Immigrant Arabs and Immigrant Jews in Montreal: Their Social Interaction and Attitudes Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict

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Α

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Abstract

Immigrant Arabs and Immigrant Jews in Montreal:
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Hadeel Abdo

This study is an attempt to explore the social interaction of immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews in Montreal and their attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. It examines the relationship between religiosity, friendship, and attitudes toward the conflict. As well, the thesis studies whether there is a change in immigrant Arabs' and immigrant Jews' attitudes toward the conflict and level of social interaction after immigrating to Canada. I have conducted face-to-face interviews with immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews to obtain my data. The findings reveal that the influence of religiosity on the attitudes toward the conflict is stronger than its influence on friendship. The results also show that friendship influences on immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews' attitudes toward the conflict. The findings indicate that the tendency for immigrant to keep the same attitudes toward the conflict is higher than the tendency to change the attitudes toward the conflict after immigration. The results vary depending on ethnicity.

ToOW

Jerusalem

Acknowledgment

This work was inspired by the Gesher/Jisr radio show, which was devoted to bringing Arabs and Jews together through cultural understanding. I would like to thank those people who worked to make Gesher/Jisr a success, especially Jose Hamra and Joelle Zahar.

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Association, Arwa from Concordia's Muslim Student Association, and Mayada Al-Sabagh.

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Introduction

When I first came to Montreal, the first person who helped me at McGill University was my Teaching Assistance (TA), Randy, who is a Jew. I asked myself: "Is it possible that he, my enemy, would help me even if he knew that I am an Arab and a Palestinian? How can I interact with one who is supposed to be my enemy!?" I needed his help and he did help me in my studies. We discussed many issues related to the course and my research interests. At that time, I was interested in researching interfaith relationships. We talked a lot about that issue.

One day, Randy told me about a group of Arabs and Jews who were organizing a program for CKUT- Radio McGill. He handed to a draft of the radio show's objectives. The main objective of the show was to try to build a bridge between Arabs and Jews through cultural knowledge: exploring each other's culture, our similarities, differences and so forth. The radio show was not political though the context was political. We rarely talked about politics, however, bringing Arabs and Jews together made it political. I was interested to know more about this group, so I attended a meeting before the first episode of the show. I talked to the people involved and I liked what they were doing. At that stage, I wanted to know who these Jews were who want peace. From this

¹ In the Middle East the main way Arabs and Jews interact with each other is through borders. There, Arabs mainly consider Jews the enemy, the bad people, and Israelis are mostly portrayed Arabs as terrorists.

radio show, I learned about Jews. I learned to differentiate between Jews, Israelis, and Zionists, and not put all Jews in the same group. I was able to trust them to a certain extent, which was a very difficult thing for me to do. I was able to look to the human being, not to his/her ethnicity or religion. I learned to look at the beliefs, opinions and the ideas that a person is fighting for and then decide if I want to interact with them or not. And I learned to choose Jewish friends in the same way I choose other friends, and to not exclude them simply because they are Jews.

Getting involved in such a challenge was a factor in making me choose to study Arabs' and Jews' attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as their social interaction in Montreal. I wanted to know if the social interaction between Arabs and Jews in Montreal was higher than in the Middle East, taking into consideration the increased opportunities of contact.

Consequently, the aim of this research is to determine the level of social interaction in Montreal between Muslim Arabs and Jews, the changes in attitudes, if any, and the degree of change in attitudes toward the conflict. My research questions are: What are the attitudes of Arabs and Jews in Montreal toward the Arab-Israeli conflict? Do they interact with each other socially? What kind of social interaction do they have? Are Arab's and Jews' attitudes and social interaction in Montreal different than those of Arabs and Jews in the Middle East? What are the factors that influence Arabs' and Jews' attitudes toward the conflict, and influence their social interaction in Montreal?

My study examines the relationships among three variables: religiosity, friendship, and attitudes toward the conflict. From these relations, the following three hypotheses emerge:

- ♦ The first hypothesis (H1) states that religious Arabs and Jews are more likely to oppose the peace process than secular Arabs and Jews.
- The second hypothesis (H2) says that secular Arabs and Jews are more likely to have friendships with "the other" than are religious ones, and
- The third and last hypothesis (H3) has two parts. The first is: Arabs and Jews who have friendships with "the other" are more likely to seek peaceful resolutions than those Arabs and Jews who have formal relationships or no relationships with "the other". The second part states that Arabs and Jews who support peace are more likely to have friendships with "the other".

My findings reveal that religiosity's influence on the attitudes toward the conflict is stronger than religiosity's influence on the level of social interaction. The results support, to a large extent, the first and second parts of my third hypothesis. Besides, the findings indicate the influence of ethnicity on the data: regarding the hypotheses, the results change depending on the ethnicity of the respondents (Arab Sample or Jewish Sample).

This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter deals with literature regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Then, it followed by a review about the different peace agreements signed between Israelis and Arabs and the criticisms of these agreements with a focus on the Palestinian-Israeli agreements. This section is followed by a review of different studies examining

Arabs' and Jews' relations and their attitudes toward the conflict. I end the chapter with the section that shows statistics about Arabs and Jews in Montreal.

Chapter two deals with methodology. The chapter covers the research problem, the research questions, the definitions of the main concepts in the study, the proposition, the hypotheses, the operationalization of the concepts, the sample, the interview guide, and data collection.

The final chapter analyzes the data. In this chapter different quotes from the interviews are included to explain the findings. I end the thesis with a conclusion.

Chapter One

Literature Review

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Brief Review

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict started mainly with the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, in which the British Government promised to establish "a national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine.

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the cabinet.

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other countries.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

(Tessler, 1994: 148; Gilbert, 1993: 8; and Godfrey and Rushbrooke, 1943: 122)

The letter from Lord Balfour, the British foreign secretary, to Lord Rothschild, head of the Jewish community in Britain.

With this declaration, Britain gave the basis for Zionists to build a state for the Jewish people in the land of Palestine, which was occupied by Palestinian Arabs who shared equal rights in all aspects with other Arabs in the Arabic countries.

After World War I, Arabs became more suspicious and annoyed by the Jewish immigration to Palestine (Godfrey and Rushbrooke, 1943: 124-125); and

by the Jewish purchases of land (Tessler, 1994: 177), which had started decades earlier. These circumstances led to several confrontations and clashes between these two groups. For example, in August 1929 there were outbreaks of violence in Hebron, Safad, Jaffa and elsewhere, in the course of which 133 Jews were killed and 339 wounded; whereas on the Arabic side 116 were killed and 232 wounded, mainly by the British police or military forces (Tessler, 1994: 235-236, Godfrey and Rushbrooke, 1943: 126 and Gilbert, 1993: 13).

From 1933 to 1936, Palestinian attacks were intensified toward the British Mandatory (Tessler, 1994: 238-239). With the increase in Jews' immigration to Palestine/Israel, the confrontations between the Arab Palestinians and Jews increased again after three years of calmness. The outbreak started in April 1936, and died down with the declaration of World War II. This outbreak took the shape of violent attacks by each group against the other, general strikes (one of these strikes lasted for six months) (Tessler, 1994: 239-240, and Godfrey and Rushbrooke, 1943: 127-128), plantation of bombs in the Arab market-places of Jerusalem and Haifa (Tessler, 1994: 240), and other violent activities.

In 1939 Britain issued the White Paper², which restricted Jewish immigration and purchase of land in Palestine/Israel. This paper satisfied neither Arabs nor Jews; and, from that day on, Zionists started to put pressure on Britain to change the regulations that were outlined in that paper. At the same time,

² For more information about the White Paper refer to Tessler book A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (1994), Pp 245-246.

Arabs wanted Britain and France to be defeated in the war because these powers had ignored the Arabic countries' desire for independence after World War I (Tessler, 1994: 253).


This suggests that Britain did not get the support of Arabs and especially the Palestinians in the war; rather, they got trouble from both parties at the time they most needed support. Taking these circumstances into consideration,

Britain "decided to turn over the whole Palestine question to the United Nation" (Safran, 1969: 27).

The United Nation established a commission of eleven states who had no interest in Palestine. These states were Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Holland, Iran, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. "The majority of the commission recommended partition while the minority advocated a federal state with autonomous Arab and Jewish provinces" (Safran, 1969: 27) (See Map 1.1). Arabs refused to accept these two proposals, considering Palestine an integral part of the Arab world, while Zionists accepted the majority proposal.

With the majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations accepting the partition proposal, and with the Zionists' establishment of Israel in May 14, 1948, the violent confrontations between the Palestinians along with some of the Arabic countries and Israel had started.


On May 15, 1948, a day after Israel announced its independence, the



MAP 1.1 Proposals of United Nations Special Committee on Palestinian, 1974 Source: A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994, 260.

military forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq attacked Israel. The Israelis call this war the war of independence, while Arabs call it al-naqba " the disaster" or "the catastrophe". This war ended with an armistice treaty between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries. Moreover, the war of 1948 resulted in Israel expanding its territory as agreed upon with the UN (Compare Map 1.1 "the majority Map "and Map 1.2), and in the Palestinian refugees problem.

The Palestinian refugee problem started with a "deliberate Zionist campaign of intimidation and terror" (Tessler, 1994: 291) such as the massacres of Deir Yassin, Khirbet Nasr ad Din near Tiberias and Ein az Zeitun near Safad.



MAP 1.2 Israeli Borders and Armistice Lines, 1949
Source: A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994, 265.

The aim of such terrorist acts was to coerce Palestinians into leaving their homeland so Jews could take possession. In order to get rid of the Palestinian population, Zionists used psychological warfare and terror tactics. In Deir Yassin, for example, forces of Irgun and Stern groups entered the village and massacred 254 defenceless civilians, mutilated many of the bodies and threw them into a well (Tessler, 1994: 291). Such massacres were used to frighten the Palestinians and, in most of the cases, provoke them into leaving their lands when they heard that the Israeli forces were moving toward their villages. For

example, to encourage the exodus of Palestinians from Arab villages in Huleh Valley, the Israeli forces gathered those Jews who had contact with Arabs in these villages and asked them to spread the word that a great Jewish reinforcement had arrived in Galilee and that it was going to burn all the villages of the Huleh (Tessler, 1994: 296).

Each year Israel celebrates its independence, whereas Palestinians remember these violent acts. Such incidents have influenced the image that Palestinians have of the Israelis. Palestinians, especially after such acts, distrust Israelis. Palestinians consider these acts of violence to be no better than the violent acts of the Nazis toward the Jews. For many Palestinians, cooperation with Jews means betraying those people who were murdered in these incidents.


The Zionists succeeded in expelling more than 800,000 Palestinians to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt (Tessler, 1994: 280 and Herzog, 1985: 105). Those Palestinian refugees who left their homes and properties assumed that the situation was temporary and that soon they would be able to return to their homes. However, the Palestinian refugees were not allowed to return to their homeland and they are still waiting for a solution. This is another cause of the hatred that Palestinians have for Jews, and explains why the conflict has continued for years without either side accepting any kind of compromise. Keep in mind that poverty and social ills are widespread in these Palestinian refugee camps, with most residents being heavily dependent on support from the United Nation and various international and local charitable

societies (Tessler, 1994: 401). In addition, there are more than a hundred thousand Palestinians who, until now, have been without nationality. Palestinian refugees blame Israelis for the miserable situations in which they are living.

In 1956 Israel, France, and Britain attacked Egypt in response to Egyptian president Jamal Abd-Al-Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. This war resulted in the allied forces' occupation of the Canal Zone, which lay between the Sinai Peninsula and the rest of Egypt, and also the Gaza strip. However, through the United Nations and Russia exerting pressure on these forces, Israel, France and Britain withdrew from these territories. In the 6 Days War (1967), Israel was able to expand its territories to take the Canal Zone and the Gaza Strip from which they withdrew in 1956, and also to occupy the West Bank and the Golan Height of Syria. (See Map 1.3) This war caused about 225,000 West Bank Palestinians to flee across the Jordan River and become refugees for the second time (Tessler,1994: 403).

Also in the Golan Heights about 16,000 Palestinian refugees from the war of 1948 fled to unoccupied Syria. In Gaza "a population of about 360,000 or even more according to some estimates, was crowded into the narrow coastal strip running north from the Israeli-Egyptian border" (Tessler, 1994: 401).

The series of wars between Israel and Arab countries continued with Syria's and Egypt's attacks on Israel in 1973. The war resulted in "Israel [recapturing] most of the territory in Sinai from which it had been forced to retreat. It also crossed the Suez canal and established positions to the west of



MAP 1.3 Israel and Occupied Territories, 1964
Source: A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994, 400.

Sinai, in the process encircling the Egyptian Third Army, which remained on the eastern side of the canal. Similarly, in the north, the IDF [Israel Defence Force] retook the territory on the Golan Heights from which it had been expelled and then drove deeper into Syria, moving eastward along the road to Damascus" (Tessler, 1994: 477). This war was the last war between Arab countries and

Israel.

The Israeli-Palestinian confrontations continued with Palestinians attacking the Israeli territories that have borders with Jordan until the PLO (the Palestinian Liberation Organization) moved to Lebanon. At that time, the PLO continued its attacks on Israel from South Lebanon- which borders the northern parts of Israel (North of Galilee)- besides its activities against Israel inside and outside Israel.

In June 6, 1982 "...a large Israeli armoured force crossed the Lebanese border in Operation 'Peace for Galilee'" (Herzog, 1985: 342). During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the massacre of Sabra and Shatilla took place on September 18, 1982. Sabra and Shatilla are two large Palestinian refugee camps in West Beirut. The Israeli General in Beirut coordinated the entry of Lebanese Phalangist forces³, which are known for their hatred toward the Palestinians, to enter these Palestinian refugee camps. In these massacres between 700-2000 defenceless men, women, and children were killed. Although the Israeli defence forces did not participate in these massacres, they coordinated them, allowed them to happen and did not stop them once they started (Tessler, 1994: 559-560). Occurrences such as these contributed to the Palestinians distrust of the Israelis.

³ "The Phalange party is a militant political movement lead by the Gemayel Family and dedicated to the principle of Maronite primacy in Lebanon" (Tessler, 1994: 591).

Peace in the Middle East: An Overview

Introduction

With this history of wars and confrontations, reaching a peace agreement between Arabs and Israelis was a difficult goal to achieve. The first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel was Egypt. On September 17, 1979 President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minster Begin of Israel signed a peace treaty "...calling for the return of Sinai to Egypt and, in exchange, the normalization of relations between Jerusalem and Cairo" (Tessler, 1994: 512).

Although there were many offers to implement peace between Arabs, especially between Palestinians and Israelis, Arabs and Israelis both kept turning down many peace offers. In the 90's, there were key factors that helped in putting together a peace treaty between the PLO and Israel. The factors are the Intifada (The Uprising) and the Gulf War.

After years of waiting for Arabs and the national community to solve the Palestinian problem, Palestinians in the occupied territories decided to depend on themselves to fight for their right to self-determination. The resistance took the shape of youths throwing stones at Israeli soldiers. This movement of 1987 was called the Intifada.

Since the PLO was too fragmented and distant, "[I]ocal committees established themselves in neighborhoods and villages throughout the West Bank and Gaza, their purpose was not only to carry forward the Intifada but also to assume responsibility for a wide range of social services" (Tessler: 687).

Hamas (The Islamic Resistance Movement) is one of the movements that became stronger during the Intifada. Hamas rose as an "alternative" to the PLO after the PLO accepted the existence of Israel and declared its willingness to negotiate with Israel in 1988. "The rise in popularity and power of Hamas further caused Arafat and Rabin to look upon each other through new eyes. Both men feared that Hamas might soon overtake the PLO as the object of the people's loyalty and standard-bearer of their cause" (Eisenberg & Caplan, 1998: 10).

Moreover, after three years of Israel's attempt to contain the Intifada, Israel seemed to observe the Intifada's message. "...[T]he Intifada was designed to send the message that there could be no peace so long as Israel continued to occupy the West Bank and Gaza and refused to come to terms with Palestinian nationalism; Palestinians also sought to send a second, more positive message. They sought to tell Israelis and others that there was an alternative to continued conflict, that they did not seek destruction of the Jewish state but merely to realize their own national aspirations within the framework of a "two state" solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute" (Tessler, 1994: 717-718).

Consequently, the Intifada impacted the decisions of Israel and the PLO to accomplish peace. Besides, the Gulf War also played a role in pushing forward the peace talks between Israel and the PLO.

The PLO's support of Iraq during the Gulf War weakened its position in the area. The Gulf states, which were supporting the PLO financially, reduced their aid for the organization. "With the Palestinian condition deteriorating and the PLO estranged from many of its natural Arab supporters, Arafat knew that a growing number of Palestinians were finding the PLO increasingly bankrupt, politically as well as financially" (Eisenberg & Caplan, 1998: 10). Losing its popularity inside and outside the occupied territories, the PLO leadership decided to intensify the peace talks with Israelis to regain its power within the Palestinian community.

The Gulf War also affected Israel. During the Gulf War Iraq fired 39 missiles on Israel, which caused property damage, injuries, and loss of life. Beyond these fears that the attacks caused in the Israeli community, it proved "...the assertion that Israel's vulnerability to missile attacks from Iraq showed the defense of the Jewish state to reside primarily in technology, and only secondarily in territory" (Tessler, 1994: 742).

We can conclude that "...the Gulf War created an opening for a renewed diplomatic push for Arab-Israeli peace...The war changed the climate of opinion among many political leaders in the Arab world. Policies rejecting Israel's right to exist were far less attractive. Militant Arab regimes could place little faith in a military solution to the Arab Israeli conflict" (Kemp & Pressman, 1997: 11). On the Israeli side, the Gulf War made Israel realize that "[s]ecure borders with neighboring Arab countries are best guaranteed by peace treaties and arms control agreements. For the most ominous threat of weapons of mass destruction from countries like Iran and Iraq, Israel needs the support and cooperation of Arab countries..." (Kemp & Pressman, 1997: 22)

Peace Agreements⁴

These circumstances set the road to negotiations between Israel and the PLO, which led to the 1993 Oslo agreement, also called the Declaration of Principles (DOP). The DOP gave the general guidelines for the negotiations to come, and laid the foundations for a regime of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a transitional period of five years. The five-year transitional period planned to begin with Israeli troop withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho and culminate in the transfer of authority in most of the rest of the West Bank "in all matters except for foreign relations, defense and other mutually agreed matters". After this period, a permanent settlement, which dealt not only with the permanent juridical form of the Palestinians entity but also with Jerusalem, Israeli settlement, global security arrangements, borders and other matters of common interests, would take place.


The Gaza-Jericho autonomy Agreement followed the Oslo Agreement.

This agreement is called also the Cairo Agreement or the Oslo I Agreement. The Oslo I was signed on May 4, 1994. The agreement emphasized Israel military redeployment from Gaza and Jericho, with Israel staying in control of the settlement and military locations. This interim period was supposed to last until May 1999.

On September 28, 1995 the Taba Agreement or Oslo II was signed. Oslo

⁴ Refer to <u>www.stimson.org/cbm/me/docs.htm.</u> for the full texts of the different agreements between Arabs and Israelis.

Il focuses on the geographical form of the Palestinian autonomy. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are divided into three zones: (See Map 1.4)



Map 1.4 The West Bank, After the Oslo II Accords

Source: Palestine and the Palestinians. Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, 269.

Area A comprises 3 percent of the total area. It includes Gaza, Jericho (already taken over in May 1994), Jenin, Qalqilya, Tulkaram, Nablus, Ramallah, and Bethlehem. "Israeli troops there are to be redeployed over a period of no longer than six months to just beyond the near suburbs, or in a ring round the cities roughly 1 to 2 kilometres out, in stages from those in the north to the others in the south (except in the cities of Hebron, where the Israeli military will continue to be deployed over 25 percent of the heart of the city to 'protect' the 400-500 Israeli settlers in the midst of about 150,000 Palestinians, and East Jerusalem)" (Farsoun & Zacharia, 1997: 266).

- Area B covers 27 percent of the West Bank where two-third of the West Bank Palestinians live. "There the Israeli military and Palestinians police will 'share' authority in joint patrols, the Palestinians overseeing civil affairs and maintaining public order inside the villages and the Israeli military having 'overall security authority,' including the right to intervene in those villages" (Farsoun & Zacharia, 1997: 266).
- ◆ Area C is made up of Israeli settlements, military locations, state lands, and roads. It remains under Israeli civil and over all security control. However, there is partial Palestinian civil jurisdiction (on Palestinian civil matters not related to territory).

Under the Netanyahu government a new agreement covering the issue of Hebron was signed. Under the terms of this agreement Israel agreed to withdraw from approximately 80% of Hebron; however, Israel would retain control over an area where 400 settlers and 20,000 Palestinians lived.

The peace process was jeopardized during Netanyahu's period of rule.

Consequently, the Wye River Memorandum was concluded on 23 October 1998.

The aim of this agreement was to implement that which was agreed upon in Oslo II. The Wye Memorandum covered the issues of Israel's withdrawal from 13% of the West Bank if the PLO revised its Charter, the opening of an airport in Gaza, a safe passage between the areas under Palestinian Authority (PA) control, fighting "terrorism", and releasing Palestinian prisoners.

The above were agreements signed between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel has signed also an agreement with Jordan. On October 26, 1994 King Hussain of Jordan and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel signed a peace treaty that stopped the state of war between the two countries. "The provisions of the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian treaty put to rest many security concerns and laid the groundwork for future cooperation. In Article 4, the parties agreed on refrain from the threat or use of any kind of force against each other, including subversion; to ensure that 'violence against the other Party do not originate from, and are not committed within, through or over their territory' (a response to historical Israeli fears of an Arab coalition attacking from the east); to cooperation on combating terrorism; and to work toward a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction. In Article 11, they went so far as to agree 'to abstain from hostile or discriminatory propaganda against each other.'

On the subject of cooperative ties, the treaty is full of calls for economic development, cultural exchanges, increased transport links, tourism promotion, and other aspects of warm relations. In addition, Jordan secured recognition of its border with Israel, a major boost to overall Jordanian legitimacy, and its

'special role' in the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. The treaty also contained novel land-leasing arrangements that allowed Israel to concede Jordanian sovereignty over several areas of farmland along the border without uprooting Israeli farmers" (Kemp & Pressman, 1997: 98).

The road to peace in the Middle East is continuing. Negotiations between Israel and both Syria and Lebanon are still ongoing. Syria is asking for full withdrawal from the Golan Heights to accomplish peace with Israel. Lebanon wants peace with no conditions: it wants Israel to get out of South Lebanon. Israel is concerned about security because giving back these "security zones" would put Israel's security in more danger than if the areas were kept occupied by Israel.

Criticism of the Palestinian-Israeli Agreements

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza supported Israel partial withdrawal from some parts of the occupied territories and Palestinian Authority taking control over these areas. The Israeli-Palestinian accords were considered the only available solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinian supporters of these agreements argued that "these 'bad' Oslo Accords nevertheless will allow the Palestinians a toehold in their own homeland from which to carry on the struggle for self-determination, that it will put the Palestinians in a much better position to achieve statehood" (Farsoun & Zacharia, 1997: 256). Left wing and pro-peace Jews tolerated Rabin's agreements with Arabs. Being fed up with war, pro-peace Jews agreed on "sacrificing" parts of the "Israeli land" for peace.

There was a wave of skepticism and criticisms about the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements. On one hand, the Oslo agreement resulted in mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. The PLO changed its National Covenant that calls for the destruction of Israel and declared the establishment of Israel "null and void". This indicates that the PLO recognized Israel as a state. Israel's agreement to negotiate with the PLO meant that Israel acknowledged the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. On the other hand, the agreements failed to "...extract Israel's recognition that it is an occupying power in the occupied Palestinian territories-including East Jerusalem-these agreements put in jeopardy any sovereign prerogatives to which the Palestinian people are entitled" (Maksoud, 1995: 119).

The attitudes toward the occupied territories of the West Bank influenced the amount of land given back to the Palestinians. Although neither the Likud nor the Labour governments admitted Israel's occupation to pre-1967 area, the Labour government appeared to be more willing to give back land. "Before Netanyahu, full withdrawal in exchange for full peace was the legitimate compromise, Labour's partial withdrawal the illegitimate one; after Netanyahu, partial withdrawal in exchange for full peace became the legitimate compromise, zero withdrawal the illegitimate one" (Finkelstein, 1999: 3).

Moreover, the division of the West Bank into three areas in the Wye

Memorandum opened another door for criticism. The PA has total control over

3% of the West Bank. The other areas of the West Bank are either shared with

or totally controlled by Israel.

Looking back to Map 1.4, page 20, we notice that there is "no territorial continuity between the Palestinian areas in the West Bank, which are cut off from each other, from Gaza and from Jerusalem" (Karmi, 1997: 200).

Consequently, Palestinians will have trouble moving between these areas of the PA or areas in their future Palestinian State. Besides, this also shows that Palestinians, in order to move between these areas, have to cross Israeli land. This situation made the PA economically dependent on Israel.

Palestinian economic dependence on Israel is another point of criticism.

Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip contributed widely to Palestinian economic dependency on Israel. The Palestinian agricultural trade was largely affected by Israel's closure of these areas. "Between 1993 and 1997, the West Bank's share of Gaza's total sales fell by half, from 96.4 percent to 48.2 percent" (Roy, 1999: 75). In sum, "given the extreme dependency of the Palestinian economy on Israel, the impact of closure-restricting the jobs and income of Palestinians working in Israel, reducing Palestinian trade levels, lowering production levels, and so on-has been to heighten poverty. In 1996, closure resulted in losses that amounted to 39.6 percent of Gaza's GNP and 18.2 percent of the West Bank's" (Roy, 1999: 69).

The issue of closure is related to the issue of security. The closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was a result of Israeli security concerns. There was a great emphasis on Israel's security in every agreement between Palestinians

and Israelis. Israel's security brought a great deal of criticism from both Israelis and Palestinians.

On one hand, some Israelis, such as those who belong to the Likud party, find the "land for peace" solution unacceptable for security reasons. For Jews who oppose peace, giving back land to Arabs jeopardize Israel's existence in a number of ways. Israel uses the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and Southern Lebanon to protect its land from Arab countries. In other words, "[t]he significance of the Golan, of Judea and Samaria [The West Bank] is not derived from the 20 miles (Golan) or 30 miles (Judea and Samaria) that they add to Israel, but rather comes from their rugged topography. Israel will always need reasonably defensive positions there to hold back a massive ground attack with a small standing army, while the Israeli reserve call-up is underway" (Begin, 1991: 29).

Moreover, the Jewish parties that oppose peace consider Israel's agreement with the PLO a risky act, in the sense that the PLO is a "terrorist" movement which is devoted to destroy Israel. They are sceptical about the PLO's intention of signing a peace treaty with Israel; for them, the PLO's aim of such a move is to get back land to build a Palestinian State which will then become the base from which to fight Israel. Besides, the PLO will promote and support Hamas attacks against Israel. (Leiter, 1993: 3-19).

The emphasis on Israel's security brought a lot of criticism especially after the 1994 Hebron Massacre. After a year of signing the DOP Baruch Goldstein,

an Israeli settler, opened fire on Muslims praying in the Ibrahimi Mosque. 29 Palestinians were killed and many others were injured. This incident brought up the question of Palestinian security. The DOP was criticized in the sense that "the primary consideration in the document is Israel's security, with none for the Palestinians from Israel's incursions...There is nothing in the document to suggest that Israel will give up *its* violence against Palestinians or compensate the victims of its policies for forty-five years, as Iraq was required to do after it withdrawal from Kuwait after an eight-month occupation" (Said, 1994: 9).

The Ibrahimi Massacre was followed by a series of suicidal attacks carried out by Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements as a revenge for the martyrs of the Hebron Massacre. Besides, these attacks tend to express Hamas's opposition to peace.

It is interesting to see how peace is differently defined according to different groups. To some, peace is what is included in the Oslo Accord, while for others this Accord is inadequate. The peace that they are seeking will happen when Israel withdraws from more land, stops violating human rights, and stops the settlements especially in the PA areas. On the other hand, there are other people who want peace but peace for them will only happen if they exclude "the other" entity. In sum, peace can mean different things to different people. The question is What is the peace that Palestinians, Arabs, Jews and Israelis are looking for?

The Attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the Middle East

Arian. Asher (1992) studied the security and political attitudes of Israelis toward the occupied territories in Israel. The surveys of Arian were conducted in five different years: 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991. Samples sizes were 1,172 in 1986; 1,116 in 1987; 873 in 1988. 1,251 in 1990; and 1,131 in 1991. The study explored the influence of the Gulf War and party affiliation on the attitudes of Israelis toward the conflict. Israelis' support for returning the territories fell from 57% before Irag's invasion to Kuwait to 50% after the invasion. "In the 1990 sample, which extended between March and October, support for the proposition of establishing a Palestinian state was slightly higher before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2 than after the invasion. The overwhelming majority of the settlers (83 percent) rejected the idea of creation such a state" (Arian. 1992:118). Arian found that the war influenced the attitudes of Israelis toward giving back territories to Palestinians. 29% said that they were more ready to compromise regarding the territories before the war than after the war. Left-wing Israelis were more likely to change their attitudes toward the conflict to more "conciliating direction" than right-wing Israelis. Right-wing Israelis tended to change their attitudes toward the conflict after the Gulf War to more "militant" position.

Based on a sample of 270 students in Birzeit University (West Bank) in 1994, Mi'ari, Mohamed (1999) explored the attitudes of Palestinians toward cultural normalization with Israel. He focused on four variables: dependency

(father's occupation), religiosity, political party and support of the Palestinian-Israeli agreement. He found that "[t]he greater dependence of Palestinian workers on the Israeli economy...increase their support for building normal relations with Israel in all fields, since they have more to gain from normalization" (Mi'ari, 1999: 340). 49% of the respondents supported the Palestinian-Israeli agreement and 51% opposed it. The agreement was supported primarily by Fatah supporters (Arafat's political party which supports peace), and opposed by most Islamic organizations. Using multiple regression coefficients, estimating the effects of several independent variables in support of normalization, he found that "four variables are significantly correlated with support of normalization: father's occupation (workers are more supportive of normalization), party support (Fatah supporters are more supportive), religiosity (negatively correlated), and support of the Palestinian-Israeli agreement (positively correlated)" (Mi'ari, 1999: 346).

The study of Al-Haj, Katz, and Shye (1993) focused on Arab and Jewish attitudes toward a Palestinian state. They tried to analyze the "extent to which the establishment of a Palestinian state and its likely character derive from a rational calculus of expected costs and benefits to one's own group" (Al-Haj, Katz and Shye, 1993: 619). The study depended on four surveys conducted in May 1989, July 1990, November 1990, and May 1991 by the Guttman Institute. Each survey was based on a sample of 1,200 Jewish and 250 Arab respondents. They explained the drop of support for a Palestinian state among Jews as being

a result of the Gulf crisis, which supports the findings of Arian's study about security and political attitudes in Israel. They also found that 69% of Israeli Jews felt that the personal safety and economic situation of Jews in Israel would be worsened by the formation of a Palestinian state. Unlike the Jews, Israeli Arabs thought consistently that Israeli Jews would benefit from a Palestinian state as far as personal safety (56%), economic situation (62%), and social situation (59%) are concerned. In addition, Israeli Arabs believe Arabs in the occupied territories would benefit from Palestinian state in terms of personal safety (95%), economical situation (90%), and social situation (91%). Israeli Jews expect that Arabs in the territory would benefit the most in terms of personal safety (55%) and social situation (47%).

Abu Sada, Mkhaimar (1998) focused on "the influences of party affiliation in determining Palestinian political attitudes toward the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations and the use of armed attacks against Israel" (Abu Sada, 1998: 712). He found that the opposition political parties such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad approved the use of armed attacks, and they rejected the peace negotiations with Israelis. He also found that there is a strong and positive relationship between age and peace negotiations. Older respondents were more likely to support peace negotiations than younger respondents. He added that "better educated" respondents were more likely to criticize the peace negotiations than "less educated" respondents. One of the interesting findings of this study was that "Palestinians show their support when the peace process moves and entails

positive results. More than 60% of the Palestinians supported the Oslo Agreement when it was signed...However, Palestinians support for the peace process declined sharply after Israel started the construction of a new settlement at Har Homa in East Jerusalem" (Abu Sada, 1998: 715).

From a survey conducted on 1,221 Jewish and 483 Arab respondents, Herman, Tamar and Yuchtman-Yaar, Ephraim (1998) found that Arabs were more likely to support the Declaration of Principles (67.6%) than Israeli Jews (33.1%). Similar to the findings of Al-Haj, Katz, and Shyel, Herman and Yuchtman-Yaar discovered that Arabs believed that Israelis' personal security would improve after the Oslo Agreement more than Israeli Jews did. 56.1% of Arabs appeared to agree that the personal security of Israelis would improve after the Oslo Declaration; whereas only 8.9% of Israeli Jews believed their personal security would improve after Oslo. They also explored the attitudes of Arabs and Jews toward territorial withdrawal, as Arian did. They found that 85.5% of Arabs supported full or almost full withdrawal from the territories compared to 26% of Jews who supported full or almost full withdrawal from the territories. "Another prominent Jewish-Arab clash of opinion...concern[ed] the future of Jerusalem: 70.1% of the Jewish respondents [said] that Jerusalem should remain united and the Capital of Israel, while only 2.1% of the Arabs favoured] this option" (Herman and Yuchtman-Yaar, 1998: 71-72).

Arabs and Jews in Montreal

Arabs in Montreal

"The formative period for the Arab-Canadian community [in Montreal] was between 1891 and 1901, during which time increasing numbers of Syrian immigrants were joining their kindred in Montreal and elsewhere in Canada" (Abu-Laban, 1980: 54). Before 1961, 4,975 people immigrated from West-central Asia and the Middle East. Between 1961 and 1970 15,165 Arabs immigrated to Canada. The number of Arab immigrants doubled between 1971 and 1980 (30,980). Arab immigration reached 77,685 people between 1981-1990. Between 1991-1996 there was a slight increase in Arab immigration to Canada (82,050).

The total population of the Arab/West Asian community in Canada, according to 1996 statistics, is 244,665. 60,850 of Arabs are between the ages of 0-14. There are 37,040 between the ages of 15-24. The largest age group of Arabs is that between 25-44 years old (95,005). Between the ages of 45-64 there are 39,955 Arabs living in Canada. The lowest number of Arabs is that between the ages of 65-74, and the ages of 75 and over (8,185 and 3,630).

Abu-Laban's survey, carried out in the spring and summer of 1974 on a sample of 175 Arabs from Toronto and vicinity, and 174 from metropolitan Montreal, reveals that the factors in Arab Immigration to Canada (1980: 77) are:

1. Social and Career Advancement	45%
a. job and economic opportunities	23%
b. educational opportunities	12
c. better future	6
d. better standard	4
2. Kin and Friends	21
a. to join family and relatives	13
b. for the sake of children	4
c. accompanied my family	3
d. to join friends	1
3. Political Considerations	12
a. political alienation	9
b. to be free-democracy	2
c. lost my country- cannot go home	1
4. Spirit of adventure	9
a. wish for adventure and change	5
b. came to visit & travel and then stayed	4
5. Miscellaneous Reasons	13

"Historically, the Arab immigrants' first major destination in Canada was Montreal" (Abu-Laban, 1980: 60). In 1996, there was an average of 72,505 Arabs living in Montreal⁵. 57,510 Montrealers identified their place of birth to be West central Asia and the Middle East. 53,715 of Montreal's population speak Arabic, whereas 33,300 speak Arabic at home.

Jews in Montreal

"In 1752, the first group of Jews from Europe settled in Halifax" (Smith, 1997: 16). In 1931, the Canadian's Jewish population was 144,791. There were

⁵ I estimated the 72,505 Arabs by adding the number of people from Arab origins (71,060) to the number of Arab/West Asian as a visible minority (73,950) in Montreal, and dividing the sum by 2. The numbers were taken from Statistic Canada's tables of 1996 of population by ethnic origin, and of visible minority population.

188,196 Jews living in Canada in 1951. The Jewish population increased to 266,547 people in 1971. After 20 years, the Jewish population reached 309.030⁶.

In 1991, Statistic Canada's results show that there are 96,710 Jews living in Montreal. The Jewish age groups in Montreal in 1991 are (Smith, 1997: 111): (under 15) 17,950, (15-24) 11,705, (25-44) 24,775, (45-64) 20,130, (Over 65) 22,150.

In 1986, there was 17,360 Jews in the Montreal's Sephardic Community.

In the same year, the Ashkenazi population in Montreal was 77,060.

The statistic of 1991 shows that there are 97,700 people in Quebec who consider their religion to be Judaism. In Montreal, the 1991 statistic reveals that 76,780 people say that their ethnicity is Jewish.

In Montreal, there are 11,255 Jews who speak Yiddish, compared to only 3,515 who speak Hebrew.

⁶ The number of the Jewish population in Canada is calculated from a table representing Canada's Jewish population in cities used by Smith (1997: 18) taken from Statistic Canada.

Chapter Two

Theoretical and Methodological Framework

The Research Problem

For more than fifty years, Arabs and Jews in the Middle East have had tense relations. As a result certain attitudes have emerged such as distrust and hatred. However, during these years many groups, especially in Israel, have been working toward developing better relationships between Arabs and Jews.

In 1993, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and the Israeli Prime Minister Issac Rabin signed the Declaration of Principles (DOP), the first peace treaty between the two peoples. This agreement was followed by other agreements between Israel and some Arab countries⁷. The attitudes toward these peace agreements vary in the Middle East. Some people in the Middle East support the current peace process. Others criticize it, though they offer other peaceful resolutions, while others refused to accept any kind of peaceful resolution⁸.

Canada is a country that attracts immigrants from all over the world,
Arabs and Jews being no exception. In Canada there are approximately
244,665,000 Arabs and 318,100,000 Jews. After Ontario, Quebec has the
highest number of Arabs and Jews, with 79,750,000 Arabs and 97,700,00 Jews

⁷ For more information about the peace agreements between Israelis and Arabs, refer back to pages 16-19.

⁸ For more information refer to pages 27-30

living in the province⁹.

This research focuses on immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews in Montreal. It explores the degree of social interaction these two groups have in Montreal and examines the different attitudes they have toward the conflict in the Middle East.

The Research Questions

In studying this issue the following questions emerge:

- ♦ What are the attitudes of Arabs and Jews in Montreal toward the conflict?
- ◆ Do they socially interact with each other? What kind of social interaction do they have?
- Are Arabs' and Jews' attitudes and social interaction in Montreal different than the attitudes and social interaction between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East?
- ♦ What are the factors that influence Arabs' and Jews' attitudes and the social interaction in Montreal?

This issue is important to explore for many reasons. First, this study is the first to examine the attitudes and social interaction between immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews in Montreal. Second, Canada is a host country to immigrants and refugees from various warring nations. It is interesting to explore whether immigrants preserve their negative attitudes toward "the other" group when they come to Canada. In this research I will study whether immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews bring with them the same attitudes toward the conflict and

⁹ These numbers are taken from Statistic Canada population report of 1996. For more statistics go to the section of Arabs and Jews in Montreal pages 30-33

toward socially interacting with each other. In this sense, the study will determine whether the host community, Montreal in this case, is another battlefield for these groups or whether it becomes a place where these groups can seek peaceful resolutions. In addition, determining the factors that have influenced immigrant Arabs' and immigrant Jews' attitudes and social interaction in Montreal will help us recommend different ways to improve Arab-Israeli relationships.

This study is based on the interview responses of Arab and Jewish immigrants who are students at McGill and Concordia Universities. Since the public information that identifies the students' ethnicities and religions are limited, I use a snowball sample technique to select my interviewees. My sample includes subjects of different characteristic in terms of ethnicity, religion, religiosity, gender, and so forth. My purpose for conducting face-to-face interviews is to gather information about Arabs' and Jews' attitudes and social interaction before and after immigrating to Canada.

Definitions of Concepts

In this section I will define the main concepts of importance in this study. The concepts are immigrant Arabs, immigrant Jews, social interaction and attitudes toward the conflict.

1) Immigrant Arabs

Abu-laban (1980: 23), in his book *An Olive Branch On The Family Tree*, defines Arab Canadians as "...first generation Christian or Muslim immigrants and their

offspring who originated, directly or indirectly, from any of the Arab states and whose roots are in the Arabic language and culture". He adds that "[the] term also appl[ies] to second and succeeding generation persons of Arab or mixed Arab and Canadian parentage, again regardless of religious affiliation or ancestral country of origin" (Abu-Laban, 1980: 23).

Jews used to live in different Arabic countries like Egypt and some of them are still living in these countries like Morocco. In this sense, the above definition of Arab Canadians ignores the fact that there are Arab Jews. For the purpose of my study, I will not classify Arab Jews to be Arabs, but as Jews. I will talk about this group when I define my sample.

My research focuses on immigrant Arab students who either have the status of landed immigrant or have Canadian citizenship at the time of the interviews. I will focus in my study on immigrant Arabs now living in Montreal but who previously had lived in an Arabic country for at least five years. I made this decision in order to make sure that they were attached to and involved in what is happening in the area, especially with relation to the conflict.

This excludes those Arabs who were born in Canada, as well as those who stayed in an Arabic country for less than 5 years. I eliminated those Arabs born in Canada because I wanted to examine the influence of the environment on changing the attitudes toward the conflict and on the social interaction between Arabs and Jews. In this sense, it would be of no use if I interviewed Arabs born in Canada and asked them about the change in their attitudes and

social interaction since their move to Canada.

There are 21 members in the league of Arab states: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab of Emirates, and Yemen. Although different Arab countries are involved in the Israel-Arab conflict, I am only focussing on those countries that have had direct confrontation with Israel. In this sense, whenever I mention Arab countries, I am talking about Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. In sum, I interviewed only immigrant Arabs now living in Montreal who consider themselves Palestinians, Lebanese, Egyptians, Jordanians, or Syrians and were originally from these countries. Since in Arab countries the father determines a child's nationality, I asked the respondent about his or her father's place of birth.

2) Immigrant Jews

Canadian Jews are divided into two groups: "Ethnic Jews" and "Assimilated Jews". The "Ethnic Jews" group consists of three groups: the "high identifiers," who indicate that both their religion and their ethnic origin is Jewish; the "apostates," who consider themselves Jews but have converted to a non-Jewish religion; and "secularists," who consider themselves Jews but have no religion (Brym, 1993: 23). The "assimilated Jews" are those who specify multiple ethnic origins (Brym, 1993: 23).

In studying immigrant Jews in Montreal, I am concerned with those Jews

who are "high identifiers". For the purpose of this study, I define an immigrant Jew as any person whose mother was a Jew or any person who has gone through the formal process of conversion to Judaism and fit one of the following criteria¹⁰:

- 1) is an immigrant or former immigrant in Canada who has visited Israel once
- 2) is an Israeli citizen
- 3) was born in Canada and has stayed in Israel for a year at least.

I have chosen these limitations to my sample of Jews because, first, I wanted to see how much the respondents are attached to Israel. I made that choice also because it will help me determine if the respondent is attached to Israel, in the sense that a Jew would not visit Israel without having feelings toward it and without being concerned about what is happening there. Second, I wanted to examine the changes in attitudes toward the conflict and the changes in their social interaction with "the other" after coming to Canada or after staying in Israel. Besides, "about two-thirds of Canadian Jewish adults (66 per cent), have been to Israel and, of those who have visited Israel, most (39 per cent of the total) have been to Israel more than once" (Brodbar-Nemzer, Cohen & others, 1993: 47); which is an important thing to consider when choosing my Jewish candidates.

¹⁰ Since I was using criteria similar to the criteria of the Arab respondents to choose the Jewish respondents, I found that I was not getting enough interviews. Consequently, I made the criteria more flexible in a way that was consistent with my study and at the same time helped me find more Jewish respondents to interview.

To summarize, whenever I am referring to immigrant Jews in Montreal, I mean Jews who have either a Jewish mother or who have converted to the Jewish faith, consider their religion and ethnicity to be Jewish, and fit one of the following criteria:1) is an immigrant or former immigrant in Canada who has visited Israel once, 2) is an Israeli citizen, or 3) was born in Canada and has stayed in Israel for a year at least.

3) Religiosity

Religiosity measures the expression of beliefs in the religious practices or rituals. It is a concept that varies from one religion to another. Since my study is limited to Muslim Arabs and Jews, I will only define religiosity according to Islam and Judaism.

Islam has five pillars: "1) The Shahadah (testominy):...(None has the right to be worshipped but Allah, and Muhammed is the Messenger of Allah). 2) Iqâmat-as-Salât (to offer the compulsory congregational prayers dutifully and perfectly). 3) To pay Zakât (Zakât is mandatory charity...4) Hajj (the greater pilgrimage to the House of Allah in Makkah) for whoever is able to do so. 5) To observe Saum (fasting during the month of Ramadan)..." (Zeno, 1996 : 16). These pillars combine both the primary beliefs and the practices of Islam. There are other important beliefs and practices of the Muslim religion as well, such as being strictly forbidden to drink alcohol and eat pork. At the same time, Islam has recommended for Muslims to read Qur'an regularly.

I have selected five practices to classify the Muslim respondents. The

practices are praying, fasting, reading Qur'an, attending Friday prayer, and eating Halal. Muslims call prayer *Salat* which is considered "...the basis of religion, without which there is no religion....Obligatory prayers are performed five times a day and are a direct link between the worshiper and God....These prayers, whether performed in congregation or individually, contain verses from the Qur'an and are said in Arabic, the language of the revelation itself."

(http://salam.muslimsonline.com/~azahoor/islamintro.htm) Prayers are performed five times a day at dawn, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset, and nightfall.

Fasting (Saum) is the abstaining from eating and drinking from sunrise to sunset throughout the whole month of Ramadan; a very Holy month in the Muslim calendar. Fasting "...teaches the believers patience and self-control, as well as reminding them of their responsibility for the millions of human beings in the world who lack provisions or are victims of their unjust distribution."

(http://salam.muslimsonline.com/~azahoor/islamintro.htm)

Qur'an is the Holy book of the Muslims. "Every word of it is the word of Allah. It was revealed over a period of 23 years in the Arabic language. It contains 114 Surahs (chapters) and over 6000 verses. The Qur'an deals with man and his ultimate goal in life. Its teachings cover all areas of this life and the life after death. It contains principles, doctrines and directions for every sphere of human life. The theme of the Qur'an broadly consists of three fundamental ideas: Oneness of Allah, Prophethood and life after death."

(http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/pillars/intropillars.html)

"Halal" is an Arabic word meaning lawful or permitted, for Muslims. The opposite of Halal is Haram, which means prohibited. All foods are considered Halal except the following: Swine/Pork and its by-products, animals improperly slaughtered or dead before slaughtering, animals killed in the name of anyone other than God, alcohol and intoxicants, carnivorous animals, birds of prey and land animals without external ears, blood and blood by-products, and foods contaminated with any of the above products. (http://www.ifanca.org/halal.htm)

In my research, I differentiate between three types of Muslims who represent different levels of religiosity: religious, practising and secular Muslims. A religious Muslim, according to my study, is a person who prays five times a day, always fasts during Ramadan, reads Qur'an (Muslims' Holy Book) regularly, does not eat pork, and does not drink alcohol¹¹.

A practising Muslim is a Muslim who follows all the above religious practices. However, he or she might skip doing some of the religious acts such as reading Qur'an or going to Friday prayers from time to time.

Those Muslims who do not observe the rituals, who for instance do not pray often, who do not fast Ramadan regularly, who drink alcohol, or who eat pork, but still consider themselves Muslims, are considered secular Muslims.

"Secularism" was a term first introduced in the Christian Western Society to refer to the separation of Church and State. "Secularization is defined as the

¹¹ I did not consider Zakât and Hajj because I am conducting interviews with students who have limited financial resources and are not likely to follow such practices.

deliverance of man 'first from religious and then from metaphysical control over his reason and his language' it is 'the loosing of the world from religious and quasi-religious understanding of itself, the dispelling of all closed world views, the breaking of all supernatural myths and sacred symbols..." (Al-Attas, 1998: 15). This indicates that a secular Muslim is a person who tends to believe in God and religion but considers the relationship between God and him/her a private matter. Moreover, the secular person would support the separation of state and religion. In other words, according to this study, a secular respondent is a person who supports the separation of state and religion, believes that the relationship between God and him/her is a private one, and/(or) does not practice religion.

The term secularism is a new term in the Muslim world as "Islam...desacralizes politics.... [F]or Islam [the state] is based in Divine Authority and on the sacred authority of the Holy Prophet..." (Al-Attas, 1985:29). In other words, according to Islam an Islamic state should follow Qur'an, the Muslims Holy book, and Sunna, the practice of Prophet Mohammed.

Judaism is also based on spiritual beliefs and earthly practices. The Torah, for example, is "a combination of the harmonious pulse of all creation and all social action and at the same time a system of religious law, ethics and ritual, functioning independently of religious experience with its own notions and authority" (Unterman, 1996: 25). The main religious belief in Judaism is the belief in one God. This belief is a simple one that many Jewish practices evolve

around. For example, "observant Jews are constantly reminded of G-d'-s presence and of [their] relationship with G-d...[through] continually praying to Him" (www.us-israel.org/jsource/Judaism/prayer.html).

A religious Jew is a person who believes in Judaism and practices

Judaism. In my study, I have chosen seven practices in order to classify who is
a religious Jew and who is a secular Jew. The religious practices are praying,
fasting, observing Sabbath, observing religious holidays, eating kosher, reading

Torah, and going to the Synagogue¹².

Jews call praying *tefilah*. The aim of praying is to be reminded of God's presence and to build a relationship between the observant Jew and God.

Jewish prayers require a minimum concentration level called *kavanah*, which refers to "an awareness that one is speaking to G-d and an intention to fulfill the obligation to pray" (www.us-israel.org/jsource/Judaism/prayer.html#tefilah). The *Tefilah* is preferred to be conducted in Hebrew. "A complete formal prayer service cannot be conducted without a quorum of at least 10 adult Jewish men; that is, at least 10 people who are obligated to fulfill the commandment to recite the prayers" (www.us-israel.org/jsource/Judaism/prayer.html#tefilah).

In Judaism, "the aim of fasting...is to subjugate our evil inclination by restriction of pleasure; to open our hearts and stir us to repentance and good deeds through which the gates of Divine mercy might be opened for us"

¹² For further information about these Jewish practices, refer to Unterman, Alan, <u>The Jews: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices</u>, Oregon: Sussex Academic Press, (1996). Also see (www.us-israel.org).

(http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Judaism/tevet.html). In my research, I am focussing on Jews fasting during two religious holidays; Yom Kippur and Tishab'Av. Yom Kippur is the Day of Atonement, where Jews ask God for forgiveness. It is regarded as "the high point of the Jewish year and ...serves as a basic measure of a Jew's commitment to his traditions" (Unterman, 1996: 165). "The fast [,in Yom Kipper] begins just before sunset, and the last morsels of food have to be consumed with a little time to spare as to add holiness to profane time" (Unterman, 1996: 165). The other special fast is during Tishab'Av, which takes place on the 9th day of the month of Ab (August). In this holiday, Jews mourn the destruction of the first and the second temples of Jerusalem (Smith, 1997: 54). "With the exception of Yom Kippur [,Tishab'Av] is the only fast which begins at sunset and lasts till night fall of the next day" (Unterman, 1996: 182).

Sabbath is another Jewish holiday; beginning on Friday evening before twilight and ending with the appearance of three stars on Saturday night. During this period no profane work may be done (Unterman, 1996: 158-159). "All Jewish holidays with Sabbath-like restrictions require that all normal business, school or secular activities cease about two hours before sundown on the eve of the holiday to allow for adequate preparations"

(http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Judaism/note.html). During the Jewish Holidays, fasting and special prayers are recommended. Besides, an extended Synagogue services are conducted.

"Kosher" refers to dietary laws which determine the foods a Jew can eat.

"Animals which both chew the cud and have a cloven hoof, such as cattle, sheep, goats, and deer are permitted, while those which do not have these characteristics, or only have one [kosher] feature, such as camels (which chew the cud) or pigs (which have a cloven hoof), are forbidden" (Unterman, 1996: 187). Jews are not allowed to mix meat and milk. In addition, the Jewish dietary laws put restrictions on "gentile [non-Jew] wine, and on food, even made out of [kosher] ingredients, cooked by a gentile" (Unterman, 1996: 191).

A religious Jew is a person who prays three times a day, who observes Sabbath all the time, who always observes the Jewish religious holidays, who fasts on Yom Kippur and Tishab'Av, who eats kosher food all the time, who reads Torah, and who goes to the Synagogue regularly. A secular Jew is a Jew who might not follow these seven religious practices regularly, believe in the separation of state and religion and who considers himself/herself a secular Jew.

4) Social Interaction and Friendship

According to Hoult, Ford (1969: 211), in *Dictionary Modern Sociology*, social interaction is "[t]he basic social process represented in communication and a mutual relationship between two or more individuals (or groups)". They add that "[t]hrough language, symbols, and gestures people exchange meanings and have a reciprocal effect upon each other's behaviour, expectation, and thought" (211). This indicates that "...one must focus upon the interaction through which the social environment exerts its influence"

(Lamb, 1979:2).

Robin Williams (1964:161) says "Given the opportunity for intergroup contact, interaction could vary in degree of intimacy-it might remain formal and institutionalized with little personal affect, or it might result in friendships and further interaction". In this matter, we can have three levels of social interaction: friendship, formal relationship, and no relationship.

A friend is defined by the *Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary* as "one who entertains for another such sentiments of esteem, respect, and affection that he seeks his society and welfare." There are different elements of friendship. "The major components of the notion of friendship are trust, communication, help, reliability, likeness, durability, sharing, affection, understanding, enjoyment, sincerity, corporeality, signs, company, conflict, respect, materiality, concern, spirituality, unexplainability, specifics" (Gurdin, 1996: 357). Accordingly, friendship is a bond between two people who have common interests, who spend time with each other, who share secrets and trust each other.

If the ongoing relationship has a superficial quality where there is no intimacy or obligation and people interact with each other because the social situation requires them to (Rawlins, 1992: 166; Duck, 1992: 147), then we consider the relationship a formal one.

When we have neither a friendship nor a formal relationship, then we do not have a relationship. In this case, people are not familiar with each other;

they are strangers.

This study examines the level of social interaction between Arabs and Jews in Montreal. It explores the kind of social interaction Arabs and Jews have in Montreal. Do they develop friendships with each other, interact with each other but keep their distance, or remain strangers?

Friendship between Arabs and Jews means that they trust each other, spend time with each other, share secrets and have common interests. When the social context obliges an Arab and a Jew to interact with each other, then we would consider such a relationship a formal one. For example, if an Arab student does a project or an assignment with a Jewish student, the project or the assignment obliges them to work together; otherwise they would not talk to each other. Those two students are spending time together, however, they are superficially interacting with each other because the course requirement places them together.

When Arabs and Jews do not have contact with each other and have no current relationship with each other, this means that they are strangers who have no relationship with each other. Keep in mind that Arabs and Jews who have not had the opportunity to have contact with "the other", may have the intention to do so in the future; but they are still considered people who have no relationship with "the other" in this study.

In summary, when I am talking about the social interaction between Arabs and Jews in Montreal, I mean the different levels of social relationship between

these two peoples.

5) Attitudes Toward the Conflict

Inbar and Yuchtman-Yaar (1989:42) studied the attitudes of Palestinians,
Arab Israelis, and Israeli Jews toward the following conflict resolutions:

- Palestinian state and expulsion of Jews,
- ♦ Binational state without expulsion of Jews,
- Palestinian state within pre-1967 borders,
- ♦ Jordanian-Palestinian state within pre-1967 borders,
- Palestinian state with border modifications to accommodate Israel's security needs,
- ♦ Jordanian-Palestinian state with border modifications to accommodate Israel's security needs,
- Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories,
- ♦ Continuation of the status quo,
- ♦ Annexation of the occupied territories without expulsion of Palestinians,
- ♦ Annexation of the occupied territories and expulsion of Palestinians.

They found that 82.9% of Israeli Jews agreed on "annexation of the occupied territories and expulsion of Palestinians," while 37.6% of Israeli Jews favoured "Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories". 78.1% of Arab Israelis supported a "Palestinian state within pre-1967 borders. A "Palestinians state with border modifications accommodate Israel's security need" was an acceptable solution to 63% of Arab Israelis. On the other hand, 64.4% of

Palestinians approved a "binational state without the expulsion of Jews" solution, whereas 53.4 % of the Palestinian sample accepted a "Palestinian state and the expulsion of Jews" solution.

In my study, the attitudes toward the conflict that I am concerned with are to support/oppose peace and to support/oppose war resolutions. Attitudes in support of peace refer to the attitudes that favor negotiations between Arabs and Israelis to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, including solutions such as "Land for Peace", two states, binational state, coexistence, and so forth. Such attitudes are synonymous with attitudes in opposition to war. Attitudes in opposition to peace are similar to attitudes in support of war. Such attitudes favor boycotting any relationships with "the other" and ruling over "the other".

Keep in mind that the questions regarding immigrant Arabs' and immigrant Jews' attitudes toward the conflict will concentrate on their attitudes before and after their immigration to Canada.

6) Friendship and the Attitudes toward the Conflict

One of the aims of this study is to explore the relationship between friendship and attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is also one of the interests of this research to examine the changes in attitudes toward the conflict and in the level of social interaction with "the other," and to determine the factors that might lead to such changes.

According to Patchen, Martin (1995), "[c]ontact, under varied conditions, may affect: 1) the categorization of others as outsiders or as part of a larger

group, as well as the content of perceptions; 2) feelings toward those in another group, either through changed perceptions or directly through affected conditioning; 3) expectations about the rewards and costs of alternative types of behavior; 4) behavior directly, which then is subject to instrumental conditioning" (Patchen, 1995: 271).

Interethnic contact is not enough to change the attitudes toward "the other". Arabs and Jews contact each other in Hebron, for instance; however, they still have the same attitudes toward each other and toward the conflict. Contact changes the interethnic attitudes depending on the nature of contact, contact situation and group pressure (Ptachen, 1995: 283).

The nature of contact deals with:

1) The frequency of contact: "If the interaction occurs only rarely and in highly formalized and restricted roles, no important changes are to be expected. If contact is frequent but occurs only in restricted roles that necessarily elicit traits similar to those already incorporated in stereotypes...interaction will reinforce stereotypes and will contribute to simplicity and definiteness of the stereotyped conceptions. If contact is frequent, occurs in widely differing situations, and involves many diverse roles, old stereotypes may tend to be modified in the direction of greater complexity and flexibility" (Williams, 1964: 185), and

The contact situation, on the other hand, deals with whether the contact is volunteer or not (Patchen, 1995: 272).

"...([I]nteraction and social approval) seem to have about equal weight, with the greatest prejudice existing among those majority group members whose friends and family disapprove and who themselves have little interaction, whereas the least prejudice is found among those individuals with both approving friends and family and high personal interaction" (Williams, 1964: 180-181).


In sum, in order for immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews to change their attitudes toward the conflict they must first develop a close relationship, a friendship, where they interact with each other frequently, have an intimate relationship and have group support.

Methodological Approach

Proposition

The research proposition is:

Immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews who socially interact with each other are more likely to accept peaceful resolutions to the conflict than immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews who have limited social interaction with "the other".



Hypothesis Derived from the Proposition

In order to test this proposition, it needs to be measured at a concrete level to determine if it provides a reliable answer to the research questions. Social interaction is measured by the level of social interaction, while conflict resolution

is measured by the attitudes toward the conflict.

Moving from the abstract level to the concrete level, we have the following hypotheses:


H1) Religious Arabs and Jews are more likely to oppose the peace process than secular Arabs and Jews.



H2) Secular Arabs and Jews are more likely to have friendships with "the other" than religious Arabs and Jews.



H3) Arabs and Jews who have friendships with "the other" are more likely to seek peaceful resolutions than those Arabs and Jews who have formal relationships or no relationships with "the other". At the same time, those Arabs and Jews who support peace are more likely to have friendships with "the other".



Operationalization of Concepts in the Proposition

Looking at the above hypotheses we can see that we are dealing with three variables: religiosity, friendship, and attitudes toward the conflict.

Religiosity has three categories: religious, practising, and secular. It is measured by asking different questions about major religious practices.

The Arab interviewees were asked the following questions to measure their religiosity: (See Appendix 1)

- 1) Do you consider yourself a: secular Muslim, practising Muslim or religious Muslim.
- 2) In the last two years, have you ever prayed? Yes (how often) or No
- 3) In the last two years, have you ever gone to Friday prayer? Yes (how often) or No
- 4) In the last two years, have you ever fasted during Ramadan? Yes (how often) or No
- 5) In the last two years, have you ever read Qura'n? Yes (how often) or No
- 6) In the last two years, have you ever drunk alcohol? Yes or No
- 7) In the last two years, have you ever eaten pork? Yes or No

The Arab respondents who said that they are secular, I did not ask them the questions about their religious practices. The other respondents, I asked them all the questions about religiosity. The respondents who answered questions 2-5 (Yes, Always) and questions 6-7 (No), I classified them as religious Muslims. The respondents who answered most of the 2-5 questions (Yes, I skip sometimes, not often, etc.), and questions 6-7 (No), I classified them in the practising Muslim category. Besides, being a Muslim myself and knowing some of the Arab respondents, I was able to use my own observations and knowledge of the respondents to finalize their classifications into one of the three categories of religiosity: secular, practising or religious.

The Jewish respondents were asked the following questions to measure their religiosity: (See Appendix 1)

- 1) Do you consider yourself a: secular Jew, practising Jew or religious Jew.
- 2) In the last two years, have you ever prayed three times a day? Yes (how often) or No
- 3) In the last two years, have you ever observed Sabbaths? Yes (how often) or No
- 4) In the last two years, have you ever observed Jewish holidays like Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur and Passover? Yes (how often) or No
- 5) In the last two years, have you ever fasted in Yom Kippur and Tishab'Av? Yes (how often) or No
- 6) In the last two years, have you ever eaten Kosher? Yes (always) or No
- 7) In the last two years, have you ever read Torah? Yes or No
- 8) In the last two years, have you ever gone to the Synagogue? Yes (how often) or No

Again, the Jewish respondents who said that they are secular, I did not ask them the questions about their religious practices. The other respondents, I asked them all the questions about religiosity. The respondents who answered questions 2-8 (Yes, Always), I classified them as religious Jews. The respondents who answered most of the 2-8 questions (Yes, I skip sometimes, not often, etc.), I classified them in the practising Jews category.

I used the same method to operationalize friendship. I asked the respondents different questions about their friendship with people from their group and people from the other groups (See Appendix 1) such as: "Tell me about your relationships with Arabs, Jews, non-Arabs or Jews. Do you go out with 'them'? And what kind of activities do you have together." The questions about friendship covered their friendships before and after immigrating to

Canada.

From these questions, I was able to classify the respondents' level of social interaction with "the other" in the three categories: friendship, formal relationship, and no relationship. The 'Friendship' category represents the respondents who have friendships with people from "the other" group. Asking the respondents different questions about their friendships with "the other". I was able to differentiate between those who have friendships and those who have formal relationships. For example, some the respondents said they socially interact with "the other" through school work. They spend time and go out with each other to discuss issues related to school. Such respondents ! did not classify in the "Friendship" category even if the respondents said they have a friendship with "the other". I classified them in the "Formal Relationship" category because the circumstances, school work in this case, force them to interact with each other; when the circumstances are not there any more, they stop interacting with each other. In this sense the second category of friendship was developed.

The 'Formal Relationship' category represents the candidates who have contacted with "the other" and/ or have considered them acquaintances but have not developed friendships with them. The respondents who do not have contacted with "the other" are classified under the 'no relationship' category.

Before conducting the interviews I considered two categories

representing the attitudes toward the conflict: whether the respondents support peace or support war. In conducting the interviews I discovered other attitudes existed as well. In response to this, I expanded my categories to fit the additional attitudes. The categories are: War-Islamic State, War-Secular State, Peace, Peace and International Jerusalem, Peace and Division of Jerusalem, and Peace and Jerusalem No. The "War-Islamic State" category includes those respondents who see war as a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and envision an Islamic state developing afterwards. The "War-Secular State" category represents those candidates who favour war as a solution but see a secular state developing afterwards. The "Peace" category includes those respondents who want peace, but do not agree with the current peace process. The candidates' opinions about the solution for the issue of Jerusalem varies. Candidates who expressed their approval of the current peace process by favouring the development of warm relationships between Arabs and Jews were included in one of two categories that deal with peace and the issue of Jerusalem: "Peace and International Jerusalem" and "Peace and Division of Jerusalem". In the "Peace and International Jerusalem" category an international Jerusalem is seen as a solution where the contested-for city becomes international, in the sense that it does not belong to any party. The "Peace and Division of Jerusalem" category expresses the view of dividing the city into East Jerusalem, the capital of the Palestinian State, and West Jerusalem, the capital of the Israeli State. The last category, "Peace and Israeli

United Jerusalem", is a category that includes those respondents who see the united Jerusalem as a Jewish state that cannot be compromised.

The attitudes toward the conflict are diverse, and, as I mentioned before, peace has many meanings to different people. Consequently, in order to measure the attitudes toward the conflict and to examine the respondents' definitions of peace, I asked different questions related to the conflict and peace 13 such as: "What do you think about Arab-Israeli relations? What are the causes of such relations? What do you think about peace between Palestinians and Israelis? What do you think about peace between Egypt and Jordan and Israel? Would you like to see peace develop in the Middle East? What kind of peace? What do you think about the "land for peace" resolution? Do you agree with a two states resolution?"

Those respondents who express their favour of war as a solution to the conflict, I asked them what kind of state they want to be established after winning the war. Besides, I looked at their attitudes toward Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel in order to classify them in one of the war categories. For example, the respondents who criticised Saudi Arabia as a state based on religion, I classified them in the "War-Secular State" category. The respondents who favoured peace, I asked them about their vision for peace, about their opinions about the current peace between Palestinians and Israelis, and about their

¹³ In the cases of Jews, in order to get to know their attitudes toward the conflict, I asked them how they feel about giving up East Jerusalem.

attitudes toward Jerusalem. For example, the respondents who disliked the current peace agreements between Palestinians and Israelis and had a clear vision of the peace that they want to be developed in the area, I classified them in the "Peace" category.

The Sampling

In order to get this information I planned to conducted face-to-face interviews with 24 students from McGill University and 24 students from Concordia University. I attempted to make sure that my sample covered the following groups:

- 1) Sephardim (Se) and Ashkenazim (As) Jews,
- 2) Palestinians (Pa) and other Arabs (O A), and
- 3) Secular (S) and religious (R) students.

The following table shows how many people I intended to interview from each group.

McGill University (24)							Concordia University (24)								
Arabs (12) Jews (12)							Arabs	(12)		Jews (12)					
Pa (6)		OA (6)		As (6)		Se (6)		Pa (6)		OA (6)		As (6)		Se (6)	
R (3)	S (3)	R (3)	S (3)	R (3)	S (3)	R (3)	S (3)	R (3)	S (3)	R (3)	S (3)	R (3)	S (3)	R (3)	S (3)

We have two groups of Jews: the Sephardim and the Ashkenazim. 50% of my immigrant Jewish sample was intended to be from Arab Jews (Sephardim). "Sephardic Jewry today is, in fact, an amalgam of Jews from Spain (the original Sephardim) who dispersed into Southern Europe, Asia Minor, and North Africa,

and what may be called Oriental Jews from communities in North Africa, Yemen, and Iraq which pre-dated the Spanish Expulsion by centuries" (Weinfeld, 1993: 175). Whereas, the other 50% of my immigrant Jewish sample was intended to be from the Ashkenazim group. "Ashkenazim (the word means Jews from Ashkenaz, or ancient Germany) are essentially European Jews and their North American descendants" (Weinfeld, 1993: 175).

I wanted to interview Sephardim Jews because I wanted to see if being a Jew and an Arab at the same time would influence their attitudes and social interaction with Arabs and Palestinians. Another reason that made me consider dividing my sample of Jews into these two groups was because we cannot talk about Jews without taking into consideration the fact that there is a group of Jews who are Arabs. I predicted that Sephardim Jews would be more willing to accept peaceful solutions with Palestinians and Arabs because some of the Sephardim Jews used to live side by side with Arabs in Arab countries. At the same time, I expected that Sephardim Jews, since they have a common history with Arabs would have social interaction with Arabs more than Ashkenazim Jews.

My sample of immigrant Jews was divided into 50% secular immigrant Jews and 50% religious immigrant Jews. Besides, 50% of my immigrant Arabs sample were Palestinians because I predicted they would be more sensitive to and directly involved in the conflict and are the ones suffering from it most immediately. I anticipated that Palestinians would be more willing to have

peaceful resolutions with the Israelis than would other Arabs.

In addition, my sample of immigrant Arabs included 50% secular immigrant Arabs and 50% religious immigrant Arabs in order to examine the influence of religiosity on the attitudes and social interaction of immigrant Arabs with Jews in Montreal. I expected that both religious Arabs and religious Jews would have the same opposing attitudes toward each other and toward the conflict.

After six months of searching for candidates and conducting interviews my sample was distributed as follow:

McGill University (15)								Concordia University (18)								
Arabs (9) Jews (8)							Arabs (14) Jews (4)							.)		
Pa(5)		OA(4)		As(8)		Se(0	Se(0)		Pa(8)		OA(6)		As(4)		Se(0)	
R (2)	S (3)	R (3)	S (1)	R (4)	S (4)	R (0)	S (0)	R (4)	S (4)	R (4)	S (2)	R (1)	S (3)	R (0)	S (0)	

I used a snowball sample technique to select my respondents. I contacted the Jewish and Arab student organizations, the Islamic organizations in both universities, my Arab and Jewish friends, and I asked the interviewees themselves to recommend to me other Arabs and Jews who fit the criteria of my sample that I could interview.

The Interview Guide

I designed two interview guides (see Appendix 1) to collect the information required, one for the Arab respondents and the other for the Jewish respondents. The contents of both guides were very similar. The interview

guides were divided into three main sections: friendship, Arab-Israel relations, and human rights.

As well, the interview guides included questions about the interviewees' backgrounds such as: "What is your father/mother's nationality? What is your nationality? How long have you been in Canada? What is your current status in Canada? Have you ever visited Israel/the West Bank and Gaza Strip?"

Overall, there were 59 questions in the Arab interview guide and 67 questions in the Jewish interview guide. Some of the questions combined other questions to elaborate and obtain the right information from the respondents.

Data Collection

I conducted Face-to-Face interviews with each respondent. I did most of the interviews in coffee shops (As a showing of my appreciation for the time the interviewees put into this research, I offered and frequently paid for the coffee). Each interview took me between one-and-a-half to two hours. I scheduled the interviews ahead of time over the phone.

The interviews started with an introduction concerning the research and the ethics of research. The respondents were asked if it was OK to tape the interviews. Most of the respondents agreed to my taping of the interviews. Some of the interviews were conducted in Arabic. The interviews ended with a thank you and a request that the respondents recommend other people for interviews.

Field Problems

Whereas it normally takes three months to finish doing the field work for a

master thesis, it took me six months to finish conducting my interviews. Two of the factors that tended to slow my interviews were exam periods and the summer holiday. I started conducting my interviews at the end of March, which is an exam period in both Concordia and McGill; it is also the time where many student leave Montreal for the summer holiday.

Being an Arab and a Palestinian in particular made it difficult for me to approach and interview Jewish students, especially religious ones, with such a research project. This fact tended to influence the Jewish respondents' answers to my questions, in the sense that if the interviews were conducted by a Jew (not an Arab, Palestinian or non-Jew), the answers might be different. At the same time, if the Arab respondents were talking to a Jew or non-Arab, their answers might change. We can summarize that the Jewish respondents were less talkative about their real attitudes toward the conflict and their level of interaction with "the other" than the Arab respondents because I was an Arab and a Palestinian.

I contacted several Jewish associations in Montreal, such as Federation CJA, Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, and Hillel Jewish Student Centre, to get help finding people to interview Jews. I also distributed flyers in both McGill's and Concordia's campuses, and posted ads in the Mirror, ici and University newspapers to get more Jewish respondents. Through these latter efforts I was still only able to acquire one new respondent, and he did not even fit my set criteria for the Jewish sample. However, I conducted the interview with him in the

hopes that he might recommend other Jews to me for the study.

The first few Jews that I interviewed were either friends of mine or recommended by my friends. They were all secular except one. Those secular Jews tended to recommend to me other secular Jews, since they tend to find it difficult to interact with religious Jews who would clash in their opinions with them. I found that secular Jews were more willing to speak with me. At one stage I realized that my Jewish interviewees were mainly secular who have similar opinions. At that time Professor Homa Hoodfar recommended that I contact Professor Frederick Krantz, the Head of the Canadian Institute for Jewish Research. Through Professor Krantz I was able to interview religious Jews who allowed me to see a different set of opinions.

In sum, being a Palestinian and having small sample of Jewish respondents impacted, to a certain extent, the data that I got from the Jewish students. As well there were other factors that made my field research and data collection take more than the average time required to finish such research.

Some of the Arabs that I approached were hesitant to talk about the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relationship between Arabs and Jews, in the sense that they were not comfortable talking about politics in general and Middle East politics in particular. This is also applies to the Jewish students who tend to find it difficult to express their true opinions about the issue to an Arab and a Palestinian. On the other hand, the Arab respondents were more comfortable to express freely their opinions about the issue because they considered me "one

of them", whereas the case might be different if a Jewish researcher had done the interviews. I would expect that more Arab respondents would have expressed their support for peaceful resolution to the conflict. This has made a big difference in Arab and Jewish responses.

In addition to these obstacles faced during the interviews period, being a women was a problem to some of the religious male Muslims¹⁴. In the case of the religious Jewish male, I did not have such trouble because I was not lucky enough to find any Ultra Orthodox Jewish student who would talk with me (or even a male researcher) about the topic.

¹⁴ Muslim men are restricted from interacting with women who have no direct relationship with the man (such as his mother, sister, or wife) unless there is another person present.

Chapter Three

Data Analysis

In this chapter I will review the findings for each of my variables, present the findings regarding my hypothesis, and interpret those findings, providing quotations from my interviews to support my interpretation.

Findings

The hypotheses that this study is trying to examine are:

- H1) Religious Arabs and Jews are more likely to oppose the peace process than secular Arabs and Jews.
- H2) Secular Arabs and Jews are more likely to have friendships with "the other" than religious ones.
- H3) Arabs and Jews who have friendships with "the other" are more likely to seek peaceful resolutions than those Arabs and Jews who have formal relationships or no relationships with "the other". At the same time, those Arabs and Jews who support peace are more likely to have friendships with "the other".

Variables

The following three tables are used to show how the respondents are distributed according to the variables of friendships, religiosity, and attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict¹⁵.

¹⁵ Pseudonyms were given for each of the respondents for ethical reasons.

Table 1: Friendship with "the other" by Ethnicity

Ethnicity Friendship	Arabs			Jews		Total
Friendship	Rawan Khalid	Samer Hatem	Fibby Jose		Sam	7
Formal Relationship	Hala Ossama Amin Murad Nadia Adel	Amani Rinad Huda Hind Sahar Amjad	David Avi Lanna Uri Maya	s S	Yaan Sigal Sarah Ranit	21
No Relationship	Maher Salem Dana Nadim	Zahi Hani Ahmed				7
Total	23			12		35

Table one focuses on the first variable: friendship. It shows that 7 of the respondents have friendships with people from "the other" group. Four of the seven are Arabs and the other three are Jews. The respondents are mainly distributed in the "Formal" category of friendship. Twelve of the twenty three Arab respondents have formal relationships with "the other". In the same manner, nine out of the twelve Jewish respondents have formal relationships with "the other". Seven of the Arab respondents explained that they have no Jewish friends, whereas all the Jewish respondents had relationships with Arabs.

Table 2 shows that seven of the Arab respondents are religious, whereas the other sixteen are either practising or religious Muslims. Most of the Jewish respondents are secular (seven out of the twelve). The other five are religious Jews.

Table 2: Religiosity by Ethnicity

Ethnicity Religiosity		Arabs		Jews		Total
Religious	Hala Ossama Maher Ahmed	Salem Hind Saher	David Uri Maya		Avi Ranit	12
Practising	Amin Murad Amani Nadim	Rinad Hani Huda				7
Secular	Rawan Khalid Hatem Samer Amjad	Dana Zahi Nadia Adel	Fibby Sam Jose Sarah		Lanna Yaan Sigal	16
Total		23		12		35

Table 3 illustrates the various attitudes toward the conflict which is the third variable in the study. Fourteen of the Arab respondents favoured the war as a solution. Eleven of them recommended an Islamic state be developed after the war, while the other three recommended a secular state be developed in the area. At the same time, nine of the Arab respondents supported a peaceful resolution.

The Jewish sample, on the other hand, supported peace as a solution to the conflict but was divided on the issue of Jerusalem. Only one Jewish respondent believed in making Jerusalem an international city. Three out of the twelve respondents favoured sharing Jerusalem with the Palestinians by dividing the city into East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem. The other eight found that there should be no compromise on the issue of Jerusalem: it should stay the eternal capital of Israel.

Table 3: Attitudes toward the Conflict by Ethnicity

Ethnicity Attitudes	Arab	os	Je	ews	Total
War-Islamic State	Hala Ossama Maher Ahmed Hind Nadim	Salem Amani Rinad Sahar Hani			11
War-Secular State	Dana Zahi	Adel			3
Peace and Israeli United Jerusalem			David Avi Lanna Ranit	Yaan Sam Uri Maya	8
Peace and division of Jerusalem			Sigal Jose	Fibby	3
Peace and International Jerusalem			Sarah	·	1
Peace	Rawan Khalid Hatem Samer Huda	Amin Murad Amjad Nadia			9
Total	23			12	35

Religiosity and Attitudes

The first hypothesis states that religious Arabs and Jews are more likely to oppose peace than secular Arabs and Jews. We would thus expect to find most cases in the upper left of the first two rows and in the lower right of the last four rows of Table 4. This is reflected largely in the results.

Seven out of the twelve religious respondents oppose the peace process.

The religious respondents who oppose peace and support war, with the

development of an Islamic state as a solution to the conflict are Hala, Ossama, Hind, Sahar, Maher, Salem, and Ahmed. The religious respondents who support peace are *David* (J), *Avi* (J), *Uri* (J), *Ranit* (J), and *Maya* (J). Although they support peace, they do not accept the division of Jerusalem or the internationalization of the city.

Table 4: The Attitudes toward the conflict by Religiosity¹⁶

able 4: The Attitudes toward the conflict by Religiosity					
Religiosity Attitudes	Religious	Practising	Secular	Total	
War-Islamic State	Hala Maher Ossama Salem Hind Ahmed Sahar	Rinad Hani Nadim		10	
War-Secular State		Amani	Dana Adel Zahi	4	
Peace and Israeli United Jerusalem	David (J) Avi (J) Uri (J) Ranit (J) Maya (J)		Lanna (J) Yaan (J) Sam (J)	8	
Peace and division of Jerusalem			Fibby (I) Sigal (I) Jose (I)	3	
Peace and International Jerusalem			Sarah (J)	1	
Peace			Rawan Samer Khalid Nadia Hatem Amjad	9	
Total	12	7	16	35	

Looking to the secular category in Table 4, we find that thirteen out of the sixteen secular respondents support peace. They are distributed among the peace categories as follows:

¹⁶ I use italicized names and (J) to refer to the Jewish respondents so as to make it easier to distinguish between the Arabic and Jewish names.

- ♦ "Peace and Israeli United Jerusalem": Sam (J), Lanna (J), and Yaan (J);
- ◆ "Peace and Division of Jerusalem": Fibby (J), Jose (J), and Sigal (J);
- ◆ "Peace and International Jerusalem": Sarah (J);
- ◆ "Peace": Rawan, Khalid, Hatem, Samer, Nadia, and Amjad.

Three secular respondents oppose peace and support developing a secular state in the area after war. The three secular respondents are: Dana, Zahi, and Adel. On the other hand, the findings show that none of the secular respondents favored war to establish an Islamic state.

Looking to Table 4, we find that none of the religious respondents fit into the last three categories of peaceful resolutions to the conflict. In addition, we find that none of the secular respondents supported "War-Islamic State" solution. Consequently, we can conclude that the findings show some support for H1 that religious Arabs and Jews are more likely to oppose peace than secular ones.

Religiosity and Friendship

H2 examines the relationship between religiosity and friendship. It states that secular Arabs and Jews are more likely to have friendships with "the other" than religious ones. From this, we expect to find most cases would be in the lower left and upper right diagonal of Table 5. However, the results are less clear than those findings that examine the relationship between the religiosity and attitude variables.

Of the religious and practising candidates, none have friendships with

"the other". Nine religious respondents (Hala, Ossama, Hind, Sahar, *David* (J), *Avi* (J), *Uri* (J), *Ranit* (J), and *Maya* (J)) have formal relationships with "the other". Also, five of the practising respondents (Rinad, Amani, Murad, Huda, and Amin) have formal relationships with "the other". Out of the twelve religious respondents, three (Maher, Salem, and Ahmed) have no relationship with "the other", whereas out of the seven practising respondents, two (Hani, and Nadim) have no relationship with "the other".

There are only seven of the sixteen secular respondents who have friendships with "the other": Rawan, Khalid, Hatem Samer, *Fibby* (J), *Sam* (J), and *Jose* (J). The other nine secular respondents either have formal relationships with "the other" or have no relationship at all. Nadia, Amjad, *Lanna* (J), *Yaan* (J), *Sigal* (J), and *Sarah* (J) have formal relationships with "the other". On the other hand, Dana, Zahi, and Adel have no relationship with them.

Table 5: Friendship by Religiosity

Religiosity Friendship	Religious	Practising	Secular	Total
Friendship			Rawan Khalid Hatem Samer Fibby (J) Sam (J) Jose (J)	7
Formal Relationship	Hala Sahar Ossama Hind David (J) Avi (J) Uri (J) Ranit (J) Maya (J)		Nadia Amjad Lanna (J) Sigal (J) Yaan (J) Sarah (J)	20
No Relationship	Maher Salem Ahmed	Hani Nadim	Dana Zahi Adel	8
Total	12	7	16	35

These findings indicate that religiosity has some influence on the friendships with "the other". However, there is some indication that among the secular respondents there is no tendency to favour friendship. Three of the secular ones have no relationship with "the other". A comparison of the data from Table 4 and 5 suggests that religiosity's influence on the attitudes toward the conflict is stronger than religiosity's influence on friendship.

Friendship and Attitudes

The last hypothesis (H3) focuses on the relationship between friendship and the attitudes toward the conflict. It says: first, Arabs and Jews who have friendships with "the other" are more likely to seek a peaceful resolution than those Arabs and Jews who have formal relationships or no relationship with "the other"; second, it states that Arabs and Jews who support peace are more likely to have friendship with "the other". This hypothesis examines whether Arabs and Jews who have friendships with "the other" are more likely to support peaceful resolutions than those who have formal relationships or no relationship with them. In addition, the hypothesis examines whether Arabs and Jews who support peace are more likely to have friendships with "the other" than those who support war. The findings of the first part of this hypothesis will be reviewed first then the findings of the second part of the hypothesis will be stated. In general this hypothesis implies that most cases will be on the lower left to upper left diagonal of Table 6. This is to a large extent supported by the results.

First Part

A comparison of the findings of the three categories: Friendship, Formal Relationship, and No Relationship will be held in order to test the first part of H3.

Table 6: The attitudes toward the Conflict by Friendship

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Friendship Attitudes	Friendship	Formal Relationship	No Relationship	Total
War-Islamic State		Hala Ossama Hind Rinad Sahar	Maher Salem Ahmed Hani Nadim	10
War-Secular State		Amani	Dana Zahi Adel	4
Peace and Israeli United Jerusalem	Sam (J)	David (I) Avi (I) Lanna (I) Yaan (I) Uri (I) Ranit (I) Maya (I)		8
Peace and division of Jerusalem	Fibby (J) Jose (J)	Sigal (J)		3
Peace and International Jerusalem		Sarah (J)		1
Peace	Rawan Samer Khalid Hatem			9
Total	7	20	8	35

In the "Friendship" category we find that the seven respondents support peace. Rawan, Samer, Khalid, and Hatem support peaceful resolution to the conflict; however, they dislike the current peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. *Fibby* (J) and *Jose* (J) support peace and the division of Jerusalem. *Sam* (J) supports peace but disagrees on the division of Jerusalem; he wants Jerusalem to be kept the united capital of Israel. In addition, in the "no

relationship" category, we find that all eight respondents support war as a solution for the Arab-!sraeli conflict. They are: Maher, Salem, Ahmed, Hani, Nadim Dana, Zahi, and Adel. Although they all support solving the conflict through war, they disagree in their views about the type of the state that they envision developing in the area. Maher, Salem, Ahmed, Hani, and Nadim support the development of an Islamic state; whereas Dana, Zahi, and Adel support the development of secular state.

In the Formal relationship category there are various views of the conflict. Five of the respondents in this category support the "War-Islamic State" vision. Only Amani supports the "War-Secular State" vision. Amin, Murad, Huda, Nadia, and Amjad support peace. *David* (J), *Avi* (J), *Lanna* (J), *Yaan* (J), *Ranit* (J), *Uri* (J), and *Maya* (J) support the "Peace and Israeli United Jerusalem" vision. *Sigal* (J) supports the "Peace and Division of Jerusalem" vision; whereas *Sarah* supports the "Peace and International Jerusalem" vision.

We can conclude that Arabs and Jews who have friendships with "the other" are more likely to seek peaceful resolutions than those who have no relationship with "the other". At the same time, the findings show that Arabs and Jews who have formal relationships with "the other" have diverse attitudes toward the conflict. In addition, we find that there is a relationship between friendship and the attitudes toward the conflict if we look at the extreme categories ("No Relationship" and "Peace"). However, if we take into consideration the "formal Relationship" category, then we find that religiosity has

slight influence on the attitudes toward the conflict.

Second Part

In order to test how immigration to Canada influenced the attitudes toward the conflict and, consequently, the relationships with "the other", we will look at the changes in these relationships and in the attitudes toward the conflict after immigrating to Canada. In this matter, we expect to find that there is an increase in the number of relationships with "the other". By looking at table 7, we see that most cases are in the lower right hand diagonal of Table 7. The results support the second part of the third hypothesis.

Table 7: Attitudes' Change toward the Conflict by Relationships' Change

able 7. Autuu	S Change towards	nie Cominc	L by Itelau	Olialliba	Change
Relationship Change Attitudes Change	Relationship Decreased	No Change in Relationship		Relationsh	ip Increased
Attitude Change in favour of War				Ossama (Is	lamic)
No Change in Attitude	Nadim	Maher Salem Ahmed Adel Jose (J) Maya (J)	Hani Dana Zahi Fibby (J) Uri (J)	Hala Hind Sahar Sigal (J)	Rinad Amani Hatem Sarah (J)
Attitude Change in favour of Peace		David (ர)	Ranit (J)	Rawan Khalid Nadia Amjad Sam (J) Yaan (J)	Samer Amin Murad Huda <i>Lanna</i> (J) Avi (J)

Table 7 distributes the respondents according to the changes in the level of relationship with "the other" and according to the changes in attitudes toward

the conflict after coming to Canada. The categories of relationships' change are:

- 1) Relationship Decreased: This category identifies the respondents who had relationships with "the other" in the past, but now tend to have no relationship with "the other";
- 2) No Relationship Change: This category indicates that the respondents did not change their level of relationship with "the other";
- 3) Relationship Increased: This category refers to the respondents who developed relationships with "the other" after coming to Canada.

From Table 7 we learn that there is change in the level of interaction after settling in Canada. 21 respondents have developed either formal relationships or friendships with "the other" after immigrating to Canada. Hala, Hind, Sahar, Rinad, Amani, Sigal (J), Sarah (J), Ossama, Amin, Murad, Huda, Yaan (J), Nadia, Amjad, Lanna (J), and Avi (J) had never contacted people from the other group before coming to Canada. Now, they have formal relationships with people from the other group. Rawan, Samer, and Khalid developed friendships with "the other" in Canada. They did not have contact with people from the other group before. Sam (J) and Hatem used to have formal relationships with "the other". At this time, they have friendships with the other. 13 respondents indicated their level of interaction did not change. Maher, Salem, Ahmed, Adel, Hani, Dana, and Zahi have no relationship with people from the other group, and they did not contact any people from the other group in Canada. Fibby (J) and Jose (J) have always had friendships with "the other".

Nadim's level of relationship with "the other" also has changed: it has decreased. Nadim had formal relationships with Jews when he was living in Israel. After immigrating to Canada he did not want to have contact with any Jew. He is not willing to have contact with Jews in Canada.

The level of relationship did not change in 13 cases. Maher, Hani, Salem, Dana, Ahmed, Zahi, and Adel had never had contacted with Jews in their life.

Fibby (J) and Jose (J) always had friendships with Arabs. David (J), Uri (J), Ranit (J), and Maya's (J) level of relationship stayed the same, a formal relationship with "the other".

To summarize, we have 21 respondents who increased their relationships with "the other". Compared to these 21 candidates, there are 13 candidates who did not change their level of relationship with "the other". This implies that the level of relationship with "the other" changes after immigrating to Canada.

The attitude change categories are:

1) Attitude change in favour of War. This category refers to an attitude change from peace to war. It also identifies an attitude change in the type of the developing state in the area; 2) No Change in Attitude. This category indicates that there is no change in the respondents' attitudes toward the conflict; 3) Attitude change in favour of Peace. This category identifies the respondents

Out of the 35 respondents we have 20 respondents who did not change their attitudes toward the conflict. Maher, Hani, Salem, Dana, Ahmed, Zahi, Adel,

who change their attitudes toward the conflict from war to peace.

Hala, Rinad, Hind, Amani, Sahar and Nadim still believe in war as a solution to the conflict. Fibby (J), Jose (J), Hatem, Sigal (J), Sarah (J), Uri (J), and Maya (J) still believe in peace as the solution to the conflict. The other 15 respondents had changed their attitudes toward the conflict. Ossama has only changed his view about the type of state he wants to develop in the area after war with Israelis. He used to support the idea of developing a secular state in the area after fighting Israelis. After becoming a religious Muslim, he began supporting the idea of having an Islamic state in the area. David (J) learned more about the Arab-Israeli conflict after visiting Israel and after the assassination of Issac Rabin. Ranit (3) used to be more hesitant about giving back land for peace. Now, she is more open to the idea of giving back the minimum for peace. Rawan, Samer, Khalid, Amin, Murad, Huda, Yaan (J), Nadia, Amiad, Lanna (J), and Avi (J) used to support war as the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Now they support peaceful resolutions to the conflict. Sam served in the Israeli Army. Now he supports peace.

The findings indicate that there are changes in the attitudes toward the conflict. However, the tendency of having the same attitudes toward the conflict is higher than the tendency of changing them. We can conclude that the changes in the level of relationships is more likely to be influenced by immigrating to Canada than the changes in attitudes toward the conflict.

Interpretations

Table 8's purpose is to summarize the major findings of the research. The

table combines three variables: friendship, religiosity, and the attitudes toward the conflict. At the top of the table, we have the three categories of friendship: Friendship, Formal Relationship, and No Relationship; whereas on the right side of the table there are three categories of religiosity: religious, practising and secular. The categories of the third variable, attitudes toward the conflict, are integrated in the table where each respondent's view is set beside his/her name.

Looking to the religiosity category we find that seven out of the twelve religious respondents support war as the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the secular category, there are only three out of the thirteen secular respondents who support war as the solution to the conflict. We can conclude that the findings support the hypothesis that religious Arabs and Jews are more likely to oppose peace than secular ones.

If we look at the friendship category in Table 8, we find that religiosity has some relationship to friendship with "the other". We have no religious respondents who have a friendship with "the other", while we have seven secular respondents who have friendships with "the other". However, there is some indication that among the secular respondents there is no tendency to favour friendship. Three of the secular ones have no relationship with "the other".

In addition, if we examine the "Friendship" and "No Relationship" categories, we find that all the respondents that have no relationship with "the other" are for war as the solution to the conflict; whereas all the respondents who have friendships with "the other" are for peaceful resolutions to the conflict. We can conclude that Arabs and Jews who have friendships with "the other" are

more likely to seek peaceful resolutions than those Arabs and Jews who have no relationship with "the other".

Table 8: The Attitudes toward the Conflict by Friendship and Religiosity 17

able 8: The Attitudes toward the Conflict by Friendship and Religiosity'					
Friendship Religiosity	Friendship	Formal Relationship	No Relationship		
Religious		Hala (War-Islamic State) Ossama (War-Islamic State) Hind (War-Islamic State) Sahar (War-Islamic State)	Maher (War-Islamic State) Salem (War-Islamic State) Ahmed (War-Islamic		
	•	David (I)* (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Avi (I) (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Uri (I)* (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Ranit (I)* (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Maya (I)* (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem)	State)		
Practising		Rinad (War-Islamic State) Amani (War-Secular State)	Hani (War-Islamic State) Nadim (War-Islamic		
		Amin (Peace) Murad (Peace) Huda (Peace)	State)		
Secular	Sam (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Rawan (Peace) Khalid (Peace) Hatem (Peace) Samer (Peace) Fibby (J) (Peace, division of Jerusalem) Jose (J) (Peace, division of Jerusalem)	Yaan (J)* (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Lanna (J) (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Nadia (Peace) Amjad (Peace) Sigal (J) (Peace, division of Jerusalem) Sarah (J) (Peace, Jerusalem international)	Dana (War-Secular State) Zahi (War-Secular State) Adel (War-Secular State)		

^{*}Not Israeli

¹⁷ I have highlighted and divided (with a line) the various attitudes between all the respondents to differentiate between the various attitudes.

As we proceeded, we found that a new variable tended to influence the findings. The variable is ethnicity, and the findings tend to differ according to ethnicity. Since Table 8 contains both the Arab and Jewish cases, we developed new tables that test the findings with consideration as to whether they are Arabs or Jews, which I call ethnicity. We will present the interpretations from the Arab sample first, and then we will present the interpretations from the findings for the Jewish respondents.

Arabs

Regarding the hypothesis that religious respondents are more likely to oppose peace with Israel than secular one, we found, from Table 9, that religious Arabs are more likely to oppose peace than secular Arabs. All the seven religious Arab respondents support the "War-Islamic State" view, while six out of the nine secular Arab respondents support the "Peace" view.

Hala, Ossama, Hind, Sahar, Maher, Salem, and Ahmed, who are religious Muslims, oppose any kind of peaceful resolution to the conflict. They see that the Arab-Israel conflict will be solved by Jihad (The Holy War). The religious beliefs of these religious Arabs have influenced their attitudes toward the conflict, in the sense that they believe that the whole land of Palestine/Israel is an Islamic land. As a result, they believe in fighting Israelis in order to return the land that was taken in 1948, and remake an Islamic state. They also have not formed friendships with Jews.

Table 9: The Attitudes toward the Conflict by Friendship and Religiosity,

the Cases of Immigrant Arabs

Friendship Religiosity	Friendship	Formal Relationship	No Relationship
Religious		Hala (War-Islamic State) Ossama (War-Islamic State) Hind (War-Islamic State) Sahar (War-Islamic State)	Maher (War-Islamic State) Salem (War-Islamic State) Ahmed (War-Islamic State)
Practising		Rinad (War-Islamic State) Amani (War-Secular State)	Hani (War-Islamic State) Nadim (War-Islamic State)
Secular	Rawan (Peace) Khalid (Peace) Hatem (Peace) Samer (Peace)	Nadia (Peace) Amjad (Peace)	Dana (War-Secular State) Zahi (War-Secular State) Adel (War-Secular State)

Hind is a religious Muslim. She immigrated to Canada when she was 17 years old. She sees:

[Peace is a] big Joke. Like taking a house from me, giving me back the bathroom and telling me let's make peace. Here take the bathroom and I will take the rest. It's a complete joke. Peace will not come until all of Palestine [is] given back to [Palestinians]. I agree that Jews who lived in Palestine before 1948 have the right to the land as much as the Palestinians who lived there before 1948.... [To each] Polish, American, German Jews [or] Gods knows what who are pouring to Palestine, to each [Jew] who comes there, there is a Palestinian who is thrown out of the of the country [Palestine] or a Palestinian who is out under tent or a Palestinian who is put under prison or whatever.(sic)¹⁸

¹⁸ All the quotations are taken as they were said in the interviews.

Her vision of peace and the resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is influenced by her religious beliefs. This was clear when she described the peace that she is looking for:

If it peace like it's defined now, No. I don't want evil to happen to other Arab countries. If it is peace defined [by Islam where] Israel gives us back our land, the Palestinian go back to their land, why I wouldn't [like to see peace develop in the area]. She adds, Muslims were ruling before the British came and acted as mediators....We get all the land back. Every one who came in leaves. Whoever came after 1948 and 1967, they leave and Muslims rule just like before and whoever was in Palestine before stays in Palestine.

The question of just peace is not only raised by secular Arabs but also by religious ones. Ahmed, the religious Syrian male who came to Canada three and half years ago, says that:

Peace should be combined with justice. Justice is not decided by [Jews]. Justice is decided by everybody, the logic, historical rights, human rights and by Islam.

In addition, our findings indicate that secular Arabs support peaceful resolutions except where there is no relationship with Jews. We have nine secular Arabs: Rawan, Khalid, Hatem, Samer, Nadia, Amjad, Dana, Zahi, and Adel. The last three secular Arabs disagree with the other five secular Arabs in their attitudes toward the conflict. Rawan, Khalid, Hatem, Samer, Nadia, and Amjad do not agree on the current peace process. However, they view that the Arab-Israeli conflict could be solved only through peaceful means.

Amjad is a Palestinian man who moved to Canada 10 years ago. He had contact with some Jews in Montreal though he did not develop friendships with

any of them. He attended some of the meetings held by McGill's dialogue group. He would like to see fair peace develop, however to him Oslo is not a just peace. He explains:

Peace is a general word. There is their peace. There is our peace and there is real peace. Oslo [agreement] is not a real peace...That's not peace...Peace is people respecting each other, people recognizing each other sufferings, people who are willing to live together. [It is] not simply drop orders and say you have to stay and that's peace. [Peace] is to compensate the people who suffer in the same way the Jews have been compensated for the Holocaust....There are hundred thousands of Palestinians living in the refugee camps in the past 50 years, I believe they deserve the right to return and get compensated....We only can have peace when Jews start acknowledging what their government has done in the past and today.

Nadia is also a Palestinian who immigrated to Canada eleven years ago. She met Jews through school. Beside Canada, she lived in Saudi Arabia and Britain. In Britain, she used to have Jewish friends. However, in Canada she did not make any Jewish friends because she is married now and doing her PhD, which gives her little time to spend with friends. She agrees with Amjad that the current peace is not what she is looking for. She sees nothing positive in the current peace. She adds:

I would love the peace process to move on. [I would love] for our people and their people to live normal life....I am for that....Peace is one kind. Peace [is] respecting human beings. That's what I fought for all my life....There should be fairness from both sides....I believe we should make peace together. They have a state and we have a state.

The case of Ossama, a Palestinian man who moved to Canada in 1994

illustrates the difference between how secular Arabs view the Arab-Israeli conflict and how religious Arabs view it. Ossama used to be a secular Muslim. His vision of the conflict was influenced by the Pan-Arab nationalistic approach. He explains that:

The land between the mountain of Toura in the east and the Atlantic Ocean are Arabic and it is not acceptable to give the land [to Jews].

After moving to Canada, he became religious. Becoming religious has influenced his attitude towards the conflict. Now he sees the Arab-Israeli conflict as an Islamic matter. He says:

I don't see [the conflict] as [an] Arab-Israeli conflict. I see it as a conflict between two ideologies: Islam and Zionism. No one can say that Islamic faith accept Israel. That's just a red line with all generations of [Prophet Mohammed] and after that. So any solution, I guess, [is going to] be very hard. To the Muslim side, the only solution is by resolving Israel. This piece of land should be part of greater Muslim country. It's not a small country. It has always been through 1300 years of Islamic Kilafa that all Muslims from all nationalities and all minorities of all nationalities and ethnicities lived in one state ruled by Islam. So for me as a Muslim and for Islam it just has to be a part of greater Muslim Empire...

The cases of Dana, Zahi, and Adel moves us to talk about the relationship between friendship and the attitudes toward the conflict. These three Arabs are secular. As a result, we would expect them to support peace. On the contrary, Dana, Zahi and Adel support war as a solution to the conflict. This could be explained through our finding that Arabs who have close friendships with "the other" are more likely to seek peaceful resolution than those who have no

friendship with "the other". The three respondents have never had contact with Jews.

Both Zahi and Adel do not have Jewish friends and are not willing to have contact with Jews. Zahi is a Syrian who goes back and forth between Canada and both Syria and Saudi Arabia. He has been in Canada for about three years. He explains why he does not have Jewish friends as follows:

You feel you had to leave your country because of [Jews]...You had to stay away from your people, [and] from the people you love...because of them....I [don't] hate them, but I can't interact with them. There is nothing that connect me with them. Why should I chose a Jewish friend? There are one thousand [people that I can be friend with].

Zahi believes in peace. However, peace for him is only a stage for Arab countries to get stronger militarily and economically, which will allow them to fight Israel eventually.

Dana is a Palestinian who immigrated to Canada 2 years ago. She used to live in Jerusalem were she only knew Jews as soldiers. Here, she did not have contact with Jews. She emphasized that she will not have any kind of relationship with them in the future. She considers those who have Jewish friends "traitors", "betrayers." She sees peace for losers. She adds:

The moment I ask for peace I am losing. I am going to lose anyway. So I rather lose fighting better than lose without doing nothing.

When I asked her about what would she consider a solution to the conflict, she said:

[I believe in] Arab unity in all the Arab world. Unite, fight Israel big fight but this is in my infinity dream.

While we are dealing with Dana's case, we should consider two factors to understand her attitude toward the conflict. First, she has never interacted with Jews. Second, she lived under war circumstances and suffered from it. This explains why she has such a view of peace, contacting and interacting with Jews. Having experienced violence and negativeness, she needs more time to heal.

The influence of war circumstances also tended to influence Nadim's relationship with Jews in Montreal. Nadim is an Arab Israeli who lived in Israel for 28 years. He studied and worked with Israelis; however he did not have any Jewish friends. He said:

I worked with few of them. I went to school with few of them. [However], I cannot identify them as genuine friends...you just work with them. You go to school with them. You have to have sort of relationship [with them].

When I asked him about the reason he had a formal relationship with Israelis, he answered:

I cannot call them close [friends]. [There is] lack of trust. Lack of caring. Lack of understanding. [Besides], the situation there does not, from their part [help them] consider me as a close friend or even a friend. So it was formal relationship.

The situation of Arab Israelis in Israel explains why Nadim did not have Jewish friends and did not have any kind of relationship with Jews in Montreal. From his point of view, the situation of Arab Israelis is best described as follow:

We, as Palestinians have no right to build our own houses there. We are not permitted to live in these nice European style buildings....80% of [Arab Israelis] are living under poverty line. We are heavily dependent on the Jewish economy. We don't have independent economy....The government prevent [us] from practicing [our] own traditions.

He adds giving an example from his life there. He said:

...if [I] walk in Haifa, for instance...I [would be] stopped in one block three times just because my features look like Arabs.

From these cases we learn how the lack of friendships with Jews influence the attitudes toward interacting with Jews, the conflict and peace.

Rawan, Khalid, Hatem, and Samer represent those Arabs who have friendship with "the other" and support peace as a solution to the conflict. For example, Rawan, a Palestinian women who immigrated to Canada 6 years ago, did not have Jewish friends in the first few years of coming to Canada. She got involved in a project called "Jerusalem the Musical" where she met Jews. At that point she interacted with Jews and made her first Jewish friend. She said:

...in my participation in the project I was open to the Jewish perspective, of learning about them, of seeing how they view things.

She used to believe that:

Palestine should be liberated from all Jews.

Now she believes that:

Palestine has this unique history. So many nations have been there....So that land has never belonged to anybody.

In sum, we can notice that having friendships with Jews influenced the attitudes of Arabs and Jews in Montreal toward the conflict. All of the Arab respondents who have no relationships with Jews (Maher, Salem, Ahmed, Hani, Nadim, Dana, Zahi and Adel) support war as a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict regardless of their level of religiosity. Moreover, all of the Arab respondents who have friendships with Jews (Rawan, Khalid, Hatem and Samer) support "Peace" vision. Secular Arabs' social interaction with Jews influence their attitudes toward the conflict.

We have talked so far about religiosity and the attitudes toward the conflict, and friendship and the attitudes toward the conflict. Now we will talk about religiosity and friendship. H2 tests the relationship between religiosity and friendship. Out of the nine secular Arabs, only Rawan, Khalid, Hatem, and Samer have friendships with Jews. Nadia and Amjad, who are Secular Arabs, have formal relationships with Jews; whereas Dana, Zahi, and Adel, who are also secular Arabs, have no relationship with Jews. Four of the religious Arabs (Hala, Ossama, Hind, and Sahar) have formal relationships with Jews; while the other three (Maher, Salem, and Ahmed) have no relationship with Jews. This indicates that H2- secular Arabs are more likely to have friendships with "the other" than religious Arabs- was supported by the findings; the findings showed that religious Arabs are less likely to have friendships with Jews than secular Arabs. However, when it comes to friendship, the general personal character of the person is more important than his/her religion.

Hind, the religious Lebanese, explains what a friend means to her:

A friend means someone who you trust. A friend means someone who you enjoy spending time with. Someone who you love for no reason just because they're there. These three things I can't imagine my self doing with a Jewish person (Is that apply to all Jews?) I don't say with any Jew. [Being a friend with] an Israeli it's out of the question...It is not impossible to find but it's so rare to find a Jew who although he's living here, although he's never been to Israel, although he's not practising at all, it's hard to imagine this person without affiliation to the state of Israel...I don't hate him because he's Jewish. I hate the person because of the idea of Israel and what they occupy from our land. This is what I hate. It is difficult to differentiate them in this country. This is why we put them all together.

At the same time, we have Amjad. This secular Palestinian agrees on how to deal friends. It is the Jews' beliefs in the state of Israel that influences Amjad's level of interaction with this person. He says:

I can be a friend with a Jew in the same basketball team without discussing politics. I am not [going to] judge him because he is Jewish. Not every thing that [going to] come up between me and a Jew is political issues....To me any person, a Jew, an Israeli, a Canadian or even a Muslim who support a government like the Israeli government and support their action, which as consequence have Palestinians living in refugee camps, cutting off water, demolishing homes, shooting kids from time to time,...any person who support that I can't be friend with.

In this sense, we can say that religiosity has slight influence on whether you make friends with Jews or not. What matters is whether you have common beliefs, interests, background, etc., with the person or not.

In summary, the findings reveal that religious Arabs are more likely to

oppose peace than secular ones, which supports the findings of Table 4. We also found that religiosity has a slight influence on the level of social interaction with Jews. Finally, in the same way the hypothesis that Arabs and Jews who have friendships with "the other" are more likely to support peaceful resolutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict than those who have no relationship with "the other" was supported, the results of Table 9 show that Arabs who have friendships with Jews are more likely to support peace than Arabs who have a lower level of social interaction with Jews.

Jews

Table 10 shows that all the Jewish respondents support peace. This does not support the assumption that religious Jews are more likely to oppose peaceful resolutions than secular Jews. This finding is not compatible with the findings that religious Arabs and Jews are more likely to oppose peaceful resolutions than secular ones, and that religious Arabs are more likely to oppose peaceful resolutions than secular ones.

Although religiosity does not influence Jews' attitudes toward the conflict, religiosity tends to influence the type of peace for which the Jewish respondents are looking. The secular Jews (Sam, Fibby, Jose, Lanna, Yaan, Sigal, and Sarah) support warmer relations with the Arabs and have a clear vision about what kind of peace they want to see develop in the Middle East, whereas David and Avi are either hesitant about the type of peace they are looking for or they have a different vision of peace than secular Jews.

Table 10:The Attitudes toward the Conflict by Friendship and Religiosity,

the Cases of Immigrants Jews

Priendship Religiosity	Friendship	Formal Relationship	No Relationship
Religious		David* (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Avi (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Uri* (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Ranit* (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Maya* (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem)	
Secular	Sam (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Fibby (Peace, Division of Jerusalem) Jose (Peace, Division of Jerusalem)	Lanna (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Yaan* (Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem) Sigal (Peace, Division of Jerusalem) Sarah (Peace, Jerusalem International)	

^{*}Not Israeli

David is a 23 year old religious Jew. He is a Canadian citizen who went to and stayed in Israel for one and a half years to study Judaism. He sees peace as a necessity, however, he believes that there should be limits on this peace. He said:

I don't believe it's gonna be easy. I don't believe they have to drop every thing....Every thing has to go through steps. Everyone has to feel security. Everyone has to secure themselves first before they look to the other side....Rabin was assassinated because he went too fast or he was doing it one sided. Some people saw he's going too fast. They really put breaks...with Netunyahu and now they are starting again. It has to happen, there has to be an agreement between the two sides. They go with their eyes open instead of going with their eyes closed....I feel it has to be done. A peace agreement that doesn't leave one side completely

empty...,completely with losing face. [They should] have an honour left.... I also believe that Israel has the right to make its line . in terms of how much its gonna give up. It's the one giving up and it's the one to decide what are the barriers. On the other hand, it cannot be too stingy. I read that some Palestinians want to drop every thing. Jerusalem. Tel Aviv. Haifa. There is no way of that or anything close to that. Israel has to be in Rammallah, Jennin, Toulkarem....l don't see why the Israeli Army has to be in any of these places except where there is Jews now: that is settlements. That is a full different subject. As Barak said couple of days ago: for the most part there are things that exist now [settlements], we gonna keep existing. For 18 people in the hill top it's not worth it but if there is 500 families,... I can't see why we have to move them away....if they are not causing direct conflict why they should move away....[I agree on Palestinians state]. in big portion of it. It should be a non-military state...but if it is a Palestinian state where people are saving Israel is our number one enemy all the time, that's not peace. It's not the way in Israel, they don't blame Arabs for everything. They are not our number one enemy.

Jose is a secular Jew. He is a Canadian and Israeli citizen. He went out of Israel because he did not want to serve in the Army. He is affiliated with the left wing movement. He agrees with David that there should be peace between Jews and Arabs, however, he has different vision of peace. He said:

[Peace] could happen....Israel does not know its own strengths. Israel does not comprehend the fact that they are very powerful nation, that could determines its own future without violence. They have the strength because they are strong to compromise without risking their own national security. For them every thing is a national security issue....There is no national security issue if you have nuclear bomb. There is no national security issue if you have strong military. They could actually compromise. They actually can give back; they can give the entire West Bank and Jerusalem....Israel has the strength [and] the capability to say...Palestinians, I don't care if you establish an Islamic state; I don't care if you establish a totalitarian regime, we have the

strength to save our borders. You gonna save your borders, don't worry because in one year we gonna realize that we gonna need each other for economics, we gonna be able to trade on a people basis. You can have your international airport, have your port, we don't care....What the Israelis have to say is take the West Bank and Gaza Strip and have a road connecting them...just secure them....[I don't agree on the current peace process because] if you look at it from practical point of view, the Israelis are smart because they gonna take all the water from Jordan....I don't think it's adequate. If you look at the map, it's nothing. The Palestinians get one third of the West Bank. It's all area A surrounded by Israelis in the Middle Area B, then area C then Gaza¹⁹. Three areas are not connected and Israelis are between them. How you can function as a state?

Besides, religiosity tends to influence the attitudes toward the solution of Jerusalem. Four out of the seven secular Jews agree on compromising on the issue of Jerusalem either in dividing it or in making the city international. Sarah is a secular Jew. She was born in Canada and lived here for 12 years. She moved to Israel and lived there for 10 years. She returned to Canada to continue her education. She is an Israeli citizen, and served in the Israeli Army. She believes:

Jerusalem should be international. It should not belong to Israelis or Palestinians....[It should be] a place where every one has access to. It should be the way it is without the political tension because Jerusalem does not belong to anyone....It's not realistic [for Jerusalem to belong] to Israel. It's not realistic [for Jerusalem] to belong only to Palestinians or anybody else.

Both David and Avi who are religious Jews, support the "Israeli United Jerusalem" solution. Avi is an Israeli who moved to Canada 3 years ago. He

¹⁹ See pages 19-21 for more information on area A, B, and C.

supports peace but not the division of Jerusalem for peace. He said:

Israel is so small....We are bargaining on things that are mini. A lot of people think it's not a big deal but the whole of Israel is a size of a lake; how much we can give? About East Jerusalem, a lot of people died in the 6 days war to get Jerusalem....I think after Israel liberated it, I don't think we're giving it back even for peace. You punch me, I take your pencil. You want your pencil back for peace now. I think I'm willing to do something for peace but [I have] to keep something...

The question of Jerusalem forces us to requestion the real intention of the Jewish respondents for peace. We should keep in mind, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, that the Jewish respondents were interviewed by an Arab, a Palestinian. This factor might have influenced the respondents' answers, in the sense that they would not say that they wanted to go to war with Arabs.

We found that all the Jewish respondents support peace. However, some of them are not willing to offer any kind of compromise on the issue of Jerusalem. Jerusalem is important for Jews, Christians, Muslims, Palestinians and Israelis. In 1976, Israel captured Jerusalem and announced it as the eternal Capital of Israel. According to the UN, East Jerusalem is an occupied territory that should be given back to the Palestinians. The DOP emphasized that the issue of Jerusalem will be left to the final negotiation. This indicates that the issue of Jerusalem is open for compromise in order to reach peace. The Palestinian Authority accept dividing the city into an Arab side (East Jerusalem) and a Jewish side (West Jerusalem). The Israeii position on Jerusalem is not clear, but Israeli leaders claim that they are open to negotiation on that issue. In this sense,

we can come to the conclusion that Jews who disagree on compromise on the issue of Jerusalem are against peace while those who agree on compromise are for peace. This conclusion changes the finding that all Jews support peace.

If we look back to Table 10, we find that eight Jewish respondents support the "Peace, Israeli United Jerusalem" solution which means that they do not support peace, they support a peace with no compromise regarding the unification of Jerusalem. Within the current politics climate this position effectively means the continuation of conflict between Palestinians and Jews. Those respondents are David, Avi, Uri, Ranit, Maya (who are religious), Sam, Lanna, and Yaan (who are secular).

The cases of Lanna and Yaan are good to illustrate the influence of religiosity on the attitudes toward the conflict. Lanna and Yaan were religious Jews. Lanna was born in Canada and moved to Israel when she was 10 months. She was raised in an Ultra Orthodox Jewish family. She became a secular Jew a year before her move to Canada in 1995. When she came here, she did not want to deal with any political matter. Then she got involved in a Radio show called Gesher/Jisr (Bridge) where Arabs and Jews come to know each other by exploring each other's cultures, traditions, similarities and differences, while avoiding talk about politics. Through the radio show, she interacted with Arabs and Palestinians. She said that she considers some of them friends²⁰. After

²⁰ I too was involved in the radio show, and came to know her in that context. In my understanding, however, what she calls friendship is more a formal kind of relationship.

coming here, contacting different people from different cultures and getting involved in the radio show, she saw the conflict differently, and now sees peace as a possibility. She said:

Before, I was probably more close minded. I saw mainly the Jewish point of view that God gave Jews the land and Jews have the right of that part of the land...We are right and [Arabs] are wrong. Then I came here and saw that people are just people and Jews are [not] the only one. I got to know [people from] other nationalities and religions. [I found out] that people are nice even if they're not Jewish. [I saw that] being a good person is more important to me than being a good Jew or observing certain rules....Because I got to know some Arabs, I think [peace] is possible....I am more willing to trust the other.

Sam, Lanna, and Yaan support the "Israeli United Jerusalem" solution although they are secular Jews. What is interesting is that the three of them are not affiliated with either the right wing or the left wing movement. On the other hand, Fibby, Jose, Sigal, and Sarah who consider themselves affiliated with the left wing movement, support compromising on the issue of Jerusalem: either by dividing the city or by creating an international city. This indicates that the affiliation to the left wing movement tends to influence secular Jews attitudes toward Jerusalem.

Only three of the seven secular Jews have friendships with Arabs. They are Fibby, Sam, and Jose. In the study, there are no Jews who do not have a relationship with Arabs. The majority of the Jewish respondents have formal relationships with Arabs. Out of the 9 Jewish respondents, 5 have formal relationships with Arabs: David, Avi, Lanna, Yaan, Sigal, and Sarah. Sigal, like

Sarah, was involved in a left wing youth movement in Israel. However, she never had contact with Arabs there. In Canada, she interacted with Arabs for the first time; she had an Egyptian friend and dated an Egyptian man. She said:

We're so much alike, having good times. [My] boyfriend and roommate [were] from Egypt. From the beginning we were good friends and after awhile [they] went away. I lost contact with them. For a year we were good friends; we felt very much alike...

In the case of Sigal and Sarah, coming to Canada did not change the way they viewed the conflict; it only made their views stronger, made them see peace as a possibility, and gave them the opportunity to contact Arabs. Although they could have interacted with Arabs in Israel, living under war circumstances and its tension, and the social pressures of their group tended to discourage them from such interaction.

These findings indicate that religiosity has a slight influence on friendships with Arabs, which means that the hypothesis that secular Jews are more likely to have friendship with Arabs than religious Jews is not supported.

Regarding the relationship between friendship and the attitudes toward the conflict, the findings did not support the hypothesis that Jews who have friendships with Arabs are more likely to support peaceful resolutions. All the Jewish respondents support peace; however, their attitudes toward Jerusalem varies. From the four respondents who have friendships with Arabs (Sam, Fibby, and Jose) only Sam does not support any kind of compromise on the issue of Jerusalem, either by dividing the city or internationalizing the city. We have no

Jewish respondent who has no relationship with Arabs. Out of the nine Jewish respondents who have formal relationships with Arabs (David, Avi, Uri, Ranit, Maya, Lanna, Yaan, Sigal, and Sarah) only two (Sigal and Sarah) support a kind of compromise on the issue of Jerusalem. Keep in mind that we have small sample of Jewish respondents, which influences the findings.

We can conclude that the findings did not support any of the hypothesis when we take into consideration only the Jewish sample. From Table 10, we learned that religiosity has influenced the attitudes of Jews in Montreal toward Jerusalem, but has not influenced their attitudes toward the conflict. We also learned that religiosity has only a slight influence on friendships. Besides, the findings showed that the hypothesis that Jews who have friendships with Arabs are more likely to support peaceful resolution than those who have no relationships with Arabs was not supported.

Conclusion

This study examines the attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and social interaction between Arabs and Jews in Montreal. It examined the relationships between religiosity, friendship, ethnicity, and attitudes toward the conflict.

The first hypothesis in this study was supported. It stated that religious

Arabs and Jews are more likely to oppose peaceful resolutions than secular

Arabs and Jews. However, religiosity has influence on the attitudes toward the conflict if we eliminate the influence of ethnicity.

The results did change depending on whether we are dealing with the Arab or Jewish samples. The findings showed that religious Arabs are more likely to oppose peace than secular Arabs, which support the findings of the first hypothesis. In other words, religiosity influenced the attitudes of Arabs in Montreal toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, religiosity impacted the respondents who support war in regards to type of state they want to see develop in the area. Religious Arabs supported the idea of an Islamic state to be developed after war, while secular Arabs supported the idea of a secular state to be developed in the area after war.

On the other hand, the findings revealed that religiosity did not impact the attitudes of the Jewish respondents in Montreal toward the conflict. As I mentioned before, being a Palestinian and having a majority of secular Jewish respondents have influenced the data. It is more difficult for a Jew than an Arab

respondent to talk about his/her intention to go with war with Arabs, if this is his/her real view. The attitudes toward the conflict became more clear when the Jewish respondents expressed their feelings about Jerusalem, an issue that I will elaborate on later. The findings showed that religiosity has some influence on the attitudes toward Jerusalem. The majority of the secular Jews of the sample in Montreal support compromising on the issue of Jerusalem, either by dividing the city to East and West Jerusalem or by making the city an international one. The religious Jewish respondents disagreed with any type of compromise on the issue of Jerusalem, believing Jerusalem should stay united, eternal Capital of Israel.

The second hypothesis explores the relationship between religiosity and friendship. It says secular Arabs and Jews are more likely to have friendship with "the other" than religious one. Although the findings show that religiosity has a slight influence on the relationship with "the other," religiosity has an influence on the degree of the relationships. Secular Arabs and Jews are more likely to have friendships with "the other" than religious ones who either have formal relationships or no relationship with "the other". Ethnicity, this time, does not have influence on the relationship between religiosity and friendship. The difference between the Arab respondents and the Jewish respondents is that there are religious Arab respondents who have no relationship with "the other"; however, there are no Jewish religious respondents who have no relationship with "the other". In addition, the findings reveal that the factor influencing

friendship is not religiosity but the character of the person.

The findings support that Arabs and Jews who have close friendships with "the other" are more likely to seek peaceful resolutions than Arabs and Jews who have formal relationships with "the other". Again, ethnicity impacted the results. The results of the Arab respondents supported the general hypothesis. However, the results of the Jewish respondents did not support the same hypothesis; it showed that the Jewish respondents who have friendships with Arabs have the same attitudes toward the conflict as the attitudes of the Jewish respondents who have a formal or no relationship with Arabs.

The results showed that the Jewish respondents were more likely than the Arab respondents to support peace. This finding is explainable by the cost-benefit findings of Al-Haj, Katz, and Shye study (See the results in pages 25-26). Many Arab respondents looked at the current peace process between Palestinians and Israelis and pointed to the issue of who is gaining the most from such agreements. They see Palestinians getting few benefits, while Israelis are controlling the situation to their own best interests. They see that Palestinians are getting back only 13% of the West Bank and is divided by Israeli land; they see settlements growing even in the Palestinian Authority's (PA) areas; they see that not much has changed in terms of Israel's violation of human rights such as land confiscation and house demolishing; they see a Palestinian Authority used as a tool in the hand of Israel. On the other hand, they see Israel giving the least and getting the most out of this peace; Hamas

was suppressed with the cooperation of the PA; the Intifada (the uprising) stopped; the main Israeli settlements in the PA's areas still in existence; Israel still having control over most of the PA's areas. Jews are more supportive to peace because, looking at what they have to gain compared to what they might lose for these peace agreements, they find themselves as winning. The questions that arise at this point are if Israelis were benefitting less, from these agreements than Palestinians, would they still support peace? And if Palestinians were gaining the most from these agreements, would they support peace?

The issue of Jerusalem is a critical one for both sides. Since this is the case, if a real peace is desired, a compromise should take place. This could happen by either dividing the city to an Arab part (East Jerusalem) and a Jewish part (West Jerusalem), or by internationalizing the city to the point where it belongs to no one. Consequently, Jews who see Jerusalem as the united Capital of Israel do not seek peace. If we looked back to Table 10, we find that eight Jewish respondents favor "Peace and Israeli United Jerusalem" solution, which means that they do not actually support peace.

From the above two comments, we should be more sensitive to the word peace and what kind of peace is proposed. Is it a fair peace for both sides? Is it a peace where one side is gaining and the other is losing? And is it a real peace, or is it just agreements signed but not applied?

In addition, being an Arab and a Palestinian tended to influence the

Jewish respondent's answers to my questions, in the sense that if the interviews were conducted by a Jew (Not an Arab, Palestinian or non-Jew), the answers might be different. At the same time, if the Arab respondents were talking to a Jew or non-Arab, their answers might change. We can summarize that the Jewish respondents were less talkative about their real attitudes toward the conflict and their level of interaction with "the other" than the Arab respondents because I was an Arab and a *Palestinian*.

At this point it is important to go back to the research questions to try to provide answers to them. The first question was what are the attitudes of Arabs and Jews in Montreal toward the Arab-Israeli conflict? Fourteen Arab respondents supported war as a solution to the conflict, compared to nine Arab respondents who supported peace. There were eight Jewish respondents who agreed on "Peace and Israeli United Jerusalem" solution; whereas four Jewish respondents agreed on either dividing the city or internationalizing the city. There were fourteen respondents who supported war as a solution to the conflict. Moreover, there were twenty one respondents who supported peace as a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In other words, the attitudes of Arabs and Jews in Montreal is in favor of peace. However, if we divided the attitudes toward the conflict to positive and negative ones, then the results change. If we considered "War-Islamic State", "War-Secular State", and "Peace and Israeli United Jerusalem" negative attitudes, then we have 22 cases that fit into these categories. However, we have only 13 candidates who fit into the positive

attitudes categories ("Peace", "Peace and Division of Jerusalem", and "Peace and International Jerusalem"). This indicates that Arabs and Jews in Montreal have negative attitudes toward the conflict.

The questions Do Arabs and Jews in Montreal interact with each other? and what kind of social interaction do they have? were also asked. The results showed that seven respondents have friendships, twenty one respondents have formal relationships, and seven respondents have no relationship with "the other". This means that Arabs and Jews in Montreal do socially interact with each other in a formal way primarily when the circumstances force them to do so.

The third question that was researched was are Arabs' and Jews' attitudes and social interaction in Montreal different than the attitudes and social interaction between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East? The findings showed that there are changes in the attitudes toward the conflict; however, the tendency of having the same attitudes toward the conflict is higher than the tendency of changing them. Fifteen respondents changed their attitudes toward the conflict. Fourteen of them changed their attitudes in favor of peace, while only one changed his attitudes toward the type of state that he favor to be build after war with Israel. Twenty respondent did not change their attitudes either in favor of war or in favor of peace. In addition, we found that the changes in the level of relationships is more likely to be influenced by immigrating to Canada than the changes in attitudes toward the conflict. Twenty one respondents increased their

relationships with "the other". Thirteen respondents did not change their level of social interaction with "the other". One respondent decreased the level of his interaction with "the other" from a formal relationship to none at all.

The last question was what are the factors that influence Arabs' and Jews' attitudes and social interaction in Montreal? Religiosity and friendship are one of the factors influencing, to a certain degree, the attitudes and social interaction of Arabs and Jews in Montreal. The findings reveal that religiosity's influence on the attitudes toward the conflict is stronger than religiosity's influence on friendship. As well, the findings indicate that there are changes in the attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the tendency of having the same attitudes toward the conflict is higher than the tendency of changing them. Moreover, the data shows that the changes in the level of social interaction is more likely to be influenced by immigrating to Canada than the changes in attitudes toward the conflict. Another factor that tends to influence the attitudes toward the conflict and the social interaction with "the other" is living under war conditions with "the other". This is revealed in Nadim and Dana's cases.

This study tried to explore the attitudes of immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews in Montreal toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, and examine their social interaction far from the Middle East where there is a great tension between the two people. The research focused on three variables, religiosity, friendship, and attitudes toward the conflict. After collecting the data, the results revealed the influence of a fourth variable (ethnicity) on the answers.

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Appendix 1

Interview Guides

The Interview Guide For Arab Respondents

nterview #:
Date:
Time of starting the interview:
Time of ending the interview:
Total time taken conducting the interview:
Comments:

See the time:

I will start the interview with something like:

Hi, I am Hadeel Abdo. **Thank you** for giving me the time to answer my questions. First of all, I would like to give you an idea about what I am doing. **My research** is about the attitudes and social interaction between immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews in Montreal. You may ask **why I have chosen this topic**.

Well, I immigrated to Canada in 1996. I used to live in Jordan. The only time that I had the chance to contact or interact with Jews was when I crossed the borders from Jordan to Israel. When I came here, I noticed that there are many opportunities for interaction between Arabs and Jews in Canada more than the opportunities for interaction in the Middle East. So I wondered if these opportunities tend to affect Arabs' and Jews' attitudes and social interaction.

This is why I wanted to conduct such a study and that is why I will ask you questions that are concerned about your life before and after your immigration to Canada.

Please feel free to **ask questions** at any time. You may **withhold** your response to any item if you wish. I would like to emphasize that your responses will be **confidential**. So far, **do you have any questions**?

Before we start, can I use a **tape recorder? The reason** why I want to tape the interview is because my English is not perfect so it would be difficult for

the to take hole of your responses without taping them. At the same time, I will
be able to pay more attention to what you are saying. If you wish, I will turn it off
at any point during the interview.
1) YesTape the interview
2) NoDo not use the tape recorder
First I would like to ask you questions that I asked before on the phone when
we set the appointment to make sure that I am on the right track.
Q1) What is your father's nationality or nationalities? Probe: If the answer was one nationality, make sure to check that the father has no other nationalities.
Q2) What is your mother's nationality or nationalities? Probe: If the answer was one nationality, make sure to check that the mother has no other nationalities.
Q3) What is your nationality or nationalities? Probe: If the answer was one nationality, make sure to check that the respondent has no other nationalities.
 If the Arab respondent did not mention one of his/her nationalities to be Jordanian, Lebanese, Egyptian, Palestinians, or Syrian, terminate the interview. If the respondent is Jordanian, Lebanese, Egyptian, or Syrian, Go to Q3a. Otherwise Go to Q4.
Q3a) Are you a Palestinian? Probe: Do your parents (ask about the mother and the father) identify themselves as Palestinians, do you identify yourself as Palestinian, and why.

Q4) Do you consider yourself an Arab?
1) YesGo to Q5 2) NoTerminate the interview
Q5) Did you live in an Arabic country before coming to Canada?
1) YesGo to Q62) NoTerminate the interview
Q6) Could you mention the name of the Arabic country or countries that you lived in?
Q7) How long did you live in each of these countries? Probe: ask if the respondent moved back and forth between countries.
If the entire period that the respondent lived in the Arabic countries was less than five years, then terminate the interview. O8) What is your current status in Canada?
· ·
Q8) What is your current status in Canada? 1) Canadian citizenGo to Q8a 2) Permanent residentGo to Q9
Q8) What is your current status in Canada? 1) Canadian citizenGo to Q8a 2) Permanent residentGo to Q9 3) Neither of the aboveTerminate the interview
less than five years, then terminate the interview. Q8) What is your current status in Canada? 1) Canadian citizenGo to Q8a 2) Permanent residentGo to Q9 3) Neither of the aboveTerminate the interview Q8a) Were you born in Canada? 1) YesTerminate the interview

MuslimGo to Q2 OthersTerminate the interview
Q12) Do you consider your self a:
Secular Muslim, Practising Muslim, or Restrictedly religious Muslim
Q13) In the last two years, have you ever prayed? Probe: Is it five times a day or less than that? .
1) Yes (How many times in the last year?)2) No,
Q14) In the last two years, have you ever gone to Friday prayer?
1) Yes (How many times in the last year?)2) No,
Q15) In the last two years, have you ever fasted during Ramadan?
1) Yes (Did you fast in both years?)2) No
Q16) In the last two years, have you ever read Qur'an?
1) Yes (How many times in the last year?)2) No
Q17) In the last two years, have you ever drunk alcohol?
1) Yes, 2) No
Q18) In the last two years, have you ever eaten pork?
1) Yes, 2) No

Q11) What is your religion?

Now I will ask you questions about **friendship**.

Q19) Before immigrating to Canada, could you describe for me your friendships with other Arabs? Probe: did you go out with them regularly, talk with them often over the phone, discuss feelings and thoughts? What kind of activities did you have together? Did you trust them? Did you have Palestinian and Arab friends? Was there any difference in your relation with your Palestinian friends and Arab friends? Why and how? Did you discuss politics with each other? Like what? Did you talk about the situation in Israel? Did you discuss Arab-Israeli relations? What about Palestinian-Israeli relations? What was their opinions?
Q20) Could you describe for me your friendship with other Arabs after you immigrated to Canada? Probe: do you go out with them regularly , talk with them often over the phone, discuss feelings and thoughts? What kind of activities do you have together? Do you trust them? Do you have Palestinian and Arab friends? Is there any difference in your relation with your Palestinian friends and Arab friends? Why and how? Do you discuss politics with each other? Like what? Do you talk about the situation in Israel? Do you discuss Arab-Israeli relations? What about Palestinian-Israeli relations? What are their opinions?
Q21) Do you have friends other than Arabs here in Montreal? Probe: what are their ethnicities? Where did you meet them? Do you socially interact with them? How often? What do you do together? Do you discuss politics? What are the topics that you talk about? Do you discuss the political situation in Israel? What are their opinions?

any Jewish friends?
1) YesGo to Q22a 2) NoGo to Q22b
Q22a) Tell me about those friendships. Probe: did you go out with them regularly, talk with them often over the phone, discuss feelings and thoughts? What kind of activities did you have together? Did you trust them? Were they Ashkenazim Jews, Sephardim Jews or both? Was there any difference in your relation with your Ashkenazim friends and Sephardim friends? Why and how? Did you discuss politics with each other? Like what? Did you talk about the situation in Israel? Did you discuss Arab-Israeli relations? Did you talk about the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis? What are their opinions? Did you consider some of them close friends? Why? Why not? Tell me about it. (What were your family's opinions about all of this?)
Go to Q23
Q22b) Was there any reason for not having Jewish friends? (Probe: did your family has any influence on that? What about your community.)
Q23) Now after immigrating to Canada, do you have Jewish friends?
1) YesGo to Q23a 2) NoGo to Q23b

Q23a) Tell me about those friendships. Probe: do you go out with them regularly, talk with them often over the phone, discuss feelings and thoughts? What kind of activities do you have together? Do you trust them? Are they Ashkenazim Jews, Sephardim Jews or both? Is there any difference in your relation with your Ashkenazim friends and Sephardim friends? Why and how? Do you discuss politics with each other? Like what? Do you talk about the situation in Israel? Do you discuss Arab-Israeli relations? Do you talk about the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis? What are their opinions? Do you consider some of them close friends? Why? Why not? Tell me about it. (What are your family's opinions about all of this?)
Move to Q24
Q23b) Is there any reason for that? Probe: Would you consider having Ashkanazim Jewish friend? What about Sephardim Jewish friend? Why? Why not? (Does you family has any influence on that? What about your community.)
Q24) Are there other Arabs living in your neighborhood? Are there many or few of them? Do you socially interact with them? How often do you socially interact with them?

Q25) Are there Jews living in your neighborhood? Are they Ashkenazim or Sephardim Jews? Are there many or few of them? Do you socially interact withom? (Why not?) Is that apply to your social interaction with both Ashkenaziand Sephardim Jews in your neighborhood? How often do you socially interacting with them? (How do you feel about interacting with them?) (probe: family and community)	m ict
Q26) Are there any other Arabs whom you know of at your school? Do you socially interact with them at school? (Why not?) How often do you interact them? What kind of activities do you have together?	vith
Q27) How is your social interaction with Jews at school? Are they Ashkenazi Sephardim Jews? Do you talk to them? (Why not?) What kind of talk? (Wearsmall talk, studies, politics [what topics]) How often do you interact with them What kind of activities do you have together?	her
Q28) Are you a member of any Arabic association at school? Which? Why? What are the activities of the association? Are you an active member in the association? Are you involved in any activities that are against/ support Israe Are you involved in any activities that promote peace with Israel? (Why not?)	

Q29) Are you a member of an Arabic organization outside the school? Probe: what is the name of the organization? Are you an active member in the organization? What are the activities of the organization? Are you involved in any activities that are against/ support Israel? Are you involved in any activities that promote peace with Israel? (Why not?)
Q30) Are you aware of the Jewish associations at your school? Do you know about their activities or interests? How do you feel about these associations' activities and interests?
Q31) Are you a member of any organizations at school or out side the school that are not related to the Arabic community? (That includes dialogue groups or organizations for peace) Probe: Tell me about them, their names and their activities. Are you an active member in the organization(s)? Are there other Arab members in the organization(s)? How is your relationship with them? Are there Ashkenazim Jewish members in the organization? How is your relationship with them? Are there any Sephardim Jewish members in the organization? How is your relationship with them?
Let us now talk about Arab-Israeli relations .
Q32) How much do you know about Arab-Israeli relations? Probe: how, where and why did you learn about them? Could you tell me, from your perspective, what you think about Arab-Israeli relations? In your opinion, what are the causes of such Arab-Israeli relations?

relations?	nmigrating to Ca				
between Israe	nmigrating to Ca and Palestinian and Egypt? Wh ic countries?	is? Probe: w	vhat did you	think about pe	eace
					
between Israe between Israe Would you like and Syria? Wh	r immigrating to lis and Palestinia and Egypt? Wh to see peace be nat is the kind of how and why?)	ans? Probe: nat about pe etween Isra	what do you ace betweer el and Lebar	think about p Israel and Jo non and betwe	eace ordan? een Israel

an	d how it came about? What was your opinion/solution?		- -
ha 1) 2) 3) 4)	88) I would like to ask for your opinion about different conflict reverse to tell me if you agree or disagree with the resolution and is Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neutral Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree		- ons. You
B) C) D) E) F) G) H) l)	Palestinian state and the expulsion of Jews 1 2 3 Binational state without the expulsion of Jews 1 2 3 Palestinians state within pre-1967 borders 1 2 3 Jordanian-Palestinians state within pre-1967 borders 1 2 Palestinian state with border modification to accommodate Is needs 1 2 3 Jordanian-Palestinian state with border modification to accoms security needs 1 2 3 Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories 1 2 3 Continuation of the status quo 1 2 3 Annexation of the occupied territories without expulsion of Palestinians 1 2 3 Annexation of the occupied territories and the expulsion of Palestinians 1 2 3	4	5
Q3	99) Which one of the previous resolution you favor most and v	vhy 	
	10) Before immigrating to Canada, which one of the previous for most and why (See if there is change and ask about it)	resolutio	on you

Q41) Have you visited the West Bank and (or) Gaza Strip?
1) YesGo to Q41a 2) NoGo to Q41c
Q41a) When and how long did you stay there each time? Why did you visit there?
Go to Q41b
Q41b) Could you tell me about your visit or visits there? Probe: what was your opinion about the situation? Did your opinions about the conflict and peace change after your visit to the West Bank and Gaza Strip? Why? Why not? Would you go and visit there again? Why? Why not?
Go to Q42
Q41c) Do you have any reasons for not visiting the West Bank and Gaza Strip? Would you visit there in the future? Why? Why not?
Q42) Have you ever visited Israel?
1) YesGo to Q42a

Q42a) Do you remember when you visited Israel? For each time that you have visited Israel, how long did you stay there? Why did you visit there?
Go to Q42b
Q42b) Could you tell me about your visit or visits to Israel? Probe: what was you opinion about the situation? Did your opinion about the conflict and peace have change after your visit to Israel? Why? Why not? How? Would you go and visit there again? Why? Why not?
Go to Q43
Q42c) Are there any reasons for not visiting Israel? Would you visit there in the future? Why? Why not?
Now I will ask you questions that are related to Human Rights.
Q43) What did you think of Hamas' and Islamic Jihad's suicidal attacks on soldiers such as the attack of January 1995, where 18 Israeli soldiers were killed and 56 others were injured?

Q44) What did you think about Hamas' attacks on civilians such as the Februar 1996 suicide bombs in both Jerusalem and Ashkelon carried out by Hamas members, which resulted in killing 23 people and injuring 49 others? (Happened after peace)	У
Q45) What did you think of the 1994 massacre in the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebro by a Jewish settler (Goldstein) in which 29 Palestinians were killed? On Goldstein's gravestone the following words are written: "Having given his life on behalf of the Jewish people, its Torah and its ancestral homeland, he was an innocent, pure hearted individual." How do you feel about that?	
Q46) What did you think of Israel's attacks on Southern Lebanon?	
Q47) What did you think of the Palestinian police killing of two Palestinians in the Rafah riots of March 1999?	

Q48) Since the Oslo Accord, more than 600 Palestinian homes have been demolished and 140,000 dunums (14000 hectares) of Palestinian land confiscated by the Israeli government. What do you think of that? (Hamas & permit)	& no
Q49) Do you think that the threat of some of the Muslim and Arabic countried Israel is a real one? (How?) Do you think that the threat of Israel to some of Arabic and Muslim countries is a real one? (How?)	
Q50) What do you think of Iran or Saudi Arabia as states based on religion What do you think of Israel? Do you consider Israel to be a democratic state How? Do you consider Israel to be the state of Jews? Why or why not? Do think that Israel is a religious state? Why or why not? Do you think that the Palestinians have the right to live in Israel like any Jewish Israeli citizen? How Why? Why not?	e? you
Q51) What do you know about the treatment of Sephardim Jews in Israel?	
Probe: What do you think of that treatment?	

Q52) What do you know about the treatment of Arabic Israelis in Israel? Probe: What do you think of that treatment?
Q53) Tell me about your reaction concerning the assassination of Isaac Rabin?
Q54) Have you ever signed or sent a petition to the Israeli government? Probe: What kind of petition(s)? Why?
Q55) Have you ever signed or sent a petition to any Arabic government? Probe What kind of petition(s)? Why?
Q56) Do you have something else that you want to say about the relation between Arabs and Jews?
Now I would like to ask you some question about your background to help me classify your answers. Q57) What is your sex?
1) Male 2) Female

Q58) What is your present age?
Q59) What school are you in?
1) McGill 2) Concordia
These are all the questions that I want to ask. If I have more questions, can I get back to you?
I have just one request before you leave. If you can look at this table and tell me if you know any person who would fit these criteria. Please write their names and their telephone numbers . (If the respondent does not have their telephone number ask if you can call him/her back to get the number). (Ask if the respondent would mind if I mentioned that he/she recommended the other people).
Thank you again for the time you gave to answer my questions. I really appreciate it.
Look at the time:

The Interview Guide For Jewish Respondents

Interview #:	
Date:	
Time of starting the interview:	
Time of ending the interview:	
Total time taken conducting the interview:	
Comments:	

See	the	time	·	 	

I will start the interview with something like:

Hi, I am Hadeel Abdo. Thank you for giving me the time to answer my questions. First of all, I would like to give you an idea about what I am doing. My research is about the attitudes and social interaction between immigrant Arabs and immigrant Jews in Montreal. You may ask why I have chosen this topic.

Well, I immigrated to Canada in 1996. I used to live in Jordan. The only time that I had the chance to contact or interact with Jews was when I crossed the borders from Jordan to Israel. When I came here, I noticed that there are many opportunities for interaction between Arabs and Jews in Canada more than the opportunities for interaction in the Middle East. So I wondered if these opportunities tend to affect Arabs' and Jews' attitudes and social interaction.

This is why I wanted to conduct such a study and that is why I will ask you questions that are concerned about your life before and after your immigration to Canada.

Please feel free to **ask questions** at any time. You may **withhold** your response to any item if you wish. I would like to emphasize that your responses will be **confidential**. So far, **do you have any questions**?

Before we start, can I use a **tape recorder? The reason** why I want to tape the interview is because my English is not perfect so it would be difficult for me to take note of your responses without taping them. At the same time, I will

be able to pay more attention to what you are saying. If you wish, I will turn it off
at any point during the interview.
1) YesTape the interview
2) NoDo not use the tape recorder
First I would like to ask you questions that I asked before on the phone when
we set the appointment to make sure that I am on the right track.
Q1) What is your father's nationality or nationalities? Probe: If the answer was one nationality, make sure to check that the father has no other nationalities.
Q2) What is your mother's nationality or nationalities? Probe: If the answer was one nationality, make sure to check that the mother has no other nationalities.
Q3) What is your nationality or nationalities? Probe: If the answer was one nationality, make sure to check that the respondent has no other nationalities.
Q4) Are both your parents Jewish?
1) YesGo to Q5 2) NoGo to Q4a
Q4a) Is your mother Jewish?
1) YesGo to Q5 2) NoGo to Q4b
Q4b) Is your father Jewish?
1) YesGo to Q5 2) NoGo to Q4c

Q4c) Did you convert to Judaism?
1) YesGo to Q52) NoTerminate the interview
Q5) Do you consider your ethnicity to be Jewish?
1) YesGo to Q6 2) NoTerminate the interview
Q6) What is your religion?
Q7) Do you consider yourself a:
 Secular Jew, Practicing Jew, or Restrictedly religious Jew
Q8) In the last two years, have you ever prayed three times a day?
1) Yes (How many times?)2) No
Q9) In the last two years, have you ever observed Sabbaths?
1) Yes (How many times?)2) No
Q10) In the last two years, have you ever observed Jewish Holidays like Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur and Passover?
1) Yes (How many times?) 2) No
Q11) In the last two years, have you ever fasted in Yom Kippur and Tisha b'Av?
1) Yes (How many times?) 2) No

Q1	2) In the last two years, have you ever eaten Kosher?
•	Yes (How many times?) No
Q1	3) In the last two years, have you ever read the Torah?
	Yes (How many times?) No
Q1	4) In the last two years, have you ever gone to the Synagogue?
•	Yes (How many times?) No
Q1	15) Are you:
2) 3)	Ashkenazim Jew, Sephardim Jew, or Falsha Other (Specify:)
Q1	16) Have you ever visited Israel?
	YesGo to Q6 NoTerminate the interview
Q1	17) How many times have you visited there?
	18) For each time that you have visited Israel, when and how long did you stayere?
Q1	19) Why did you visit there?
-	

Q20) Are you planning to go back to Israel? Probe: Is it to visit or to stay there? Why? Why not?
Q21) What is your current status in Canada?
 Canadian citizenGo to Q21a Permanent residentGo to Q22 Neither of the aboveTerminate the interview
Q21a) Were you born in Canada?
1) YesTerminate the interview 2) NoGo to Q22
Q22) How long have you been here?
Q23) Before your immigration to Canada, where did you live?
Now I will ask you questions about friendship.
Q24) Before immigrating to Canada, could you describe for me your friendships with other Jews? Probe: did you go out with them regularly , talk with them ofter over the phone, discuss feelings and thoughts? What kind of <u>activities</u> did you have together? Did you trust them? Did you have Ashkenazim and Sephardim Jewish friends? Was there any difference in your relation with your Ashkenazim friends and Sephardim friends? Why and how? Did you discuss politics with each other? Like what? Did you talk about the situation in Israel? Did you discuss Arab-Israeli relations? What were their opinions?

imi oft you Se As pol you	5) Could you describe for me your friendship with other Jews after you nigrated to Canada? Probe: do you go out with them regularly, talk with them over the phone, discuss feelings and thoughts? What kind of activities do have together? Do you trust them? Do you have Ashkenazim and chardim Jewish friends? Is there any difference in your relation with your nikenazim friends and Sephardim friends? Why and how? Do you discuss itics with each other? Like what? Do you talk about the situation in Israel? Do discuss Arab-Israeli relations? What about Palestinian-Israeli relations?
- - -	
the Ho top	6) Do you have friends other than Jews here in Montreal? Probe: what are ir ethnicities? Where did you meet them? Do you socially interact with them? w often? What do you do together? Do you discuss politics? What are the ics that you talk about? Do you discuss the political situation in Israel? What their opinions?
-	
	7) While you were living in (mention the name of the country), did you have Arab friends?
•	YesGo to Q27a NoGo to Q27b

Q27a) Tell me about those friendships. Probe: did you go out with them regularly, talk with them often over the phone, discuss feelings and thoughts? What kind of activities did you have together? Did you trust them? Did you have Palestinian friends? Was there any difference in your relation with your Palestinian friends and other Arab friends? Why and how? Did you discuss politics with each other? Like what? Did you talk about the situation in Israel? Did you discuss Arab-Israeli relations? What are their opinions? Did you consider some of them close friends? Tell me about it. (What were your family's opinions about all of this?)	e
Go to Q28 Q27b) Was there any reason for not having Arab friends? Probe: I understand that you also do not have Palestinian friends. (Probe: did your family has any influence on that? What about your community.)	
Q28) Now after immigrating to Canada, do you have Arab friends?	
1) YesGo to Q28a 2) NoGo to Q28b	
Q28a) Tell me about those friendships. Probe: do you go out with them regularly, talk with them often over the phone, discuss feelings and thoughts? What kind of activities do you have together? Do you trust them? Do you have Palestinian friends? Is there any difference in your relation with your Palestinian friends and other Arab friends? Why and how? Do you discuss politics with each other? Like what? Do you talk about the situation in Israel? Do you discuss Arab-Israeli relations? What are their opinions? Do you consider some of them close friends to you? Tell me about it. (What are your family's opinions about all of this?)	ì h
Move to Q29	

Q28b) Is there any reason for that? Probe: Does that also apply for Palestinians? Would you consider having an Arab friend? What about a Palestinian friend? Why? Why not? (Does your family has any influence on that? What about your community.)	
Q29) Are there other Jews living in your neighborhood? Are there many or few them? Are they Ashkenazim or Sephardim Jews? Do you socially interact with them? (Both or one group more than the other). How often do you socially interact with them? How do you feel about interacting with Ashkenazim Jews in your neighborhood? What about Sephardim Jews?	
Q30) Are there any Palestinians who live in your neighborhood? Are there man or few of them? Do you socially interact with them? (Why not?) How often do you socially interact with them? (How do you feel about interacting with them?) (Probe: family and community)	
Q31) Are there any Arabs living in your neighborhood? Are there many or few of them? Do you socially interact with them? (Why not?) How often do you social interact with them? (How do you feel about interacting with them?) (Probe: Family and community)	
Q32) Are there any other Jews whom you know of at your school? Are they Ashkenazim Jews or Sephardim Jews? Do you socially interact with Ashkenazi Jews at school? (Why not?) How often do you interact with them? Do you socially interact with Sephardim Jews at school? (Why not?) How often do you interact with them? What kind of activities do you have together?	

Q33) How is your social interaction with Pale them? (Why not?) What kind of talk? (Weath topics]) How often do you interact with them have together?	er, small talk, studies, politics [what
Q34) How is your social interaction with Arab them? (Why not?) What kind of talk? (Weath topics]) How often do you interact with each you have together?	ner, small talk, studies, politics [what
Q35) Are you a member of any Jewish association? An association? An association? Are you involved in any activities you involved in any activities that promote per a second control of the control of th	re you an active member in the es that support/ against Israel? Are
Q36) Are you a member of a Jewish organize what is the name of the organization? Are you organization? What are the activities of the organy activities that support/ against Israel? Are promote peace with Arabs? (Why not?)	ou an active member in the organization? Are you involved in

Q37) Are you aware of the Palestinian associations at your school? Do you know about their activities or interests? How do you feel about these associations' activities and interests?	
Q38) Are you aware of the Arabic associations at your school? Do you know about their activities or interests? How do you feel about these associations' activities and interests?	
Q39) Are you a member of any organizations at school or out side the school that are not related to the Jewish community? (That includes dialogue groups organizations for peace) Probe: Tell me about them, their names and their activities. Are you an active member in the organization(s)? Are there other Jewish members in the organization(s)? Are they Ashkenazim Jews or Sephardim Jews or both? How is your relationship with them? Are there any Arab members? How is your relationship with them? Are there any Palestinia members? How is your relationship with them?	s or
Let us now talk about Arab-Israeli relations . Q40) How much do you know about Arab-Israeli relations? Probe: how, when	re
and why did you learn about them? Could you tell me, from your perspective what you think about Arab-Israeli relations? In your opinion, what are the cau of such Arab-Israeli relations?	÷,

Q41) Before immigrating to Canada, what was your opinion about Arab-Israel relations?
Q42) Before immigrating to Canada, what was your opinion about peace between Israelis and Palestinians? Probe: what did you think about peace between Israel and Egypt? What about peace between Israel and other Arabi countries?
Q43) Now after immigrating to Canada, what is your opinion about peace between Israelis and Palestinians? Probe: what do you think about peace between Israel and Egypt? What about peace between Israel and Jordan? Would you like to see peace between Israel and Lebanon and between Israel and Syria? What is the kind of peace you would like to see develop? (If there change ask how and why?)
Q44) What would you consider would be a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflic
Q45) Did you have such an opinion before immigrating to Canada? Probe: when and how it came about? What was your opinion/solution?
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Q4	6) I would like to ask for your opinion about di	ffere	nt conf	lict res	solutio	ns. Yo	u
	re to tell me if you agree or disagree with the r	resol	ution a	ind is i	it		
•	Strongly agree						
•	Somewhat agree						
,	Neutral						
•	Somewhat disagree						
5)	Strongly disagree						
A)	Palestinian state and the expulsion of Jews	1	2	3	4	5	
B)	Binational state without the expulsion of Jews	1	2	3	4	5	
C)	Palestinians state within pre-1967 borders	1	2	3	4	5	
D)	Jordanian-Palestinians state within pre-1967	bord	ers 1	2	3	4	5
E)	Palestinian state with border modification to a	accor	nmoda	ate Isra	ael's s	ecurity	
•	needs	1	2	3	4	5	
F)	Jordanian-Palestinian state with border modif	fication	on to a	ccomi	modate	e Israe	ľs
	security needs	1	2	3	4	5	
G)	Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territori	es 1	2	3	4	5	
H)	Continuation of the status quo	1	2	3	4	5	
I)	Annexation of the occupied territories without	exp	ulsion	of			
•	Palestinians	1	2	3	4	5	
J)	Annexation of the occupied territories and the	e exp	ulsion	of			
•	Palestinians		2	3	4	5	
Q4	7) Which one of the previous resolution you	favo	r most	and w	/ hy		
					-		
					-		
	8) Before immigrating to Canada, which one				esoluti	on you	
fav	or most and why (See if there is change and a	ask a	ibout it	:)			
					-		
					-		
					-		
					-		

-	ny? Why not? How?
Q5	0) Have you visited the West Bank and (or) Gaza Strip?
•	YesGo to Q50a NoGo to Q50c
	0a) When and how long did you stay there each time? Why did you visit ere?
	Go to Q50b
op ch:	60b) Could you tell me about your visit or visits there? Probe: what was your inion about the situation. Did your opinions about the conflict and peace ange after your visit to the West Bank and Gaza Strip? Why? Why not? How buld you go and visit there again? Why? Why not?
op ch:	inion about the situation. Did your opinions about the conflict and peace ange after your visit to the West Bank and Gaza Strip? Why? Why not? How
op ch:	inion about the situation. Did your opinions about the conflict and peace ange after your visit to the West Bank and Gaza Strip? Why? Why not? How

Now I will ask you questions that are related to Human Rights.

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ebruary as
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s in

Q56) Since the Oslo Accord, more than 600 Palestinian homes have been demolished and 140,000 dunums (14000 hectares) of Palestinian land confiscated by the Israeli government. What do you think of that? (Hamas & permit)	nc
Q57) Do you think that the threat of some of the Muslim and Arabic countries Israel is a real one? (How?) Do you think that the threat of Israel to some of the Arabic and Muslim countries is a real one? (How?)	
Q58) What do you think of Iran or Saudi Arabia as states based on religion? What do you think of Israel? Do you consider Israel to be a democratic state? How? Do you consider Israel to be the state of Jews? Why or why not? Do you think that Israel is a religious state? Why or why not? Do you think that the Palestinians have the right to live in Israel like any Jewish Israeli citizen? How Why? Why not?	ou
Q59) What do you know about the treatment of Sephardim Jews in Israel? Probe: What do you think of that treatment?	

Q60) What do you know about the treatment of Arabic Israelis in Israel? Probe: What do you think of that treatment?
Q61) Tell me about your reaction concerning the assassination of Isaac Rabin?
Q62) Have you ever signed or sent a petition to the Israeli government? Probe: What kind of petition(s)? Why?
Q63) Have you ever signed or sent a petition to any Arabic government? Probe What kind of petition(s)? Why?
Q64) Do you have something else that you want to say about the relation between Arabs and Jews?
Now I would like to ask you some question about your background to help me classify your answers.
Q65) What is your sex?
1) Male 2) Female

Q66) What is your present age?
Q67) What school are you in?
1) McGill 2) Concordia
These are all the questions that I want to ask. If I have more questions, can I get back to you?
I have just one request before you leave. If you can just look at this table and tell me if you know any person that would fit in these criteria. Please write their names and their telephone numbers . (If the respondent does not have their telephone number ask if you can call him/her back to get the number). (Ask if the respondent would mind if I mentioned that he/she recommended the other people).
Thank you again for the time you gave to answer my questions. I really appreciate it.
Look at the time:

Appendix 2

The Respondents' Profile

This appendix gives a brief review of each respondents' profile.

The Arab Sample

Adel:

Adel immigrated to Canada 3 years ago from Saudi Arabia. He is a 21 year old Palestinian. He is a secular Muslim. He never had been to Palestine/Israel. For a short period of time, he got involved in the *Concordia Center for Palestinian Human Rights* (CCPHR). He never had contacted a Jew before neither in Saudi Arabia nor in Canada. He does not consider having a Jewish friend in the future. He believes that the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is by gaining power then fighting the Jews. He envisions a secular state develop after the war with Jews where Jews are welcomed to live in.

Ahmed:

Ahmed is a 30 year old Syrian. He has been in Canada for three and a half years. He is a religious Muslim who had never been to Palestine/Israel. He believes that Palestine/Israel should be returned to Palestinians. After returning Palestine, Palestinians would decide if they want to allow Jews to live with them or not. He believes that the Palestinian state should be Islamic because when Muslims ruled there and they respected all religions.

Amani:

Amani is a 26 year old Palestinian women. She is a practicing Muslim. She moved to Canada before 7 months. Through her school, Amani contacted Jews for the first time in her life in Montreal. She considers all the area of Palestine/Israel a Palestinian land. Peace, for her is a temporary stage that is going to be replaced by war with the Israelis.

Amin:

Amin is a 20 year old practicing Muslim. He is a Palestinian who has *Lam-Samel*, a card that allows him to stay in the Occupied Territories but not in Israel. He used to visit there each summer. He has been in Canada for 2 years. He is an activist in the Palestinian association at Concordia. He has formal relationships with Jews who he meet at school. He wants just peace. He dislikes the current peace process between Palestinians and Israelis because it did not give Palestinians good percentage of their rights.

Amjad:

He was born in Saudi Arabia and lived there for 10 years. He is 20 years old. His father is Palestinian while his mother is Lebanese. He immigrated, with his family, to Canada 10 years ago. Amjad is a secular Muslim. He is an activist. He went as a volunteer to the Gaza Strip. He has no Jewish friends, however he considers some of them acquaintances. He attended some of the meetings of McGill's dialogue group. He does not like the Oslo accord, however he supports just peace.

Dana:

She is a 20 year old Palestinian. She was born in Jerusalem and used to live there. She has a Jerusalem identity card which allows here to live inside Israel. She moved to Canada 2 years ago. In the last two years, she always went back to her hometown for visits. She is a secular Muslim. She considers Jews as the enemies. She did not socially interact with Jews. She considers peace for losers and supports the "War secular" solution to the conflict.

Hala:

Hala is a religious Muslim who moved to Canada before one and a half years ago. She is a 22 year old Syrian. She used to live in Saudi Arabia. She has never visited Palestine/Israel. She has formal relationships with Jews who she met at school. She dislikes peace because it is good for the Israelis not the Arabs. She sees that the Arab-Israel problem will be solved when Israel gives the land back to Arabs who will decide if they want to allow Jews to live with them or not.

Hani:

Hani is a practicing Palestinian who moved to Canada 3 years ago. He used to live in Jordan. He has never been to Palestine/Israel. He did not has contact with Jews neither in Jordan nor in Canada. He is not wiling to develop friendship with Jews. He believes that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be solved by war where an Islamic state will come to existence.

Hatem:

Hatem is an Egyptian secular Muslim who immigrated to Canada before six years. He is 39 years old. He had Jewish friends in Egypt. He used to play with them. They left to Israel when he was twelve years old. In Canada, he also has Jewish friends who are his neighbors. He believes that the current peace is a cold one. He is looking for fair peace where every one will be given equal rights, obey UN resolutions, respect "the other", and accept the right of the other to live in the land.

Hind:

Hind is a Lebanese women who has been living in Canada for 8 years. She is a 25 year old religious Muslim. She would like to go visit Palestine/Israel. She had contact with Jews at school. She does not like the peace process. For her, Jihad is the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. She believes the Palestinian state should become Islamic one.

Huda:

Huda moved to Canada 6 years ago. She is a 21 year old practicing Muslim. She is Palestinian. She contacted Jews while she was living in Halifax. She does not mind having Jewish friends in the future. She supports just peace.

Khalid:

Khalid is a Lebanese secular Muslim. He is 28 years old. He used to live in Lebanon before moving to Canada two years ago. He is not interested in visiting Palestine/Israel. He has Jewish friends. He also dated a Jewish girl. He considers the current peace a failure because the Palestinians got 20% of the land and no rights. He believes that the first step toward peace is the recognition of Israel.

Maher:

He is a religious Lebanese. He is 26 years old. He moved to Canada from Saudi Arabia 6 years ago. He never had been to Palestine/Israel. He had never interacted with Jews though he is willing to interact with Jews in the future. He considers the whole area of Palestine/Israel Palestine or the occupied territories. For him, the solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict is developing an Islamic Palestinian state where Jews can live in it with Palestinians. He does not believe that Jews should be thrown out of the area. He accepts peace between Palestinians and Israelis if it is to ease the suffering of Palestinians.

Murad:

Murad is a 19 year old Syrian. He came to Canada, from Saudi Arabia, 2 years ago. He did not visit Palestine/Israel. He has formal relationships with Jews in school. He sees Jews support peace more than Arabs. He believes that peace implementations are not good because Palestinians lost more with this peace than they would have lost if they stayed in war with Israel. The solution is a fair peace.

Nadia:

Nadia is a 37 Palestinian women. She immigrated to Canada 11 years ago from Britain. She lived in Saudi Arabia for 16 years. She visited Palestine/Israel. She had Jewish friends when she lived in Britain and the US. In Canada, she contacted Jews who she considers acquaintances. She wants to see fair peace

develop between Palestinians and Israelis.

Nadim:

Nadim is a 33 year old practicing Muslim. He is Palestinian who has been in Canada in for 5 years. He is an Arab Israeli. He goes back and forth between Canada and his country of origin. He used to have formal relationship with Jews when he was in Israel. In Canada, he did not has contact with Jews. He thinks peace will be accomplished by returning all of Palestine/Israel to Palestinians.

Ossama:

Ossama is a 23 year old Palestinian. He used to be a secular Muslim. He became religious in Canada. Ossama has the Jerusalem identity card which he goes to renew every three years. He lived in Jerusalem for few years. Before moving to Canada, five years a go, he lived in Jordan. He did not have Jewish friends there for different reasons such as the war conditions, and the social impact. He has formal relationships with Jews who he met at school. He does not consider having a Jewish friends because there might be clashes in views. He does not want peace to happen in the area. His solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is by building an Islamic state where Muslims will rule and other people from other faiths will live as minorities.

Rawan:

Rawan is a 30 year old Palestinian women. She is a secular Muslim who moved to Canada 7 years ago. She has never been to Palestine/Israel. She has Jewish friends who she met in Montreal. She believes that violence is not the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, she dislikes the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis.

Rinad:

Rinad is a 25 year old Syrian. She is a practicing Muslim who used to live in Saudi Arabia. She moved to Canada 2 years ago. She would like to visit Palestine/Israel. She never contacted Jews in Saudi Arabia. She met Jews through school in Canada. She has a formal kind of relationship with them. She believes that Peace is only a stage for war. She thinks that the current peace between the Palestinians and Israelis is not fair for Palestinians. The solution, for here, is war.

Sahar:

Sahar is a religious Palestinian who have been in Canada for 3 years. She is 20 years old. She is involved in the Muslim Student Association (MSA). She had contact with Jews for the first time in her life in Canada. She had never been to Palestine/Israel. For her peace is a lie. The solution is by Jihad (The holy war) where an Islamic state would develop.

Salem:

Salem is a 30 year old religious man. He moved to Canada from Egypt 3 years ago. He did not contact a Jew in his life. He believes that peace is going to happen when Jews give the whole land to Palestinians. He also thinks that the Palestinian state should be an Islamic one where Jews will be allowed to live in it. For him, the current peace is not fair. It is a peace for Israel because it is the only beneficial.

Samer:

He is a 22 year old secular Muslim. He has been in Canada for 6 years. He is a Palestinian who went and visited Palestine/ Israel. He has Jewish friends whom he met in Canada. One of his best friends is a Jew. He does not like the current peace process, however, he believes in peace as the solution to the conflict.

Zahi:

He is a 21 year old Syrian. He immigrated to Canada 3 years ago. He goes back and forth between here and Saudi Arabia where his parents live. He never interacted with Jews neither in Saudi Arabia nor in Canada. He gave different reasons for not interacting with Jews such as blaming "the other" and his upbringing.

The Jewish Sample

Avi:

Avi is a 24 year old religious Israeli Jew. After he served in the Israeli Army, he decided to continue his study in Canada. He moved to Canada in 1995. He is a religious Jew. He has formal relationships with some Arabs in Montreal. He believes in peace where security is the key factor. However, Jerusalem for him is the undivided Capital of Israel.

David:

David is a 23 year old religious Jew. He stayed in Israel for one and a half year for a Jewish study program. There, he became more involved politically. At the time David was there, Issac Rabin the Israeli Prime Minister was assassinated. After returning to Canada, he started learning more about the issue. He supports the current peace process. He is more hesitant about the Palestinian-Israeli relations. He believes that the issue of Jerusalem is not negotiable.

Fibby:

Fibby is an Israeli Jew who used to live in the US. She has been in Canada since 1996. She considers herself a left wing Israeli. She lived in Israel for 6 years. She goes there every year. She is involved in McGill dialogue group. She has Arab friends who she met in US, Canada, Israel and Jordan. She always

has believed in peace to be the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. She believes in the division of Jerusalem to be the solution to the question of Jerusalem.

Jose:

Jose is a 22 year old secular Jew. He was born in Israel and stayed there for 9 and a half years. He moves back and forth between Canada and Israel. Although he is Israeli citizen, he is only allowed to stay in Israel for 3 months because he does not want to do his military duty. Most of Jose's friends, in Canada, are Arabs. He used to have Arab friends when he was living in Israel. He believes in giving back territories to Palestinians including East Jerusalem for peace.

Lanna:

Lanna was born in Canada and left when she was 10 months. She lived in Israel for 21 years. She did not serve in the Army because she used to be religious Jew. At that time, she did not believe in compromising whatever the Jews have. Before two years of leaving Israel, Lanna became secular. The first time for her to contact Arabs was in Canada. By interacting with Arabs and having formal relationships with them, she realized that peace is possible between Arabs and Jews. However, she does not like to see Jerusalem divided.

Sarah:

Sarah is a 23 year old secular Israeli Jew. She was born in Canada and moved to live in Israel when she was 12 years old. She moved back to Canada 2 years ago. She served in the Israeli Army. Although she believed in peace and was involved in the Israeli left wing movement, she did not interact with any Arab in Israel. In Canada, she developed formal relationships with some Arabs.

Sigal:

Sigal is a 24 year old Israeli women. She lived in Israel for 21 years and moved to Canada 4 years ago. She is a left wing secular Jew. She goes to Israel 2-3 times a year. She served in the Israeli Army. She did not contact Arabs in Israel/Palestine although, she was involved in the left wing movement in Israel. In Canada, she had an Egyptian roommate which became her friend. She also dated an Egyptian man. She lost contact with them after they moved. She believes in Peace as a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. She also agrees on dividing Jerusalem to East and West.

Yaan:

Yaan is a 20 year old Jew. He moved to Canada from the U.S. 3 years ago. He is a secular Jew who used to be religious. He visited Israel twice. He contacted Arabs in the U.S. and Canada. He used to believe that Israel is the promised

land where non-Jews cannot live in it. He emphasizes on the influence of religiosity on his attitudes toward the conflict. He supports peace as a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, he disagrees on the "land for peace" solution if there is any risk on Israel's security.