,000	35	15	20.8	12	3	15	9	24	19	
\$150-199,000	35	11	41.8	10	6	16	9	25	22	
\$200,000 or More	42	19	58.1	17	9	26	12	38	33	
Appr'd, Annual PY's										
0	47	15	4.4	18	3	21	2	23	23	
1	59	22	7.5	2	0	2	2	4	3	
2-4	168	58	9.6	3	1	3	4	7	6	
5-9	24	12	30.5	3	1	3	3	6	5	
10-14	5	3	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	
15-19	3	1	19.9	na	na	na	na	na	na	
20 or More	2	1	242.5	1	0	1	6	7	1	

**TABLE 8-17 (Cont.)
COST PER PERSON-YEAR OF EMPLOYMENT CREATED DURING PROJECT LIFE**

Variable and Attribute	Number of Projects		Regarding Cost Per PY Created (1)						
	Financial Financed	Data	Total PY's Created Per Project	Cost Per PY Created (\$000's)(2)					Gross Gov't Cost
				Program Grants	Other Sources Grants	Total Grants	Other Sources Loans	Total Cost	
Appr'd, No. of Products									
1	312	105	15.8	13	6	19	13	32	25
2	65	31	16.2	14	7	21	14	34	29
3 or More	40	15	55.8	11	5	16	5	21	20
Appr'd, Product									
Agriculture	13	3	3.3	143	108	251	49	300	251
Fishing	6	2	32.3	2	0	2	2	5	6
Logging&Forestry	77	12	5.2	65	35	101	101	201	143
Logging&For.-Mfg.	10	4	20.6	15	16	31	20	51	50
Mining	2	1	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Manufacturing	11	2	86.8	8	3	10	4	15	11
Construction	26	7	2.2	190	89	280	151	431	320
Transportation	39	16	15.4	5	1	6	4	10	8
Communications	3	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Retail	78	36	18.8	8	4	12	6	18	16
Retail-Food&Bev.	10	5	13.3	16	19	35	29	64	62
Fin.,RI.Est.&Bus.Serv.	3	1	29.0	5	0	5	4	10	5
Health,Ed.,Local Gov't	2	1	242.5	1	1	2	8	10	2
Accommodation	2	2	6.8	19	3	22	30	52	31
Accom.-Food&Bev.	7	5	19.5	8	2	10	6	17	13
Cabins,Camps,Lodges	32	11	35.0	17	9	26	8	34	32
Food & Beverage Serv.	11	7	2.6	23	2	25	13	38	33
Other Services	36	14	7.6	18	2	21	12	32	28

1. PY's are defined as the total number of full-time, full year job equivalents that existed over the lifespan of projects whose lifespans are known.
2. Cost per PY is found by dividing financed costs per project per attribute, by the mean number of PY's per project.

TABLE 8-18
ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH & LOW COSTS PER YEAR OF PROJECT LIFE, AND
ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH & LOW COSTS PER YEAR OF EMPLOYMENT CREATED

Variable and Attribute	Longevity Cost Is		Per Year Employment Cost Is	
	High	Low	High	Low
Who Prepared Application				
Case Program				
Other Government Agency	X		X	
Non-government Agent Applicant				
Appr'd, Owner Type				
Proprietor		X		X
For-Profit Private Corp.			X	
Non-Gov't Collective	X			
Indian Band	X			
Local Government	X			
Federal/Provincial Gov't	X			
Appr'd, Owner Location				
Organized Community		X		X
Unorganized Community		X		
Indian Reserve	X		X	
Out-Area Known	X		X	
Appr'd, Owner Status				
Registered Indian	X		X	
Other Aboriginal		X		X
Not Aboriginal				X
Perf. of Exist. Business				
Positive		X		X
Negative	X		X	
Previous Gov't Financing				
None				X
Any Government				
Federal Government		X		
DRE/IE			X	
Appr'd, Operational Location				
Organized Community		X		X
Unorganized Community				
Indian Reserve	X		X	
Goal				
New Business				
Existing Bus. Starts New Bus.				
New Purchase		X		
Existing Bus. Purchases New Bus.				X
Expand			X	
Other Goal	X			X
Quality of Full Application				
Blank		X		
Not Blank				
Not 1 Yr EBITDA	X		X	
1-3 Yrs EBITDA		X		
3 Yrs Proforma				
Equity				
Full Appl. = 0			X	
Full Appl. > 0				X
Final Approval = 0			X	
Final Approval > 0				X

**TABLE 8-18 (Cont.)
 ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH & LOW COSTS PER YEAR OF PROJECT LIFE, AND
 ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH & LOW COSTS PER YEAR OF EMPLOYMENT CREATED**

Variable and Attribute	Longevity Cost Is		Per Year Employment Cost Is	
	High	Low	High	Low
Projected Highest Net Income				
Full Appl. ≥ 0		X	X	
Full Appl. < 0	X			X
Final Approval ≥ 0		X	X	
Final Approval < 0	X			X
Appr'd, Value of Financing				
Less Than \$25,000		X		
\$25-49,000				
\$50-74,000				
\$75-99,000				
\$100-149,000				
\$150-199,000	X			
\$200,000 or More	X			
Appr'd, Product				
Agriculture	X			
Fishing		X		
Logging & Forestry			X	
Logging&Forestry - Mfg.	X			
Mining	X			
Manufacturing				
Construction	X		X	
Transportation				X
Communications				
Retail		X		X
Retail - Food&Beverage	X		X	
Finance, Real Estate & Bus. Servs.				
Health, Educ., & Local Gov't				
Accommodation				
Accommodation - Food&Beverage			X	
Cabins,Campgrnds,Lodges	X			
Food & Beverage Services				
Other Services		X		

CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION

The first part of the Conclusion contains a synthesis of the findings from Chapters 5 through 8. It pulls together qualitative findings concerning program structure and operations, and quantitative findings concerning activity flows per application/project variable through the various stages of the causal model introduced in Chapter 2. The second part of the Conclusion addresses the propositions and points-of-interest derived from the literature on economic development and administrative theory. Those propositions are stated and tested here in the form of hypotheses. The third section lists application/project attributes that governments having differing policy balances between expenditures and impacts might focus on in order to improve the efficiency of public expenditure. The fourth section lists the principal public policy implications of the findings. The last section suggests directions for further research concerning public sector financing of business development in less developed areas of Canada.

The reader is reminded that this study includes both exploratory research and quasi-experimental research. The exploratory part of the study is structured by the public policy issues and causal model presented in Chapter 2. Data and findings relevant to the public policy issues have been discussed in Chapters 5 through 8. Since each of these chapters addresses a separate stage of the causal model, it is useful to synthesize the highlights.

Synthesis of Findings

Rates of attrition per variable at each stage, and cumulatively as of each stage of the causal model are displayed in Table 9-1. The reader may find it helpful to consult this table as rates of attrition and survival are discussed. The "cumulative rate of attrition" is defined as the number of surviving projects as a proportion of the number of screen applications. This cumulative rate is one measure of both program and client action efficiency. The "rate of attrition of the applications and approvals process" is the

number of projects financed as a proportion of the number of screen applications. This rate is, of course, a measure of program and client efficiency to the point of a financing decision. It can also be seen as a measure of political "output" efficiency. The "rate of survival" is the number of surviving projects as a proportion of the number of financed projects.

Overview

Genesis of the programs took place during a period of expanding government; belief in the efficacy of regional development as a tool for nation building, modernization and inclusion; and intergovernmental competition for legitimacy and power in newly uncovered public "markets." Manitoba provided a unique set of circumstances for the early and intensive application of regional development initiatives to a rural northern region.

Design of SARDA and NDA2 occurred rapidly and was not tested in advance. NEDP3 spent so much time in the design stage that operation barely got underway before the program was terminated. Initial design of SARDA was skeletal with in-filling and adjustment taking place after startup. Design of NDA2 never moved past the skeletal stage. Design of all programs was primarily process and form focussed. Emphasis was placed on generation of applications, application processing and administration of payments. Program parameters were loosely defined, left to the interpretation of program officers and often in flux. Applications were structured so as to generate information concerning, and staff time was expended on, many attributes that appear to have had weak associations with project outcomes rather than on community, managerial or other personal characteristics that may have had more impact on project survival. Minimal resources were available for quality economic and business planning, analysis and preparation of markets, pre-startup training and aftercare. The programs had minimal ability to enforce letters-of-offer once substantial money had been paid. They avoided most opportunities to use the only real sanction available to them, to cease payments, because of probable local and regional political pressure, and because expenditures already made would well be lost were the project to perish as a result. Program staff

tended to be generalists with some understanding of northern conditions who also had a sympathetic, if not advocative, orientation. Relatively few staff were well trained in business planning and economic analysis. Staff generally operated with a high level of discretion; with very high caseloads; with minimal complementary or specialized resources; and under immense pressure from regional interest groups, the provincial government and, no doubt, their own masters to move funds and get projects started. No wonder program officers had trouble predicting project financing needs, performance or expected levels of employment.

The programs utilized an initial or screen application to identify clients, to link each client to a program officer, and to eliminate applications that were clearly outside program parameters or that were placed by applicants who were not acceptable to the program or who were not acceptable to representatives of regional interest groups sitting on program advisory committees. The screen eligibility followed a first-past-the-post and "satisficing" strategy. There was little effort to allocate support resources according to any development or impact maximizing strategy.¹ It took, on average, roughly two-thirds of a year for the programs to issue an eligibility decision on a screen application. Much attrition took place during this stage through lack of contact with applicants. Such tests of initiative and persistence most likely saved resources for more worthy applicants. SARDA in particular used this technique. NDA2, the later and more loosely defined of these two programs, just "pushed" applications through.

Eligible screen applications were to be followed by full applications prepared by the applicant with or without the assistance of other government programs, regional or local governments and development organizations, or consultants. Use of such assistance was left to the applicant's discretion. Full applications were ostensibly designed to encourage the applicant to think through his or her proposal in greater detail and to ensure that the program officer had a good understanding of the project, its capital requirements and financing, and expected financial flows.

1. Such as, for example, decreasing return-on-investment.

Program officers were to use this financial information as a base from which they could prepare financial analyses.

Mean elapsed time between receipt of the last full application and the final decision was five and one-half months, by far most of this time was taken by program officers' data collection and analyses. As a result, an average of roughly 13 months elapsed between receipt of the screen application and the final decision respecting financing. Furthermore, another six months, on average, elapsed between that final decision and release of the first payment to a project. In total, therefore, at least a year and one-half transpired between the date of the screen application and the date of first payment. Despite complaints from the province and regional interest groups about the time required to traverse program processes, this is a short period of time from inception of an idea, which is what most screen applications reflected, and commencement of project operation. It could be argued that the time required was in fact too short, that the entrepreneur's investment of time and effort would be an insufficient foundation for a sound proposal to which the entrepreneur was strongly committed.

Most attrition in the system occurred between the screen and full application stages. Once a full application was placed the chance of receiving approval was very high and the chance of receiving financing was also very high. The programs did not operate so as to force quality business development with attendant high attrition rates during the application and approval stages. Instead, they operated so as to reward both moderate persistence and at least some effort in meeting the minimal information requirements of forms. Program officers often did things the applicants should have done in the full application and project start-up stages.

Full application forms were not well-designed. They did not force applicants to thoroughly work through their ideas. If writing, and elementary financial and mathematics skills were generally lacking among clients, there

was no alternate way¹ of ensuring that the client had worked through the idea. As with screen decisions, the full application decision process was that of first-past-the-post that "satisfices." The programs were to be responsive, and they tried to respond positively. They made few changes to the intent of applications except in the area of financial projections. For applications that predicted a negative highest net income the programs generally changed the expected net income from negative to positive, and for applications that predicted a positive highest net income the programs reduced the positive net income. One-quarter of the final decisions were taken without having received an adequate full application. Most final rejections were not supported by formal project or financial analyses. All this implies that project decisions were often made on the basis of information, including financial information, not contained in the extensive data base of this study. It also implies that staff resources were focused on "successful" applications; that is, resources were focused on applications that were neither withdrawn by the applicant nor rejected by the programs. Effort was concentrated on "pushing" volumes through decision processes.

Evidence indicates that analysis of full applications became more perfunctory as quantities of applications and approvals greatly increased. Program officers spent most of their time facilitating completion of application forms, communicating applications to their programs, facilitating purchases of materiel by projects and administering payments. Because of the use of staff resources for management support and because considerable time was spent analyzing applications, project monitoring and aftercare received less attention than might be expected. Private sector financiers of high-risk, low-security ventures run by green management demand much greater levels of knowledge about, and involvement in, such ventures.

Final decisions by program officers, program advisory committees, and

1. One alternate method, for example, might have been to have the client explain the proposal in person and in detail to the program officer. This method, and probably most other alternates to the written full application would have, of course, driven staff and operational costs much higher. Although no explicit reason was found for not implementing such a method, concerns about the costs of project operational reviews and audits led to reductions in on-site visits for these purposes.

senior managers and ministers seldom differed. There is little evidence of direct political interference in decisions. There also was no apparent effort to allocate support resources according to any development strategy other than to respond to what "bubbles-up."

The 1,596 screen applications received by the three programs resulted in 419 financed businesses. Attrition through the application and approvals process was, therefore, 74%. By far, most of this attrition was due to applicant difficulties, or to transgression of program guidelines and operating rules. Problems stemming directly from the environment or project substance were relatively infrequent.

Just short of 3,000 person-years of employment were created by financed projects. The total cost per person-year of employment, contributed by all public and private¹ sources, but excluding program operational costs, was an estimated \$30,000. Coincidentally, this amount was the maximum level of financing allowed by the programs per "job," but that was in current dollars as of the mid 1970's.² Roughly \$21,000 of this of the \$30,000 came from the case programs, most of the remainder came directly or indirectly from senior governments. If a "job" is one person-year existing for the average project lifespan (6.5 years) then the total cost per on-going "job" was around \$195,000 and the cost to case programs per on-going "job" was around \$140,000. It could be argued that business development, as practiced by these programs in their environment, was an inefficient method of job creation, or an inefficient method of providing social assistance relative to making direct payments. Alternately, it could be argued that this was the premium paid for some mixture of work experience, political support or social assimilation to be had through the medium of business culture. Whatever the underlying purpose, regional and Aboriginal leaders were willing participants. They did not argue for reorienting expenditures toward a more focussed strategy of long-term business or regional economic development. Consequently, governments did not face

1. With the caveat that contributions from for-profit, private corporations were minimal.

2. \$30,000 in 1975 translates to just over \$80,000 in 1990 dollars.

political pressure from target group leaders to restructure the programs.

On average, financed projects generated 40% less employment per year of their existence than the programs predicted.¹ Government involvement in the preparation of applications and approvals exacerbated this "job gap" and the "job gap" grew over time. Had job creation clauses in letters-of-offer been enforced, the rate of project survival would have nose-dived. There was, in practice, an unresolved contradiction in the simultaneous pursuit of the two goals: business and job creation.

The gross capital cost of projects was around \$90 million. Over 60% of this cost was covered by grants from senior governments and almost 70% of such grants came from the case programs. Most of the remaining 40%, received as loans, came directly from senior governments or indirectly from senior governments by way of senior government grants to local governments and non-government collective organizations. Security for such loans was, in practice, minimal. Expenditures from all principal sources of financing increased dramatically after 1984; that is, once the social infrastructure of the region had greatly improved. NDA2, the least demanding of the three programs, had the highest level of annual expenditures. Availability of capital was not, during the study period, a major obstacle to business development. Projects, especially projects that became operational, tended to receive substantially more financial support from governments than predicted. Because a large share of this additional financing came in the form of loans, however, project success would have been negatively impacted. Rather than availability of capital being the obstacle to economic development, a high opportunity cost was placed on development by equitably and thinly spreading publicly contributed capital over many less than well developed and poorly managed projects rather than over fewer well developed and well managed projects.

1. After translating their predictions of "number of jobs," which is how this data was reported up the organizational hierarchy and publicized, into the equivalent number of person-years. Government programs that provided complementary financing were also reporting and publicizing the same jobs - created as a consequence of their contributions.

As at December, 1994, five years after the last year during which financing had been approved, only one-quarter of financed businesses are known to have been operating. Therefore, cumulative attrition as of the end of 1994 was 94%. Only 6% of screen applications, 17% of full applications and 22% of financed projects are known to have generated businesses that at least achieved medium-term (five year) survival. This survival rate is lower than those found in other known accounts of small business survival. It is much lower than the success rate the programs believed they were having. The programs did not, however, institute systems to inform them of medium to longer term business survival and employment outcomes. Rather than improve program effectiveness through analysis of outcomes, project monitoring was driven by the need to "push-out" money, and the need for procedural and payments accountability.

Per Program

SARDA received the highest number of screen applications followed by NDA2 and NEDP, respectively. Compared to the minimally demanding NDA2, SARDA had a much higher rate of attrition through the full application stage. Of the two programs, projects financed by the less demanding NDA2 show a much higher survival rate although this is mostly due to the fact that all NDA2 projects received funding after 1983.

Per Study Period

There is remarkably small variation in cumulative system success among screen applications placed during the five study periods. There are two possible explanations. One explanation is that the quality of the case programs and other complementary government programs improved over time, but this improvement in quality was insufficient to compensate for a decline in viable business environment-entrepreneur niches. The other explanation is that the quality of the case programs and other complementary government programs did not improve over time. The weight of evidence presented in this study supports the latter explanation.

In general, program criteria became looser, program intake and output expanded dramatically with little increase in staff or other support resources, and the thoroughness of post-finance monitoring was reduced with no appreciable building of compensatory support services. There is no evidence that institutional learning from outputs and results was a priority. To the extent that significant changes in operational quality were recommended, either no changes resulted or the underlying issues were washed-over by even more approvals and higher levels of capital expenditure. As well, data indicate that the environment was able to absorb new projects with little effect on post-financing survival rates.

Annual changes in numbers of screen and full applications appear more related to federal elections than to political events in Manitoba or to the economic health of Manitoba or northern Manitoba. The processes involved in federal election-associated increases in number of applications are not clear.

Fluctuations in rates of survival do not appear to be associated with changes in the well-being of the provincial or northern economies. This, perhaps unexpected, finding is likely the consequence two things: (1) community economies that are heavily dependent on transfer payments and other expenditures by senior and local governments, and (2) prospective project financings that were almost totally dependent on senior government expenditures. Data concerning the northern economy indicate that the value of transfer payments and government expenditures continued to rise through the study period, particularly for Indian reserves.

Per Agent that Prepared the Full Application

In general, the less skilled and experienced the agent who prepared the full application, the lower the rate of cumulative attrition. Lest this finding appear counter-intuitive, the reader is reminded there is likely to be a substantial political disincentive for staff of senior governments to, in effect, show an applicant that his or her project will not work even though a full and balanced analysis might lead to such conclusion. As well, the role of staff

from other senior government agencies was to help their clientele gain access to resources from what they viewed as "external" sources, such as the case programs. INAC staff, in particular, must promote and protect the well-being of registered Indians, especially those living on Indian reserves. To dramatically constrain the number of applications and flow of funds to Indian reserves would have contradicted one of the principal *raisons d'être* of INAC and generated concern among Indian political leaders. Furthermore, those full applications not prepared by staff of senior governments or by the applicants themselves were, in most cases, prepared by either employees of local governments or by consultants hired by applicants. The writer knows from his professional experience that the employees of local governments were generally not well-trained and had minimal business-related experience. Such employees are under intense political pressure to produce applications that result in funds flowing to their communities. Consultants, especially when acting in what was essentially a mixed technical-promotional role, are likely to generate a favourable scenario for the client. Consultants have two interests at stake: reputation for quality of work and integrity, and future work from communities whose leaders are in frequent mutual communication. In fact, many consultants that worked on applications to these programs saw their role as one of "preparing applications," not planning and analyzing business ventures. Finally, it would have been difficult for applicants, having received extensive free assistance and, in the case of financed projects, largely free financing, to place blame for failure on those who did so much for them with so little onus.

Quality of Applications

The study utilizes seven measures of applicant and owner capacity: (1) rate of acceptance of screen applications, (2) rate of fall-off from screen acceptance to submission of a full application, (3) relative completeness of full application, (4) speed of bringing projects into operation once financing has been approved, (5) ability to stay within budgeted financing, (6) rate of operational problems and (7) rate of business survival. Indian bands and other applicants based on Indian reserves who chose the operational location for their business to be an Indian reserve, as well as other local government

and non-government collective organizations show the greatest capacity to generate reasonable quality applications and to maintain post-application follow-through. These organizations, supported by grants from senior governments, had longevity; and they often employed staff with some, if minimal, training or experience whose function was business, or usually the more generic "project," development.

Capacity to generate and shepherd proposals, however, did not translate into capacity to successfully operate businesses. This was a major flaw in the economic and business development system of senior governments. Governments misjudged both the strength of the local educational and experiential base, and the social forces at work in communities. Collective and Indian band owned businesses frequently required substantially more financing than predicted. Indian bands and Indian owned businesses were slow in bringing projects into operation. Businesses owned by non-government collective organizations and proprietors experienced high rates of operational problems. Businesses located on Indian reserves had a poor record of survival and businesses owned by collective organizations show only moderate rates of survival. Only Indian band owned businesses show a relatively high rate of survival. There are some indications, however, that the survival rate of Indian band owned businesses may be related to their ability to obtain ongoing subsidies from external sources and through internal cross-subsidization.¹²

Per Number and Type of Applicant/Owner

Cumulative attrition rates are lowest for projects with at least one

1. Many Indian band owned project proformas were in large part predicated on providing material or services, especially construction and transportation, to the bands or to band-owned organizations.
2. From the standpoint of the community this is may or may not be a bad thing. The economic worthiness of cross-subsidization would be a function of net social costs, the impact of cross-subsidization on the internal distribution of well-being and the degree to which community-level autarky prevents the development of more effective and efficient district or regional level businesses.

owner that is an Indian Band or other form of local government. These lower rates are primarily a consequence of the ability of local governments to successfully traverse the application and approvals process. These organizations had the staying power and access to sufficient resources, including political power, to bring a relatively high proportion of projects through to receipt of financing.

The vast majority of screen and full applications were submitted by single applicants who intended to become proprietors. The proportion of full applications from proprietors was lower than the proportion of screen applications from proprietors because of proprietors' low rate of screen acceptances and their relative weakness in turning screen acceptances into full applications. Very few screen and full applicants were from private, for-profit business corporations. This demonstrates the relative absence of private business corporations resident in, or doing business in, the study area. Proprietorships and Indian bands took much more time than other entrepreneurs to get their projects operational. This suggests that these entrepreneurs were not sufficiently prepared as of the date of financing.

One pattern that emerges is the increasing proportion of Indian bands as screen applicants over time. The proportion of known applicants who were Indian bands more than doubled over the study period. As well, an even higher proportion of full applications than screen applications came from Indian bands because of Indian bands' high rate of screen acceptances and because of their superior capacity to turn screen acceptances into full applications. This resulted from the collectivist and more "total" institutional¹ structure of most Indian reserves, the very weak economies of most reserves, and the increasing capability and assertiveness of Indian bands and tribal councils over the study period. INAC and EIC provided substantial resources to bands and tribal councils thereby enabling these organizations to both employ economic development staff or consultants, and to form public sector social and economic development organizations.

1. In the sense of Goffman, 1961.

Regression models suggest that involvement of local governments and government-sponsored collective organizations, both dependent on senior governments, interfere with the association between community socioeconomic conditions and frequency of entrepreneur-events. This may be because local government and collective organizations are driven, not primarily by one or a few individuals in pursuit of self-employment income or profit, but by the amount of organizational funding available from senior governments coupled with local pressures to bring additional funding to communities. Regression models testing the association between business survival and community variables, however, point to the converse. Project survival is more strongly associated with community variables for businesses owned by governments and non-government collective organizations than it is for businesses owned by non-government, non-collective owners. A possible explanation is that project survival under private ownership is more dependent on idiosyncratic personal characteristics of the owner/management whereas government and collective organizations have external and internal stabilizers, greater ongoing political power *vis-a-vis* the senior governments, and the ability to cross-subsidize their "business" venture(s).

Residence of the Applicant

As a proportion of applicants of known location, Indian reserve originated applications increased through the study period. This again, shows the relatively high rate of approval and superior follow-through capability of entrepreneurs from Indian reserves.

Unorganized communities show the highest rate of screen applications per thousand adult residents, but entrepreneurs from Indian reserves show the highest rate of full applications per thousand adult residents. The organized communities, having a relatively higher proportion of their population who were not Aboriginal and, therefore, who were not the target of the programs, placed substantially fewer applications per thousand adult residents. The entrepreneurship of Indian bands compensated for the relatively low rate of non-government entrepreneurship from Indian reserves.

Regression models indicate that population size and proportion of the population that is Aboriginal have relatively strong explanatory power for frequency of entrepreneur-events. This shows that the programs effectively focussed on the target population. Greater income inequality is positively associated with incidence of entrepreneurship. Higher per capita income, but not high median household income, is positively associated with frequency of entrepreneurship. Source of income, as measured by the proportion of earned plus investment income, is positively associated with frequency of "high level" entrepreneur-events. That the proportion of population that normally speaks an Aboriginal language at home is negatively associated with frequency of entrepreneur-events is consistent with indications from other studies that this variable is negatively associated with a variety of improved socioeconomic conditions. The author has suggested, in other not-published works, that behavioral and value patterns from an earlier mode of production as reflected and perpetuated in language, may inhibit the adoption of behavioral and value patterns appropriate for a new mode of production. Because of low significance levels regression results do not support the hypotheses that reserve residence, more difficult access or low educational levels inhibit incidence of entrepreneur-events. Directions of association, however, are consistent with such hypotheses.

Regressions that test the relationship between rate of project survival and community socioeconomic conditions show surprisingly little association. The only socioeconomic variable that is positively associated with rate of project survival is the proportion of the population with less than grade 9 education. These regressions indicate that project survival is negatively associated with operational location on an Indian reserve, and perhaps negatively associated with total population and proportion of the population with at least some post-secondary education. The author also found a negative association between proportion of the population with post-secondary education and rate of business survival in another study.

Status Group of Applicant

Because the majority of registered Indians resident in the study area

live on Indian reserves this group benefited from the superior application generating resources available to entrepreneurs from Indian reserves. Registered Indians not resident on Indian reserves, however, fared poorly through the application process.

Differences in rates of application per thousand adults between Indian reserve applicants and registered Indian applicants indicate that, in the absence of environmental limits to non-governmental entrepreneurship existing on Indian reserves, the propensity to entrepreneurship among registered Indians is similar to the propensity to entrepreneurship among other Aboriginal people.

Registered Indians took substantially more time than other entrepreneurs to bring their projects into operation. This suggests that these entrepreneurs were not sufficiently prepared as of the date of financing. As well, projects owned by resident out-groups, such as off-reserve registered Indians, other Aboriginals from organized communities and non-Aboriginals from unorganized communities had high incidence of operational problems. This suggests that either these entrepreneurs also were not sufficiently prepared, or that their outgroup membership obstructed project operation. There is minimal difference in the survival rates of businesses owned by registered Indians and other Aboriginals. This similarity, however, masks the fact that the survival rate for non-government, non-collective registered Indian owned businesses is substantially lower than the survival rate for non-government, non-collective businesses owned by other-Aboriginals. Non-Aboriginal owned businesses have the highest rate of survival, nearly twice that of registered Indians and other-Aboriginals.

Existing Businesses

Over the study period 70% of applicants of known business state (29% of all applicants) were existing businesses. The attrition rate through the application and approvals process of existing businesses was lower than it was for applicants that were not existing businesses. As well, the survival rate of existing businesses was much higher than the survival rate for

applicants that were not existing businesses. Existing businesses with prior positive net income cumulatively fared better than those with prior negative net income. Existing businesses with prior positive net income had relatively higher screen acceptance rates, lower fall-off rates through to full applications, and higher rates of approval and financing. Despite this, existing businesses that had prior positive net income had the same rate of survival as existing businesses that had prior negative net income.

Of existing business applicants nearly a third had received previous government financing, nearly a third had received previous government financing from a federal government source and a sixth had received previous financing from a DRE/IE source. Few existing businesses had received financing from non-federal government and non-government sources. These data support one of the *raisons d'etres* for the programs, that there was an absence of non-government financing institutions willing to finance small business development in the rural north. As well, data indicate that provincial sources did not play a major role in financing small businesses independent of complementary federal government financing.

Interdepartmental and intergovernmental risk-sharing, particularly respecting business financing for non-reserve based businesses, added to the public's and the entrepreneurs' administrative costs, and increased effectiveness-inhibiting complexity. However, this risk-sharing likely increased total available financing.

Existing businesses that received prior government financing had a substantially better survival rate than existing businesses that did not receive prior government financing. If the programs were aware of these outcomes, staff would have felt conflicting pressures: place more assistance with those who had already received assistance but run afoul of the principle of equity, or maintain the principle of equity but reduce program success.

Over the study period, a majority of existing business applicants had negative net income for their prior fiscal year. This situation, however, improved substantially over time. The fact that such a high percentage of existing businesses were in financial trouble before making application

challenged the longer term program effectiveness. The programs, weak in the areas of business planning, analysis, training and aftercare, with a tendency to "push" projects through so long as process requirements were met, were not able to deliver an appropriate, conditional mix of assistance to such projects. The fact that over the study period most businesses that had previously received government financing were in financial trouble, and the fact that through much of the study period there was a secular deterioration in the financial condition of existing business applicants that had previously received government sourced financing are further evidence of design flaws in government business financing programs. It is significant, however, that this trend was finally reversed in the 1984-88 period. This reversal suggests that this later cohort of existing business applicants that had previously received government sourced financing may have performed better than earlier cohorts of existing business applicants that had previously received government sourced financing.

Applicant Goals

The goal of the majority of applications was to create a new business establishment. This goal is followed, in order of overall proportion of applications, by the goals: "expand business" establishment, "purchase business," and "maintain business." This reinforced the already difficult circumstances facing the programs. Most applicants had little or no business experience, and those that did were more often than not in financial trouble.

Existing businesses wanting to make changes (i.e. those that did not want to "maintain" their business) show almost as high a rate of attrition between the screen and full applications stages as applicants that were not existing businesses. This suggests two things. The goal "maintain" the business often may have been a proxy for "rescue" the business, and existing businesses that did not pursue the goal "maintain" the business often estimated the cost of continuing programs procedures to be too high given the expected benefit. These businesses may have found the programs to be less than enthusiastic at being seen to be helping businesses that appear to be doing well and/or they realized that expansion/improvements

would not generate the additional employment demanded by the programs.

As noted above, the survival rate of existing businesses, whether prior owned by the applicant or purchased by the applicant is much higher than it is for the totally greenfield, new business owner - new business combination. Regression models that test the relationship between rate of project survival and applicant/application attributes support this finding revealed by descriptive statistics. Regression analyses also indicate that projects with the goals "maintain" and "expansion," and therefore necessarily projects owned by existing businesses, are positively associated with project survival. To the extent that the programs were aware of these outcomes, program staff would have felt conflicting pressures: support higher-payoff, but higher-risk totally greenfield proposals; or support lower-risk, but lower-payoff existing business proposals.

Location of Head Office

The vast majority of screen and full applications said the head office of the business would be located within the study area. As well, for the vast majority of prospective businesses, owner residence, head office and operations were to be in the same location.

The most frequent intended location was an Indian reserve, followed by an unorganized community or area, and an organized community. Indian reserves became the most frequent locational choice for operations during 1974-78. This location garnered an increasing lead over time. This shift is consistent with the increasing proportions of applications received from, and acceptances and approvals given to, applicants from Indian reserves, registered Indians and Indian bands.

Neither "metropolitan" areas, rural southern Manitoba nor northern "urban" centres were often listed as head office locations. This finding is not consistent with a crude version of the metropolis-hinterland theory of underdevelopment. A crude reading would predict most frequent head office locations to be in "metropolitan" or more highly-developed locations.

Location of Operations

Nearly all intended business locations were in the study area. As well, the vast majority of intended (and actual) operational locations were in the same community as the intended and actual head offices. This is consistent with all the qualitative indications that almost all financed businesses were owner-operated small businesses. Operational locations, in order of frequency, were Indian reserves, unorganized communities and organized communities, respectively. Therefore, the programs stayed within their geographic and racial targets. Again, largely because of the involvement of Indian bands, Indian-controlled collective organizations and INAC, Indian reserves were the operational location of choice when compared to the organized and unorganized communities. Projects located in unorganized communities have a higher rate of operational problems than projects located in organized communities or Indian reserves. It is suggested that the larger population size of many Indian reserves coupled with their low level of prior commercial development may have resulted in fewer market-related problems for Indian reserve projects than faced by projects located in the unorganized communities that were generally smaller, but better serviced commercially. Among the three primary locational groups, however, businesses located on Indian reserves had the worst survival rate.

The three sets of regressions on community variables generate a picture of the cause-and-effect linkages between entrepreneur-events, the locational targeting of operations and community socioeconomic conditions. Involvement of local governments or government-sponsored collective organizations appear to have little effect on the relationship between community socioeconomic conditions and choice of operational location at the screen application stage. At the full application stage, however, there is a stronger association between community socioeconomic conditions and target location if local government and non-government collective organization entrepreneurs are eliminated from the analysis.

Regarding the targeting of operational location only two independent variables show high levels of significance for both "low level" and "high level" targeting. Not surprisingly, total population has a positive association

with frequency of targeting. The proportion of the population that usually speaks an Aboriginal language at home, however, has a negative association with frequency of targeting. One variable, proportion of the population that is Aboriginal, shows positive association with frequency of targeting at a high level of significance for "low level" targeting, but at a moderate level of significance for "high level" targeting. One other variable, proportion of the population with less than grade 9 education shows a negative association with frequency of targeting, but at a moderate level of significance for both "low level" and "high level" targeting. The variable "community type" shows no significant association with "low level" locational targeting, but Indian reserve location is positively associated with "high level" targeting. In general, income-related variables do not have the strong association with locational targeting that might be expected. Per capita income shows a positive association of high significance for "low level" targeting, but this variable is replaced in "high level" targeting by the positively associated, moderately significant, variables "median household income" and "proportion of income derived from earned or investment income." The latter variables should be a good predictor of level of demand for most of the consumer product or service businesses proposed by applicants. The variables "proportion employed" and "access" show no significant explanatory power for both "low" or "high level" choice of operational location.

Equity

Surprisingly, applications with a "real" equity investment proffered by the applicant or expected by the programs had a higher rate of attrition through the application and approvals process than applications with no equity proffered or expected. Applications with a "real" equity investment proffered by the applicant or expected by the programs, however, had a higher rate of project survival than applications with no equity investment proffered or expected. This is consistent with conventional business thinking and lending. Willingness of the programs to approve applications with no "real" equity investment was not only contrary to a program criterion, but also is evidence of project "pushing."

Predicted Highest Net Income

Full applications that predicted positive net income had a slightly higher rate of attrition through the application and approvals process, but a much higher rate of survival than those that predicted negative net income. Also, financing approvals based on program predictions of negative net income had a much higher rate of survival than financing approvals based on program predictions of positive net income. These findings indicate that applicants and programs had major difficulties predicting project outcomes. The findings also support the conjecture that the programs "pushed" projects forward that did not meet program equity and viability criteria.

Size and Complexity

The study utilizes four variables that measure business size and complexity: (1) number of applicants/owners, (2) number of person-years employed annually, (3) gross capitalization and (4) number of products. Generally, descriptive data and regression analyses indicate a positive association between size and ability to persist through the applications-approvals process, and between size and ability to survive.

In terms of number of applicants, applications with more than one applicant or owner show both a lower rate of attrition through to financing and a higher rate of survival. Gross capitalization shows no apparent relationship to rates of attrition through to financing. It appears, however, that businesses with higher levels of capitalization had higher rates of operational problems, but also had a higher rate of survival. Predicted person-years of annual employment shows no clear relationship with the rate of attrition through the application and approvals process or rate of project survival, but is positively associated with higher rates of operational problems. Businesses with three or more products have both a higher rate of attrition through the application and approvals process, and a higher rate of operational problems than businesses with less than three products. Businesses with three or more products also had a higher rate of survival than businesses with less than three products. The larger, more complex

projects tend to be concentrated under the ownership of local governments and non-government collective organizations¹. These organizations received substantially more financing than budgeted, and these organizations are able to cross-subsidize their "business" internally or through their parent organization. Therefore, for such businesses it is not inconsistent that both incidence of startup and operational problems, and rate of survival are high.

Product

There were 13 types of products each proposed by 30 or more screen applications. Roughly one-quarter of the screen applications were directed at primary products, especially at logging & forestry related products. Primary products that were the intended output of 30 or more screen applications include: agriculture, logging & forestry, and logging & forestry and manufacturing. Projects with all these products had high rates of cumulative attrition. Roughly another quarter of screen applications were directed at non-primary, non-service products. Projects with all these products also had high rates of cumulative attrition. Non-primary, non-service products proposed by 30 or more screen applications include: manufacturing, construction, and transportation. Regression models found manufacturing projects to be positively associated with rate of project survival. Service products that were proposed by 30 or more applicants include: retail, retail and food & beverage, accommodation, accommodation and food & beverage, cabins-campgrounds-lodges, food & beverage services, and other services. Roughly one-half of screen applications were directed at service products. Retail only proposals comprised 38% of service applications and 19% of all applications. Service product projects generally had the lowest rates of cumulative attrition. Indeed, the regression models found cabin-campground-lodges projects to be positively associated with project survival.

Over time there was a shift of applications from primary products to

1. Most collective organizations were effectively owned by local governments, especially Indian bands and tribal councils.

non-primary products, from non-primary non-service products to service products, and from non-service products to service products.

Projects to Focus on to Improve the Efficiency of Public Expenditure

Table 8-18 in Chapter 8 lists those project attributes characteristic of relatively high payoffs for public expenditures and those project attributes characteristic of relatively low payoffs for public expenditure, *given a business development support and financing system similar to that of the programs and their environment*. There are project attributes associated with relatively high and low administrative costs through the financing stage, again given a business development support and financing system similar to that of the case programs and their environment. Cumulative attrition through the financing stage as shown in Table 9-1 is a proxy for these costs. A high rate of attrition through the application and approvals process generally implies high program operating costs per project.

A public sector, business financing program is more efficient¹ the better it can meet three criteria:

1. minimization of application, analysis and payments administration costs per surviving project;
2. maximization of the survival of financed projects; and
3. maximization of person-years of employment generated among financed projects.

Applicant and project characteristics scoring high and low against these criteria are listed in Table 9-2. How might governments with differing

1. According to the economic, not Weberian, meaning of the term "efficiency." The reader is referred to the discussion of Weberian efficiency in Chapter 4.

financial and impact priorities respond to this information?¹

Given a business development support and financing system similar to that of the programs and their environment, a very frugal government might focus on applications with the following attributes: owners from unorganized communities; owners who are other Aboriginals; existing businesses; existing businesses with positive net income; existing businesses that had previously received financing from the federal government, but not DRE/IE; proponents that did not submit a full application; and proposals to establish a retail business. A somewhat less frugal government that tolerates higher administrative costs, but also places a high priority on successful outcomes might focus on applications with the following attributes in addition to those listed above: owners that are proprietors; owners from organized communities; owners who are not Aboriginal; applicants who never received government financing; proposals to operate the business in an organized community; purchases of existing businesses; full applications that include one to three years EBITDA; full applications that offer, and final approvals that expect, a "real" equity contribution; projects that are predicted to cost less than \$25,000 in non-equity financing; and projects in the fishing, transportation, and other services industries.

Given a business development support and financing system similar to that of the programs and their environment, a government that is frugal might wish to avoid applications with the following attributes: owners from -----

1. The object of this dissertation is not to determine policy to guide public sector business financing in northern Aboriginal communities. Documentation and analysis of program resources and procedures imply that certain elements (such as the balance between technical and training resources and size of the financing fund; understanding of the applicant and location; and completeness and grounding of project analyses) need to be examined. These implications are relatively straightforward. Less straightforward is identification of the "best" and "worst" project cost-outcome combinations. This section squeezes some, admittedly simple, implications from a complex analysis of project costs and outcomes. Its purpose is to point-out issues to be examined and to show the methods and fruits of cost-outcome analysis under differing political regimes, it is not intended as a policy prescription. The reader should understand that program procedures and project cost-outcome combinations interact. A modest program with a much higher ratio of expenditures on non-financial developmental and aftercare resources will not only generate a different array of project costs than the case programs, but it will likely generate a different array of project outcomes.

out-of-area locations, existing businesses with negative net income, full applications not containing at least one year of EBITDA and projects in the construction industry. Such a government might be concerned with applications with the following attributes: ownership by a non-government collective organization; ownership by a registered Indian; applicants that are not existing businesses; business expansions; and businesses in mining, retail and food & beverage services, accommodation and food & beverage services, and cabins-campgrounds-lodges industries.

Study Findings, and Hypotheses and Points-of-Interest Derived from the Literature

The propositions and points-of-interest generated in Chapters 4 and 5 are itemized in List 9-3. The findings concerning these propositions and points-of-interest are presented below with the propositions restated in hypothetical form. Hypotheses and points-of-interest related to development theory are discussed first, followed by discussion of hypotheses and points-of-interest related to public administration. If the reader is curious about the relationship between the propositions and points-of-interest shown in List 9-3 and the hypotheses and points-of-interest discussed below, the relevant item number(s) from List 9-3 are shown after each hypothesis or point-of-interest. Some propositions or points-of-interest may relate to more than one of the hypotheses or points-of-interest discussed below. Some propositions and points-of-interest could not be substantially addressed. These are listed at the end of this section.

Hypothesis 1: Absorptive capacity is an important obstacle to economic and business development. (Items 6, 24, 25, 37 and 38)

The evidence concerning this hypothesis is inconclusive. The number of screen and full applications per year generally increased through the study period. The fact that the overall proportion of applicants with the goal "new establishment" remained relatively constant over the study period implies that overall within the study area (and on Indian reserves, in particular)

prospective entrepreneurs continued to find available business niches, albeit at low cost given the grant financing nature of the case programs, despite years of government assistance to many new projects. The number of screen and full applications that targeted Indian reserve operational locations especially increased. Of the three primary types of locations, it was Indian reserves that experienced the greatest improvement in social infrastructure during the study period. For full applications, predicted profitability was highest for businesses intended for organized communities. It was lowest for businesses intended for Indian reserves: the community type that had the lowest level of social infrastructure over the entire study period. There was a secular decline in the proportion of full applications that were predicted to break-even or to profit, but the rate of decline was highest for businesses targeted for organized communities and lowest for businesses targeted for Indian reserves. Among operational locations Indian reserves had the lowest rate of business survival. The overall rate of business survival fell, then increased or plateaued,¹ over the study period.

Hypothesis 2: *Businesses that are owned by governments or other non-employee-owned collectives will be more successful than businesses that are not owned by governments or other non-employee owned collectives.*
(Items 2, 3, 19, 20, 39, 40 and 53)

The hypothesis is supported. Businesses owned by governments and non-government collectives not owned by employees had a higher rate of survival than businesses owned by proprietors or private, for-profit corporations. The difference in rates of survival is entirely due to the much higher survival rate of local government-owned businesses. Businesses owned by non-government collectives had a lower survival rate than businesses owned by proprietors or private, for-profit corporations.

1. Use of the descriptor "increased" or the descriptor "plateaued" will depend on one's assumptions concerning the rate of attrition for surviving projects that had receiving financing during the last few years of the study period and one's assumption concerning the reasons behind the higher survival rate of businesses owned by governments and non-government collective organizations.

Band-owned businesses, which comprised most government and collective owned businesses, had a relatively high rate of survival. These businesses often had guaranteed markets, and were supported by the political and financial power of their owners. These businesses also could tap band or tribal council economic development support services.

Hypothesis 3: *Businesses will be less successful when located on Indian reserves because of the effect of reserve environmental conditions on business operations.* (Items 1, 2, 8, 9 and 53)

Study findings are consistent with the hypothesis. The rate of survival for businesses located on Indian reserves was substantially less than the survival rate for businesses located in both organized communities and unorganized communities. Regression models that test the association between rate of business survival and community attributes indicate the attribute "location of a business on an Indian reserve" has a significant, negative coefficient.¹

Hypothesis 4: *More business proposals will target their operational locations for places with a high level of social infrastructure than the number of business proposals that target their operational locations in places with a low level of social infrastructure.* (Items 6, 24, 25 and 52)

Some evidence supports this hypothesis. Over the study period as the level of social infrastructure greatly improved in the unorganized and Indian reserve communities, the number of proposals received from entrepreneurs in these locations and the number of proposals targeting operational locations in these communities increased. In particular, the number of

1. The reader is reminded that status as an Indian reserve community did not inhibit the frequency of proposals targeting Indian reserves for business locations. Quite the opposite. If local government and collective organization entrepreneur-events are excluded, however, status as an Indian reserve community appears to be negatively related to the frequency of targeting reserves as operational locations.

proposals received from entrepreneurs residing on Indian reserves and the number of proposals targeting their operational locations on Indian reserves increased dramatically. During the study period Indian reserves underwent the greatest improvement in social infrastructure, given initial conditions, followed in degree of improvement by the unorganized communities.

Hypothesis 5: *More businesses will be proposed for places with a better educated population.* (Item 6)

The hypothesis is supported for both locational targeting of proposed businesses and location of entrepreneurs. Regression models concerning frequency of "low" and "high" level entrepreneurial-events, and frequency of "low" and "high" level locational targeting generate negative associations between proportion of the population with less than grade 9 education and entrepreneurship. The less-than-grade-9-education associations show higher levels of significance for locational targeting than entrepreneur location. As well, regression models concerning frequency of "low" and "high" level entrepreneur-events, and frequency of "low" and "high" level locational targeting also generally yield positive associations between proportion of the population with at least some post-secondary education and entrepreneurship. For reasons that are not clear, the at-least-some-post-secondary-education associations, however, have low levels of significance.

Hypothesis 6: *Businesses will be more successful in places with a better educated population.* (Item 6)

This hypothesis is not supported. Results obtained from the regression model concerning business survival indicate a positive association, of at least moderate significance, between proportion of the population with less than grade 9 education and business survival. As well, results from the same regression model show a negative association between proportion of the population with at least some post-secondary education and business survival. Perhaps a better educated population is also more discerning and mobile; and, therefore, is a less-captured market.

Hypothesis 7: *More businesses will be proposed for places that are more accessible to customers or suppliers. (Items 10 and 14)*

The hypothesis is not supported. There is no evidence of an association between frequency of locational targeting and accessibility.

Hypothesis 8: *Businesses will be more successful in places that are more accessible to customers or suppliers. (Items 10, 15, 27 and 28)*

This hypothesis is not supported. A test of the association between accessibility and rate of business survival results in a negative coefficient. However, the coefficient is below a reasonable level of significance.

Hypothesis 9: *Most business proposals either entailed the direct conversion of primary resources into products to satisfy final demand, or minimal finishing of imported goods prior to supplying final demand. (Item 17)*

Only the last part of the hypothesis receives support. A very few proposals, such as milling wood for local use and a few agricultural projects, involved the direct conversion of primary resources into products to satisfy final demand. Most business proposals, however, used imported products to supply final demand. This occurred in most construction,¹ transportation, communication and service projects.

Hypothesis 10: *Business located in less developed areas will be more successful if they undertake the conversion of primary resources into final demand, or if they undertake minimal finishing of imported goods prior to supplying final demand. (Items 16 and 18)*

1. Most construction projects entailed construction to satisfy final demand, not construction of productive facilities.

The hypothesis is supported. The rate of survival of businesses in the construction, transportation, communication and service¹ industries is four times higher than the rate of survival of businesses in the primary² and business service industries.

Hypothesis 11: Those businesses that were export-oriented and received a high level of externally-sourced investment were relatively successful. (Item 21)

The businesses financed by the programs were, of course, primarily financed by external investment. As well, most non-case program financing was essentially externally sourced. The data, however, are not strongly consistent with the hypothesis. Businesses that were predominately export-oriented were those that produced primary products and those that provided cabins-campgrounds-lodges. In general, businesses that produced primary products had a lower than average rate of survival. Cabins-campgrounds-lodges, however, had a positive association with survival.

Hypothesis 12: Those financed businesses that offer a single, focused, product mix will be more successful than those financed businesses that offer a mix of products. (Item 41)

The findings are not consistent with the hypothesis. Financed businesses with three or more products had a higher rate of survival than financed businesses with less than three products.

1. Not including the finance, insurance and business services projects which are intermediate services to businesses.

2. Not including two agriculture projects that satisfied regional and local final demand, one of which survived. Not including logging & forestry and manufacturing businesses of which many supplied final demand.

Point-of-Interest 13: *Was ability to raise equity financing a frequent obstacle to business development or success? (Item 30)*

The answer to this question depends on attributes of the applicant. Applicants that were not healthy existing or large businesses, that were not local governments, or that were not non-government collective organizations had difficulty raising equity. Almost all of these applicants, however, were able to raise the necessary equity in part because of the flexibility of the programs concerning the form of equity and the low proportion of capital costs expected as equity. Applicants that were healthy existing or large businesses, that were local governments, or that were non-government collective organizations had little difficulty raising equity. If they did not find the equity within their existing resources, other government programs issued "flow-through" grants to them to cover the equity contributions.

Point-of-Interest 14: *Was ability to raise debt financing a frequent obstacle to business development or success? (Item 31)*

The answer to this question also depends on the applicant. Applicants that were healthy small businesses or large businesses were able to get debt financing from commercial financial institutions and suppliers. Applicants that were local governments or that were non-government collective organizations had little difficulty getting debt financing from other government programs. Most proprietors who intended to operate their business on an Indian reserve were able to get debt financing from INAC. As well, many proprietors residing in other parts of the study area were able to get debt financing from provincial sources.

Hypothesis 15: *There is a lower propensity to develop businesses by residents of communities in which there is a higher rate of use of an Aboriginal language in the home. (Item 35)*

The findings are consistent with the hypothesis. Regression models yield significant, negative associations between proportion of residents who

usually speak an Aboriginal language at home and propensity to develop businesses.

Hypothesis 16: Financed businesses that are located in communities in which there is a higher rate of use of an Aboriginal language in the home show a lower rate of survival. (Item 36)

The findings are mixed. Regression models generate a negative association, but of low significance, between proportion of residents who usually speak an Aboriginal language at home in communities in which financed businesses are located and rate of business survival.

Point-of-Interest 17: Was decision taking within these administrative organizations compatible with the paradigms of rational planning, bounded rationality, disjoint incrementalism, mixed scanning or social interaction? (Item 43)

The programs do not fit the decision paradigm of rational planning. They were loosely developed, loosely structured, interactive systems not built on a foundation of cogitation, empiricism or academic literature.

Program decisions minimally satisfied stated performance goals. Performance goals and environment were connected by a rationale limited in depth and breadth. Economic development theory was perceived not to be effective in less developed countries, and there were few if any serious analyses of development initiatives in the less developed areas of Canada or other developed countries. Financed projects had to at least appear to be plausibly viable and to create some "jobs." Project financing could not be seen to be disguised social assistance, make-work funding, an incentive-laden road to assimilation, the buying of political allegiances, buying social peace, or a buying-off of regional and local elites. Outright fraud and embezzlement were minimized. In the face of relatively severe limitations on staff resources given client demand and client and environmental conditions, decision-takers relied on procedural rationality; that is, decisions that are the

outcome of an appropriate series of actions.

The decision paradigm best describing decision-taking among the programs over the study period is the disjointed incrementalism of Braybrook and Lindbloom. The programs were designed with minimum of knowledge concerning business development in less developed, northern, Aboriginal communities. Cogitation was never a strong element. Issues were dealt with in short memos of complaint or containing less-than-well-thought-through "how-to's" and large meetings, not through reflective analyses of alternatives and consequences informed by relevant literature. Interaction with clients, interest groups, complementary programs of the federal and provincial governments, and the political and policy side of the provincial government drove small, incremental changes in the programs especially the longer-lived SARDA. Changes in the programs were most often movements away from problematic issues: be they the job creation criterion, the viability criterion, expectations of applicant ability and effort, the purchase of existing businesses, ensuring quality management training, forcing letters-of-offer, collecting on misappropriated funding or bad debts, the obviously inadequate methods of collecting and assessing information about prospective projects, or the difficulties in business startups and the first years of operations.

The advent of NEDP could have been evidence that problems with SARDA and NDA2, along with changes in the client and government components of the environment uncovered by policy scanning, were to be translated into a substantial or fundamental program changes. "Bit" decisions could have been overcome by a "contextual" decision, a contextual decision perhaps informed by cogitation and some rational planning. Instead, NEDP expended a massive effort on cogitation. Some of this effort was effectively translated into Aboriginal capital corporations, perhaps the main focus of NEDP. Some of it never appeared to gel into a direction for NEDP and some planning barely became operational before NEDP was replaced by the Aboriginal Economic Program. At the outset, the business financing component of this Program differed only incrementally from SARDA.

Wildavsky's social interaction - retrospective rationality, and policy analysis driven decision system did not appear to be at work within the

programs. Retrospective rationality and policy analysis only appeared during the never fully consummated, coming-into-being of NEDP. Substantial retrospective rationality and policy analysis also took place prior to the advent of the Aboriginal Economic Program and may have played a role in guiding incremental changes in the design of that program.

Point-of-Interest 18: Were the actions of the case organization and programs consistent with the determinist or strategic choice conceptions of organizations? (Item 44)

The answer to Point-of-Interest #17 above implies that these programs exercised minimal strategic choice. Their goals, structure and operations were largely determined by higher authority and the client environment.

Point-of-Interest 19: Do government business financing organizations operate according to the principles of a bureaucracy, in particular a Weberian bureaucracy? (Items 49 and 51)

The structure and operation of the programs conformed to the definition of Weberian bureaucracy. They had a hierarchy, division of labour, differentiated reward system where pay was given by those in authority based on limited employment contracts, limited objectives, and they operated according to universalist procedures, were procedure-bound and emphasized output. They were, however, not able to focus on, or achieve harmony between, the goals of business and employment creation.

Ironically, the programs foundered because they were not bureaucratic enough concerning goal definition and focus, but too bureaucratic in their emphasis on universal procedures and output. They could not sufficiently differentiate and respond to proposals on the basis of particularistic attributes, and they were unable to concentrate sufficiently on longer-term impacts. These weaknesses were exacerbated by political pressures and the western democratic principle of non-particularistic, equitable service.

Hypothesis 20: *These bureaucracies displaced goals and reported progress respecting goals so as to minimize the divergence between stated goals and achievements.* (Item 48)

The findings support this hypothesis. The programs minimized the divergence between stated goals and their achievements. Goal displacement involved reporting performance in terms of business and "jobs" creation, not in terms of long term business or "job" outcomes. The entrance of NDA2 in the latter part of the study period further reduced tracking of even short-term outcomes. Furthermore, the many government financing agencies involved multiple-counted many "businesses," and some such "businesses" were not businesses as this term is generally understood. These "businesses" were operated by local governments providing services, such as local road construction, that do not differ from services provided by most municipal governments. The equivalent in the south would be a municipality that establishes a wholly-owned subsidiary, becomes its sole or principal and guaranteed customer, then calls the subsidiary a "business." As well, the practice of reporting undifferentiated "jobs" created minimized the divergence between formal goals and achievement. Finally, no program ever stated its goals in a form that could support unambiguous accountability.

Hypothesis 21: *If these programs were bureaucracies, they were faced with a quantity of demand for services that substantially outstripped their resources.* (Item 48)

The hypothesis is supported. Staff capacity to provide close, quality interaction with, and support to, applicants was overwhelmed by pressures to place project financing generated by regional and local political interests, the provincial government, and other federal departments such as INAC.

The hypothesis is, however, not supported in terms of finance capital. From the very beginning, the problem was finding enough opportunities to justify spending the allotted capital within program parameters.

Hypothesis 22: *In order to cope with the substantial excess of quantity of service demand over ability to supply services, street-level bureaucrats will establish informal means for varying service levels among clients so as to bring levels of service demand and supply into balance. (Item 48)*

This hypothesis is supported. Program staff reduced service levels through a number of informal and incremental changes. Staff, especially SARDA staff, used client attrition due to lack of assertiveness as a way to balance service demand and supply. SARDA staff backed away from demanding relatively complete full applications and also backed away from completion of all forms. SARDA staff ceased preparing 10-year proformas and multiple analytical algorithms, NDA2 staff often did not prepare even 3-year proformas. SARDA retreated operationally from most of its core criteria. NDA2 barely had any core criteria, the work load on NDA2's street-level staff was reduced and they had a high degree of discretion.

Point-of-Interest 23: *How were the programs structured in terms of segmentation, differentiation, hierarchy, centralization, prevalence of rules and span-of-control? How were these structural elements functional or dysfunctional? (Items 45, 46 and 50)*

Although embedded within large, highly differentiated, hierarchies, program organizations were relatively flat, segmented organizations with minimal differentiation, with an abundance of rules promulgated from the centre, but lacking in strong, central, discretionary direction. This structure was generally functional given the environmental circumstances of the programs. The programs were expected to "push-out" money, get lots of projects started, generate substantial employment and have long-term positive effects on business and employment conditions in the communities - all in a response mode with minimal complementary support services. Program structure enabled service staff to be responsive to a wide variety of applicants and applications without jeopardizing the broad or loose limits that

would have been the concern of central authorities.¹ Staff tended to be relatively homogeneous generalists whose work required minimal interdependence. Internal communication leakages were not a large problem nor would such leakages have been particularly costly.²

Point-of-Interest 24: Did the program organizations use loose-coupling? If this organizational structure was used, what was its function? (Items 47 and 50)

The programs show evidence of loose-coupling especially after the initial years of SARDA. Rules existed, but they tended to be loosely defined, not rigidly applied and not well-enforced. Rather, there appears to have been three program components - the program officers including their interaction with clients and applications, the decision committees, and the high authorities in Ottawa - each of which was loosely coupled to the other two components. This loose-coupling enabled and compounded program "drift." Loose-coupling also maximized the ability to meet demands for equity and absorb shocks³ while minimizing accountability.

Coupling (or coordination) amongst the budgeted public agencies, even among regional delivery agents of the federal government, was, as predicted by the literature, weak. Incentive systems, analogous to market prices, were not in place or, to the extent that they were in place, were not effective in achieving coordination.

Items that could not be substantially addressed because of data limitations include: 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 34 and 42.

1. Such as financial abuse or fraud, overt politicization of financing, inappropriate proportions of financing going to non-target groups and substantial budget overruns.

2. In comparison to, for example, the probable cost of communication leakages in warfare, emergencies or international diplomacy.

3. Such as a number of financing scandals which were publicized in the media, but which had no discernable impact on program operations other than to ensure that central authorities were more quickly informed of "sensitive" cases.

Items 22 and 23 could not be addressed because all financed businesses substantially relied on external sources of financing.

Policy Recommendations

The reader will, no doubt, have thought of many possible policy implications that flow from the findings. What does the writer have to say about the policy implications?

First and foremost, the writer largely retreats behind the cover that detailed policy recommendations require knowledge of many givens: the macro-policy, resource, economic, complementary program and political environment within which the business development initiative is to occur. Policy priorities and trade-off algorithms must be known, at least in a broad sense. Detailed policy recommendations, therefore, demand much additional work. There are, however, six general or overarching policy recommendations that clearly flow from the findings:

1. Government should clarify and at least roughly prioritize the mix of policy goals it wishes to achieve in a region or population. These goals should be factored to implementing organizations so that such organizations are not expected to achieve incompatible, diffuse or not tightly tied, in a cause-and-effect sense, goals.
2. An organization charged with the goal of financing business development should have as its principal goal, to which any other goals should clearly be subordinate, the long term survival of its financed businesses. Organizational performance should be principally monitored for and assessed against this goal - not for promises, expectations, outputs or collateral outcomes.
3. Such a business financing organization should be placed in an environment, or should be expected only to respond to those aspects (e.g. clients) of its environment, which contain(s) prerequisite organizational and skill conditions, and necessary well-functioning complementary services so as to enable the financing organization to stick to its core, quality services. Working relations with the most important complementary services should be tightly structured and performance focussed.
4. Management and operation of business financing should be located and structured so as to be immune to micro- and macro-level political pressures and interference.

5. Resources within the financing organization should be in balance with the core service mix required from the organization. The organization should be staffed by people skilled and experienced in its focussed function and services. Such staff should, however, be capable of learning the client environment and working with most clients who meet threshold criteria.
6. Initial organizational methods and procedures should be based on knowledge about what methods have been most successful in similar environments. The approach should be demanding, yet supportive, of clients. A management information system should be instituted that forces continuous testing and learning from the organizations' and similar organizations' experience.

Directions for Further Research

As noted in the introduction, despite the amount of public money expended there exist few empirical studies on business and economic development in the less developed parts of Canada. Further research may be particularly fruitful in four principal areas.

1. The findings could be tested and elaborated by investigating a sample of projects from a wider or different environmental context.
2. The findings could be tested and elaborated by investigating a sample of projects from a similar environmental context, but financed through a more highly structured, strictly managed and interventionist-oriented financing program.
3. The findings could be complemented by investigating a sample of projects located in a similar environmental context, but focussing on personal and operational attributes of owners and managers.
4. The findings could be complemented by investigating a sample of projects located in a similar environmental context, but generated through an integrated economic development plan.

**TABLE 9-1
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM, RATES OF ATTRITION PER STAGE AND CUMULATIVE**

Variable and Value	Application			Approved			Financed			Operating as of 31 Dec./94		
	Screen #	Full #	% Attrition	#	% Attrition Full	Cum. #	#	% Attrition App'd	Cum. #	#	% Attrition Fin'd	Screen
Program												
All (1)	1596	527	-67	470	-11	-71	419	-12	-74	91	-78	-94
SARDA	1379	375	-73	338	-10	-75	290	-17	-79	49	-83	-96
NDA2	178	130	-27	124	-5	-30	121	-2	-32	36	-70	-80
NEDP3	39	22	-44	8	-64	-79	8	0	-79	6	-25	-85
Period, Screen*												
1971-73	102	22	-78	19	-14	-81	9	-111	-91	3	-67	-97
1974-78	236	57	-76	71	25	-70	51	-39	-78	5	-90	-98
1979-83	446	112	-75	85	-24	-81	61	-39	-86	10	-84	-98
1984-88	734	357	-51	258	-28	-65	248	-4	-66	68	-73	-91
1989	44	32	-27	14	-56	-68	34	59	-23	2	-94	-95
Who Prep'd Appl.												
Case Program	-	4	-	4	0	-	2	-100	-50	0	-100	-100
Other Govt Agency	-	42	-	31	-26	-	28	-11	-33	4	-86	-90
Non-gov't Agent	-	281	-	155	-45	-	145	-7	-48	35	-76	-88
Applicant	-	144	-	89	-38	-	77	-16	-47	21	-73	-85
Number of Approvals												
0	-	-	-	397	-	-	398	0	-	84	-79	-79
1	-	-	-	19	-	-	19	0	-	7	-63	-63
2	-	-	-	1	-	-	0	-100	-	0	-	-100
3 or More	-	-	-	2	-	-	0	-100	-	0	-	-100
No. of Appls/Owners												
1	1385	446	-68	265	-41	-81	343	23	-75	70	-80	-95
2	181	63	-65	40	-37	-78	52	23	-71	17	-67	-91
3 or More	30	18	-40	11	-39	-63	13	15	-57	4	-69	-87
Owner Type												
Proprietor	1550	471	-70	234	-50	-85	303	23	-80	62	-80	-96
F-P Private Corp.	41	16	-61	9	-44	-78	8	-13	-80	1	-88	-98
Non-Gov't Collective	83	34	-59	28	-18	-66	17	-65	-80	3	-82	-96
Indian Band	155	97	-37	55	-43	-65	61	10	-61	22	-64	-86
Local Government	9	5	-44	4	-20	-56	4	0	-56	1	-75	-89
Federal/Provincial	10	2	-80	2	0	-80	4	50	-60	0	-100	-100
Owner Location												
Organized Cmty	261	56	-79	48	-14	-82	41	-17	-84	9	-78	-97
Unorganized Cmty	477	141	-70	137	-3	-71	124	-10	-74	36	-71	-92
Indian Reserve	752	333	-56	221	-34	-71	203	-9	-73	40	-80	-95
Out-Area Known	114	38	-67	20	-47	-82	11	-82	-90	6	-45	-95
Owner Status												
Registered Indian	785	347	-56	202	-42	-74	213	5	-73	44	-79	-94
Other Aboriginal	334	97	-71	69	-29	-79	106	35	-68	24	-77	-93
Not Aboriginal	204	87	-57	58	-33	-72	55	-5	-73	23	-58	-89
Existing Business												
Yes	473	178	-62	174	-2	-63	161	-8	-66	45	-72	-90
No	1115	347	-69	295	-15	-74	257	-15	-77	46	-82	-96
Exist. Business Perf.												
Positive	53	31	-42	41	32	-23	39	-5	-26	14	-64	-74
Negative	91	48	-47	48	0	-47	47	-2	-48	17	-64	-81

**TABLE 9-1 (Cont.)
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM, RATES OF ATTRITION PER STAGE AND CUMULATIVE**

Variable and Value	Application			Approved			Financed			Operating as of		
	Screen	Full	%			%						
	#	#	Attrition	#	Full	Attriti	#	Attrition	#	Attrition	#	Attrition
					Cumu			App'd		Fin'd	Screen	
Prev. Gov't Financing												
None	331	107	-68	100	-7	-70	88	-14	-73	22	-75	-93
Any Government	142	71	-50	74	4	-48	73	-1	-49	23	-68	-84
Federal Gov't	135	70	-48	71	1	-47	70	-1	-48	23	-67	-83
DRE/IE	79	40	-49	45	13	-43	44	-2	-44	15	-66	-81
Goal												
New Business	949	287	-70	153	-47	-84	134	88	-86	16	-88	-98
Exist.Bus.Stts.New Bus.	30	16	-47	12	-25	-60	10	83	-67	2	-80	-93
New Purchase	198	57	-71	35	-39	-82	34	97	-83	15	-56	-92
Exist.Bus.Pur.New Bus.	10	7	-30	7	0	-30	7	100	-30	4	-43	-60
Expand	304	107	-65	71	-34	-77	64	90	-79	18	-72	-94
Maintain Bus.	90	43	-52	32	-26	-64	30	94	-67	9	-70	-90
Operational Location												
Organized Cmty	203	44	-78	45	2	-78	38	-18	-81	10	-74	-95
Unorganized Cmty	476	133	-72	148	11	-69	133	-11	-72	41	-69	-91
Indian Reserve	651	290	-55	220	-24	-66	200	-10	-69	35	-83	-95
Quality of Full Appl.												
Blank	-	177	-	154	-13	-	135	-14	-24	27	-80	-85
Not Blank	-	527	-	316	-40	-	284	-11	-46	64	-77	-88
Not 1 Yr EBITDA	-	37	-	28	-24	-	22	-27	-41	2	-91	-95
1-3 Yrs EBITDA	-	163	-	96	-41	-	89	-8	-45	22	-75	-87
3 Yrs Proforma	-	327	-	192	-41	-	173	-11	-47	40	-77	-88
Equity												
Full Appl. = 0	-	71	-	45	-37	-	44	-2	-38	8	-82	-89
Full Appl. > 0	-	380	-	271	-29	-	202	-34	-47	51	-75	-87
Final Approval = 0	-	-	-	51	-	-	47	-9	-	8	-83	-84
Final Approval > 0	-	-	-	412	-	-	364	-13	-	82	-77	-80
Proj'd Highest Net Inc.												
Full Appl. >= 0	-	294	-	172	-41	-	153	-12	-48	33	-78	-89
Full Appl. < 0	-	31	-	19	-39	-	19	0	-39	7	-63	-77
Final Approval >= 0	-	-	-	302	-	-	266	-14	-	52	-80	-83
Final Approval < 0	-	-	-	168	-	-	13	-1192	-	4	-69	-98
App'd, Value of Financ.												
Less Than \$25,000	-	-	-	123	-	-	109	-13	-	11	-90	-91
\$25-49,000	-	-	-	107	-	-	100	-7	-	12	-88	-89
\$50-74,000	-	-	-	68	-	-	58	-17	-	13	-78	-81
\$75-99,000	-	-	-	36	-	-	32	-13	-	9	-72	-75
\$100-149,000	-	-	-	41	-	-	36	-14	-	15	-58	-63
\$150-199,000	-	-	-	31	-	-	28	-11	-	10	-64	-68
\$200,000 or More	-	-	-	58	-	-	56	-4	-	21	-63	-64

**TABLE 9-1 (Cont.)
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM, RATES OF ATTRITION PER STAGE AND CUMULATIVE**

Variable and Value	Application			Approved			Financed			Operating as of 31 Dec./94		
	Screen #	Full #	% Attrition	#	% Attritl Full	Cumu	#	% Attrition App'd	Cumu	#	% Attrition Fin'd	Screen
Employment, Total PY's												
0	-	48	-	48	0	-	47	-2	-2	21	-55	-56
1	-	71	-	64	-10	-	59	-8	-17	10	-83	-86
2-4	-	242	-	179	-26	-	168	-7	-31	30	-82	-88
5-9	-	64	-	29	-55	-	28	-4	-56	9	-68	-86
10-14	-	27	-	8	-70	-	7	-14	-74	1	-86	-96
15-19	-	5	-	3	-40	-	3	0	-40	2	-33	-60
20 or More	-	11	-	2	-82	-	2	0	-82	2	0	-82
No. of Products												
1	1212	374	-69	348	-7	-71	312	-12	-74	59	-81	-95
2	287	95	-67	75	-21	-74	65	-15	-77	11	-83	-96
3 or More	97	58	-40	43	-26	-56	40	-8	-59	21	-48	-78
Product												
Agriculture	39	10	-74	14	40	-64	13	-8	-67	2	-85	-95
Fishing	19	3	-84	6	100	-68	6	0	-68	2	-67	-89
Logging&Forestry	221	66	-70	86	30	-61	77	-12	-65	2	-97	-99
Logging&For. - Mfg.	34	11	-68	10	-9	-71	10	0	-71	0	-100	-100
Mining	10	5	-50	2	-60	-80	2	0	-80	1	-50	-90
Manufacturing	71	21	-70	14	-33	-80	11	-27	-85	2	-82	-97
Construction	117	37	-68	26	-30	-78	26	0	-78	6	-77	-95
Transportation	138	40	-71	44	10	-68	39	-13	-72	3	-92	-98
Communications	6	3	-50	4	33	-33	3	-33	-50	3	0	-50
Wholesale	8	2	-75	2	0	-75	0	-	-100	0	-	-100
Retail	297	105	-65	87	-17	-71	78	-12	-74	27	-65	-91
Retail - Food&Bev.	31	13	-58	13	0	-58	10	-30	-68	2	-80	-94
Fin., Rl. Est. & Bus. Serv.	13	5	-62	3	-40	-77	3	0	-77	0	-100	-100
Local Gov't, Health, Ed.	6	4	-33	2	-50	-67	2	0	-67	1	-50	-83
Accommodation	32	6	-81	2	-67	-94	2	0	-94	1	-50	-97
Accom. & Food&Bev.	34	11	-68	11	0	-68	7	-57	-79	3	-57	-91
Cabins, Camps, Lodges	134	55	-59	33	-40	-75	32	-3	-76	16	-50	-88
Food & Beverage	66	16	-76	15	-6	-77	11	-36	-83	1	-91	-98
Other Services	155	50	-68	38	-24	-75	36	-6	-77	7	-81	-95

1. Includes all instances of a variable value "not known". Variable counts may not add to these totals.

**TABLE 9-2
ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH AND LOW ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS PER PROJECT,
PER SURVIVING PROJECT AND PER YEAR OF EMPLOYMENT**

Variable and Attribute	Administrative Cost Is	Longevity Cost Is	Employment Cost Is
Who Prepared Application			
Case Program	H		
Other Government Agency	L	H	H
Non-government Agent	H		
Applicant	H		
Appr'd, Owner Type			
Proprietor	H	L	L
For-Profit Private Corp.	H		H
Non-Gov't Collective	H	H	
Indian Band	L	H	
Local Government	L	H	
Federal/Provincial Gov't	L	H	
Appr'd, Owner Location			
Organized Community	H	L	L
Unorganized Community	L	L	
Indian Reserve	L	H	H
Out-Area Known	H	H	H
Appr'd, Owner Status			
Registered Indian		H	H
Other Aboriginal		L	L
Not Aboriginal			L
Existing Business			
Yes	L	L	
No	H	H	
Perf. of Exist. Business			
Positive	L	L	L
Negative	H	H	H
Previous Gov't Financing			
None	H		L
Any Government	L		
Federal Government	L	L	
DRE/IE	L		H
Appr'd, Operational Location			
Organized Community	H	L	L
Unorganized Community	L		
Indian Reserve	L	H	H
Goal			
New Business	H		
Purchase	H	L	
Expand	H		H
Other Goal		H	L
Quality of Full Application			
Blank	L	L	
Not Blank	H		
Not 1 Yr EBITDA	H	H	H
1-3 Yrs EBITDA	H	L	
3 Yrs Proforma	H		
Equity			
Full Appl. = 0	L		H
Full Appl. > 0	H		L
Final Approval = 0	L		H
Final Approval > 0	H		L

**TABLE 9-2 (Cont.)
ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH AND LOW ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS PER PROJECT,
PER SURVIVING PROJECT AND PER YEAR OF EMPLOYMENT**

Variable and Attribute	Administrative Cost Is	Longevity Cost Is	Employment Cost Is
Projected Highest Net Income			
Full Appl. >= 0	H	L	H
Full Appl. < 0	L	H	L
Final Approval >= 0	L	L	H
Final Approval < 0	H	H	L
Appr'd, Value of Financing			
Less Than \$25,000		L	
\$25-49,000	L		
\$50-74,000	H		
\$75-99,000			
\$100-149,000			
\$150-199,000		H	
\$200,000 or More	L	H	
Appr'd, Product			
Agriculture		H	
Fishing		L	
Logging & Forestry			H
Logging&Forestry - Mfg.		H	
Mining	H	H	
Manufacturing	H		
Construction	H	H	H
Transportation			L
Communications	L		
Wholesale	H		
Retail		L	L
Retail - Food&Beverage		H	H
Finance, Real Estate & Bus. Servs.	H		
Health, Educ., & Local Gov't			
Accommodation	H		
Accommodation - Food&Beverage	H		H
Cabins,Campgrounds,Lodges	H	H	
Food & Beverage Services	H		
Other Services	H	L	

LIST 9-3
LIST OF PROPOSITIONS AND POINTS-OF-INTEREST

1. Business development will be more successful in areas with less political constraints to the exchange of goods, services and resources.
2. Business development will be more successful in areas where government is least involved in activities outside the limited sphere specified by this model.
3. Businesses that are not owned or controlled by governments or other collectivities will be more successful than those businesses that are owned or controlled by governments or other collectivities.
4. Business development will be more successful in areas with less social constraints to the exchange of goods, services and resources.
5. Business development will be more successful in areas with greater non-human resource endowment.
6. Business development will be more successful in areas with better educated, more experienced, human resources.
7. Business development will be more successful in areas where there is greater personal safety.
8. Business development will be more successful in areas where there is greater safety of private property.
9. Business development will be more successful in areas where there are lower levels of economic, social or political uncertainty.
10. Denser linkages among businesses within a less developed area will improve business success.
11. More attempts will be made to create businesses if there are denser linkages among businesses within a less developed area.
12. More attempts will be made to create businesses as a result of backward linkages from existing businesses seeking intermediate inputs than as a result of forward linkages from existing businesses seeking potential customers.

LIST 9-3
LIST OF PROPOSITIONS AND POINTS-OF-INTEREST (Cont.)

13. Businesses created as a result of backward linkages from existing businesses seeking intermediate inputs will be more successful than businesses created as a result of forward linkages from existing businesses seeking potential customers.
14. More attempts will be made to create businesses, other things being equal, in locations that are more accessible to primary locations of customers or suppliers.
15. Businesses will be more successful, other things being equal, in locations that are more accessible to primary locations of customers or suppliers.
16. New businesses engaged in the manufacture or provision of goods or services for the local market into which goods or services had been hitherto imported are more successful than other new businesses selling into local markets.
17. Proposals for business creation in less developed areas will be for businesses that convert primary resources into final demand, or for businesses that put the final value-added elements on imported goods.
18. In areas with few businesses, new businesses will be more successful if they either convert primary resources into final demand, or if they the final value-added elements on imported goods than if they do neither of these functions.
19. Assuming that the public sector is interested in promoting or maintaining businesses in a less developed area, those businesses that have the public sector as an important customer will be more successful than those businesses that do not have the public sector as an important customer.
20. Businesses that are not export-oriented, but primarily sell directly to government, and have a high level of externally-sourced investment will be relatively successful.
21. Businesses that are export-oriented with a high level of externally-sourced investment will also be relatively successful.
22. Businesses that are not export-oriented, that do not primarily sell directly to government, and that do not rely on external sources of capital will be more successful if they sell into areas with high levels of income than if they sell into areas with low levels of income.

LIST 9-3
LIST OF PROPOSITIONS AND POINTS-OF-INTEREST (Cont.)

23. Least successful will be businesses that are not export-oriented, that make minimal use of external sources of capital and direct government demand, and that sell into areas with low levels of income.
24. More attempts will be made to create businesses in areas having higher levels of social overhead than in areas having lower levels of social overhead.
25. Businesses will be more successful in areas having higher levels of social overhead than in areas having lower levels of social overhead.
26. Business development will force the placement of social overhead in circumstances where other factors are favourable to business success and the cost of additional social overhead is not prohibitive.
27. Businesses located in those communities which had, in the past, the closest ties to the larger and more economically powerful metropoli will be less successful than businesses located in those communities which had, in the past, weaker ties to the larger and more economically powerful metropoli.
28. Businesses located in those communities which are now less institutionally separated from larger and more economically powerful metropoli will be less successful than businesses located in those communities which are now more institutionally separate from larger and more economically powerful metropoli.
29. Relatively successful projects will be those that do not export their product, that produce a basic good, that use a high proportion of resources supplied from local sources and that are locally owned.
30. A large proportion of business proposals were rejected or business project failed because the prospective owner(s) could not provide sufficient equity.
31. A large proportion of business proposals were rejected or business projects failed because the project could not raise sufficient debt financing from non-government sources.

LIST 9-3
LIST OF PROPOSITIONS AND POINTS-OF-INTEREST (Cont.)

32. Business development and business success is inhibited in locations where there is greater cultural dissonance; that is, in locations where earlier forms of non-capitalist, particularistic culture are relatively strong.
33. Communities in which there is a higher rate of domestic hunting and fishing will have a lower propensity to start businesses.
34. Communities in which there is a higher rate of domestic hunting and fishing will also have a lower rate of successful businesses.
35. Communities in which there is a higher rate of use of an Aboriginal language in the home will have a lower propensity to start businesses.
36. Communities in which there is a higher rate of use of an Aboriginal language in the home will also have a lower rate of successful businesses.
37. There is a secular reduction in either the number of potentially viable businesses being proposed, or if there is no decline in the number of new businesses being proposed, there is a secular reduction in the predicted profitability of additional new businesses. The latter reduction will be especially pronounced during periods in which very large numbers of new businesses are being proposed.
38. There is a secular decline in the success of financed businesses.
39. Among businesses that commence operation the proportion of total investment that is made by organizational members is positively associated with business success.
40. Businesses operated by organizations whose only function is operation of the business will be more successful than businesses operated by organizations that have principal functions other than operation of the business.
41. Among businesses that commence operation those businesses that offer a single, focused, product mix will be more successful than those businesses that offer a multiple product mix.
42. Collectivist forms of business organization that do not entail substantial, direct member or owner investment will be less successful than other forms of business organization that do entail substantial, direct member or owner investment.

LIST 9-3
LIST OF PROPOSITIONS AND POINTS-OF-INTEREST (Cont.)

43. To what extent did the organizations and programs that are the subject of this study behave in a manner that is primarily consistent with any one of the seven social decision processes?
44. To what extent do the organization and programs that are the subject of this study fit the determinist or strategic choice conceptions of organizations?
45. How were the case study organizations structured in terms of segmentation, differentiation, hierarchy, centralization, prevalence of rules and span-of-control?
46. Why was(were) this(these) structure(s) used?
47. To what extent did the case organizations utilize loose-coupling? If loose-coupling was used, what was its function?
48. Did conditions within the case programs result in the use of performance distorting, personal coping schemes by street-level staff?
49. To what extent did the programs utilize bureaucratic structures?
50. If the programs utilized bureaucratic structures, how well did these structures mesh with the nature of the target population?
51. If the programs utilized bureaucratic structures, how well did these structures mesh with demands for relative equity generated by the political process?
52. What impact does the unique conjunction of mostly negative historical circumstances, a dependent but unitary governing institution and tax benefits have on the volume and source of proposals to locate businesses on Indian reserves?
53. What impact does the unique conjunction of mostly negative historical circumstances, a dependent but unitary governing institution and tax benefits have on the rate of success of businesses located on Indian reserves?

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APPENDIX

**APPENDIX, TABLE 2-1
IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ("POLICY")
AND PROJECT FILES WITHIN THE FEDERAL RECORDS CENTRE*, WINNIPEG**

Program	Dates	Accession	Bays	Box Numbers
SARDA	1970-77	77-F07	6916	6-12
	1970-80	80-107	T6956	5-6
	1970-78	79-067	T6948-49	1-2
	1970-79	80-022	T3630-32	16
	1970-80	80-107	T6912-15	2
	1972-81	81-098	2524	.-**
	1972-82	82-106	T6599	.-**
	1974-82	82-047	T6959	.-**
	1970-83	83-099	T6602	.-**
	1972-81	81-098	2524	41-45,50-53,56-59
	1983-86	86-099	812	28-29,31-42
	1984-88	89-070	2540-41	7-29
	1987-89	90-170	4406	1-24
	1984-91	92-0716	3404	20-41
	1983-87	88-013	1038	1-10
NDA2	1984-91	92-0716	3404	8-13
	1983-89	90-062	621	18-43
	1986-90	91-155	3799	8-16
NEDP3	1984-86	88-148	1193-1195	1-61
	1984-86	90-012	2041-2042	1-15
	1984-86	91-033	T3272-T32	1-26
	1984-86	93-0907	1956-1957	24-48

* Part of the National Archives of Canada.

** Boxes not numbered. Usually one box only.

**APPENDIX, TABLE 2-2
LOCATION CODES**

First Two Digits		Second Two Digits		Last Digit	
Area organized =	10	Cmty area =	01-4	Area =	0
Area unorganized =	11	"	"	or cmty=	1-7
Area reserve/changed =	12	"	"	or non-reserve cmty=	8
Area mixed (org.-res.) =	13	"	"	or unk =	9
Area mixed (unorg.-res.)=	14	"	"	"	"
Organized community =	15	"	"	"	"
Unorganized community =	16	"	"	"	"
Indian reserve community =	17	"	"	"	"
Area community unknown=	18	"	"	"	"
Census Division =	19-23	Total organized =	17	Area =	0
or total of all CD's =	24	Total unorganized data(1)	18	"	"
Unorganized, non-cmty =	25	Total unorganized calc(2) =	19	"	"
Indian res., non-cmty region=	26	Total non-reserve =	20	"	"
		Total Indian reserve =	21	"	"
		Total calc with data(1) =	22	"	"
		Total calc all calc(2) =	23	"	"
Not in-area North Mb =	27	Nil	00	Nil	0
Manitoba, non-North =	28	"	"	"	"
Canada, non-Manitoba =	29	"	"	"	"
Ex Canada =	30	"	"	"	"

Number of Communities Coded by Type

Local areas =	25
Organized =	5
Unorganized =	55
Non-reserve =	60
Indian reserve =	36
All =	96

1. Data directly available, principally from Statistics Canada.
2. Data implied by, or estimated from, directly available data.

**APPENDIX, TABLE 2-3
PRODUCT CODES**

- Agricultural and Related Service Industries
 - 010 - Agricultural industries
 - 020 - Service industries incidental to agriculture
- Fishing and Trapping Industries
 - 031 - Fishing industries
 - 032 - Services incidental to fishing
 - 033 - Trapping
- Logging and Forestry Industries
 - 040 - Logging industry
 - 050 - Forestry services industry
- Mining (Including Milling), Quarrying and Oil Well Industries
 - 060 - Mining industries
 - 070 - Crude petroleum and natural gas industries
 - 080 - Quarry and sand pit industries
 - 090 - Service industries incidental to mineral extraction
- Manufacturing Industries
 - 100 - Food industries
 - 110 - Beverage industries
 - 120 - Tobacco products industries
 - 150 - Rubber products industries
 - 160 - Plastics products industries
 - 170 - Leather and allied products industries
 - 180 - Primary textiles industries
 - 190 - Textile products industries
 - 240 - Clothing industries
 - 250 - Wood industries
 - 260 - Furniture and fixture industries
 - 270 - Paper and allied products industries
 - 280 - Printing, publishing and allied industries
 - 290 - Primary metal industries
 - 300 - Fabricated metal products industries (except machinery and transportation equipment inds.)
 - 310 - Machinery industries (except electrical machinery)
 - 320 - Transportation equipment industries
 - 330 - Electrical and electronic products industries
 - 350 - Non-metallic mineral products industries
 - 360 - Refined petroleum and coal products industries
 - 370 - Chemical and chemical products industries
 - 390 - Other manufacturing industries
- Construction Industries
 - 400 - Building, developing and general contracting industries
 - 410 - Industrial and heavy (engineering) construction inds.
[industrial, highway, and heavy]
 - 420 - Trade contracting industries [trades activity]
 - 440 - Service industries incidental to construction [prjct mgmt etc.]
- Transportation and Storage Industries
 - 450 - Transportation industries
 - 460 - Pipeline transport industries
 - 470 - Storage and warehousing industries
- Communication and other utility industries
 - 480 - Communication industries
 - 490 - Other utility industries

APPENDIX, TABLE 2-3 (Cont.)
PRODUCT CODES

Wholesale Trade Industries

- 500 - Farm products industries, wholesale
- 510 - Petroleum products industries, wholesale
- 520 - Food, beverage, drug and tobacco industries, wholesale
- 530 - Apparel and dry goods industries, wholesale
- 540 - Household goods industries, wholesale
- 550 - Motor vehicle, arts and accessories industries, wholesale
- 560 - Metals, hardware, plumbing, heating and building materials inds, wholesale
- 570 - Machinery, equipment and supplies industries, wholesale
- 590 - Other products industries, wholesale

Retail Trade Industries

- 600 - Food, beverage and drug industries, retail
- 610 - Shoe, apparel, fabric and yarn industries, retail
- 620 - Household furniture, appliances and furnishings inds., retail
- 630 - Automotive vehicles, parts and accessories industries, sales and service
- 640 - General Retail Merchandising Industries
- 650 - Other retail store industries
- 690 - Non-store retail industries

Finance and Insurance Industries

- 700 - Deposit accepting intermediary industries
- 710 - Consumer and business financing intermediary industries
- 720 - Investment intermediary industries
- 730 - Insurance industries
- 740 - Other financial intermediary industries

Real Estate Operator and Insurance Agent Industries

- 750 - Real estate operator industries (except developers)
- 760 - Insurance and real estate agent industries

Business Service Industries

- 770 - Business service industries

Government Service Industries

- 810 - Federal government service industries
- 820 - Provincial and territorial government service industries
- 830 - Local government service industries
- 840 - International and other extra-territorial gov't service inds

Educational Service Industries

- 850 - Educational service industries

Health and Social service Industries

- 860 - Health and social service industries

Accommodation, Food and Beverage Service Industries

- 910 - Accommodation service industries
- 920 - Food and beverage service industries

Other Service Industries

- 960 - Amusement and recreational service industries
- 970 - Personal and household service industries
- 980 - Membership organizational industries
- 990 - Other service industries

Industry Unknown

- 999 - Industry unknown
-
-

Source: Statistics Canada 1980.

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-1
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES (1)**

Location (2)	Name of Local Government	Notes
Aghaming-Seymourville LA		
Aghaming UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3
Hollow Water IR #10	Hollow Water First Nation Band No. 263	
Manigotogan UC	Manigotogan Community Council	
Seymourville UC	Seymourville Community Council	
Baden-Westgate LA		
Baden UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3.4
Barrows UC	Barrows Community Council	
National Mills UC	National Mills Community Committee	
Powell UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3.5
Red Deer Lake UC	Red Deer Lake Community Committee	
Westgate UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3
Berens River LA		
Berens River UC	Berens River Community Council	
Berens River IR #13	Berens River Band No. 266	
Big Black River UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3
Bloodvein LA		
Bloodvein Indian IR #12	Bloodvein Band No. 267	
Long Body Creek UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3
Brochet LA		
Brochet UC	Brochet Community Council	
Brochet Indian IR #197	Barren Lands (Brochet) Band No. 308	
Camperville-Pine Creek LA		
Camperville UC	Camperville Community Council	
Duck Bay UC	Duck Bay Community Council	
Pine Creek Indian IR #282	Pine Creek Band No. 282	
Chemawawin-Easterville LA		
Chemawawin First Nation IR #2	Chemawawin First Nation Band N. 309	6
Easterville UC	Easterville Community Council	
Churchill OC	Local Government District of Churchill	
Cormorant UC	Cormorant Community Council	
Cross Lake LA		
Cross Lake UC	Cross Lake Community Council	
Cross Lake IR #'s 19,19A,19B,19C,19E	Cross Lake Band No. 276	
Crane River LA		
Crane River IR #51	Crane River Band No. 279	
Crane River UC	Crane River Community Council	
Dallas-Pequis LA		
Dallas-Red Rose UC	Dallas\Red Rose Community Committee	
Fisher Bay UC	Fisher Bay Community Committee	
Fisher River IR #'s 44,44A	Fisher River Band No. 264	
Harwill UC	Harwill Community Committee	
Peguis IR #18		
Dauphin River LA		
Dauphin River (Anama Bay) UC	Dauphin River Community Committee	
Dauphin River IR #48A	Dauphin River Band No. 316	
Fox Lake IR #'S 1,2,3	Fox Lake (Gillam, Bird) Band No. 305	7
Garden Hill-Wasagamack LA		
Garden Hill (Island Lake) #22A	Garden Hill Band No. 297	8
Island Lake UC		
St. Theresa Point UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3
St. Theresa Point IR (Island Lake) #22	St. Theresa Point Band No. 298	8
Wasagamack IR (Island Lake #22)		
God's Lake LA		
God's Lake Narrows UC	God's Lake Narrows Community Committee	
God's Lake IR #23	God's Lake Band No. 296	
God's River UC		9
God's River IR #86A	God's River Band No. 302	9

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-1 (Cont.)
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES (1)**

Location (2)	Name of Local Government	Notes
Grand Rapids LA	Local Government District of Grand Rapids	
Grand Rapids OC	Grand Rapids Band No. 310	
Grand Rapids IR #33	Grand Rapids Band No. 310	
Granville Lake UC	Granville Lake Community Committee	
Iford UC	Iford Community Council	10
Jackhead IR #'s 43,43A	Jackhead Band No. 268	
Lac Brochet IR #197A	Northlands (Lac Brochet) Band No. 317	11
Little Black River IR #9	Little Black River Band No. 260	
Little Grand Rapids LA		
Little Grand Rapids UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3
Little Grand Rapids IR #14	Little Grand Rapids Band No. 270	12
Pauingassi UC	Indian and Northern Affairs Canada	12
Pauingassi First Nation IR #327	Little Grand Rapids Band No. 270	12
Loon Straits UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3
Matheson Island UC	Matheson Island Community Council	
Moose Lake LA		
Moose Lake UC	Moose Lake Community Council	
Moose Lake IR #'s 31A,31C,31G,31J	Moose Lake Band No. 312	
Nelson House LA		
Nelson House UC	Nelson House Community Committee	
Nelson House IR #'s 170,170A,170B,170C	Nelson House Band No. 313	
Norway House LA		
Norway House UC	Norway House Community Council	
Norway House IR #'s 7A,7B	Norway House Band No. 278	
Warren's Landing UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	13
Oxford House LA		
Oxford House UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3
Oxford House IR #24	Oxford House Band No. 301	
Pelican Rapids-Shoal River LA		
Pelican Rapids Community	Pelican Rapids Community Council	
Shoal River (Dawson Bay) IR #'s 65A,65B,65F	Shoal River Band No. 314	
Pikwitonei UC	Pikwitonei Community Council	
Pine Dock UC	Pine Dock Community Council	
Poplar River LA		
Poplarville UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3
Poplar River IR #16	Poplar River First Nation Band No. 277	
Princess Harbour UC	Princess Harbour Community Committee	
Pukatawagan IR #178	Mathias Colomb Band No. 311	14
Red Sucker Lake LA		
Red Sucker UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3
Red Sucker Lake IR #1978	Red Sucker Lake Band No. 300	9
Shamattawa IR #1	Shamattawa First Nation Band No. 307	
Sherridon UC	Sherridon Community Council	
South Indian Lake UC	South Indian Lake Community Council	
Split Lake-York Landing LA		
Split Lake IR #'s 171,171A,171B	Split Lake First Nation Band No. 306	
York Landing UC		15
York Landing IR #304 (York Factory)	York Factory Indian Band No. 304	15
Tadoule Lake IR #1 (Churchill)	Fort Churchill (Tadoule Lake) Band No. 303	
The Pas LA		
The Pas OC	Town of The Pas	
The Pas LGD OC	Local Government District of Consul	
The Pas IR #'s 21,21A-21P	The Pas Band No. 315	
Wanless OC	Local Government District of Consul	3
Thicket Portage UC	Thicket Portage Community Council	
Wabowden UC	Wabowden Community Council	

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-1 (Cont.)
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES (1)**

Location (2)	Name of Local Government	Notes
Waterhen LA		
Mallard UC	Mallard Community Council	
Meadow Portage UC	Meadow Portage Community Committee	
Rock Ridge UC	Rock Ridge Community Council	16
Salt Point UC	Manitoba Northern Affairs	
Spence Bay UC	Manitoba Department of Northern Affairs	3.16
Waterhen UC	Waterhen Community Council	
Waterhen IR #45	Waterhen Band No. 281	

Notes:

1. Those communities, including Indian reserves, located north of the area of Manitoba located north of the southern jurisdictional limit of the Northern Affairs Act including adjacent Indian reserves.
2. The communities in each group are located near to one another and are accessible to one another by road or navigable water. Groups are listed alphabetically according to the name of the largest community in the group.
3. These communities have no formal local government structure or status.
4. Baden was recognized as a community in 1985.
5. Powell was recognized as a community in 1984.
6. The Chemawawin Band was relocated in 1963 from Reserve No. 1 which was flooded when the Grand Rapids Generating Station was constructed.
7. In 1977 the Fox Lake Band received reserve lands near Atkins and Armstrong Lakes. In the early 1980's Band members moved to Bird. Reserve #2 was established there in June, 1985. Band members live in Bird and Gillam. Reserves #1 (Atkins Lake) and #3 (Armstrong) are uninhabited.
8. Reserves No. 22 and 22A are jointly "owned" by the Garden Hill, St. Theresa Point, Red Sucker Lake and Wasagamach Bands. The Garden Hill Band occupies Reserve No. 22A, the St. Theresa Point and Wasagamach Bands share Reserve No. 22, and the Red Sucker Lake Band occupies Reserve No. 1976.
9. Since an unknown date prior to 1971 the God's River community was settled by members of the God's Lake Band and it was administered by Indian Affairs Canada. In June, 1988 this settlement became a reserve governed by the God's River Band.
10. This is a long term settlement. Although the War Lake Band lives within the settlement it has not been established as an Indian reserve.
11. Around 1973 part of the Barren Lands Band separated to become the Northlands Band. In the late 1970's this new Band relocated to Lac Brochet where a new reserve was established in October, 1980.
12. Little Grand Rapids Band members live on the Little Grand Rapids and Pauingassi Indian Reserves. Reserves. The Pauingassi Settlement, which had been a long term settlement administered by Indian Affairs Canada became a reserve in March, 1988. Through the end of the study period a single Band council governed both reserves.
13. As of 1991 Warren's Landing no longer had any residents. It remains as a seasonal fishing centre.
14. Until the late 1960's the Mathias Colomb was located at the Prayer River Settlement at Highrock Indian Reserve No. 199. This Settlement was destroyed by fire forcing the Band to relocate.
15. York Landing has been settled since the late 1940's or early 1950's and was administered by Indian Affairs Canada. A reserve was established in May, 1990.
16. Rock Ridge and Spence Lake were recognized as new communities in 1989.
17. All reserves created during the study period became exempt from the income tax on the date they gained reserve status. No other non-reserve communities were exempt from the income tax during this period.

Sources:

Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. 1986 and 1991.
 Manitoba Northern Affairs. n.d. 1993 Community Profiles.
 Manitoba Northern Affairs. n.d. 1989 Community Profiles.
 Revenue Canada, personal communication.
 Rouire, personal communication.
 Stagg, personal communication.

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-2 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS
DIVISIONS, POPULATION SIZE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTION**

CD	Ar	PI	Place	1981									
				SttsCn TotPop	MNA (1982) TotPop	Data MNA AbPo	INAC OnReR	TotPop	Estimates				
									Estimated Minimums				
									Number		Proportion		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	AbPo	OnRe	NonOR		
19	a	a	Aghaming-Seymourville LA	u	u	u	398	822	737	398	0.90	0.48	0.41
19	s	u	Aghaming UC	u	22	15	0	22	15	0	0.68	0.00	0.68
19	s	r	Hollow Water IR	461	u	u	398	461	398	398	0.86	0.86	0.00
19	s	u	Manigotogan UC	216	220	206	0	216	202	0	0.94	0.00	0.94
19	s	u	Seymourville UC	130	123	115	0	123	122	0	0.99	0.00	0.99
19	a	a	Baden-Westgate LA	u	u	u	0	311	250	0	0.80	0.00	0.80
19	s	u	Baden UC	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
19	s	u	Barrows UC	199	188	149	0	199	158	0	0.79	0.00	0.79
19	s	u	National Mills UC	56	62	60	0	56	54	0	0.97	0.00	0.97
19	s	u	Powell UC	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
19	s	u	Red Deer Lake UC	41	50	40	0	41	33	0	0.80	0.00	0.80
19	s	u	Westgate UC	15	23	7	0	15	5	0	0.30	0.00	0.30
19	a	a	Berens River LA	919	u	u	739	919	879	681	0.96	0.74	0.22
19	s	u	Berens River UC	238	226	188	0	238	198	0	0.83	0.00	0.83
19	s	r	Berens River IR	681	u	u	739	681	681	681	1.00	1.00	0.00
19	a	u	Big Black River UC	38	32	31	0	38	37	0	0.97	0.00	0.97
19	a	u	Bissett UC	132	304	24	0	132	10	0	0.08	0.00	0.08
19	a	a	Bloodvein LA	413	u	u	404	413	404	404	0.98	0.98	0.00
19	s	r	Bloodvein IR	413	u	u	404	413	404	404	0.98	0.98	0.00
19	s	u	Long Body Creek UC	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
23	a	a	Brochet LA	u	u	u	244	639	525	244	0.82	0.38	0.44
23	s	u	Brochet UC	u	297	281	0	297	281	0	0.95	0.00	0.95
23	s	r	Brochet IR	342	u	u	244	342	244	244	0.71	0.71	0.00
19	a	a	Camperville-Pine Creek LA	1480	u	u	423	1480	1408	300	0.95	0.20	0.75
19	s	u	Camperville UC	586	639	619	0	586	568	0	0.97	0.00	0.97
19	s	u	Duck Bay UC	594	696	633	0	594	540	0	0.91	0.00	0.91
19	s	r	Pine Creek IR	300	u	u	423	300	300	300	1.00	1.00	0.00
21	a	a	Chemawawin-Easterville LA	589	u	u	356	589	502	356	0.85	0.60	0.25
21	s	r	Chemawawin IR	439	u	u	356	439	356	356	0.81	0.81	0.00
21	s	u	Easterville UC	150	234	227	0	150	146	0	0.97	0.00	0.97
23	a	o	Churchill OC	1304	u	u	0	1304	u	0	u	0.00	u
21	a	u	Cormorant UC	445	451	429	0	445	423	0	0.95	0.00	0.95
21	a	o	Cranberry Portage OC	984	u	u	0	984	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	a	a	Crane River LA	550	u	u	118	550	420	118	0.76	0.21	0.55
19	s	u	Crane River UC	336	389	350	0	336	302	0	0.90	0.00	0.90
19	s	r	Crane River IR	214	u	u	118	214	118	118	0.55	0.55	0.00
22	a	a	Cross Lake LA	2077	u	u	1567	2077	u	u	u	u	u
22	s	u	Cross Lake UC	510	u	u	0	510	u	0	u	0.00	u
22	s	r	Cross Lake IR	1567	u	u	1567	1567	1567	1567	1.00	1.00	0.00
19	a	a	Dallas-Peguis LA	u	u	u	2246	2133	2092	2011	0.98	0.94	0.04
19	s	u	Dallas-Red Rose UC	u	38	22	0	38	22	0	0.58	0.00	0.58
19	s	u	Fisher Bay UC	u	48	47	0	48	47	0	0.98	0.00	0.98
19	s	u	Harwill UC	u	36	12	0	36	12	0	0.33	0.00	0.33
19	s	r	Fisher River IR	706	u	u	795	706	706	706	1.00	1.00	0.00
19	s	r	Peguis IR	1305	u	u	1451	1305	1305	1305	1.00	1.00	0.00
19	a	a	Dauphin River LA	104	u	u	94	104	99	70	0.95	0.67	0.28
19	s	u	Dauphin River (Anama Bay) UC	34	47	40	0	34	29	0	0.85	0.00	0.85
19	s	r	Dauphin River IR	70	u	u	94	70	70	70	1.00	1.00	0.00
21	a	u	Dawson Bay (Overflowing R) UC	43	u	u	0	43	u	0	u	0.00	u
21	a	o	Flin Flon OC	7894	u	u	0	7894	u	0	u	0.00	u
23	a	r	Fox Lake IR	na	na	na	na	u	na	na	na	na	na

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-2 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS
DIVISIONS, POPULATION SIZE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTION**

CD (1)	Ar (2)	PI (3)	Place	1991									
				Data - Statistics Canada				Estimates					
				Census	Censu	APS	OnReR (7)	Estimated Minimums					
				TotPop (4)	AbPop (5)	AbPo (5)		Number	Proportion				
				TotPop (8)	AbPop (9)	OnReR (10)	AbPo	OnRe	NotOR				
19	a	a	Aghaming-Seymourville LA	767	u	u	410	767	545	410	0.71	0.53	0.18
19	s	u	Aghaming UC	16	u	u	0	16	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	r	Hollow Water IR	427	420	u	410	427	420	410	0.98	0.96	0.02
19	s	u	Manigotogan UC	197	u	u	0	197	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Seymourville UC	127	125	125	0	127	125	0	0.98	0.00	0.98
19	a	a	Baden-Westgate LA	280	u	u	0	280	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Baden UC	54	u	u	0	54	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Barrows UC	139	u	u	0	139	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	National Mills UC	23	u	u	0	23	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Powell UC	15	u	u	0	15	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Red Deer Lake UC	49	u	u	0	49	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Westgate UC	u	u	u	0	u	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	a	a	Berens River LA	840	u	811	670	840	809	670	0.96	0.80	0.17
19	s	u	Berens River UC	140	u	119	0	140	119	0	0.85	0.00	0.85
19	s	r	Berens River IR	700	690	692	670	700	690	670	0.99	0.96	0.03
19	a	u	Big Black River UC	14	u	u	0	14	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	a	u	Bissett UC	154	u	u	0	154	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	a	a	Bloodvein LA	455	u	u	420	455	430	420	0.95	0.92	0.02
19	s	r	Bloodvein IR	432	430	429	420	432	430	420	1.00	0.97	0.02
19	s	u	Long Body Creek UC	23	u	u	0	23	u	0	u	0.00	u
23	a	a	Brochet LA	440	u	424	220	440	426	220	0.97	0.50	0.47
23	s	u	Brochet UC	211	u	197	0	211	197	0	0.93	0.00	0.93
23	s	r	Brochet IR	229	230	227	220	229	229	220	1.00	0.96	0.04
19	a	a	Camperville-Pine Creek LA	1467	u	u	435	1478	1466	435	0.99	0.29	0.70
19	s	u	Camperville UC	579	u	579	0	579	579	0	1.00	0.00	1.00
19	s	u	Duck Bay UC	427	u	433	0	438	427	0	0.97	0.00	0.97
19	s	r	Pine Creek IR	461	460	u	435	461	460	435	1.00	0.94	0.05
21	a	a	Chemawawin-Easterville LA	696	u	u	505	696	675	505	0.97	0.73	0.24
21	s	r	Chemawawin IR	551	540	543	505	551	540	505	0.98	0.92	0.06
21	s	u	Easterville UC	145	u	135	0	145	135	0	0.93	0.00	0.93
23	a	o	Churchill OC	1143	550	u	0	1143	550	0	0.48	0.00	0.48
21	a	u	Cormorant UC	382	u	346	0	382	346	0	0.91	0.00	0.91
21	a	o	Cranberry Portage OC	817	325	u	0	817	325	0	0.40	0.00	0.40
19	a	a	Crane River LA	501	u	u	235	501	265	235	0.53	0.47	0.06
19	s	u	Crane River UC	226	u	u	0	226	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	r	Crane River IR	275	265	244	235	275	265	235	0.96	0.85	0.11
22	a	a	Cross Lake LA	3006	u	2890	2545	3006	2918	2545	0.97	0.85	0.12
22	s	u	Cross Lake UC	401	u	343	0	401	343	0	0.86	0.00	0.86
22	s	r	Cross Lake IR	2605	2575	2547	2545	2605	2575	2545	0.99	0.98	0.01
19	a	a	Dallas-Peguis LA	u	u	u	2918	u	815	805	u	u	u
19	s	u	Dallas-Red Rose UC	77	u	u	0	77	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Fisher Bay UC	57	u	u	0	57	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Harwill UC	31	u	u	0	31	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	r	Fisher River IR	850	815	821	805	850	815	805	0.96	0.95	0.01
19	s	r	Peguis IR	u	u	u	2113	u	u	u	u	u	u
19	a	a	Dauphin River LA	113	u	u	100	113	103	100	0.91	0.88	0.03
19	s	u	Dauphin River (Anama Bay) UC	10	u	u	0	10	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	r	Dauphin River IR	103	105	102	100	103	103	100	1.00	0.97	0.03
21	a	u	Dawson Bay (Overflowing R) UC	52	u	u	0	52	u	0	u	0.00	u
21	a	o	Flin Flon OC	7119	610	u	0	7119	610	0	0.09	0.00	0.09
23	a	r	Fox Lake IR	154	150	u	145	154	150	145	0.97	0.94	0.03

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-2 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS
DIVISIONS, POPULATION SIZE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTION**

CD	Ar	PI	Place	1991									
				Data - Statistics Canad				Estimates					
				Census TotPop (4)	Censu AbPop (5)	APS AbPo (5)	OnReR (7)	TotPop (8)	Number AbPop OnReR (9) (10)		Estimated Minimums AbPo OnRe NotOR		
19	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	na	na	na
19	d	du	All UC (Data)	3717	2945	u	0	3717	2945	0	0.79	0.00	0.79
19	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	3643	u	1256	0	3654	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	3555	125	1256	0	3566	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	6053	5955	3319	8002	6053	5953	5795	0.98	0.96	0.03
19	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	9770	8900	u	8002	9770	8898	5795	0.91	0.59	0.32
19	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	9696	u	4575	8002	9707	u	5795	u	0.00	u
21	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	8892	2385	u	0	8892	2385	0	0.27	0.00	0.27
21	d	du	All UC (Data)	1839	950	u	0	1839	950	0	0.52	0.00	0.52
21	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	642	u	481	0	642	u	0	u	0.00	u
21	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	9534	u	481	0	9534	u	0	u	0.00	u
21	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	2557	2405	2011	2225	2557	2405	2225	0.94	0.94	0.07
21	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	13288	5740	u	2225	13288	5740	2225	0.43	0.17	0.43
21	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	12091	u	2492	2225	12091	u	2225	u	0.18	u
22	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	na	na	na
22	d	du	All UC (Data)	2105	1715	u	0	2105	1715	0	0.81	0.00	0.81
22	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	2216	u	1471	120	2216	u	120	u	0.05	u
22	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	2216	u	1471	120	2216	u	120	u	0.05	u
22	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	14817	14664	3877	14455	14817	14664	14455	0.99	0.99	0.01
22	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	16922	16379	u	14455	16922	16379	14455	0.97	0.85	0.11
22	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	17033	u	5348	14575	17033	u	14575	u	0.86	u
23	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	1143	550	u	0	1143	550	0	0.48	0.00	0.48
23	d	du	All UC (Data)	258	130	u	0	258	130	0	0.50	0.00	0.50
23	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	986	u	912	700	986	u	700	u	0.71	u
23	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	2129	1305	912	700	2129	1500	700	0.70	0.33	0.38
23	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	2263	2250	933	2490	2263	2244	2230	0.99	0.99	0.01
23	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	3664	2930	u	2490	3664	2924	2230	0.80	0.61	0.19
23	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	4392	u	1845	3190	4392	u	2930	u	0.67	u
All	t	co	Included OC (Cal.)	10035	2935		0	10035	2935	0	0.29	0.00	0.29
All	t	du	All UC (Data)	7919	5740		0	7919	5740	0	0.72	0.00	0.72
All	t	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	7487	u		820	7498	u	820	u	0.11	u
All	t	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	17434	u		820	17445	u	820	u	0.05	u
All	t	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	25690	25274		27172	25690	25266	24705	0.98	0.96	0.02
All	t	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	33609	31014		27172	33609	31006	24705	0.92	0.74	0.19
All	t	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	43124	u		27992	43135	u	25525	u	0.59	u

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-2 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS
DIVISIONS, POPULATION SIZE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTI**

CD	Ar	PI	Place	1959/61			1971			1976	
				1961	1959		SttsCn TotPop	AbPo	Prop. AbPop	SttsCn TotPop	AbPop
				SttsCn TotPop	Legassi AbPop	Prop. AbPop					
(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)	(6)	(4)	(5)	(4)	(5)	

Notes:

1. Census division as at the 1991 Census.
2. Area (Ar): "a" = area, "s" = sub-area, "t" = total for census division(s)
3. Place (PI): "a" = area; "o" = organized community; "r" = Indian reserve; "u" = unorganized community; "co" = census division; "du" = CD data unorganized; "cu" = calculated unorganized; "cn" = calc. non-reserve; "cr" = CD calculated reserve; "cd" CD calculated reserve & organized; "cc" = CD calculated organized plus data unorganized; unorganized plus calculated reserve.
4. Total pop. for year. SttsCn 1961, 1971, 1976, 1981 & 1991 data from Dominion Bureau of Statistics and Stats Cda. MNA 1981 & 1986 for unorganized cmties are from Manitoba Northern Affairs 1982 & n.d.
5. Population of aboriginal ancestry. 1961 counts are multiple ancestry from "Table 4. Location, Population and Acreage of Indian Reserves per Band, Manitoba, 1958", "Table 11. Metis Population in Manitoba by Community", and "Table 15. Metis Population in Predominantly Metis Communities" in Legasse 1959. 1971, 1976 & 1981 organized cmty counts area single ancestry data from Statistics Canada, Censuses of Canada. 1981 counts for the unorganized cmties from a 1982 survey published as "Population of Northern Affairs Communities by Ethnic Origin", Manitoba Northern Affairs, 1982, Pp. 1-3. 1986 counts are multiple ancestry data from "Table 6. Population of Manitoba, Census Subdivisions by Aboriginal Origins", Mba Bureau of Statistics, 1989 Pp. 32-43. 1991 reserve and organized community counts are multiple ancestry data are from a special tabulation by Statistics Canada. 1991 organized community counts are the self-identified population according to Statistics Canada's Aboriginal People's Survey.
6. Legasse 1959 lists the following cmties as "predominantly Metis": Baden Barrows, Red Deer L, Big Black R, Camperville, Duck Bay, Crane R, Manitogogan, Loon Straits, Matheson Is, Warren's Landing, Pine Dock, Mallard & Meadow Portage. In Table 4 Legasse notes 2,373 of 20,339 (12%) of Indians registered to Bands with reserves live off reserve.
7. 1981 & 1986 on reserve, reg. Indian(OnReRI) counts are the total of "own band res." + "Crown land admin'tered by own band" from Indian & Northern Affairs, 1981 & 1986. 1991 on-reserve reg. Indian counts from "Table 1. Pop. by Aborig. Origin Showing Single and Multiple Response Indian Registration and Indian Band Membership for Cdn Provinces Cen. Subdivisions, '91 Census-20% Sample Data" in Stats Cda, 1994.
8. Statistics Canada, Manitoba Northern Affairs, and Indian and Northern Affairs data in that order of priority.
9. 1981, 1986 & 1991 estimated minimum Aboriginal pop. is the Statistics Canada, Mba Bureau of Statistics or Mba Northern Affairs Aboriginal count if Stats Canada data are not available. Estimates based on North Affairs data are calculated as the same proportion of the Stats Canada pop. as the original Northern Affairs count is of the Northern Affairs total pop. INAC on reserve counts are directly used as estimates only when Stats Canada data are not available, otherwisethe Stats Canada total reserve pop. is treated as the maximum on reserve population.
10. Statistics Canada data used unless not available.

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-2 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS
DIVISIONS, POPULATION SIZE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTION**

CD (1)	Ar (2)	PI (3)	Place	1991									
				Data - Statistics Canada				Estimates			Estimated Minimums		
				Census TotPop (4)	Censu AbPop (5)	APS AbPo (5)	OnReR (7)	TotPop (8)	Number AbPop (9)	OnReR (10)	Proportion		
			AbPo	OnRe	NotOR								

Sources:

- Dominion Bureau of Statistics. 1963.
- 1961 Census of Canada. Population. Unincorporated Villages.
- Ottawa: Minister of Trade and Commerce. Bulletin SP-4.
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- Ottawa: Dept. of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.
- Legasse, Jean H. 1959.
- A Study of the Population of Indian Ancestry Living in Manitoba. Main Report.
- Winnipeg: Department of Agriculture and Immigration. Pp. 35, 58-64, 72.
- Manitoba Bureau of Statistics. 1989.
- Manitoba Aboriginal Persons, A Statistical Profile.
- Winnipeg: Manitoba Bureau of Statistics.
- Manitoba Northern Affairs. 1982.
- 1982 Census of Remote Northern Communities.
- Winnipeg: Manitoba Northern Affairs.
- Statistics Canada. 1994.
- Canada's Aboriginal Population by Census Subdivisions and
- Census Metropolitan Areas. Aboriginal Data. 1991 Census of Canada.
- Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science and Technology. Cat. No.: 94-326.
- Statistics Canada.
- Censuses of Manitoba.
- Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- Statistics Canada. 1973.
- 1971 Census of Canada. Population. Census Subdivisions (Historical).
- Ottawa: Minister of Trade and Commerce. Cat. No.: 92-702.

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN**

CD	Ar	PI	Location	1959/61				1971				1978			
				Known or Estimated				Known or Estimated				Known or Estimated			
				Minimum (Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Minimum (Single Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Minimum (Single Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason
19	a	m	Aghaming-Seymourville LA	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
19	s	u	Aghaming UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
19	s	r	Hollow Water IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
19	s	u	Manigotogan UC	0.81	Y	Y	3	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	Seymourville UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
19	a	u	Baden-Westgate LA	U	Y	U	2	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	2
19	s	u	Baden UC	NA	Y	Y	3	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	Barrows UC	0.33	Y	Y	3	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	National Mills UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
19	s	u	Powell UC	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
19	s	u	Red Deer Lake UC	U	Y	Y	3	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	Westgate UC	0.36	Y	N	4	U	Y	N	A	U	Y	N	A
19	a	m	Berens River LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
19	s	u	Berens River UC	0.78	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	r	Berens River IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
19	a	u	Big Black River UC	U	Y	Y	3	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	a	u	Bissett UC	0.11	N	N	3	U	N	N	A	U	N	N	A
19	a	m	Bloodvein LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
19	s	r	Bloodvein IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
19	s	u	Long Body Creek UC	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
23	a	m	Brochet LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
23	s	u	Brochet UC	0.63	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
23	s	r	Brochet IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
19	a	m	Camperville-Pine Creek LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
19	s	u	Camperville UC	1.00	Y	Y	3	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	Duck Bay UC	0.73	Y	Y	3	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	r	Pine Creek IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
21	a	m	Chemawawin-Easterville LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
21	s	r	Chemawawin IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
21	s	u	Easterville UC	1.00	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
23	a	o	Churchill OC	0.15	N	N	4	0.29	Y	N	4	U	N	N	A
21	a	u	Cormorant UC	0.60	Y	Y	4	0.13	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
21	a	o	Cranberry Portage OC	0.22	N	N	4	0.15	N	N	4,A	U	Y	Y	A
19	a	m	Crane River LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
19	s	u	Crane River UC	1.00	Y	Y	3	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	r	Crane River IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN**

CD	Ar	PI	Location	1959/61				1971				1976			
				Known or Estimated				Known or Estimated				Known or Estimated			
				Minimum (Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Minimum (Single Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Minimum (Single Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason
22	a	m	Cross Lake LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
22	s	u	Cross Lake UC	0.62	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
22	s	r	Cross Lake IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
19	a	m	Dallas-Peguis LA	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	Dallas-Red Rose UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
19	s	u	Fisher Bay UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
19	s	u	Harwill UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	U	7
19	s	r	Fisher River IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
19	s	r	Peguis IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
19	a	m	Dauphin River LA	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	7
19	s	u	Dauphin River (Anama Bay) UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
19	s	r	Dauphin River IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
21	a	u	Dawson Bay (Overflowing River) UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6
21	a	o	Flin Flon OC	0.01	N	N	4	0.01	N	N	4	U	N	N	A
23	a	r	Fox Lake IR	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
22	a	m	Garden Hill-Wasagamack LA	U	Y	Y	A,B	U	Y	Y	A,B	U	Y	Y	A,B
22	s	r	Garden Hill IR (#22A)	NA	NA	NA	NA	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
22	s	u	Island Lake UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
22	s	u	St. Theresa Point UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6
22	s	r	St Theresa Pt & Wasagamack IR(#22)	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
23	a	o	Gillam OC	0.16	N	N	4	0.15	N	N	4	U	N	N	A
22	a	m	God's Lake LA	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
22	s	u	God's Lake Narrows UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
22	s	r	God's Lake IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
22	s	u	God's River UC	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	7,A
22	s	r	God's River IR	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
21	a	m	Grand Rapids LA	U	Y	U	2,6	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	7
21	s	o	Grand Rapids OC	0.24	N	N	4	0.36	Y	U	4	U	Y	U	A
21	s	r	Grand Rapids IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
23	a	u	Granville Lake UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
21	a	u	Herb Landing UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	N	N	7
19	a	u	Homebrook and Peonan Point UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	N	N	7
22	a	u	Ilford UC	0.36	Y	N	4	U	Y	U	A	U	Y	Y	B
19	a	r	Jackhead IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
23	a	r	Lac Brochet IR	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	U	Y	Y	5
23	a	o	Leaf Rapids OC	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	U	U	U	6
19	a	r	Little Black River IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN**

CD	Ar	PI	Location	1959/61				1971				1978			
				Known or Estimated				Known or Estimated				Known or Estimated			
				Minimum (Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Minimum (Single Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Minimum (Single Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason
19	a	m	Little Grand Rapids LA	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
19	s	u	Little Grand Rapids UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
19	s	r	Little Grand Rapids IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
19	s	u	Pauingassi UC	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	r	Pauingassi IR	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
19	a	u	Loon Straits UC	0.66	Y	Y	3,4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
23	a	o	Lynn Lake OC	0.09	N	N	4	0.01	N	N	4	U	N	N	A
19	a	u	Matheson Island UC	0.99	Y	Y	3,4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	a	m	Moose Lake LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
19	s	u	Moose Lake UC	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	r	Moose Lake IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
22	a	m	Nelson House LA	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	2
22	s	u	Nelson House UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
22	s	r	Nelson House IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
22	a	m	Norway House LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
22	s	u	Norway House UC	0.79	Y	Y	4	0.36	Y	Y	4,A	U	Y	Y	A
22	s	r	Norway House IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
22	s	u	Warren's Landing UC	U	Y	Y	3	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
22	a	m	Oxford House LA	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
22	s	u	Oxford House UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
22	s	r	Oxford House IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
19	a	m	Pelican Rapids-Shoal River LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
19	s	u	Pelican Rapids UC	0.98	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	r	Shoal River (Dawson Bay) IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
22	a	u	Pikwitonei UC	0.77	Y	Y	4	0.57	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A
19	a	u	Pine Dock UC	0.90	Y	Y	3	u	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	a	m	Poplar River LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
19	s	u	Poplarville UC	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	r	Poplar River IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
19	a	u	Princess Harbour UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
23	a	r	Pukatawagan IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
22	a	m	Red Sucker Lake LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
22	s	u	Red Sucker Lake UC	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	B
22	s	r	Red Sucker Lake IR	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	U	Y	Y	5
23	a	r	Shamattawa IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN**

CD	Ar	Pl	Location	1959/61				1971				1978			
				Minimum (Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Minimum (Single Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Minimum (Single Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason
21	a	u	Sherridon UC	0.68	Y	Y	4	0.88	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A
21	a	o	Snow Lake OC	0.07	N	N	4	0.03	N	N	4	U	N	N	A
23	a	u	South Indian Lake UC	1.00	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
22	a	m	Split Lake-York Landing LA	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2	U	Y	Y	2
22	s	r	Split Lake IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
22	s	u	York Landing UC	1.00	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
22	s	r	York Landing (York Factory) IR	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
23	a	r	Tadoule Lake (Churchill) IR	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	U	Y	Y	5
21	a	m	The Pas LA	U	U	U	6	U	Y	N	A	U	Y	N	B
21	s	o	The Pas OC	0.14	N	N	4	0.07	N	N	4	U	N	N	A
21	s	o	The Pas LGD OC	0.16	N	N	4	0.18	U	N	A	U	U	N	A
21	s	r	The Pas IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
21	s	o	Wanless OC	0.59	Y	Y	4	0.47	Y	Y	4,A	U	Y	U	B
22	a	u	Thicket Portage UC	0.61	Y	Y	4	0.64	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A
22	a	o	Thompson OC	U	U	U	6	0.03	N	N	4	U	N	N	A
22	a	u	Wabowden UC	0.78	Y	Y	4	0.32	Y	Y	4,A	U	Y	Y	A
19	a	m	Waterhen LA	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
19	s	u	Mallard UC	U	Y	Y	3	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	Meadow Portage UC	U	Y	Y	3	U	U	U	6	U	N	N	7
19	s	u	Rock Ridge UC	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
19	s	u	Salt Point UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	Y	7
19	s	u	Spence Lake UC	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
19	s	u	Waterhen UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	Y	N	7
19	s	r	Waterhen IR	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3 (Cont.)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN**

CD	Ar	PI	Location	1981				1986				1991			
				Known or Estimated Minimum (Sin./Mul. Aboriginal Origin)(1)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Known or Estimated Minimum Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Known or Estimated Minimum Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason
19	a	m	Aghaming-Seymourville LA	0.90	Y	Y	4	0.53	Y	Y	4	0.71	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Aghaming UC	0.68	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	B
19	s	r	Hollow Water IR	0.66	Y	Y	4	0.96	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Manigotogan UC	0.94	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
19	s	u	Seymourville UC	0.99	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	0.98	Y	Y	4
19	a	u	Baden-Westgate LA	0.80	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
19	s	u	Baden UC	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	B
19	s	u	Barrows UC	0.79	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
19	s	u	National Mills UC	0.97	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	B
19	s	u	Powell UC	NA	NA	NA	NA	U	Y	Y	7	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	Red Deer Lake UC	0.80	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
19	s	u	Westgate UC	0.30	Y	N	4	U	N	N	B	U	N	N	C
19	a	m	Berens River LA	0.96	Y	Y	4	0.81	Y	Y	4	0.96	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Berens River UC	0.83	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	0.85	Y	Y	4
19	s	r	Berens River IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4
19	a	u	Big Black River UC	0.97	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
19	a	u	Bissett UC	0.08	N	N	4	U	Y	N	7	U	Y	N	B
19	a	m	Bloodvein LA	0.98	Y	Y	4	0.81	Y	Y	4	0.95	Y	Y	4
19	s	r	Bloodvein IR	0.98	Y	Y	4	0.95	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Long Body Creek UC	NA	NA	NA	NA	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
23	a	m	Brochet LA	0.82	Y	Y	4	0.43	Y	Y	4,2	0.97	Y	Y	4
23	s	u	Brochet UC	0.95	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	0.93	Y	Y	4
23	s	r	Brochet IR	0.71	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
19	a	m	Camperville-Pine Creek LA	0.95	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	2	0.99	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Camperville UC	0.97	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	1.00	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Duck Bay UC	0.91	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	0.97	Y	Y	4
19	s	r	Pine Creek IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	5	1.00	Y	Y	4
21	a	m	Chemawawin-Easterville LA	0.85	Y	Y	4	0.64	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4
21	s	r	Chemawawin IR	0.81	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4
21	s	u	Easterville UC	0.97	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	0.93	Y	Y	4
23	a	o	Churchill OC	U	N	N	A	0.41	Y	N	4	0.48	Y	N	4
21	a	u	Cormorant UC	0.95	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	0.91	Y	Y	4
21	a	o	Cranberry Portage OC	U	Y	Y	A	0.19	N	N	4	0.40	Y	N	4
19	a	m	Crane River LA	0.76	Y	Y	4	0.29	Y	Y	2	0.53	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Crane River UC	0.90	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
19	s	r	Crane River IR	0.55	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	4	0.96	Y	Y	4

APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3 (Cont.)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN

CD	Ar	Pl	Location	1981				1988				1991			
				Known or Estimated Minimum (Sin./Mul. Aboriginal Origin) (1)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Known or Estimated Minimum Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Known or Estimated Minimum Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason
22	a	m	Cross Lake LA	U	Y	Y	2	0.75	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4
22	s	u	Cross Lake UC	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A	0.88	Y	Y	4
22	s	r	Cross Lake IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4
19	a	m	Dallas-Peguis LA	0.98	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	Dallas-Red Rose UC	0.58	Y	Y	4	U	Y	U	A	U	Y	N	B
19	s	u	Fisher Bay UC	0.98	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	B
19	s	u	Harwill UC	0.33	Y	N	4	U	Y	U	A	U	Y	Y	B
19	s	r	Fisher River IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4
19	s	r	Peguis IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	5	U	Y	Y	5
19	a	m	Dauphin River LA	0.95	Y	Y	4	0.66	Y	Y	4	0.91	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Dauphin River (Anama Bay) UC	0.85	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	B
19	s	r	Dauphin River IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
21	a	u	Dawson Bay (Overflowing River) UC	U	U	U	6	U	Y	N	7	U	Y	N	A
21	a	o	Flin Flon OC	U	N	N	A	0.07	N	N	4	0.09	N	N	4
23	a	r	Fox Lake IR	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.99	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4
22	a	m	Garden Hill-Wasagamack LA	0.98	Y	Y	4	0.87	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4
22	s	r	Garden Hill IR (#22A)	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
22	s	u	Island Lake UC	0.54	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	7	U	U	U	6
22	s	u	St. Theresa Point UC	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6	U	U	U	6
22	s	r	St Theresa Pt & Wasagamack IR(#22)	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.80	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
23	a	o	Gillam OC	U	N	N	A	0.23	N	N	4	0.28	Y	N	4
22	a	m	God's Lake LA	0.97	Y	Y	4	0.89	Y	Y	4	0.91	Y	Y	4
22	s	u	God's Lake Narrows UC	0.80	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	B
22	s	r	God's Lake IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4
22	s	u	God's River UC	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4	NA	NA	NA	NA
22	s	r	God's River IR	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.00	Y	Y	4
21	a	m	Grand Rapids LA	0.27	Y	U	B,6	0.77	Y	Y	4	0.83	Y	Y	4
21	s	o	Grand Rapids OC	U	Y	Y	7	0.66	Y	Y	7	0.70	Y	Y	4
21	s	r	Grand Rapids IR	0.94	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
23	a	u	Granville Lake UC	0.97	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
21	a	u	Herb Landing UC	0.15	N	N	4	U	N	N	A	U	N	N	B
19	a	u	Homebrook and Peonan Point UC	0.00	N	N	4	U	N	N	A	U	N	N	B
22	a	u	Ilford UC	0.87	Y	Y	4	0.90	Y	Y	4	0.90	Y	Y	4
19	a	r	Jackhead IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	5	0.99	Y	Y	4
23	a	r	Lac Brochet IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
23	a	o	Leaf Rapids OC	U	N	N	7	0.15	N	N	4	0.24	N	N	4
19	a	r	Little Black River IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.96	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3 (Cont.)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN**

CD	Ar	Pl	Location	1981				1986				1991			
				Known or Estimated				Known or Estimated				Known or Estimated			
				Minimum (Sin./Mul. Aboriginal Origin) (1)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Minimum Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Minimum Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason
19	a	m	Little Grand Rapids LA	0.92	Y	Y	4	0.96	Y	Y	4	0.93	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Little Grand Rapids UC	0.62	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	B
19	s	r	Little Grand Rapids IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Pauingassi UC	0.80	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4	NA	NA	NA	NA
19	s	r	Pauingassi IR	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.96	Y	Y	4
19	a	u	Loon Straits UC	1.00	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
23	a	o	Lynn Lake OC	U	N	N	A	0.15	N	N	4	0.29	Y	N	4
19	a	u	Matheson Island UC	0.71	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
19	a	m	Moose Lake LA	0.99	Y	Y	4	0.31	Y	Y	2	0.53	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Moose Lake UC	0.98	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
19	s	r	Moose Lake IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
22	a	m	Nelson House LA	0.99	Y	Y	4	0.90	Y	Y	4	0.93	Y	Y	4
22	s	u	Nelson House UC	0.91	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	B
22	s	r	Nelson House IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4
22	a	m	Norway House LA	0.93	Y	Y	4	0.76	Y	Y	4	0.84	Y	Y	4
22	s	u	Norway House UC	0.62	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
22	s	r	Norway House IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4
22	s	u	Warren's Landing UC	0.92	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	7	NA	NA	NA	NA
22	a	m	Oxford House LA	0.92	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4
22	s	u	Oxford House UC	0.83	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	B
22	s	r	Oxford House IR	0.92	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4
19	a	m	Pelican Rapids-Shoal River LA	0.98	Y	Y	4	0.61	Y	Y	4	0.74	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Pelican Rapids UC	0.94	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
19	s	r	Shoal River (Dawson Bay) IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
22	a	u	Pikwitonei UC	0.95	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	0.94	Y	Y	4
19	a	u	Pine Dock UC	0.51	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
19	a	m	Poplar River LA	U	Y	Y	2	0.89	Y	Y	4	0.89	Y	Y	4
19	s	u	Poplarville UC	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	r	Poplar River IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4
19	a	u	Princess Harbour UC	0.63	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	A	U	Y	Y	B
23	a	r	Pukatawagan IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
22	a	m	Red Sucker Lake LA	0.99	Y	Y	4	0.89	Y	Y	4	0.91	Y	Y	4
22	s	u	Red Sucker Lake UC	0.93	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	C	U	Y	Y	D
22	s	r	Red Sucker Lake IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4
23	a	r	Shamattawa IR	0.98	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3 (Cont.)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN**

CD	Ar	Pl	Location	1981				1988				1991			
				Known or Estimated Minimum (Sin./Mul. Aboriginal Origin)(1)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Known or Estimated Minimum Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Known or Estimated Minimum Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason
21	a	u	Sherridon UC	0.77	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
21	a	o	Snow Lake OC	U	N	N	A	0.08	N	N	4	0.16	N	N	4
23	a	u	South Indian Lake UC	0.96	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4
22	a	m	Split Lake-York Landing LA	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
22	s	r	Split Lake IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.99	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4
22	s	u	York Landing UC	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.97	Y	Y	4	NA	NA	NA	NA
22	s	r	York Landing (York Factory) IR	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.00	Y	Y	4
23	a	r	Tadoule Lake (Churchill) IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.96	Y	Y	4	0.95	Y	Y	4
21	a	m	The Pas LA	0.12	Y	N	B	0.35	Y	N	4	0.35	Y	N	4
21	s	o	The Pas OC	U	N	N	A	0.19	N	N	4	0.23	N	N	4
21	s	o	The Pas LGD OC	U	Y	N	7	0.36	Y	N	4	0.31	Y	N	4
21	s	r	The Pas IR	0.80	Y	Y	4	0.90	Y	Y	4	0.91	Y	Y	4
21	s	o	Wanless OC	U	Y	U	B	0.38	Y	N	4	0.15	N	N	4
22	a	u	Thicket Portage UC	0.95	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	0.99	Y	Y	4
22	a	o	Thompson OC	U	N	N	A	0.20	N	N	4	0.28	Y	N	4
22	a	u	Wabowden UC	0.72	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	0.84	Y	Y	4
19	a	m	Waterhen LA	0.72	Y	Y	4	0.42	Y	N	2	0.41	Y	Y	4,2
19	s	u	Mallard UC	0.99	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	B	U	Y	Y	C
19	s	u	Meadow Portage UC	0.18	N	N	4	U	N	N	A	U	N	N	B
19	s	u	Rock Ridge UC	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	Salt Point UC	0.68	Y	Y	4	U	Y	Y	7	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	Spence Lake UC	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	U	Y	Y	A
19	s	u	Waterhen UC	0.39	Y	N	4	U	Y	U	A	U	Y	Y	B
19	s	r	Waterhen IR	1.00	Y	Y	4	1.00	Y	Y	4	0.98	Y	Y	4

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3 (Cont.)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN**

CD	Ar	PI	Location	Overall Include/ Decision Proportion Aboriginal >25% >50%	Rationale for Community Specific Decisions
19	a	m	Aghaming-Seymourville LA	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Thomas, personal communication.
19	s	u	Aghaming UC	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Thomas, personal communication.
19	s	r	Hollow Water IR	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions.
19	s	u	Manigotogan UC	Y	A: 1959/61 & 1981 decisions. B: 1981 & 1991 decisions. C: Thomas, pers. com.
19	s	u	Seymourville UC	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions.
19	a	u	Baden-Westgate LA	Y	A: 1959/61 & '81 dec'ns. B: 1981 & '91 dec'ns. C: In '91 71% of area residents were single origin.
19	s	u	Baden UC	Y	A: 1959/61 and 1991 decisions. B: Maynard, personal communication.
19	s	u	Barrows UC	Y	A: 1959/61 & 1981 decisions. B: 1981 & 1991 decisions. C: Maynard, pers. com.
19	s	u	National Mills UC	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Maynard, personal communication.
19	s	u	Powell UC	Y	A: Maynard, personal communication.
19	s	u	Red Deer Lake UC	Y	A: 1959/61 & 1981 decisions. B: 1981 & 1991 decisions. C: Maynard, pers. com.
19	s	u	Westgate UC	Y	A: 1959/61 & 1981 decisions. B: 1981 & 1991 decisions. C: Maynard, pers. com.
19	a	m	Berens River LA	Y	A: 1959/61 and 1981 decisions. B: 1981 and 1991 decisions
19	s	u	Berens River UC	Y	A: 1959/61 & 1981 decisions. B: 1981 & 1991 decisions. C: Stagg, pers. com.
19	s	r	Berens River IR	Y	A: 1959/61 and 1981 decisions. B: Thomas, personal communication.
19	a	u	Big Black River UC	N	
19	a	u	Bissett UC	N	
19	a	m	Bloodvein LA	Y	
19	s	r	Bloodvein IR	Y	
19	s	u	Long Body Creek UC	Y	A: Cmty disappeared, residents became reg. Indians at end of study period (Stagg, pers. com.)
23	a	m	Brochet LA	Y	A: 1959/61 and 1981 decisions. B: 1981 and 1991 decisions
23	s	u	Brochet UC	Y	
23	s	r	Brochet IR	Y	
19	a	m	Camperville-Pine Creek LA	Y	
19	s	u	Camperville UC	Y	A: 1959/61 and 1981 decisions. B: 1981 and 1991 decisions
19	s	u	Duck Bay UC	Y	A: 1959/61 and 1981 decisions. B: 1981 and 1991 decisions
19	s	r	Pine Creek IR	Y	
21	a	m	Chemawawin-Easterville LA	Y	
21	s	r	Chemawawin IR	Y	
21	s	u	Easterville UC	Y	A: 1959/61 and 1981 decisions. B: 1981 and 1991 decisions
23	a	o	Churchill OC	N	A: 1971 and 1986 decisions
21	a	u	Cormorant UC	Y	A: 1959/61 and 1981 decisions. B: 1981 and 1991 decisions
21	a	o	Cranberry Portage OC	N	A: 1971 and 1986 decisions
19	a	m	Crane River LA	Y	
19	s	u	Crane River UC	Y	A: 1959/61 & 1981 decisions. B: 1981 & 1991 decisions. C: Stagg, pers. com.
19	s	r	Crane River IR	Y	

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3 (Cont.)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN**

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CD	Ar	PI	Location	Overall		Rationale for Community Specific Decisions
				Include/ Decision	Proportion Aboriginal	
				>25%	>50%	
22	a	m	Cross Lake LA	Y	Y	
22	s	u	Cross Lake UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/61 and 1991 decisions.
22	s	r	Cross Lake IR	Y	Y	
19	a	m	Dallas-Peguis LA	Y	Y	A: Fisher River & Peguis Reserves have held around 95% of the local area pop.
19	s	u	Dallas-Red Rose UC	Y	u	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Thomas, personal communication.
19	s	u	Fisher Bay UC	Y	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Thomas, personal communication.
19	s	u	Harwill UC	Y	u	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Thomas, personal communication.
19	s	r	Fisher River IR	Y	Y	
19	s	r	Peguis IR	Y	Y	
19	a	m	Dauphin River LA	Y	Y	
19	s	u	Dauphin River (Anama Bay) UC	Y	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Thomas, personal communication.
19	s	r	Dauphin River IR	Y	Y	
21	a	u	Dawson Bay (Overflowing River) UC	U/Y	N	A: Funk, personal communication.
21	a	o	Flin Flon OC	N	N	A: 1959/61, 1981, 1986 and 1991 decisions.
23	a	r	Fox Lake IR	Y	Y	
22	a	m	Garden Hill-Wasagamack LA	Y	Y	A: 1981, 1986 & 1991 decisions. B: Pop. of non-reserve communities is very small.
22	s	r	Garden Hill IR (#22A)	Y	Y	
22	s	u	Island Lake UC	Y	Y	
22	s	u	St. Theresa Point UC	Y	Y	
22	s	r	St Theresa Pt & Wasagamack IR(#22)	Y	Y	
23	a	o	Gillam OC	N	N	A: 1959/61, 1971, and 1986 decisions.
22	a	m	God's Lake LA	Y	Y	
22	s	u	God's Lake Narrows UC	Y	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Dudar, personal communication.
22	s	r	God's Lake IR	Y	Y	
22	s	u	God's River UC	Y	Y	A: Settled by members of God's Lake Band, this cmty became a reserve in 1988.
22	s	r	God's River IR	Y	Y	
21	a	m	Grand Rapids LA	Y	Y	A: In 1971 214 registered Indians lived on the IR (Nelson, pers. com.). B: 1976 and 1986 decisions.
21	s	o	Grand Rapids OC	Y	Y	A: 1971 and 1986 decisions.
21	s	r	Grand Rapids IR	Y	Y	
23	a	u	Granville Lake UC	Y	Y	
21	a	u	Herb Landing UC	N	N	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions B: Stagg, personal communication
19	a	u	Homebrook and Peonan Point UC	N	N	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions B: Thomas, personal communication
22	a	u	Ilford UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/61 and 1971 decisions B: 1981 decisions
19	a	r	Jackhead IR	Y	Y	
23	a	r	Lac Brochet IR	Y	Y	
23	a	o	Leaf Rapids OC	N	N	
19	a	r	Little Black River IR	Y	Y	

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3 (Cont.)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN**

CD	Ar	PI	Location	Overall		Rationale for Community Specific Decisions
				Include/ Decision	Proportion Aboriginal	
				>25%	>50%	
19	a	m	Little Grand Rapids LA	Y	Y	
19	s	u	Little Grand Rapids UC	Y	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Thomas, personal communication.
19	s	r	Little Grand Rapids IR	Y	Y	
19	s	u	Pauingassi UC	Y	Y	A: Community settled by members of Little Grand Rapids Band.
19	s	r	Pauingassi IR	Y	Y	
19	a	u	Loon Straits UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/81 & 1981 decisions. B: 1981 & 1991 decisions. C: Thomas, pers. com.
23	a	o	Lynn Lake OC	N	N	A: 1971 and 1986 decisions.
19	a	u	Matheson Island UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/81 & 1981 decisions. B: 1981 & 1991 decisions. C: Thomas, pers. com.
19	a	m	Moose Lake LA	Y	Y	
19	s	u	Moose Lake UC	Y	Y	A: 1971 & '81 decisions. B: 1981 & '91 decisions. C: 81% of residents are single origin (StatsCan 1994).
19	s	r	Moose Lake IR	Y	Y	
22	a	m	Nelson House LA	Y	Y	A: The IR contains over 90% of the local area population.
22	s	u	Nelson House UC	Y	Y	A: 1981 & 1991 decisions. B: All residents are single origin Aboriginal (Stats Canada 1994).
22	s	r	Nelson House IR	Y	Y	
22	a	m	Norway House LA	Y	Y	
22	s	u	Norway House UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/81 & '81 dec'ns. B: 1981 & '91 d'ns C: 42% single origin, has high mixed origin pop (StatsCn '94)
22	s	r	Norway House IR	Y	Y	
22	s	u	Warren's Landing UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/81 and 1981 decisions.
22	a	m	Oxford House LA	Y	Y	A: The IR contains nearly 100% of the local area population
22	s	u	Oxford House UC	Y	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Dudar, personal communication
22	s	r	Oxford House IR	Y	Y	
19	a	m	Pelican Rapids-Shoal River LA	Y	Y	
19	s	u	Pelican Rapids UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/81 & 1981 decisions B: 1981 & 1991 decisions C Stagg, pers. com.
19	s	r	Shoal River (Dawson Bay) IR	Y	Y	
22	a	u	Pikwitonei UC	Y	Y	A: 1971 and 1981 decisions. B: 1981 and 1991 decisions
19	a	u	Pine Dock UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/81 & 1981 decisions. B: 1981 & 1991 decisions. C: Thomas, pers com.
19	a	m	Poplar River LA	Y	Y	
19	s	u	Poplarville UC	Y	Y	A: Since 1991 the cmty has disappeared, residents joined the Band (Thomas, pers. com.).
19	s	r	Poplar River IR	Y	Y	
19	a	u	Princess Harbour UC	Y	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Thomas, personal communication
23	a	r	Pukatawagan IR	Y	Y	
22	a	m	Red Sucker Lake LA	Y	Y	
22	s	u	Red Sucker Lake UC	Y	Y	A Thru '71 location of RSL Band B 1971 & '81 decisions C 1981 & '91 dec'ns. D. Stagg, pers. com.
22	s	r	Red Sucker Lake IR	Y	Y	
23	a	r	Shamattawa IR	Y	Y	

APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3 (Cont.)
 NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
 PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN

CD	Ar	PI	Location	Overall		Rationale for Community Specific Decisions
				Include/ Decision	Proportion Aboriginal	
				>25%	>50%	
21	a	u	Sherridon UC	Y	Y	A: 1971 & 1981 decisions. B: 1981 & 1991 decisions. C: Dudar, pers. com.
21	a	o	Snow Lake OC	N	N	A: 1971 and 1986 decisions.
23	a	u	South Indian Lake UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/81 and 1981 decisions.
22	a	m	Split Lake-York Landing LA	Y	Y	
22	s	r	Split Lake IR	Y	Y	
22	s	u	York Landing UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/81 and 1981 decisions.
22	s	r	York Landing (York Factory) IR	Y	Y	
23	a	r	Tadoule Lake (Churchill) IR	Y	Y	
21	a	m	The Pas LA	Y	N	A: In '71 889 reg lnds lived on IR (Nelson pers com), so 20% of area was single origin. B: '71 & '86 dec'ns
21	s	o	The Pas OC	N	N	A: 1959/81 and 1986 decisions.
21	s	o	The Pas LGD OC	u	N	A: 1959/81 and 1986 decisions.
21	s	r	The Pas IR	Y	Y	
21	s	o	Wanless OC	Y	N	A: % multiple origin for 1959/81 is 12 points higher than '71 single origin. B: 1971 & '86 dec'ns.
22	a	u	Thicket Portage UC	Y	Y	A: 1971 and 1981 decisions. B: 1981 and 1991 decisions.
22	a	o	Thompson OC	N	N	A: 1971 and 1986 decisions.
22	a	u	Wabowden UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/81 and 1981 decisions. B: 1981 and 1991 decisions.
19	a	m	Waterhen LA	Y	Y	
19	s	u	Mallard UC	Y	Y	A: 1959/81 & 1981 decisions. B: 1981 & 1991 decisions. C: Maynard, pers. com.
19	s	u	Meadow Portage UC	N	N	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Maynard, personal communication.
19	s	u	Rock Ridge UC	Y	Y	A: Maynard, personal communications.
19	s	u	Salt Point UC	Y	Y	A: Maynard, personal communication.
19	s	u	Spence Lake UC	Y	Y	A: Maynard, personal communication.
19	s	u	Waterhen UC	Y	Y	A: 1981 and 1991 decisions. B: Maynard, personal communication
19	s	r	Waterhen IR	Y	Y	

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-3 (Cont.)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES
PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAT IS OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN**

CD	Ar	PI	Location	1981			1986			1991		
				Known or Estimated Minimum (Sin./Mul. Aboriginal Origin)(1)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Known or Estimated Minimum Multiple Aboriginal Origin)	>25%	>50%	Reason	Known or Estimated Minimum Multiple Aboriginal Origin)

General notes:

1. Single origin for organized communities and reserves, multiple origin for unorganized communities.
 2. Decision implied by decisions respecting included communities.
 3. Listed as "predominantly Metis" by Lagasse 1959 (Appendix Table 4-3).
 4. Minimum known or est. percent for the census year (Appendix Table 4-3).
 5. Indian reserves reserves are assumed to have a majority aboriginal population. For example, see actual percentages for 1981, 1986 and 1991.
 6. Insufficient data.
 7. Assume adjacent 5 year data applies.
- Reasons for community/year specific decisions (A,B...) are explained in the last column of the Table.

Sources:

Ducharme, Rick (pers. com.; 26 June, 1996)
 Dudar, Walter (pers. com.; 26 June, 1996)
 Funk, Caroline (pers. com.; 27 June, 1996)
 Maynard, Laurie (pers. com.; 27 June, 1996)
 Nelson, Barbara (pers. com.; 19 & 28 June, 1996)
 Stagg, Roger (pers. com.; 26 June, 1996)
 Statistics Canada 1994B and 1994C
 Appendix, Table 4-3.
 Thomas, Margaret (pers., com.; 26 June, 1996)

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-4 (Example)
RELEVANT NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS
DIVISIONS, POPULATION SIZE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTION**

CD	Ar	PI	Place	1981									
				SttsCn TotPop	MNA (1982) TotPop	Data		TotPop	Estimates				
						MNA AbPo	INAC OnReR		Estimated Minimums				
									Number				
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	AbPo	OnRe	NonOR		
19	a	a	Aghaming-Seymourville LA	u	u	u	398	822	737	398	0.90	0.48	0.41
19	s	u	Aghaming UC	u	22	15	0	22	15	0	0.68	0.00	0.68
19	s	r	Hollow Water IR	461	u	u	398	461	398	398	0.86	0.86	0.00
19	s	u	Manigotogan UC	216	220	206	0	216	202	0	0.94	0.00	0.94
19	s	u	Seymourville UC	130	123	115	0	123	122	0	0.99	0.00	0.99
19	a	a	Baden-Westgate LA	u	u	u	0	311	250	0	0.80	0.00	0.80
19	s	u	Baden UC	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
19	s	u	Barrows UC	199	188	149	0	199	158	0	0.79	0.00	0.79
19	s	u	National Mills UC	56	62	60	0	56	54	0	0.97	0.00	0.97
19	s	u	Powell UC	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
19	s	u	Red Deer Lake UC	41	50	40	0	41	33	0	0.80	0.00	0.80
19	s	u	Westgate UC	15	23	7	0	15	5	0	0.30	0.00	0.30
19	a	a	Berens River LA	919	u	u	739	919	879	681	0.96	0.74	0.22
19	s	u	Berens River UC	238	226	188	0	238	198	0	0.83	0.00	0.83
19	s	r	Berens River IR	681	u	u	739	681	681	681	1.00	1.00	0.00
19	a	u	Big Black River UC	38	32	31	0	38	37	0	0.97	0.00	0.97
19	a	a	Bloodvein LA	413	u	u	404	413	404	404	0.98	0.98	0.00
19	s	r	Bloodvein IR	413	u	u	404	413	404	404	0.98	0.98	0.00
19	s	u	Long Body Creek UC	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
23	a	a	Brochet LA	u	u	u	244	639	525	244	0.82	0.38	0.44
23	s	u	Brochet UC	u	297	281	0	297	281	0	0.95	0.00	0.95
23	s	r	Brochet IR	342	u	u	244	342	244	244	0.71	0.71	0.00
19	a	a	Camperville-Pine Creek LA	1480	u	u	423	1480	1408	300	0.95	0.20	0.75
19	s	u	Camperville UC	586	639	619	0	586	568	0	0.97	0.00	0.97
19	s	u	Duck Bay UC	594	696	633	0	594	540	0	0.91	0.00	0.91
19	s	r	Pine Creek IR	300	u	u	423	300	300	300	1.00	1.00	0.00
21	a	a	Chemawawin-Easterville LA	589	u	u	356	589	502	356	0.85	0.60	0.25
21	s	r	Chemawawin IR	439	u	u	356	439	356	356	0.81	0.81	0.00
21	s	u	Easterville UC	150	234	227	0	150	146	0	0.97	0.00	0.97
23	a	o	Churchill OC	1304	u	u	0	1304	u	0	u	0.00	u
21	a	u	Cormorant UC	445	451	429	0	445	423	0	0.95	0.00	0.95
19	a	a	Crane River LA	550	u	u	118	550	420	118	0.76	0.21	0.55
19	s	u	Crane River UC	336	389	350	0	336	302	0	0.90	0.00	0.90
19	s	r	Crane River IR	214	u	u	118	214	118	118	0.55	0.55	0.00
22	a	a	Cross Lake LA	2077	u	u	1567	2077	u	u	u	u	u
22	s	u	Cross Lake UC	510	u	u	0	510	u	0	u	0.00	u
22	s	r	Cross Lake IR	1567	u	u	1567	1567	1567	1567	1.00	1.00	0.00
19	a	a	Dallas-Peguis LA	u	u	u	2246	2133	2092	2011	0.98	0.94	0.04
19	s	u	Dallas-Red Rose UC	u	38	22	0	38	22	0	0.58	0.00	0.58
19	s	u	Fisher Bay UC	u	48	47	0	48	47	0	0.98	0.00	0.98
19	s	u	Harwill UC	u	36	12	0	36	12	0	0.33	0.00	0.33
19	s	r	Fisher River IR	706	u	u	795	706	706	706	1.00	1.00	0.00
19	s	r	Peguis IR	1305	u	u	1451	1305	1305	1305	1.00	1.00	0.00
19	a	a	Dauphin River LA	104	u	u	94	104	99	70	0.95	0.67	0.28
19	s	u	Dauphin River (Anama Bay)UC	34	47	40	0	34	29	0	0.85	0.00	0.85
19	s	r	Dauphin River IR	70	u	u	94	70	70	70	1.00	1.00	0.00
21	a	u	Dawson Bay (Overflowing R)UC	43	u	u	0	43	u	0	u	0.00	u
23	a	r	Fox Lake IR	na	na	na	na	u	na	na	na	na	na

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-4 (Example)
RELEVANT NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS
DIVISIONS, POPULATION SIZE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTION**

CD	Ar	PI	Place	1981									
				SttsCn TotPop (4)	MNA (1982) TotPop (4)	Data MNA AbPo (5)	INAC OnReR (7)	TotPop (8)	Estimates Estimated Minimums Number				
									AbPop (9)	OnReR (10)	Proportion AbPo OnRe NonOR		
19	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	na	na	na
19	d	du	All UC (Data)	4278	4278	na	0	4278	na	0	u	0.00	u
19	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	3754	4482	3818	236	4497	3794	236	0.84	0.05	0.79
19	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	3443	4075	3503	236	4413	3736	236	0.85	0.05	0.79
19	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	6381	na	na	6702	6381	6213	6208	0.97	0.97	0.00
19	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	10659	na	na	6702	10659	na	6208	u	0.58	u
19	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	10135	na	na	6938	10878	10007	6444	0.92	0.59	0.33
21	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	9344	na	u	0	9344	na	0	u	0.00	u
21	d	du	All UC (Data)	2507	2507	na	0	2507	na	0	u	0.00	u
21	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	733	852	784	0	733	675	0	0.79	0.00	0.92
21	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	10077	852	784	0	10077	675	0	0.92	0.00	0.92
21	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	2248	na	na	1839	2248	1839	1839	0.82	0.82	0.00
21	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	14099	na	na	1839	14099	na	1839	u	0.13	u
21	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	12325	na	na	1839	12325	2514	1839	0.84	0.62	0.23
22	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	na	na	na
22	d	du	All UC (Data)	2703	2703	na	0	2703	na	0	u	0.00	u
22	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	2450	2271	1691	251	2531	1540	0	0.76	0.00	0.76
22	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	2125	2271	1691	0	2531	1540	0	0.73	0.00	0.73
22	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	9651	na	na	10848	9651	9561	9561	0.99	0.99	0.00
22	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	12354	na	na	10848	12354	na	9561	u	0.77	u
22	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	12101	na	na	11099	12182	11101	9561	0.95	0.78	0.13
23	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	1304	u	u	0	1304	u	0	u	0.00	u
23	d	du	All UC (Data)	1465	1465	na	0	1465	na	0	u	0.00	u
23	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	907	1229	1178	0	1204	1154	0	0.96	0.00	0.96
23	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	2211	1229	1178	0	2508	1154	0	0.96	0.00	0.96
23	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	1890	na	na	1784	1890	1784	1784	0.94	0.94	0.00
23	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	4659	na	na	1784	4659	na	1784	u	0.38	u
23	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	4101	na	na	1784	4398	2938	1784	0.95	0.58	0.37
All	t	co	Included OC (Cal.)	10648	u	u	0	10648	u	0	u	0.00	u
All	t	du	All UC (Data)	10953	10953	na	0	10953	na	0	u	0.00	u
All	t	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	7844	8834	7471	487	8965	7163	236	0.85	0.03	0.82
All	t	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	17856	8427	7155	236	19529	7105	236	0.85	0.03	0.82
All	t	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	20170	na	na	21173	20170	19397	19392	0.96	0.96	0.00
All	t	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	31123	na	na	21173	41771	na	19392	u	0.46	u
All	t	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	38026	na	na	21409	39699	26502	19628	0.93	0.69	0.24

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-4 (Example)
RELEVANT NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSU
DIVISIONS, POPULATION SIZE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTION**

CD (1)	Ar (2)	PI (3)	Place	1986									
				SttsCn TotPop (4)	MNA (1985) TotPop (4)	Data		TotPop (8)	Estimates			Proportion	
						MBS AbPo (5)	INAC OnReR (7)		Number		AbPo OnRe (10)		
									AbPop (9)	OnReR (10)			AbPo OnRe NotOR
19	a	a	Aghaming-Seymourville LA	814	u	u	470	814	435	435	0.53	0.53	0.00
19	s	u	Aghaming UC	15	19	u	0	15	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	r	Hollow Water IR	452	u	435	470	452	435	435	0.96	0.96	0.00
19	s	u	Manigotogan UC	218	230	u	0	218	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Seymourville UC	129	126	u	0	129	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	a	a	Baden-Westgate LA	338	378	u	0	355	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Baden UC	59	65	u	0	59	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Barrows UC	159	176	u	0	159	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	National Mills UC	47	46	u	0	47	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Powell UC	u	17	u	0	17	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Red Deer Lake UC	57	55	u	0	57	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Westgate UC	16	19	u	0	16	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	a	a	Berens River LA	963	u	u	852	963	780	780	0.81	0.81	0.00
19	s	u	Berens River UC	160	195	u	0	180	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	r	Berens River IR	803	u	780	852	803	780	780	0.97	0.97	0.00
19	a	u	Big Black River UC	u	43	u	0	43	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	a	a	Bloodvein LA	u	u	u	488	493	400	400	0.81	0.81	0.00
19	s	r	Bloodvein IR	420	u	400	488	420	400	400	0.95	0.95	0.00
19	s	u	Long Body Creek UC	u	73	u	0	73	u	0	u	0.00	u
23	a	a	Brochet LA	u	u	u	281	566	245	245	0.43	0.43	0.00
23	s	u	Brochet UC	u	315	u	0	315	u	0	u	0.00	u
23	s	r	Brochet IR	251	u	245	281	251	245	245	0.98	0.98	0.00
19	a	a	Camperville-Pine Creek LA	u	u	u	509	u	509	509	u	u	u
19	s	u	Camperville UC	588	692	u	0	588	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Duck Bay UC	559	669	u	0	559	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	r	Pine Creek IR	u	u	u	509	u	509	509	u	u	u
21	a	a	Chemawawin-Easterville LA	675	u	u	413	675	430	413	0.64	0.61	0.03
21	s	r	Chemawawin IR	441	u	430	413	441	430	413	0.98	0.94	0.04
21	s	u	Easterville UC	234	230	u	0	234	u	0	u	0.00	u
23	a	o	Churchill OC	1217	u	505	0	1217	505	0	0.41	0.00	0.41
21	a	u	Cormorant UC	447	482	u	0	447	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	a	a	Crane River LA	530	u	u	152	530	152	152	0.29	0.29	0.00
19	s	u	Crane River UC	209	328	u	0	209	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	r	Crane River IR	321	u	u	152	321	152	152	0.47	0.47	0.00
22	a	a	Cross Lake LA	2365	u	u	2255	2365	1775	1775	0.75	0.75	0.00
22	s	u	Cross Lake UC	580	581	u	0	580	u	0	u	0.00	u
22	s	r	Cross Lake IR	1785	u	1775	2255	1785	1775	1775	0.99	0.99	0.00
19	a	a	Dallas-Peguis LA	u	u	u	2587	u	2448	2448	u	u	u
19	s	u	Dallas-Red Rose UC	u	101	u	0	101	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Fisher Bay UC	u	55	u	0	55	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	u	Harwill UC	u	37	u	0	37	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	r	Fisher River IR	765	u	745	884	765	745	745	0.97	0.97	0.00
19	s	r	Peguis IR	u	u	u	1703	u	1703	1703	u	u	u
19	a	a	Dauphin River LA	159	u	u	105	159	105	105	0.66	0.66	0.00
19	s	u	Dauphin River (Anama Bay)UC	34	48	u	0	34	u	0	u	0.00	u
19	s	r	Dauphin River IR	125	u	u	105	125	105	105	0.84	0.84	0.00
21	a	u	Dawson Bay (Overflowing R)UC	40	43	u	0	40	u	0	u	0.00	u
23	a	r	Fox Lake IR	156	u	155	235	156	155	155	0.99	0.99	0.00

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-4 (Example)
RELEVANT NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSU
DIVISIONS, POPULATION SIZE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTION**

CD	Ar	PI	Place	1986										
				SttsCn TotPop	MNA (1985) TotPop	Data		TotPop	Estimates					
						MBS AbPo	INAC OnReR		Number		Estimated Minimums			
									AbPop	OnReR	AbPo	OnRe	NotOR	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	AbPo	OnRe	NotOR		
19	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	na	na	na
19	d	du	All UC (Data)	3760	3760	2890	0	3760	2890	0	0.77	0.00	0.77	
19	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	3515	4693	u	0	4447	u	295	u	0.07	u	
19	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	3515	4601	u	0	4355	u	295	u	0.07	u	
19	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	5205	na	4630	8242	5205	7292	7231	0.94	0.93	0.01	
19	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal)	8965	na	7520	8242	8965	10182	7231	0.87	0.54	0.33	
19	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	8720	na	u	8242	9652	u	7526	Same as reserves			
21	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	9123	na	2375	0	9123	2375	0	0.26	0.00	0.26	
21	d	du	All UC (Data)	2200	2200	1320	0	2200	1320	0	0.60	0.00	0.60	
21	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	816	885	u	0	816	u	0	u	0.00	u	
21	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	9939	885	u	0	9939	u	0	u	0.00	u	
21	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	2526	na	2325	2109	2526	2325	2109	0.92	0.83	0.09	
21	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal)	13849	na	6020	2109	13849	6020	2109	0.43	0.15	0.28	
21	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	12465	na	u	2109	12465	u	2109	u	0.17	u	
22	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	na	na	na	
22	d	du	All UC (Data)	2410	2410	1970	0	2410	1970	0	0.82	0.00	0.82	
22	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	2964	2930	u	0	2628	u	0	u	0.00	u	
22	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	2426	2930	u	0	2628	u	0	u	0.00	u	
22	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	13214	na	12515	14196	13214	12515	12445	0.95	0.94	0.01	
22	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal)	15624	na	14485	14196	15624	14485	12445	0.93	0.80	0.13	
22	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	16178	na	u	14196	15842	u	12445	u	0.79	u	
23	d	co	Included OC (Cal.)	1217	u	505	0	1217	505	0	0.41	0.00	0.41	
23	d	du	All UC (Data)	380	380	345	0	380	145	0	0.38	0.00	0.38	
23	d	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	798	1237	u	0	1113	u	0	u	0.00	u	
23	d	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	2015	1237	u	0	2330	u	0	u	0.00	u	
23	d	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	2345	na	2310	3259	2345	2310	2310	0.99	0.99	0.00	
23	d	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal)	3942	na	3160	3259	3942	2960	2310	0.75	0.59	0.16	
23	d	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	4360	na	u	3259	4675	u	2310	u	0.49	u	
All	t	co	Included OC (Cal.)	10340	u	2880	0	10340	2880	0	0.28	0.00	0.28	
All	t	du	All UC (Data)	8750	8750	6525	0	8750	6325	0	0.72	0.00	0.72	
All	t	cu	Included UC (Cal.)	8093	9745	u	0	9004	u	295	u	0.03	u	
All	t	cn	Included Not-IR (Cal.)	17895	9653	u	0	19252	u	295	u	0.02	u	
All	t	cr	Included IR (Cal.)	23290	na	21780	27806	23290	24442	24095	0.95	0.93	0.01	
All	t	cd	IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal)	32040	na	28305	27806	32040	30767	24095	0.89	0.68	0.21	
All	t	cc	IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	41185	na	u	27806	42542	u	24390	u	0.52	u	

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-4 (Example)
RELEVANT NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND
DIVISIONS, POPULATION SIZE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTION**

CD	Ar	PI	Place	1959/61			1971			1976	
				1961	1959	Prop.	SttsCn	AbPo	Prop.	SttsCn	AbPop
				SttsCn	Legass		TotPop			TotPop	
(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)	(6)	(4)	(5)	(4)	(5)	

Notes:

1. Census division as at the 1991 Census.
2. Area (Ar): 'a' = area, 's' = sub-area, 't' = total for census division(s)
3. Place (PI): 'a' = area; 'o' = organized community; 'r' = Indian reserve; 'u' = unorganized community; 'co' = census division; 'du' = CD data unorganized; 'cu' = calculated unorganized; 'cn' = calculated non-reserve; 'cr' = CD calculated reserve; 'cd' = CD calculated reserve and organized, 'cc' = CD calculated organized plus data unorganized; unorganized plus calculated reserve.
4. Total population for year. SttsCn 1961, '71, '76, '81 & '91 data from Dominion Bureau of Statistics & Stats Canada. MNA 1981 & '86 data for unorganized communities are from Mba Northern Affairs 1982 & n.d
5. Population of Aboriginal ancestry. 1961 counts are multiple ancestry from "Table 4. Location, Population and Acreage of Indian Reserves per Band, Manitoba, 1958", "Table 11. Metis Population in Manitoba by Community", and "Table 15. Metis Population in Predominantly Metis Communities" in Legasse 1959. 1971, 1976 & '81 organized community counts area single ancestry data from Statistics Canada, Censuses of Canada. 1981 counts for the unorganized cmties from a 1982 survey published as "Population of Northern Affairs Communities by Ethnic Origin", Manitoba Northern Affairs, 1982, Pp. 1-3. 1986 counts are multiple ancestry data from "Table 6. Population of Manitoba, Census Subdivisions by Aboriginal Origins", Mba Bureau of Statistics 1989, Pp. 32-43. 1991 reserve and organized community counts are multiple ancestry data are from a special tabulation by Statistics Canada. 1991 organized community counts are the self-identified population according to Statistics Canada's Aboriginal People's Survey.
6. Legasse 1959 lists the following communities as "predominantly Metis": Barrows, Red Deer L, Big Black R, Camperville, Duck Bay, Crane R, Manitogogan, Loon Straits, Matheson Is, Warren's Landing, Pine Dock, Mallard and Meadow Portage. In Table 4 Legasse notes 2,373 of 20,33 (12%) of Indians registered to Bands with reserves live off reserve.
7. 1981 & '86 on reserve, reg. Indian (OnReRI) counts are the total of 'own band reserve'+ 'Crown land admin' red by own band" from Indian Northern Affairs, 1981 & 1986. 1991 on-reserve registered Indian count "Table 1. Pop. by Aborig. Origin Showing Single and Multiple Response Indian Registration & Indian Band Membership for Canadian Provinces Census Subdivisions, 1991 Census-20% Sample Data" in Stats Canada
8. Statistics Canada, Manitoba Northern Affairs, and Indian and Northern Affairs data in that order of priority.
9. 1981, '86 & '91 estimated minimum Aboriginal population is the Stats Canada, Mba Bureau of Statistics or Mba Northern Affairs aboriginal count if Stats Canada data are not available. Estimates based on North Affairs data are calculated as the same proportion of the Stats Canada pop. as the original Northern Affairs count is of the Northern Affairs total pop. INAC on reserve counts are directly used as estimates only when Stats Canada data are not available, otherwise the Stats Canada total reserve pop. is treated as the maximum on reserve pop.
10. Statistics Canada data used unless not available.

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-4 (Example)
RELEVANT NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSU
DIVISIONS, POPULATION SIZE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTION**

CD (1)	Ar (2)	PI (3)	Place	1991								
				Data - Statistics Canad				Estimates				
				Census TotPop	Censu AbPop	APS AbPo	OnReR	Estimated Minimums				
				(4)	(5)	(5)	(7)	TotPop (8)	Number AbPop OnReR (9) (10)		Proportion AbPo OnRe NotOR	

Sources:

- Dominion Bureau of Statistics. 1963.
- Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. 1981. 1986. 1991.
- Legasse, Jean H. 1959.
- Manitoba Bureau of Statistics. 1989.
- Manitoba Northern Affairs. 1982.
- Statistics Canada. 1994A.
- Statistics Canada. 1994B, 1987, 1983, 1973.

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-5 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
ATTRIBUTES OF INCOME (\$000's)**

Location	Median Hshld Income				Average Hshld Income				Average Less Median Household Income				Number of Households			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
Aghaming-Seymourville LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	157	194	u
Aghaming UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	8	7	u
Hollow Water IR	u	20.4	19.8	23.2	u	25.0	25.1	26.4	u	4.7	5.3	3.3	70	90	100	90
Manigotogan UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	36	64	u
Seymourville UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	23	23	u
Baden-Westgate LA	u	u	u	15.6	u	u	u	18.8	u	u	u	3.2	u	79	121	95
Baden UC	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	26	u
Barrows UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	49	48	u
National Mills UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	11	11	u
Powell UC	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	10	u
Red Deer Lake UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	11	18	u
Westgate UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	8	8	u
Berens River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	160	200	u
Berens River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	45	45	u
Berens River IR	u	17.1	26.9	25.4	u	21.8	30.5	28.5	u	4.7	3.6	3.0	150	115	155	145
Big Black River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	7	7	u
Bloodvein LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	92	u
Bloodvein IR	u	15.9	8.5	18.6	u	20.0	15.7	21.7	u	4.2	7.2	3.1	65	75	75	90
Long Body Creek UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	17	u
Brochet LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	103	83	u
Brochet UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	48	48	u
Brochet IR	u	19.6	28.0	u	u	22.6	28.7	u	u	3.0	0.7	u	80	55	35	40
Camperville-Pine Creek LA	u	u	u	12.6	u	u	u	17.4	u	u	u	4.8	u	370	u	430
Camperville UC	u	u	u	10.5	u	u	u	15.3	u	u	u	4.9	u	163	157	185
Duck Bay UC	u	u	u	13.7	u	u	u	20.0	u	u	u	6.3	u	142	142	120
Pine Creek IR	u	13.7	u	14.4	u	14.8	u	17.6	u	1.1	u	3.2	55	65	u	125
Chemawawin-Easterville LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	124	u
Chemawawin IR	u	u	22.7	23.6	u	u	26.7	27.8	u	u	4.0	4.2	u	u	80	120
Easterville UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	45	44	u
Churchill OC	u	37.8	42.2	37.4	u	40.7	44.2	41.0	u	3.0	2.0	3.6	495	425	430	425
Cormorant UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	85	85	u
Crane River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	85	81	u
Crane River IR	u	u	u	16.3	u	u	u	23.0	u	u	u	6.8	15	u	u	60
Cross Lake LA	u	u	u	22.7	u	u	u	26.3	u	u	u	3.7	u	366	470	610
Cross Lake UC	u	u	u	22.2	u	u	u	29.0	u	u	u	6.7	u	91	110	105
Cross Lake IR	u	16.2	13.0	22.7	u	21.0	17.1	25.9	u	4.9	4.1	3.2	310	275	360	505
Dallas-Peguis LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	497	u	u
Dallas-Red Rose UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	38	38	u
Fisher Bay UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	10	10	u
Harwill UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	9	9	u
Fisher River IR	u	20.3	22.6	18.3	u	25.0	27.2	23.9	u	4.7	4.6	5.6	110	140	185	245
Peguis IR	u	18.4	u	u	u	24.0	u	u	u	5.6	u	u	230	300	u	u
Dauphin River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Dauphin River (Anama Bay) UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	11	13	u
Dauphin River IR	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	15	u	u	30
Fox Lake IR	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	30	35
Garden Hill-Wasagamack LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	533	818	u
Garden Hill IR (22A)	u	19.1	19.0	18.2	u	24.7	22.6	21.1	u	5.6	3.6	3.0	u	175	375	375
Island Lake UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	34	32	u
St. Theresa Point UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	14	11	u
St Theresa Pt & Wasagamack IR	u	16.7	20.8	22.0	u	20.0	23.2	26.1	u	3.3	2.4	4.2	475	310	400	390

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-5 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
ATTRIBUTES OF INCOME (\$000's)**

Location	Median Hshld Income				Average Hshld Income				Average Less Median Household Income				Number of Households			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
CD19 Included OC (Cal)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD19 UC (Data)	u	17.1	18.2	16.8	u	22.1	23.2	22.0	u	5.0	5.0	5.2	860	1020	1025	1140
CD19 Included UC (Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD19 Incl'd OC(Cal)+UC(Data)	u	17.1	18.2	16.8	u	22.1	23.2	22.0	u	5.0	5.0	5.2	860	1020	1025	1140
CD19 Included IR (Cal)	u	17.2	18.7	15.2	u	21.9	23.9	18.6	u	4.6	5.3	3.3	1090	1085	985	1435
CD19 IR(Cal)+UC(Data)+OC(Cal)	u	17.2	18.4	15.9	u	22.0	23.6	20.1	u	4.8	5.1	4.2	1950	2105	2010	2575
CD19 IR(Cal)+UC(Cal)+OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included OC (Cal)	u	39.7	41.0	39.0	u	41.4	39.5	42.2	u	1.7	-1.5	3.2	2685	2635	2935	3065
CD21 UC (Data)	u	29.3	32.8	32.1	u	38.2	38.5	39.5	u	8.9	5.7	7.4	530	590	590	575
CD21 Included UC (Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Incl'd OC(Cal)+UC(Data)	u	37.8	39.6	37.9	u	40.8	39.4	41.8	u	3.0	-0.3	3.9	3215	3225	3525	3640
CD21 Included IR (Cal)	u	26.6	19.8	21.2	u	31.2	24.7	28.0	u	4.6	4.9	4.8	245	300	520	615
CD21 IR(Cal)+UC(Data)+OC(Cal)	u	36.9	37.1	35.5	u	40.0	37.5	39.5	u	3.2	0.4	4.0	3460	3525	4045	4255
CD21 IR(Cal)+UC(Cal)+OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD22 UC (Data)	u	28.5	30.5	28.0	u	33.9	35.0	33.6	u	5.4	4.5	5.6	605	545	570	570
CD22 Included UC (Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Incl'd OC(Cal)+UC(Data)	u	28.5	30.5	28.0	u	33.9	35.0	33.6	u	5.4	4.5	5.6	605	545	570	570
CD22 Included IR (Cal)	u	18.2	20.2	23.1	u	21.8	23.6	26.6	u	3.6	3.4	3.5	1670	1670	2425	2915
CD22 IR(Cal)+UC(Data)+OC(Cal)	u	20.7	22.2	23.9	u	24.8	25.8	27.8	u	4.1	3.6	3.9	2275	2215	2995	3485
CD22 IR(Cal)+UC(Cal)+OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included OC (Cal)	u	37.8	42.2	37.4	u	40.7	44.2	41.0	u	3.0	2.0	3.6	495	425	430	425
CD23 UC (Data)	u	15.5	25.2	29.8	u	20.4	29.7	31.1	u	4.9	4.4	1.3	365	285	80	55
CD23 Included UC (Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Incl'd OC(Cal)+UC(Data)	u	28.8	39.6	36.6	u	32.6	41.9	39.9	u	3.8	2.4	3.3	860	710	510	480
CD23 Included IR (Cal)	u	16.5	14.7	14.4	u	19.3	16.1	16.8	u	2.8	1.5	2.5	270	195	415	440
CD23 IR(Cal)+UC(Data)+OC(Cal)	u	26.2	28.4	25.9	u	29.7	30.4	28.8	u	3.5	2.0	2.9	1130	905	925	920
CD23 IR(Cal)+UC(Cal)+OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Included Organized (Cal)	u	39.5	41.2	38.8	u	41.3	40.1	42.1	u	1.9	-1.0	3.2	3180	3060	3365	3490
All UC (Data)	u	22.4	25.4	23.6	u	28.4	30.4	29.3	u	6.0	5.0	5.8	2360	2440	2285	2340
All Included UC (Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Incl'd OC(Cal)+UC(Data)	u	31.9	34.8	32.7	u	35.6	36.2	37.0	u	3.7	1.4	4.3	5540	5500	5630	5830
All Included IR (Cal)	u	18.5	19.3	20.1	u	22.5	23.1	23.6	u	4.0	3.8	3.5	3275	3250	4345	5405
All IR(Cal)+UC(Data)+OC(Cal)	u	26.9	28.0	26.6	u	30.8	30.5	30.5	u	3.8	2.4	3.9	8815	8750	9975	11235
All IR(Cal)+UC(Cal)+OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-5 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
ATTRIBUTES OF INCOME (\$000's)**

Location	Total Household Income				Per Capita Income				Proportion Earned + Other Income			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
Aghaming-Seymourville LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Aghaming UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Hollow Water IR	u	2254.3	2510.4	2379.5	u	4.9	5.6	5.6	u	u	0.75	0.70
Manigotogan UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Seymourville UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Baden-Westgate LA	u	u	u	1788.2	u	u	u	6.4	u	u	u	0.65
Baden UC	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u
Barrows UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
National Mills UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Powell UC	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u
Red Deer Lake UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Westgate UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River IR	u	2507.4	4722.4	4126.4	u	3.7	5.9	5.9	u	u	0.64	0.55
Big Black River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Bloodvein LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Bloodvein IR	u	1502.9	1178.2	1951.5	u	3.6	2.8	4.5	u	u	0.77	0.46
Long Body Creek UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet IR	u	1242.8	1004.9	u	u	3.6	4.0	u	u	u	0.46	u
Camperville-Pine Creek LA	u	u	u	7482.0	u	u	u	5.0	u	u	u	0.58
Camperville UC	u	u	u	2836.6	u	u	u	4.8	u	u	u	0.58
Duck Bay UC	u	u	u	2397.5	u	u	u	5.5	u	u	u	0.59
Pine Creek IR	u	959.5	u	2197.1	u	3.2	u	4.8	u	u	u	0.49
Chemawawin-Easterville LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Chemawawin IR	u	u	2136.1	3334.2	u	u	4.8	6.1	u	u	0.67	0.65
Easterville UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Churchill OC	u	17313.1	19005.0	17420.8	u	13.3	15.6	15.2	u	u	0.91	0.90
Cormorant UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River IR	u	u	u	1381.0	u	u	u	5.0	u	u	u	0.74
Cross Lake LA	u	u	u	16060.4	u	u	u	5.3	u	u	u	0.63
Cross Lake UC	u	u	u	3040.5	u	u	u	7.6	u	u	u	0.77
Cross Lake IR	u	5779.7	6169.5	13091.6	u	3.7	3.5	5.0	u	u	0.52	0.59
Dallas-Peguis LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Dallas-Red Rose UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Fisher Bay UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Harwill UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Fisher River IR	u	3499.9	5027.8	5866.5	u	5.0	6.6	6.9	u	u	0.70	0.66
Peguis IR	u	7195.4	u	u	u	5.5	u	u	u	u	u	u
Dauphin River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Dauphin River (Anama Bay) UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Dauphin River IR	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Fox Lake IR	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u
Garden Hill-Wasagamack LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Garden Hill IR (22A)	u	4325.4	8484.0	7924.9	u	4.9	4.5	4.6	u	u	0.52	0.48
Island Lake UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
St. Theresa Point UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
St Theresa Pt & Wasagamack IR	u	6211.3	9271.7	10195.0	u	3.5	3.5	4.8	u	u	0.43	0.54

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-5 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
ATTRIBUTES OF INCOME (\$000's)**

Location	Total Household Income				Per Capita Income				Proportion Earned + Other Income			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
CD19 Included OC (Cal)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD19 UC (Data)	u	22554.8	23788.4	25074.3	u	5.3	6.3	6.7	u	u	0.69	0.68
CD19 Included UC (Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD19 Incl'd OC(Cal)+UC(Data)	u	22554.8	23788.4	25074.3	u	5.3	6.3	6.7	u	u	0.69	0.68
CD19 Included IR (Cal)	u	23734.4	23580.5	26620.6	u	3.7	4.5	4.4	u	u	0.65	0.50
CD19 IR(Cal)+UC(Data)+OC(Cal)	u	46289.2	47368.9	51694.9	u	4.3	5.3	5.3	u	u	0.67	0.58
CD19 IR(Cal)+UC(Cal)+OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	0.0	0.0	0.0	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included OC (Cal)	u	109205.1	116041.1	129412.8	u	11.7	12.7	14.6	u	u	0.88	0.89
CD21 UC (Data)	u	22535.6	22701.5	22718.8	u	9.0	10.3	12.4	u	u	0.86	0.83
CD21 Included UC (Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Incl'd OC(Cal)+UC(Data)	u	131740.7	138742.6	152131.6	u	11.1	12.3	14.2	u	u	0.88	0.88
CD21 Included IR (Cal)	u	9357.7	12862.7	16013.6	u	4.3	5.1	6.3	u	u	0.72	0.67
CD21 IR(Cal)+UC(Data)+OC(Cal)	u	141098.4	151605.3	168145.3	u	10.1	10.9	12.7	u	u	0.86	0.85
CD21 IR(Cal)+UC(Cal)+OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD22 UC (Data)	u	18462.8	19935.8	19145.2	u	6.8	8.3	9.1	u	u	0.83	0.81
CD22 Included UC (Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Incl'd OC(Cal)+UC(Data)	u	0.0	0.0	0.0	u	0.0	0.0	0.0	u	u	0.83	0.81
CD22 Included IR (Cal)	u	18462.8	19935.8	19145.2	u	1.9	1.5	1.3	u	u	0.52	0.57
CD22 IR(Cal)+UC(Data)+OC(Cal)	u	54882.0	77121.7	96737.4	u	4.4	4.9	5.7	u	u	0.58	0.61
CD22 IR(Cal)+UC(Cal)+OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included OC (Cal)	u	17313.1	19005.0	17420.8	u	13.3	15.6	15.2	u	u	0.91	0.90
CD23 UC (Data)	u	5814.7	2372.8	1710.9	u	4.0	6.2	6.6	u	u	0.67	0.77
CD23 Included UC (Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Incl'd OC(Cal)+UC(Data)	u	23127.8	21377.8	19131.6	u	8.4	13.4	13.7	u	u	0.87	0.88
CD23 Included IR (Cal)	u	3761.3	6698.4	7397.1	u	2.0	2.9	1.7	u	u	0.35	0.35
CD23 IR(Cal)+UC(Data)+OC(Cal)	u	26889.2	28076.2	26528.7	u	5.8	7.1	4.6	u	u	0.64	0.63
CD23 IR(Cal)+UC(Cal)+OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Included Organized (Cal)	u	126518.2	135046.2	146833.6	u	11.9	13.1	14.6	u	u	0.88	0.89
All UC (Data)	u	69368.0	68798.4	68649.2	u	6.3	7.9	8.7	u	u	0.77	0.75
All Included UC (Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Incl'd OC(Cal)+UC(Data)	u	195886.2	203844.6	215482.7	u	9.1	10.7	12.0	u	u	0.84	0.83
All Included IR (Cal)	u	73272.6	100327.4	127623.6	u	3.6	4.3	4.6	u	u	0.56	0.54
All IR(Cal)+UC(Data)+OC(Cal)	u	269158.8	304172.0	343106.3	u	6.5	7.2	7.5	u	u	0.71	0.69
All IR(Cal)+UC(Cal)+OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-5 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
ATTRIBUTES OF INCOME (\$000's)**

Location	Total Household Income				Per Capita Income				Proportion Earned + Other Incom			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991

Sources:

Appendix, Table 4-4.
Statistics Canada. 1973, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1994B.

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-6
ESTIMATED ANNUAL WAGE BILL FROM NORTHERN HYDRO PROJECTS**

Year Note Col.	Actuals							Estimates										
	Peak Quarterly P-D's (1) (B)	Total P-D's (1) (C)	Peak Empl't (2) (D)	Tot. P-D's/ Peak P-D's (E)	Employment		Percent "Basic" Trades (H)	Peak Empl' (4) (I)	Total P-D's/ Peak Empl't (5) (J)	Total P-D's (6) (K)	Trades P-D's		Trade Wages		Total Wage Bill			
					"Basic" Trades (3) (F)	"High-End" Trades (3) (G)					"Basic" P-D's (7) (L)	"High-End" P-D's (7) (M)	"Basic" \$/hr (\$'90) (8) (N)	"High" \$/hr (\$'90) (8) (O)	"Basic" Trades (\$000s) (\$'90) (P)	"High" Trades (\$000s) (\$'90) (Q)	"Basic"+"High" Trades (\$000s) (\$1990) (R)	
1971	-	-	Unk	-	-	-	-	-	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
1972	-	-	Unk	-	-	-	-	120.30	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk
1973	-	-	2099	-	-	-	-	166.02	348470	219536	128934	15.41	22.01	45099	37838			82936
1974	-	-	3355	-	-	-	-	169.52	568737	341242	227495	15.53	22.13	70843	87124			137767
1975	-	-	3217	-	-	-	-	178.96	575728	305136	270592	15.65	22.25	63654	80270			143924
1976	-	-	2267	-	-	-	-	213.28	483499	217575	265924	15.76	22.37	45734	79309			125043
1977	-	-	1706	-	-	-	-	238.03	406077	203039	203039	15.88	22.49	43001	60877			103878
1978	-	-	741	-	-	-	-	232.87	172554	101807	70747	16.00	22.61	21724	21325			43048
1979	-	-	512	-	-	-	-	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	16.12	22.73	Unk	Unk			Unk
1980	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	16.24	22.85	0	0			0
1981	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	16.36	22.96	0	0			0
1982	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	16.48	23.08	0	0			0
1983	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	16.60	23.20	0	0			0
1984	7810	11421	-	1.46	Unk	Unk	Unk	108	105.29	11421	Unk	Unk	16.72	23.32	Unk	Unk		Unk
1985	43081	71979	-	1.67	370	124	0.75	598	120.30	71979	53911	18068	16.84	23.44	12104	5647		17751
1986	131329	302818	-	2.31	255	151	0.63	1824	166.02	302818	190334	112484	16.96	23.56	43035	35336		78371
1987	144405	339992	-	2.35	221	147	0.60	2006	169.52	339992	204180	135812	17.08	23.68	46491	42881		89371
1988	108817	270477	-	2.49	239	213	0.53	1511	178.96	270477	143018	127459	17.20	23.60	32792	40446		73238
1989	76761	227380	-	2.96	168	202	0.45	1066	213.28	227380	103243	124137	17.32	23.92	23836	39589		63426
1990	61437	203108	-	3.31	213	212	0.50	853	238.03	203108	101793	101315	17.44	24.75	23663	33434		57097
1991	52899	171089	-	3.23	248	175	0.59	735	232.87	171089	100307	70782	17.55	24.87	23478	23470		46946

P-D = person-days

**APPENDIX, TABLE 4-6
ESTIMATED ANNUAL WAGE BILL FROM NORTHERN HYDRO PROJECTS**

Notes:

1. Peak quarterly and total person-days for 1984-1991 from Manitoba Hydro, Northern Projects Employee System. Peak employment for 1983 assumed to be 0 since construction of the Limestone generating station had not begun.
2. Peak employment for 1973-1982 from "Exhibit No. 1" Memorandum from A.H. Horrocks, 17 June, 1983
3. Number of employees from "Northern Resident Employment Committee Annual Reports". "Basic" trade includes labourers, security guards, operating engineers, teamsters, carpenters, office workers, and caterers. "High-end" trades include millwrights, ironworkers, rebar workers, electricians and pipefitters. (Main, personal communication)
4. Peak employment calculated by dividing peak quarterly person-days by 72 (12 weeks x 6 days/week) (Hiley, personal communication).
5. 1972-78 ratios are copied from column "J" 1984-91 ratios. The peak employment year ratio for 1974 is assumed to be the same as the peak employment year ratio in 1987. Annual increases to 1974 and annual decreases after 1974 are assumed to follow the 1984-91 construction cycle. 1984-91 estimates are calculated by dividing column "C" by column "I" of the same year.
6. Column "K", 1973-78 P-D's, calculated by multiplying column "D" data times column "J" estimate of the same year. 1984-91 P-D's copied from column "C" data of the same year.
7. Column "L" 1973-78 calculated by multiplying column "J" by column "H" where column "H" 1987 is multiplied times column "K" 1974, column "H" 1988 is multiplied times column "K" 1975, etc. (see note #5). Column "M" is the residual.
8. 1973 "Basic" and "High-end" trade wages of \$4.375 + 6% and \$6.50 + 6%, respectively, and 1990 "Basic" and "High-end" trade wages of \$15.85 + 10% in benefits, respectively, are based on collective agreements then in effect (D. Main, Construction Division, Manitoba Hydro). 1974-89 wages interpolated as 1/17th increments and 1991 wages extrapolated as a 1/17th increment. Total wage bill for "Basic" and "High-end" trades based on 6, 10-hour days per week, 40 hours of straight time plus 20 hours of double time (equivalent to 1/3 straight time days plus 2/3 double time days).

APPENDIX, TABLE 4-7
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TOTAL INCOME PER LOCATION TO MANITOBA GDP OR EMPLOYMENT INCOME BY INDUSTRY (1)

GDP-Industry Combination (2,3)	Organized						Unorganized						Reserves					
	1981-86		Best 1986-91		81-86 +		1981-86		Best 1986-91		81-86 +		1981-86		Best 1986-91		81-86 +	
	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best
F	0.09483	0.42312	0.51794				0.01899	1	0.03133	1	0.05031	1	0.01899	1	0.03133	1	0.05031	1
G	0.00489	0.07511	0.07980				0.07115		0.05592		0.12708		0.07115		0.05592		0.12708	
H	78389.9	0.48838	78370.4				78370.0		0.99708		78371.0		78370.0		0.99708		78371.0	
L	0.40364	0.21983	0.62327				0.32780		0.50995		0.83775		0.32780		0.50995		0.83775	
M	0.26566	0.08267	0.34832				0.18982		0.25051		0.44033		0.18982		0.25051		0.44033	
T	0.80348	0.91122	1.51470				0.52764		1.15942		1.68708		0.52764		1.15942		1.68708	
F+G	0.00478	0.07545	0.08023				0.07106		0.05584		0.12690		0.07106		0.05584		0.12690	
F+H	3.48831	0.47437	3.94268				3.54415		0.77881		4.32076		3.54415		0.77881		4.32076	
F+L	0.24525	0.34310	0.58835				0.16941		0.21953		0.38894		0.16941		0.21953		0.38894	
F+M	0.24807	0.02085	0.26892	3			0.17223		0.22372		0.39596		0.17223		0.22372		0.39596	
F+T	0.28415	0.53070	0.81485				0.20831		0.27998		0.48829		0.20831		0.27998		0.48829	
G+H	0.00090	1	0.07858		0.07748	1	0.07494		0.05926		0.13420		0.07494		0.05926		0.13420	
G+L	0.00509	0.07520	0.08029				0.07075		0.05557		0.12832		0.07075		0.05557		0.12832	
G+M	0.00708	0.07402	0.08110				0.06876		0.05380		0.12256		0.06876		0.05380		0.12256	
G+T	0.00508	0.07534	0.08040				0.07078		0.05559		0.12837		0.07078		0.05559		0.12837	
H+L	3.34846	0.44798	3.79844				3.42430		0.77063		4.19492		3.42430		0.77063		4.19492	
H+M	0.14330	0.11026	0.25356				0.21914		0.17099		0.39013		0.21914		0.17099		0.39013	
H+T	5.40627	0.51865	5.92492				5.48211		0.84262		6.32473		5.48211		0.84262		6.32473	
L+M	0.27922	0.05765	0.33687				0.20338		0.27198		0.47536		0.20338		0.27198		0.47536	
L+T	0.48045	0.42971	0.91016				0.40461		0.70723		1.11184		0.40461		0.70723		1.11184	
M+T	0.28718	0.04502	0.33220				0.21134		0.28494		0.49628		0.21134		0.28494		0.49628	
F+G+H	0.00100	2	0.07691		0.07791	2	0.07484		0.05918		0.13401		0.07484		0.05918		0.13401	
F+G+L	0.00518	0.07554	0.08072				0.07068		0.05548		0.12614		0.07068		0.05548		0.12614	
F+G+M	0.00717	0.07435	0.08152				0.06867		0.05372		0.12239		0.06867		0.05372		0.12239	
F+G+T	0.00516	0.07568	0.08084				0.07068		0.05551		0.12619		0.07068		0.05551		0.12619	
F+H+L	1.58239	0.44330	2.02568				1.65822		0.61967		2.27790		1.65822		0.61967		2.27790	
F+H+M	0.11879	0.13666	0.25545				0.19483		0.15391		0.34854		0.19483		0.15391		0.34854	
F+H+T	1.95281	0.49934	2.45215				2.02865		0.66597		2.69462		2.02865		0.66597		2.69462	
F+L+M	0.26193	0.00320	0.26513	1			0.18609		0.24473		0.43082		0.18609		0.24473		0.43082	
F+L+T	0.32878	0.42630	0.75508				0.25294		0.35716		0.61011		0.25294		0.35716		0.61011	
F+M+T	0.26852	0.01028	0.27880	2			0.19268		0.25498		0.44766		0.19268		0.25498		0.44766	
G+H+L	0.00131	0.07667	0.07797	3			0.07453		0.05891		0.13344		0.07453		0.05891		0.13344	
G+H+M	0.00333	0.07548	0.07881				0.07251		0.05712		0.12963		0.07251		0.05712		0.12963	
G+H+T	0.00128	3	0.07681		0.07809		0.07456		0.05893		0.13349		0.07456		0.05893		0.13349	
G+L+M	0.00747	0.07411	0.08158				0.06836		0.05345		0.12181		0.06836		0.05345		0.12181	
G+L+T	0.00546	0.07543	0.08089				0.07038		0.05523		0.12561		0.07038		0.05523		0.12561	

APPENDIX, TABLE 4-7
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TOTAL INCOME PER LOCATION TO MANITOBA GDP OR EMPLOYMENT INCOME BY INDUSTRY (1)

GDP-Industry Combination (2,3)	Organized						Unorganized						Reserves					
	1981-86		Best 1986-91		81-86 + 86-91		1981-86		Best 1986-91		81-86 + 86-91		1981-86		Best 1986-91		81-86 + 86-91	
	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best	Best
G+M+T	0.00745	0.07425	0.08170				0.06839	0.05347	0.12186				0.06839	0.05347	0.12186			
H+L+M	0.08955	0.11642	0.20587				0.16539	0.13260	0.29799				0.16539	0.13260	0.29799			
H+L+T	1.82955	0.47648	2.30603				1.90538	0.65188	2.55726				1.90538	0.65188	2.55726			
H+M+T	0.09573	0.13080	0.22633				0.17157	0.13719	0.30875				0.17157	0.13719	0.30875			
L+M+T	0.29797	0.02388	0.32185				0.22213	0.30291	0.52504				0.22213	0.30291	0.52504			
F+G+H+L	0.00141	0.07700	0.07841				0.07443	0.05882	0.13325				0.07443	0.05882	0.13325			
F+G+H+M	0.00343	0.07581	0.07924				0.07241	0.05704	0.12945				0.07241	0.05704	0.12945			
F+G+H+T	0.00138	0.07714	0.07852				0.07446	0.05884	0.13330				0.07446	0.05884	0.13330			
F+G+L+M	0.00757	0.07444	0.08201				0.06827	0.05337	0.12164				0.06827	0.05337	0.12164			
F+G+L+T	0.00556	0.07577	0.08133				0.07028	0.05515	0.12543				0.07028	0.05515	0.12543			
F+G+M+T	0.00754	0.07458	0.08212				0.06830	0.05339	0.12168				0.06830	0.05339	0.12168			
F+H+L+M	0.07226	0.14097	0.21323				0.14810	0.11948	0.26758				0.14810	0.11948	0.26758			
F+H+L+T	1.07268	0.46694	1.53963				1.14852	0.52978	1.67830				1.14852	0.52978	1.67830			
F+H+M+T	0.07724	0.15472	0.23198				0.15308	0.12330	0.27637				0.15308	0.12330	0.27637			
F+L+M+T	0.27992	0.02517	0.30509				0.20408	0.27311	0.47719				0.20408	0.27311	0.47719			
G+H+L+M	0.00373	0.07557	0.07930				0.07211	0.05677	0.12888				0.07211	0.05677	0.12888			
G+H+L+T	0.00169	0.07689	0.07858				0.07415	0.05857	0.13272				0.07415	0.05857	0.13272			
G+H+M+T	0.00370	0.07570	0.07941				0.07214	0.05679	0.12893				0.07214	0.05679	0.12893			
G+L+M+T	0.00785	0.07434	0.08218				0.06799 3	0.05312 3	0.12111 3				0.06799 3	0.05312 3	0.12111 3			
H+L+M+T	0.04949	0.13550	0.18499				0.12533	0.10158	0.22691				0.12533	0.10158	0.22691			
F+G+H+L+M	0.00382	0.07590	0.07973				0.07201	0.05669	0.12870				0.07201	0.05669	0.12870			
F+G+H+L+T	0.00179	0.07723	0.07901				0.07405	0.05849	0.13254				0.07405	0.05849	0.13254			
F+G+H+M+T	0.00380	0.07604	0.07984				0.07204	0.05671	0.12875				0.07204	0.05671	0.12875			
F+G+L+M+T	0.00794	0.07467	0.08261				0.06790 2	0.05304 2	0.12094 2				0.06790 2	0.05304 2	0.12094 2			
F+H+L+M+T	0.03666	0.15801	0.19468				0.11250	0.09118	0.20368				0.11250	0.09118	0.20368			
G+H+L+M+T	0.00410	0.07579	0.07990				0.07174	0.05644	0.12818				0.07174	0.05644	0.12818			
F+G+H+L+M+T	0.00420	0.07613	0.08032				0.07164	0.05636	0.12800				0.07164	0.05636	0.12800			

1. As measured by the absolute difference between the rate of change in total income per location to the rate of change in industry employment income or GDP.

A perfect match of the two rates of change would give a quotient of 0.

2. Coding: F = Commercial Fishing L = Logging
G = Manitoba GDP M = Mining
H = Manitoba Hydro Northern Projects T = Commercial Trapping

3. \$0.0001 million has been added to Manitoba Hydro northern project employee income in 1981 to avoid division by zero

Sources: Tables 4-5 and 4-6.

APPENDIX TABLE 4-8 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
LABOUR FORCE CONDITIONS

Place	Population Age 15 & Over				Labour Force Participants				Participation Rate				Number Employed			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
Aghaming-Seymourville LA	u	490	496	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Aghaming UC	u	20	11	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Hollow Water IR	215	265	260	260	85	85	125	140	0.40	0.32	0.48	0.54	45	75	100	90
Manigotogan UC	u	141	155	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Seymourville UC	u	64	70	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Baden-Westgate LA	u	u	u	205	u	u	u	90	u	u	u	0.44	u	u	u	55
Baden UC	na	na	55	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u
Barrows UC	u	120	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
National Mills UC	u	36	30	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Powell UC	na	na	13	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u
Red Deer Lake UC	u	38	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Westgate UC	u	18	13	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River LA	u	524	580	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River UC	u	149	125	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River IR	480	375	455	420	210	135	235	190	0.44	0.36	0.52	0.45	210	105	175	150
Big Black River UC	u	20	26	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Bloodvein LA	u	u	276	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Bloodvein IR	200	188	235	255	20	45	60	85	0.10	0.24	0.26	0.33	15	45	55	50
Long Body Creek UC	u	u	41	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet LA	u	458	302	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet UC	u	293	177	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet IR	235	165	125	135	15	40	20	45	0.06	0.24	0.16	0.33	15	30	15	30
Camperville-Pine Creek LA	u	1054	u	920	u	u	u	320	u	u	u	0.35	u	u	u	180
Camperville UC	u	418	468	375	u	u	u	130	u	u	u	0.35	u	u	u	75
Duck Bay UC	u	456	409	280	u	u	u	105	u	u	u	0.38	u	u	u	55
Pine Creek IR	180	180	u	265	40	45	u	85	0.22	0.25	u	0.32	30	25	u	50
Chemawawin-Easterville LA	u	336	397	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Chemawawin IR	u	202	265	330	u	u	155	130	u	u	0.58	0.39	u	u	120	110
Easterville UC	u	134	132	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Churchill OC	1100	900	865	845	850	755	685	655	0.77	0.84	0.79	0.78	800	735	595	555
Cormorant UC	u	262	296	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River LA	u	331	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River UC	u	256	222	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River IR	40	75	u	155	15	25	u	60	0.38	0.33	u	0.39	0	15	u	40
Cross Lake LA	u	u	1421	1755	u	u	u	795	u	u	u	0.45	u	u	u	535
Cross Lake UC	u	u	361	235	u	u	u	130	u	u	u	0.55	u	u	u	90
Cross Lake IR	1030	885	1060	1520	255	180	340	665	0.25	0.20	0.32	0.44	220	160	210	445

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-8 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
LABOUR FORCE CONDITIONS**

Place	Population Age 15 & Over				Number of Labour Force Participants				Participation Rate				Number Employed			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
CD19 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD19 UC (Data)	2730	2680	2500	2500	970	1160	1265	1280	0.36	0.43	0.51	0.51	825	915	875	975
CD19 Included UC (Cal.)	u	2826	2857	1105	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD19 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	2826	2857	1105	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD19 Included IR (Cal.)	3265	3529	2810	3650	1165	1385	1265	1470	0.36	0.39	0.45	0.40	950	1030	875	1070
CD19 IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	5995	6209	5310	6150	2135	2545	2530	2750	0.36	0.41	0.48	0.45	1775	1945	1750	2045
CD19 IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	u	6355	5667	4755	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included OC (Cal.)	8310	8350	6480	6520	4005	4370	4810	4695	0.63	0.69	0.71	0.72	3810	4105	4130	4215
CD21 UC (Data)	1435	1630	1490	1340	670	1490	1490	1340	0.47	0.91	1.00	1.00	640	800	670	610
CD21 Included UC (Cal.)	u	507	547	0	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	8857	7027	6520	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included IR (Cal.)	790	1247	1450	1610	385	625	870	885	0.49	0.50	0.60	0.55	295	560	590	640
CD21 IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	8535	9227	9420	9470	5060	6485	6970	6920	0.59	0.70	0.74	0.73	4745	5465	5390	5465
CD21 IR (Cal.) + UC (Calc.) + OC (Cal.)	u	8104	8477	8130	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD22 UC (Data)	1720	1625	1530	1335	820	1530	1530	1335	0.48	0.94	1.00	1.00	775	580	625	635
CD22 Included UC (Cal.)	u	1689	2072	1000	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	1689	2072	1000	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included IR (Cal.)	7435	5580	7315	8720	1440	1500	2595	3835	0.19	0.27	0.35	0.44	815	1270	1525	2580
CD22 IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	9155	7205	8845	10055	2260	3030	4125	5170	0.25	0.42	0.47	0.51	1590	1850	2150	3215
CD22 IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	u	7289	9387	9720	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included OC (Cal.)	1100	900	865	845	850	755	685	655	0.77	0.84	0.79	0.78	800	735	595	555
CD23 UC (Data)	1010	810	230	170	330	810	230	170	0.33	1.00	1.00	1.00	290	220	70	70
CD23 Included UC (Cal.)	u	797	710	440	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	1697	1575	1285	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included IR (Cal.)	885	1015	1270	1275	160	160	460	485	0.18	0.18	0.36	0.38	155	130	240	335
CD23 IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	2995	2725	2365	2290	1340	1725	1375	1310	0.45	0.63	0.58	0.57	1245	1085	905	960
CD23 IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	u	2712	2845	2560	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Included Organized (Cal.)	7410	7250	7345	7365	4655	5125	5295	5350	0.66	0.71	0.72	0.73	4610	4840	4725	4770
All UC (Data)	6895	6745	5750	5345	2790	4990	4515	4125	0.40	0.74	0.79	0.77	2530	2515	2240	2290
All Included UC (Cal.)	u	5819	6186	2545	u	u	u	945	u	u	u	0.37	u	u	u	660
All Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	13069	13531	9910	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Included IR (Cal.)	12375	11371	12845	15255	3150	3670	5190	6675	0.25	0.32	0.40	0.44	2215	2990	3230	4625
All IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	19270	18116	18595	20800	5940	8660	9705	10800	0.31	0.48	0.52	0.52	4745	5505	5470	6915
All IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	u	24440	26378	25165	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-8 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
LABOUR FORCE CONDITIONS**

Place	Employment Rate				Part. Rate x Empl. Rate				Number Self-Employed			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
Aghaming-Seymourville LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Aghaming UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Hollow Water IR	0.53	0.88	0.80	0.64	0.21	0.28	0.38	0.35	u	0	0	0
Manigotogan UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Seymourville UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Baden-Westgate LA	u	u	u	0.61	u	u	u	0.27	u	u	u	0
Baden UC	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u
Barrows UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
National Mills UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Powell UC	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u
Red Deer Lake UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Westgate UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River IR	1.00	0.78	0.74	0.79	0.44	0.28	0.38	0.36	u	0	30	0
Big Black River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Bloodvein LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Bloodvein IR	0.75	1.00	0.92	0.59	0.08	0.24	0.23	0.20	u	0	0	0
Long Body Creek UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet IR	1.00	0.75	0.75	0.67	0.06	0.18	0.12	0.22	u	0	0	0
Camperville-Pine Creek LA	u	u	u	0.56	u	u	u	0.20	u	u	u	35
Camperville UC	u	u	u	0.58	u	u	u	0.20	u	u	u	10
Duck Bay UC	u	u	u	0.52	u	u	u	0.20	u	u	u	25
Pine Creek IR	0.75	0.56	u	0.59	0.17	0.14	u	0.19	u	10	u	0
Chemawawin-Easterville LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Chemawawin IR	u	u	0.77	0.85	u	u	0.45	0.33	u	u	30	0
Easterville UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Churchill OC	0.94	0.97	0.87	0.85	0.73	0.82	0.69	0.66	u	20	20	20
Cormorant UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River IR	0.00	0.60	u	0.67	0.00	0.20	u	0.26	u	0	u	0
Cross Lake LA	u	u	u	0.67	u	u	u	0.30	u	u	u	10
Cross Lake UC	u	u	u	0.69	u	u	u	0.38	u	u	u	0
Cross Lake IR	0.86	0.89	0.62	0.67	0.21	0.18	0.20	0.29	u	0	0	10

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-8 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
LABOUR FORCE CONDITIONS**

Place	Employment Rate				Part. Rate x Empl. Rate				Number Self-Employed			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
CD19 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD19 UC (Data)	0.85	0.79	0.69	0.76	0.30	0.34	0.35	0.39	u	220	235	60
CD19 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD19 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD19 Included IR (Cal.)	0.82	0.74	0.69	0.73	0.29	0.29	0.31	0.29	u	130	90	10
CD19 IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	0.83	0.76	0.69	0.74	0.30	0.31	0.33	0.33	u	350	325	70
CD19 IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included OC (Cal.)	0.95	0.94	0.90	0.90	0.60	0.65	0.64	0.65	u	235	260	65
CD21 UC (Data)	0.96	0.89	0.77	0.77	0.45	0.82	0.77	0.77	u	45	60	20
CD21 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included IR (Cal.)	0.77	0.90	0.68	0.72	0.37	0.45	0.41	0.40	u	35	55	0
CD21 IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	0.94	0.84	0.77	0.79	0.56	0.59	0.57	0.58	u	315	375	85
CD21 IR (Cal.) + UC (Calc.) + OC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD22 UC (Data)	0.95	0.38	0.41	0.48	0.45	0.36	0.41	0.48	u	30	35	20
CD22 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included IR (Cal.)	0.57	0.85	0.59	0.67	0.11	0.23	0.21	0.30	u	15	50	10
CD22 IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	0.70	0.61	0.52	0.62	0.17	0.26	0.24	0.32	u	45	85	30
CD22 IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included OC (Cal.)	0.94	0.97	0.87	0.85	0.73	0.82	0.69	0.66	u	20	20	20
CD23 UC (Data)	0.88	0.27	0.30	0.41	0.29	0.27	0.30	0.41	u	55	0	10
CD23 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included IR (Cal.)	0.97	0.81	0.52	0.69	0.18	0.13	0.19	0.26	u	5	10	10
CD23 IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	0.93	0.63	0.66	0.73	0.42	0.40	0.38	0.42	u	80	30	40
CD23 IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Included Organized (Cal.)	0.95	0.94	0.89	0.89	0.62	0.67	0.64	0.65	u	255	280	85
All UC (Data)	0.91	0.50	0.50	0.56	0.37	0.37	0.39	0.43	u	350	330	110
All Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	0.70	u	u	u	0.26	u	u	u	70
All Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Included IR (Cal.)	0.70	0.81	0.62	0.69	0.18	0.26	0.25	0.30	u	185	205	30
All IR (Cal.) + UC (Data) + OC (Cal.)	0.80	0.64	0.56	0.64	0.25	0.30	0.29	0.34	u	535	535	140
All IR (Cal.) + UC (Cal.) + OC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-8 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
LABOUR FORCE CONDITIONS**

Place	Population Age 15 & Over		Number of Labour Force Participants			Participation Rate			Number Employed			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991

Sources:

Manitoba Northern Affairs. 1989.
Manitoba Northern Affairs. 1982.
Statistics Canada. 1973, 1983, 1988, 1994B.

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-9 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THE ADULT POPULATION**

Place	Of Those Age 15 & Over, Number																		
	With Less than Grade 9			With a Secondary Certificate			With a Trade Certificate			With Some Post-Second or University			With a Trade Certificate or, Some Post-Secondary or University						
	1976	1981	1986	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	
Aghaming-Seymourville LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	
Aghaming UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	
Hollow Water IR	115	140	105	70	u	u	25	0	10	10	10	15	10	40	75	40	10	50	85
Manigotogan UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Seymourville UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Baden-Westgate LA	u	u	u	85	u	u	10	u	u	10	u	u	u	u	20	u	u	u	30
Baden UC	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u
Barrows UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
National Mills UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Powell UC	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u
Red Deer Lake UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Westgate UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River IR	330	230	235	220	30	5	10	10	5	0	0	30	60	70	30	40	65	70	30
Big Black River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Bloodvein LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Bloodvein IR	135	155	135	155	10	0	5	0	0	0	0	5	10	20	0	5	10	20	0
Long Body Creek UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet IR	205	115	80	80	10	5	0	10	0	5	0	5	0	15	0	5	0	20	0
Camperville-Pina Creek LA	u	u	u	410	u	u	45	u	u	10	u	u	u	u	110	u	u	u	120
Camperville UC	u	u	u	165	u	u	25	u	u	0	u	u	u	u	40	u	u	u	40
Duck Bay UC	u	u	u	130	u	u	10	u	u	0	u	u	u	u	35	u	u	u	35
Pine Creek IR	105	80	u	115	5	0	u	10	0	u	10	15	35	u	35	25	35	u	45
Chemawawin-Easterville LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Chemawawin IR	u	u	165	175	u	u	0	10	u	5	20	u	u	15	30	u	u	20	50
Easterville UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Churchill OC	260	230	175	170	185	80	50	65	265	50	25	190	315	355	290	455	365	380	325
Cormorant UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River IR	25	40	u	45	5	0	u	0	0	0	u	0	0	u	u	0	0	u	55

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-9 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THE ADULT POPULATION**

Place	Of Those Age 15 & Over, Number																			
	With Less than Grade 9				With a Secondary Certificate				With a Trade Certificate				With Some Post-Second or University				With a Trade Certificate or, Some Post-Second or University			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
CD19 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD19 UC (Data)	1260	1420	985	930	245	70	125	170	75	5	50	50	130	345	470	465	205	350	520	515
CD19 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD19 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD19 Included IR (Cal.)	2215	2080	1415	1700	190	40	60	150	110	15	30	80	170	465	350	600	280	480	380	680
CD19 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	3475	3500	2400	2630	435	110	185	320	185	20	80	130	300	810	820	1065	485	830	900	1195
CD19 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included OC (Cal.)	1580	1420	1145	900	1325	380	395	470	1105	205	170	295	1030	1275	2715	2875	2135	1480	2885	3170
CD21 UC (Data)	715	655	445	295	170	55	85	80	155	25	15	50	165	360	510	420	320	365	525	470
CD21 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included IR (Cal.)	430	450	675	530	55	30	35	70	115	5	25	70	40	210	240	490	155	215	265	560
CD21 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	2725	2525	2265	1725	1550	465	515	600	1375	235	210	415	1235	1845	3465	3785	2610	2080	3675	4200
CD21 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD22 UC (Data)	790	790	545	360	220	40	65	110	170	10	25	45	145	200	310	320	315	210	335	365
CD22 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included IR (Cal.)	9625	2970	3735	3785	385	95	135	320	105	35	60	400	295	550	735	1515	400	585	795	1915
CD22 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	10415	3760	4280	4125	605	135	200	430	275	45	85	445	440	750	1045	1835	715	795	1130	2280
CD22 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included OC (Cal.)	280	230	175	170	185	80	50	65	265	50	25	35	190	315	355	290	455	365	380	325
CD23 UC (Data)	645	545	115	75	70	5	10	10	110	5	0	10	50	85	35	30	160	90	35	40
CD23 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included IR (Cal.)	730	450	840	690	35	5	15	20	25	10	10	30	15	25	90	130	40	35	100	160
CD23 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC (Cal)	1635	1225	1130	935	290	90	75	95	400	65	35	75	255	425	480	450	655	490	515	525
CD23 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Included Organized (Cal.)	1840	1650	1320	1070	1510	460	445	535	1370	255	195	330	1220	1590	3070	3165	2590	1845	3265	3495
All UC (Data)	3410	3410	2090	1660	705	170	285	350	510	45	90	155	490	990	1325	1235	1000	1035	1415	1390
All Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	620	u	u	u	115	u	u	u	30	u	u	u	280	u	u	u	310
All Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Included IR (Cal.)	13000	5950	6665	6685	665	170	245	560	355	65	125	580	520	1250	1415	2735	875	1315	1540	3315
All IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	16410	9360	8755	8345	1370	340	530	910	865	110	215	735	1010	2240	2740	3970	1875	2350	2955	4705
All IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-9 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THE ADULT POPULATION**

Place	Percent of the Population Age 15 & Over With																			
	Less than Grade 9				Secondary Certificate				Trade Certificate				Some Post-Secondary or University				Trade Certificate or, Some Post-Secondary or University			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
Aghaming-Seymourville LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	
Aghaming UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	
Hollow Water IR	0.53	0.53	0.40	0.27	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.10	0.12	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.15	0.29	0.19	0.04	0.19	0.33
Manigotogan UC	u	u	0.00	na	u	u	0.00	na	u	u	0.00	na	u	u	0.00	na	u	u	0.00	na
Seymourville UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Baden-Westgate LA	u	u	u	0.41	u	u	u	0.05	u	u	u	0.05	u	u	u	0.10	u	u	u	0.15
Baden UC	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u
Barrows UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
National Mills UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Powell UC	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u	na	na	u	u
Red Deer Lake UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Westgate UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Berens River IR	0.69	0.61	0.52	0.52	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.16	0.15	0.07	0.08	0.17	0.15	0.07
Big Black River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Bloodvein LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Bloodvein IR	0.68	0.82	0.57	0.61	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.00
Long Body Creek UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Brochet IR	0.87	0.70	0.64	0.59	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.00
Camperville-Pine Creek LA	u	u	u	0.45	u	u	u	0.05	u	u	u	0.01	u	u	u	0.12	u	u	u	0.13
Camperville UC	u	u	u	0.44	u	u	u	0.07	u	u	u	0.00	u	u	u	0.11	u	u	u	0.11
Duck Bay UC	u	u	u	0.46	u	u	u	0.04	u	u	u	0.00	u	u	u	0.13	u	u	u	0.13
Pine Creek IR	0.58	0.44	u	0.43	0.03	0.00	u	0.04	0.06	0.00	u	0.04	0.08	0.19	u	0.13	0.14	0.19	u	0.17
Chemawawin-Easterville LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Chemawawin IR	u	u	0.62	0.56	u	u	0.00	0.03	u	u	0.02	0.06	u	u	0.06	0.10	u	u	0.08	0.16
Easterville UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Churchill OC	0.24	0.26	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.24	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.17	0.35	0.41	0.34	0.41	0.41	0.44	0.38
Cormorant UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River LA	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River UC	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
Crane River IR	0.63	0.53	u	0.29	0.13	0.00	u	0.00	0.00	0.00	u	0.00	0.00	0.00	u	0.35	0.00	0.00	u	0.35

APPENDIX TABLE 4-9 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THE ADULT POPULATION

Place	Percent of the Population Age 15 & Over With																			
	Less than Grade 9				Secondary Certificate				Trade Certificate				Some Post-Secondary or University				Trade Certificate or, Some Post-Secondary or University			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
CD19 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD19 UC (Data)	0.46	0.53	0.39	0.37	0.09	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.13	0.19	0.19	0.08	0.13	0.21	0.21
CD19 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD19 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD19 Included IR (Cal.)	0.68	0.59	0.50	0.47	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.09	0.14	0.14	0.19
CD19 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	0.58	0.56	0.45	0.43	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.08	0.13	0.17	0.19
CD19 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included OC (Cal.)	0.25	0.22	0.18	0.14	0.21	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.18	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.16	0.20	0.42	0.44	0.34	0.23	0.45	0.49
CD21 UC (Data)	0.50	0.40	0.30	0.22	0.12	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.11	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.11	0.22	0.34	0.31	0.22	0.24	0.35	0.35
CD21 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD21 Included IR (Cal.)	0.54	0.43	0.47	0.33	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.15	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.20	0.17	0.31	0.20	0.21	0.18	0.35
CD21 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	0.32	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.18	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.16	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.14	0.20	0.37	0.40	0.31	0.23	0.39	0.44
CD21 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
CD22 UC (Data)	0.48	0.49	0.36	0.27	0.13	0.02	0.04	0.08	0.10	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.08	0.12	0.20	0.24	0.18	0.13	0.22	0.27
CD22 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD22 Included IR (Cal.)	1.29	0.53	0.51	0.43	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.10	0.10	0.17	0.05	0.10	0.11	0.22
CD22 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	1.14	0.52	0.48	0.41	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.12	0.18	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.23
CD22 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included OC (Cal.)	0.24	0.28	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.24	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.17	0.35	0.41	0.34	0.41	0.41	0.44	0.38
CD23 UC (Data)	0.64	0.67	0.50	0.44	0.07	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.18	0.16	0.11	0.15	0.24
CD23 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
CD23 Included IR (Cal.)	0.82	0.45	0.66	0.54	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.10	0.05	0.03	0.08	0.13
CD23 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC (Cal)	0.55	0.45	0.48	0.41	0.10	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.13	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.09	0.16	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.18	0.22	0.23
CD23 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Included Organized (Cal.)	0.25	0.23	0.18	0.15	0.20	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.18	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.16	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.35	0.25	0.44	0.47
All UC (Data)	0.49	0.51	0.36	0.31	0.10	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.15	0.23	0.23	0.15	0.15	0.25	0.26
All Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u	0.34	u	u	u	0.06	u	u	u	0.02	u	u	u	0.15	u	u	u	0.17
All Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u
All Included IR (Cal.)	1.05	0.53	0.52	0.44	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.11	0.11	0.18	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.22
All IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	0.85	0.52	0.47	0.41	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.15	0.19	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.23
All IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u	u

Sources:

Statistics Canada 1973, 1983, 1988, 1994B

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-10 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
USE OF ABORIGINAL LANGUAGE AND ACCESS ATTRIBUTES**

Location	1991 Home Language			Access				1991 INAC Access Zone
	No. Speaking Abor. Language Most Often	As a % of Population		Highest Level of Access				
		Aboriginal	Total	1976	1981	1986	1991	
Aghaming-Seymourville LA	50	0.09	0.07	r	r	r	r	2
Aghaming UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Hollow Water IR	50	0.12	0.12	r	r	r	r	2
Manigotogan UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Seymourville UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Baden-Westgate LA	10	u	0.04	r	r	r	r	2
Baden UC	na	na	na	na	na	r	r	2
Barrows UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
National Mills UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Powell UC	na	na	na	na	na	r	r	2
Red Deer Lake UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Westgate UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Berens River LA	475	0.59	0.57	a	a	a	a	5
Berens River UC	u	u	u	a	a	a	a	5
Berens River IR	475	0.69	0.68	a	a	a	a	5
Big Black River UC	u	u	u	w	w	w	w	5
Bloodvein LA	215	0.50	0.47	w	w	w	w	2
Bloodvein IR	215	0.50	0.50	w	w	w	w	2
Long Body Creek UC	u	u	u	w	w	w	w	2
Brochet LA	200	0.47	0.45	w	w	w	w	6
Brochet UC	u	u	u	w	w	w	w	6
Brochet IR	200	0.87	0.87	w	w	w	w	6
Camperville-Pine Creek LA	130	0.09	0.09	r	r	r	r	2
Camperville UC	45	0.08	0.08	r	r	r	r	2
Duck Bay UC	50	0.12	0.11	r	r	r	r	2
Pine Creek IR	35	0.08	0.08	r	r	r	r	2
Chemawawin-Easterville LA	395	0.59	0.57	r	r	r	r	2
Chemawawin IR	395	0.73	0.72	r	r	r	r	2
Easterville UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Churchill OC	35	0.06	0.03	t	t	t	t	4
Cormorant UC	u	u	u	t	t	t	t	4
Crane River LA	10	0.04	0.02	r	r	r	r	2
Crane River UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Crane River IR	10	0.04	0.04	r	r	r	r	2
Cross Lake LA	2115	0.72	0.70	r	r	r	r	2
Cross Lake UC	90	0.28	0.22	r	r	r	r	2
Cross Lake IR	2025	0.79	0.78	r	r	r	r	2
Dallas-Peguis LA	35	0.04	u	r	r	r	r	2
Dallas-Red Rose UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Fisher Bay UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Harwill UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Fisher River IR	35	0.04	0.04	r	r	r	r	2
Peguis IR	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Dauphin River LA	35	0.33	0.31	r	r	r	r	2
Dauphin River (Anama Bay) UC	u	u	u	r	r	r	r	2
Dauphin River IR	35	0.33	0.34	r	r	r	r	2
Fox Lake IR	20	0.13	0.13	na	na	r	r	2

**APPENDIX TABLE 4-10 (Example)
NORTHERN MANITOBA COMMUNITIES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS
USE OF ABORIGINAL LANGUAGE AND ACCESS ATTRIBUTES**

Location	1991 Home Language		
	No. Speaking Abor. Language Most Often	As a % of Population Aboriginal	Total
	CD19 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na
CD19 UC (Data)	250	0.08	0.07
CD19 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u
CD19 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u
CD19 Included IR (Cal.)	2550	0.43	0.42
CD19 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	2800	0.31	0.29
CD19 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u
CD21 Included OC (Cal.)	180	0.08	0.02
CD21 UC (Data)	385	0.41	0.21
CD21 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u
CD21 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u
CD21 Included IR (Cal.)	1010	0.42	0.39
CD21 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	1575	0.27	0.12
CD21 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u
CD22 Included OC (Cal.)	na	na	na
CD22 UC (Data)	205	0.12	0.10
CD22 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u
CD22 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u
CD22 Included IR (Cal.)	11370	0.78	0.77
CD22 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	11575	0.71	0.68
CD22 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u
CD23 Included OC (Cal.)	35	0.06	0.03
CD23 UC (Data)	155	1.19	0.60
CD23 Included UC (Cal.)	u	u	u
CD23 Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u
CD23 Included IR (Cal.)	900	0.40	0.21
CD23 IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	1090	0.37	0.19
CD23 IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u
All Included Organized (Cal.)	215	0.07	0.02
All UC (Data)	995	0.17	0.13
All Included UC (Cal.)	0	0.00	0.00
All Included Not-IR (Cal.)	u	u	u
All Included IR (Cal.)	15830	0.63	0.57
All IR(Cal) + UC(Data) + OC(Cal)	16825	0.54	0.47
All IR(Cal) + UC(Cal) + OC(Cal)	u	u	u

Sources:

Indian Affairs and Northern Development. n.d.
Manitoba Highways and Transportation.
Statistics Canada. 1994B, 1994C.

APPENDIX, TABLE 8-1
1986 COMMUNITY SOCIOECONOMIC DATA AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE DATA FOR REGRESSING 1984-88 PROJECT DATA
PROJECT SURVIVAL RATES

Place	Independent Variables												Dependent Variables					
	CTR	TOP	ADP	PAB	PAL	MHY	PCY	PEY	PEM	PG9	PTP	ACC	SU1(11)		SU2(14)		SU3(15)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	Known	Rate	Known	Rate	Known	Rate
Hollow Water IR	1	452	260	0.96	0.12	19.8	5.6	0.75	0.38	0.40	0.19	0	6	0.00	3	0.00	2	0.00
Berens River IR	1	803	455	0.97	0.68	26.9	5.9	0.64	0.38	0.52	0.15	1	3	0.33	1	0.00	2	0.50
Bloodvein IR	1	420	235	0.95	0.50	8.5	2.8	0.77	0.23	0.57	0.09	1	1	0.00	1	0.00	0	-
Brochet IR	1	251	125	0.98	0.87	28.0	4.0	0.46	0.12	0.64	0.16	1	0	-	-	-	-	-
Chemawawin IR	1	441	265	0.98	0.72	22.7	4.8	0.67	0.45	0.62	0.08	0	3	0.67	3	0.67	0	-
Churchill	0	1217	865	0.41	0.03	42.2	15.6	0.91	0.69	0.20	0.44	1	2	0.50	2	0.50	0	-
Cross Lake IR	1	1785	1060	0.99	0.78	13.0	3.5	0.52	0.20	0.55	0.11	0	2	2.00	1	0.00	1	1.00
Fisher River IR	1	765	510	0.97	0.04	22.6	6.6	0.70	0.30	0.36	0.25	0	7	0.14	4	0.00	3	0.33
Garden Hill IR	1	1873	1050	0.99	0.94	19.0	4.5	0.52	0.24	0.50	0.17	1	4	0.00	2	0.00	2	0.00
St Theresa Pt & Wasagamack IR	1	2627	1105	0.80	0.98	20.8	3.5	0.43	0.19	0.44	0.12	1	6	0.00	3	0.00	3	0.00
God's Lake IR	1	867	510	0.97	0.94	27.4	5.5	0.54	0.26	0.51	0.10	1	4	0.00	2	0.00	1	0.00
God's River IR	1	300	155	0.98	0.97	24.4	4.6	0.61	0.35	0.55	0.03	1	0	-	-	-	-	-
Grand Rapids, LGD	0	625	425	0.66	0.07	44.2	11.6	0.88	0.65	0.22	0.34	0	5	0.20	5	0.20	0	-
Grand Rapids IR	1	318	135	0.97	0.96	19.9	6.5	0.65	0.52	0.63	0.11	0	2	0.00	1	0.00	1	0.00
Lac Brochet IR	1	428	230	0.99	0.00	23.3	4.7	0.47	0.11	0.87	0.00	1	4	0.25	4	0.25	0	-
Little Black River IR	1	251	140	0.96	0.14	13.5	4.4	0.73	0.32	0.46	0.07	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
Little Grand Rapids IR	1	537	335	0.99	0.80	11.6	3.1	0.71	0.34	0.55	0.10	1	0	-	-	-	-	-
Pauiagassl IR	1	299	170	0.99	0.91	9.5	3.4	0.63	0.24	0.62	0.18	1	0	-	-	-	-	-
Moose Lake IR	1	252	135	0.97	1.00	19.2	3.7	0.37	0.19	0.56	0.04	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
Nelson House IR	1	1112	665	0.99	0.53	20.6	4.2	0.52	0.15	0.61	0.11	0	5	0.20	4	0.25	1	0.00
Norway House IR	1	2269	1380	0.98	0.65	24.6	5.1	0.60	0.25	0.45	0.10	0	18	0.11	16	0.00	1	1.00
Oxford House IR	1	1288	715	0.98	0.94	19.1	4.6	0.52	0.18	0.55	0.07	1	8	0.00	7	0.00	1	0.00
Shoal River(Dawson Bay) IR	1	298	160	0.98	0.75	6.1	2.7	0.50	0.19	0.56	0.09	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
Poplar River IR	1	583	350	0.97	0.32	20.6	5.2	0.56	0.27	0.63	0.07	1	1	0.00	1	0.00	0	-
Pukatawagan IR	1	728	400	0.98	0.38	14.7	2.8	0.42	0.23	0.53	0.06	1	2	0.00	0	-	2	0.00
Red Sucker Lake IR	1	437	260	1.00	0.96	18.8	4.7	0.50	0.19	0.65	0.04	1	1	0.00	1	0.00	0	-
Shamattawa IR	1	564	280	0.99	0.86	19.2	3.0	0.51	0.21	0.75	0.05	1	3	0.00	2	0.00	0	0.00
South Indian Lake	0	743	490	0.98	0.50	25.9	4.7	0.61	0.19	0.47	0.09	0	4	0.50	4	0.50	1	1.00
Split Lake IR	1	976	570	0.99	0.35	21.1	4.6	0.47	0.18	0.53	0.10	0	3	0.00	2	0.00	1	0.00
The Pas, Town	0	6283	4495	0.19	0.02	41.5	13.4	0.90	0.64	0.15	0.48	0	15	0.20	15	0.20	0	-
The Pas, LGD	0	1940	1370	0.36	0.02	43.9	12.6	0.90	0.66	0.20	0.41	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
The Pas IR	1	1767	1050	0.90	0.18	19.1	4.9	0.75	0.38	0.40	0.22	0	17	0.12	10	0.00	7	0.29

1986 COMMUNITY SOCIOECONOMIC DATA AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE DATA FOR REGRESSING 1984-88 PROJECT DATA
APPENDIX, TABLE 8- 1 (Cont.)
PROJECT SURVIVAL RATES

1. CTR = 1-Indian reserve community, 0-not an Indian reserve.
2. TOP = Total population of community.
3. ADP = Adult population (15 yrs. or more) of community.
4. PAB = Proportion of community population that is Aboriginal.
5. PAL = Proportion of community population that speaks an Aboriginal language at home.
6. MHY = Median household income of community.
7. PCY = Per capital income of community.
8. PEY = Proportion of community income that is earned income.
9. PEM = Proportion of adult population (15 yrs. or more) of community that is employed.
10. PG9 = Proportion of the community population with less than grade 9 education.
11. PTP = Proportion of the community population with some post secondary, trade, or university education.
12. ACC = Road accessibility of community. 1-road, 2- no road.
13. SU1 = Known cases and survival rate for all types of entrepreneurs.
14. SU2 = Known cases and survival rate for non-government, non-collectively owned entrepreneurs.
15. SU3 = Known cases and survival rate for government and collectively owned entrepreneurs.

APPENDIX, TABLE 8-2
1991 COMMUNITY SOCIOECONOMIC DATA AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE DATA FOR REGRESSING 1984-88 PROJECT DATA*
PROJECT SURVIVAL RATES







Place	Independent Variables												Dependent Variables					
	CTR	TOP	ADP	PAB	PAL	MHY	PCY	PEY	PEM	PG9	PTP	ACC	SU1(11)		SU2(14)		SU2(15)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	Known Cases	Rate	Known Cases	Rate	Known Cases	Rate
Hollow Water IR	1	427	260	0.96	0.12	23.2	5.6	0.70	0.35	0.27	0.33	0	6	0.00	3	0.00	2	0.00
Berens River IR	1	700	420	0.97	0.68	25.4	5.9	0.55	0.36	0.52	0.07	1	3	0.33	1	0.00	2	0.50
Bloodvein IR	1	432	255	0.95	0.50	18.6	4.5	0.46	0.20	0.61	0.00	1	1	0.00	1	0.00	0	-
Camperville	0	579	375	1.00	0.08	10.5	4.8	0.58	0.20	0.44	0.11	0	4	0.50	4	0.50	0	-
Chemawawin IR	1	551	330	0.98	0.72	23.6	6.1	0.65	0.33	0.56	0.16	0	3	0.67	3	0.67	0	-
Churchill	0	1143	845	0.41	0.03	37.4	15.2	0.90	0.66	0.20	0.38	1	2	0.50	2	0.50	0	-
Cross Lake	0	401	235	0.86	0.22	22.2	7.6	0.77	0.38	0.26	0.17	0	2	0.00	1	0.00	0	-
Cross Lake IR	1	2605	1520	0.99	0.78	22.7	5.0	0.59	0.29	0.47	0.21	0	2	2.00	1	0.00	1	1.00
Duck Bay	0	427	280	1.00	0.11	13.7	5.5	0.59	0.20	0.46	0.13	0	3	0.33	3	0.33	0	-
Fisher River IR	1	850	580	0.97	0.04	18.3	6.9	0.66	0.47	0.27	0.38	0	7	0.14	4	0.00	3	0.33
Garden Hill IR	1	1711	985	0.99	0.94	18.2	4.6	0.46	0.24	0.50	0.22	1	4	0.00	2	0.00	2	0.00
St Theresa Pt & Wasagamack IR	1	2116	1135	0.80	0.98	22.0	4.8	0.54	0.26	0.38	0.21	1	6	0.00	3	0.00	3	0.00
God's Lake IR	1	809	450	0.97	0.94	19.0	4.2	0.51	0.31	0.51	0.09	1	4	0.00	2	0.00	1	0.00
God's River IR	1	299	160	0.98	0.97	16.2	3.3	0.66	0.44	0.34	0.13	1	0	-	-	-	-	-
Grand Rapids, LGD	0	506	345	0.86	0.07	34.8	12.9	0.85	0.57	0.20	0.49	0	5	0.20	5	0.20	0	-
Grand Rapids IR	1	374	220	0.97	0.96	19.5	5.7	0.61	0.45	0.32	0.30	0	2	0.00	1	0.00	1	0.00
Lac Brochet IR	1	489	270	0.99	0.00	18.2	3.6	0.40	0.15	0.69	0.04	1	4	0.25	4	0.25	0	-
Little Grand Rapids IR	1	461	285	0.99	0.80	9.5	2.4	0.32	0.12	0.77	0.04	1	0	-	-	-	-	-
Paungassi IR	1	280	160	0.99	0.91	9.8	2.9	0.57	0.19	0.75	0.06	1	0	-	-	-	-	-
Moose Lake IR	1	420	250	0.97	1.00	16.7	4.0	0.55	0.18	0.52	0.16	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
Nelson House IR	1	1409	860	0.99	0.53	25.5	5.6	0.61	0.33	0.40	0.25	0	5	0.20	4	0.25	1	0.00
Norway House	0	507	325	0.71	0.08	35.0	10.5	0.85	0.60	0.18	0.34	0	7	0.57	7	0.57	0	-
Norway House IR	1	2818	1745	0.98	0.65	26.1	6.0	0.62	0.33	0.34	0.37	0	18	0.11	16	0.00	1	1.00
Oxford House IR	1	1351	805	0.98	0.94	25.0	5.3	0.54	0.30	0.55	0.09	1	8	0.00	7	0.00	1	0.00
Shoal River(Dawson Bay) IR	1	427	230	0.98	0.75	13.3	4.1	0.49	0.20	0.48	0.11	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
Poplar River IR	1	441	255	0.97	0.32	15.6	4.2	0.56	0.31	0.51	0.16	1	1	0.00	1	0.00	0	-
Pukatawagan IR	1	676	355	0.98	0.38	21.5	4.6	0.59	0.28	0.48	0.14	1	2	0.00	0	-	2	0.00
Red Sucker Lake IR	1	358	225	1.00	0.96	17.9	5.0	0.58	0.27	0.60	0.09	1	1	0.00	1	0.00	0	-
Shamattawa IR	1	486	270	0.99	0.86	27.1	5.2	0.58	0.31	0.54	0.11	1	3	0.00	2	0.00	0	0.00
South Indian Lake	0	732	420	0.98	0.50	19.6	4.7	0.51	0.29	0.46	0.12	0	4	0.50	4	0.50	1	1.00
Split Lake IR	1	1090	690	0.99	0.35	27.8	6.2	0.55	0.23	0.40	0.15	0	3	0.00	2	0.00	1	0.00
The Pas, Town	0	6166	4585	0.19	0.02	39.0	14.9	0.89	0.65	0.13	0.50	0	15	0.20	15	0.20	0	-
The Pas, LGD	0	1892	1335	0.36	0.02	41.0	13.7	0.89	0.68	0.18	0.46	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
The Pas IR	1	1632	1060	0.90	0.16	20.9	6.5	0.69	0.40	0.27	0.42	0	17	0.12	10	0.00	7	0.29
Wabowden	0	546	350	0.84	0.02	35.6	10.4	0.83	0.46	0.30	0.07	0	9	0.22	9	0.22	0	-

APPENDIX, TABLE 8-2 (Cont.)
1991 COMMUNITY SOCIOECONOMIC DATA AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE DATA FOR REGRESSING 1984-88 PROJECT DATA*
PROJECT SURVIVAL RATES

* The reserve communities of Brochet and Little Black River had to be dropped because of insufficient data for 1991.
The unorganized communities of Camperville, Duck Bay, Cross Lake, Norway House and Wabowden have been added.

1. CTR = 1-Indian reserve community, 0-not an Indian reserve.
2. TOP = Total population of community.
3. ADP = Adult population (15 yrs. or more) of community.
4. PAB = Proportion of community population that is Aboriginal.
5. PAL = Proportion of community population that speaks an Aboriginal language at home.
6. MHY = Median household income of community.
7. PCY = Per capital income of community.
8. PEY = Proportion of community income that is earned income.
9. PEM = Proportion of adult population (15 yrs. or more) of community that is employed.
10. PG9 = Proportion of the community population with less than grade 9 education.
11. PTP = Proportion of the community population with some post secondary, trade, or university education.
12. ACC = Road accessibility of community. 1-road, 2- no road.
13. SU1 = Known cases and survival rate for all types of entrepreneurs.
14. SU2 = Known cases and survival rate for non-government, non-collectively owned entrepreneurs.
15. SU3 = Known cases and survival rate for government and collectively owned entrepreneurs.

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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