# ORGANICISM IN MUSICOLOGY: A CRITIQUE OF SELECTED TWENTIETH-CENTURY WRITINGS

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# ORGANICISM IN MUSICOLOGY: A CRITIQUE OF SELECTED TWENTIETH-CENTURY MUSICOLOGICAL WRITINGS

by

ROSEANNE KYDD

a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of York University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation calls attention to some of the historical, rhetorical, and gendered components brought into play in musicology's recourse to organicist models. Organicism has been a defining model in music criticism, history, theory and analysis since the turn of the nineteenth century. Its residual philosophical assumptions, the implications of its metaphorical nature and accompanying social practices have not been investigated in any concerted way in the musicological literature to this time. As a result, unexamined metaphysical commitments and social practices accompany musicological discourse and institutional operations which are often deeply at odds with current sensibilities. The mediation of language is poorly understood, in particular the use of metaphor, forcing music which falls outside prevailing depictions to be judged deficient. Especially lacking in the musicological literature is how gender issues are shaped by the language of organicism.

The models employed in musical discourse reflect deeply held values that are rarely foregrounded. The language constructing these models provides a means of access to these values, the articulation of which offers a challenge to their ongoing influence. Literary critical sources were engaged to reconstruct the primary historical horizon, while the work of Paul de Man and feminist studies provided a theoretical framework with which to investigate selected Anglo-American musicological writings from the 1960s to 1990s. Their ability to enrich the composite picture of organicism was assessed.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## INTRODUCTION

> The organicist legacy is a fecund one,....Its teats are intact; the milk still flows.
>
> Paul Douglass[1]

> Over the past forty years we have seen an astonishing virtuosity develop in critical explications, all proceeding from the assumption of organic unity, an assumption amply proved by practice even if inadequately understood in theory.
>
> Norman Holland[2]

> As many musicologists have come to realize (and verbalize), musicology cries out, at this stage of its development, for enrichment from other disciplines; in this it is far behind art history, literary studies, and the rest of the humanities and social sciences, perhaps because of the peculiarly self-contained nature of musical syntax and structure, so seemingly recalcitrant to general humanistic understanding.
>
> Peter Kivy[3]

For many centuries people have sought to articulate their feelings and understanding of music in imagery borrowed from non-musical sources. Music's ineffability and non-specificity prompt efforts to capture its meaning and importance in words. The language in which listeners negotiate their conceptions of music is inseparable from the cultural associations and values evoked in the rhetorical network. A passage from

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[1] "'Such as the Life Is, Such Is the Form': Organicism Among the Moderns," 1987, 271.

[2] "Why Organic Unity?" 1968, 19. Norman Holland is a literary critic.

[3] *Osmin's Rage: Philosophical Reflections of Opera, Drama, Text*, 1988, xi.

Dahlhaus's study, *The Idea of Absolute Music*, underscores the significance of language in shaping musical comprehension:

> Music esthetics--the verbal expression of musical phenomena and problems--is hardly less dependent on the development of literary esthetics than on changes in music itself; and insofar as *the language used to discuss music directly affects the music as it represents itself in the listener's consciousness*, the esthetics of literature, on whose categories and formulae the esthetics of music feeds, belongs to the determining factors of a history of music that does not exhaust itself in the history of musical technique. [my emphasis] (55)

The present study is concerned with how the rhetoric of musical discourse interacts with the cultural values of the Western art tradition while ostensibly addressing purely musical issues *directly*. Organicism is one among many ways of picturing music, albeit one that is prone to forget its semiotic mode, preferring a substantial referentiality which transforms music into a natural entity that develops from its own inner generative forces.[4] Musical cognition, rhetoric, and cultural values form a seamless web.

The motivation for this study stems from my exposure to musical analysis and criticism at two graduate schools where I earned master's degrees in piano performance and in music criticism. What I intuited was a sharp disjunction between musical scholarship's claims to methodological rigour derived from scientific models and the metaphysical orientation of the nineteenth-century intellectual environment which

---

[4]This is the first of many times in this study in which I adopt the literary convention of attributing agency to an intellectual movement, in this case, organicism. This custom may be more typical of European practice than North American writing, and therefore, I draw attention to it here.

nourished current musical concepts. My perception of analysts in white lab coats subjecting works to microscopic examination failed to match the accompanying assumptions of the authority of a canon of musical texts, of their perfection and inexhaustible potential for study. The unquestioning attitude of reverence seemed strangely out of place in the university, more reminiscent of the cathedral or seminary studies of another era.

The permeation of the musical disciplines by an aesthetics dependent upon a metaphor which depicts works as organisms draws attention to this tension between scientific methodologies and philosophical commitments. An investigation of organicism provides a microcosm, a site on which to engage these larger issues. It is hoped that the reader will be challenged by this investigation: to refuse a non-critical acceptance of scholarly claims that indicate no awareness of language's mediating intervention in all listening, reflection, and serious study; and to be wary of "neutral" or "objective" writing which ignores or denies any social context or political implications for its subject matter.

Any model chosen to describe music can be seen as a function of several criteria which operate in ways which are not clearly articulated in musicological literature. First, a model should demonstrate a capacity to explain some of music's properties--formal features, compositional processes, thematic variety, emotional content, etc. Lacking the characteristics of literature--semantics, grammar, narrative, or logic--instrumental music devoid of text created a distinctive challenge for theorists to explain how parts related to wholes. Second, a model must be congruent with the prestige desired for the music. As

Thomas Christensen has observed in his study of Rameau, "He showed an uncanny genius for casting his theory in a rich assortment of intellectual metaphors and models that enjoyed high prestige among his readers..." (304). Science or philosophy have traditionally been fertile sources. Third, a model will reflect certain philosophical positions in currency. For example, the romantic view of music as the embodiment of spirit derives from German idealism. Fourth, a model must be able to express the ideological complex of certain socio-economic groups whose interests are invested in the music.[5]

In the case of an organism as a musical model, what ties these criteria together is a metaphor which is capable of signifying one or more or all of these criteria at the same time. The collapse of these diverse functions into organicism renders any monistic explanation inadequate. Thus historical approaches may revel in discovering parallels in the language of nineteenth-century biology, philosophy, or theology with organicist thinking without, however, taking into account how these ideas appeared to solve musical problems or how this language operates in its twentieth-century manifestations. Failure to recognize the refractory nature of organicism's significations--the conflation of musical

---

[5]An article that has just come to my attention in the Spring 1998 issue of *19th Century Music* focuses on some of these very issues: the interaction among the marketplace, the status of musicians, education, nationalism at the turn of the century in the German states. Celia Applegate writes:

> The paradigm shift, by which literary models of artistic autonomy and transcendence began to shape a new musical hermeneutics as well, can be seen as a new set of mental schemata made necessary by a significant reordering of forms of social integration and employment of musicians. (286)

technicalities, metaphysics, and social practices in this metaphor--contributes to the ongoing imprecision upon which organicism feeds. The closest one can approach to any "precision" in articulating the richly textured thought complex from which organicism issued is to explore its fictive qualities, its history, its network of philosophy and social implications; to tease out its many significations.

Included among these differing paradigms of musical explanation have been *music as mathematics* (from the music of the spheres to Milton Babbitt's interpretation of "pitches and their relationships in terms of modular arithmetic and mathematical group theory" [Simms 87]), *music as language* (including music as rhetoric and syntax),[6] *music as machine* ("music as a system with functioning parts" [Bent 1994, 1]),[7] and *music as science* (an historical model recycled in this century and critiqued by Joseph Kerman).[8] Currently such differing approaches to musical study as science, semiotics, and narrativity, along with cultural and/or feminist critique coexist in university music departments.

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[6]Three articles which address the concept of music as language include: Arnold S. Powers's "Language Models and Musical Analysis," 1980; Robert P. Morgan's "Secret Languages: The Roots of Musical Modernism," 1984; and Joseph P. Swain's "The Concept of Musical Syntax," 1995. Mark Evan Bonds's *Wordless Rhetoric* will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.

[7]Jamie Croy Kassler's article, "The Systematic Writings of Music of William Jones (1726-1800)," 1973, explores one music theorist whose model is mechanistic.

[8]Kerman's article, "How We Got into Analysis and How to Get Out," will be considered in Chapter One.

*Music as organism* has been a particularly persistent model in the musical disciplines continuing into the 1990s, sometimes in conjunction with other critical systems. This persistence of the organic model does not, however, exclude appeals to other, conflicting imagery. Logical consistency suffers many lapses when theorists strike out in search of fitting portrayals for their ideas.

The pervasiveness of organicism in music history, theory, analysis, aesthetics, and criticism--notwithstanding the sometimes coexistence of competing models--is matched only by its longevity, spanning almost 200 years. Hoffmann's 1810 review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is rife with organic suppositions, including the idea that an opening motive, like a seed, "determines the character of the whole piece" (Hoffmann 239). Writing in 1918, Arnold Schoenberg called upon nature to explain the compositional process in vocabulary that links music with the living, organic properties of nature: "A work of art is the same as any perfect organism. It is so homogeneous in its composition that it reveals its true inner essence in each detail" (*Blaue Reiter Almanac* ed. Kandinsky and Marc 1974, 95). Two other pivotal musical figures in the twentieth-century convey dramatically their identification of music with living nature:

> <u>Webern</u> 1932-33 lectures (*The Path to New Music* 1966, 10): "There is no essential contrast between a product of nature and a product of art, but that it is all the same, that what we regard as and call a work of art is basically nothing but a product of nature in general."
>
> <u>Schenker</u> 1935 (*Free Composition*, xxi): "I here present a new concept, one inherent in the works of the great master; indeed, it is the very secret and source of their being: the concept of organic coherence."

All of these writers express a nostalgia for the transubstantive act: music turned into organism, absolute presence--growing, living, breathing.

The remarkable endurance of organicism in so many musical domains may be a function of its success in connecting musical works considered to be "masterpieces" with other deeply embraced values, in conjunction with a strong potential for adaptability to technical, especially music-analytical, concerns. Not the least of its attractions is a tendency to erase the mediating and distancing qualities of language, transforming music into a natural object of immediacy and life. A similar conflation of the organic with the highest critical evaluation can be seen in literary criticism:

> The phrase *organic unity* was in itself so impressive, so productive of what A. O. Lovejoy has called 'metaphysical pathos,' that [A. W.] Schlegel and Coleridge often regarded the mere pronouncing of it as sufficient justification of their beloved Shakespeare. (Benziger 46)

From E. T. A. Hoffmann's early nineteenth-century reviews of Beethoven's symphonies to yesterday's column of music criticism in the local daily, organicist imagery stamps music with the mystery of nature as it ascribes positive value to a performance, a new composition, an old masterpiece. The cellist Yo-Yo Ma is quoted in an interview in *The Toronto Star* (Jan. 6, 1996):

> With the Bach Suites, the DNA of a piece can exist in a small fragment. It can (appear) through six movements and never lose its identity....It makes you think of music as living material that's planted in my mind--in your mind.

An investigation of organicism in musicology has not been attempted on the scale of this dissertation. It holds potential interest for all whose enjoyment of music leads them

to read about music in the writings of others, to reflect about music with the help of words, or to commit such thoughts to writing. So intriguing is musicology's enchantment with organicity that calls for a reception history of music's reliance upon the organic figure in the musicological literature are not uncommon. In his article, "'Eroica' Perspectives: Strategy and Design in the First Movement," 1982, Lewis Lockwood underscores the need for a history of musicology's dependence upon organicism:

> Although the issue [organicism] has yet to be seriously studied by musicologists, it would be extremely profitable to trace the ways in which this idea, gathering force, in the nineteenth century following Goethe, Coleridge, and other writers, found its way readily into writings on music and became deeply embedded in analytic procedures. (264)

In her dissertation, "Metaphor and Model in the Analysis of Melody," 1977, Ruth Solie notes, "In literary criticism since Coleridge the organic idea has become so widely known and applied that it may be labelled as such in textbooks like Pepper's" (80).[9] In a footnote to this sentence Solie continues,

> This is in sharp contrast to other arts, particularly music, in which the terms are used rather promiscuously without reference to a set body of ideas. To my knowledge the technical implications of this metaphor for music have never been clarified.

Nadine Hubbs notes in her 1990 dissertation, "Musical Organicism and Its Alternatives," that the precise nature of organicism in musical discourse "remains vague, and its attributes and specifically musical manifestations remain largely unidentified and unformalized" (3).

---

[9]She is referring here to Stephen Pepper's *The Basis of Criticism in the Arts*, 1946.

While this study may not fulfill the objectives of Locke, Solie, or Hubbs, it does follow a more recent departure within musicology, away from a focus on "the music itself" to a focus on the intellectual milieu which undergird, legitimate, and propel musical investigation. There are many indicators of this new direction. One of the most striking is the shift in attitude amongst Schenkerian scholars away from an earlier aversion to Schenker's philosophical excesses to increased interest in the broader philosophical connections of his musical theories. Patrick McCreless observes a new stage in English-language musical scholarship:

> Historians have moved beyond an overriding concern with musical substance and structure to take into account the philosophical, aesthetic, and cultural contexts of the theories about which they write. (McCreless 1998, 170)

Feminist theory and language debates have been two of the strongest influences dominating critical discourse in the last half of this century . Consequently, insights derived from these proliferating fields have made available some challenging new perspectives with which to approach musical scholarship. An understanding of musicology's dependence upon organicism can be enlarged and clarified by recourse to linguistic analysis and feminism.

While engaging musical writings from the perspective of language analysis comprises a fairly new approach in musicology, it is quickly attracting a wide range of scholars, both established ones and promising younger ones. Writing in 1991, Henry Kingsbury referred to "studies of the rhetorical organization of scholarly writing" as

something of a "growth industry." While this was not a description of the field of music, it is becoming truer of musicology, as Chapter Seven and Eight will demonstrate. The injection of feminist theory into musical discourse spawned a whole new perspective for scholarly investigation. My master's thesis, "Feminist Music Criticism: Derivations and Directions," 1992, participated in this new concern, documenting the burgeoning literature published in the field.

The importance of organic imagery in musical writings is treated as a *given* in this study, a full reception history of musical organicism being beyond its scope. My aim is to probe organic imagery in twentieth-century musical studies in order to provide a more comprehensive grasp of the issues at play in musicology's addiction to organicism, with a view to evaluating critiques of organicism in Anglo-American musicological writings from the last three decades. Such a perspective is still lacking. Some minor initiatives in the form of articles have been taken which open organicism to questioning; however, the lack of a shared frame of reference hampers any tidy investigation derived from a schema of rules and definitions. Dahlhaus offers a warning to those wishing to investigate the language of aesthetics:

> The language in which aesthetic judgments are formulated is often vague and confused. Logical purists obsessed by a desire to lock all ideas into fixed definitions should avoid aesthetics and its history, which would drive them to despair. (*Analysis and Value Judgment* 31)

In order to accommodate the intractable qualities of organicism, my methodology is of necessity multifarious. Organicism's intrinsically metaphorical character renders

theoretical paraphrase problematic, its outstanding features being at bottom often illogical, polyvalent, and inconsistent. My critical approach is three-fold: historical, linguistic, and feminist. Some *historical* clarification is necessary as a means to elucidate present usage of organic imagery which not infrequently calls forth unarticulated values from the past. Accordingly, the historical horizon of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which gave rise to organicism will be explored. The *linguistic* perspective of rhetorical analysis, which concentrates on a text's figurative discourse--sometimes termed "discourse analysis"--will assist in this probing. Not unrelated to rhetorical analysis is an investigation of metaphor. Some criteria relating to metaphor will be assessed in Chapter Two. *Feminist* theory will be called upon to address the relationship between gender and organicism, a topic consistently overlooked even in recent engagements with musical organicism. Organicism's appropriation of the "feminine" acted to exclude women themselves from the public world of music by means of an aesthetic that was gendered, if undeclared.

These three orientations reflect my assumptions that a review of the historical horizon which gave rise to organicism can clarify the present; that language forms the principal conduit for the naturalizing, synthesizing operations which the trope of organicism performs; that organicism manifests multiple gender-based exclusions and implications which call for careful examination.

Organicism represents a curious blend of concepts, figures, and values which overlap and support each other. Being intrinsically metaphorical, organicism is not subject

to paraphrase. For the purposes of this study I will depict organicism as a "cluster" of interconnected ideas. In this heuristic "organic cluster," I identified eight ideas or characteristics as components which usually, but not necessarily function together: unity, autonomy, totality, teleology, growth, nature, genius, soul/spirit. It can be argued that the list is incomplete or too extensive, or that some of these elements overlap or can be further divided. I have chosen to maintain them in part because of their historical links as key words in the vocabulary of aesthetics, but also because of their value for purposes of discussion. While the metaphor of organicism may provide the spark and continuing appeal of organicism through its linking of music with nature, it is very much more than a metaphor. It is more fully articulated as a metanarrative, a root metaphor, an archetype, or a master trope.

The non-musicological texts pertaining to literary history, philosophy, or feminism are selected primarily for their capacity to enrich a composite picture rather than to exhaust a narrow domain. The designations, primary and secondary, are not always appropriate in my critique as individual sources slip in and out of these categories, playing sometimes one role and sometimes another. What appears as a secondary source because of its dependence upon earlier materials, becomes itself a primary text subject to discourse analysis as it participates in the ongoing dialogue about organicism.

While sources addressing organicism are increasing in this decade, the *critical* literature is not very extensive in this century relative to musical writings that rely upon organic figures. I have outlined three criteria which guide the selection: 1. Anglo-

American or translations of European musical writings relating to the canon of Western art music; 2. a timeframe encompassing the decades of the1960s through 1990s; 3. the writer's critical awareness of organicism or organic imagery, in contrast to an unconscious dependence upon it.

However rich may have been the interpretive and analytical insights which organicist musical scholarship has produced, it also produced deficits relating to metaphysics, social practices, and musical complexity. The language of organicism continues to evoke the metaphysical presumptions of earlier centuries, denials notwithstanding. A focus upon rhetoric reveals the blurring of boundaries between natural and human processes and products. Paul de Man identifies this erasure of ontological difference as the "archtypal error: the recurrent confusion of sign and substance" (1983, 136). Musical organicism enacts this archtypal error by fusing musical, linguistic, and natural reality.

The social practices that were part of the organic aesthetic network intersect with a wide range of issues including race, class, and gender. The relationship between organicism and gender has been seriously neglected in the musical disciplines; it is, therefore, one aspect of the social web I will explore. For example, has the language of artistic creativity borrowed from woman's capacity to give birth empowered or diminished women's opportunities in the musical disciplines?

Organicist models in music history, criticism, and analysis conspired to filter from musical discourse those aspects of music which were at odds with its narrow parameters.

Thus music that seemed incongruous with history's progressive, developmental model was passed by as discussions of Schumann's and Liszt's work illustrates in Chapter Three. Music that failed to display the tightly-knit qualities of generative motivic material, didn't measure up to organicist evaluation. Adherence to the organicist template may account for a negative judgement on music conceived under different paradigms, such as literary or visually inspired models.

One other component of this study requires explanation: the religious affiliation of aesthetics. In writing a dissertation, one sometimes encounters other paths that beckon but which, however compelling, must fall outside the scope of a study whose boundaries are already wide. It became clear early on in my research that one of the principal conduits from past centuries into the present, in addition to the biological sciences and philosophy, was the Judeo-Christian tradition. Here art was rendered "alive" through its embodiment of "living spirit." An emphasis upon the sacred text as autonomous (positing a potentailly inexhaustible source for analysis and contemplation), and upon the unity of disparate ontologies (the human and divine) in word, symbol, and ritual conspired to facilitate the kind of metaphorical transubstantiation that turned art into a spiritual organism suitable for intense study. This migration of theological concepts from Judeo-Christian principles will be encountered first in Chapter One in the transformation of the roles of God-the-Creator, prophet or priest, or interpreter of the sacred, into the secularized musical functions of composer, critic, or analyst. It is difficult to avoid confrontation with religious matters when, as Dahlhaus expresses the phenomenon, "In

great instrumental music the soul of a Christian epoch was expressing itself" (1989, 55). Some acknowledgement of the religious dimension is, therefore, necessary.[10]

Music history, criticism, and analysis have all utilized the figure of an organism in some pivotal if differing ways. Music historiographer Vincent Duckles credits Guido Adler with furnishing "the dominant rationale for modern historical scholarship in music" (82). In his 1885 treatise, "Scope, Method and Aims of Musicology," Adler writes:

> The most satisfying task of the scholar of art is to demonstrate and establish how, proceeding from the beginnings of simple melody, the structure of works of art gradually grows; how, proceeding from the simplest thesis, the artistic norms latent in the tonal products become more and more complicated; how tonal systems pass away with disappearing cultures; how little by little, a chain of cells attaches itself to a limb and so grows organically; how elements standing outside the mainstream of progressive development perish because they are not viable. (8)

Adler depicted music as an organism that proceeds just as teleologically as any of nature's processes, in a meaningful and ongoing development. The comparison of the whole of

---

[10]This is an area that has received more attention recently as is evidenced by John Covach's article, "The Sources of Schoenberg's 'Aesthetic Theology'," 1996. The latter phrase in quotations comes from Dahlhaus's article, "Schoenberg's Aesthetic Theology," in his book, *Schoenberg and the New Music*. Dahlhaus readily acknowledges the importance of theology in aesthetics in his writings. The following excerpt from his *Nineteenth-Century Music* is illustrative:

> If true church music belongs to a lost age, Hoffmann finds metaphysical substance--and for him that meant religious substance--in modern instrumental music, namely, in the Beethoven symphony, which speaks in notes of the "marvels of a distant realm"....Granted the existence of a "religion of art," even Beethoven's symphonies become "religious" music, since they represent an evolutionary stage at which the "ever-drifting World Spirit" has transmuted clearly defined Christian beliefs into previsions of the "marvels of a distant realm." (183-84)

music history to an organism worked just as effectively as the comparison of an individual musical work to an organism. Duckles claims that most of the concepts and methods of nineteenth-century musicology, of which Adler is a prominent example, are "alive and functioning in our own day" (75-76).

While the importance of the metaphor in guiding music history texts is well understood, its role in criticism and analysis is less clear.[11] For this reason my emphasis on its application to music history will be less extensive, limited mainly to Warren Dwight Allen's book, *Philosophies of Music History*, discussed in Chapter Three.

It is difficult to separate the *critical* and *analytical* employment of the organic metaphor in music writing because critical comment frequently relies upon analytical procedures to substantiate its claims. A circular argument is in operation here as the "organic" is assumed as a value which legitimates a musical work, and an analysis which seeks to demonstrate organicity is brought forth as evidence of a piece's artistic worth. Thus a piece is selected for study on the basis of its organicity, the "organic" functioning here as a concealed value, after which its organicity is shown in analysis as proof of what was initially assumed.[12] It would seem that analysis provides the technical, musical

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[11]For examples of an early and late twentieth-century engagement with "organic" history, see Warren Dwight Allen's *Philosophies of Music History* 1939, revised 1962, and Gary Tomlinson's *Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others*, 1993.

[12]This is a point which Joseph Kerman underscores in his article, "How we Got Into Analysis, and How to Get Out," 1980 and is taken up again in Alan Street's article, "Superior Myths, Dogmatic Allegories: The Resistance to Musical Unity," 1989. Chapters One and Eight respectively explore these essays.

working out or evidence for the evaluative process that characterizes criticism. Insofar as both criticism and analysis have been limited to a standard musical repertoire of Western art music, the critical judgement has become absorbed into the selection process which is already established. Until recently a broader-based criticism, including historical and cultural phenomena, has been lacking, leaving critics little to do apart from analysis.

Whether criticism or analysis, what is involved is a comparison of a musical work with a living organism, most commonly a plant. Hoffmann compares Beethoven's instrumental music to Shakespeare and both to a tree, an insight available to the "initiated" who can expound on art with great care:

> Aestheticians have often complained about Shakespeare's complete lack of the unities and inner continuity, although for those who inspect more closely, a beautiful tree springs from a seed and puts forth leaves, blooms, and fruit. In the same way, Beethoven's supreme self-possession--inseparable from true genius and nourished by dedication to the art--is revealed only after a thorough investigation of his instrumental music. (Hoffmann 85, trans. Schaeffer)

A similar organic image proposed by Coleridge is of a seed growing into an organism as it stretches outward, absorbing light and nutrients and re-assimilating them into itself as it develops according to its own inner design. This description portrays not only the active imagination of the artist, penetrating like a light into the world, absorbing and assimilating objects from the external world and transforming them into living products of art, it also describes the work of art itself which represents a living whole whose parts cannot be removed or altered without threatening the unity of the whole. It is this symbolizing mode facilitated by the organicist trope, which is the target of much

linguistic critique. The metamorphosis of one mode of being--the mind, spirit, cognition--into another mode of being--sound, pigment, words--or into yet another mode of being, nature--is the fiction that motivates a mysticism desiring the immediate presence of what language can only promise, but never deliver.

## CHAPTER GUIDE

**CHAPTER ONE** introduces some of the musicological issues involved in dependence upon the organic trope. The chapter is a dialogue with two texts, "The Living Work: Organicism in Musical Analysis," 1980, by Ruth Solie, and "How We Got into Analysis and How to Get Out," 1980, by Joseph Kerman. These essays can be seen as an early response from musicology to the predominence of musical analysis, based upon the writers' perceptions of some problems arising from a too-heavy dependence upon organicism. A closer examination of some passages from Schenker, prompted by Kerman's and Solie's essays, concludes the chapter.

**CHAPTER TWO** examines two favoured metaphors, the mirror and the machine, providing an historical background in which to place the reaction of proponents of organic imagery. It also raises the matter of how metaphors shape and filter the interpretation of texts. The focus narrows to examine organicism as it developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, with Coleridge and the early German romantics giving it its most succinct expression. It raises the question, what is organicism? M. H. Abrams's

classical study of literary history as metaphor, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*, offers a guide to follow the twists and turns of paradigmatic metaphors in aesthetics and literary criticism in an historical context.

**CHAPTER THREE** interrogates a sampling of musical writings from 1960-1979. I will explore these texts as twentieth-century sources which provide a window onto organicism in musical studies, especially musical analysis, that genre of study which has been so in favour at least since the translation of Heinrich Schenker's writings into English in the late 1970s. Included in this chapter are those who reflect upon organicism, some positively and some negatively: Vernon Kliewer's Ph.D. dissertation, "The Concept of Organic Unity in Music Criticism and Analysis," 1961; Warren Dwight Allen's book, *Philosophies of Music History: A Study of General Histories of Music 1600-1960*, 1939/1962; and Arthur Hutchings's article, "Organic Structure in Music," 1962.

**CHAPTER FOUR** commences with the article, "Some Models of Unity in Musical Form," by Carl Dahlhaus, broadening to encompass his larger oeuvre as it relates to organicism. Dahlhaus's writings represent a deep, if brief, engagement with this biologically-based metaphor, one that is marked by contradiction and suspicion. Some unresolved difficulties anticipate the need for a more rigorous approach to language, one that Paul de Man supplies.

**CHAPTER FIVE** focuses upon Paul de Man's encounter with organicism. De Man is one of the leading deconstructive critics who has confronted organicism on many fronts, but particularly as it functions as language. His emphasis upon the inherent

temporality and contingency of language, upon the impossibility of direct access to truth or reality through unmediated language, upon a favouring of allegory over metaphor because of its attention to distancing, upon the importance of the reader, upon the proliferation of meaning in language because of its tropical nature and the operations of irony which destabilize it--all of these ideas and more stand in opposition to organic assumptions, what de Man labels "ideology."

**CHAPTER SIX**: Less obvious is the political potential of organicism in musical discourse, until, that is, one begins to scrutinize organicism with the same intensity of gaze one fixes on a work of art. The gender implications hidden in organicism raise many other critical, linguistic, and theoretical issues which extend beyond purely feminist concerns. These include the concept of nature, the birth metaphor, the proliferation of meanings generated by words; the operations of power in binary thinking; the intrinsic male perspective infiltrating all of the organic components. These queries tie in with the larger agenda of critical theory according to Jonathan Culler who states:

> The main thrust of recent theory...has been the critique of whatever is taken as natural, the demonstration that what has been thought or declared natural is in fact a historical, cultural construction. (Culler 1991, 207)

**CHAPTERS SEVEN AND EIGHT** investigate some more recent grappling with the organic in musical discourse. I will explore how various musicologists conceptualize organicism, probing their texts for both their own awareness of rhetoric in musical discourse and how the rhetoric of their own essays operates. The critical perspectives outlined in earlier chapters will be brought to bear on these materials. Chapter Seven

addresses differing conceptualizations of organicism by musicologists since the 1980s. Chapter Eight explores musicological texts for the writer's awareness of rhetorical critique.

In summary, my thesis is that the organicism upon which so much of music history, criticism, theory and analysis depends is tolerated by music scholars with an unacceptably low level of critical intervention. Using historical, linguistic, and feminist approaches, my investigation probes a network of inter-related concepts (what I have termed a cluster of eight components) that involves undeclared metaphysical assumptions and social practices: for example, a commitment to the importance of deep structures which determine surface events, the elevation of gifted men to the status of priests or prophets, the privileging of unity over diversity. I maintain that failure on the part of musicologists to identify organicist depictions as derived from a metaphor reveals presuppositions about language that ignore its mediating position and that fail to recognize the inability of signifier and signified to coincide.

The overall organization involves an initial foray into musicology to determine what issues are at stake in dependence upon organicism. This leads to a widening spiral which precipitates a dialogue between music and other disciplines. The study is structured to reflect escalating standards and expectations for the problem. Pre-1980 writings in musicology are considered before my examination of post-structural or feminist critiques which could not reasonably have been expected to influence them. Specifically the engagement with Dahlhaus calls for the insights expressed in de Man's work. The wider

critical spectrum developed in the preceding chapters is then brought to bear on the final two chapters. The dissertation is primarily an exercise in criticism. As such, it does not propose some new methodology, allegorical or otherwise, the notion of methodology itself being a questionable migrant from science. It is my contention that a longer and deeper critical exercise is necessary at this historical juncture.

# PART I: THE HERITAGE

The Creator is not a maker of artificial flowers. He lets them all grow from one germ. Fugues and canons are subject to similar laws.

Moritz Hauptmann

[Schenkerian analysis] is, primarily, a means of uncovering organic unity within masterworks of tonal music, with "organic unity" understood not as an abstract aesthetic norm but rather as a demonstrably concrete relationship of part to whole.

Maury Yeston

It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical convictions.

Richard Rorty

## CHAPTER ONE

### *TWO INITIAL MUSICOLOGICAL TREATMENTS OF ORGANICISM: JOSEPH KERMAN AND RUTH SOLIE PLUS A CONSIDERATION OF SCHENKER*

> The central metaphors by means of which authors shape their musical conceptions inescapably affect the kinds of activities and aesthetic attitudes that readers find themselves invited to adopt.
>
> Robert Snarrenberg[1]

> But for the preponderance of organicism attitudes, the consensus of opinion that surrounds 'the instrumental music of the great German tradition' could never be so strong.
>
> Alan Street[2]

> None of the arts has been affected more deeply than music by the ideology of organicism; its baleful influence is still very much with us.
>
> Joseph Kerman[3]

Unlike the epigrams opening the Introduction, all of the above excerpts are the work of musical scholars. A time lag of approximately twenty years separates the interest of literary critics in confronting organicism from music critics' concern with the subject. Joseph Kerman and Ruth Solie are two historical musicologists who pioneered inquiry into the addiction to organicism manifested in musical analysis. Their excursions into literary

[1]"Competing Myths: the American Abandonment of Schenker's Organicism," 1994, 31.

[2]"Superior Myths, Dogmatic Allegories: The Resistance to Musical Unity," 1989, 83.

[3]*Contemplating Music*, 1985, 65.

criticism and philosophy account in no small measure for their insights. The publication of their articles in 1980 signals a reaction to the dominance of analysis in musical scholarship along with its practice of denying any relevance or legitimacy to the "outside" dimensions of a work, its philosophical underpinnings or ideology. What reasons might account for this time difference in response to the organicist preoccupation in literary criticism and musicology?

One explanation points to the more insular nature of musical studies derived in part from the many years of intense study required to achieve competence in such demanding musical skills as performance, composition, or analysis. Music specialists tend not to have formally studied such subjects as philosophy, history, sociology, literature, or science in their university careers. Moreover, music theory and analysis provide scholars with such a rigorous and satisfying means of access to musical works that disciplinary border-crossing offers little attraction.

The separation of criticism and analysis in musical study is a phenomenon unparalled in the other arts. Tracing the developments of these two sides of musical investigation is beyond the scope of this study; however their uneasy relationship, discussed in Kerman's article, highlights some issues relevant to organicism in music. The ever-increasing importance granted analysis at the expense of other musical perspectives, primarily musicology and criticism, bears witness to the triumph of explanations able to link musical theories with organic unity. There is no comparable counterpart in the other arts to the highly technical concepts and methods of musical analysis. Appeal to the

organism metaphor in musical study has the effect of obscuring music's affinity with mathematics and its connections to the historical disciplines of counterpoint and harmony, two highly constructed disciplines quite unlike natural organisms.

Patrick McCreless provides a helpful context for the articles by Kerman and Solie, early signs of resistance to the dominance of musical analysis. In his essay, "Contemporary Music Theory and the New Musicology: An Introduction," 1996, McCreless tracks the ascendence of contemporary music theory or analysis (the terms are often used interchangeably whether legitimately or not) in the academic power structures. He is referring to the "distinctly American version of music theory" which established its claim for admission "to the modern research university" on "the rigors of twelve-tone," "pitch-class-set theory," and "the European pedigree, of Schenker" (3). McCreless notes the international influence of American music theory: "Contemporary American theory serves as a model for theoretical and analytical journals in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and beyond" (3).

A defining moment in the trajectory of current music theory came in 1977 with the founding of the Society for Music Theory. The two disciplines against which theory defined itself were composition and musicology, the former to which it felt "subordinated in the job market" and the latter from which it wished to distance itself, in particular, "description rather than analysis, the study of genre, and worst of all, the study of style and stylistic change." McCreless writes, "What *we*, as theorists understood that the musicologists reputedly did not was *music*--dare I say, music itself: the score, the sound,

the structure, the work, and how 'it' 'works'" (3). Musicological writings that could offer Schenkerian graphs to illustrate a point served as hard evidence in building an argument and therefore ranked higher in the scale of values where analysis itself was a stated value. Key words associated with this way of knowing are "rigor," "analysis," "structure," and "work."

The hegemony of theory and analysis provoked yet another reaction from musicology, to what it perceived as the narrowness, inadequacies, and blindness of theory-based analysis. As McCreless explains:

> It was music theory's tying itself so doggedly to the notions of structure, of system, of work, that in time inadvertently opened up a disciplinary space for the new, postmodern musicology, thus providing the latter with a foil against which *it* could constitute *itself* as a new knowledge, a new power. (3)

The "new" musicology was characterized by a questioning of "the ideology and politics on which both the canon and musicology itself were based" (4).

McCreless' account of "Contemporary Music Theory and the New Musicology" highlights the newly elevated status of theory-based analysis in the academic power structures of the late 1970s and 80s and locates Kerman's concerns and to a slightly lesser extent Solie's, in a mode of reaction to this emphasis. Kerman and Solie are musicologists noted for their work in nineteenth-century music and for their interdisciplinary perspective. Their challenge to organicism, which they judge to be the cornerstone of musical analysis, is a recognition of the rise of musical analysis in the 1970s as an authoritative discipline

that defined itself as a more rigorous, scientific approach to music, one found wanting in the supposedly laxer methodologies of musicology.

These essays also mark a trend noted in the Introduction toward interest in the intellectual milieu, in particular, philosophical issues which support and direct musical scholarship. This shift away from exclusive focus upon "music" to the wider base of philosophical connections is especially evident amongst Schenkerian scholars. The practice of separating Schenker's "non-musical" aspects from the purely musical theoretical parts has long been acknowledged in a number of ways. One is the simple deletion of the more offensive sections in translations geared for American democratic readers who might be shocked by Schenker's elitist, sexist, or racist inclinations. In the second German edition of *Der freie Satz*, Oswald Jonas "cut nearly one fifth of the foreword and first chapter and rearranged what was left" (Snarrenberg 1994, 29).[4] More commonly it is stated that Schenker's "indulgence" in polemics or philosophy bears no substantial relationship to his analytical insights and can, therefore, be ignored. The following three passages are all by Allen Forte, the first appearing in the introduction to the English translation of Schenker's *Free Composition*, 1979:

> Almost none of the [polemical and quasi-philosophical] material bears substantive relation to the musical concepts that he developed during his lifetime and, from that standpoint, can be disregarded.... (xviii)

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[4]A note on deletions and their restoration is found in the "Series Editor's Acknowledgment" (*Der freie Satz*, x).

The next two excerpts are taken from Forte's influential essay, "Schenker's Conception of Musical Structure" anthologized in Maury Yeston's *Readings in Schenker Analysis and Other Approaches*, 1977 and first published in 1959:

> The bases of Schenker's concept of structural levels...are not to be found in abstruse speculation, nor in acoustical or metaphysical formulations (although Schenker was not averse to these), but in the organization of the music itself (7). [Footnote to this statement]: A certain amount of confusion in this regard may be attributed to Schenker's frequent indulgence in lengthy ontological justification of his concepts. (34)

> Implicit here is a distinction between Schenker as theorist and Schenker as philosopher-historian. Schenker's interpretation of music history rarely demonstrated the same clear, rigorous thinking which is evident in much of his theoretical work. (Footnote 23, 36)

By contrast the profusion of writings which attend to Schenker's philosophical affiliations suggests a radical departure from a viewpoint claiming orientation to exclusively musical concerns.[5]

Three parts make up the rest of the chapter: Joseph Kerman's examination of organicism, Solie's investigation, plus a final section on Schenker. The latter is in recognition of the central position of Schenker's theories in musical studies which provide

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[5]These include: on Goethe--Gary Don, "Goethe and Schenker"; Pastille, "Music and Morphology: Goethe's Influence on Schenker's Thought"; on Hegel--Michael Cherlin, "Hauptmann and Schenker: Two Adaptations of Hegelian Dialectics"; on Kant--Kevin Korsyn, "Schenker and Kantian Epistemology"; on Neo-Platonism--Jamie Kassler, "Heinrich Schenker's Epistemology and Philosophy of Music: An Essay on the Relations Between Evolutionary Theory and Music Theory"; on Schopenhauer-- Nicholas Cook, "Schenker's Theory of Music as Ethics." In addition, there are more general essays addressing Schenker's philosophical interests. See discussion of Hubbs, Lubben, Snarrenberg, Solie, and Street in Chapters Seven and Eight below.

some of the most compelling imagery of organicism in music. It is prompted by Kerman's references and by Solie's extensive quotations of Schenker but expanded by my own observations along with some other Schenker sources.

## JOSEPH KERMAN'S EXAMINATION OF ORGANICISM

Kerman's paper, "How we Got into Analysis, and How to Get Out," 1980, marks the recognition of a specific occurrence in the musical disciplines that peaked in the 1980s: the predominance of musical analysis as an authoritative voice in musical academia.[6] In his essay Kerman registers an incipient doubt about the completeness or ability of any one analytical system to convey the complexity and uniqueness of musical works. In critiquing analysis, Kerman targets the organicism upon which these systems are based, especially its applicability outside of the largely German, common-practice period of instrumental music. Without rejecting organicism, Kerman examines its ideological underpinnings and its limitations as a total interpretation of any one piece.

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[6]Kerman's essay was first presented in 1979 as a Thalheimer Lecture in Philosophy at the Johns Hopkins University. Subsequently it was published in *Critical Inquiry* 1980 (my source), *On Criticizing Music: Five Philosophical Perspectives* 1981, and in *Criticism and Analysis*, The Garland Library of the History of Western Music, vol. 13, 1985. It has found its most recent home in Kerman's book of 20 articles, *Write All These Down: Essays on Music*, 1994. Kjellrun Hestekin's review of Kerman's *Write All these Down* in *Canadian University Music Review*, 1996, 16/2, notes the publication sources of this article (144).

Kerman bemoans the fact that criticism of a substantial, complex nature is lacking in musical discourse. What he does find however is a great deal of attention and "respect" accorded musical analysis. The nomenclature of this activity--analysis or criticism--may be clarified by looking at what other areas of the arts understand by criticism. Kerman writes:

> Analysis sets out to discern and demonstrate the functional coherence of individual works of art, their "organic unity," as is often said, and that is one of the things--one of the main things--that people outside of music mean by criticism. (312)

It would have been interesting to see Kerman pursue this difference between literary criticism and music criticism. Whereas in literary criticism, analysis and criticism are not distinguished, in musical studies analysis and criticism are distinct, if related. It is their confused intermingling and the undeclared dependence of criticism upon analysis that Kerman addresses. In exploring this difference between literary and music criticism, the question arises, how does the absence of any equivalent to music analysis in literary studies affect an understanding of organicism, if at all?[7]

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[7]Bernard Shaw had an answer. He would quite simply have eliminated musical analysis which he parodied relentlessly:

> [Shakespeare], dispensing with the customary exordium, announces his subject at once in the infinitive, in which mood it is presently repeated after a short connecting passage in which, brief as it is, we recognize the alternate and negative forms on which so much of the significance of repetition depends. (Shaw, ed. Crompton, xii)

Shaw's contempt for music analysis is seen in his description of it as parading "silly little musical parsing exercises to impress the laity exactly as the performances of the learned pig impress the rustics at a fair." ("How to Become a Musical Critic," anthologized in *A Selection of Readings of Criticism and the Criticism of Criticism*, compiled by Alan Walker, McMaster University, no pagination).

If demonstrating coherence is one criterion of criticism, another characteristic of criticism is the study of a work in "its own self-defined terms." The claims of analysts may exclude the criterion of "value" or "aesthetic criteria"--normative components of the critical agenda--but Kerman wonders if musical analysts' acceptance of "objective methodologies" can be taken at face value. This refusal of aesthetic value is a recent occurrence in music theory, earlier critics such as Schenker and Tovey being unambiguous in their championing of "the superiority of the towering products of the German musical genius":

> It is only in more recent times that analysts have avoided value judgments and adapted their work to a format of strictly corrigible propositions, mathematical equations, set-theory formulations, and the like--all this, apparently, in an effort to achieve the objective status and hence the authority of scientific inquiry. (313)

In the next sentence, Kerman heightens his polemic:

> Articles on music composed after 1950, in particular, appear sometimes to mimic scientific papers in the way that South American bugs and flies will mimic the dreaded carpenter wasp.

Included among these writers is Allen Forte whose book, *The Compositional Matrix*, is devoid of "all affective or valuational terms." But as Kerman points out, no treatment of Sammartini or Gyrowetz is to be found there interfering with the lavish attention to Beethoven. According to Kerman the question of aesthetic value is "absolutely basic and begged, begged consistently and programmatically" (314). The true centre of analysis is "not science but ideology." Kerman defines ideology: "By ideology, I

mean a fairly coherent set of ideas brought together not for strictly intellectual purposes but in the service of some strongly held communal belief" (314).[8]

The centrepiece of this belief is the overarching value accorded to German instrumental music with its key figures Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, and Brahms. Stemming from this belief was a "mystical" notion of authentic performance, the portrayal of the "artist as sage and suffering hero," and "a strain of Hegelian aesthetic philosophy" which found full expression in the music criticism of Eduard Hanslick (314). Hanslick's understanding of music as "sounding form" pointed in the direction of its study as formalistic.

Kerman proceeds to describe formalist methods in a way that bears directly on organicism:

> The vision of these analyst-critics was and is of a perfect, organic relation among all the analyzable parts of a musical masterpiece. Increasingly sophisticated techniques of analysis attempt to show how all aspects or "parameters" or "domains" of the masterpiece perform their function for the total structure. Critics who differ vastly from one another in their methods, styles, and emphases still view the work of art ultimately as an organism in this sense. From the standpoint of the ruling ideology, analysis exists for the purpose of demonstrating organicism, and organicism exists for the purpose of validating a certain body of works of art. (315)

Calling upon J. N. Forkel, E. T. A. Hoffmann, Hanslick, Schenker, Tovey, Reti, and Alfred Lorenz, Kerman traces the broad commitments to organicist dogma. He credits

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[8]Kerman's definition reflects a criterion of models borrowed to explain music as outlined in the Introduction, that they reflect the belief system or values of the community with which the music is identified.

Schoenberg with the remarkable insight that the continuance of the great European tradition of music was not dependent upon tonality, as so many of its champions believed, but upon the ideology of organicism. Kerman observes, "In retrospect one can see implicit from the start the ideal of 'total organization' which was to be formulated by the new serialists after World War II" (318). In expressing such admiration for Schoenberg's insight that the European tradition's continuance was based upon organic ideology rather than tonality, Kerman makes a case for the ongoing use of organic models in analysis. This would seem to challenge his earlier statement that organicism be confined to works of the nineteenth century.

Kerman leaves his historical musings to return to the contemporary scene which first prompted his concern about the state of music criticism. One of the reasons for the failure of criticism to take hold, he reasons, is the very success of analysis--its prestige and power, yes, but also its "deeply satisfying" nature. Kerman quotes the philosopher and critic, Stanley Cavell, who notes with envy the precision of musical analysis. Kerman's comments on the comparative looseness of visual art or literature in contrast with music highlights a point I wish to develop. He describes Cavell:

> [He] knows how much more fully one can fix a melodic line as compared to a line in a drawing, or a musical rhythm as compared to a poetic one, or even an ambiguity in harmony as compared to an *ambiguity of metaphor*. [my emphasis] (321)

Kerman is strangely unaware of the import of what he has written about the "ambiguity of metaphor." Apparently music deals in the clear specificity of its shapes, rhythms, and

harmonies, escaping the "ambiguity of metaphor" so endemic to literature. He has just invested 10 pages of his essay demonstrating the dependence of musical analysis upon an ideology grounded in organicism and is about to launch his final 10 pages. Nine of these pages engage in an analysis of the second piece of Schumann's song cycle, *Dichterliebe*, as an illustration of the inadequacy of an organicist, reductionist model to address the unique and interesting qualities of the song. He does not state that what he has been dealing with all along is precisely "the ambiguity of metaphor"--the very unwieldy functioning of language. In this case a metaphor joined music and organisms in a figurative transfer and gradually collected such a variety of ideational baggage that its primary nineteenth-century exponents would hardly be able to recognize their current ancestors.[9]

Kerman offers an alternative to what he describes as "the limitations of the discipline [analysis] as a whole," using Schumann's second number, "Aus meinen Thränen spriessen" from his song cycle, *Dichterliebe*. The significance of this choice lies in its having been analyzed by Allen Forte in an article which has been printed in four different venues. In other words, this analysis has become exemplary in the discipline.

Kerman's criticism is almost wholly negative, focussing on what is endemic to a Schenkerian approach: the loss of other musical features plus historical and cultural

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[9]This emphasis upon "fixing" a musical element like some specimen is in stark contrast to Hoffmann's spiritual orientation of 1810:

> Beethoven's instrumental music unveils before us the realm of the mighty and the immeasurable...destroying within us all feeling but the pain of infinite yearning....Only in this pain...do we live on as ecstatic visionaries. ("Beethoven's Fifth Symphony," 238)

factors which escape the reductive procedure. Distinctive musical qualities such as the importance of a cadence gesture disappear in the musical graph, absorbed by structural features; the words and their unique interaction with the music are ignored (326-29); the role of the piano accompaniment working sometimes in tension with the voice finds no representation in the Schenkerian sketch; any connections to the larger song cycle cannot be registered; historical considerations relating to the song's composition, genre, Schumann's fascination with disguises, etc. cannot be incorporated. Kerman concludes:

> What is important is to find ways of dealing responsibly with other kinds of aesthetic value in music besides organicism. I do not really think we need to get out of analysis,...only out from under. (331)

What he proposes as an alternative is the broadening of analysis with this distinction: that it be designated "criticism."

Kerman's identification of organicism as a continuous influence in the Western music tradition from the eighteenth century through to the 1980s was a subject little explored at the time of its first publication. Kerman assumes a constancy to organicism without attempting to define it. He makes no inquiries into its gender implications despite the exclusiveness of "masterpieces" as the only objects of study. Nor does he distinguish among the many different ways organicism signifies, be it as ideology, or a prop for modern structuralism. The metaphorical status of the organic is not pursued, nor are the many insights such an identification opens up. Nonetheless, Kerman's raising of organicism as a cornerstone of musical analysis implicated in an unexpressed ideology was an indication of new winds blowing over the musicological landscape.

## RUTH SOLIE'S EXAMINATION OF ORGANICISM

Ruth Solie's article, "The Living Work: Organicism and Musical Analysis," 1980, precedes her engagement with critical theory and feminism. While gender issues are absent from the discussion and linguistic criticism does not figure prominently, Solie does acknowledge the role of language. More attention to it can be teased out than perhaps Solie intended. Her focus upon the historical-philosophical context of organicism, along with its rhetoric, represents an early foray into research that seeks to identify submerged presuppositions, ones not purely musical but informed by the broader intellectual climate in which they flourished. Her analysis of passages from the music theorists, Heinrich Schenker and Rudolf Reti, provides a clear musicological critique of issues that has not lost its relevance for more recent musical scholarship.

In the late 1970s only a few musicologists were straying from the well-defined boundaries of their own discipline in search of fresh ideas. Solie was one of those hunters and gatherers in other scholarly fields and the stimulus she has provided as a result of her border crossings more than compensates for any lack of methodological rigour which might have kept her more strait-jacketed. Tracking a metaphor can be an exercise in diffuseness. In her dissertation she explains:

> Where my subject matter ventures into other disciplines, the research has been difficult and sometimes rather random. No single thread can be pursued as far as one would like, since each leads into a totally separate and open-ended field of endeavor.... (13)

In examining this article, I am interested in specifying those themes which later writings have profitably pursued and in identifying those areas which Solie neglects but which are nonetheless significant in the discussion of organicism.

Solie's first observation, which she does not develop but is nevertheless of great importance, relates to the use of the organism as a metaphor. This metaphoric use she locates in the new linguistic insights typical of our time. Solie writes:

> As linguists have been telling us for some time now, language is not merely reflective but actually constitutive of our awareness[;] constellations of language like that surrounding the figure of the organism tend to shape and control the observations of the analyst using them. (Solie 1980, 147)

In addition to the metaphoric and linguistic nature of organicism, Solie points out the concomitant "network of related ideas" which evocation of "organic unity" recalls. The idea of a metaphor acting as a "network" of interconnected concepts, suggests the breadth of utility of this figure. Solie later acknowledges the paradigmatic status of organicism, but for now she simply refers to the network evoked by the term "organic unity." Unity is such a hallmark of aesthetic excellence that it is too often assumed, unquestionably, "taken utterly for granted" (148).

Solie provides a definition of aesthetic organicism which she describes as originating in the literary criticism of its "major exponent," Coleridge. She quotes from Stephen Pepper:

> The maximum of integration is a condition where every detail of the object calls for every other....Or negatively, it is a condition where no detail can be removed or

> altered without marring or even destroying the value of the whole. Such a whole is called an organic unity. (Quoted in Solie 148)[10]

Here is her own simple definition: "A work of art should possess unity in the same way, and to the same extent, that a living organism does" (148).

Solie draws attention to Coleridge's concern that an organic unity be marked by "the multeity of traits assimilated in a work" (148). Coleridge emphasizes the importance of the continued tension derived from the maximum unity which is at the same time capable of supporting the individual quality of the components. Given the subsequent propensity for interest in unity to overwhelm diversity, I think it noteworthy that Coleridge's nuance differs from Pepper's which places more stress on assimilation than distinctness of the parts. This is a point Dahlhaus addresses in his essay discussed in Chapter Four.

Solie proposes some questions which might unsettle the metaphor, such as, "Why do works of art need such unity?" suggesting that neglect of these queries reveals forces at work beyond mere metaphoric qualities. She proposes that the larger dimension of the trope can be found in German and English idealism. This allusion to the historical dimension of organicism offers some perspective on its beginnings, but Solie does not probe for reasons of its historical appeal during these earlier centuries. Chapter Two looks at some of the questions to which organicism proposed an answer.

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[10]This can be found in Stephen Pepper's *The Basis of Criticism in the Arts*, 1946, 79.

It was the disjunction between the "vehicle" and "tenor" of the organism and music which prompted Solie to explore some possible extra-metaphorical qualities in the comparison. These terms are put forward by I. A. Richards as designations for the two parts of a metaphorical comparison. In the musical organism, the "tenor" is the music and the "vehicle" is the organism. Further discussion of Richard's views on metaphor occurs in Chapter Two.

While noting the divergence of views amongst those labelled idealists, Solie elaborates on several strands they all share: the supremacy of "mind-spirit values" over material ones, the belief that reality operates in an "ideal realm" as opposed to the finite world, and an emphasis upon the interrelatedness of all things (149). Solie paraphrases Leibniz' definition of an organism, "an ideal substance which expresses the universe in a wider sense. Not an unlikely definition for a work of art!" (149). In Leibnizian terms, "every small thing mirrors the whole universe" (150).[11] These metaphysical substances, or monads, Leibniz called organisms (152).

In Hegel's writings Solie finds the "clearest explication of the relationship of idealism to organicism" (149). Hegel places art, religion, and philosophy at the peak of human achievements that are characterized by transcendence of the finite. According to

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[11]See Leibniz's *Basic Writings: Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology*, especially the *Monadology*, 251-73. He writes, "This body of a living being or of an animal is always organic, because every monad is a mirror of the universe..." (265).

Hegel, the art work is the "apparent" of the "Idea," just as nature is a manifestation of Idea and therefore a model of aesthetic beauty (149).

Solie interrupts her historical sketch to comment upon what she calls the "paradoxical reversal" of values occurring among later exponents of organicism who literalize the metaphor, therefore differing from those ideas expressed at the inception of the concept. It is clear that there was a reversal of emphasis over the two centuries from a more spiritual or transcendent organicism to an immanent or physical one; however I would dispute Solie's claim that the earlier exponents of the organic did not literalize the metaphor, albeit for a very different emphasis. For example, A. B. Marx's spiritual understanding of sonata form allows for little tension between tenor and vehicle. Music *is* spirit:

> In general, one speaks so often about form as a *typus* for all works of the spirit, seeming to designate it as something existing once and for all. Yet is form something independent? Is it something other than the revelation of the *Idee, the incarnation of thought in the musical artwork?* [my emphasis] (Trans. in Burnham 1990, 185)

Solie writes,

> For the philosophers, the point of calling something "organic" was not to describe the arrangement of its physical attributes but, on the contrary, to elevate it to a status transcendent of the physical. They stressed that the ideal quality of living organisms was the element of soul or *Geist*, and wished to attribute this quality to works of art. (150)

The twentieth-century propensity for the concrete particulars of music was not so evident in those first advocates of the supremacy of instrumental music although for Hoffmann and Marx, describing "the arrangement of its physical attributes" *and* elevating it

"to a status transcendent of the physical" were all part and parcel of the organic work of art. Carl Dahlhaus confirms the importance of the spiritual dimension in his book *Nineteenth-Century Music* when he writes,

> By ridding itself of texts and the expression of definite emotions music does not degenerate into preliterate vagueness, as was believed in the eighteenth century, but rather transcends language to become a prefiguration of the infinite and absolute. (31)

It was this very non-specific, transcendent quality of music that so appealed to the romantics. Only music could express the inexpressible, inner contemplative world of the spirit.

Continuing her historical pursuit, Solie turns to the pre-romantic understanding of the world's construction as "part-to-whole," a prevailing view known as mechanicism. This shift in worldviews from mechanicism to organicism Solie attributes in no small measure to the "fundamental biological orientation of thought in the period":

> The study of functional interrelationships of the many parts of a complex organism calls for a new paradigm of thought, fundamentally different from the old linear cause-and-effect model...
> This self-contained unitary quality stands in direct opposition to the nature of machines or of inorganic matter. (150)

In the next few pages Solie addresses the analytical systems of Heinrich Schenker and Rudolph Reti, both exponents of methodologies which have gained recognition as "standard" in music departments. Both represent products of the same aesthetic and metaphoric orientation of the nineteenth century (147-48). Solie credits Reti and Schenker with recognizing the "process" quality of music, its ability to create the effect of movement

in time. The metaphors of "motion," "growth," and "development" reflect this aspect of music more successfully than the language of "architecture, logic, and rhetoric" which, Solie claims, "entails a restriction to morphological, low-level observations" (156).[12] Each theorist views the whole history of music, in addition to a work's unfolding, as teleological and evolutionary in its development (154).

If Reti and Schenker exemplify organicist positions, they do so with some marked differences. Schenker's "holistic aesthetic" relies upon "the generative force which brings forth the composition," that is, "music's origin in nature, in the major triad or *Naturklang* as found in the overtone series" (151). Solie documents Schenker's grounding of music in nature via the *Ursatz* with this passage from his *Free Composition*:

> Even the octave, fifth, and third of the harmonic series are a product of the organic activity of the tone as subject, just as the urges of the human being are organic. (Schenker/Solie 151)[13]

This commitment to wholeness inevitably produces "an intense singularity of focus," an imbalance in favour of unity at the expense of diversity. By contrast, Reti's organicism, based on "thematic patterns," allows for greater recognition of musical divergence. Reti argues that the composer "strives toward *homogeneity in the inner essence* but at the same

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[12]In contrast to Solie, Dahlhaus's preference for language and logic as models of music over organisms stems from his conviction that music is produced consciously by creators who are not acting as vessels for natural or divine forces. Chapter Four will address this issue.

[13]Schenker, *Free Composition*, 9, hereafter FC. FC was published in 1935 in German shortly after Schenker's death.

time toward *variety in the outer appearance*" (Reti/Solie 152).[14] Reti's emphasis echoes the importance Coleridge attached to unity marked by "the multeity of traits assimilated in a work" (148).

Another difference in the two theorists' organicist understanding relates to a work's unfolding. Schenker's "growth" imagery concerns a piece's "conceptual progress from background to foreground" (153). This represents a *hierarchical* picture of levels of musical production. Reti's "growth" reflects "the perceptual progress of the piece," with each motif generating another different from the first yet derived from it after the manner of cells engendering others both unique and similar to the parent cells. This represents a *linear* development of musical themes.

While both Reti and Schenker express the idealist belief in "the autonomous inner life of the organism and his instinctive distrust of the mechanical," (155) Reti is clear that this inner dimension does not stem from "the harmonic or contrapuntal mechanism" (Reti/Solie 155).[15] The latter view is Schenker's, in which free composition is generated by "elements which were 'lying budlike' in strict contrapuntal technique" (153).

Solie pursues some of the implications of "organic" composition, specifically the role of the composer and critic. The organicists, Coleridge, Jean Paul Richter, William Blake, Hegel, Carlyle, and Schenker himself support the position of artists giving "birth" to what they themselves attribute to "natural forces coming from within" (155). Solie

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[14]Reti, *The Thematic Process in Music*, 13.

[15]*Thematic Process*, 109.

concludes: "Genius was indeed considered organic itself, born and not made" (156). This mystical perception of the composer spills over to that of the critic who is also deemed to be a kind of "priestly oracle."

One last theme which Solie does not raise but rather unconsciously reports on is gender imagery. Both references occur in the context of a discussion of genius. Describing Coleridge's *ab intra* phrase denoting the presence of genius, she writes, "The organism grows and takes shape by itself: the artist need only give it birth" (155). Clearly this is a case of male appropriation of female reproduction. How this gender reversal works forms part of Chapter Six. In the next paragraph, Solie notes, "Since the artist was regarded as a sort of midwife to this immanent life force..." Here it is she who interjects the term "midwife" to depict the change from the transmission of the artist's consciousness into the physical art work. The borrowing of these birth metaphors does not include recognition of the original possessors of these birthing capabilities, that is, actual women. The appropriation of them, however, which involves an exclusionary tactic, raises issues of gender discrimination. Gender is not a theme that Solie pursues in regard to organicism at this point. She has more than made up for this lack of feminist critique in subsequent articles and books on the subject, none of which however addresses organicism in relation to gender.[16]

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[16]Some recent examples by Solie include: "What do Feminists Want? A Reply to Pieter van den Toorn," *Journal of Musicology* Vol. IX/4 (1991): 399-410; "Changing the Subject," *Current Musicology* 53 (1993): 55-65; and the book she edited, *Musicology and Difference: Gender and Sexuality in Music Scholarship*, Berkeley: University of

What Solie has eminently succeeded in doing is calling attention to the wider metaphorical network of organicism which has spilled into musical analysis. Her identification of specific problems surrounding organicism has blazed a trail which others have followed and taken further.

## SCHENKER AND ORGANICISM

McCreless, Kerman, and Solie all draw attention to the over-arching influence of Schenker in musical analysis. My concern in this section is not so much to identify Schenker's writings as a "primary" source of organicism, one more "authentic" by virtue of its greater historical proximity to some "origins," but rather to see Solie as a current interpreter and critic of Schenker's organicism. All the same, given Solie's very condensed encounter with Schenker, it may be valuable to confront some of the problems organicism exemplifies via Schenker himself.

One cannot help but notice the inconsistencies and literalizing tendencies of Schenker's reliance upon the organic figure based upon the quotations Solie includes from his writings. At every turn some version of the organic is called upon to reinforce some musical notion. It is my observation that the bombardment of organic imagery coming from Schenker in ongoing volleys, more than any sustained analogy or argument,

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California Press, 1993.

comprises the force of the comparison. Unable to sort out the tangle of organic figures, one can be left with the sense that whatever is going on, it is always *good* when some musical aspect is described in organic terms. The details are less important. Validation via organic imagery is uppermost: "The organism becomes by literal or metaphoric extension the validator of the work" (Solie151).

In his essay, "The Spirit of Musical Technique," 1895, one which registers his early ambivalence regarding organicism, Schenker understood very well how the "organic" label was used "carelessly" to render positive judgement of a work such that its popular application had the effect of contaminating its musical object. Schenker writes despairingly, "The highest praise that can be rendered to a musical artwork today is to say that it is constructed `organically'" (Schenker 1895, 98).

Solie's citations from Schenker display some of the variety of usages to which Schenker subjects the organism in musical compositions. Schenker's early view of the seed-kernel as motive differed from that of his mature explication of the seed-kernel as *Ursatz*. All excerpts from *Free Composition* represent Schenker's later position. The procedure I will follow is to provide Solie's considered selection of Schenker's passages and then improvise on the themes represented, sometimes drawing in her comments but always probing a bit deeper, introducing other Schenkerian passages where appropriate. For ease of reference I will number the passages in the order found in Solie's article and provide a heading.

#1: *Organicism linking humans and musical tones*

> Even the octave, fifth, and third of the harmonic series are a product of the organic activity of the tone as subject, just as the urges of the human being are organic. (Schenker/Solie 151)

Solie comments: "It is at this juncture that the reliance of Schenker's holistic aesthetic upon traditional concepts of organicism is most clear: the generative force which brings forth the composition--an entelechy or *élan vital*...is music's origin in nature, in the major triad or *Naturklang* as found in the overtone series" (151).

This passage raises two issues which themselves mesh with a network of other polarities. The first concerns the nature/culture binarisms. In the *Naturklang* the mathematical model of music is collapsed into "organic activity." While these views of music as derived from the "chord of nature" receive little credibility today, it is interesting that they were also seriously questioned as early as 1817 when Gottfried Weber, writing in opposition to Rameau's theory declared:

> Take all of this into account and you will easily become convinced that the resonance of the overtones of a string, far from being intrinsic to the essential nature and beauty of the sound, is an impurity, the harmful effect of which is averted only by the inaudibility of these resonating sounds. (Quoted and trans. in Bent 1994, 9)

Ian Bent brings together in English translation excerpts from Mattheson, Weber, Marx, Fétis, and Hauptmann as evidence of the "*human mind* as the organizing principle of musical harmony, rather than...the acoustical phenomena in nature," all as an expression of anti-Rameau sentiment (11). Bent locates an echo of this position in A. B. Marx from 1837: "Marx purged the whole apparatus of acoustics, believing that the calculated

perception of relationships between overtones had nothing to do with the mental and spiritual activity of music creation and perception" (Bent 1994, 10). Fétis, writing in 1840, is even more explicit regarding tonality and scales being derived from the laws of calculus: "I reply that their origin is purely metaphysical: we conceive this order, and the melodic and harmonic phenomena that ensue from it, as a consequence of our mental make-up and of our education" (Quoted and trans. by Bent 1994, 10). By contrast Schenker persisted in locating in the overtone series music's "natural" origins.

The second issue arises from Schenker's notions of the "tone as subject" relating to matters of will and destiny. What is Schenker's comparison precisely? The previous two sentences from this passage in FC are illuminating: "Music is not only an *object* of theoretical consideration. It is *subject*, just as we ourselves are subject" (FC 9). It would seem that Schenker wishes to attribute to the musical tones the same kind of will or self determination that is associated with "organic" human subjects. It emphasizes a *living* quality of perhaps *movement*, these qualities being metaphorical transfers, but it could also be seen as promoting the mystification of musical processes. Later on the same page, Schenker notes "that strange mysteries also lie behind tones." Some musicologists, notably, Jamie Kassler and Robert Snarrenberg, see in Schenker's procreative organic metaphors a humanizing element which they interpret in positive terms.[17]

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[17]Writings by these authors will be explored in Chapters Seven and Eight.

Schenker's ubiquitous appeals to organic imagery create the appearance of consistency in his argumentation, but they also serve to obscure some issues. If music is in some sense organic by virtue of its production by humans, it is difficult to justify Schenker's exclusion of other biological human organisms–the masses, non-Germans, and even most musicians (to be discussed under quotation #3). Without going beyond the organic metaphor, how does one explain that geniuses are more "organic" than other species of human organisms? It is surely some other features unrelated to their membership in the species of human organisms that explains genius. Schenker's conception of organic genius as dependent upon the work of the unconscious fails to overcome the dilemma, for presumably all humans have an unconscious dimension driving their creativity to some degree. Schenker writes, "True organic similarity arises in the imagination only when the composer has not willed it" ("Spirit of Musical Technique" 100). Logically, the unconscious or imagination may be equally responsible for compositional errors.

#2: *Urlinie as organism.*

> All transformations presume a final unalterable nucleus: in man, it is character, and in composition it is the urlinie.
> Just as there is only one line, there is only one consummation of it. The urlinie is, to employ a concept of Leibniz, the pre-stabilized harmony of the composition. (151)

This second passage is taken from an earlier piece by Schenker, *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik*, published in three volumes between 1925 and 1930. The nucleus, the *Urlinie*, Schenker describes as being akin to Leibniz's monads. The early *Urlinie* resembles the nucleus motive more than the upper descending line whose pairing with the *Bassbrechung*

comprises the *Ursatz* of FC. Schenker's "unalterable nucleus," "*Urlinie*," "the prestabilized harmony of the composition," the Leibnizian monad--all conspire to establish the musical nucleus as a transcendent category, one mirroring the universe in every degree, according to Leibniz. Solie comments: "Like Leibniz's monads, the *Ursatz* is elemental stuff, mystical musical protoplasm" (151).

Once again, mystery and other worldliness are promoted in association with music. The pre-determined quality and necessary, singular trajectory of the *Urlinie* appear to leave little room for the composer's shaping control or choices. It raises questions too about Schenker's view of human subjectivity which he compares to musical tones, now revealed to be operating teleologically. This second passage definitely links Schenker with German idealism and further contributes to the mystification of musical composition. It marks the initial motive, called here *Urlinie*, as a metaphysical substance which mirrors the universe.

*#3: Organicism and social distinctions*

> I here present a new concept, one inherent in the works of the great masters; indeed, it is the very secret and source of their being: the concept of organic coherence. (151, FC xxi)

Solie comments, "It is nothing new to point out that Schenker is the organicist *par excellence*. He is everywhere explicit about the use of metaphoric figures, warning that 'music is never comparable to mathematics or architecture'"... (151). The remainder of this passage begun by Solie compares music "generated organically" to "language" (FC 5). While Schenker overwhelmingly favours organic figures, he is not adverse to mixing his metaphors. His "concept of organic coherence" serves as a remedy to "mechanistic

approaches"; however, Schenker is not always consistent in his rejection of architectural figures. In their article, "Rewriting Schenker: Narrative-History-Ideology," Littlefield and Neumeyer consider some of the implications of a passage which includes this architectural metaphor by Schenker: "'Through an arpeggiation upwards and passing tones downwards, it describes a high-vaulted arch between each pair of *Urlinie* tones'" (42).

This bald statement equating the "secret and source of their being" with the organic concept merits some attention. Given the favourable reception of organic concepts in such critics as E. T. A. Hoffmann, Hanslick, and A. B. Marx, it is not obvious from this one statement why the concept should be described as "new." Making this concept the "very secret and source of their being" is a fairly dramatic claim. First of all it assumes that there is some "secret" to master works which somehow accounts for their "being."[18] Second, the notion of coherence suggests that it is a permanent, intrinsic feature of all of these works.

Furthermore it only applies to "the works of the great masters." The music of the masses does not exhibit the organic concept, an idea to be encountered again in the Chapter Three discussion of a critic's analysis of Tchaikovsky's music, where the gypsy melody lacked organic qualities. Schenker is unambiguous in his understanding of a direct relationship between art and life:

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[18] In his article, "The Sources of Schoenberg's 'Aesthetic Theology,'" John Covach looks at Schoenberg's borrowing of "concepts that once belonged exclusively to theology" in a process of secularization whereby theology migrates into art. Among these is the "hidden" quality of themes, always residing below the surface, not unlike the truths of scripture. (253)

> The masses...lack the soul of genius. They are not aware of background, they have no feeling for the future. Their lives are merely and eternally disordered foreground, a continuous present without connection, unwinding chaotically in empty, animal fashion. (Schenker FC, 3)

Tied in as it is with Schenker's whole theoretical system--masses="eternally disordered foreground"--such dismissal of a group of people defined solely by their numbers as masses is disturbing.

There is also a curious irony in Schenker's rejection of the masses depicted "without connection, unwinding chaotically in empty, animal fashion." As "animals," these humans should be expected to live as organisms, that is, teleologically driven by their genetic codes. The human organism, on the other hand, is supposedly marked by greater independence and freedom than animal organisms, but in this sense is further removed from true organic functioning. However, it is the very organistic, animal qualities characterized by wholeness, growth, teleology that signal an organic composition by organic genius. Schenker's inconsistencies betray the use of "organic" as a means of validating what he values rather than any coherent principle of composition.

Solie provides more excerpts which expand on the third excerpt.

#4 AND #5: *Some non-organic technical aspects of composition. Organicism as filter.*

> This characteristic is determined *solely* by the invention of the parts out of the unity of the primary harmony--in other words, by the composing out of the fundamental line and the bass arpeggiation. [Solie's emphasis] (Solie 152)[19]

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[19]Schenker, "Organic Structure in Sonata Form," *Das Meisterwerk in der Music II* (1926), trans. Orin Grossman, *Journal of Music Theory* 12 (1968): 166. This article also appears in Maury Yeston's *Readings in Schenker Analysis*, which was my source.

> *All musical content* arises from the confrontation and adjustment of the indivisible fundamental line with the two-part bass arpeggiation. [Solie's emphasis] (Solie 152, FC 15)

Here it becomes clearer what is meant by the secret of organic coherence. Schenker employs some very specific musical terms, the *Auskomponierung*, "the composing out of the fundamental line [*Urlinie*] and the bass arpeggiation [*Bassbrechung*]." This *Ursatz* represents counterpoint working in conjunction with harmony. In the Introduction to *Free Composition*, Schenker compares his mission to that of C. P. E. Bach: "His incomparable great work was motivated by a desire to do his utmost to save and clarify that discipline [thoroughbass]" (xxii). His instructional plan, "the concept of organic coherence," entails: "instruction in strict counterpoint (according to Fux-Schenker), in thoroughbass (according to J. S. and C. P. E. Bach), and in free composition (Schenker)" (xxi, xxii). For the moment, metaphors are laid aside along with music's mysteries in favour of harmony and counterpoint, two very rule-bound technical musical disciplines which have been shaped historically over many centuries and require considerable application to acquire competency in them.

When one undresses the organic metaphor, what is revealed are some basic musical skills, historically constructed by people who have learned them and taught them as musical disciplines, not as mysteries. I would include here Schenker's specific contribution of the synthesis of harmony and counterpoint and his enlargement of counterpoint over the span of a piece. Considerable investment of study is necessary to acquire competence in the application of Schenker's concepts for musical analysis. Schenker acknowledges this time

investment: "My teaching, in contrast to more rapid methods, slows the tempo of the educational process" (xxiii). Mystery fades as concrete curricula take shape. This long educational process seems strangely at odds with Schenker's celebration of the unconscious, gifted nature of genius. Indeed, he writes, "Such sowing and reaping can't be taught" (FC xxii).

Solie's emphasis upon "solely" and "all musical content" certainly draws attention to the sweep of Schenker's claim. Does this mean that other musical parameters such as rhythm, orchestration, dynamics, texture, register, tempo, and articulation--surely what qualifies as "musical content"--are all determined by the *Ursatz*? Or is Schenker only interested in music's structural features as defined by the encounter between harmony and counterpoint? Kerman's critique of a Schenkerian approach to Schumann's "Aus meinen Thränen spriessen" confirms this narrowness. Certainly it is the structural qualities that captivate current Schenkerians as is evident from what has become the accepted translation of *Ursatz*, Allen Forte's "fundamental structure." Bent suggests other possible translations for *Ursatz*, less oriented to structural models: "primal counterpoint" or "contrapuntal archetype" (Bent 1994, 9).

Quotations 4 and 5 point to some less exotic interpretations of organic coherence derived from traditional music disciplines, while at the same time they seem to indicate a rather reduced interpretation of what qualifies as musical content. This could be seen as an instance of the organic metaphor filtering out other important musical components in favour of exclusive attention to the interaction of counterpoint and harmony. On the basis

of quotations 4 and 5, one is left with the impression that Schenker's organic coherence is rather limiting of musical interpretation.

#6: *Organicism as destiny.*

> The origin of every life, whether of nation, clan, or individual, becomes its destiny....The inner law of origin accompanies all development and is ultimately part of the present. Origin, development, and present I call background, middleground, and foreground; their union expresses the oneness of an individual, self-contained life. (Solie 153, FC 3)

Solie comments upon the resonance of this statement with Freud's, "biology is destiny" and also with Reti's pronouncement on the Tristan chord as the ultimate musical organism: "'compressed into one chord, the musical story of the whole opera is latent in this initial harmony'" (Reti/Solie 153).[20]

All three sources, Schenker, Freud, and Reti, express biological determinism, a metaphysical commitment one would not normally link with any kind of "neutral" study of music theory. If the first quotation left any doubt about Schenker's views of human freedom, the accumulative evidence leaves little room for negotiation: a very unequivocal pronouncement of individual destiny determined its "origin."

This problem of musical creativity as "free" is one which has concerned some of Schenker's exponents. J. C. Kassler writes of the tension between consciousness and the will of the music itself:

> On the one hand, creativity refers to the efforts of the listener to apprehend new musical forms through choice of prolongation techniques, efforts which take place

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[20] *Thematic Process* 338.

> by means of internal, psychological principles of consciousness and will. On the other hand, creative activity refers to musical processes, which, Schenker holds, are free, because music makes itself; that is, the causes of its unfolding are immanent within the system of tonality. (Kassler 1983, 243)

This view would be disputed by the nineteenth-century anti-Rameauists, but it has had surprising resilience in this century, in no small part because of the refusal of the first wave of American Schenkerians to address philosophical issues. This sixth passage transfers "the inner law of origin"--based on the then-current understanding of cell growth and mapped metaphorically onto the "nation, clan, or individual"--directly to musical development. In explaining human individual life and the history of nations in biological terms, a very deterministic philosophy emerges, ideas which escape the sympathetic treatments afforded Schenker by Kassler and Snarrenberg, who interpret Schenker's organic, procreative metaphors as evidence of a favourable human orientation.[21]

#7 and #8: *Whole composition genetically coded in musical seed.*

> The hands, legs, and ears of the human body do not begin to grow after birth, they are present at the time of birth. Similarly, in a composition, a limb which was not somehow born with the middle and background cannot grow to be a diminution. (Solie 153, FC 6)

Solie's comments are linked with the two epigraphs which she gives at the beginning of the essay. The first is from Schenker's FC:

> Every linear progression shows the eternal shape of life--birth to death. The progression begins, lives its own existence in the passing tones, ceases when it has reached its goal--all as organic as life itself. (Solie 147, FC 44)

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[21] See Chapters Seven and Eight for discussion.

The second is from Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West*:

> Every culture passes through the age-phases of the individual man. Each has its childhood, youth, manhood, and old age. (Solie 147, Spengler 107)

The organic cliché, "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny," a nineteenth-century evolutionary concept which has travelled into art and culture from genetics, rests on a confusion between "temporal and spatial" modalities. Solie writes, "Clearly, the existence of a human child in complete (albeit small) form is not properly analogous to the unheard but ever-present background of a piece of music." Solie charges that Schenker is "conflating ideas of temporal and logical priority" (153). While in organisms, the seed precedes the plant or animal temporally, in music the *Ursatz* or background does not temporally precede the composition in an analogous manner, but in a logical mode.

In focussing upon matching details of the vehicle and tenor in the metaphorical comparison which inevitably breaks down under scrutiny--the nature of metaphor is built upon a creative "error"--it is easy to be distracted from more fundamental matters. While logic plays some role in comparisons, the evocation of a metaphor draws its strength more powerfully from illogical leaps. The longevity of the "ontology recapitulates phylogeny" formulation can be explained on the basis of its metaphysical appeal, the security of the notion that the life of an individual recapitulates that of the larger culture. The fact that a teleological science appeared to be a logical contradiction was not an obstacle to its acceptance during its heyday in the nineteenth century. By identifying the slippage in Schenker's metaphor, Solie highlights part of the problem. The solution is not to clarify or

clean up the metaphorical alignment, but to foreground how dependence upon metaphor, which signifies in different, uncontrollable directions, is at the bottom of a system ostensibly built on logic and reasoning. The metaphor of the organism upon which Schenker relies attempts to bring about the metaphorical union of two disparate ontological realms, music and nature. This violation renders his whole theory problematic.

What the 7th and 8th passages reveal is Schenker's unmistakeable reliance upon a deterministic worldview which he borrows for his understanding of musical organisms. The foreordination of the unfolding or "composing out" of the musical primal substance defies any practical experience of how music is created. Taking Schenker's insistence of the presence of a whole composition in germinal musical material whose development is pre-determined has the effect of diminishing the individual role of the composer. It does, however, stand in perfect agreement with the biological view of palingenesis put forward by the scientist, Charles Bonnet, in the mid-eighteenth century which, as Stephen Gould explains in his book, *Ontogeny and Phylogeny*, meant the "evolution of organisms already preformed in the germ" (Gould 19).

#9: *The foreordination of music's structural levels.*

> The content of the second and subsequent levels is determined by the content of the first level, but at the same time it is influenced by goals in the foreground, mysteriously sensed and pursued. (Solie 154, FC 68)

This passage reinforces the deterministic aspect of music's development along with the sense of its mystery. If the behaviour of the tones mimics human consciousness, it is a very programmed kind of consciousness, one that leaves little room for the random or

unexpected so endemic to human affairs. It is Schenker's view that art supplies what real life lacks, calm resolution: "Man lives his whole life in a state of tension. Rarely does he experience fulfillment; art alone bestows on him fulfillment..." (FC xxiv). One wonders how, if music reflects human organisms with their "inner urges," complexities, and tension, it does not also reflect more human chaos, diversity, randomness. Schenker's comparison of art as displaced fulfillment has the effect of creating a gulf between life and art, thus questioning both how life is organic, that is, teleologically determined, and how music is like life, that is, complete, orderly, resolved. If life and music are so different that music is needed to supplement what is lacking in life, how are they both organic?

#10: *Total naturalizing of music.*

> The fundamental structure shows us how the chord of nature comes to life through a vital natural power. But the primal power of this established motion must grow and live its own full life: that which is born to life strives to fulfil itself with the power of nature. (Solie 155, FC 25)

Solie observes that just as the musical work shares in the teleological growth pattern of animals or plants, so it must also share "in whatever mysterious force or wisdom guides that predestined course" (154). This appeal to the old "vital force" or the principle of entelechy is hard to miss in Schenker. It is my observation in reading Schenker that the stress on inherent principles of development directing an organism distracts from the hard-core business of learning counterpoint and harmony, the *sine qua non* of any composer. This "vital natural power" cannot be seen or named, yet bears responsibility for music's unfolding. This 10th quotation continues the distancing from the basic skills of

composition, preferring once again mystery or vital forces to musical construction according to its established disciplines.

#11: *Organicism and genius.*

> Musicians are distinguished [i.e., can be divided] into those who create out of the background, that is to say, from tonal space, the urlinie, who are the geniuses, and those who move only within the foreground, who are the non-geniuses....A perennial barrier lies between them. (Solie 155; Kalib, *Der Meisterwerk* 161-62)

The distinction of genius/non-genius is also reflected in the "restricted repertoire" which Schenker included in his analyses.

Some strong motivation is necessary to account for the many issues which Schenker must obscure in this simple polarity of genius and non-genius. The next passage, "Organicism as theology," may go a long way to explain this radical separation. What must Schenker deny in order to maintain this "perennial boundary?" Schenker must gloss any grounding of those "who create out of the background" in any historical or time-bounded context. Linked inextricably to Schenker's theory, however, is the tonal system, a thoroughly historical musical expression. This criterion theoretically eliminates the possibility of any pre- or post-tonal composers' qualifications as geniuses. Schenker's genius does not, therefore, form a universal category, but a historically limited one.

This polarity also serves to obscure the dependence of genius upon many non-geniuses to pass on the musical traditions in an educational system. The reliance of genius upon non-genius for the steps to reach the heights of genius contaminates the exclusivity of the term. By forcing the distinction so absolutely, Schenker is also unable to appreciate the

near-genius whose contributions may be lost in holding to such a radical, impenetrable boundary. The conciseness of the divide also poses the problem of when a potential candidate for genius can be recognized. Child protégés do not always fulfil their early promise, while plodders, not unlike Haydn, who find themselves in favourable circumstances, sometimes achieve success. Furthermore, those often hailed as geniuses in their day fade into oblivion over time. For Georg Kiesewetter, writing music history from the perspective of the mid-nineteenth century, the epochal composers were Willaert, Carissimi, A. Scarlatti, Leo, and Durante. Bach and Handel are not mentioned (Allen 89).

If it is not difficult to critique Schenker's understanding of genius, it must also be placed in the context of ideas about genius still in circulation in the early twentieth century as he wrote. In his *Truth and Method*, Gadamer locates the genius doctrine at the heart of the aesthetic championed by Kant, who describes genius in the following manner:

> The genius is a favorite of nature--just as natural beauty is regarded as a favor of nature. We must be able to regard art as if it were nature. Through genius, nature gives art its rules. In all these phrases the concept of nature is the uncontested criterion.
>
> Thus what the concept of genius achieves is only to place the products of art on a par aesthetically with natural beauty. (Gadamer 55)

#12: *Organicism as theology.*

> The fundamental line and bass-arpeggiation governed him [Haydn] with the power of a natural force, and he received from them the strength to master the whole as a unity. (Solie 155, "Organic Structure" 168)

Solie picks up on the quasi-religious language here which bespeaks life forces, inspiration:

> Since the vital element or entelechy of artworks as well as organisms appears quite mysterious to the onlooker, a certain amount of magical power becomes attached

> to the artist who then is revered as the prophet or revealer of hidden unities, relationships, or meanings in his work--what Carlyle called the "secret and silent growth" of the organism. This quasi-priestly function of the artist is even shared, by extension, with the critic, who serves as a kind of acolyte or substitute revealer, and to whose advantage it therefore is to dwell upon hidden and obscure aspects of a work. "I was given a vision of the urlinie, I did not invent it!" (156)

Solie notes the tension between the mysticism which "organicist criticism invites," and the more democratic demands of present audiences which tend to produce different styles of criticism and analysis. Yet the romantic legacy persists. She writes, "More than one school of contemporary analytic thought relies upon somewhat cabalistic symbology accessible only to a closed circle and prompting inevitable analogies to 'discipleship'" (156).

It requires no great stretch of imagination to see musical analysis and interpretation modelled upon attitudes to the Bible. The books of scripture claim divine inspiration as their source: "...holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost" (II Peter 1. 21) and in II Timothy 3.16: "All scripture is given by inspiration of God..." The prophetic and priestly work of the authors, all dependent upon inspiration, produces holy writings inexhaustible in the layers of meaning which intense exegesis can reveal. If one operates on the premise that every word or note of a passage is intrinsic to the whole having been placed there by a genius or holy one guided by God, then the business of interpretation or analysis takes on a very serious tone. The blending of ontologies is no obstacle in metaphors of faith where the union of the human and divine is what is sought. The presence of the divine in nature, the logos, the arts, or the individual is a positive fusion of being that is apprehended by faith. An aesthetic that claims the presence of a

divine element or nature in its objects has not left the assumptions integral to religious belief.

Two of the three epigraphs at the opening of the Introduction to FC are from the Old Testament. One cannot escape the God-centred nature of Schenker's music theory:

> All that is organic, every relatedness belongs to God and remains His gift, even when man creates the work and perceives that it is organic.
> The whole of foreground, which men call chaos, God derives from His cosmos, the background. The eternal harmony of His eternal Being is grounded in this relationship.
> The astronomer knows that every system is part of a higher system; the highest system of all is God himself, God the creator. (FC xxiii)

One wonders which of the above 12 excerpts could be eliminated in teaching composition to students without putting any educational principles at risk or without compromising a Schenkerian orientation? In order to write a good fugue, is it necessary to think of notes as "the organic urges of humans," or to think of oneself as a genius, an aristocrat, or a divine appointee? Is it important to think of musical "seeds" about to unfold their destiny? It would seem from the present perspective that what cannot be eliminated is an understanding of harmonic function, formal genre, and counterpoint. However, notions of nature, genius, aristocracy, and divinity were necessary ingredients in the network supporting Schenker's understanding of his restricted musical repertoire. The ongoing influence of these now-submerged connections can only be diminished by a direct confrontation with their historical, philosophical, political, and social implications. Schenker's proposal of structural levels related to second species counterpoint as a means of framing large-scale works is inseparable from this imagery. Organicism became built

into Schenker's system in the drive to find a unity which over-ruled any disjunct elements. The triumph of the general over the particular, the one over the many are historical, philosophical problems. McCreless describes the relationship between Schenker's rhetoric and his musical principles succinctly:

> Schenker...conveniently overlooked or repressed the fact that his attitude toward musical works was entirely conditioned by the *thought* of the nineteenth century, even though the technical apparatus that he developed to explain those works derived from the *theory* of the eighteenth. (McCreless 1998, 172)

From one perspective, Schenker's synthesis could be extolled as creative; however his conditioning by nineteenth-century thought betrays heavy reliance upon a metaphysical system currently rejected by those who still adhere to Schenkerian theory. It also contains a central tension: the couching of eighteenth-century *mechanical* views in nineteenth-century *organic* rhetoric. Schenker's rejection of mechanicism was unequivocal.

Schenker appeals to organisms to make music "live"; to situate it as a social practice which excludes laymen, foreigners, masses, and women; to blur the ontological boundaries of nature and culture, making music into a natural product; to obscure music's highly technical and mechanical features with a naturalizing metaphor; to include religious ideas about spirit in music. The tension between Schenker's rhetoric and the working out of issues related to harmony and counterpoint points to a false consciousness in operation.

## CHAPTER TWO

## *THE HISTORICAL HORIZON OF ORGANICISM*

> Like every other movement, Romanticism started as an opposition to what had existed just before it.
>
> Charles Rosen and Henri Zerner[1]

An organicist aesthetic involved a shift away from an understanding of art as imitation of nature, represented metaphorically as "mirror" of nature, and also a reaction against prevailing Enlightenment thinking with its assumption of the cosmos as giant "machine" and its scientific methods of mechanicism. Mirrors, machines, and organisms are all figures which have been metaphorically borrowed from some other sphere to elucidate aesthetic and philosophical concepts.

The mirror derives its significance from the notion of art as imitation. "Mimesis," from the Greek word for "imitation," has subsequently been used to describe the aesthetic principle which values art as imitation of nature. Richard Rorty argues, "The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various representations--some accurate, some not--and capable of being studied by pure,

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[1]Rosen and Zerner, *Romanticism and Realism: The Mythology of Nineteenth-Century Art*, 23.

nonempirical methods" (Rorty 1979, 12). More than a model of aesthetics, mimesis brings into play fundamental philosophical issues of representation and referentiality.

The machine figure is also associated with an aesthetic theory and encompasses a system of thought whose methodology accords supremacy to reason, careful observation, and the reduction of phenomena to mathematical quantifications. The two depictions are not mutually exclusive and overlap in diverse ways which cannot be explored here. The machine trope tended to replace the mirror during the years surrounding the Scientific Revolution, without fully abandoning the idea of the mind's ability to reflect reality. However one construes the tropical sequence, certainly a less than clear transition, organicism was understood to have developed in opposition to mechanicism.[2]

Motivating my probing of the figures of mirror, machine, and organism is the larger question of what is at stake when metaphors are brought into circulation, in particular, when they perform determinative roles in aesthetic theories that do not acknowledge their metaphoricity. This chapter begins with a brief inquiry into the function of metaphor, drawing upon the writings of four authors who have helped to initiate recent debates on the subject of metaphor. "Inquiries into Metaphor" is the heading for this section.

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[2]See Abrams's "Introduction: Orientation of Critical Theories, 3-29, and chapters VII and VII, "The Psychology of Literary Invention: Mechanical and Organic Theories" and "The Psychology of Literary Invention: Unconscious Genius and Organic Growth."

The historical horizon[3] which gave rise to organicism will then be investigated in the second section, "The Historical Horizon of Mirror and Machine," with a view to understanding some of the issues or questions for which the older models of mimesis and mechanism were considered inadequate and for which organicism was proposed as a solution. An examination of mechanicism, the aesthetic model which dominated immediately prior to organicism, will be undertaken here as a means of understanding its perceived deficiencies in relation to organicism which gradually supplanted it in musical writings. Insofar as the problems identified with mechanistic explanations cannot be divorced from philosophical concerns, special attention will be given to Kant's ground-breaking distinction between the machine and organism models.

The main focus of the chapter considers the question, "What Is Organicism?" from the perspective of its primary historical horizon. This heading forms the last section. Organicism received its fullest expression initially in the philosophical discourse of early German and English romanticism where problems articulated as aesthetic had a wide import. M. H. Abrams's study of the metaphor of organicism, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*, will assist in the investigation.

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[3]I have made reference to "historical horizon" in the Introduction but I will offer some explanation here for the concept. Gadamer developed the idea of "horizon" in his *Truth and Method* as a means of highlighting a self-conscious historical framework marking the disparity between past and present vis-a-vis the observer or researcher. This involves questioning what lies behind what is being said: "We understand the sense of the text only by acquiring the horizon of the question..." (370). Appeal to an historical horizon underscores the time-boundedness of experience, the need to comprehend an object or idea from the perspective of a particular time and space.

## INQUIRIES INTO METAPHOR

At the centre of organicism is a metaphor of an organism which compares art works to nature. Organicism itself is much more than a metaphor. Borrowing selectively from the many characteristics of organisms, it has become a system of aesthetics with broad application in the arts. A particularly successful incorporation of it has persisted in musical studies embracing a wide range of theories, some quite contradictory in their expression. Organicist philosophy, as expressed principally in German idealism, will not be a focus of the study. Until recently little attention has been accorded to how the core metaphor functions and what is involved when the logic of a musical theory is built upon a trope.[4]

Metaphors have historically been suspect, considered subversive, ornamental, or illicit in the business of serious thought. They were especially deemed out of place in the discourses of philosophy and science. This view has predominated up to the 1950s and beyond, and will be seen in, for example, the suspicion with which Dahlhaus regards them. Mark Johnson, editor of *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, sums up the dominant philosophical view of metaphor which has prevailed from Aristotle to the middle of this

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[4]The term, "trope," derives from *tropikos, tropos* "which in Classical Greek meant `turn' and in Koiné `way' or `manner.' It comes into modern Indo-European languages by way of *tropos*, which in Classical Latin meant `metaphor' or `figure of speech'..." (White 1978, 2). Its application to music theory as "mood" or "measure" in Late Latin is not of relevance to this study.

century: "A metaphor is an elliptical simile useful for stylistic, rhetorical, and didactic purposes, but which can be translated into a literal paraphrase without any loss of cognitive content" (Johnson 1981, 4). By contrast, Paul de Man proposes a radically different perspective:

> Tropes are not understood aesthetically, as ornament, nor are they understood semantically as a figurative meaning that derives from literal, proper denomination. Rather, the reverse is the case. The trope is not a derived, marginal, or aberrant form of language but the linguistic paradigm par excellence. The figurative structure is not one linguistic mode among others but it characterizes language as such. (de Man 1979, 105)

The 1970s saw a remarkable blossoming of studies about metaphor. Warren Shibles's *Metaphor: An Annotated Bibliography and History*, 1971, bears witness to this proliferation. Many outstanding thinkers participated in debates pertaining to theories of meaning, objective reality, and language. What became clear from the literature on metaphor was the contribution of a few key figures in initiating a strong challenge to long-held views on metaphor. The work of Max Black and I. A. Richards forms the core of the early assaults; Thomas Kuhn made a significant contribution in demonstrating the dependence of cognition upon models often related to metaphors. Paul de Man made metaphor an important part of his work twenty years after the publication of Black's influential essay on metaphor.

While the extensive literature on metaphor holds great relevance for this study, it was necessary to limit the research to questions thought to pertain most directly to an understanding of organicism. To that end, I have identified several issues which will serve

as guides or tools in helping to produce a sharper focus in the investigation of organicism in music studies. Because of the way the topic unfolds in the material explored below and because of its non-chronological sequence, no tidy, linear treatment can be guaranteed.

In an attempt to establish a technical language for reference throughout the study, I have italicized some words and phrases which recur with some regularity. They will be discussed in the next few pages. This effort should not be viewed as a hard and fast standardized terminology, but rather as vocabulary that creates points of continuity and recognition. Following are some of the questions which will be discussed in anticipation of the more specific attention to the musical organic.

Is it possible to *paraphrase a metaphor* in literal language without any loss or excess of meaning? (Black, Richards, de Man). This last question stems from the well-established polarity of a *literal* versus a *figurative* presentation. How can the parts be described which comprise a metaphor? (Richards: *tenor and vehicle*). How important is some *self-awareness of metaphoric use* within a text? (de Man). Are there *repressed or invisible elements* involved in a metaphorical process? (Black: *associated commonplaces*, *metaphor as filter*). Can metaphors be used on a broader scale? (Kuhn: *paradigmatic metaphors*, de Man: *nucleus metaphors* or my term, *cluster metaphor*). The matter of self-awareness concerns distancing, an idea that dovetails with categories to be discussed in Chapter Five. Lack of consciousness in metaphorical dependence sometimes involves *literalizing the metaphor* such that, for example, a musical work is considered to be an organism in many respects. This *fusion* of different ontologies through language

potentially creates a falseness or error that de Man has termed "aesthetic ideology." The *allegorical* perspective favoured by de Man emphasizes the distance between signifier and signified, acknowledging the non-coincidence of language and its objects.

One publication was especially influential in challenging the literal/figurative divide, a divide strongly reinforced by logical positivist views of language (Johnson 1981, 16). In 1955 the philosopher Max Black delivered a ground-breaking address to the Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, simply titled, "Metaphor." It was subsequently published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1955, and spawned a whole new field of study. Black stresses the use of metaphor as a "filter" and proposes by way of illustration the metaphorical statement, "Man is a wolf." In addition to the idea of filter, Black observes that the effectiveness of the metaphor depends upon an understanding of the term, wolf, but more so upon "the *system of associated commonplaces*" with wolf. What is important is not so much the "truth" of these commonplaces, "but that they should be readily and freely evoked" (Black 287).

> Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked about in 'wolf-language' will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others--in short, *organizes* our view of man. (Black 288)

Just as the system of associated commonplaces derived from *wolf* filters or organizes a system of associated commonplaces surrounding *man*, so the system of ideas linked with natural organisms screens and determines musical systems. The metaphor is indispensable

to the cognitive insight. The literal/metaphorical division becomes more fluid in Black's interactive model of metaphor.

Black's metaphorical comparison of warfare with a chess game illustrates further the colouring effect of metaphor:

> The vocabulary of chess has its primary uses in a highly artificial setting, where all expression of feeling is formally excluded: to describe a battle as if it were a game of chess is accordingly to exclude, by the choice of language, all the more emotionally disturbing aspects of warfare. (Black 289)

Depicting warfare as chess strategy had the effect of subtly obscuring or repressing its inherently violent nature. In other words, the tenor, war, interacts with the vehicle, chess game, to sanitize or repress its murderous nature, transforming it from the physical and emotional to the cerebral. There is no literal substitute for this war/chess metaphor in which one category filters what is perceived in the other. Black claims that simple reduction of metaphors to literal equivalents is not possible.

While the publication of I. A. Richards's work preceded Black's by almost twenty years, its sympathetic reception does not antedate Black. The prevailing position of logical positivism in the 1930s was not open to Richards's views on metaphor. As a literary critic lacking the necessary qualifications of a respected philosopher, Richards was not taken seriously (Johnson 1981, 19).

Richards anticipated many of the more recent thorny language debates in his 1936 study, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. For example he writes, "So much misinterpretation comes from supposing that if a word works one way it cannot simultaneously work in

another and have simultaneously another meaning" (119). In a sense, the working of a word in different directions summarizes what is meant by metaphor: "When we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction" (93). Richards insisted on metaphor as "the omnipresent principle of language" and thought, finding it even in the sciences. He observes:

> In the semi-technicalised subjects, in aesthetics, politics, sociology, ethics, psychology, theory of language and so on, our constant chief difficulty is to discover how we are using it and how our supposedly fixed words are shifting their senses. (92)

Richards's chapter, "The Command of Metaphor," 115-38, is a rich resource. His famous distinction of *tenor*, "the principal subject," and *vehicle*, "what it resembles," as the two components at work in metaphor assists in clarifying issues (96). His equal emphasis upon disparity and similarity between tenor and vehicle is revelatory:

> When Hamlet uses the word *crawling* its force comes not only from whatever resemblances to vermin it brings in but at least equally from the differences that resist and control the influences of their resemblances....Some similarity will commonly be the ostensive ground of the shift, but the peculiar modification of the tenor which the vehicle brings about is even more the work of their unlikenesses than of their likenesses. (127)

Richards, along with Black, points to the fluidity of the literal/figurative line and the inadequacy of any rigid division:

> Traditional theory...made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between and intercourse of *thought*, a transaction between contexts. (94)

> A modern theory would object....That the vehicle is not normally a mere embellishment of a tenor which is otherwise unchanged by it but that vehicle and tenor in co-operation give a meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed to either. (100)

Richards further problematizes the literal/figurative distinction by pushing the illustration of a "leg":

> We notice that even there the boundary between literal and metaphoric uses is not quite fixed or constant....When a man has a wooden leg, is it a metaphoric or a literal leg?....A word may be simultaneously both literal and metaphoric.... (118)

Thomas Kuhn's contribution has not been primarily in the field of metaphor, but his explanation of "paradigm shift" has been linked to the idea of metaphors serving as controlling models during specific time periods in fields quite different from science. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1962, describes movements in scientific thought for which we can find parallel developments in aesthetics, "paradigm shifts" based to some degree upon organizing metaphors. The notion of "crisis" within a paradigm such as Kuhn described within electromagnetic theories prior to Einstein's theory of relativity in 1905 (Kuhn 74), seemed to characterize mechanistic philosophy as understood by the early romantics at the turn of the nineteenth century. Mechanicism could not account for qualities of design or teleology observed in both biology and works of art. Some new paradigm or metaphor was needed to replace the machine.[5]

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[5]Carl Dahlhaus refers to Kuhn's "paradigm shift" with some frequency. In *The Idea of Absolute Music*, Dahlhaus describes participants in the music-esthetic ethos of the last 150 years as "aligning themselves to a music-esthetic 'paradigm' (to use the term that Thomas Kuhn applied to the history of science): that of 'absolute music'" (2).

An article by Paul de Man, "The Epistemology of Metaphor," commences by rehearsing the "perennial problem" of "metaphors, tropes, and figural language in general" for philosophical discourse. He discusses the recognition of the long held suspicion of the figurative by philosophers in reviewing the attempts of three writers, Locke, Condillac, and Kant to police rhetoric. For example, Kant's dependence upon the metaphors of "grounding" and "standing"--not reliable by Kant's own epistemological standards--points to "the hidden uncertainty about the rigor of a distinction that does not hold if the language in which it is stated reintroduces the elements of indetermination it sets out to eliminate" (de Man 1983, 48). Here Kant shows no awareness of his dependence upon metaphor and this unconscious dependence allows the language to work independently of his intentions. In other words, Kant loses control of something at the centre of his argument, an undeclared figure.[6]

De Man's primary reference is to John Locke whose attitude to the rhetorical elements of language is considered "exemplary." He quotes a passage from Locke which illustrates the anxiety of philosophers toward rhetoric, but more generally points to the role of language mediating between ideas or objects and their verbal expression:

> They [words] interpose themselves so much between our understandings and the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend that, like the *medium* through which visible objects pass, their obscurity and disorder

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[6]In his Ph. D. dissertation, "The Appeal to Reason: The Legitimacy of Science and the Cartesian Genealogy of Knowledge," Jonathan Bordo locates the metaphor of an edifice as a governing depiction of philosophical foundationalism. He critiques this confusion of the rhetoric of knowledge with knowledge itself.

> does not seldom cast a mist before our eyes and impose upon our understandings. (Quoted by de Man, 35, from Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, edited by Yolton, Bk.3, ch. 9, 87-88)

In another passage ("*Eloquence*, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against" [Bk.3, ch. 10, 106]), Locke described rhetoric as feminine, implying it had its place but not in the men's world of philosophy (de Man 36).

De Man claims that it is impossible to maintain a clear distinction between the various manifestations of rhetoric: "The resulting undecidability is due to the asymmetry of the binary model that opposes the figural to the proper meaning of the figure" (48, 49). The binarism is itself based upon a "tropological pattern," that of polarity (49). By showing the intrinsicality of metaphor in philosophical writings--many a difficult line of argument builds on the very figures considered suspect--de Man illustrates the insidiousness of rhetorical discourse which always interrupts its own closure.

De Man addresses Locke's attempt to maintain the distinctiveness of "simple ideas," that is, proper meanings. Locke concludes--after tracing efforts to define "motion" which circulate around explanations that argue motion is passage, and passage is movement from one place to another--that translation and not definition is involved. Definition never moves beyond tautology. De Man writes, "The discourse of simple ideas is figural discourse or translation and, as such, creates the fallacious illusion of definition" (38). Proper meanings fail to stand alone, and therefore an insistence upon their simplicity leaves little alternative to that of figural explanations.

Two other ideas de Man conveys hold import for this study. He wonders "whether the metaphors illustrate a cognition or if the cognition is not perhaps shaped by the metaphors" (36). This questioning resonates with the previous authors discussed. Its applicability relates to music, where one's understanding of music is mediated by organicist vocabulary that shapes what is apprehended at a cognitive level.

The next depiction of tropes acknowledges the tendency of figures to attract a cluster of concepts around themselves, forming a larger entity, all of which can move in conjunction with the nucleus metaphor without, however, declaring themselves. De Man writes, "Tropes are not just travellers, they tend to be smugglers and probably smugglers of stolen goods at that" (39). Of interest is what accompanying, yet undeclared travellers, may enter musical practices in the luggage of organicism. The question of concealment in metaphorical usage is raised, if not developed here.

What becomes evident from an examination of recent writings on metaphor is that there is no obvious systematic approach to the study of metaphor. The old distinction of literal/figural which assumed an unproblematic translation of figural language into literal language no longer holds, nor does a consistent separation of the vehicle and tenor, generally seen as interacting with one another, following Richards and Black. The pervasiveness of metaphor in the everyday processes of conceptualization and of language points to the inescapability of tropes, their failure to comply with the rules and discipline of philosophy.

What can be a telling criterion in understanding how a metaphor functions, in particular a paradigmatic metaphor such as organicism, is the level of awareness demonstrated in a text of the metaphoricity of the figure. Black's illustration of how the vehicles, "wolf" and "chess," organize views of man and war points to a filter effect or a repression of those elements which do not fit the controlling vehicle. The correlation between self-conscious deployment of the organicist figure and other factors relating to concealment or repression is one which may prove fruitful, one which de Man among the above authors has pursued more fully and that under a different frame of reference, namely allegory.

## THE HISTORICAL HORIZON OF MIRROR AND MACHINE

It is appropriate at the outset of this historical treatment of aesthetic tropes to draw attention to how national traditions accorded different perspectives to mechanicism and organicism. Like organicism, mechanism ranged widely in its characteristics from time to time and place to place, varying from discipline to discipline. It differed from Galileo to Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Newton, and Hume in the extent of its application. Hume, for example, saw all of life in mechanistic terms, while Descartes and Newton would separate the spiritual from the material and allow free reign to an all-powerful God. Nonetheless, all were committed to the scientific method, to explanation in terms of natural laws--primarily the motion of bodies composed of distinct particles. It would appear that it was not some

kind of "pure" mechanistic principles against which the romantics objected so much as it was to exaggerations and abuses developed during the Enlightenment--its sterility, soulessness, inadequacy to account for teleology in nature and art, its atheistic tendencies.

Having said that, immediate qualification is required for each of the German states, France, and England. In Germany, the fear of the French Revolution with its terrible excesses, made the Germans wary of anti-religious sentiments or widespread democracy in government. While radical in aesthetics, organicism was a socially conservative influence in the German states. By contrast, in France, organicist social theory supported the republican cause. Across the English Channel, however, Coleridge's explication of organicism, unlike the German experience, cannot be explained by reaction to the French Revolution. What I want to underscore is the historical situatedness of organicism, notwithstanding my distillation of organicist attributes into what appears to be a trans-historical "cluster." Having said that, I must acknowledge a practical constraint which precludes an in-depth pursuit of national differences in the interests of focus and manageability, except where it bears directly upon an argument. Abrams's study below explores the German and English expressions in their historical contexts to some extent.

The literary critic and historian, M. H. Abrams, has drawn attention to new interpretative possibilities derived from bringing "submerged analogies" upon which criticism builds into the open. Abrams's book, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*, is an investigation of the shift to the organic paradigm

in literary criticism as part of the movement to romanticism away from neo-classicism.[7] Central to his study is the question, what is revealed when controlling root analogies are brought to the foreground? Abrams is not the only critic to observe the importance of root metaphors or analogies in aesthetics or other disciplines, but he is one of the first to give clear articulation to the idea, specifically as it draws attention to the role of language in determining what is seen or ignored. It is his emphasis upon language which propels his ideas into the current critical foreground.[8]

Abrams's title is drawn from William Butler Yeats:

> I must go further still: that soul must become its own betrayer, its own deliverer, the one activity, the mirror turn lamp (quoted on title page).

Abrams's choice of Yeats' two metaphors, the "mirror" and the "lamp," indicates first, the extent to which Abrams believes that critical systems run on analogical thinking, and second, that it is these particular images which most succinctly capture the shift at the turn of the nineteenth century as they offer antithetical metaphors for the mind. The "mirror" stands in for mimesis, art as reflector of the external world; the "lamp" highlights the

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[7]The designations, romanticism and neo-classicism, have very different standard textbook references in music. Whereas in literature, romanticism (1785-1830) followed neo-classicism (1660-1785), in music the reverse occurred: musical neo-classicism marks a reaction to late romanticism between the two World Wars. Writers often refer to all of nineteenth-century music as "romantic."

[8]In his article, "The Mirror Stage," in the collection, *High Romantic Argument: Essays for M. H. Abrams*, Jonathan Culler remarks: "Abrams' whole approach is predicated, as he tells us, upon the insight that since critical terminology is borrowed and hence figurative, the logic of the figures themselves, will, to a considerable extent, determine critical thinking" (160-61).

projection of the mind into the objects it illuminates, a quality most evident in the work of a genius.

While the "mirror" and the "lamp" represent the mimetic and romantic aesthetics respectively and therefore denote metaphorically the movement from neo-classicism to romanticism in literary history and its corresponding theories of the mind, Abrams does not develop the lamp figure itself to any great extent. It is the "plant" or "organism" which is the real counterpart to the mirror as Abrams describes Coleridge's literary theories of poets and poems. Abrams's attention to the metaphorical language of critical discourse led him to observe that a change in figures signalled a radical alteration in viewpoints. He writes, "The bringing of submerged analogies into the open puts certain old facts into a new and, it seems to me, a revealing perspective" (Preface, no pagination).

The "mimetic theory" continued with much variation right into neo-classic aesthetics where it had by then lost its central force. Of Plato's reflector images--the mirror, water, or shadows--one could ask how well the analogy illustrates the concept of art. But Abrams raises a different question: "To what extent may the concept have been generated from the analogy?" (31).[9] The additional role of metaphor, the part it plays in

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[9]Retrospectively, it can be seen that Abrams is asking the same kinds of questions posed by Richards, Black, and Mark Johnson, among others. Richards insisted that, far from being a mere verbal exercise, metaphor is an omnipresent quality of language, one that shapes our very concepts. Abrams's echo of Richards in his suggestion that the concept may "have been generated from the analogy" recalled a connection between Abrams and Richards found in Abrams's Preface: "This book had its distant origin in a study of the writings of [Samuel] Johnson and Coleridge, under the stimulating direction of I. A. Richards at Cambridge University..." (no pagination).

criticism as "certain more or less submerged conceptual models" (archetypal analogies), also functions "in helping to select, interpret, systematize, and evaluate the facts of art" (31). (This is reminiscent of Black's view of how the "wolf" metaphor organizes a certain view of "man.") Some analogues are "casual and illustrative"; some, on the other hand, seem to be "constitutive":

> They yield the ground plan and essential structural elements of a literary theory, or of any theory. By the same token, they select and mould those 'facts' which a theory comprehends. (31)

It is in this observation that a metaphor can structure a theory that Abrams goes beyond Black and Richards and it is this which bears most directly on my study of organicism.[10]

The mirror metaphor "selects" and "moulds" interpretations of art by establishing a concentration on content. It deflects attention away from the importance of artistic conventions and offers little role to the artist. Those parts of a poem which deviate from representing the "real" world and veer off into the imaginative are deemed "ornamental" and therefore, inferior. "Truth" is measured by how closely a poem corresponds to what is reflected (34). Abrams concludes that "...the very sharpness of focus afforded by a happily chosen archetype makes marginal and elusive those qualities of an object which fall outside its primitive categories" (35).

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[10]While Abrams's connection to Richards is evident, interaction with Black's work at the time of this publication of *The Mirror and the Lamp*, 1953, cannot be seen from Abrams's bibliography. Abrams's expansion of Black's articulation of metaphor may be quite independent of Black, many of these ideas having been expressed, if less fully developed, in Richards's work.

In addition to his treatment of metaphor and his expansion on the mirror-based mimetic theories, Abrams points to some forces which contributed to the new importance accorded the artist. As the work of art was seen to imitate the "ideal" more than nature itself, the conception of artist shifted from that of a craftsman to that of a creator during the eighteenth century. This seemingly subtle alteration held the greatest significance as the artist assumed the qualities of a Godlike creator, making art in the manner of God making the universe (42). It was posited that "traces of the divine archetype" were "stamped into the intellect before birth" (44). These incipient ideas came to fruition in the nineteenth-century enchantment with genius.

The machine trope provides a concentration of issues and outlooks against which the organicists reacted. But it was no more a singular, unified concept than organicism. However mechanicism may have differed in diverse times and places, some characteristic features can be extracted. Briefly put, mechanism explains natural happenings in terms of motion of discrete units according to fixed laws as revealed by mathematical methods. The whole product is produced by "aggregation of parts" rather than growth. It is this quality that is both like organicism in its identification of parts, and unlike it in its termination of analysis when it has named the parts. "Unity" under mechanism and under organicism are not to be confused. In organic unity the whole is greater than the sum of its parts; in mechanical unity it is simply the sum of its parts and their individual relationships. Organicism is concerned with the teleological outgrowth of integral parts from some seminal unit created by a genius who in some way incorporates his feeling or spirit in the

composition. The fitting of parts together, even acting causally upon one another by extension, is not organically derived.

With an emphasis upon the machine understood as aggregation of parts, I will investigate two examples: Kant's model of the machine as a clock and musical analysis based upon the flip side of aggregation or addition of parts which is analysis or division into parts.

Philosophy: Kant's Articulation of the Machine Trope

Kant's work stands in a unique historical position, bridging the historical periods designated Enlightenment and Romanticism. His analysis of the properties of organisms in the *Critique of Judgement*, particularly his refutation of their explanation in purely mechanical terms, lent organicism a new impetus and higher profile. Joseph Margolis writes, "Aesthetics, as a discipline, begins approximately with Kant's *Critique of Judgment*" (5).

It is in the realm of aesthetics that the mind locates its purposiveness or causal connections. Kant writes, "For only in *works of art* can we become conscious of reason as the cause of objects, which are therefore called purposive or ends..."(Kant §9:38-39). Because of the inadequacy of "simply mechanical causality" to account for the concepts of form and purposiveness in nature, Kant turns to teleology, thereby making the concept of natural purpose a "reflective" or subjective judgment, a rational concept introducing "into a natural science a new causality" (§61, 206-7). A "reflective judgment" is distinct from a

"determinative judgment" which is objective and capable of empirical proof. It is only because of this posited principle of teleology that one can attribute design to nature.

At this point Kant offers a negative example, that of a watch, which he uses to illustrate the failure of the *mechanical* principle to account for "organized and self-organizing being":

> In this case the producing cause of the parts and of their form is not contained in the nature (of the material), but is external to it in a being which can produce effects according to ideas of a whole possible by means of its causality....An organized being is then not a mere machine, for that has merely *moving* power, but it possesses in itself *formative* power of a self-propagating kind which it communicates to its materials though they have it not of themselves; it organizes them, in fact, and this cannot be explained by the mere mechanical faculty of motion. (§65, 220-21)

The organism is distinguished not only by its internal organizing ability but also by its reproductive power, its assimilative and self-reparation abilities. Kant writes:

> Hence a watch wheel does not produce other wheels; still less does one watch produce other watches, utilizing (organizing) foreign material for that purpose; hence it does not replace of itself parts of which it has been deprived, nor does it make good what is lacking in a first formation by the addition of the missing parts, nor if it has gone out of order does it repair itself--all of which, on the contrary, we may expect from organized nature. (§65, 220-21)

The mechanical/organic opposition, illustrated here by Kant, functions as a theme throughout much of the literature that deals with the organic. It highlights the failure of the machine metaphor to explain growth and development, reproduction, and the interdependence of parts. But the organismic priority of the whole over the parts, a reversal of the machine's aggregation of parts to whole, could not be explained by a

sequential mode of causal construction. Recourse to our own mental concepts of purpose which we impose upon material and events could have no correlate in non-intelligent objects. In §65 Kant concludes, "To speak strictly, then, the organization of nature has in it nothing analogous to any causality we know" (Kant 221).

Kant rejects the machine model as inadequate but is cautious in proposing an *a priori* principle of purposiveness as seen in organisms. The teleology evidenced in organisms is not "an exactly fitting analogy to human art" (§65, 222). Kant therefore offers his teleological principle not as constitutive of understanding or reason, but as "a regulative concept for the reflective judgment, to guide our investigation about objects of this kind by a distant analogy with our own causality" (Kant §65, 222). This more tentative, "regulative" quality of the teleological principle so integral to organicism lost much of its cautionary aspect in the hands of writers less guarded than Kant. In effect, Kant's cautions and acute self-consciousness of the distance between his imagery and nature or art illustrate de Man's mode of allegory.

### Music and the Machine Model

The mechanistic model is reflected in musical studies in a number of ways, the total of which does not produce any single theory or unified scheme. It is not always self-evident how this orientation to machine imagery was expressed in musical discourse. What does emerge are recurring interests: the ordering and classification of musical information;

the dissecting and labelling of a work's parts based upon the mechanistic assumption of a whole as an aggregation of parts.

How do these interests intersect with the machine model? The great concern with an orderly taxonomy concerned the breaking down of objects into discrete units upon the basis of their identity or difference. It was the depiction of the world as cosmic machine and its breakdown into smaller machines whose parts could be labelled and categorized that provided the *raison d'être* for this focus upon classification. The parts were not understood to be interconnected functions growing out of germinal material.

A spate of musical publications throughout the eighteenth century--dictionaries, theoretical treatises, and guides to performance practice--all have in common the work of ordering and classifying different kinds of musical information:

1. Dictionaries: 1703 *Dictionnaire de musique* by Sebastian de Brossard; 1743 *Musikalisches Lexicon* by Johann Gottfried Walther; 1740 *Grundlage einer Ehrenpforte, woran der tüchtigsten Capellmeister, Componisten, Musikgelehrten, Tonkünstler, etc., Leben, Werke, Verdienste, etc., erscheinen sollen* by Johann Mattheson;[11] 1768 *Dictionnaire de musique* by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
2. Theoretical Treatises: 1725 *Gradus ad Parnassum* by Johann Joseph Fux; 1722 *Traité de l'harmonie* by Jean-Philippe Rameau.

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[11]"Fundamentals of a triumphal arch, at which the best (most capable conductors, composers, music scholars, musicians, etc. works, accomplishments, are to be published."

3. <u>Guides to Performance Practice</u>: 1752 *Versuch einer Anweisung die Flöte traversière zu spielen* by J. J. Quantz; 1753 *Versuch über die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen, mit Exempeln...* by C. P. E. Bach; 1753 *Versuch einer gründlichen Violinschule* by Leopold Mozart; 1771 *Traité des Agréments de la Musique* by Guiseppe Tartini.

As W. D. Allen notes in his *Philosophies of Music History*,

> Dictionaries are not the only signs of the classificatory activities of this era....This belief [in the fixity of species] was reflected in the proverb, "God created, Linnaeus arranged."
>
> ...The simultaneous appearance of classificatory works in various fields [seems] to indicate something more than coincidence, for the main emphasis at this time appears to be directed toward atomistic types of philosophy and investigation. (Allen 63)

Taxonomy and categorization and the clarifying order which they represented were trademarks of the age of science.

If one work were to stand out as stereotypically epitomizing the codification endemic to an ethos influenced by mechanistic models, it would be Rameau's theoretical work in music. Thomas Christensen has written a very thorough and stimulating book on this subject, *Rameau and Musical Thought in the Enlightenment*. Christensen observes Rameau's obsession with grounding his theory of *basse fondamentale* in science. Rameau's theory reflects the shifting loyalties of the intellectual circles in which he moved. Christensen writes,

> At one time or another, Rameau cast his theory of the fundamental bass in the varied rhetorics of neoplatonism, Cartesian mechanism, Newtonian

> gravitation, Lockean sensationalism, and Malebranchian occasionalism.[12] (Christensen 13)

Great value was attached to Rameau's theoretical system by his contemporaries, in spite of its clear errors, many of which were recognized, particularly by scientists. The theory may have had gaps and contradictions, and certainly Rameau overextended his principle of the *corps sonore*, but the key to its success was "that it offered solutions to a number of critical problems deemed important to its readers" not the least of which was the introduction of a new efficiency in thorough bass (303).

The final word on the success of theories, models, or paradigms, with respect to Rameau's musical system, Christensen locates in another arena, that of language. I quote at some length because of the resonance of this idea with the framework of this chapter:

> Rhetoric is not simply an embellishment of some underlying idea, or worse, an obfuscation of that idea. Already in the eighteenth century, writers from Vico to Burke recognized how rhetoric is an integral and even inseparable part of a thought's articulation. We have seen how so many of the most significant tenets of Rameau's theory, from his definitions of dissonance and mode, to his conception of the fundamental bass, were not merely cast into the language of extra-musical ideologies (neoplatonism, Newton's theory of gravity, and Cartesian mechanism), but indeed motivated by them. (Christensen 304)

Another writer, Gary Don, notes Rameau's appeal to mechanistic imagery, that of tones interacting "as if they were billiard balls striking one another":

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[12]Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715) was a philosopher and scientist who defended Descartes' work by attempting "to find a place for God in Descartes's mechanistic universe of extended matter and motion" (Christensen 298).

> Rameau...used such an analogy in his *Treatise on Harmony*. He stated that when a note that is consonant above the bass is tied over and becomes dissonant against the new bass note and the upper voices, the effect is analogous to an object at rest that is struck by a moving object, which imparts its momentum to the struck object, then comes to rest. (Don 1991, 70)

One example from late eighteenth-century aesthetics, Johann Georg Sulzer's *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste*, 1771-74, illustrates the struggle with attempts to account for unity and temporality in music.[13] Several passages point to the tension between a mechanistic model and an as yet undefined organistic one. Without the organizing metaphor of the organism, much qualification is needed to express the tighter kind of cohesion Sulzer seems to be seeking. Compare the following by Sulzer to Kant's negative example of a clock:

> Springs and other such parts of a clock have such a connection to one another that any one of them separated from the others can never constitute a whole, rather only a part. Thus there is unity in a clock, but not in the collection of drinking glasses upon a table. (Sulzer 43)

Again he wrestles with imagery to depict interrelatedness:

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[13]Large portions of Sulzer's work are translated in *Aesthetics and the Art of Musical Composition in the German Enlightenment: Selected Writings of Johann Georg Sulzer and Heinrich Christoph Koch*, 1995, as part of the *Cambridge Studies in Music Theory and Analysis* edited by Ian Bent.

*General Theory of the Fine Arts* is an encyclopedia in two large volumes, written principally by the Swiss encyclopedist, Sulzer, and consisting of articles arranged alphabetically. J. P. Kirnberger and J. A. P. Schulz contributed some of the more technical aspects of music in the articles, while Sulzer dealt with all of the aesthetic issues (Christensen in Intro. to Sulzer, 14). Christensen is listed in the bibliography under the editors, Baker and Christensen. Christensen translates and edits the work of Sulzer; Baker, the work of Koch.

> There has to be a thread drawing together the many different things so that they are not arbitrarily joined, but rather have a natural connection to one another. (Sulzer 47)

Later he addresses the need for intrinsic connection of all the parts of a work without the benefit of the organic idea of a "seed" from which a piece can "grow," an idea based upon the organic conception of the priority of the whole to the parts:

> The artist,...must try to form a clear and exact idea of the work he wishes to create in his mind so that he can evaluate whether every idea that comes to him can contribute to making the work what it should be. (Sulzer 59)

Such artistic skills can be enhanced by "a constant study of art and preexisting works" (Sulzer 62). This attention to craft and study contrasts with the romantic emphasis upon giftedness. In one paragraph Sulzer comes very close to expressing romantic conceptions of artistic creativity based on organic growth. He does not, however develop the idea:

> When they [thoughts] are left alone they will by themselves grow in greater clarity, much as that period in which plants germinate unnoticed and all at once burst into full bloom. Some concepts will gestate little by little in our mind, so to speak, and extract themselves from the mass of obscure ideas into the clear light. (Sulzer 63)

This sounds much like close to the "lamp" version of the artistic mind penetrating into the external world like a plant growing up to the sun. But it is a fleeting thought.

In examining theory and analysis for how mechanicism was expressed in music, I will look at two examples: the English theorist, William Jones (1726-1800), and the composer and teacher, Carl Czerny (1791-1857).

In her article, "The Systematic Writings on Music of William Jones," Jamie Kassler explores the work of William Jones, whom she describes as "paradigmatic of British

theoreticians who published treatises on harmony and composition in the period 1760-1830." The point she wishes to make is that too often the "biological model of thought" is applied retrospectively to music for which another model was used, the mechanistic model (92). She claims that the "biological model" is inadequate to account for theories of sonata form current in the eighteenth century which "drew their principles from a mechanistic model" (92).

Kassler highlights some of the integral elements in Jones's theory:

> Jones considers music as a particulate mass, divisible into various classes of particles (notes, intervals, chords, harmonic periods, and subjects). Furthermore, Jones regards the classes of music as material to be used. In his rules for the conduct of subject, Jones considers the subject for what it can do, specifying two functions: the production of uniformity and variety...
> On the level of structure of the subject, a musical piece is represented symbolically as a unity produced by the repetition of subjects....The only differences accounted for within a musical piece are the change in the arrangement of or the order in which subjects follow one another. The patterns of repetition that can be constructed upon the basis of this rule stem from pure mathematics...The only facet that will account for *this* piece of music as distinct from *that* piece is the order and arrangement in which the known beginnings are conducted. (98-100)

Because there is nothing in Jones's theory to account for the change of arrangement of musical material--"the space in which they are arranged makes no qualitative difference of any kind to them"--Jones must find an external source. Even the idea of genius, for whom his invention is a gift, "a property of the soul," cannot fully explain the music:

> The form of Jones's thought compels him to refer to something beyond the system of musical symbols. The process moves from the hierarchy concerning the nature of music to its purpose--to the composer and his intention--and ultimately, to God. (100)

It is interesting that Jones's theory "did not treat of large-scale structure" (106). His focus was chiefly the music of Corelli and Handel. Of Boccerini and Haydn, Jones wrote, "[They] are sometimes so desultory and unaccountable in their way of treating a Subject, that they may be reckoned among the wild warblers of the wood" (Jones quoted in Kassler 107).

Kassler's summation of the differences in what she terms the "biological model" and the "mechanistic model" reflects the contrast well:

> Representation of a musical piece as a unity of differences or opposites, proceeding dialectically, is a biological apprehension, not a mechanistic one. A mechanistic interpretation will account for differences merely as changes in the number or in the arrangement of musical equivalences in space or in time. Symmetry is paramount under such an interpretation.... (100)

The second example, a passage from Czerny's analysis of Beethoven's Waldstein Sonata, illustrates the lack of ends and means embedded in teleologically driven musical elements so integral to an organicist orientation. It conveys an understanding of composition as elementalist, that is, the construction of smaller thematic units into larger forms. After producing an harmonic reduction of the sonata's Allegro extending over six pages, Czerny writes:

> The remarkable unity and symmetry of the whole of this movement depend on the following causes:-
>
> 1st It is not overladen with too many different melodies; for it consists only of four ideas, namely: the principal theme, the middle subject, the imitation following it, and concluding subject.
>
> 2ndly The ideas, which are judiciously chosen are always beautifully connected with each other.

> 3rdly The modulations are naturally and rhythmically conducted.
> 4thly Each period is of suitable length.
> 5thly The character of the whole, from beginning to end, is truthfully designed and preserved. (excerpted in Bent, 1994, 196)

Although Czerny does employ organicist language on occasion, the compositional process is expressed in terms of putting together thematic units to create structures. Seminal motifs do not grow into purposeful wholes in what Czerny has indicated in this analytical piece. The notion of form as aggregation of parts, a key plank in mechanicism, persists in this analysis, produced between 1832 and 1836. The impression of music as a language with a grammar is also very strong with the parsing of larger units into smaller ones.

The machine model meshed well enough with musical methods of dividing music into parts and constructing it according to rational and mathematical concepts. Composition understood as additive, the arrangement of parts into a whole by a composer as the designer of the product, was not unlike a machine. The components of a machine are arranged by a skilled machinist so as to connect gears or levers with the externally generated motion being passed from one part to the next. This model of physics nevertheless fails to explain the necessity of the arrangements of musical elements in a composition. If there is no necessary explanation--no teleology--in music's temporal order then there is no framework within which one sequence can be preferred over another. The formalistic features of music offer only limited direction in determining an arrangement.

The most radical difference between mechanistic and organic explanations in music is the absence in the former of notions of growth, development, or unfolding of genetically coded material, all of which convey the sense of necessity. According to organicism, parts are not arranged; they are pre-determined by a background formula or germinal motives in the opening measures. It is not the case that Beethoven's early sonatas were conceived mechanistically and his later ones organically. However, it was during his lifetime that some of the issues relating to the conceptualization of musical processes were being worked out. What did change was the rhetoric that attempted to capture what was thought to be important in representing both the more technical aspects of composition and what was valued both in the intellectual and societal environment of the nineteenth century.

## Transition to Organicism

The waning of the mirror trope took place on at least two fronts: psychology[14] and aesthetics. Kant's Copernican shift from the external world as centre, to the innate categories of the mind as essential to the production of knowledge, was a challenge to empiricist psychology which claimed the senses as the chief source of knowledge. New theories of the mind were needed to match epistemological changes. Concurrent with a

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[14]Psychology is not used here in its modern sense. Its concern was more epistemological in orientation, examining how the mind processed knowledge. Under a sensationalist empiricism after Locke, the mind functioned like a machine, reassembling its data derived from the senses. The mind had no innate properties. Kant's philosophy shifted the centre from outside to inside as the locus for knowledge production.

new psychology was a concentrated focus upon the poet/artist's inner nature, soul, or feelings as opposed to art as imitation of external nature or natural relations, or art involving a skilful arrangement of parts as in a machine.

Abrams outlines three metaphor-like polarities around which much of the critical development revolved without, however, calling attention to their metaphoric properties. The first dichotomy, inside/outside, represents the radical reversal of orientation from "outside" nature, the external universe, to "inside" nature, the innermost being of the heart, soul, and mind of the artist. The theoretical counterparts of this shift are the mimetic theory based upon the mirror metaphor, and the expressive theory based upon the organic trope. Pivotal to the latter is the poet/artist who enables the internal to be made external by an act of overflowing from within (48). Ludwig Tieck captures the new attitude to the outer and inner: "Not these plants, not these mountains, do I wish to copy, but my spirit, my mood, which governs me just at this moment..." (Quoted in Abrams 50).

This movement of the centre from outside to inside put a strain upon the ability of words to reflect adequately this inner state of the poet. Instrumental music rose to a new prominence in this changing climate. Its very inability to portray nature precisely--formerly a failure--now defined its highest quality. In section seven of his *Confessions of an Art-loving Friar*, 1797, "The Characteristic Inner Nature of the Musical Art and the Psychology of Today's Instrumental Music," Wackenroder points to an "inexplicable sympathy" between tonal relationships and "fibres of the human heart" (Wackenroder 188).

If it is through music that we learn to feel emotion, music "does not know the relationship of its emotions to the real world" (Wackenroder 192).

This new view of the poet's mind and the external world has implications for the second dichotomy, the subject/object polarity, a cleavage entrenched in philosophy by Descartes. The new aesthetic with its attention on the artist's inner resources attempted to bridge this chasm. Here poetry functions as a site of "interaction, the joint effect of inner and outer, mind [or subject] and object, passion and the perceptions of sense" (Abrams 51). As Coleridge expresses this idea, "In every work of art there is a reconcilement of the external with the internal; the conscious is so impressed on the unconscious as to appear in it..." (*Biographia Literaria* II, 258).

A third dichotomy plays out the old polarity of active/passive. Aristotle and John Locke are representatives of the passive pole. with Aristotle depicting the mind as "wax" on which it receives impressions, and Locke the "tabula rasa," the blank slate on which sensations paint or write themselves (Abrams 57). An indication of the activity of the imagination was the habit of poets to animate landscapes with life and passion. Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind" illustrates both the animation of nature, termed in formal rhetoric "prosopopoeia" or personification, and also the fusion between the external and the internal:

> Make me thy lyre, even as the forest is:
> What if my leaves are falling like its own!
> The tumult of thy mighty harmonies
>
> Will take from both a deep, autumnal tone,

> Sweet though in sadness. Be thou, Spirit fierce,
> My spirit! Be thou me, impetuous one! (*The Heath Introduction to Literature* 840)

The poet as wind-harp or "lyre" was a recurring image of the poetic mind.

Abrams sees interaction with the external world through the mind's active engagement with it as an attempt "to overcome the sense of man's alienation from the world by healing the cleavage between subject and object" (65). He summarizes Wordsworth's interaction of internal/external:

> This experience of the one life within us and abroad cancels the divisions between animate and inanimate, between subject and object--ultimately, even between object and object, in that climactic ALL IS ONE of the mystical trance-state (66)

In his book, *Romanticism and the Forms of Ruin: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Modalities of Fragmentation*, Thomas McFarland expands on what Abrams simply touches on, the relationship between an emphasis upon wholeness as in organicism and "lack." McFarland sets up a different opposition, that between the mimetic and the meontic modes. The mimetic imitates what is there; the meontic, what is not there (384). The following represents McFarland's argument:

> In every emotional longing for the absent then..., there is also a longing for wholeness. "The utmost," says Coleridge, in a passage that we may take as summary of this entire melding of emotional and cognitive longing, "is only an approximation to that absolute *Union*, which the soul sensible of its imperfection in itself, of its *Halfness*, yearns after." (McFarland 407; Coleridge, *Notebooks* III, 3325)

In addition to some of the binary oppositions around which these ideas have revolved--inside/outside, subject/object, active/passive--there is another important polarity

which is not explored and therefore continues to operate from a submerged position. It is the masculine/feminine dichotomy. Abrams's reports on female-based images of "embryonic growth," "birth" of poetry, "gestation and growth" (192-93) evoke no comment from him. I shall defer an examination of this binarism to Chapter Six.

The most preferred and productive image of all Abrams reserves for the last, in effect, an introductory link to much of the remainder of the book. It happened to be Coleridge's favourite:

> [It was] destined to alter more drastically the conceptions of mind, art, and the universe than all the apparatus of lamps, fountains, and wind-harps we have come upon thus far. This was the archetype (potentially present in the Platonist's figure of the 'seeds of light' in the mind) representing the mind not as a physical object or artifact, but as a living plant, growing out into its perception. (68)

The following quotation from Coleridge's *Lay Sermons* (75-7) is excerpted with some regularity in writings on the subject:[15]

> Lo!—with the rising sun it commences its outward life and enters into open communion with all the elements, at once assimilating then to itself and to each other. At the same moment it strikes its roots and unfolds its leaves, absorbs and respires, steams forthe its cooling vapour and finer fragrance, and breathes a repairing spirit, at once the food and tone of the atmosphere, into the atmosphere that feeds it. Lo!--at the touch of light how it returns an air akin to light, and yet with the same pulse effectuates its own secret growth, still contracting to fix what expanding it had refined. (Quoted in Abrams 69)

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[15]See for example McFarland 42-43, Douglass 256, I. A. Richards 111.

This merging of the theory of mind and the theory of art in the trope of the organism provided a compelling alternative to the eighteenth-century portrayal of the mind as mechanism and art as imitation.

If the mechanistic philosophy of the Enlightenment associated with, among others, Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Locke, and Hume, was the negative back-drop against which Coleridge, for example, wove his theories of organicist criticism, it was also a part of, or subsumed by, the active mind assimilating and transforming its environment. As Abrams explains, "Mechanism is false, not because it does not tell the truth, but because it does not tell the whole truth" (175). Clearly, by these standards, the psychology of the mind and the products of artists were thought to be represented more accurately when compared to the properties of living organisms.

## WHAT IS ORGANICISM?

Many of the writers who address the organic trope do not attempt to define their subject matter. This is not necessarily a bad strategy, given the inescapable tautological nature of definition as exemplified in de Man's study of Locke. In addition, an over-arching definition of organicism is problematic because it assumes some kind of constancy or stability to the concept which is inimical to its ongoing modulation. Paul de Man also promotes a method that avoids definition:

> Booth's approach to irony is eminently sensible: he starts out from a question in practical criticism, doesn't get involved in definitions or in the theory of tropes. (de Man 1996, 165)

He endorses Wayne Booth's questions: "By what markers, by what devices, by what indications or signals in the text we can decide that a text is ironic or is not?" (de Man 1996, 165). Perhaps these questions about the ironic trope could be adapted to probing for reliance upon organicist assumptions in a critical work: "By what markers, by what devices, by what indications or signals in the text can we decide that an analysis or criticism is organically based?" There is, of course, no ultimate criteria for determining the irony or organicism of a text, the reader's interaction with the text being a pivotal factor.

Keeping in mind, first, the undesirability of fixing a meaning to a concept which has been in flux over the centuries--not to mention its variation at the hands of different thinkers--and second, the danger of sacrificing richness in the interests of precision or convenience, I will trace some of the meanings that have been proposed by various writers. My goal is to cultivate a broad perspective on organicism such that the various threads or tangles which comprise its web-like structure can be made visible.

Organicism is not a single, unified concept, but a cluster of figures, until recently, all valued positively. What emerges is the desired fusion of art and nature--music *is* an organism--with language performing a complicit role. This synthesizing operation of two kinds of being--the mental and the sensual--is often articulated as the symbolic mode. According to this understanding, a work of art is like or becomes a work of *nature* in that as a *unified whole*, all of its parts *grow* from an inner design *teleologically* into an

*autonomous totality* that is complete in itself, having been created by a *genius* in the manner of God's creative acts thus imbuing it with *spirit*. As that with which art is compared--or indeed fused, become one with--nature occupies a pivotal position in the organic system. Language performs the transubstantive act through its metaphorizing function, adding a mystifying element to its naturalizing operations.

The eight components identified above in italics comprise what I have posited as the cluster of elements which commonly move together with the nucleus metaphor of the organism. M. H. Abrams's *The Mirror and the Lamp* also explores the network of ideas connected to organicism. While Abrams does not frame his investigation in precisely these terms, he does point to these components as markers or "signals in the text" indicating an organicist perspective. Abrams's definition provides a good starting point for approaching the meaning of organicism. Interwoven with the discussion of Abrams's historical and literary study of organicism will be discussions of other authors, in particular Coleridge, who shed light on the meaning of the organic in aesthetics. The concepts of "genius" and "soul," discussed separately by Abrams, will also be investigated as they intersect with organicism.

## Abrams's Treatment of Organicism

Curiously, Abrams's definition of organicism comes in brackets in the middle of his book, at the bottom of page 168 of a 335-page book, excluding notes and index.

> (Organicism may be defined as the philosophy whose major categories are derived metaphorically from the attributes of living and growing things). (168)[16]

One can speculate that such an unobtrusive insertion acknowledges the greater importance Abrams attaches to his historical, analytical quest into the nature of the comparison between organisms and art than to a tidy definition. But the odd placement of this definition buried in the middle of a book which has already allotted considerable space to discussing organicism, plus its framing in brackets has the opposite effect: it calls attention to itself. It merits closer reading.

The first thing to note is that organicism is a "philosophy," that is, it is about basic principles--in this case, epistemology, ontology, metaphysics. It is worthwhile to keep in view organicism's fundamentally philosophical grounding when confronting its more recent usages which tend to cut it off from its roots and employ it for structural analytical purposes. Abrams states that it is not "the general philosophy of organism, but only the increasing tendency to view a work of art, in its becoming and being, as endowed with organic properties" that he is concerned with (186). Second, organicism is an entity made up of "categories," some designated "major," some others presumably "minor." All of these categories stem from a comparison with "living and growing things" that is but "metaphorical."

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[16] All references in this section are to Abrams's *The Mirror and the Lamp* unless otherwise indicated.

This emphasis upon the metaphorical characteristics of organicism in Abrams's literary history holds potential for illuminating how the same figure operates in music. It was seen in "Inquiries into Metaphor" earlier that metaphor has a tendency to fuse the two sources of comparison, thus reducing distance in a way that often hides difference. This "tendency" of metaphor to fuse the tenor and vehicle, reducing their inherent distance and tension, is a problem that arises in music when a work is considered to *be* an organism, when in fact, those making the claims *wish* it to be like it in some respects and unlike it is others.

These "living and growing things" are not identified as either plant or animal; earlier, Abrams refers to the replacement "of a mechanical process by a living *plant* as the implicit paradigm governing the description of the process and the product of literary invention" [my emphasis] (158).[17] In what seems like a contradictory vein he also describes this shift in "psychological criticism" as the result of "an analogical substitution," not a metaphorical transfer. So while a closer reading may be somewhat productive, the surrounding pages point to a looseness about the choice of words which suggests this definition is indeed parenthetical to the larger task of an historical inquiry into organicism.

Abrams proceeds to document Coleridge's challenge to the old mechanical aesthetics by identifying five properties of plants which have import for criticism and

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[17]G. N. Giordano Orsini, an "aesthetician and literary historian who has made the study of Coleridge and organic form his particular province of expertise" (Rousseau, xi), writes in his article, "The Organic Concepts in Aesthetics," that the plant analogy is "one of the most hard-worked similes in the history of criticism" (Orsini 5).

psychology. This five-point explication of plant properties comprises the heart of Coleridge's organicist philosophy.[18] But first Abrams locates Coleridge's sources in biology and German philosophy. Two words, "assimilative" and "coadunate," are imported from contemporary biology and merit explanation:

> "Assimilative" connoted the process by which an organism converts food into its own substance, and "coadunate" signified "to grow together into one." (169)

This biological vocabulary captured Coleridge's depiction of the "imagination," a function of the mind higher than what he termed the "fancy." The latter was passive, mechanical, associative, and aggregative while the imagination was synthetic and creative, with assimilative and coadunating faculties (168). Coleridge equated "knowing with growing" where the mind's processes were like the "assimilation and respiration of a plant" (169).

Coleridge borrowed freely from German philosophy, particularly A. W. Schlegel and Schelling. In his article, "Organic Concepts in Aesthetics," Orsini translates a passage from A. W. Schlegel's *Lectures on Dramatic Literature (1809-1810)* which illustrates the kind of German literary criticism which held such strong appeal for Coleridge:

> In an essay on *Romeo and Juliet*, written a number of years ago (1797), I went through the whole of the scenes in their order, and demonstrated the inward necessity of each with reference to the whole....From all this it

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[18]For a discussion of Abrams's five-point summary, see William Wimsatt's article, "Organic form: some questions about a metaphor," in *Organic Form: The Life of an Idea* edited by G. S. Rousseau. Wimsatt writes, "The five, I believe, might be readily synthesized into fewer, or into one; or they might be analyzed into a larger number" (Wimsatt 67). Wimsatt goes on to argue for "a loose, stretchable and adjustable kind of organic form" (76).

> seemed to follow unquestionably that, with the exception of a few witticisms, nothing could be taken away, nothing added, nothing otherwise arranged, without mutilating and disfiguring this perfect work. (Quoted in Orsini 1969, 6-7)[19]

The five properties of plants which Abrams derives from Coleridge's writing are not located in one source (170). Rather they are drawn from the whole range of Coleridge's writings and in that sense are more a construction by Abrams with materials culled from Coleridge than a coherent, systematic doctrine put forth by Coleridge.

1. "The plant originates in a seed"[20] The organic is understood in relation to the inadequacies of the mechanical mode of thinking. An organizing principle in Coleridge's proposal of this new paradigm based on a comparison with organisms is that of this binary opposition. Thus the plant's origin in a seed indicates the priority of the whole to the parts. This is the opposite of the "elementaristic principle" or aggregation of parts discussed earlier in which the whole was a result of parts coming together. By contrast the seed precedes the parts, containing within itself the cause of all the other parts which are derived from it.

2. "The plant *grows*." Growth is one of the outstanding qualities of organisms and it is this central idea that Coleridge exploits to the fullest, both as a psychological process

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[19]This passage is found in Schlegel's *Sämmtliche Werke*, Leipzig, 1845, VII, 71-97.

[20]This discussion of the five properties of plants is found on four pages of *Mirror and Lamp*, 171-74. I will not make specific page references for this more detailed engagement with the text to avoid saturating the pages with documentation. One of the reasons for a more careful pause over this section is its treatment by Wimsatt in "Organic form: some questions about a metaphor" already referred to, and in de Man's "Form and Intent in the American New Criticism." This last article will be reviewed in Chapter Five.

in the mind of the poet and in the product. With reference to Shakespeare, Coleridge wrote, "All is growth, evolution, *genesis*--each line, each word almost, begets the following..."[21] The idea of a line begetting the next is a familiar concept in musical analysis also. Building on Schoenberg's concept of developing variation, Walter Frisch describes Brahms's String Quartet, op. 51, no. 2 in this manner: "In the Andante from the String Quartet, the tail of each 'phrase' immediately generates the succeeding phrase" (Frisch 16). Earlier Frisch explained, "This technique, by which a 'new' idea evolves spontaneously from a preceding one, is a distinctly Brahmsian one, which Schenker called *Knüpftechnik*, or linkage technique" (15).

3. "Growing, the plant assimilates to its own substance the alien and diverse elements of earth, air, light, and water." In the former "associative" or mechanical theory products were made by the recombination of reflecting images of the senses. In the organic theory, the mind absorbs sensual materials as food which is processed into new products. The active mind works like living nature assimilating light and nutrients to grow outward from its inner design.

4. "The plant evolves spontaneously from an internal source of energy...and organizes itself into its proper form." Coleridge used the Latin phrases, *ab extra* and *ab intra*, to indicate the contrary operation of mechanisms and organisms. In lifeless mechanisms, the form is imposed from without; in organisms the unity is formed from

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[21]This quotation can be found in Coleridge's *Shakespearean Criticism*, vol I, 233.

within. By recourse to this property of growing organisms, Coleridge thought he had found the solution to the problem which mechanistic theory could not solve, an account of order and design by purely mechanical means. An organism is innately teleological with its shape evolving from invisible powers, absorbing the sensual data as it transforms it.

5. "The achieved structure of a plant is an organic unity." Unlike the combinations of parts of a machine, parts of an organism are related on different levels to each other and the whole in a detailed and complex manner. Abrams writes,

> Also, while the whole owes its being to the co-existence of the parts, the existence of that whole is a necessary condition to the survival of the parts; if, for example, a leaf is removed from the parent-plant, the leaf dies.[22]

Abrams compares Coleridge's formulation of teleological principles with Kant's. In Kant's wording, "An organized product of nature is one in which every part is reciprocally purpose [end] and means" (Kant 1951, 222). In Coleridge's phrasing the parts of a living whole are "so far interdependent that each is reciprocally means and end."[23] Thus the parts are dependent on the whole as is the whole dependent on the parts.

In addition to plant biology and Kant, Schelling's dialectical principle is another source of Coleridge's aesthetic. In the thesis-antithesis-synthesis of his logic, the organic must include its opposite, the mechanical. This polarity finds its expression in two distinct

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[22]This is not strictly true for all plants. Some in fact do propagate from a single leaf. The Jay plant is one of these varieties. In keeping with Black's illustration of the evocation of "commonplace associations" in the filtering effect of the vehicle upon the tenor, precise details are not determinative for metaphorical understanding.

[23]This quotation by Coleridge is in Abrams, 174, and in Coleridge's *Theory of Life*, 44.

kinds of art. The one can be explained in mechanical terms and involves the "lower faculties of fancy, `understanding,' and empirical `choice.'" It is the result of talent, ranking below the higher classification of organic poetry which involves the faculties of "imagination, `reason,' and the `will.'" The latter are the products of "genius." Coleridge describes the works of talent as "mere aggregations without unity." By contrast, he writes, "In the Shakespearean drama there is a vitality which grows and evolves itself from within" such that "Shakespeare is the height, breadth, and depth of genius..."[24]

The subject of genius is an integral part of the organic analogue. Abrams does not include it in his succinct definition nor in the five-point properties of plants upon which aesthetic comparisons are based, but he does devote considerable attention to a discussion of the topic and therefore I am including it under this first section. The notion of genius is a pervasive component of organicist philosophy.

Not surprisingly, the new emphasis upon genius as an important component in the organically derived view of art, was not without its antecedents. Abrams acknowledges that even within the mechanical scheme of things in which craft, deliberation, and rule were central, there was on the periphery a strong sense of the mystery of creativity. A movement of these feelings of awe towards exceptional artists from the margins to the centre characterized the shift in orientation to the organic analogue. Abrams orders his

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[24]Coleridge's quotation is found in Abrams's *Mirror and Lamp*, 176, and in Coleridge's *Shakespearean Criticism* II, 170-71.

treatment of genius around some pivotal features which are rehearsed with significant frequency in the organic theory of art.

Different theories are proposed to account for the phenomenon of an artist's extraordinary powers, but there is some consistency in the characteristics which mark a person so endowed. Abrams lists four of these: 1. "The composition is sudden, effortless, and unanticipated." 2. "The composition is involuntary and automatic" independent "of the will of the poet." 3. "In the course of composition, the poet feels intense excitement..." 4. "The completed work is as unfamiliar and surprising to the poet as though it had been written by someone else" (189).

The most persistent theory called upon to explain these characteristics was a supernatural one. From the Hebrew singers,[25] to Plato's Socrates[26] through the Renaissance and up to the latter seventeenth century, the source of spontaneity, ecstasy, and amazement was enthusiasm or divine inspiration. Thereafter supernatural explanations waned. Hobbes's reaction in the late seventeenth century to divine inspiration was surprise that anyone with intelligence would prefer to have his work explained in terms of inspiration "like a Bagpipe" (190). Some fifty years later the inspiration slant on creativity blossomed in ever greater proportions, this time with dependence upon images of organic

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[25] "My heart was hot within me, while I was musing the fire burned: then spake I with my tongue" Psalms 39.3.

[26] "Through them [the poets] he [God] is conversing with us" (Quoted in Abrams 189).

growth. Abrams quotes Shelley's statement on the inventive process from the "Defence of Poetry":

> A great statue or picture grows under the power of the artist as a child in the mother's womb; and the very mind which directs the hands in formation is incapable of accounting to itself for the origin, the gradations, or the media of the process. (192)[27]

This theme of the mystery of artistic creation resonates throughout the writings of the romantics. In *Confessions of an Art-loving Friar*, Wackenroder records the fictitious letter of an anonymous pupil to the artist Raphael. The pupil writes, "Thou must possess some secret in Thy work." Raphael replies,

> It is carried out as if in a pleasant dream and, during the work I have always thought more about the object itself than about how I wanted to portray it. I did not acquire it through bitter effort. (Wackenroder 92-93)

Schelling echoes this theme when he writes of God's production of art through the mediated form of genius which he describes as the "indwelling element of divinity in human beings...a piece of the absoluteness of God" (Schelling 1989, xiv).[28]

In Germany, where the soil was more receptive to a work of art growing "out of the impenetrable depths of the mind of genius," the lineage of supporters of organic-based genius is impressive--Leibniz, Sulzer, Herder, Goethe, Kant, Schiller, Schelling, Jean Paul, A. W. Schlegel. The English, with their strong empiricist tradition, were slower to

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[27]This passage can be found in *Shelley's Literary and Philosophical Criticism* in the section, "Defence of Poetry," 155.

[28]Schelling's *Philosophy of art*, written in 1803, was not published until 1859. The English edition of 1989 is translated and edited by Douglas W. Stott.

embrace ideas of genius, but they too contributed to this phenomenon. Amongst the English advocates Abrams discusses are Edward Young, Scott, Keats, Wordsworth, Hazlitt, Blake, Carlyle, and of course, Coleridge. These lists are not comprehensive but they do give some sense of the pervasiveness of the preoccupation with "genius" in writers of early romanticism in Germany and England.

In this section addressing genius, I am less concerned to explore the shadings of difference amongst the various contributors, than to understand the connection of genius to organic assumptions about artistic production. Literature understood as a revelation of the poet's personality is a logical extension to the idea of the poem being a product of the genius' organic imagination. When poetry came to be viewed as the expression of personal feeling or of the author's mind, then the poem could be seen as a revelation of the poet's life, thoughts, dreams, beliefs, or unique character (226-27). Criticism then became a matter of determining the nature of the poet from reading his poetry. However, assuming a one-to-one correspondence between poem and poet seemed too direct, almost naive. It would be more correct to say that the poet disguises his expression in his poem, giving him a perspective both inside and outside his work (236).

What model might have served to depict literature as an indirect expression of character, where the author is at the same time inside and outside of his work? Abrams points to theology as the origin of the ideas and to Kantian philosophy as the source of the vocabulary for their expression. A striking parallel between God the creator and the poet and his creation developed. Here the link between the "poem as a disguised projection of

its author" and the theological view of God's world as revelation of the divine character become apparent. The universe is both physical *and* spiritual: the material creation serves as manifestation of God's attributes of love, glory, and power.

The notion of the author as "visibly invisible" echoes Paul's letter to the Romans, 1.20: "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." This bifurcated interpretation which points to the outer world of the work and the inner world of the author Abrams locates in medieval and Renaissance typology which, in turn, derives from theology.

There are two other matters connected to notions of genius which are of importance in the organicist convoy. The two ideas stem from the same analogy, that of the poet as god-like creator. I will first explore the parallel between the poet as creator and God as creator, and second the product of such a creation, a work of art, as a separate world, free and independent, not unlike the autonomous world of God's making.

The poet as creator is itself based upon a metaphor between the poet and God, an idea that seems hardly metaphorical anymore. The use of this metaphor aligning the poet and God in "his unique and most characteristic function" bordered on blasphemy a few centuries ago" (272). The link between the poet and divinity is as old as the belief in the inspiration of the gods. What was new was "the explicit reference of the poet's invention to God's activity in creating the universe" (272). It was during the Renaissance that this parallel first was raised in the writings of Cristoforo Landino (1481), Scaliger (1561), and

in English criticism in Sir Philip Sidney and his contemporary, George Puttenham (272-74). It was Puttenham who announced the word "create" in this context. Abrams notes,

> In ecclesiastical Latin, *creare* was the common word to connote the orthodox concept that God made the world 'out of nothing.' If poets, said Puttenham, 'be able to devise and make all these things of them selves, without any subject of verities,' then 'they be (by maner of speech) as creating gods.' (273-74)

Writing in the mid-eighteenth century the English critic, Addison, took the next step suggesting that the world of the poet's making need not imitate the sensual world but could be a world unto itself. With bringing the creative domain inside, into the poet's faculty of imagination, the poet's flights of fancy became all the more highly valued, indeed closer in kind to God's creative acts by virtue of their originality (275). Thus severed from any constraint to represent the "real" world, the poem as a world of its own had only to exhibit coherence and non-contradiction. The poem as "heterocosm," modelled on the analogue of poet and creator-God, was subject only to its own internal laws of self-consistency.

What are some of the implications of the view that the poet is a god-like figure, creating works of extraordinary quality? Reverence and awe were appropriate attitudes to assume, and it was Shakespeare who above all evoked this response. Whether Herder, Goethe, the Schlegel brothers, Tieck, or Coleridge--all were in agreement that "Shakespeare remained the cardinal example of the poet as divinity" (281).[29] Whatever

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[29]Benziger confirms the importance of Shakespeare in a lengthier treatment in his article, "Organic Unity: Leibniz to Coleridge," especially page 35: "The desire to regard

models of creation were called upon it was clear that the poet was a priest, a prophet, a seer. According to Novalis, "The genuine poet.. is always a priest" (Translated in Wellek 83).

The second consideration related to the poet-God comparison, is of the work as an autonomous world to itself. This heterocosm or "world of its own" produced by the artist is an *autonomous* creation. Its independence parallels that of God's creation; it is self-sufficient and internally consistent. Abrams writes, "The real and poetic worlds alike become self-originating, autonomous, and self-propelling, and both tend to *grow* out into their organic forms" (282). The work as autonomous is of great importance in musical formalism employing organicist assumptions.

In English criticism, this parallel produced an emphasis upon the process of creation more than the product, but it was not long before artistic autonomy became a full-blown doctrine in the organic orbit. Drawing on the early twentieth-century literary critics A. C. Bradley, Austin Warren, and Elder Olson, Abrams underscores their emphasis upon the absolute freedom of the poet and the independence of his creation. He compares the poem as microcosmos to an ancient prototype, "the peremptory and absolute fiat of Jehovah in the Book of Genesis" (285).

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Shakespeare's works as near perfect contributed to organic theory."

Echoes of this "fiat" can be heard in the language of probably the two most influential proponents of organicist methods of musical composition, theory, and analysis, Schenker and Schoenberg. Schenker writes:

> "And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." [Genesis 1. 2] But the Creative Will has not yet been extinguished. Its fire continues in the ideas which men of genius bring to fruition for the inspiration and elevation of mankind. (Schenker, *Free Composition*, xxiv)

In his *Style and Idea*, Schoenberg writes:

> To understand the very nature of creation one must acknowledge that there was no light before the Lord said: "Let there be Light." [Genesis 1.3] and since there was not yet light, the Lord's omniscience embraced a vision of it which only His omnipotence could call forth. (Schoenberg 214-15)

There is one more characteristic element in the "organic" constellation which is not particularly foregrounded by Abrams and which I have observed to be integral to other literature on the organic, especially in music. It is the emphasis upon soul or spirit which also features so prominently in idealist philosophy. Nalbantian describes this connection of the soul with German Idealism: "Associated with the soul is the *Sehnsucht* or infinite yearning for the absolute which is a major characteristic of German Idealism" (Nalbantian 5).

From my readings of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century authors I noted more emphasis on spiritual qualities than I found in Abrams, notwithstanding his accounts of the secularization of theological ideas in literary criticism. However secularized the concept of soul or spirit may have become during the nineteenth century, as a symbol of

non-materiality it provided strong resistance to the mechanistic tendency to explain the world in exclusively scientific terms.

For example, in the 81 pages of Wackenroder's *Confessions of an Art-Loving Friar*, there are 170 references to soul and/or spirit. One would look long and hard to find bed-rock consistency for the concept; however, what does emerge is a strong religious connection, an emphasis upon "inner" experience, and opposition to "soulless" mechanism. In his comparison of Raphael and Miche'Angelo Buonarotti, Wackenroder describes Raphael as an "artist of the New Testament," exhibiting the "divine *spirit* of Christ [my emphasis]." Mich'Angelo Buonarotti is an "artist of the Old Testament" whose *spirit* is that of "inspired prophets" (Wackenroder 130). The "silent rapture" experienced in kneeling down before great art is "the true meaning of prayer" and brings about "salvation of the *soul* [my emphasis]" (Wackenroder 126).

In his study of the soul in the nineteenth century, entitled *L'Ame Romantique et la Rêve*, Albert Beguin writes,

> The first myth was that of the Soul: while reason decomposed 'being' into juxtaposed faculties like an assemblage of wheels that can be disassembled, an unexplained but fervent belief reaffirmed the existence of an interior center; as a principle of our life, place of our certitudes, inalienable entity, the soul is no longer the object of psychological curiosity oriented toward disclosing the functioning of our mind. It becomes a living essence, concerned more with its eternal destiny than with its mechanism....[30]

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[30]This excerpt is translated from the French by Naibantian in her book, *The Symbol of the Soul from Hölderlin to Yeats*, 10.

In *Originality and Imagination,* Thomas McFarland relates the transfer of properties from the "soul" to the "imagination":

> Imagination became so important because soul had been so important and because soul could no longer carry its burden of significance. That significance was an assurance that there was meaning in life. No soul, no meaning. But even if soul wilted under the onslaught of science and skepticism, so long as there was imagination as secondary validator then at least there remained the possibility of meaning. (McFarland 1985, 151)

Karl Philip Moritz, a Berlin professor, travelling companion to Goethe, and an acquaintance of Wackenroder and Tieck, proposed this view:

> The souls of men of genius image the supreme `Organization' particularly well, and...they have furthermore a strong desire to express their image of the supreme organization in a material medium, in the creation of works of art. (Quoted in Benziger 41)

Here the soul is seen as a mirror of a larger unit, the "Supreme monad" with special individuals, geniuses, reflecting most accurately this "Organization."

How does this emphasis on soul or spirit among the romantics relate to organicism? Did it simply exist alongside it or was it more implicated in the organic web? As the movement from imitating the "outer" world of nature moved to imitating the "inner" world of human nature, the soul or spirit as the epitome of "innerness" took on new prominence. The mirroring of a poet's inner nature ultimately contributed to the demise of mimesis and new metaphors of lamps and organisms came to the fore. Coupled with this shift was a greater awareness of alienation and fragmentation with an accompanying loss of the sense of soul in a mechanical universe. New accentuation upon an inner centre sought to offset this rift.

Discussions surrounding the mirror, machine, and organism tropes suggested how grounding metaphors have guided investigations in fields as diverse as philosophy, theology, biology, and the arts. Growing dissatisfaction with the machine analogue, and its failure to account satisfactorily for unity and a necessary unfolding of musical sequences extending over larger and larger time spans not supported by text, prepared for acceptance of organicist explanations of musical functioning. The organic paradigm promised a better account of musical operations. This dependence upon metaphor, until recently, has not been matched by an awareness of the role of metaphor in musical discourse. Musicological research up until the 1980s is typical in this oversight. The next two chapters elaborate on several engagements with an organicist musical aesthetics from the 1960s and 70s which signal the opening of a critical debate.

## CHAPTER THREE

### *TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF ORGANICISM IN MUSICOLOGY: 1960-1979*

> Organic unity [in music] is still largely a mystery, its means a secret, its artistic achievement and perception subconscious.
>
> Arthur Hutchings[1]

> I suspect that a theorist's rhetoric offers us important clues about his theories--clues that we ignore at a cost.
>
> Ian Bent[2]

In this chapter I will investigate some of the early writings which have explored organicism in music to determine if and how organic assumptions continue to function in later twentieth-century musicological literature. I was able to locate four musicological writings which adopt a critical stance toward organicism, at least in a rudimentary sense, in the decades of the 1960s and 70s. Vernon Kliewer has noted the scarcity of such writings:

> Since, to the knowledge of the investigator, no writings on music exist which have established criteria based on the organic analogy, the evidence was compiled from writings which can be classified, in general, as critical, historical, or theoretical. (Kliewer 175)

Listed in order of presentation, the four sources are: Vernon Lee Kliewer's dissertation, "The Concept of Organic Unity in Music Criticism and Analysis," 1961, Indiana University; Arthur Hutchings's article, "Organic Structure in Music," 1962, published in *The British*

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[1]"Organic Structure in Music," 1962, 347.

[2]"History of Music Theory: Margin or Centre," 1992, 19.

*Journal of Aesthetics*; Warren Dwight Allen's book, *Philosophies of Music History: A Study of General Histories of Music 1600-1960*, a 1962 revision of the original 1939 edition; and Carl Dahlhaus' article, "Some Models of Unity in Musical Form," 1975, *Journal of Music Theory*. If frequency of referencing and use by established Anglo-American scholars are any indication of influence, then Hutchings's article is far and ahead the most important piece of writing of the group, if the briefest. Because of the importance of the ideas raised by Dahlhaus and because of his eminent position in twentieth-century musicology, I have devoted a Chapter Four to probing his treatment of organicism in music. The years following 1980, the year in which Solie's and Kerman's essays appeared, witness a greater interest in the intrinsically philosophical and tropological nature of organicism with the result that many more publications are available during these last two decades. These latter writings are the subject of Chapters Seven and Eight.

My criterion of a "critical stance" eliminates the writings of "practitioners" of organicism, that is, working musical analysts, historians, and critics, the volume of which would require further delimitation to facilitate close study. It is characteristic of this group that its writers are blind to their dependence upon the figures of speech and philosophical systems which ground their theories. The volume of this literature, in conjunction with the lack of self-conscious attention to the philosophical and figurative qualities of organicism, prompted me to look for another level of writing which stepped back, so to speak, from the fray of music history, analysis, theory, and criticism in order to assess how organicism functions in these disciplines.

One other consideration should be mentioned, my greater attention to the use of organicism in musical analysis and criticism than in music history. On the surface it would seem that notions of "organic" history in which ideas of progress or teleology prevailed have been less tenacious than the persistence of organicity in musical analysis and perhaps criticism. While talk of "culminations" or "developing" histories has diminished of late, the musical canon which favoured composers whose work seemed to "anticipate" later established composers continues to dominate musical studies. The evolutionary, organic principles which directed the selection of composers and works may be rejected but the residue of these practices is built into the curricula and current standard textbooks of Western musicology.

A review of musicological literature for ongoing dependence upon tropes of historical organicism is an area needing investigation. Allen's *Philosophies of Music History* is exceptional in its treatment of history and the organic model, if limited to works preceding 1962, the date of its second edition. Because of the scarcity of material in this area, I shall focus more on music criticism and analysis, understanding the extensive overlapping and interdependence between these genres, with my review of Allen's book being the only inquiry into music history as organism.[3]

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[3]A good treatment of music history as progressive evolutionary development based upon organic growth can be found in Ruth Solie's dissertation, Chapter IV, "Melody and Music Historiography," 145-86. In his book, *Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others*, Gary Tomlinson also challenges the concept of "organic" history.

In the interests of consistency in the examination of the publications, I initially imposed a grid of categories upon each for questioning:

1. Stated goals
2. Procedure or method
3. Assumptions--both stated and/or implied
4. Sources--genres of writers, i.e., theorists, critics, etc.
5. Attention to the figurative quality of "the organic"
6. Understanding(s) of organicism that emerge
7. Criticism of organicism
8. Unique contribution

While this served as a guide to ensure balance in my research, the following report includes only non-routine findings. Of special interest is the last category. Other categories will be identified only as they bear directly on the discussion.

## VERNON LEE KLIEWER'S "THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIC UNITY IN MUSIC CRITICISM AND ANALYSIS," 1961

Kliewer completed this dissertation at Indiana University in 1961. His stated goals are:

> (1) to attempt to determine the meaning of "organic unity" as the term is used by twentieth-century writers on music, and (2) to determine the methods which twentieth-century writers on music use to apply the concept of organic unity to the analysis of music. (2)

Clearly he is not attempting to question or critique organic unity so much as he is trying to clarify and understand its meaning.

In addition to some "practical applications of the use of the concept in literary criticism" and its relevance for music, this survey of aesthetics claims to demonstrate "the

*origin* of the analogy, which is related to one of the assumptions basic to this study, i.e., that 'organic unity' and the terms 'organic,' 'organism,' and 'organic whole' are related terms" (63). By way of underscoring the need for a study of organicism, Kliewer comments upon the rather loose reliance of musical writings upon a number of terms-- "balance" is offered as an example. Kliewer observes that these terms have migrated often from other domains; it is frequently in their metaphorical or symbolic quality that their interest lies; they are often associated with an evaluative judgement; and they generally imply "a greater understanding of what has been evaluated" (2). The problem seems to be that these "terms" are "used freely" and are not subjected to the same "careful scrutiny" they seem to receive in other disciplines. "The musician, however, frequently accepts the terms without attempting to determine the thing designated" (2). The next sentence states: "It is the use of one such term that is the concern of this study."

In a somewhat circuitous manner Kliewer seems to indicate that the problem is the fuzziness of this term, "organic unity," or its variants "organic," "organicism," or "organic whole" (4). He seeks a precise definition of organic unity by attempting to clarify "the principles on which the concept has apparently been based" (3). He writes, "apparently," because music criticism and analysis do not subject the criteria of their use to careful scrutiny; indeed they do not articulate them at all, but *assume* them. Kliewer notes that organic unity usually designates a judgement of excellence in relation to a composition, and that some works "have" organic unity, making them "better" than those works which do not "have" organic unity. What Kliewer does not call attention to here is that this

"judgement of excellence" is itself based upon the criterion of organic unity, thus creating a circular argument.

On the basis of a sampling of analyses from 1940-60, Kliewer sought to determine "the essence of meaning" of a definition of organic unity by identifying the "underlying assumptions" of organic unity as it was deployed in the analyses. Thus:

> The total of these critical analyses was then compared with the basic assumptions of the concept of organic unity to point out the extent to which the concept and the analyses, in terms of the deduced definition, agreed or disagreed. When these processes had been completed, the investigator had at his disposal the evidence necessary to formulate a definition of "organic unity" and to show how this concept has been applied to the analysis of music. (7, 8)

On page 4 Kliewer makes what appears to be an even more encompassing premise: "It was assumed that mid-twentieth century expressions of the concept of organic unity would also express the meaning of the term as it appeared in literature on music previous to the year 1940." This presupposition is very questionable. It indicates the unchanging qualities of a "concept" that, while exhibiting remarkable resilience, has not been historically invariable.

After surveying the organic analogy in the aesthetics of Plato, Aristotle, Coleridge, T. S. Eliot, and Cleanth Brooks, Kliewer then turns to musical aesthetics, working his way through writers who rely on the organic analogy: Hanslick, Dewitt Parker, Harold Osborne, Morris Weitz, Susanne Langer, Arthur Edwards, and Leonard B. Meyer.[4] This

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[4]In his later publications, Meyer clearly questioned the organic concept. See his *Style and Music*, 1989, and "A Pride of Prejudice; Or, Delight in Diversity," 1991.

encounter with an organic music aesthetics serves as a springboard to probe the underlying assumptions of those critics who rely on organicist images in their music writings. In examining this sampling of writers who employ organic vocabulary, Kliewer articulated various principles which different writers emphasized as significant when organic unity was operative. Kliewer is guided by his own assumption that the "concept of organic unity" is itself a unified concept, a substantive idea.

His findings took the following format. Five assumptions were identified: the first was the principle of connectedness or coherence; the second was the interrelatedness of all the elements, the third the integration of all the elements, the fourth the affinity of a work's elements, and the fifth was a combination of the previous four in which organic unity was an *a priori* assumption on the part of the writer. Significant quotations from the writers provided a context for the discussion which followed. A definition for organic unity concluded the chapter. I will expand briefly on the first assumption, the principle of connectedness or coherence (64).

This was illustrated with numerous quotations from Abraham Veinus on Tchaikovsky and Bach (1946); Mosco Carner on Schumann and Beethoven (1947) and (1952) [four examples]; Lewis Lockwood on Ruffo (1957); Willi Apel on Hugh Aston's 'Hornpype' (1947); Hugo Leichtentritt on Schoenberg (1950); Yasser on Wagner (1956). It is interesting to see the changing historical reception of Schumann and Tchaikovsky whose works were often considered inferior during these years because they lacked "organic unity." On the first movement of Tchaikovsky's violin concerto Veinus writes,

"It is evident that 'the thread of organic unity has failed'; there is much mending of seams and a patchwork solution of the design" (65). On Schumann, Carner writes,

> With the exception of the first movement of the *Rhenish*, there is nowhere in the Schumann symphonies a wide sweep of ideas, a continuous growth from within. Even the extraordinary economy of the first movement of the D minor Symphony does not succeed in creating an organic whole.... (69)[5]

Kliewer sets in motion a string of polarities which appear in the course of this 55-page chapter as oppositely valued qualities: mechanical-organic (66), artificial-necessary (65), patchwork-whole (65), juxtaposition-organic whole (72, 95, 104, 105), mechanical-natural (93). The second half of the pair is always valued positively.

Kliewer's concluding definition incorporates these assumptions:

> Organic Unity is the coherence, interrelation, and affinity of all the various elements of which a musical composition is composed. (116-17)

He claims that this definition "represents the essence of meaning of all the cases examined..." (117).

His Chapter IV raises the question, "How has the concept of organic unity been applied to the analysis of music?" (118). At this point some confusion arises as to the difference between music criticism and music analysis. Nowhere does Kliewer address this distinction, although his chapter headings, "Organic Unity in Music Criticism," and "Organic Unity in Musical Analysis," suggest two different genres of writings as sources.

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[5]John Daverio addresses this changing reception of Schumann's music in relation to a paradigm of organicity in chapters two and three of his *Nineteenth-Century Music and the German Romantic Ideology*, 1993.

In his chapter IV on analysis, he writes, "The principal examples of analytic application were also found to be primarily the same examples that were used to ascertain the meaning of 'organic unity'" (119). The difference between criticism and analysis, if there ever was any, is erased. Kliewer selects from the previous chapter's examples "only those cases in which actual analytic demonstration was given..." (119). He concludes that in each example the analyst attempts to demonstrate "how a musical composition becomes, or is, a musical entity" (169). Thus Girdlestone shows the interrelatedness between themes; Gerald Abraham shows coherence by illustrating the "derivation of themes from a common source;" Katz and Salzer "attempt to demonstrate how the various elements of a composition are integrated, interrelated, and related in that organic unity which is a musical composition;" Reti points to the affinity of themes in a whole work; Gillespie, Keller, and Toch focus upon the basic motif as the unifying factor (169-70). Other elements which contribute to organic unity include the "dominance" of a theme, the "derivation" of a theme from a common source, and "repetition" of a theme. The technique of "reduction" was important in demonstrating "oneness."

Kliewer's attention to the figurative quality of "the organic" was a very marginal part of his larger treatment of the subject. One can see in his references to organic unity as metaphor (2, 5, 8), as analogy (13, 59), or as symbol (175, 178) some uncertainty as to how this obviously figurative term was functioning. He notes right at the beginning, "Frequently, the value placed on these terms lies in their metaphorical expressiveness and in their symbolic qualities" (2). A few pages later he makes a distinction between the

"purely expressive sense" of organic unity, that is its function as a metaphor "or an analogy to, a living organicism," and its use as something which was "demonstrated and could be observed in the music" (5). This distinction is very reminiscent of philosophy's division between the proper or literal use of language and the figural. In a footnote to Socrates' comparison of a literary composition to a living organism--what Kliewer claims is "the 'beginning' of the organic analogy"--Kliewer adds this important qualification:

> It should be noted here that Socrates' judgment is that a work of art should resemble a living organism, not that it is a living organism. This distinction is a basic one. If a work of art were considered to be a living organism, it would follow biological principles rather than artistic principles. Most critics would, certainly, be hesitant to concede that a work of art is composed according to biological principles. (13)

But what happens is that this line between the figurative and the literal becomes blurred and Kliewer does not confront the problems associated with the idea that poets or composers create organically as organisms grow. Organisms create of necessity, not by convention or with freedom. This blurring of the literal and rhetorical can be seen in the following examples which Kliewer extracts from Mason, Schoenberg, and Reti. The first citation refers to Beethoven's string quartet Op. 18, No. 1 which Mason describes as an "elementary type" of sonata form, bearing "somewhat the same relation to sonata form that humble biological forms, like the amoeba, bear to man":

> Thus do musical organisms, like physical ones, evolve in orderly sequence from a simpler to more complex types. (104)

Daniel Gregory Mason compares this early Scherzo and Trio of Beethoven's to an amoeba, which, according to evolutionary theory, developed into a human over time. The

reason for its designation as "elementary" stems from its parts being "merely juxta-posed, not as in the sonata, interdependent and com-posed: it makes a mosaic rather than an organism" (104).

> Thence it becomes clear to me that the work of art is like every other complete organism. It is so homogeneous in its composition that in every little detail it reveals its truest, inmost essence. When one cuts into any part of the human body, the same thing always comes out--blood. When one hears a verse of a poem, a measure of a composition, one is in a position to comprehend the whole....(94)

Likewise, Arnold Schoenberg makes little distinction between the work of art and the human body, preferring to fuse art and organism.

> Music is created from sound as life is created from matter. In the organic sphere one cell engenders the other in its own image, yet each of the innumerable cells is different from all the others. By a magic interplay between these identical yet different cells, the higher forms of life come into existence. (112)

Reti's link of music and organic life is even more explicit. It is difficult to discern any figurative properties as the literal organic is preferred.

While Kliewer does not provide a criticism of organicism, he does note the variations in the use of the concept of organic unity. What he fails to do is explore these, preferring to smooth out the wrinkles and produce a homogeneous definition. His unique contribution lies in his having foregrounded the dependence of musical writings of the twentieth century upon the organic figure. The evidence he marshals in support of its use is impressive. His work could be regarded as an initial step in a broader investigation to which the present study contributes.

In a sense Kliewer's dissertation represents all of the problems associated with seeking a definitive critical apparatus with which to limit, contain, and analyze something which is too loose and diverse in its usage and assumptions to isolate and study. He oversimplifies, forces definition, reduces the multiple to the singular, and endlessly repeats his "organic" principles as if to convince himself or his readers that these are the only possibilities.

While Kliewer is ostensibly establishing a concise definition of organic unity through his examination of selected writings, he is unwittingly demonstrating the ineffectiveness of organicism as a template applied uniformly to works which are not themselves created on this model. What he shows is that organicism as an aesthetic criterion is historically contingent. It is not a universal measuring rod for pieces.

## ARTHUR HUTCHINGS'S "ORGANIC STRUCTURE IN MUSIC"

Hutchings's article, "Organic Structure in Music," is published in the *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 1962, and has enjoyed a more prominent reception than Kliewer's unpublished dissertation.[6] It is generally included in bibliographies of the last two decades as a philosophically informed formulation of organic structure in relation to music.

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[6]During the time this article was written, Arthur Hutchings was senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Western Australia, research fellow at Birbeck College, London, and art critic for several Australian magazines. This information appeared in Hutchings' article "Organic Unity Revindicated?" 323.

It is my conclusion that Hutchings's article is a thinly disguised paean to the Western canon of music. Hutchings's contribution to how organicism informs musical understanding is minimal. What is of interest and justifies the attention I devote to it is the example it offers of an exposition that simply invokes organicist language as a means of valorizing music already deemed of the highest order. If, as Hutchings claims, organic unity in music is a mystery, a secret, what can be offered to "explain" it? Awe and reverence are more appropriate responses.

It is in keeping with his emphasis upon "mystery" that Hutchings does not foreground his goals, methodology, assumptions, or understanding of "the organic," in such a clear manner as the other authors examined, but these categories can be extracted nonetheless with a bit of probing. No criticism of organicism is mentioned, nor is there a very sophisticated awareness of its figural qualities. The closest Hutchings comes to a stated goal is his explanation that he was sent Rudolf Reti's *The Thematic Process in Music*, 1961, to review and wishes to discuss it in relation to Deryk Cooke's *The Language of Music*, 1959. It was a very contingent event that prompted this essay.

In linking and comparing the two books, Hutchings finds a pretence for doing the real business of musical aesthetics: praising great music. Analysis may support critical assessment of music, but in the end it has a task more significant than revealing structure, and that is "to elicit admiration" (350). In addition to eliciting admiration for the Western canon of art music as it was conceived in the 1960s, Hutchings highlights the differences in musical study as seen from the British and the German or continental perspectives.

According to Hutchings, continental studies, especially in Germany, have been characterized by extreme specialization, a situation in which a music student passes through conservatories rather than universities, on to the highest degree obtainable in music research, the Ph.D. This narrow concentration upon music has prevented the kind of understanding of musical composition which now (that is, in 1962) he claims characterizes British musical scholarship. It is ironic that some thirty years later, the scene of musical analysis in Anglo-American studies is dominated by the Austro-Germans, Schoenberg and Schenker.

What can be drawn from Hutchings's article as to his understanding of organicism? First, some very specific things: that attention to the unidimensional approach of thematic development in a work as exemplified by Reti is important but inadequate to explain music's organic qualities; second, that those who move in a number of disciplinary fields, that is, British musical scholars (Stanford, Parry, Tovey, Gerald Abraham, Dent, Westrup, Hans Keller, Eric Blom), are more likely to grasp music's essence as broadly organic; third, that the best understanding of music's organicity may stem from the work of people such as Cooke who look to the human creative mind itself, "the sentient organisms, of human minds" as the source of music's richness.

Hutchings prefers to leave the secret of music as a mystery, somehow connected to religious feeling or philosophy, and apprehended only by symbols or metaphors (349). "Organic unity is possible only as the expression of personality--with ideas entirely his [the composer's] own, not parodistic" (346). Organic musical works must be "creations of the

whole man, organic works by reflection of the organism we call total personality" (349). These ideas resonate with nineteenth-century models of male genius propounded by, for example, Coleridge, and explored in Chapter Two and critiqued in Chapters Six through Eight. With such dependence upon individual gifted creativity which spurns that which "designs, calculates, arranges, assembles" (349), one wonders what need there is of organic principles to evaluate a specific composition. One must determine if the composer is a genius, end of judgement. According to this logic, Liszt is and is not, depending on the critic's viewpoint. Schumann was not and now is, his reception having undergone revision with less organically-based models.

A comparison of Kliewer's and Hutchings's treatments of the same composers and writers shows how loosely organicist allusions are used in musicology and how assumptions steal in unnoticed. Both Kliewer and Hutchings discuss the musicologists Gerald Abraham and Hugo Leichtentritt. Both employ Abraham as a means to illustrate an organicist position in opposition to another inferior pole, differently characterized in each instance as will be shortly seen. The case of Leichtentritt demonstrates how two writers, Kliewer and Hutchings, both using organicism as a value judgement, reach opposite conclusions. If organicism were indeed a clear principle of evaluation, rather than a conduit for smuggling in undeclared, unexplained evaluations, these contradictions could not occur. When a metaphor operates at the heart of a system without being subject to careful interrogation, it is at best an unreliable principle.

Kliewer discusses Abraham's analysis of Tchaikovsky's song, "Reconciliation":

> The varied rhythms of the vocal part and the skillful sequences help to give distinction; the bare couplet structure of the ordinary gypsy songs is replaced by one more strongly welded; above all, 'Reconciliation' is distinguished from the popular gypsy folk songs by its organic unity of form: the recapitulation sums up the metres of the first and second sections. (Quoted in Kliewer 88-89)

Compare Abraham's words describing Tchaikovsky's contribution with those describing the gypsies:

| Tchaikovsky | Gypsy Songs |
|---|---|
| varied rhythms | bare couplet structure |
| skillful sequences | ordinary |
| distinction | popular |
| strongly welded | |
| organic unity of form | |

The dichotomy Abraham creates between Tchaikovsky's distinguished skills and the ordinary, popular qualities of the gypsy songs obscures Tchaikovsky's dependence upon the very original melodies and rhythms of these gypsy songs. Value-laden language, with the clincher that "organic unity of form" distinguishes Tchaikovsky's work from the gypsies' music, sets up a false hierarchy of the superior over the inferior, when dependence--not hierarchy--is involved. Organic unity is the criteria used to establish the hierarchy, one which more likely stems from an entrenched view of gypsies than anything

relating to an aesthetic or analytical principle. No musical evidence is offered for the evaluation.

How does Hutchings employ Abraham? Using tactics not unlike Abraham's polarization of Tchaikovsky and gypsy music, Hutchings sets up a polarity between British and German musicians. He quotes Abraham also as an exponent of organicism:

> Worthwhile composition is the result of musical ideas and their growth, not a mould for which ideas must be measured or into which they must be forced'--that sentence is now a platitude of the schoolroom in this country; it is not so in Germany and other countries...in this matter we were ahead and have remained so. (342)

A similar table reflecting value-laden words can be set up:

| British | German and Others |
|---|---|
| worthwhile composition=musical ideas and their growth | composition=mould, ideas measured or forced |

It is not obvious why a British "polymaths" approach rather than a more specialized one should produce scholars who base their analyses on organic metaphors. The nationalities seem irrelevant to deciding on what is or is not organic. This argument is all the more curious because it was in the German states that organic figures flourished in nineteenth-century music criticism where such writers as E. T. A. Hoffmann, Hanslick, and A. B. Marx wrote the manuals (so to speak) on organicist music. Schoenberg, Schenker, and Reti are twentieth-century inheritors of this tradition. What is at work here is the same method of argument by binarisms when one pole is attributed with a positive value,

organicism, and the other pole is considered deficient. Once again an interdependence occurs in which the British learned their organicist lessons from the Germans. The pole marked superior turns out to depend on the pole marked inferior.

The following use of Leichtentritt by both authors illustrates a logical impasse. The following passage is quoted by Kliewer and is taken from Leichtentritt's *Music, History, and Ideas*, 1950, 260. It completely contradicts Hutchings's evaluation of Liszt while at the same time it reveals Leichtentritt's grounding in organicist principles:

> In the matter of musical form he [Liszt] applied for the first time the principle of "cyclic" construction, evolving all the various themes of a symphonic or sonata-like work in several movements from a few fundamental motives, which through rhythmical or melodic transformations could be made to assume numerous changes of expression.... Here we see a particularly striking musical application of the dominant romantic idea of evolution. In his symphonies, and his concertos, Liszt has brilliantly demonstrated the possibilities of this principle of organic structure. (Quoted in Kliewer 96)

Laying aside for a moment the different conclusions about Liszt, it can be seen that Kliewer draws upon Leichtentritt as an example of an author who exemplifies dependence upon organic unity as a value in his analyses. Kliewer reiterates: "The idea of evolution, itself, contains the idea of integration; for if integration were not present, evolution could not be observed. What has evolved has been unified into a whole" (96).

Hutchings criticizes Leichtentritt for the very things Kliewer praises him for. Hutchings condemns him for not understanding how one secures "coherence in long pieces," notwithstanding Leichtentritt's careful treatment of motivic unifying compositional methods. Hutchings describes him as "the old dissector rather than the [musical]

biologist," without offering very much evidence for this judgement (344). If organic criteria were indeed reliable principles of evaluation, it would be difficult to see how this confusion in placing Leichtentritt could arise.

The example of Liszt further muddies the waters of organic evaluation in music. The above excerpt from Leichtentritt supports the idea that Liszt demonstrated organic coherence in his symphonies. Hutchings takes the opposite view of Liszt when he writes:

> Whether or not his [a good student's] *musical* personality is distinguished seems to depend upon the gods. If it were commensurate with the will, imagination or intelligence, Liszt would have been the greatest composer of his century, but whereas Schubert's or Wagner's response to a mood, idea or situation came *as music*, Liszt's came as a mixture of words, pictures and sounds, which would not always crystallize as music. (346)

Using the measuring rod of organic unity, Leichtentritt finds Liszt to have "brilliantly demonstrated the possibilities of this principle of organic structure." Using the same rod supposedly, Hutchings found Liszt lacking in the ability to "crystallize" his images "as music." According to Kliewer "certain works `have' organic unity and some works do not, and that a composition which `has' organic unity is `better' than a composition which does not" (Kliewer 3). If one takes seriously the judgements of Leichtentritt and Hutchings, Liszt's music both has and does not have organic unity. This logical impossibility casts the notion of organicity in music as a criterion of evaluation in a very suspicious light. If as a principle, organicity cannot be denied or affirmed in any conclusive manner when the same music is examined, this suggests its unreliability and

ineffectiveness as a guide to the evaluation of music. It also points to the very subjective role of the critic in forming judgements.

Hutchings's essay illustrates a commitment to an organicist aesthetic paradigm. Just what this organic paradigm is, is not articulated. Certainly it has to do with unity expressed in part through thematic coherence and reinforced in such other musical parameters as orchestration and rhythm. But it also points to mystery, music's secrets, the religious, and the philosophical. Somehow it reflects the whole organism of "man's" mind, the mind of the god-endowed genius. It is an ultimate standard for determining what comprises great music and what is mere "invention." Yet there is little agreement on the final evaluations or any method. Organicist aesthetics seems to tolerate contradiction and a looseness of application few other "concepts" could endure. According to this criterion, Liszt and Schumann do and do not qualify.

How does Hutchings incorporate the components which this paper identifies as the organic cluster? Unity or wholeness figures large, as does growth. Soul or spirit could be considered inferred by Hutchings' appeal to music's mysterious religious affiliations. Nature is assumed as that of which organisms are a part, but is not highlighted. Genius plays a very important role in the production of organic music and in its evaluation. Nowhere is a musical work described in autonomous terms, although nowhere is it considered part of a larger social context. I think the assumption of autonomy is so taken for granted that it need not be mentioned.

What Hutchings does add, by way of a hint more than an explicit claim, is that the musical work reflects the total personality or mind of its genius creator. This idea of the genius pouring himself into his product is not foreign to romantic understandings of the creative process, but it is not in itself emphasized as an "organic" feature according to my construct.

What appears very suspect about Hutchings's reliance upon binarisms is his stereotyping of German musical education as inferior, evidence from such outstanding musical figures as Schoenberg, Schenker, and Hans Keller notwithstanding.[7] It is a curious reversal of Schenker's German prejudices. It would seem more fitting to identify values or criteria specifically rather than to associate them with a particular nationality, especially when there is no consistency to the alignment. The same could be said of Hutchings's gender pronouncements reviewed in Chapter Six.

In one promising passage early in the essay, Hutchings questions his own dichotomy of the "antonyms," mechanistic and organicist, noting how in both nature and art this distinction is not always crystal clear. This doubt is quickly left behind as he pursues what is "the secret of life in a work of art" (339). It seems to me that this doubt or ambiguity is a clue to the constructedness of the whole polar enterprise. When the two primary designations, mechanical and organic, themselves represent a blending of categories, how can one ever claim one piece of music to be organically coherent and

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[7]While Keller's career blossomed in England, his educational roots were grounded in the Austro-German tradition.

another to be assembled? The organical compositional procedures depend upon learned musical mechanical skills even for the most creative flights.

While analysis is evoked to reveal organic characteristics in musical works, there is no agreement upon what organicism is and which works manifest organic qualities. Yet even theorists and composers who disagree strongly upon approaches and methods stand firm on the music's organicist essence. Schoenberg and Schenker illustrate this seeming contradiction. If organic principles defy deniability, how then do they function? Whatever they are, they are a virtue.

## WARREN DWIGHT ALLEN'S *PHILOSOPHIES OF MUSIC HISTORY: A STUDY OF GENERAL HISTORIES OF MUSIC 1600-1960*

According to Allen's stated goal:

> This inquiry is in pursuit not of men but of assumptions, in the tracking down of persistent notions that have tended, apparently to perpetuate old methods and to prevent formulation of new ones. (xix)

His "pursuit" of assumptions echoes Kliewer's, but for very different reasons. Allen is a critic of organicism; Kliewer is an advocate.[8]

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[8]Allen's book is a continuation of work begun as a master's thesis in the 1930s, "A Critique of Music Histories," pursued as a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University, and published in 1939 as *Philosophies of Music History*. The Dover edition brought out in 1962 is an unabridged reprint of the original work with a new Preface written especially for Dover, in which Allen sketches an update of histories after 1939, including a review of Donald J. Grout's *A History of Western*

Allen's lengthy history is not a piece of light reading and too significant to summarize hurriedly. I will, therefore, concentrate on those parts which deal most directly with issues relating to organicism. The *Philosophies of Music History* (hereafter PMH) is divided into two large sections, "Part I. History of Music Histories," and "Part II. Philosophies of Music History." The first part is concerned with a chronological survey of music histories. Chapters 6 through 8, from "The Romantic Era" to "Histories of Music Since 1900," relate to organicist theories. While it is difficult to exclude any sections of part II, I shall attempt to extract Allen's major contributions.

Allen's goal to write a history of the philosophies of music history is built upon definite assumptions. One is that music histories are very much a part of their larger intellectual and cultural environment and that they reflect this milieu. A second is that music histories have "borrowed" many of their concepts from other disciplines including "theology, mathematics, biology, mechanics, and psychology" (xv). Allen has attempted to track some of the sources of "these concepts and analogies and the fallacies involved." Implicit in this second assumption may be the more tacit premise that histories should or can somehow escape these concepts or analogies. A third is that the current (1939) separation between the "scientific" and the "popular" orientations to music history should be abandoned. In chapter 13 Allen suggests "that both types of inquiry can co-operate to explain (without analogies) how our musical arts, preferences, and prejudices have come

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*Music*, 1960.

to be what they are" (xv). This last statement seems to echo the literal-figural dichotomy which favours the literal as more "true," a reflection of the bias against rhetorical language which has been so integral in philosophy.

One of the methods which Allen mentions is the copious use of "direct quotation" in the text, largely because of the unavailability of these primary sources either in second edition or in English. No specific selection criteria is given; however publications which embrace some kind of philosophy of history, such as Wagner's *Oper und Drama*, are considered as relevant as works which claim to be general histories. In selecting his sources Allen has aimed "to include all general contributions in their historical setting, and to study their persistent assumptions" (xvi).

Allen approximates attention to the figurative quality of "the organic" when he writes:

> These words ["growth, development, rise, decline, separation, corruption, progress, decadence, unity, and evolution"] are merely popular words which have been used to explain the history of music. These words have not explained anything. They are words which have a history which is closely bound up with the history of our ideas. (xx)

Quite bluntly he continues:

> The source of hierarchical scales of fixed value, and of the notion of the development of "form" through these stages in time is located in the *organism analogies* of medieval theology. Sources of the belief in triad and triunity theories, also in the "growth" and "decay" of musical "forms" are found in the pseudo-mysticism and evolutionary theologies of nineteenth-century popular science. [my emphasis] (xx-xxi)

In his chapter, "The Romantic Era (1800-1850)," Allen stresses the importance of Christianity, both from the perspective of a carry-over of theories of music's divine origins and of the renewed interest in religion by those resistant to the dry dogmas of Enlightenment thinking. He writes,

> It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the mainspring of the Romantic movement was the restoration of Christian belief. Rationalism had resulted in revolution and terror; faith in revelation began to take its place. (86)

Allen actually acknowledges this new brand of Christianity earlier in a footnote with reference to Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme* in which Christianity was valued less for any truth content than for its aesthetic beauty (86, footnote 1), but it is curious that one must search the footnotes to become informed of such an important distinction. With this qualification of the aesthetic importance of Christianity it is easier to accept Allen's bold statement of religion as a "mainspring."

Two sections in chapter 6 are of central concern: "I. The Great-Man Theory" and "II. The Organic Hypothesis and Triune Theories." Allen notes the contrast between how the eighteenth-century rationalists had praised musicians as "inventors," "men who had advanced the art and science of music because of their reasoning powers, and as a result of their conscious efforts," and how the romantics praised musicians in supernatural terms.[9] Thus G. Bainin in 1828 "referred to Palestrina as 'the amanuensis of God,' and frequent references to 'God-given genius' were not figures of speech, but regarded as statements of

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[9]The discussion of birth metaphors in Chapter Six also emphasizes this change from Dryden through to the romantics.

`historical fact'" (86-87). The great-man theory, which elevated those whom the gods had blest at birth, became a guiding principle in music history just as it was in the literature of Sir Walter Scott, Thomas Carlyle, and Victor Hugo.

In Allen's "Part I. The Great-Man Theory," one readily sees how this theory served to bolster notions of genius. It also illustrated the importance of "divine origin" explanations in directing historical interpretation. In "Part II. The Organic Hypothesis and Triune Theories," Allen foregrounds a different philosophy of history, an "organic hypothesis" which emphasized wholeness, with less attention to individuals and single events. Allen applauds recognition of the interdependence of "arts, customs, and institutions," but sees this hypothesis as incapable of demonstration in any "scientific" manner. Romanticists simply proclaim its truth using logic, and this is insufficient according to Allen, who writes, "Their logic was based upon premises derived entirely from analogy, one of the most dangerous of our useful modes of thought" (91). This reference to "danger" in connection with tropes, in this case, analogy, is reminiscent of Max Black's opening statement in his article, "Metaphor:"

> To draw attention to a philosopher's metaphors is to belittle him--like praising a logician for his beautiful handwriting. Addiction to metaphor is held to be illicit, on the principle that whereof one can speak only metaphorically, thereof one ought not to speak at all. (Black 1955, 273)

Allen is on the right track in locating a problem related to a philosophy of history that has a metaphor as its primary assumption. This is precisely what de Man located at the centre of Kant's philosophy, the metaphor of "grounding." The "danger" derives not

from dependence upon figures, an inescapable situation, but from the confusion of the figures with reality. It is the lack of awareness of language's operations that one must guard against. Allen is, I believe, perfectly justified in rejecting the "organic hypothesis," but not simply because of its figural qualities. The comparison or belief in this depiction of history poses metaphysical, theological, political and social conundrums which an unexamined appeal to organic imagery conceals: issues such as predestination and individual responsibility; state control versus personal rights; assumptions of class, race, and gender.

The analogy to which Allen refers is that of the life of a man being mapped onto the ages of history. He quotes Pascal writing in 1647:

> The whole succession of men, throughout the course of so many centuries should be envisaged as the life of a single man who persists forever and learns continually. (Quoted by Allen, 91)

Both August Comte and Hegel made this biological analogy the "cornerstone" of their system according to Allen. Drawing upon a wide range of authors, Allen illustrates the entanglement of the number three with the sacred, the biological, and the musical triad. Hegel's racist depiction of world history based on a "man's" life encompasses five levels and includes a movement of maturity progressing geographically from east to west: childhood of the human spirit=the Orient; boyhood=Central Asia; adolescence=Greece; manhood=Rome; and full maturity=the German states of the early nineteenth century (92)

I have presented most of the remaining examples Allen cites in the condensed form of a table in the order given in the chapter. The first, second, and third refers to three life-historical stages as represented by the different authors:

| WRITER | FIRST | SECOND | THIRD |
|---|---|---|---|
| Comte, in *Philosophie positive*, (1830-42): Law of Three Stages of the human mind | theological, or fictitious | metaphysical, or abstract | scientific, or positive |
| Krause (1827) Music History | Ancient (melody) | Christian (polyphony) | Modern (harmony) |
| Victor Hugo *Preface to Cromwell* (1827) | primitive times (patriarchal) lyric poetry | ancient times (theocratic) epic poetry | modern times (national) dramatic poetry |
| J. M. Fischer Music History (1836) | Antiquity (pure melody) | Christian Era (harmony) | Modern Era (harmony and counterpoint) |
| *Oxford History of Music (1920-32)* V.I | Melody | Polyphony | Harmony |
| Lorenz Oken (1810), mathematician | 0 | + | - |
| Fischer (1859) on the triad | ground-tone (masculine) | third (feminine) | dominant (intellectual supremacy) |

In summary, Allen's representation of the organic hypothesis views the triadic division of history into epochs as based upon the analogy of the development of one man's

growth to maturity with world history's movement to maturity. This development is generally understood in terms of "threes": a division which is linked both to ancient gods and the concept of the Trinity in Christianity; to the "natural" musical triad and historical epochs in music; to social stratification; and to gender (although Allen seems not to notice this aspect) as seen in Fisher's triad. An assumption which underlay this analogy of biological development regarded less developed parts of the world to be in a state of primitive "infancy" with presumably the hope of growing up to Western maturity.

This chapter serves as a reminder of some noteworthy differences between organicism in history and organicism in music criticism and analysis. The model is still nature, but in the case of history, it is an animal or human. An organic musical work is more commonly described as developing in the manner of a plant, from a seed that grows, a germ or kernel whose essence permeates the whole. Furthermore, a human--the single "man" projected over historical eras--has consciousness; a plant does not. Allen does not explore the implications of differing figures of analogy or metaphor, or their differing models at this point. His labelling of figurative language as "dangerous" no doubt interferes with any such pursuit.

Chapter Seven, "Revolutions and Evolutionists," spanning the last fifty years of the nineteenth century, investigates Wagner's essay, "Art and Revolution," and his promotion of the organic union of all the arts. The influence of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, 1859, together with Herbert Spenser's writings was very extensive in music history: "Interest turned back to origins, and epochs of growth as exhibited not in the lives of men, but in the

organisms known as musical form" (109). This is reflected in Fétis' second edition of the *Biographie universelle*, 1873:

> The first point of view is therefore that which envisages the art in itself, *creating itself, developing itself,* and *changing itself by virtue of various principles which are unfolded,* each in its turn. Each one of these principles bears *all its consequences within itself,* and *these are discovered periodically, by men of genius, in a logical order which nothing can prevent*.... [emphasis in text] (Quoted in Allen 108)

Sir Hubert Parry's *The Art of Music*, first published in 1893, and republished as *The Evolution of the Art of Music* with additional chapters by H.C. Colles, 1930, traced "the evolution of musical forms as objective manifestation of spiritual activity" (113).[10] The centre of interest for Parry was the changes which occur in "musical structure," although he was not adverse to the celebration of "great men," however much the genius was theoretically but an actor in the great organic drama of history. On Wagner, Parry writes:

> Of the method itself it may be said that it is the logical outcome of the efforts of the long line of previous composers, and the most completely organized system for the purposes of musical expression that the world has yet seen. (Quoted in Allen, 116)

Chapter Eight, "Histories of Music Since 1900," continues to plot the utilization of evolutionary explanations up to the book's publication. I shall leave Part I for

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[10]H. C. Colles' texts on *The Growth of Music* are still on my shelf, texts required by the Royal Conservatory of Toronto during my years as a music student. Ideas of music's "growth" and "development" both in history and in individual pieces were bred into the bones of musical students up until very recently.

"Philosophies of Music History," Part II, where Allen develops a broader base for the some of the ideas initiated in the first half.

The notion of music history as organism which Allen explores is very different from its general understanding in music criticism and analysis. He extends its use back into the Middle Ages where society was pictured as one whole. It is not clear from the quotations used whether this image is one articulated by medieval writers or imposed on this time period by more romantic authors looking backward. Be that as it may, there is one idea of music as organism which I have not encountered anywhere else, and that is the implication that if music is an organism, it *must* grow and change. Such an assumption has some complicated ramifications. It holds the potential for pitting progressives against conservatives, those who accept, even promote change, and those who believe the only sacred route is backward-looking, to "originals" or roots. These ideas were played out in church history where, broadly speaking, the Catholic church sought preservation of its musical traditions and the Protestant churches, especially under Luther, encouraged innovation and hearty congregational singing.

More recent manifestations of organic-based music history from the late eighteenth century and onwards aligned themselves with evolutionary models as opposed to human life writ large in historical development. According to the logic of "organic history" which, for example, Heinrich Schenker subscribed to, music must continue to evolve according to its own designs. However, commitment to the inevitable development of new music flies in the face of Schenker's promotion of the Austro-German canon and

rejection of post-tonal music. Curiously, adherence to a music history based on organicist premises generally reveals conservative musical tendencies which preclude acceptance of history's ongoing "growth." It is as though the organisms of music's history were embalmed in the nineteenth century.

Allen's pre-romantic encounter with history as unfolding organism provides an opportunity to see a very old metaphor in operation prior to its more intense manifestation during the years surrounding the turn of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century. Progress and development are definitely elements of organicism, as is genius, but the cluster of components I have been describing in this dissertation finds a narrower application to music history than to individual art works. The romantic "genius" drew on earlier religious affinities with priest and prophet, but only after these associations had lapsed somewhat during the Enlightenment. The idea of "growth" held very different connotations following biology's pioneering understanding of cell development. The organic aesthetic seems not to be dominant in this historical organic described by Allen. While there are definitely overlapping ideas, the organic work of art was yet to be articulated. The work of art was still "functional," not autonomous. Even history texts did not include musical examples. Allen's portrayal of music developing historically as an organism imitated the human individual's stages of maturation.

Allen's Part I focused upon establishing a thorough documentary record of history pictured as the unfolding of human life stages or of historical evolution mimicking the growth of an organism, history "without gaps." This project of charting the variable

images of historical "progress" becomes clearer in Part II, where the philosophies of these histories are extracted and examined in greater detail for basic assumptions. These assumptions, as it turns out, are governed in no small degree by the rhetoric in which they are couched. Allen is distrustful of these figures of speech which he identifies consistently as analogies. However, because he lacks the theoretical framework to confront directly how these "figures" produce meaning, the importance of historical analogies--with that of the organism predominating--recurs like a leitmotif throughout the book, one that is simply there, recognized, criticized for its implication in figurative language, but one that is not grappled with succinctly.

Because Part II is a philosophical analysis which probes more deeply than Part I, I want to re-examine briefly some of the grid of categories outlined earlier. In his Introduction, Allen wrote:

> The processes of music history have been explained in terms of theology, mathematics, biology, mechanics, and psychology. Therefore an attempt has been made to point out the historical sources of these concepts and analogies and the fallacies involved. (xv)

Allen's assumption that if he can eliminate the analogies, that is, "explain (without analogies) how our musical arts, preferences, and prejudices have come to be what they are," (xv) that he will have somehow dealt with the problem, is itself open to question. He does provide some background information that points to his own journey of discovery. Allen admits, "The writer [meaning himself] had used them [evolutionary analogies] for years until chance and research led him to investigate them" (317). His goal then is to

trace these "analogies" which have been part of the history of ideas with a view to unmasking their dependence upon some problematic comparisons, in particular the organic analogy in its implication with theology, biology, and evolutionary theory. This organic analogy however is seen only in its comparison to the development of history, not to the piece of music as an organic entity, this latter presumably being the domain of music criticism and analysis, although Allen does not make this distinction.

Not surprisingly then, Allen reports on the loss of distance which results when analogies are literalized:

> Cultures, treated as organisms that have birth, growth, decay, and death, bearing in the latter the seeds of the new, are for Spengler not merely metaphorical analogies. They are presented, as in Hugo's Preface to *Cromwell*, as matters of historical fact. (251)

Allen sees "The danger...that the reader may be led to regard these analogies as matters of fact and as adequate historical syntheses" (252). This registers even more strongly in the following statement: "This Idea of Progress has been so powerful that it was regarded as a law of Nature" (293). Allen objects earlier that "'The Laws of Nature'...should not have to depend upon analogy" (248). Paul de Man would share in Allen's concerns of the fusion of a figure with what it is being compared to as participating in aesthetic ideology. He would, however, differ in the solution. What must always be acknowledged in interpretation is the distance between the signifier and signified, the impossibility of their union. The literal-figurative dichotomy acts to obscure the more important issue that all language--better understood as figurative--prevents oneness with thoughts or objects as it

points to them. Allen does continue to distinguish among these various expressions of the organic, always with a view of course to their involvement with music history. The volume of his examples and insights is like a blizzard of ideas, impossible to treat justly within the parameters of this concentrated discussion.

There is a sense in which Allen's project is not unlike Abrams's *The Mirror and Lamp*. Both identify figural language as determinative in shaping scholarship and both attempt to bring to the surface assumptions that are embedded in these figures. Abrams' articulation of certain metaphors or analogies functioning in a paradigmatic manner does not appear in Allen's treatment. In Allen's work, the organism as the means of comparison is primary, and others, such as historical "streams," or "mountains," are minor, but he seems not to grasp the significance of this one model, however much he refers to it.

In the place of music history as a tri-partite structure of maturation, or of history as a developing organism, Allen proposes another perspective derived from some examples in music history. The history of plainsong is instructive. Basically what is given is a very "constructed" view of music, one posited as oppositional to progressive history, organic history, great man theories, etc.

In the history of plainsong, Allen highlights "the processes of wilful modification" which have been involved in its existence and argues that it should be valued as itself a "living art," as opposed to a stage in music's "development" (325). (Allen is not adverse to metaphor himself when he employs terms such as "living.") He points to the calculated, careful *preservation* of plainsong by ecclesiastical authorities and more recently, by

musicologists. Bitter *competition* among the different expressions of the Gregorian, Ambrosian, and the Mozarabic concluded by favouring the Gregorian, thanks in no small measure to Roman authority. *Neglect* during the Enlightenment years, *revival* during the nineteenth century, and "*restoration* in its pristine purity in 1903 by the papal *Motu proprio*" all contributed in a major way to the continuity of plainsong [my emphasis] (325). Drawing attention to these contingencies in its history acts to question both organic views: one which pegs plainsong as a link in some developing organic chain unfolding according to divine purpose, or the other which sees it standing at the headwaters of Christian music, a tradition which must not be tampered with in any way, simply preserved. Allen does not articulate these conclusions as I have done, but hints at them. Preservation, competition, neglect, revival, and restoration point to very inorganic, human interventions in music history.

Whether supporting divine origin theories of music in the voice, aesthetic or political views, or the "hierarchical ordering of the arts and values" (341), the analogy of music history as organism has been negative according to Allen's judgment, residing as he believes it does "in the nineteenth-century notions of music form as `organisms,' a modern pseudo-mystical concept which has done more than anything else to postpone the modern scientific approach to musicology as a study of *style*" (341). It has led students to see artificial periods of music as fenced off from each other, feeding the next phase of development, rather than as interesting times where music is to be valued on its own terms. It has obscured the craftedness of music in favour of "genius," another tie-in to the

mystery of divine giftedness. It has denigrated non-Western musics to stages in the larger framework of a linear music history which sees itself as superior to all others. It has behaved on occasion as a kind of "social religion" which has served to obscure the "ugliness of ordinary life," opting instead for a mystic union on a higher plane (273-76).

Music history as organism betrays a fixation with "origins." One hears intimations of Foucault when Allen asks, "May there not be other important sources of historical evidence, such as correlations with contemporary events and living realities?" (183). Allen's attention to the operations of power in music has a very current ring to it. He remarks on the "demonstration of cultural power" so evident "from the *jongleurs* of medieval society to Haydn and his *Capell* at the court of Esterhazy" (333). While his treatment of analogy lacks the insights of more recent language debates, the fact that he has so consistently nibbled on something which he felt was a strong determining influence in musical scholarship is in itself remarkable in 1939. His error was in believing that figurative language could be eliminated in favour of a more "scientific" approach. Carl Dahlhaus's treatment of organicism--his rejection of "organic history" plus his own deep suspicion of biologically-based models which threaten creative freedom--shows remarkable affinity to Allen's approach to musicology, one which, however, extends beyond the latter's concern with history to include aesthetics and analysis.

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# CHAPTER FOUR

## *DAHLHAUS: "SOME MODELS OF UNITY IN MUSICAL FORM"*

> Music...is constantly surrounded by linguistic turns of phrase that influence our musical awareness in conjunction with, and sometimes no less significantly than, the acoustic phenomenon itself
>
> Carl Dahlhaus[1]

> Ever greater integration is the correlative of ever more abundant diversity; in the *organicist theory*, which gained ground in aesthetics in the late eighteenth century, and was at the same time implicitly acknowledged in compositional practice, that observation is a commonplace [my emphasis].
>
> Carl Dahlhaus[2]

> Analysis, emancipated from [nineteenth-century] form theory, is oriented less towards analogies to *architecture*, than towards the model of *literary theory*. (One can...speak of an exchange of paradigms.) [my emphasis.]
>
> Carl Dahlhaus[3]

> One could...even speak of philosophical `redemption' of analysis through an exchange of paradigm, through the interchange of the *organic model* with the *textual model*. [my emphasis.]
>
> Carl Dahlhaus[4]

In a review of the English translation of Dahlhaus's *Realism in Nineteenth-Century Music*, 1982/1985, Christopher Hatch writes, "In breadth of learning and subtlety of

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[1]*Nineteenth-Century Music*, 1989, 244.

[2]*Beethoven*, 1987/1991, 51.

[3]"Models of Unity in Musical Form," 1975, 9.

[4]Ibid, 19.

argument Carl Dahlhaus has no peer among students of nineteenth-century music" (Hatch 187). In his "Recollections: Carl Dahlhaus, 1928-1989," Joseph Kerman celebrates "a scholar whose bibliography in 1988 ran to nearly forty pages, and whose accomplishment dwarfs that of any other musicologist of our time so obviously as to require no comment" (Kerman 1989 57). Because of Dahlhaus's "towering position" in twentieth-century musicology and because of the uniqueness of his views on organicism in music which appear to diverge from the understanding of organicism presented in this study, I will devote a chapter to a discussion of his work.

Dahlhaus's ambivalence regarding metaphor, showing astute awareness of its functions on the one hand, and embracing different metaphors as a means of escaping the deterministic qualities of organicism on the other, illustrates the difficulties that arise when no theoretical framework of rhetorical analysis is evident. Dahlhaus's understanding of aesthetic models related to metaphors is reflected in his notion of aesthetic paradigm shifts. What is lacking is a grasp of how the metaphor is historically derived and interconnected with a network of ideas not easily dismissed by the introduction of other metaphors more in keeping with one's own sensibilities. This problem will be seen in Dahlhaus's attempt to substitute the figure of "text" for "organism" in depicting musical works.

Some of the issues regarding organic aesthetics and analysis which Dahlhaus addresses are raised to a more intense level of debate in the writings of Paul de Man, the subject of the next chapter. Dahlhaus and de Man share an aversion to organicism. Dahlhaus responds to this by minimizing it, avoiding the label, critiquing it directly if rarely,

and emphasizing music as language or text. Dahlhaus seems to regard music as text to be a less offensive metaphor, one that was concurrent with organicism, if older. De Man, on the other hand, confronts and critiques organicism relentlessly as a dangerous ideology. Not surprisingly, his understanding of language and the role of metaphor is more deeply considered and carefully articulated than Dahlhaus's, as it is foundational to his life's work. While on the surface it seems incidental to Dahlhaus, judging by the infrequency of references, it is central to de Man.

In his article, "The Dahlhaus Project and Its Extra-Musicological Sources," James Hepokoski draws attention to what he describes as the "forbiddingly Germanic" orientation of Dahlhaus's grounding in the intellectual tradition of idealist philosophy, so foreign to Anglo-American analytical empiricism (222).[5] Dahlhaus's article, "Some Models of Unity in Musical Form," *Journal of Music Theory*, 1975, is typical with respect to its positioning in German aesthetics and musicology. The difficulties it poses for an English reader are well worth the extra time required to appreciate its insights. De Man also draws attention

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[5] I was left with a similar impression of a forbiddingly German orientation upon reading de Man's articles. Although de Man has a stronger affinity to French, being a bilingual Belgian, the historical sources guiding Dahlhaus and de Man are remarkably similar. Hepokoski calls attention to the links between Hans Robert Jauss's "main theoretical resources" and those of Dahlhaus: Gadamer, Collingwood, Kant, Husserl, Russian Formalism, Prague Structuralism. Jauss and de Man are very familiar with each other's work as is seen in de Man's introduction to Jauss's study, *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*. Jauss, then, forms an interesting link between Dahlhaus and de Man. Apart from their differing specialities of music and philology, the main difference between Dahlhaus and de Man lies in de Man's greater grasp of poststructuralist issues arising from his focus upon language.

to the problems involved in juxtaposing critical studies from German criticism with that of France or America:

> The methodological questions that are being debated in some sectors of modern German criticism are often centered on the same problems as in France or in America, although the terminology and the historical background are different enough to make direct contact very difficult. (*Blindness and Insight* 36)

Be that as it may, the title of Dahlhaus's article suggests rich mining for a study concentrating on organicism, an idea driven to a great extent by interest in models of unity.

Curiously, it is not until page 18 of this 30-page essay that Dahlhaus introduces the term "organic." There he uses it four times and thereafter with regularity. Given the material presented in the previous three chapters of this study, it is hard to imagine any treatment of the subject of "Models of Unity in Musical Form" that would not begin with at least an acknowledgment of a model which, according to Solie, Kerman, and Abrams, was an aesthetic paradigm in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Is Dahlhaus, the pre-eminent scholar of nineteenth-century musicology, unaware of its pervasiveness? Are Solie, Kerman, and Abrams among others, wrong in attributing such a leading role to organicism in musical and literary studies? Have they somehow exaggerated its importance? Or is Dahlhaus's seeming wariness of the term explainable by something as yet unexpressed, unaccountable from historical sources alone?

It is this initial failure of expectation at finding a clear historicist account of organicism as a model of unity that has prompted my deeper investigation into Dahlhaus's

discussions specifically of organicism in music or of some of the components comprising its cluster as they can be found in his writings. To appreciate this absent-presence of organicism as a driving force in Dahlhaus's "Models of Unity," it is necessary, therefore, to embrace the broader perspective offered by the context of his other works. Given the extent of Dahlhaus's oeuvre, I have limited this search to works available to Anglo-American readers, which seemed most likely to yield information on models of analysis in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These include: *Esthetics of Music*, *Foundations of Music History*, *Analysis and Value Judgment*, *The Idea of Absolute Music*, *Nineteenth-Century Music*, *Between Romanticism and Modernism*, *Beethoven*, and *Schoenberg and the New Music*.[6]

Dahlhaus commences his essay by inquiring into the objection by twentieth-century theorists, analysts, or critics that nineteenth-century theorists tended toward "empty schematization" in their theories of musical form (2-3).[7] He reflects upon the historical change in models of musical form from the nineteenth through the twentieth centuries with a movement towards the "progressive individualization of musical forms" (5). He begins by recognizing musical form as "a theoretical reaction to classical instrumental music" (2). While acknowledging that these changes were neither "rectilinear" nor "uninterrupted," the

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[6]The following abbreviations will serve for the titles mentioned in the order above: EM, FMH, AVJ, IAM, NCM, BRM, B, and SNM.

[7]Dahlhaus uses the designations critic, theorist, and analyst loosely, making them interchangeable for the most part.

two centuries are marked by distinct characteristics which Dahlhaus presents as opposites. Thus analysts of the nineteenth century show a commitment to formal features not only as constitutive, essential, and substantive musical qualities, but as also capable of representation in schemata (3). Their philosophical presuppositions operate under the category of "essentialism," that is, "the belief in the substantiality of the general" (5).

By contrast, twentieth-century analysts exhibit great scepticism about the representation of reality in a system. Dahlhaus describes their position as "nominalism," the belief that there are no universal essences in reality, abstract concepts being mere names.[8] Dahlhaus characterizes their concentration upon form as "aesthetic formalism": "the form--not the content--constituted the essence of music...a uniquely individual--and not a generally schematic--form" (4).[9] The criticism of their predecessors includes the charge that in empty schematization, "merely secondary or even inconsequential aspects are grasped and emphasized by the abstraction" (3).

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[8]It is unfortunate that Dahlhaus does not supply examples of specific theorists who typify these positions. Nor does he relate nominalism to the theorists he does engage with later in the article. This level of linguistic or philosophical sophistication is not readily seen in the Anglo-American followers of, for example, Réti, Schoenberg, or Schenker, nor am I aware of it in the writings of these three theorists themselves. The question remains, who are these nominalists? Would he include himself in this category?

[9]The re-introduction of "essence" in this definition by Dahlhaus casts some doubt upon the "nominalism" offered in opposition to "essentialism." If the nature of the *essences* have simply changed from *general* forms to *changeable* forms, it is not clear that essentialism has been eluded.

The methodology Dahlhaus employs is hermeneutics and dialectics. Dahlhaus is very explicit about what the "hermeneutic circle" involves: a dialogue of question and answer, with answers being reinserted into the ongoing questioning process. He is adamant about the need to "sympathize" with the people and historical texts under examination, making every effort to apprise oneself of the historical horizon under investigation (Dahlhaus 1983, 73).[10] Dahlhaus practices this method throughout the article, although his questions and answers are not always easy to identify on first reading. The guiding question of how musical unity originates traces the work of key German theorists in a sympathetic manner, all the time probing for limiting prejudices, blind spots, inconsistencies, and insights.

A dialectical method which seeks a synthesis among opposites also characterizes Dahlhaus's procedures. The whole investigation is structured around dichotomies that shift and combine in new and provocative ways. This can be seen in his treatment of Hans Mersmann's "community of substance"--the relation of motifs through common pitch or rhythmic features--which he synthesizes with what Mersmann considers the opposite view, "the functional theory of musical form"--motifs are related through their work as complementary functions. Dahlhaus shows these views to be not opposite, but interdependent (13). This synthesis of views deemed polar by Mersmann foreshadows the

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[10]This concern to analyze a writer's position sympathetically sometimes makes it difficult to identify Dahlhaus's voice in an argument. The fact that he does not present organicism with anything approaching "sympathy," is a strong clue to the strength of his reaction against it.

larger synthesis of essentialism and nominalism which Dahlhaus will perform as his hermeneutics develops.

In the course of the article, Dahlhaus works towards demonstrating the twentieth-century critics' complicity with what they accuse their nineteenth-century opponents of: that is, of treating music's formal features as constitutive, *substantive* musical qualities rather than treating formal features as *functional*, individualized qualities. These two terms, the "substantive" and the "functional," provide a polar structure around which much of the discussion takes place. They are initially mapped onto the theorists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively, although the placement of some writers across the century divide makes this chronological distinction difficult to maintain. The terms "essentialism" and "nominalism" fade into the background and are not evoked again. In the end, Dahlhaus synthesizes these views, undermining what seemed like the deconstructive move proposed in the opening pages of accusing the twentieth-century critics of the same charges they laid against their nineteenth-century predecessors.

Dahlhaus commences by listing a "few flaws" in the eclectic system of musical analysis, the method found most commonly in teaching and study practices and the one he seems to be most comfortable with, (6-8);[11] then he proceeds to investigate some

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[11]Dahlhaus's identification with an "eclectic" approach can be seen in reference to an historical methodology in *Nineteenth-Century Music*:

> Rather than adopting principles and pursuing them to first causes and ultimate consequences, historians are almost always eclectic....Obviously, the eclectic approach is fraught with difficulties and contradictions; for the moment, however, it is all we have. (3)

implications of the postulate that "a musical form must be conceived as the result of an interplay between its parts and components" (9). One might anticipate the introduction of structuralism at this point. Instead Dahlhaus compares this claim to the similar aesthetic and methodology of literary New Criticism, all in his Part III. Dahlhaus is not alone in comparing the methods of musical analysis with those of New Criticism. Joseph Kerman writes, "Musical analysis has also reminded many observers of the New Criticism which arose at that time" [1930s] (Kerman 1980, 319). De Man makes the connection of New Criticism with organicism when he writes:

> One could even find historical confirmation of this filiation [between unity of forms and the `metaphor of the analogy between language and a living organism'] in the line that links, especially by way of I. A. Richards and Whitehead, the structural formalism of the New Critics to the `organic' imagination so dear to Coleridge. (de Man 1983, 27, 28)

Dahlhaus omits stating any connection of New Criticism with organicism. At this point in the article, organicism circles in the background, unnamed.

Dahlhaus discusses five consequences which flow from this postulate of form as an interplay between its parts and components. For ease of reference I will arrange them in a list made up of their somewhat dissimilar components. Three of the "consequences" provide occasion to discuss the ideas of particular music scholars:

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Again in *Between Romanticism and Modernism*, Dahlhaus writes, "Eclecticism has always been the philosophy of historical studies and no historian need be ashamed of it" (80). It seems clear from the tone of this article on musical unity that the eclectic approach is also preferred for analysis.

1. An exchange of paradigms occurs in analysis from the old one, oriented to architecture (form as parts arranged according to "symmetry, balance, and proportion), to the new one "analyzed from points of view which recall the interpretation of texts" (9).

2. Adler's "process of stylistic criticism" whereby "the musical form must be understood as a functional coherence of its parts and components" is inadequate because it misses "the artistic character of the work."

3. "Analysts who describe a musical work as a functional coherence *tend automatically* towards a methodological axiom or prejudice which one might call *the postulate of uninterrupted functionality...*" [emphasis in text] (10).

4. Dahlhaus critiques Hauptmann's and Riemann's "functions theories of harmony and meter" not as "natural," but as the "re-interpretation of the historical into the supertemporal" (11).

5. Dahlhaus explores Hans Mersmann's 'community of substance'--the connections, often hidden, among themes and motifs.

The first consequence suggests that recourse to "interplay" is less suited to the older paradigm which emphasized "symmetry, balance, and proportion," and is more at home in an analysis that recalls "the interpretation of texts." Later in the article, Dahlhaus will propose the metaphor of music as "text" to solve some problems associated with the organic model, but here already he has settled on this designation for a score.[12] The shift,

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[12]Dahlhaus's description of music as "text" does not originate with this article. In *Esthetics of Music*, 1967/1982, he writes, "It would be an exaggeration to deprive written music of the status of a text in the undiluted sense of the word, and to see in notation nothing but a set of instructions for a musical practice" (12). The music-as-text metaphor is favoured above all others in the works I consulted in places too numerous to document. For example, Dahlhaus was not informed by Roland Barthes's distinction of work/text. Dahlhaus does not ask what a text is, rather he understands the autonomous "work" as expounded in *The Idea of Absolute Music* to be the equivalent of a musical "text." But not any score qualifies as a "musical text." Rossini's "recipes" for opera do not constitute texts; Beethoven's scores do:

then, is from analogies of "architecture" to "the model of literary theory," a change so significant that Dahlhaus describes it as an "exchange of paradigms." He does this in a strangely back-handed manner, putting it in brackets: "(One can, if one is not frightened by big words, speak of an exchange of paradigms)" (9). One presumes that the former, architecture, is found in the nineteenth century and the latter, literary theory, in the twentieth, but this division by centuries is becoming less distinct as the second implication of the "interplay" postulate indicates (9).

A reference to Beethoven in BRM suggests that the architectural model characterized by a "balance of complementary parts" was held in tension with the new "development" form:

> The transition to 'logical' form, form determined by the development of musical ideas, is half accomplished in Beethoven; he did not, however, jettison architectural form altogether but held the divergent principles poised in a precarious balance. (BRM 59)

Reference to Dahlhaus's linking of "development" with organicism will be discussed later.

In his second point, Dahlhaus directs criticism to the first specific musicologist, Guido Adler, 1855-1941. As a scholar who straddles the two centuries, Adler fits into both of them, but this chronological placement muddies the polarity of positions defined by

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> Beethoven's symphonies represent inviolable musical "texts" whose meaning is to be deciphered with "exegetical" interpretations; a Rossini score, on the other hand, is a mere recipe for a performance, and it is the performance which forms the crucial aesthetic arbiter as the realization of a draft rather than an exegesis of a text. (NCM 9)

centuries.[13] At any rate, Dahlhaus finds Adler's "stylistic criticism" inadequate because of its failure to consider the "artistic character of the work." In dissecting works into components in an effort to identify style factors for historical categorization, the result is a "*dead* schema" that "has absorbed nothing of the *life* of the work" [my emphasis].[14] Thus musical works become documents, "witnesses for a stylistic history...alien from the works as works" (10). It may be noteworthy that Adler's orientation to both individual works and music history as the unfolding of a developing organism is passed over by Dahlhaus. It is difficult to separate Adler's approach to stylistic criticism from his understanding of what he considers to be the organic processes of works and history.[15]

If Dahlhaus chooses not to address Adler's organicist orientation in this article, he does confront it in some detail in his *Foundations of Music History*, even underscoring the centrality of this orientation for the whole stylistic approach. In the interests of grasping more fully Dahlhaus's attitude to organicism--one which the reader senses but which is only rarely confronted directly by Dahlhaus--I will briefly move from the present article to explore Dahlhaus's treatment of Adler's organicism in *Foundations of Music History*:

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[13]This division of the theoretical positions by centuries flies in the face of another explanation of form in *Analysis and Value Judgment*. Dahlhaus gives two meanings for form during the nineteenth century, meanings which in this later article he maps onto the two centuries in "Models": 1. form is schematic, 2. form had to be "individual and unique to each work" (76).

[14]This is the first encounter with the living/dead dichotomy which will resurface later in this article, one which serves here as an undeclared aesthetic value. Its metaphorical qualities remain unacknowledged.

[15]For a prior discussion of Adler as organicist, see the Introduction.

> When Guido Adler proposed his theory of musical style in 1922 (in *Der Stil in der Musik*) he drew on what Erich Rothacker later called the 'organism model'. However treacherous this approach has proved to be, it seems virtually indispensable for compiling histories from the musical facts that have been determined on the basis of style criticism....According to Adler the 'style of a period, a school, an artist or work' does not come about 'by chance as a mere contingency to the artistic will manifested therein, but rather is grounded on the laws of origin, growth and decline found in organic evolution.' [Rothacker 13] Thus Adler raises an analogy--which however permissible as a metaphor, makes a dubious historiographical theorem--to the status of a 'law' governing music history. When it is viewed from the standpoint of its methodological function, however, this naive metaphysic proves to be anything but a mere chance deficiency that could be removed without substantially altering the notion of a history of style. On the contrary, *the analogy is an integral part of the argument*.... [my emphasis] (14, 15)

Dahlhaus critiques the organism model:

> The resulting pyramid of stylistic concepts cannot easily be transformed into a picture of an evolutionary process. When Adler referred to the juxtaposition of styles in works as '*disjecta membra* of a pseudo-history'...he put his finger squarely on the weak point of his own conception.... (FMH 15)

The "aesthetic bias towards classical styles" that Adler betrays in which the "classical zenith" of each style period (meaning something "fully developed") is celebrated, deprives the method of "conviction and meaning." For it reveals simply changes in styles rather than an evolutionary process. Dahlhaus concludes:

> Once the notion that a style progresses from archaic to classical and eventually to mannerist stages 'in accordance with the laws of organic evolution' (Adler's solution to our problem) is dismissed as *a mere metaphor hypostatised into a law of history*, then the forces that caused counterpoint with functionally subordinate parts to evolve into a polyphony of equal voices and back again will continue to elude us. [my emphasis] (FMH 16)

Dahlhaus's characterization of the "organism model" as "treacherous" typifies other direct encounters with organicism, be it as historical unfolding or as analytical assumption. What is of special interest to this study is what it conveys about Dahlhaus's interpretation of language and metaphor. He describes Adler's comparison of music history with an organism--sometimes as analogy, sometimes as metaphor--as "indispensable" to history as style criticism. Here he endorses the more recent view of metaphor as integral rather than extraneous to a proper meaning.[16] The analogy creates a "naive metaphysic," one teleological in focus, for which "the analogy is an integral part of the argument." Having judged the metaphor to be "integral," Dahlhaus then proposes that these "laws of evolution" be dismissed "as a *mere metaphor* hypostatised into a law of history" [my emphasis].[17]

Integral metaphors cannot be dismissed as "mere metaphor." It is their very metaphoricity which makes possible the error of hypostatizing them "into a law of history," along with all the insights which flow from dependence upon this figure. It is Adler's lack of rhetorical awareness that enables him to claim to be expounding a historical theory based upon empirical historical research, all the while he is shaping his data into a

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[16]For discussion of this intrinsic quality of metaphor, see Mark Johnson's Introduction to *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, 1981, especially the section, "The Twentieth-Century Revival," 16-20.

[17] "Hypostatize" is derived from Greek and means to attribute substantial or personal existence, that is, being or reality, to something. My thanks to Ron Kydd for assistance with a Greek lexicon.

metaphorical mould governed by profound metaphysical assumptions concerning music's teleology and ontology and compositional freedom. While Dahlhaus is certainly on the right track here in *criticizing* the hypostatization of the organic metaphor, his argument stops just where one expects a fuller engagement.

Rejecting the possibility of preserving the metaphor for "heuristic" purposes because of its intrinsicality to the idea, Dahlhaus's solution is to dismiss it. In my opinion, Dahlhaus's refusal of the hypostatization of the metaphor into a law of history exhibits a sophistication unmatched by other musicologists or music theorists that I have read from this time, that is, 1975. For whatever reason, Dahlhaus does not foreground these ideas. They are very isolated in his writings and seem not be carried through with a high degree of consistency. Dahlhaus's great aversion to anything that smacks of determinism, be it a naive Marxism or organicism, seems to be what sparks his opposition. In his critique of Adler's "organic history," it was clear that music history simply did not fit the model Adler proposed. Its teleology, a "dubious metaphysics," was deterministic, but also simply erroneous vis-à-vis the historical arrangement of musical works.

I return now to the five consequences that Dahlhaus discusses. The third consequent of the postulate that form be considered as a "functional coherence of its parts and components," is what I would term a radical or extreme organicism. Dahlhaus describes analysts who hold this postulate:

> [They] tend automatically towards a methodological axiom or prejudice which one might call the postulate of uninterrupted functionality: every musical phrase should legitimize itself through the function which it fulfills

> in the whole of the work--as if uninterrupted functionality were the essence of aesthetic perfection. (10)

Such a high degree of integration characterizes Stephen Pepper's definition of organic unity quoted earlier:

> The maximum of integration is a condition where every detail of the object calls for every other....Or negatively, it is a condition where no detail can be removed or altered without marring or destroying the value of the whole. Such a whole is called an organic unity. [See Chapter One][18]

Dahlhaus identifies Schoenberg with this position. However much he admires Schoenberg, Dahlhaus prefers Adorno's emphasis which can also "celebrate the discontinuity of structure and the montage of heterogeneous pieces of partially artificial and partially lowly origin..." (10, 11).

Dahlhaus's dependence upon the idea of "function" of musical parts within the whole is very evident. This understanding of "function" is derived from the biological functioning of parts in organic wholes, but the spectre of determinism such a view raises is highly distasteful to Dahlhaus, so much so that he appears unwilling to explore these philosophical antecedents themselves. In my opinion it is not possible to have conceived

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[18]The philosophers Catherine Lord and Arthur Hutchings carry on a debate about the issue of the necessity of all parts to the whole, their absolute unalterability without dislocating the whole. In her article, "Organic Unity Reconsidered," 1964, Lord takes exception to this view held by Hutchings; Hutchings replies with "Organic Unity Revindicated?" 1964. The intention that every detail be equally necessary to the whole is identified with a degree of organicism Lord rejects and Hutchings accepts. Although neither author employs the phrase "uninterrupted functionality," the sense of every phrase legitimizing itself through its continuous functionality seems like the musical equivalent of the necessity of every word or phrase to the whole of a literary piece. This claim is derived from an organicist orientation to unity.

of the merging of form and content, a hallmark of aesthetic unity and musical analysis of the past two centuries, without an understanding of how this concept works in biology.

According to this unity of form and content, the morphology or form of a plant or animal is determined by its content or material growth. Thus the structural design of leaves on a stem is dictated by the need for the leaves to expose themselves to sunlight and air for photosynthesis in the most efficient manner. Translated into musical terms, a form is no longer conceived of as a mould into which musical content is poured, but is itself determined genetically from within by the musical material which, like a seed or cell, develops outwardly according to innate, teleological principles. The metaphor of the organism applied to music made this conception of the fusion of form and content thinkable.

The ensuing emphasis upon "function," indicating parts working together toward a goal in a self-contained entity, is the legacy of the organicist imagery. In her article, "A Problem in Organic Form: Schoenberg's Tonal Body," Patricia Carpenter links organicism with musical function:

> Because a piece of music is like an organism, its formal members, like the limbs of an organism, are differentiated and characterized by their function--such as, for example, statement and establishing, transition and bridging, contrast, elaboration, or closing. (39)

This can be seen, if dimly, in Dahlhaus's "axiom of functionality": "the thesis that the assumption of a motivic connection acquires probability, if a formal function which it fulfills can be recognized..." (Models 8). In other words, a motive (musical content)

participates in a work's structure as it functions, for example, as a main theme in a rondo or sonata. In an organism the positioning of the parts is a function of the overall design. In AVJ, Dahlhaus writes, "In order not to fall apart or to appear as a mere succession (which does not conclude but just stops), a musical form extending across hundreds of measures must form a system of functions" (45).

The notion of "function" dovetails readily with both a biologically based approach as well as one oriented to structuralist methods. Derrida's definition of structuralism leaves little to quarrel with in terms of "organic" unity and the interdependent functioning of parts. Derrida describes the structuralist demand which leads to "the comprehensive description of a totality, of a form or a function organized according to an internal legality in which elements have meaning only in the solidarity of their correlation or their opposition..." (*Writing and Difference* 157).

In an article to be explored in Chapter Seven, musicologist Alan Street lumps together organicism and structuralism as two manifestations among others of "atemporal formalism"--"a doctrine whose authority increases across time, both conceptually and historically, from organicism to structuralism and beyond" (Street 89). Whether one's leanings are to an organicist model or structuralism, the idea of "function" predominates.

Dahlhaus returns to the exaggerated view of uninterrupted functionality repeatedly in different contexts as an unsupportable position. For example, in *Beethoven*, he writes,

"(It would be dangerous to speak of total comprehensiveness, for the ambition to expound the derivation of each and every note could become an obsession)" (93).[19]

Dahlhaus's fourth consequent is less familiar to me, deriving as it does from German theorists whose systems have not had as wide an influence in North America as in German-speaking countries. Dahlhaus critiques Moritz Hauptmann's and Hugo Riemann's theories of harmony and meter "(the thesis of the hierarchy of heavier and lighter rhythmic pulses, measures, phrases, and half-phrases)" as based, not on nature as they claim, but on historically changing interpretations which only partially account for tonal music, never mind pre- or post-tonal music (11). Dahlhaus writes, "The habit of constantly appealing to the nature of music (and not to its history) meant that one considered the functionality of harmony and meter as a universal certainty of tonal music" (11). This undermining of appeals to nature echoes a feminist critique of organicism which claims affinity to nature for legitimation.

Dahlhaus pursues some further consequences of this theory which insist upon the harmonic and metric nature of music "at every moment," another instance of uninterrupted functionality. He proposes instead "that the components which make up a musical structure can advance and retreat to different degrees during the formal process" (11).[20] It

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[19]It is curious that Dahlhaus encloses some of his most insightful comments in brackets.

[20]Lord's literary equivalent to this picture of musical components having alternatively prominent and backgrounding positions is as follows:

> Padding is desirable because a poem in which every line and word counts is like a conversation in which every remark must be intelligent, the familiar

is the job of the analyst to explain how musical continuity is at all possible "in the interplay of the various musical elements" (11). Here Dahlhaus evokes the comparison of musical components with actors in a drama, "who do not always need to be present and who, even when they are, sometimes have little or nothing to say" (12).

For his fifth point, Dahlhaus suggests not a consequence of the postulate of functionality, but a dimension that it tends to neglect, what Hans Mersmann terms a "community of substances." In this tradition of analysis the diastematic or pitch factor guides a search for "hidden or manifest" connections among themes and motifs "in order to show the inner coherence of a composition" (12). What is understood by Mersmann as in opposition to the functional view, Dahlhaus shows to be interdependent. For example, a motivic connection, by itself not striking, takes on greater significance when it appears first in an antecedent phrase and is taken up again in the consequent phrase: "The formal function underscores the substantive connection," while the reverse is also true (13). This reconciliation or synthesis of the substantive and functional theories is not particularly foregrounded here; however, it anticipates Dahlhaus's fuller treatment of a synthesis in Friedrich Blume, the penultimate section of the article.

In his Part IV, Dahlhaus explores objections raised to the eclectic method of analysis which he first defines: "describing musical form as the functional coherence between parts and components which are alternately accentuated and whose relationships

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> goal of the academic Philistine. In this connection padding prevents fatigue, if not a sense of oppression. (Lord 1964, 264)

cannot be reduced to formulae but must always be individually defined" (14). The section is itself divided into three parts, the first of which addresses objections to an eclectic approach. One of these centres around Ernst Kurth who emphasizes the "dynamic" quality of form, an "effective energy which the listener must feel from a musical process in order to comprehend the 'living spirit' behind the 'dead letter'...(15).[21] He begins by raising the work of three other theorists who are aligned with substantive musical factors, "which--like the 'Ursatz' or 'Urlinie' of Heinrich Schenker, or a diastematic 'Urzelle' (primary cell) in the sense of Rudolph Réti or Hans Mersmann--present the origin of musical works hidden behind the notes" (15). Dahlhaus relates the conception of analysis of the last three theorists to "Goethe's sensuous-ideal 'Urplanze' (primary plant)."

The second part of IV addresses what some theorists consider a weakness of the functional, eclectic approach, namely that it does not assume uninterruptedness. Dahlhaus responds:

> It is characteristic...precisely for methods of analysis which aim at scholarliness and which go beyond pedagogical, propaedeutic purposes to seek determining features which are uninterruptedly present in a work....No tone of a Beethoven sonata can, in an analysis of Rudolph Réti, be excepted from the deduction from an 'Urzelle'. For Theodore W. Adorno, it is the joy of an analyst to be able to show that every note is the result of 'developing variation'.[22] Heinrich Schenker's 'Urlinie' is protected from the danger of ever breaking down, by a grand scale for the analytical

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[21]This is the second reference to the living/dead dualism, one which Dahlhaus will draw on for his comparison of music with a "text."

[22]Earlier, Dahlhaus had referred to Adorno as one who celebrated the montage of heterogeneous elements and structural discontinuity in composition. See "Models," 10, 11.

> selection of structurally important tones, which permits a neglect of the unsuitable (the 'Urlinie' determines, independently of the rhythm, what is essential for the context). (16)

Leaving Adorno aside, Réti and Schenker are well-known for their organicist approaches to analysis. Solie's exposition of their work leaves little doubt as to the organic orientation of these two. Yet Dahlhaus avoids the term, critiquing them for views which are difficult to imagine without organic imagery.

He has strong words, however, for analytical theories which claim uninterrupted functionality, one expression of which involves pitch:

> The idea that musical unity grows out of the omnipresence of a diastematic substance which penetrates the entire composition, risks the danger of becoming an obsession which borders on the nonsensical. Or, more soberly formulated: flawlessness of an analysis, although it may be taken as the triumph of a method, is a reason for scholarly, theoretical mistrust. One may suppose that an explanation which is able to encompass every tone is empty. (17)

The eclectic method does not suffer from its discontinuous qualities; rather this is its great advantage. Dahlhaus explains, "Limitation is thus no disadvantage, but rather an advantage of a theory. That facts prove to be unwieldy and impenetrable for a theory is a lesser evil than slipping into claims which are just as unrevealing as irrefutable" (17).

It is in this third section of Part IV that Dahlhaus introduces the word "organic." It arises in the context of the objection to analysis that the work examined is destroyed in dissection. According to Dahlhaus, musical analysis operates around a metaphorical system of dichotomies--synthesis/analysis, organic/mechanical, intuition/construction--which itself circles around "the antithesis of the living and the dead" (18). Dahlhaus shows

two ways in which the organic/mechanical polarity fails to maintain its oppositional quality: "in an analysis an `organic' whole is constructed by means of a `mechanical' model"; and the language of analysis resembles "engineering jargon" more than "an intuition from the whole" (18).

Dahlhaus locates in the "organic model" the source of this fatal dialectic of the living/dead. He writes:

> The dilemma is unavoidable as long as aesthetic reflection, by which the analytic method is supported, is oriented exclusively to an organic model. This model, contrary to popular prejudice, by no means represents the only way in which one can proceed in order to make oneself understood in the meaning of words, living and dead, with regard to music. Namely, as soon as one--supported by the fact that one can consider a musical work as a text--takes as a basis the antithesis between `living spirit' and `dead letter,' the position of argumentation is abruptly changed....The description as functional coherence, previously suspected of being a `mechanical'--`dead'--model of an `organic' whole, is now proven to be the presentation of the musical logic which constitutes the inner composition, i.e., the presentation of the `spirit' which is the `life' of the work. (18, 19)

I think the first statement of this passage confirms that the "aesthetic reflection" which has transpired on the previous pages, supporting the analytical methods discussed, has been "oriented exclusively to an organic model." According to "popular prejudice," the only way of preserving music understood in terms of "living" and "dead," is the organic model. Dahlhaus's alignment of the organic model with "popular prejudice" evokes a negative association: first, the term, "popular," implies a negative judgment for Dahlhaus as it does for Adorno; second, any sympathy for this historical position--a criterion of any good methodology according to Dahlhaus--is lacking. One wonders how appeals to nature,

criticized earlier by Dahlhaus, are avoided here in this ongoing evocation of "life." As long as the metaphors, "living" and "dead," continue to orient musical understanding, it is difficult to see how one has escaped a naturalized or substantialized language.

Furthermore, Dahlhaus describes this movement from "organism" to "text" as the "interchange of the organic model with the textual model" (19). This is not the first reference to a change of models or paradigms even within this article. The first occurs where Dahlhaus explains that recourse to "interplay" is less suited to the ***older paradigm*** which emphasized "symmetry, balance, and proportion," and is more at home in an analysis that recalls "the interpretation of texts." Dahlhaus continues:

> Analysis, emancipated from form theory, is oriented less towards analogies to architecture, than towards the model of literary theory. (One can...speak of an exchange of paradigms.) (9)

The first sentence of the previous quotation ("The dilemma is unavoidable...") suggests that aesthetic reflection supporting the analytic method "is oriented exclusively to an organic model," although to what degree is not clear. Where does this "organic model" fit in terms of the historically correlated paradigms Dahlhaus is proposing? In the first chapter of *The Idea of Absolute Music*, titled "Absolute Music as an Esthetic Paradigm," Dahlhaus describes another instance of a paradigm shift: "One may without exaggeration call this a music-esthetic `paradigm shift,' a reversal of esthetic premises" (7). In this context, Dahlhaus refers to the change from an esthetic based upon "the doctrine of affections and the esthetics of sentiment" which favoured texted music and its moral messages, to the idea of "absolute music," "the conviction that instrumental music purely

and clearly expresses the true nature of music by its very lack of concept, object, and purpose"--and all this in spite of the fact that "the term did not arise for another half-century" (7). Efforts by Johann Mattheson in 1739 to provide supporting arguments for textless instrumental music were based on music as "sound oratory or tone speech." In noting Johann Mattheson's characterization of a musical theme "as analogous to the proposition of a legal argument," Dahlhaus remarks on these thematic developments as "the beginnings of the process that later on, as thematic-motivic work in Haydn and Beethoven, became the epitome of discursive musical logic." With a barely-disguised enthusiastic tone, Dahlhaus pursues the language metaphor as it culminates in Hanslick's influential esthetic. Drawing upon Wilhelm von Humbolt, whose linguistic theory Dahlhaus claims was a strong influence on Hanslick, Dahlhaus writes, "Speech is not manifested as mere 'clothing' of thoughts and feelings, as in the older theory of language predicated by Forkel, but as [spiritual] activity that forms and does not simply formulate" (IAM 112). If speech is 'inner form,' a 'working of the spirit' in 'articulated sound,' then music "can be designated as a language *in an almost unmetaphorical sense*" [my emphasis] (113).

The depiction of music and language as "speech" and "spiritual activity" aligned with qualities of "life" recalls Derrida's treatment of Saussure's and Rousseau's (among others') privileging of speech over writing. Here speech was also linked with life, absolute presence, and interiority. Derrida's well-known deconstruction of the speech/writing oppositions can be readily mapped onto Dahlhaus's distinctions, maintained under the

living/dead dichotomy where speech is living presence. Retrospectively, Dahlhaus seems almost to play deliberately into the metaphysical traditions of unmediated presence which Derrida and de Man target. Another publication performs a similar role: Roland Barthes's article, "From Work to Text," published two years after Dahlhaus's "Models," defines "work" in the very terms Dahlhaus would want to escape--"The latter [work] refers to the image of an *organism* which grows by vital expansion, by 'development' (a word which is significantly ambiguous, at once biological and rhetorical); the metaphor of the Text is that of the *network*..." (Richter anthology, 1008). Barthes's authorless "text" would have found little resonance with Dahlhaus's preference for "text."

The "image of a comprehensible discourse" favoured by Mattheson--what Mark Evan Bonds labelled the metaphor of oration[23]--continued to function alongside other depictions, dovetailing nicely with the notion of music as philosophical dialogue and as logic. Friedrich Schlegel's aphorism on instrumental music is one of Dahlhaus's favourites: "'Must not pure instrumental music itself create a text of its own? And does not its theme get developed, confirmed, varied, and contrasted like the object of meditation in a philosophical sequence of ideas'" (IAM 107).[24]

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[23]Bonds's book, *Wordless Rhetoric: Musical Form and the Metaphor of the Oration*, will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.

[24]See, for example, the same passage quoted by Dahlhaus in *Nineteenth-Century Music*, 95. Within IAM, Dahlhaus refers previously to this passage on pages 70-71 where he quotes it.

Dahlhaus's description of changes in esthetics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as a "paradigm shift" is consistent from the perspective of a timeframe in his writings. However, his linking of the earlier model to such diverse representations as oration and architecture with a subsequent movement to text, logic,[25] drama, and an esthetic of "absolute music" lessens the impact of what is understood as a paradigm shift. One could argue for the continuity of imagery under the terms Dahlhaus presents, in particular, the over-riding depiction of music as language--oration, text, logic.

The paradigm shift spoken of in this dissertation, especially as emphasized in the change from a mechanical to an organic model in Chapter Two, would seem not to support Dahlhaus's very different terms; however, it agrees with the historical timeframe, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Abrams described dating this shift: "Setting the date at which this point of view became predominant in critical theory, like marking the point at which orange becomes yellow in the color spectrum, must be a somewhat arbitrary procedure" (1953, 22). While no one would pinpoint one particular year as signalling this change in aesthetic orientation, there is widespread agreement on the

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[25]Dahlhaus's likening of music to "logic" can be seen in the following passage:

> The forces in compositional technique that made an 'autonomization' of instrumental music possible may be summarized in the concept of 'musical logic'--a concept closely connected to the notion of the 'speech character' of music. That music presents itself as sounding discourse, as development of musical thoughts, is the compositional justification of its esthetic claim that it exists to be heard for its own sake: a claim that was nothing else than self-evident in the late eighteenth century. (IAM 104)

decades surrounding the turn of the nineteenth century as the period in which the shift quickened.

It should be recognized that while some metaphors may be favoured to such an extent that they may dominate an historical period, there is never any purity of figurative language. More commonly it is the case that a mixture of metaphors is employed as people wrestle with how to put into language--which never quite fits an idea--some conception they wish to convey. It is also the case that the metaphors of choice reflect a speaker or writer's preference, perhaps even ideology, regardless of prevailing favourites.

Another matter arising from the above passage, "The dilemma is unavoidable...," concerns the living/dead dichotomy which has already been raised twice in the article. Dahlhaus wishes to preserve the "life" of a work without being subject to what seemed like an inescapable inconsistency--the dissolution of organic qualities into mechanical ones--when the organic model is the only recourse. He attempts to escape the logical inconsistency of preserving an organic model by mechanical means, by shifting the living qualities to "text," an image not subject to this seeming contradiction.

Before pursuing this alternative of "text" offered by Dahlhaus, I want to show a certain inconsistency in Dahlhaus's logic as it relates to metaphors. Several objections come to mind. First, the organic or "life" aspect need not be threatened by mechanical means if one stops to consider the interdependence of organic and mechanical features in organisms, that is, the vehicle in the organism/music metaphorical pair. The "life" of an animal is in no way diminished by its dependence upon the "mechanical" functioning of its

pumping heart. All organisms rely upon mechanical workings to a greater or lesser degree, even as they maintain their unique qualities as self-generating, growing entities with some level of autonomy. Why is Dahlhaus reluctant to use a dialectical approach with this organic/mechanical polarity?

Second, Dahlhaus protects the analysis/synthesis polarity from the "fatal" dialectic of the organic/mechanical by showing how the equation of analysis with a killing dissection only holds true when "analysis" is literalized, in a "primitive formulation." The following three sentences comprise Dahlhaus's reasoning:

> It cannot be denied that the description of a musical work as a functional coherence is not 'analytical' in the suspect sense of the word, that one can, rather, call it 'synthetic,' because it--instead of being mere dissection--reveals connections and interplay between the parts and components of the work. However the process is not secure from the objection that in an analysis an 'organic' whole is constructed by means of a 'mechanical' model. The substance of the objection--that the living is injured or destroyed--remains therefore the same, *although the first, primitive formulation--which took the term analysis literally, in order to cast suspicion upon it*--must be sacrificed and replaced by a second. [my emphasis] (18)

It could be argued that Dahlhaus too has relied upon a "primitive formulation" of the term "organic" in attributing real "life" to it. If he wishes to be literal, he should go further and recognize that organisms incorporate mechanical qualities. Even Coleridge, whose opposition to the mechanical in art was adamant, was not adverse to acknowledging the dialectical relationship of the organic and mechanical, although admittedly, he tended to forget this in his disparagement of the mechanical.

In substituting "text" for "organism," Dahlhaus attempts to maintain the "life" qualities minus the possibility that analysis or dissection could destroy the object. It should be noted that "life" still rests on a metaphor, that of a living text, an old metaphor that St. Paul used in his second letter to the Corinthians.[26] Whereas in organicism, the living quality is derived from biological organisms whose "life" no one doubts, in the case of the text, its living quality is derived from yet another metaphor, that of a living spirit--an idea not so readily acknowledged in a secular society. Perhaps had the metaphorical quality of the organic model been recognized from the start, some of this confusion could have been prevented. One wonders if Dahlhaus is trying to make this metaphor of the organism function uninterruptedly, that is, as an hypostatized substance?

Part V is also divided into three sections. Dahlhaus begins with the observation that however different those theories are that highlight a primary constituent as guaranteeing the "unity and inner coherence of a work through its uninterrupted presence," their logical structure is strikingly similar. Whether Kurth, Lorenz, or Réti, "it always seems as if the definition is clinging to one aspect of the musical composition, to a single parameter--intensity, duration, or pitch--which is the fundamental musical quality and the

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[26]"...not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life" II Corinthians 3.6. A more recent source for this well-worn metaphor of living language can be seen in arguments by Humbolt, Schelling, and Schleiermacher for the incorporation of the study of classics into the new University of Berlin. Schelling proposed that recognizing the "living spirit of a dead language" in classical studies was akin to the study of nature. Both nature and the ancient authors are written in "hieroglyphics on colossal pages" (Shaffer 43).

central characteristic of musical form" (19). Joseph Kerman made a similar observation, one which has been underscored by more recent critics. However, Kerman expressed this conclusion, observing the common thread of organicist imagery among different theorists: "Critics who differ vastly from one another in their methods, styles, and emphases still view the work of art ultimately as an organism in some sense" (Kerman 1980, 315).

The first objection Dahlhaus raises is motivated by an historical perspective and is very convincing. None of the conceptions of form were conceived as "historically limited outlines." Dahlhaus cautions, "The extensive outlines must be historically limited if even the partial truth content, which they doubtless have, is not to be endangered by the pretension to universality" (19).

Passing over Dahlhaus's treatment of Kurth's dynamic, "psychic energy," and Riemann's and Lorenz's basis in "intensified rhythmic correspondences," I will focus on the third formal type, "the developmental form."[27] Dahlhaus seems to allot the greatest credibility to this concept as can be deduced from the following passage:

> A third formal type, the developmental form, as it is employed--in different degrees of interplay with the correspondence or grouping principle--by Haydn, Beethoven, Wagner, Brahms, and Schoenberg, forms the illustrative model for the thesis that musical form proceeds primarily from developing variation of diastematic (pitch) factors. (20)

Aligning the lead players in the Austro-German canon (minus Bach and Mozart) with the developmental form offers it great distinction. No doubt the other methods also address

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[27]These two theories are of less interest to North American theorists than the developmental form often associated with Réti and Schoenberg.

these composers' works, but it is only under this third category that Dahlhaus acknowledges a correlation between actual composer's methods and a formal model.[28] What this concept stresses, according to Dahlhaus, is the "logical": "Form does not appear as sounding architecture, but rather as 'sound speech,' analogous to a discursive text" (20). This shift of analogies from architecture to language recalls Dahlhaus's earlier reference to "an exchange of paradigms."

In fact on other occasions, Dahlhaus has referred to this very "developmental form" as the organic model. In *Analysis and Value Judgment*, 1970/1980, the same book in which he investigated a "law of biology" in its transfer to music, Dahlhaus referred to "the postulate of the complementation of differentiation and integration" as an aesthetic conception "based on an organic model" (41). A few pages further he speaks of four principles of form: a continuous series, "spinning-out," development, and grouping. In his discussion of development here, he does not draw upon organic figures with the exception perhaps of "skin":

> The development principle, of which the outer compositional skin is created by thematic and motivic working-out, has been investigated and characterized so often that a recapitulating description would be superfluous pedantry. Movements built according to the development principle are the primary and historically determined object of an analysis of forms aimed at revealing motivic relationships that give a composition inner cohesion." (49)

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[28]The second epigraph found at the beginning of this chapter points to a different connection, one between "organicist theory" and what was "implicitly acknowledged in compositional practice."

It is true that this principle has been investigated with great frequency, but not by Dahlhaus under the name of organicism.

In *Beethoven*, 1987/1991, Dahlhaus broaches the subject of organicism again in relation to the development concept:

> The process of finding the ***whole*** of a movement or a work preformed in a single intervallic 'cell' is linked to a debatable conception of ***development***. The interpretation is influenced by a model adopted from ***organic life***, which encourages thinking of intervallic substrata as if they were seeds in which ***the growth of the form is already determined***, although empirically there is nothing to be observed other than that certain characteristics of a structure recur in the variants, and others are changed. The conception of 'development' is a metaphor which is unexceptionable so long as it means nothing more than that the alteration of characteristics is a process in time; but it becomes questionable if it is made the basis for the metaphysical conclusion that an intervallic configuration is a 'cell', from which growth proceeds according to *a musical law of nature which a composer must obey*, rather than make the law himself. [my emphasis] (92)

This concentration of organic components in this passage portrays "growth" or, as Dahlhaus terms it, "development," as part of the larger metaphor "influenced by a model adopted from *organic life*." The italicized words suggest the cluster components of unity, growth, teleology, and genius.

If Dahlhaus finds this conception of development to be "debatable," he offers good reasons for his hesitation. He zeroes in on the deterministic implications of a composer obeying a musical law of nature. He does not contend with attempts to resolve this conflict in which "genius gives the rule to art" (Kant), or in which the genius acts as if he were nature (Coleridge), or in which only geniuses can properly "compose out" the *Ursatz* (Schenker). He points out that an empirical observation reveals nothing but recurrence and

change, no "seeds" growing. Such a view, of course, refuses the organism any metaphorical status, insisting on its literalness. In *Beethoven*, Dahlhaus seems to show more sympathy for this view of genius in which the whole is intuited first, describing Beethoven's "genius" as "irrational productive power":

> Instead of the combinatory facility that progresses from the part to the whole, the fundamental arbiter is an intuition that imagines the whole in one flash....There should be no doubt at all that it was the intuitive conception of the whole, which then worked back to determine alterations to the individual details, that was the generative element in the creative process. (66)

It is curious that Dahlhaus should identify "development," which is one characteristic of organisms, as the metaphor on which the whole conception is built, rather than the organism itself. His comment on the "development" concept as highlighting "a process in time," while technically correct, does not reflect "organic" analytical practices which spatialize a work as a closed entity. The phrase, "is unexceptionable so long as it means nothing more...," minimizes the metaphor ("unexceptionable"), while a hint about the possibility that it may mean something more is definitely there. The metaphysical conclusions are this "something more" and they are problematic.

Dahlhaus follows this paragraph with a critique of the "debatable conception of development":

> The truth is that a musical formal process does not issue from any one single origin, but requires a number of different, linked or overlapping, initial starting points and associations; and there will be differences in the attributes of the notes in which these manifest themselves, in the degrees of abstraction underlying them, and the extent of their range. (92)

The opening, "the truth is," reflects back on the previous discussion as being false.

The larger context in which the paragraph beginning, "The process of finding...," appears as a section on "Motivic Relationships" in the chapter, "Issues in Sonata Form," 91-120 in *Beethoven*. The first sentence of the chapter has a footnote to Réti and this links the derivation of movements from motivic "cells" to the organic model. The unmistakable connection of Réti with organicism is glossed in "Models of Unity," but here the names of Schoenberg and Réti are allied with this "debatable" organicism. Dahlhaus sets a negative tone from this first statement:

> One of the preconceptions that do more harm than good in musical analysis is the belief that it is a triumph of methodology if it can be shown that the entire motivic and thematic substance of a movement--and even the non-thematic components--derive from the same motivic 'cell', just one interval-succession. (*Beethoven* 91)

Echoes of uninterrupted functionality are unmistakable in this condemnation.

I will deal with the last two sections of Part V together, with special attention to the concept of "hypostatization." In the first of these last two sections, Dahlhaus tries to salvage what is "fitting" from the three theories which variously elevate a single musical aspect (dynamics, rhythm, and diastematics) to "be the central characteristic of music." Dahlhaus draws on the language of scholarly logic when he designates these theories as resting upon "abstraction and hypostatization" (21). In each theory, the one component is assumed to be "substantive." Dahlhaus writes,

> The ongoing search for the musically substantive and the impulse to let concepts of musical theory merge into aesthetic-metaphysical categories are obviously two sides of the same thing....The hypostatization of a single

> factor--rhythm or dynamics--is to be understood as an attempt to make 'graspable,' through substantializing the unity of the form which, in its description as functional coherence, is a sum of connections. (23)

By contrast, the functional theory of musical form "explains aesthetic unity as the configuration of 'roles'" (23). Dahlhaus's structuralist leanings are hard to miss although they are not declared.

Dahlhaus also recognizes hypostasis as involving a metaphysical assumption, without mentioning the ontological status of the work. But he does not reject metaphysics out of hand. He acknowledges the attraction of substantializing a single factor:

> [Here] one transforms narrowly limited categories of musical theory into widely expanded, association-rich, aesthetic and metaphysical concepts....It seduces one into passing over from an emphasis on the perceivable (the stressing of a single musical factor) directly and unexpectedly to the 'intellectual view' (of a sublimated dynamic) which Kant had reason to distrust. ("Models" 23)

Dahlhaus points to the dangers of overextending the stress on a single factor without, however, dwelling on this aspect or illustrating with any specifics. He risks contradiction in saying that holding to "functional coherence" is correct, but substantializing a musical component is much more "association-rich" in terms of "aesthetic and metaphysical concepts." Dahlhaus does not recoil from metaphysics. The following passage from his *Beethoven* illustrates these leanings:

> The 'thematic element' can be understood as the constant factor in the changing pattern of exterior forms, and, hence, as the 'analogue of the ego'--though not by someone who a priori rejects metaphysical interpretation of aesthetic matters as 'unscholarly.' (53)

With the partial exception of Friedrich Blume, discussed in Part VI, Dahlhaus does not put forward any theorists as exemplaries of the functional theory of form, sometimes referred to as "eclectic." He seems to have demonstrated that indeed twentieth-century theorists did rely on substantive factors, as did nineteenth-century theorists.

In this penultimate section, Dahlhaus explores Blume's treatise, "Fortspinnung und Entwicklung," 1929. Not surprisingly, given Dahlhaus's propensity for dialectics, Blume, if unwittingly, offers the synthesis between the substantive and functional approaches, a possibility touched on in the treatment of Mersmann. The argument Dahlhaus presents is intricate and follows the twists and turns of Blume's uniquely German expressions, none of which seems to have had a great influence upon the North American musical scene. Dahlhaus notes that Blume's treatise has not been productive in analytical practice even in Germany where it was overtaken by Wilhelm Fischer's concept of "Fortspinnungstypus" (24). However, the arguments are worth following to some degree as they demonstrate, I believe, a potential correlation between the organic model and a textual or logical model, the latter being preferred by Dahlhaus.

Dahlhaus describes "Fortspinnung" and "development" ["Entwicklung"][29] as polar principles in which one pole "is defined as the deficient mode of the other." He provides Blume's definitions:

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[29]The translator does not maintain the German for "Entwicklung," substituting "development." "Fortspinnung" is left in its German form.

> Fortspinnung means a process of joining together unrelated, independent elements, a series of motifs, which do not need to be substantively related, and which only become related through their placement in connection with one another. Development means a process of gradual transformation of a beginning element into further elements, substantively related to it and joined to it. It is a variety of separate motifs which form a chain of inner connections. (Blume quoted by Dahlhaus 25)[30]

The following table condenses Dahlhaus's account of Blume's subdivisions of the two principles:

| FORTSPINNUNG | | | DEVELOPMENT |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mechanical (unconnected in a linear series) | Organic (closely connected by contrast or repetition) | | |
| | fantastic | logical (Substantive relationship of the parts) | |
| FUNCTIONAL | | | SUBSTANTIVE |
| Dahlhaus suggests an alternative typology, based on Blume: | | | |
| Series (Mechanical) | | | Grouping (Organic) |

[30]Dahlhaus gives no page reference for this passage in the 1929 article, "Fortspinnung und Entwicklung."

Dahlhaus does not agree with Blume either in his subdivisions or on the primacy he gives to "relationship of substance" over a secondary "functional coherence" (25). In his own arguments, he will reverse Blume's emphasis.

In the subdivision of "organic" Fortspinnung into "fantastic" and "logical" (the latter defined as "the substantive relationship of the parts"), Dahlhaus notes that "a logical Fortspinnung can hardly be distinguished from a development [Entwicklung]" (25). "On the other hand," he writes, "it seems that the difference between mechanical and organic Fortspinnung is so radical that it would be more appropriate to speak of two form types--"series" and "grouping"--instead of forcing together divergent phenomena under the collective concept "Fortspinnung" (26). Thus "mechanical" becomes "series" and "organic" becomes "grouping." The mechanical and organic are subsumed under preferred labels and rendered invisible, however important their distinction seems to be.

This discussion of mechanical and organic forms a curious contrast to the earlier one in this study in which the dualism comprised the fatal dialectic circulating around the living/dead polarity. Here there is no mention of the organic's dependence upon mechanical means, collapsing the opposition between them. Rather "the difference between mechanical and organic Fortspinnung is so radical," that these "divergent phenomena" must not be forced together. Even so, Dahlhaus produces a new synthesis whereby the functional (Fortspinnung) and substantive (development) can support and supplement each other.

Dahlhaus explains: "By the term, `development,' is meant the constitution of a musical text through the transformation of melodic thoughts--through `developing variation,' as Arnold Schoenberg would say" (26). As discussed earlier, Dahlhaus viewed "development" as a metaphor "adopted from organic life," which "encourages thinking of intervallic substrata as if they were seeds in which the growth of the form is already determined" (*Beethoven* 92). In the context of the present article, "development" is understood to be "the constitution of a musical text." The organic has been made textual.

Dahlhaus cautions that in relying on expressions like "musical syntax and the development of musical thought," "there can be no question of an analogous correlation in music" to linguistic syntax which is the syntax of a semantic structure. He adds, "(The expression `development of musical thought' is a metaphor)" (26). What is missing is the recognition of a double metaphor employed here, "development" and "thought." Whereas in *Beethoven*, Dahlhaus recognizes development as a "debatable" and "questionable" metaphor when understood to be a "cell" which grows according to natural laws, here he focuses exclusively on "musical thought" as a metaphor--a choice he clearly feels more comfortable with.

In the last section of his article, Part VII, Dahlhaus moves away from a discussion synthesizing substantive and functional qualities to bring about the synthesis of one last dichotomy, one not previously raised in this context. This dualism refers to the longstanding divide between those factors which analysis grasped as "the joining together of musical thought into a form"--the "unity" dimension, and that which was not subject to

rational investigation, "multiplicity," "the product of inspiration." The latter comprised "a melody theory" which until this century was not considered subject to "compositional-technical categories."

The turning point for this re-orientation to melody coincided with Gustav Nottebohm's publication of Beethoven's sketch books. Here one could see that "the formulation of a musical thought can be the result of work" (29). Dahlhaus concludes, "The methodological consequence was the amalgamation of melody and form theory" (29). This conclusion occurs in the last paragraph of the article and offers no examples. Presumably this final synthesis supports the substantive/functional synthesis, but I found this short final section to be more of a digression from the article's argument than a conclusion. What seems to have occurred in relation to Dahlhaus's larger concerns regarding artistic freedom, is the removal of the last obstacle to the rationality of absolute music, the mystery of inspiration illustrated in the melody component which had up until Nottebohm's publication, remained an irrational factor. Formerly explained by the notion of genius, the invention of melody has been tamed, rationalized. This view is less than convincing when placed up against Dahlhaus's greater sympathy for genius as expressed by Beethoven, described as "irrational productive power" (*Beethoven* 66).

The following description of Dahlhaus's understanding of a model for analysis has been culled from his whole article and will be measured against my description of the components which comprise the "organic" cluster. Dahlhaus' emphasis upon "functional coherence" in a musical work reflects the importance of the element of *unity*, but it does

not exclude difference, disjunction, or multiplicity. Thematic material need not control the work at every moment, but like an actor in a drama, its presence can be felt without being centre stage at all times. Dahlhaus' commitment to *autonomy* is well known.[31] As for *nature*, Dahlhaus is critical of any interpretation which calls upon nature to transform the historical into the supertemporal; however, he has trouble escaping the living/dead dichotomy of analytical models, a connection that belies a complicity with appeals to nature. Although he would not endorse the old nineteenth-century adherence to form as the objectification of spiritual principles, Dahlhaus seems untroubled with *spirit* used figuratively as in "living spirit" contrasted with "dead letter." *Genius* is not mentioned in "Models," but in FMH, Dahlhaus notes, "So obviously is the autonomy principle connected

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[31]Hepokoski examines Dahlhaus's views on autonomy:

> It can hardly be denied that, for all his awareness of the problem in principle, in practice Dahlhaus usually carried out his historical work, at least in *Nineteenth-Century Music*, as though the concepts of autonomy and the work had not been seriously challenged. (Hepokoski 237)

An in-depth discussion of the autonomy principle by Dahlhaus is found on 27-29 of his *Foundations of Music History*. At the risk of reducing his very complex attachment to autonomy, I will include here one of Dahlhaus' concluding statements: "Aesthetic autonomy is not merely a methodological principle which an historian is free to take or leave, but an historical fact that he has to accept" (28). There is no history of music without a history of musical works and this implies close attention to their internal construction. But a focus upon works does not exclude social considerations. Dahlhaus writes:

> Far from implying the isolation of music, aesthetic autonomy meant just the opposite, namely that music played an active part in one of the main currents of the age: the notion of *Bildung* or liberal education and the cultivation of the mind. (146)

It seems that for Dahlhaus, music still plays this role. However, reduction of music to documentary status or to a result of social-historical forces threatens this view.

with the aesthetic of genius and the concept of originality..." (144). In *Beethoven*, Dahlhaus juxtaposes "wit" and "genius," the rational working out of ideas and "irrational productive power," as capable of being synthesized in a composer, here Beethoven, who works with conscious productivity and intuition (66). While *teleology* is not explicitly announced in the article, Dahlhaus is critical of the idea of *growth*, where the "idea that musical unity grows out of the omnipresence of a diastematic substance..." becomes obsessive (17).

Dahlhaus's contribution to the study of organicism in music is considerable, if sometimes veiled. He makes five specific criticisms of ideas embedded in organicism: 1. Exclusive attention to motivic connections puts difference or disjunction in the background. Organicists are committed to unity; difference is of no interest. Indeed it is viewed as threatening coherence (7). 2. Dahlhaus questions how one can determine which motivic connections claimed by analysts are real or fictional (8). Organicists do not question connections; they depend upon them. 3. The idea of uninterrupted functionality Dahlhaus dismisses as an "obsession." This kind of omnipresent penetration can be meaningless (10, 17). 4. While organicists rely upon "natural" explanations, Dahlhaus prefers historically situated accounts which are subject to change (11). 5. Any explanation which claims to take into account every musical factor creates a totality that cannot be falsified. Dahlhaus calls such theories "as unrevealing as irrefutable" (17).

It is in a sixth contribution that I locate the source of Dahlhaus's greatest hesitancy regarding organicism and this calls for a more expanded treatment. This relates to the loss

of the composer's individual freedom which acceptance of organicism seems to imply. The first hint of the absence of organicism in "Models"occurred as the work of A. B. Marx was raised without any reference to his organic depiction of musical unity. Dahlhaus describes Marx as the "founder of musical form theory," noting Marx's understanding of form: "Form...could be schematic and general precisely because the individuality of a work was moulded by the contents which it expressed" (Models 4). This is a classical statement of biologically-based aesthetic organicism, minus any comment. In NCM Dahlhaus suggests that the idea of "organic development" was established prior to Marx's time: "We stand little chance of determining when the notion of 'organic development' entered our awareness of musical form: in music theory it happened sometime between Heinrich Christoph Koch and Adolf Bernhard Marx..." (55). Very clearly, Dahlhaus was describing concepts which Marx had expressed in organic terms but which are omitted in this account.

I have reserved a final passage on organicism by Dahlhaus to illustrate this concern most succinctly. Located in *Analysis and Value Judgment*, it is the only instance I found in which Dahlhaus makes reference to biology:

> It is a *law of biology* (inviting transfer to art) that differentiation and integration--manifold distinction of the parts of a whole and their closer functional cohesion--are two aspects of the same development which engage and complement each other. Whether this law operates in aesthetics as empirical rule or as postulate, and whether its historical scope is unlimited or restricted, has not been settled. Without aesthetic and historic reflection, praise of growing differentiation and stricter integration is, in any case, hardly valid. It would be both idle and easy to enumerate richly differentiated musical works which show a low degree of integration: the series would extend from Gregorian melodies governed by the principle of *varietas*, non-repetition, to the 'obligatory recitative' in Schönberg's

> *Orchestra Pieces* op. 16. An aesthetic law analogous to the biological law is out of the question.
>
> But even as an aesthetic postulate, the principle of conciliating differentiation and integration is not always defensible... [Dahlhaus cites gallant style with exchangeable sections, Schönberg's and Webern's early atonal works.] Apparently the ***biological analogy*** fails in certain periods. The spontaneous suspicion arises that the postulate of the complementation of differentiation and integration--***like other aesthetic conceptions based on an organic model***--hides a classicistic tendency which leads to injustice toward stylistically archaic or mannered works.... [my emphasis] (41, 42)

Only once does Dahlhaus use the term "organic model," but it is used to include what he calls the "law of biology...that differentiation and integration...are two aspects of the same development." The uncertainty indicated in the second sentence of this "law" as "empirical rule" or "postulate" leaves no room for doubt in the last sentence of the paragraph": "An aesthetic law analogous to the biological law is out of the question." Some expansion on this statement would be welcome. Dahlhaus grounds the organic principle in classical instrumental music, thus robbing it of any transhistorical validity. This limitation is not always maintained, however.

Dahlhaus's emphasis upon the "aesthetic and historic reflection" accompanying "praise of growing differentiation and stricter integration" suggests a distance between the tenor and vehicle that he would like to maintain. Nonetheless, he writes:

> Although integration is thus not a postulate of unrestricted and historically invariable validity and scope, one can hardly deny that the drive toward ever stricter and comprehensive integration belongs to the tendencies which have determined the course of music history, at least in Europe, if not without interruptions and relapses.... (AVJ 42)

If "ever stricter and comprehensive integration" is derived from an organic model as indicated above, and if this drive to organicism is a tendency that has "determined the course of music history, at least in Europe, if not without interruptions and relapses...," then this is an historically significant postulate that calls for serious engagement, one that Dahlhaus skirts on most occasions.

Dahlhaus acknowledges the importance of the organic model in aesthetics and analysis, albeit rarely; reasons for this hesitancy are not difficult to identify, if only speculatively. His clearest articulation of scepticism can be seen in a passage quoted earlier regarding the metaphor of biological "development" of musical cells: "...it becomes questionable if it is made the basis for the metaphysical conclusion that an intervallic configuration is a `cell', from which growth proceeds according to a musical law of nature which a composer must obey, rather than make the law himself" (*Beethoven*, 92). There can be no determinism or necessity in musical creativity based on images of biological or organic growth in Dahlhaus's value system.

Dahlhaus does not investigate this concept any further, assuming it to be a contradiction to artistic freedom. By contrast, Coleridge and A. W. Schlegel propose their doctrine of organic unity with the freedom of the poet--especially Shakespeare--at the centre. To them, to be determined was to operate "mechanically," to assemble by association or cause and effect. In his article, "Organic Unity: Leibniz to Coleridge," James Benziger writes, "In the earlier Berlin *Lectures*...1884, [A. W.] Schlegel develops his

entire doctrine of organic unity from the consideration of precisely this point, of how an artist can create characters who do not behave as mere puppets" (39). He continues:

> Both Schlegel and Coleridge were for saving the concept of human freedom at all costs. They asserted the poet's right to create freely, and organically, and individualistically, rather than by mechanically following certain generally accepted critical laws....In thus upholding the sanctity of human freedom Schlegel and Coleridge were--to phrase the matter in current terms--upholding the rights of the individual against the authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies which they perceived in neoclassical criticism and in the eighteenth-century science of psychology. (40)

If Benziger concluded that Coleridge and Schlegel understood organicism as a means of affirming artistic freedom in the tradition of Kant's organicism, and my reading of them confirms this, Arthur Lovejoy puts a very different face on organicism in pursuing the results of Kant's emphasis upon the primacy of the whole. He quotes from Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, §65: "In such a product of nature, every part not only exists *by means of* the other parts, but is thought as existing *for the sake of* the others and the whole--that is as an (organic) instrument." Lovejoy reaches different conclusions:

> Kant was talking about a natural organism--a tree; but, as is well known, the conception was speedily carried over into the provinces of metaphysics, of morals and, especially, of politics. The 'Idea of the Whole' came increasingly to mean, in its practical application, the idea of the political State....But the general result of the repetition of this conception...was the conditioning of the mind of individuals to think of themselves (to a degree perhaps unprecedented in history) as *mere* members of *das Ganze*, as 'tools or organs' of the national State....Without a long prior conditioning, then, to this idea, among others, the totalitarian ideology would not, I suggest, have the potency that it has, either in Germany or Italy. (273)

If nothing else, what these contradictory receptions of German organicism reveal is the importance of interpretation in extracting meaning from historical writings. Lovejoy was writing in 1941, at the time of the enormous threat by Nazism to the free world. Benziger's article stems from the American Midwest of 1951. Might there be any relation between Dahlhaus's milieu in the West Berlin of the 1960s to 1980s and his aversion to organicism?

What is very clear from Dahlhaus's writing is a consistent polemic against musical writings which gloss the artistic individuality of a work in search of some social or economic meaning which is the work's real essence. This opposition to a naive Marxism runs through his writings as an ongoing theme, if often positioned in the background. The reduction of art works to "false consciousness," an ideology of a privileged elite, may contain some truth, but for sociologists of music, "A half truth is loudly proclaiming to be the whole truth" (*Schoenberg and the New Music* [hereafter SNM] 241). Dahlhaus observes:

> The drabness of the sociological claims, which one can repeat, but which one can hardly expand upon and develop in analyses of individual works, stand in disconcerting and shameful contrast to the formal wealth that is uncovered by aesthetic contemplation. (SNM 214)

In *The Idea of Absolute Music*, Dahlhaus records a Marxist response to "absolute music": "Hanns Eisler, who made a serious attempt to apply Marxism to music and music esthetics, described the concept of absolute music as a figment of the 'bourgeois period'...(IAM 2). In his *Foundations of Music History*, Dahlhaus offers these "historiographical reflections"

specifically *not* as "an ideological critique in the respective traditions of Hegel and Marx" (1). James Hepokoski sums up Dahlhaus's anti-Marxist stance:

> The brunt of his objections to Marxist approaches to music is that they regarded artworks not as aesthetic objects but as messages to be decoded in the search for the real, non-musical content, a concealed meaning generally implicated in unsavory social power relations. (228)

If Dahlhaus's views about Marxism are not obscure, how is this fact related to organicism? I think it is the case that a biological model of composition threatened Dahlhaus's commitment to the musical work as an individual entity of essentially aesthetic value premised on the freedom of the artist. Hepokoski confirms the importance of artistic autonomy to Dahlhaus: "The essence--and for some the sticking-point--of the Dahlhaus Project comes to seem [seems to be?] its unnecessarily rigid affirmation of aesthetic autonomy and the concreteness of the artwork" (236). Rather than foregrounding organicism as a musical paradigm in both history and analysis such as many Anglo-American musicologists have done, Dahlhaus emphasized aspects of musical imagery that heighten intelligibility: logic, discourse, text, drama. While Dahlhaus held to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as the timeframe in which a definite aesthetic shift in sensibilities occurred, his lack of consistency in identifying the nature of the changes could reflect the lack of clarity in the historical landscape itself. Or it could indicate Dahlhaus's own preference when interpretation is not without controversy. If Dahlhaus was uneasy with organic tendencies, Paul de Man shared this reaction. His response took the form of an ongoing confrontation with them.

## PART II: NEW HORIZONS

Nothing...more clearly divides us from the Modernists than our changed conception of the potentiality of any Master-trope; particularly the Organic.

Paul Douglass

Metaphor is defined, poetically, as the nostalgia for Being (seen in the guise of objective Nature) and as such is in a never-ending conflict with the way language [ex-ists], i.e., is without *origin*, has no being....

Juliet Flower MacCannell

# CHAPTER FIVE

## *ORGANICISM AND PAUL DE MAN*

> De Man's stalwart attack upon symbol in the name of allegory is a climactic moment in the theoretical turnaround against the long and impressive development of organic poetics from the late eighteenth century through the New Criticism.
>
> Murray Krieger[1]

In Chapter Three, it was seen that Kliewer and Hutchings celebrated organicism as a means to explore the wonders of the high art tradition in Western music. By contrast, Allen put the organicist enterprise into serious question as it was expressed in the context of history. In Chapter Four, Dahlhaus problematized organicism, primarily as in his view a threat to the composer's freedom. However, he seemed to have difficulty acknowledging its role with any degree of consistency, even as a time-honoured historical construct, preferring textual depictions of music which evoked intelligibility and reason. He raised the issue of metaphor as an integral part of musical understanding, referring to the practice of hypostatization and to the introduction of metaphysics into musical assumptions, but the thinness of his arguments betrayed someone ill at ease with the intricacies of the functions of language vis-a-vis music. It is in this area of rhetorical theory that de Man's engagement

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[1] *Allegory, Myth and Symbol*, 13.

with organicism demonstrates richer potential for critique, replacing Dahlhaus's opaqueness and sometimes errors with clarity and precision.

Other theorists introduced in Chapter Two of this study, M. H. Abrams (in his book, *The Mirror and the Lamp*, 1953), and Max Black, (in his article, "Metaphor," 1954-55), spearheaded studies on the importance of metaphor. They could neither foresee nor endorse the more radical and exclusive attention to language which ensued under the formulations of poststructuralism and deconstruction. This chapter marks both a continuity with Abrams's initial attention to metaphors as powerful organizing paradigms in literary history and also a break with the humanism Abrams represents. Dahlhaus, while outside the tradition of literary theory, functions somewhat as a transitional figure between Abrams's historical treatment framed in metaphorical paradigms and de Man's more radical deconstructionist approach. Dahlhaus's sympathies remain within the humanist tradition, having no affinity for a decentred subjectivity. De Man builds on the work of Abrams and Black, relying particularly upon Abrams's historical accounts. De Man's acute attention to rhetoric, by which he means figurative language, has been a primary source for his unique contribution to literary theory.

It will be seen that a confluence of de Man's concerns with the present study's questions surrounding organicism is the most convincing reason for selecting this particular theoretical treatment for investigation. This chapter falls into three sections. In the first, I will direct attention to some recurring issues in de Man's oeuvre--some words, themes, ideas which surface with a degree of regularity in his essays. I will also make a point of

connecting de Man's themes to the larger concerns of the dissertation, in particular their relevance to Dahlhaus. The second and third sections will leave this general engagement for more in-depth explorations of two of de Man's articles, "Form and Intent in the American New Criticism," and "The Rhetoric of Temporality," both collected in *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*. I will then return briefly to Dahlhaus and some unresolved issues which benefit from this investigation of de Man.

## SOME RECURRING EXPRESSIONS IN DE MAN'S WRITINGS

Engagement with the organic metaphor is a recurring theme in de Man's writings. In his study, *Paul de Man: Deconstruction and the Critique of Aesthetic Ideology*, Christopher Norris underscores the importance of this theme. He identifies two main theses which he claims de Man elaborated over almost thirty years of critical writing. The second relates to reading with attention to "ironic disparities between meaning and intent."

> The first has to do with the delusory character of any such appeal to *organic* or *naturalizing* metaphors while dealing with questions of poetry, language, or representation. This is the source of the potent 'aesthetic ideology' whose origins...and whose effects...de Man will set out to deconstruct with increasing emphasis and care. [emphasis in original] (xii)

A particularly focussed example of this is found in "Form and Intent in the American New Criticism," where De Man zeroes in on the "naturalizing" operations which an appeal to the organic trope performs in language. The following passage illustrates the link of interest in organicism between the New Criticism and Coleridge as de Man saw it:

> On the one hand, we blame American criticism for considering literary texts as if they were natural objects but, on the other hand, we praise it for possessing a sense of formal unity that belongs precisely to a living and natural organism. Is not this sense of the unity of forms being supported by the large metaphor of the analogy between language and a living organism, a metaphor that shapes a great deal of nineteenth-century poetry and thought? One could even find historical confirmation of this filiation in the line that links, especially by way of I. A. Richards and Whitehead, the structural formalism of the New Critics to the 'organic' imagination so dear to Coleridge. ("Form and Intent" 27)[2]

While Christopher Norris, who is intimately acquainted with the work of Paul de Man on a wide scale, feels confident in identifying two main theses which propel de Man's critical project, my experience of reading his essays points to the difficulty of summarizing material that is complex, modulates its stance subtly over a period of years, and resists the idea of unity. In the Preface to *The Rhetoric of Romanticism*, 1984, de Man comments on the lack of coalescence of his essays: "If some secret principle of summation is at work here, I do not feel qualified to articulate it..." (viii). This statement could, however, be a kind of denial of what is evident to others, an attempt on de Man's part to be consistent in his refusal of unity, an ironic effort from someone who, by his own account, feels no obligation for coherence.

What I did locate were recurring words or issues, some consistency of tendencies, and above all, a much-rehearsed polemic against any manoeuvre that granted language in any guise--be it philosophy, science or "literature" itself--the status of a "given." Neither

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[2]Unless otherwise stated, quotations from this section will be drawn from "Form and Intent," hereafter, FI.

object "out there" nor concept "in here" yields unmediated access. Language "always already" intervenes and its unreliability can be counted on. It is this lack of awareness of the operations of language--unquestioned assumptions of its reliability and immediacy--that causes musicologists to err.

Certainly to map out some grand scheme or methodology derived from de Man's articles would deeply violate all that he represented. How then does one illustrate these ideas without drawing the nodes into a pattern which suggests a system, or, even more challenging, without falling into all of the ideological traps de Man critiques? The point de Man makes is that complete avoidance of inconsistency is impossible, for one's insights are uncannily linked to blindness. The source of one's vision, the sun, reveals as its very brightness blinds.

Without attempting to sketch some broad representation of de Man's literary project as a prologue to the more detailed encounter to follow in examining specific articles, I will narrate my encounter with de Man around the problems of reading, methodology, primary/secondary sources, and the decoding of difficult texts. The first assumption was that I could read *and* understood what I read. But the business of "reading" is precisely what de Man problematizes. He sees the "act of reading as an endless process in which truth and falsehood are inextricably intertwined" (Foreword BI, ix). Although competence in de Man's complete oeuvre is desirable, it would not in itself guarantee a better understanding because no "literary text can be reduced to a finite meaning or set of meanings" (Foreword BI, ix). Besides, de Man is profoundly suspicious

of notions of mastery or any grand schemes that suggest transcendence or the escapability of language's innate temporality or contingency.

Perhaps clarifying the methodology with which I approach his texts would ensure greater verifiability or reproducibility in the result. But no, this imitates the procedures of science with their clear dichotomy between given objects, *data*, and rigorous *modus operandi*. Such an approach suggests that texts are a raw resource, "nature," so to speak, and in a kind of just Baconian marriage between mind and matter, they can be made to yield their secrets. De Man queries the ground upon which the need for methodology arises. He asks, what is reading? Failure to grasp the nature of reading spawns the creation of new methodologies designed to gain direct access to meaning, as if direct access could ever be achieved.

In desperation one might call upon some "secondary" sources that have grappled with de Man's work, by way of further insight. What then is secondary discourse if not an admission that "primary" discourse is not in itself complete and self-revealing but rather depends upon another level of representation to mine what was trapped and obscured in its "natural" environment? Such an admission turned back on the "primary" source renders it too a form of representation, not the object itself. The model for the primary/secondary distinction is not science, but theology, in which the relation of sacred document and commentary migrated and became constitutive in philosophy, history, and, more fundamentally, in modern universities generally (Godzich, Introduction BI, xvii).

The difficulty of de Man's own language, like that of some poetry, seems to call for decoding, interpretation, or some other level of language as if it could bring one closer to the "real" meaning. The following sentence, for example, requires not just acquaintance with Hegel, Kant, and Proust, but careful tracking of the intricate weaving of a dense, logical fabric:

> This symbol that is not symbolic is much like the theory of the aesthetic which, in Hegel, is no longer aesthetic, like the subject which has to say "I" but can never say it, the sign which can only survive as a symbol, a consciousness (or subconsciousness) which has to become like the machine of mechanical memory, a representation which is in fact merely an inscription or a system of notation. ("Sign and Symbol in Hegel's *Aesthetics*," *Aesthetic Ideology*, 103)

Although an "aesthetic" representation such as a poem may differ markedly in genre from de Man's burdened words, the same kind of thinking which seeks to explain them prevails. The language needs to be "translated," decoded, the signifiers declared. The "truth" then would be more at home in this less obfuscating, alternative expression, and meaning and its sign would have supposedly joined in more perfect resonance. But this is to overlook the inevitable heterogeneity of readings, be they of poems or heavy philosophical debates.

If there is any motif to be found running throughout the above discussion of reading, methodologies, primary and secondary discourses, and the decoding of difficult texts, it is attention to the ontological gulf separating words, language, or representation and the worlds of natural objects or mental concepts. De Man gives the label, "ideology," to the belief that one can somehow escape "representation" and enter the realm of truth or reality unmediated by language. De Man describes this ideology of the symbol:

> The commanding metaphor that organizes this entire system is that of interiorization, the understanding of aesthetic beauty as the external manifestation of an ideal content which is itself an interiorized experience, the recollected emotion of a bygone perception. ("Sign and Symbol in Hegel's *Aesthetics*," 100)

The "aesthetic" is particularly vulnerable to such ideological lapses in the claim to unite materiality and mind in artistic products with a figurality that seduces through its simulacrum of absolute presence.

## "FORM AND INTENT IN THE AMERICAN NEW CRITICISM"

This article offers an early and, in some sense, a simpler unfolding of concepts to which de Man responds with ongoing dialogue.[3] It seems to be the case that later essays are reactions to earlier ones, "Form and Intent" being a response to and expansion on "The Dead End of Formalist Criticism," 1956 (*Blindness and Insight*, 229-45, hereafter DE). The strongest reason for selecting this article is its subject, New Criticism, which has a parallel in musical analysis,

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[3]"Form and Intent in the American New Criticism," was first published as "New Criticism et nouvelle critique" in *Preuves* 188, October 1966. It was later translated and revised by de Man for inclusion as chapter II in *Blindness and Insight*, the first edition of which was published in 1971. The second edition of 1983, which included two more articles plus an Introduction by Wlad Godzich, is my source of reference. Chapter II remains unaltered from its 1971 form (de Man, Foreword to Revised, Second Edition, xi).

whose emphasis on a "close reading" of scores in, for example, Schenkerian and Schoenbergian analysis, also exhibit attention to detail and formal structures.

De Man first encountered New Criticism upon his arrival in the United States in the early fifties. At least two results flowed from this encounter. First, his admiration for the New Critics' practice of "close reading" influenced his own technique. De Man writes, "It is true that American textual interpretation and `close reading' have perfected techniques that allow for considerable refinement in catching the details and nuances of literary expression" (FI 27). By close reading de Man practised what is sometimes described as a reading "against the grain," that is, a reading which refuses the assumptions of totality or of a controlling meaning for all the parts. Rather it probes for resistances to unity, for rhetorical figures that might undo an argument. But also striking in the New Criticism was its lack of concern with philosophical issues. Having been steeped in the writings of Heidegger, Sartre, and Blanchot for whom philosophical matters were integral to literary criticism, de Man found an almost unchallenged field for investigation in his adopted country (Norris 39-40). His attention to the metaphysical assumptions so neglected by the New Critics was the second result of this encounter and became a major focus of his work.

In this essay, de Man focuses on a web of interconnected themes exemplified in the work of the American New Critics: the notion of textual autonomy or reification of form and its connection to the role of intentionality in

critical reading; the text's comparison to nature via the organic metaphor; the circularity of the interpretive process. Before exploring de Man's treatment of this topic, I will offer a brief sketch of New Criticism.

The American New Criticism seems to have derived its name retrospectively from a book of that title by John Crowe Ransom, *The New Criticism*, 1941.[4] The heyday of the American New Critics encompassed the decades of the 1930s through 60s. Their influence has continued up to the present, however, with a more self-conscious employment of their methods of close reading. New Criticism is marked not so much by a well-defined theoretical system as by methodologies that give primacy of place to a rigorous exegesis, with close attention to those distinctive poetic devices that (supposedly) mark poetry off from non-poetry, especially paradox, ambiguity, and metaphor. Associated with the New Criticism were I. A. Richards, T. S. Eliot, John Crowe Ransom, Cleanth Brooks, W. K. Wimsatt, Allen Tate, Monroe Beardsley, and R. P. Blackmur, to name some of its more prominent exponents. De Man includes William Empson, a student of I. A. Richards, within

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[4]For a fuller discussion of New Criticism, see Terry Eagleton's chapter, "The Rise of English," in his *Literary History*, 1983, and David Richter's elaboration of "The New Criticism," 726-30, in the anthology he edited, *The Critical Tradition*, 1989. Two outstanding examples of New Critical writings include *Understanding Poetry* by Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, first published in 1938 with a fourth edition issued in 1976; and *The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry*, 1954, by W. K. Wimsatt, with two essays written in collaboration with Munroe Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy," and "The Affective Fallacy."

this grouping, but identifies his work as contributing to the dissolution of certain New Critical premises.

In "The Dead End of Formalist Criticism," de Man identifies American New Criticism as a trend arising around 1935 which, while not a school or homogeneous group, "can generally be subsumed under the denomination of 'formalist' criticism" (230). De Man continues:

> This movement has come to wield considerable influence, in journals and in books, and especially in university teaching; to such an extent that one could legitimately speak of a certain formalist orthodoxy. In some cases, an entire generation has been trained in this approach to literature without awareness of any other. (DE 230)

According to New Critical understandings, the poem (and it was more likely a poem than a novel) was cut off, made into a self-contained natural object, one which nonetheless was a clear window to its referents, corresponding to or including an outside reality. Specific targets of the New Criticism were the old historicism that probed a work's context and genesis, and "Croce idealism" that emphasized the author's intentions.

Dahlhaus too argued for an aesthetic interpretation of art works which involved their isolation from any social, economic, or political context, without, however, denying the relevance of such influences. The Marxist sociologists with whom he disagreed viewed the musical work as a social document, evidence of bourgeois elitism. By contrast Dahlhaus insisted on the inadequacies of a sociological approach, preferring the richness of a work which could be "uncovered by aesthetic contemplation" (Dahlhaus 1988, 241). As an example of this impoverished social analyses, Dahlhaus considers a Bach fugue: "If one

Bach fugue is a tonal reflection of the principle of manufacture, then so is another. The individuality of the entities, which constitutes their very essence, is not within the reach of social decoding, at least at present" (Dahlhaus 1988, 236). Dahlhaus's approach to analysis and aesthetics does not diverge significantly from New Criticism of which he generally wrote favourably ("Models" 9). However, in his *Esthetics of Music*, Dahlhaus expresses some reservation about the New Critics' disregard for historical context (91).

In a similar vein, De Man launches his paper expressing regret that American criticism never aspired to the balance between historical interest and attention to formal properties which characterized the best of European works (FI 20). Challenges to this confinement of the American New Criticism within its narrow boundaries of aesthetic autonomy came from two sources: the application of French structuralism to literature, and renewed interest in "sociological, political, and psychological considerations" (21). De Man sees these new challenges as an occasion to re-examine "the assumptions on which the position of autonomy was founded," assumptions which may never have been well understood or even derived from literary models.

De Man is moving toward a discussion of Wimsatt and Beardsley's "intentional fallacy" of 1942, but he first pauses over some issues raised by the semanticist, Stephen Ullmann, and the literary critic, Erich Auerbach, by way of preparation. Both writers posit a continuity between the sensory appearance ("the surface dimensions of language"--for example, sound, meter, imagery) and the subjective, inner experiences of the author that determine the articulation of this surface. De Man objects that there exists a "radical

discontinuity that no dialectic is able to bridge": the depth of meaning of the author's experience and the surface of the sensory text (22-23).

It may be useful at this point to recall de Man's earlier essay on formalist criticism, DE, which addresses the same problem, in this instance as expressed in the criticism of I. A. Richards. When Richards "postulates a perfect continuity between the sign and the thing signified" (DE 232), de Man complicates this assumption by outlining the steps involved from reading a word to constructing "a whole universe in order to understand it" (233). Richards's unproblematized conviction that form can function as an imitation of a mental experience in a literary work lays a heavy burden on language. De Man describes this confusion: "Language is no longer a mediation between two subjectivities but between a being and a non-being" (DE 232). It is this claimed ability of the aesthetic to fuse the sensible and the intelligible that de Man targets relentlessly throughout his essays.

There is one last preparatory stop along the way before de Man's encounter with "intent." It is necessary to clarify the distinction between a "natural" object and an "intentional" object. De Man selects "a stone" to illustrate the first category, and a "chair" for the second. He understands the two to represent entirely different "species of entities." The "meaning" of "stone," minus any complications from the imagination, can refer to the totality of its sensory appearances. This natural object, then is of that order of which the following can be said: "Certain entities exist the full meaning of which can be said to be equal to the totality of their sensory appearances" (23). On the other hand, an object like a chair requires a different explanation. Any description of a chair must include its function,

its design to be sat upon. "The potential act of sitting down is a constitutive part of the object. If it were absent, the object could not be conceived in its totality" (24). By contrast, no constitutive act is part of the description of a natural object.

It is here that de Man challenges Ullmann, and by implication, Auerbach and Richards, and anticipates the problem of the "intentional fallacy," a central plank of New Criticism:

> By asserting *a priori*, as in Ullmann's text, that, in literary language, the meaning is equal to the totality of the sensory appearances, one postulates in fact that the language of literature is of the same order, ontologically speaking, as a natural object. The intentional factor has been bypassed. (24)

De Man highlights the New Critics' attention to "intentionality" as a rare theoretical moment, albeit a negative one. The "intentional fallacy" as articulated by Wimsatt and Beardsley delimited the horizon of literary criticism as it asserted "the autonomy and the unity of the poetic consciousness" (24). It served as a defence against encroachments from "outside" the text by such factors as history or psychology which might "oversimplify the complex relationship between theme and style" (24).

In his book, *The Verbal Icon*, Wimsatt acknowledges that a poem as a "thing" suspended between a poet and an audience is an "abstraction." In fact, "The poem is an act" (Quoted in FI 24).[5] As noted in the last chapter, Wimsatt goes on to propose that it is

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[5]This discussion takes place in *The Verbal Icon* in Chapter I, xvii.

necessary to hypostatize the poem in order to "lay hold of the poetic act" (24). The act becomes the thing. De Man sums up this operation:

> If such a hypostasis, which changes the literary act into a literary object by the suppression of its intentional character, is not only possible but necessary in order to allow for a critical description, then we have not left the world in which the status of literary language is similar to that of a natural object. (25)

De Man pursues the debate by drawing attention to the physical model upon which such a misunderstanding of the nature of intentionality rests. Intent is seen incorrectly as transfer of mental content from the poet's to the reader's mind, "somewhat as one would pour wine from a jar into a glass" (25). It is de Man's insistence that intention is neither physical nor psychological in nature, but structural. He writes:

> The structural intentionality determines the relationship between the components of the resulting objects in all its parts, but the relationship of the particular state of mind of the person engaged in the act of structurization to the structured object is altogether contingent. (25)

While admitting the work of literature to be more complex than is the case with a chair, de Man proposes that the intentionality of the act assists in defining a poem's unity and does not in any way pose a threat to the poetic entity. The "intentionality" of which de Man writes is not to be confused with the commonsensical understanding of "intention" which focuses attention upon the creator of a work, as opposed to a reader, assuming that the "intentions" can be identified from an examination of the work.

After nuancing Northrop Frye's account of intention and poetry, de Man observes: "Northrop Frye falls into exactly the same error as Wimsatt and reifies the literary entity

into a natural object" (26). De Man concludes that the inadequacies of North American formalism are in part "due to its lack of awareness of the intentional structure of literary form" (27).

The next three pages of FI constitute the climax of the article. The tension tightens as de Man acknowledges a seeming contradiction: the New Criticism's exclusion of intentionality has cost it considerable insight; New Criticism's hypostatization of texts has created an ontological dilemma; but the very assumption of formal unity derived from the above errors has yielded remarkable literary interpretations. De Man asks, "Is not this sense of the unity of forms being supported by the large metaphor of the analogy between language and a living organism, a metaphor that shapes a great deal of nineteenth-century poetry and thought?...The introduction of the principle of intentionality would imperil the organic analogy and lead to a loss of the sense of form" (27-28).

De Man calls upon Coleridge, a strong nineteenth-century advocate of organicism, whose image of the poem as plant yet allowed for the poet's design or intention to guide the creative process. Both Abrams and Georges Poulet in their studies of Coleridge underscore his insistence upon the poets' imposition of their own will upon their work. De Man observes: "That is to say that the structural power of the poetic imagination is not founded on an analogy with nature, but that it is intentional" (28). This "ambivalence" which appears in the New Critical disciples of Coleridge reveals a "discrepancy between their theoretical assumptions and their practical results" (28). In practice, the minute close readings of American criticism have produced not a unitary meaning but a plurality of

meanings. "It pushes the interpretative process so far that the analogy between the organic world and the language of poetry finally explodes" (28).

What was the source then of this "unity?" De Man locates it in the reader's act of interpreting the text not in the text itself. Here is his explanation for what happened in New Criticism: "Because such patient and delicate attention was paid to the reading of forms, the critics pragmatically entered into the hermeneutic circle of interpretation, mistaking it for the organic circularity of natural processes" (29). De Man offers Heidegger's theory of the hermeneutic circle as an alternative to the organic-based analogy of the text and a natural object. He makes two points. The first relates to the epistemological nature of interpretation. Unlike the workings of scientific laws, where the focus is on perhaps predictability or measurement and no claim to understanding is made, in the interpretive act, "relationships *that were already there* are being disclosed, not only in themselves (like the events of nature) but as they exist *for us*" (29). An awareness of temporality is important to this practice: the explicit interpretation or commentary always lags temporally behind the implicit knowledge of the text.

The second point de Man derives from Heidegger's hermeneutics is the idea of circularity or totality. Not unlike the New Criticism, a totality is assumed, but in this instance, consciously posited to further the act of interpretation which is itself understood as a never-ending dialectic of questioning between work and interpreter. The temporal factor prevents any completion or real sense of totality from ever occurring. De Man warns, "Understanding can be called complete only when it becomes aware of its own

temporal predicament and realizes that the horizon within which the totalization can take place is time itself" (32).

Several themes which are developed in de Man's later writings can already be seen in FI. One of the most significant, which has become identified with de Man himself and some of his colleagues at Yale (J. Hillis Miller and Geoffrey Hartman), is the recurring pattern of discrepancy between a general conception or methodology and its interpretive results. This was seen in the work of the New Critics, whose adherence to an absolute unity based on its metaphoric affiliation with a natural organicism, was highly problematic both ontologically and because of its disavowal of intention. In New Criticism, the assumption which shed light was at the same time a source of blindness. This is referred to as de Man's principle of Blindness and Insight, the title given to the book in which this article appears. Thus American criticism was both supported and undermined by its assumptions of organic unity. It ultimately fell apart under the strain of detailed probing derived from the premises which guided it.

The closing paragraph of this article raises the "allegorical" dimension, "which appears in the work of all genuine writers and constitutes the real depth of literary insight" and which is found in the essays of Walter Benjamin (35). According to de Man, Benjamin was well acquainted with the allegorical dimension, defining it as a void "'that signifies precisely the non-being of what it represents'" (35). These ideas are taken up by de Man with some regularity and can be seen developed in the essays to follow. De Man's attention to the temporal and allegorical elements in interpretation emphasized in FI takes

on a greater importance in what Jonathan Culler has described as the most photocopied article in history, "The Rhetoric of Temporality."

"THE RHETORIC OF TEMPORALITY"

"The Rhetoric of Temporality" is frequently referred to as a watershed text in de Man's oeuvre.[6] In his *Serenity in Crisis: A Preface to Paul de Man*, Ortwin de Graef describes it as "pivotal" (xi). Derrida relates a coming to the "crossroads of what Paul de Man calls allegory and irony" with a "vitally necessary rereading of 'The Rhetoric of Temporality'" (Derrida, "Psyche: Inventions of the Other" in Waters and Godzich, 37). Juliet Flower MacCannell highlights the importance of the essay in stronger terms:

> De Man's concern with countering the spatial organicism of the New Critics led him into their authors of choice--Coleridge primarily--and to what is perhaps the most comprehensive of all his writing (in the sense that the reversal and reinscription is contained within the same text): "The Rhetoric of Temporality: Irony and Allegory" ...All students of literary history would be well-advised to read this essay, as would all critics of Paul de Man. (MacCannell 72)

ROT is a lengthy article divided into two almost equal parts: 1. Allegory and Symbol (187), and 2. Irony (208). Insofar as irony is more indirectly related to organicism, primarily through its play in language and split being, I shall focus exclusively on "Allegory and Symbol." De Man introduces his topic by noting the renewed interest in rhetorical

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[6]First published in 1969, it is included in the *Blindness and Insight* collection. Hereafter ROT

figures after their fall into disrepute during the nineteenth century. The constructed nature of rhetorics was incompatible with the emphasis upon the unconscious creativity of genius. Such French critics as Roland Barthes, Gérard Genette, and Michel Foucault have employed rhetorical terms in conjunction with their interest in structural linguistics. De Man refers also to Walter Benjamin's rediscovery of the "allegorical and emblematic style" in his 1928 study which was translated into English as *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 1964.

De Man cites the need for "historical clarification" in any renewed use of intentional rhetoric in order to establish the changes which such terms as mimesis, metaphor, allegory, or irony have undergone in valuation and structure over the last 200 years. A significant example of such changes is the ascendency of "symbol" in its tendency "to supplant other denominations for figural language, including that of 'allegory'" (188).

De Man's treatment of allegory and symbol in the following pages, 188-91, reads like an ellipsis of Gadamer's account of the same topic under his heading, "The Limits of *Erlebniskunst*[7] and the Rehabilitation of Allegory," 70-81 in *Truth and Method*. While de Man follows Gadamer in his very condensed version of the historical trajectory of the allegory-symbol pair, he does not take the time here to explore to the same extent as Gadamer what he describes as the outstanding feature of symbol, its fusion of "the image

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[7]Gadamer attributes two ambiguous meanings to this word as it evolved during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The first understands art as coming *from* experience, and the second is used for art "that is intended *to be* aesthetically experienced" (Gadamer 70).

that rises up before the senses and the supersensory totality that the image suggests" (189). He defers fuller treatment to the section on Coleridge (191-99).

Both writers underscore the complexity and contradictions involved in the climate of the debate between symbol and allegory. There is agreement between them that in the mid and late nineteenth century, "The supremacy of the symbol, conceived as an expression of unity between the representative and the semantic function of language, becomes a commonplace that underlies literary taste, literary criticism, and literary history" (de Man 189).

The demise of allegory in conjunction with the rise of the symbol during the period of Goethe, Schiller, Schelling, the Schlegels, Coleridge, and Rousseau witnessed the shift from the dry rationalism of the Enlightenment to an organic aesthetics in which the symbol "can be interpreted inexhaustibly because it is indeterminate" (Gadamer 74-75). De Man locates in this "appeal to the infinity of a totality"..."the main attraction of the symbol" (188).

Gadamer's fuller treatment of symbol and allegory merits some reflection. He begins by observing the similarities between allegory and symbol. In addition to their common structure, both represent one thing by means of another, and "both find their chief application in the religious sphere" (Gadamer 73). Allegory and symbol arise from the common need to refer "to the incommensurability of the suprasensory being of God with our minds, which are accustomed to the world of the senses" (Gadamer 73). The leap from the senses to the divine always starts with the senses. Gadamer points to this link

with all religious experience as the convergence of allegory and symbolic: "the inseparability of visible appearance and invisible significance" (74).

The antinomies of allegory and symbol as described by Gadamer and endorsed in de Man's essay are summarized in the following table:

| ALLEGORY | SYMBOL |
|---|---|
| a rhetorical figure which always belongs to the sphere of logos | not limited to rhetoric or logos, its own physical sign has meaning (e.g., a landscape) |
| no metaphysical presumption | "presupposes a metaphysical [religious] connection between visible and invisible" (Gadamer 73) |
| always points to something beyond itself | achieves inward unity of idea and appearance in itself |
| more precise relation to meaning | indeterminate relation to meaning |
| non-art | art |
| loss of value with rise of genius | increase in value with rise of genius |
| depends on stable traditions and rational interpretation | product of genius,<br>depends on inspiration |
| new interest since Benjamin, Gadamer, de Man | given added status by Goethe, Schiller, Schelling, Solger, F. Schlegel, Rousseau, Coleridge |

One aspect which de Man does not bring into the debate but which is emphasized by Gadamer is the inherent tension between the world of the senses and the world of ideas upon which the religious symbol feeds. Unlike the aesthetic sphere, the religious context is not disturbed by the disproportion between "form and expression." Gadamer explains:

> The possibility of the instantaneous and total coincidence of the apparent with the infinite in a religious ceremony assumes that what fills the symbol with meaning is that the finite and infinite genuinely belong together. Thus the religious form of the symbol corresponds exactly to the original nature of 'symbolon,' the dividing of what is one and reuniting it again. (Gadamer 78)

The symbol can be seen then, as restoring the original connection between gods and humans.

Gadamer concludes his study of the history of symbol with this "factual inference:" "The fixed contrast between the two concepts--the symbol that has emerged 'organically,' and cold, rational allegory--becomes less compelling when we see its connection with the aesthetics of genius and of experience..." (Gadamer 80). A more thoughtful examination of the symbol-making imagination reveals a remarkable dependence upon a tradition not unrelated to myth and allegory. The antinomy of allegory and symbol becomes less absolute and more interdependent as revealed by a renewed interest in pre-romantic art genres like the baroque on the part of twentieth-century critics. Such an acknowledgement puts into question the whole concept of aesthetic consciousness.

De Man concludes his section on allegory and symbolism from the German tradition with the same questions Gadamer raised. Both query the nineteenth-century tendency to base aesthetics on the special symbolizing powers of the mind, no longer considered a solution to "the problem of metaphorical diction" (191). De Man quotes Gadamer: "'Is the symbolizing activity not actually still bound today by the survival of a mythological and allegorical tradition?" (de Man 191; Gadamer 81).

In his article, "The Dahlhaus Project and Its Extra-musicological Sources," James Hepokoski traces to Gadamer and his pupil Jauss, the principal sources for Dahlhaus's "empirical-hermeneutic-phenomenological" orientation (231). Hepokoski identifies specifically Gadamer's *Truth and Method* as "a pervasive, guiding force, a `starting point' throughout his mature work" in the mid-1970s. Dahlhaus's himself confirms this in FMH where he writes, "So as not to fall behind in this dispute, we should take as our starting point the historicism question in the context put forward by Hans-Georg Gadamer in *Wahrheit und Methode*" (FMH 58, Hepokoski 231). Dahlhaus obviously absorbed Gadamer's historical criticism, but for whatever reason, demonstrated less sympathy regarding the role of symbol and organicism in aesthetics.

Having established in this opening section on allegory and symbol, using German sources, the theoretical and historical framework of the essay, de Man investigates Coleridge, Rousseau, and to a lesser extent, Wordsworth and Blake. His aim is no less than a challenge to the conceptualization of romanticism as a subject-object tension built upon the assumed "predominance of the symbol" and its claims to fuse the sensible and intelligible. He asks whether this idea of the supremacy of the symbol derives from the texts of romanticism or from their critics.

De Man carefully documents the widespread acceptance by historians and critics of "this close unity between mind and nature as a fundamental characteristic of romantic diction" (199). He identifies this tendency in English, French, and American critics: "The supremacy of the symbol still functions as the basis of recent French and English studies of

the romantic and post-romantic eras, to such an extent that allegory is frequently considered an anachronism and dismissed as non-poetic" (190).

De Man cites four critics who challenge the privileging of the symbol: Ernst Curtius, Erich Auerbach, Walter Benjamin, and Gadamer. The presence of myth and tradition in symbol, as opposed to pure originary creative sources, suggests no legitimate claim to a priority of symbol over other figures. What kind of arguments or evidence does de Man offer for such claims? De Man divides his attention unevenly among Coleridge, Rousseau, Wordsworth, and Blake, with Coleridge and his critics receiving the most extensive treatment. He seems to dwell on the ideas associated with Coleridge in order to establish the issues succinctly, but then without solving any of the confusion he outlines, he moves on to the French scene and Rousseau where he insists that, because of a different historical trajectory, the problem of analogy can be seen "somewhat clearer there than in England" (199).

How does Coleridge depict symbol and allegory? In his critique, de Man targets what he claims is the too pervasive portrayal of Coleridge by critics "who take his dialectic of subject and object to be the authentic pattern of romantic imagery" (197). It is not difficult to locate assertions by Coleridge of an apparent priority of symbol over allegory. De Man recognizes Coleridge's claim for the symbol as "the product of the organic growth of form; in the world of the symbol, life and form are identical: 'such as the life is, such is the form'" (191). As synecdoche, the symbol constitutes the totality that it represents. Allegory, by contrast, is aligned with "mechanical" form, "an abstraction whose original

meaning is even more devoid of substance than its 'phantom proxy,' the allegorical representative" (191-92).

What de Man finds in a closer examination of Coleridge's explication of symbol and allegory is not the clear opposition proposed by literary critics and associated with the symbol, but rather, "ambiguity." The source of this ambiguity is seen in the use of the word, "translucence," whose meaning puts in doubt any clarity of an image seen through a medium which allows the passage of light, but not enough for complete lucidity. Here is the passage de Man quotes from Coleridge's *The Statesman's Manual*:

> The symbol is characterized by the translucence of the special in the individual, or of the general in the special, or of the universal in the general; above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal. (Quoted by de Man 192)

According to de Man, the final part of this passage describes allegory as "being *merely* a reflection" (192). The distinction between symbol and allegory, the one exhibiting "the organic coherence of the synecdoche" and the other "a pure decision of the mind," blurs in light of their common reference to a "transcendental source." This lack of congruence between object and subject evoked by the ambiguity of "translucence" is not, however, what has been pursued by later Anglo-American criticism, including William Wimsatt, M. H. Abrams, and Earl Wasserman. Each draws attention to the greater affinity of mind and nature that characterizes the poetry of Coleridge and Wordsworth as indicated both in the detailed descriptions of nature in conjunction with, paradoxically, a turn to inwardness, memory, reverie, and "deeper regions of subjectivity" (194).

What emerges is a curious contradiction. In the characteristic romantic meditations of landscape, in which thought makes explicit what was implicit in nature, the superiority of object over subject "that is implicit in an organic conception of language" is asserted. Yet this concentration of inner musing prompted by nature suggests an intersubjective relationship, one that could be construed as "a relationship of the subject toward itself" (196). The following passage from Wordsworth is offered both in Abrams and Wasserman and is given again by de Man to illustrate the "radical idealism" connected to the romantic poets:

> I was often unable to think of external things as having external existence, and I communed with all that I saw as something not apart from, but inherent in, my own immaterial nature. (Quoted in de Man 196)

One characteristic of Wordsworth's poetry that de Man observes with some care relates to the subject's borrowing of the stability of "time" from the outside world of nature. He does not develop the significance of this note here, but given the title of the essay, one can guess its importance. "A striking temporal paradox is evoked" in Wordsworth's depictions of mountains in *The Prelude*:

> ...these majestic floods--these shining cliffs
> The untransmuted shapes of many worlds,
> Cerulian ether's pure inhabitants,
> These forests unapproachable by death,
> That shall endure as long as man endures...; (197)

This attempt to bring into the self nature's eternity by means of a metaphorical borrowing can also be found in Coleridge and to a lesser extent is acknowledged in Abrams and Wasserman.

De Man ponders the alternatives: is romanticism a subjective idealism bordering on the solipsistic, or a nostalgic elevation of some version of naturalism? The claim by some critics for Coleridge as the great synthesizer of these polarities, de Man finds to be unconvincing (198). He wonders if indeed the object/subject tension based upon the predominance of the symbol is the fundamental issue. "Does the confusion originate with the critics, or does it reside in the romantic poets themselves?" (198). For an answer he turns to French literary history.

In consulting the criticism of French literature, as represented by Daniel Mornet and Herbert Dieckmann, de Man concludes in a sweeping statement that is valuable also for its summary:

> There is the same stress on the analogical unity of nature and consciousness, the same priority given to the symbol as the unit of language in which the subject-object synthesis can take place, the same tendency to transfer into nature attributes of consciousness and to unify it organically with respect to a center that acts, for natural objects, as the identity of the self functions for a consciousness. (199-200)

The same "ambivalence" of a faulty subject that must garner from the external world a sense of temporal stability lacking in itself is also present in French criticism.

De Man made the statement earlier that by detouring through French criticism the source of the problem of this priority of symbol could be more easily identified. The fact that Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse* has so consistently been the text from which the supremacy of symbolic language has been derived, makes the work of tracking the development of the symbol a more manageable project.

There is no doubt that the novel builds on a closeness between "inner states of the soul and the outward aspect of nature," but de Man insists that this is not the central theme of the work.[8] By way of proof he turns to Julie's garden, "the central emblem of the novel" to see what kind of subject/object relationship is depicted there. What kind of garden is this? External sources reveal Rousseau's interest in English gardens and their attempt to construct a "natural" appearance based upon "extreme artifice" (202). By Julie's own admission, "'Il est vrai,' Rousseau has Julie say, 'que la nature a tout fait [dans ce jardin] mais sous ma direction, et il n'y a rien là que je n'aie ordonné'" (202).[9] Outer nature is very self-consciously arranged by Julie.

Two internal references point to Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* and the medieval work, *Le Roman de la rose*, as possible sources of illumination for Rousseau's attitude to nature. The close parallels between Julie's garden and Deduit's love garden in the first section of Guillaume de Lorris' poem from *Le Roman* emphasize the control of nature by people (203). Other differences notwithstanding, it is in the "the use of allegorical diction rather than of the language of correspondences that the medieval and eighteenth-century sources" converge (203).

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[8]De Man cites the Meillerie episode in the fourth part of the novel in which the wild desert can be understood as a kind of reflection of St. Preux's inner state (200-201).

[9]"It is true, that nature has made everything [in this garden] but under my direction, and there is nothing there that I have not commanded." [my translation].

De Man calls upon recent studies of Defoe which highlight the puritanical, religious qualities to which Rousseau was responding.[10] It is this affiliation which led to the choice of "stylized emblems" that favoured allegorical over metaphorical uses of nature. Julie's garden and the Meillerie episode represent the tension between the puritanical and erotic, the allegorical and the symbolic. The conflict is resolved in a "renunciation" of immediate moments, and "this renunciation establishes the priority of an allegorical over a symbolic diction" (204). De Man regrets that this allegorical element has been overlooked in favour of a false interpretation of Rousseau as a "primitivist or naturalist" (204).

Significant implications flow from a recognition of allegory within the romantic tradition. De Man writes:

> For, if the dialectic between subject and object does not designate the main romantic experience, but only one passing moment in a dialectic, and a negative moment at that, since it represents a temptation that has to be overcome, then the entire historical and philosophical pattern changes a great deal. (204-205)

According to him, all European literature between 1760 and 1800 exhibits allegorizing qualities, including Blake and Wordsworth.[11] What the presence of allegory points to is the necessary temporal element--the absolute difference in being between the subject and nature, in which it seeks refuge against the ravages of time. "It remains necessary, if there

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[10]These studies are: G. A. Starr, *Defoe and Spiritual Autobiography* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965) and J. Paul Hunter, *The Reluctant Pilgrim: Defoe's Emblematic Method and Quest in Robinson Crusoe* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1966).

[11]On pages 205-206 de Man offers examples of allegory in Blake and Wordsworth using Abrams as a source.

is to be allegory, that the allegorical sign refer to another sign that precedes it" (207). The flow of time highlighted in allegory makes any convergence of sign and meaning an impossibility.

The relationship of identification exhibited by the symbol is contrasted with the relationship of distance expressed by allegory. Allegory "establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference." De Man concludes, "In so doing, it prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self, which is now fully, though painfully, recognized as a non-self" (207). De Man remarks on the failure of critics to heed the theological and philosophical sources of the poets as one reason for the perpetuation of the view of romanticism as a "primitive naturalism or a mystified solipsism."

There are many ideas in the two articles examined which bear directly on music. Music is an *intentional*, not a *natural* object; it is not like a stone, but a chair. A composer's intention is reflected in a work's design and therefore, its meaning exceeds "the totality of the sensory appearances" (FI 24). Musical analysis is a *representation* of music, never the music itself, Schenker's graphs notwithstanding. Music can never capture inner feeling; it can at best serve as a sign for it.

Time is integral to music. In repetition music allegorizes the anxiety of our inability to control time; in the reappearance of themes in disguise, music's ineffable qualities are challenged again and again. The strains of music die, dissipate as do our lives; by repeating, studying, analyzing, controlling music, we enact the fending off of our own death.

Organicism in music re-enacts symbolizing tendencies originating in religion whereby split ontologies--God and humans, nature and humans--are restored to oneness, as represented in symbols (bread and wine) and rituals (baptism). Claiming a musical work to be an organism, or the compositional process to be organic, makes an intentional act into a natural object, complete in itself, an object to be studied by scientific methods.

Like the New Critics, many musical scholars assume a work's autonomy, thus bracketing off the world in favour of a work's totality. If music is not referential in the same way that literature is, it is not thereby incapable of meaning. Just as music's formal structures result from the composer's willed arrangement and therefore are meaningful, so also do music's genres, modes, tempos, instrumentation, register, dynamics, etc. signify. For example, a single line of oboe music descending softly and slowly in a minor mode means something quite different from a loud brass band playing a march in a quick tempo. If musical signification is inexact, it is also sometimes more exact than words. The broadcast of Chopin's music throughout Poland during its takeover by the Russians had greater meaning for Poles than any speech about freedom. It allegorized their historical fight against oppression.

It is allegory--a mode of apprehension that acknowledges temporal distance, the impossibility of becoming one with its object, the ongoing nature of interpretation, the unbridgeable gap that marks human consciousness--that de Man proposes as an alternative to the symbol. This mode is also apt for musical interpretation.

Before leaving de Man for an investigation of more recent musicological writings, I would like to return to some matters left unresolved in my treatment of Dahlhaus which may be addressed more meaningfully from the perspective de Man offers. It is very evident from Dahlhaus's treatment of, for example, substantiality, metaphor, and structure, that he has not come to terms with the more recent debates which grapple with matters of gender, representation, essentialism, metaphysics, and rhetoric. His work would, I think, be strengthened by such an engagement. I will look at one instance of this shortly: his attempt to hold onto the terms "living" and "dead" in writing about music.

It is also the case that Dahlhaus would likely reject rather strongly some basic tenets of current critical theory. One aspect in particular, the role of the subject, whose individuality he wishes to guard from any infringement, would not mesh well with a de-centred subjectivity whose multiplication of selves takes place in language.[12] According to de Man allegory's establishment in the void of temporal difference "prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self, which is now fully, though painfully, recognized as a non-self" (BI 207). Even in *Beethoven*, one of his later works, Dahlhaus maintains an identification of the self with the thematic element in music:

> The 'thematic element' can be understood as the constant factor in the changing pattern of exterior forms, and, hence, as the 'analogue of the ego'--though not by someone who a priori rejects metaphysical interpretations of aesthetic matters as 'unscholarly'. For the conscious awareness of our own selves will always, inevitably, serve as the model of a unity in diversity that manifests itself in abstract, not physical, form: we

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[12]See *Blindness and Insight* 199, 200, 207, 213,

> know that our own selves preserve their identities in changing circumstances, and from that knowledge--from it alone--we know it of other things. To that extent, the identity that we attribute to a piece of music reflects our own identity. (53, 54)

Dahlhaus's struggle to hold onto "life" while escaping the determinism that organicism seems to imply is a problem he never quite comes to grip with. His lack of clarity regarding metaphorical function prevents recognition of his own ongoing entrapment in metaphor. Rejecting the potentially deterministic qualities of a biologically-based organic figure, Dahlhaus attempts to maintain the "living" component of music by introducing another metaphor, that of a text with "living spirit." In effect, he maintains the "life" element by means of other intervening figures, "text" and "spirit." Whereas music as living organism represents a one-on-one comparison, (one tenor--music, and one vehicle--an organism), music as living text requires the work of several vehicles: "text" must itself be metamorphosed into "spirit" which must be posited as "alive." Meanwhile the metaphor of "living," a defining quality of organisms, has not been removed but preserved through a more circuitous route. By substituting "text" for "organism" as the metaphor for music, Dahlhaus claims that his description of functional coherence "is now proven to be the presentation of the musical logic which constitutes the inner composition, i.e., the presentation of the 'spirit' which is the 'life' of the work" ("Models" 19).

There are a number of ways a de Manian critique can intersect with Dahlhaus's arguments. The desire to maintain a "living" quality in music represents an undisguised nostalgia for presence, being, immediacy, truth. It is furthermore a violation of the

unbridgeable ontological differences separating a work and a reader or listener. There is no incarnation of "life" in music, despite the pleas of festival adjudicators and music critics the world round to "make the music live." De Man writes of this impossibility in relation to poetry, but the same holds true for music:

> The ambiguity poetry speaks of is the fundamental one that prevails between the world of the spirit and the world of sentient substance: to ground itself, the spirit must turn itself into sentient substance, but the latter is knowable only in its dissolution into non-being. The spirit cannot coincide with its object and this separation is infinitely sorrowful. (BI 237)

Most significantly, Dahlhaus does not problematize interpretation as an activity that extracts meaning that is there in the score, never mind in the music, another layer of representation distinct from the score. His failure to separate analysis from music as a product in language produced from reading or listening leaves him vulnerable to the charge of what de Man opposes as aesthetic ideology. Dahlhaus's lapse into an assumption of the analyst's direct access to music betrays an ideology that unites mind and materiality in an interiorized experience. The text as natural object has not been challenged.

In bringing Dahlhaus and de Man into a dialogue, I want to emphasize that it is not simply the case that de Man exhibits a degree of competence relating to aesthetic presuppositions dependent upon language which escape Dahlhaus's narrower frame of reference. Some of this disparity is an obvious reflection of two scholars working in separate disciplines and investing their time and energies in different directions. If Dahlhaus can be chastised for not keeping up with current theoretical debates, de Man also suffers some lapses when he ventures into the field of music. In another article, "Rhetoric

of Blindness," in which he explores Rousseau's treatment of music, de Man's lack of clarity with regard to melody and harmony, so integral to his argument, leads to no small failure.

Both de Man and Dahlhaus regard music as a kind of language. De Man writes, "The structural characteristic of language are exactly the same as those attributed to music..." (BI 131). While this statement itself is open to question, I want to draw attention to de Man's use of the metaphor, "structure," in relation to music. He does not identify it as a metaphor. Dahlhaus, on the other hand, recognizes a problem with this term immediately:

> 'Structure' has become an in-word. Moreover, in-words sometimes serve no other purpose than to conceal difficulties; they are ideology, false consciousness, in verbal form....Protected by the ambiguity of the concept, the error thrives that it is sufficient to solve difficulties in compositional technique in order at the same time to solve formal ones. (*Schoenberg and the New Music* 260)

Here Dahlhaus sounds more like de Man whose practice it is to call attention to the metaphor upon which a logical discourse depends to contain its unruly meanings.

It is interesting to compare de Man's analysis of William Wimsatt's hypostasis of poetry with Dahlhaus's treatment of the hypostatization of musical components by some music theorists ("Models" 21). De Man claims that Wimsatt's concern for a work's autonomy leads him "into contradictory assumptions about the ontological status of the work of literature" (de Man, "Form and Intent" 24). In his study, *The Verbal Icon*, Wimsatt begins by acknowledging the poem as "an act" and then continues, "But if we are

to lay hold of the poetic act to comprehend and evaluate it, and if it has to pass current as critical object, it must be hypostatized" (FI 24, 25).[13] De Man concludes:

> If such a hypostasis, which changes the literary act into a literary object by the suppression of its intentional character, is not only possible but necessary in order to allow for a critical description, then we have not left the world in which the status of literary language is similar to that of a natural object. (FI 25)

Dahlhaus and de Man approach the problem of hypostasis from different angles: De Man identifies it as an ontological violation based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of intentionality: "The concept of intentionality is neither [physical] nor psychological in its nature, but structural....The structural intentionality determines the relationship between the components of the resulting object in all its parts..." (FI 25). Dahlhaus deals with hypostasis as it relates to musical analysis. While cautious about the substantializing of some aspect of composition, for example, diastematics or rhythm, he is not immune to its attractions. Of relevance is this passage quoted in the previous chapter:

> The hypostatization of a single factor--rhythm or dynamics--is to be understood as an attempt to make 'graspable,' through substantializing, the unity of the form which, in its description as functional coherence, is a sum of connections. ("Models" 23)

Greater possibilities exist in the above model for "association-rich, aesthetic and metaphysical concepts," something Dahlhaus acknowledges Kant is distrustful of (23).

If Dahlhaus lacked a deep understanding of recent philosophies of language, de Man's direct contributions to musical scholarship have not been remarkable. The tension

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[13] *The Verbal Icon*, xvii.

in operation here is in part a symptom of human limitation. It just is the case that musical scholars do not generally function at the same level of competence outside their own discipline, and more frequently, they are being criticized for this naivety vis-a-vis their epistemological assumptions. Rarely, however, are thinkers devoted to the latest critical debates charged with their ignorance of musical issues. The point is that musicologists are too often left behind by their more philosophically oriented colleagues, and this does have import for musical studies, whatever reasons are involved. In his article, "Disciplining Deconstruction (For Music Analysis)," Adam Krims notes this difficulty:

> Testifying to the problems of learning critical theory is music theorist John Covach, who has publicly pleaded that it is comprised of "complicated groups of texts with a substantial secondary literature....[I]t takes a lot of time to work through [that literature]...and time doing philosophy is time not doing [music] theory or musicology." (Krims 319)

These tensions abound in the musicological writings to be addressed in Chapters Seven and Eight. First, however, a subject largely ignored by musical theorists requires airing: gender and organicism.

## CHAPTER SIX

### *GENDER AND ORGANICISM*

> Virtually all feminist scholarship begins with a challenge to the assumption that disciplinary inquiry is gender-neutral.
>
> Carolyn Korsmeyer[1]

It is in this chapter that the connection between organicism and social practices will be explored, specifically the relationship between organicism and gender. The chapter falls into two sections: the first investigates feminist critique as it applies to some components of the organic cluster--autonomy, nature, unity, and genius; the second relates to teleology and growth as they are expressed in birth imagery surrounding creative processes. While it is not possible to *prove* a direct causal link between ideas that operate in the realm of the mind and participate in the current discursive environment, and practices that comprise a sphere related to institutional norms, evaluative standards, and musical opportunities, I propose that organicism has incorporated gender ideologies, largely covert, that are unfavourable to women. Attention to the operations of metaphoricity in organicism will assist in understanding how some aspects of the comparison are highlighted and others obscured. Abrams referred to this as "the bringing

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[1]"Introduction: Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Feminist Scholarship," 1993, vi. Korsmeyer is co-editor with Hilde Hein of *Aesthetics in Feminist Perspective*, in which this article appears

of submerged analogies into the open" (Abrams 1953, Preface, no pagination). Recalling Max Black's example of the wolf/man metaphor, one is reminded that a metaphor's effectiveness is derived not so much from a knowledge of the vehicle, in this case, "wolf," as from "the *system of associated commonplaces*" of wolf. Their truth matters less than their ability to be easily evoked.[2]

I would suggest that the organism metaphor "organizes our view" of man *and* woman, all the while it suppresses some details that call for exposure. Just as discrepancies between the wolf/man comparison might point out some extra-metaphorical motivations being played out, so contradictions between the tenor and vehicle of organisms and art or music may signal issues which at first seem to escape or be irrelevant to the comparison, but on closer inspection reveal more troubling matters. This distinction between "prominent" and "background" is intended to draw attention to those components of the organic cluster which are prominent as opposed to those components that the metaphor suppresses, that is, relegates to the background.

In his article, "Organic Structure in Music," examined in Chapter Three, Arthur Hutchings makes two allusions to women, both of which cast certain practices in a negative light by invoking an association with women:

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[2]Here is the Black passage quoted earlier:

> Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked about in 'wolf-language' will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others--in short, *organizes* our view of man. (Black 288)

> By this time, indeed, [late nineteenth century] Wagner and other composers had increasingly thwarted methods of study that recall those of a leaden-eyed governess on a botanical walk. (340)

Hutchings wishes to put in a bad light the old biological methods which simply classified and did not stress growth, evolution, integration. To express his disapproval, he lights upon the example of a "governess." Not only is this instructor female, she is also "leaden-eyed," meaning someone who does not see, that is, comprehend things very well.

His second reference to women concerns early attitudes to Schenker:

> Curiously enough, my informant was not greatly impressed by Schenker and bade me note that most of Schenker's idolaters were female.... (345)

Why would his informer want Hutchings to note the gender of Schenker's followers if not to denigrate Schenker by virtue of an association with the denigrated sex? This writing occurred before Schenker achieved his current position of high repute. Hutchings's only references to women are wholly negative, where the female sex is imbued with intrinsic, but unspecified, devalued qualities.

It can be argued that these prejudicial remarks, using gender-inflected language to register approval or disapproval, are of a merely localized nature and have nothing to do with the music. However, when one broadens the frame to include the whole standard repertoire of music, one finds a domain populated exclusively by male composers, with the scholarship surrounding it practised by predominantly male historians, critics, theorists, and analysts. In his article "Gender and Other Dualities of Music History," Leo Treitler carefully documents the intrinsic implication of gender at the "headwaters" of mainstream

European music, the origins of medieval chant. "The plainchant is, by implication, masculine, and the word with which Rousseau labels its opposite--*efféminée*, literally, 'effeminated'--carries a sense of deterioration from what is by nature manly" (28).

This next example approximates an organicist orientation more closely with its allusion to a "whole" way of thinking, recalling the "great masters" whose musical conceptions commenced with the whole. Arnold Schoenberg writes in his article "The Blessing of the Dressing," 1948 (*Style and Idea*):

> I used to say that the composer must be able to look very far ahead in the future of his music. It seems to me this is the *masculine* way of thinking: thinking at once of the whole future, of the whole destiny of the idea, and preparing beforehand for every possible detail. This is the manner in which a man builds his house, organizes his affairs, and prepares for his wars. The other manner is the *feminine* manner which takes into account with good understanding the nearest consequences of a problem, but misses preparing for the more remote events. This is the way of the dressmaker, who might use the most valuable material without thinking whether it will last long, if only it makes the desired effect now--right now. (385)

If these examples represent a masculinist orientation, they nonetheless do not *constitute* organicist assumptions, principles, or methods, although the Schoenberg example comes close. These observations which call attention to the gendering and accompanying valuation of certain activities is modelled on the work of feminist music critics who have questioned assumptions in musical studies that have passed as neutral, universal, objective presuppositions. There are, however, other more disturbing illustrations of an organicist orientation that build into its aesthetics attitudes that are biased against women. It is these gender ideas, intrinsic to many expressions of

organicism, that this chapter will address. To use Black's language, they comprise a "background" that "organizes" gender vis-a-vis the organic metaphor.

## FEMINIST CRITIQUE AND THE ORGANIC CLUSTER

Although there has been an ongoing discussion touching on the various components of organicism throughout the study, I will begin each section with a brief focus on one of the four components as a means to orient the treatment of gender to follow.

1. Aesthetic Autonomy

One of the hallmarks of aesthetics since its inception as a branch of philosophy in mid-eighteenth-century Europe has been its focus upon a work of art as a separate totality, complete in itself, and involving a kind of disinterested contemplation. The art work represents an independent entity, divorced from any social or political context. Focus upon the "inside" of a work, its internal organizing structures and meanings, is what is meant by artistic autonomy. "Art for art's sake" is a phrase frequently associated with this viewpoint.

As it prompted more rigorous methods of analysis and criticism in literature and music during the twentieth century, organicism grew more dogmatic in its insistence on a work's autonomy. However much modernism wished to distance itself from what it saw

as the excesses of romanticism, it clung tenaciously to the notion of the work of art as autonomous.

Echoes of this view reverberate strongly in musical analysis. In his article, "The Origins of Schenker's Thought: How Man is Musical," Allan Keiler writes:

> There is also bound up in this description the conviction that musical faculties and musical technique are as much as possible intrinsic and musically autonomous properties, not dependent on other media or external circumstances. (Keiler 282)

Allen Forte provides reinforcement for maintaining the inside/outside boundary of the music when he writes in his influential article, "Schenker's Conception of Musical Structure,"

> I wish to emphasize at this point that the bases of Schenker's concept of structural levels, upon which his theory of music rests, are not to be found in abstruse speculation, nor in acoustical or metaphysical formulations (although Schenker was not averse to these), but in the organization of the music itself. (7)

Forte simply refuses to acknowledge that Schenker's "structural levels," far from being solely "in the organization of the music itself," extended to levels in society. The teeming masses who, according to Schenker, were aligned with the chaos of the foreground, were incapable of understanding his music theory (FC 3,4). Schenker did not maintain this distinction between "outside" society and "inside" music.

The notion of aesthetic autonomy seems strangely out of sync with physical organisms which are essentially interdependent with their environment and other organisms. How then did autonomy become such an important member in the organicist

constellation? The obvious "commonplace association" of organisms is their independent functioning vis-a-vis machines. Organisms require no outside force to set them in motion. Similarly, the autonomous art work (theoretically) required no social function, such as church or state sponsorship, to sustain it. If aesthetic autonomy has a complex historical trajectory built initially upon philosophical and social arguments, its metaphorical qualities point in another direction, not to its independence from its surroundings but to its interdependence, qualities that are typically backgrounded in the appeal to organisms.

Charles Rosen puts a more favourable interpretation upon the doctrine of autonomy, one that not all advocates of autonomy would endorse:

> It was only by this autonomy that the work could assume an authority that was once the prerogative of the sacred image or test. The doctrine has been misunderstood: it does not imply that a text does not refer outside itself, or, even more absurdly, that it is intelligible without a knowledge of the universe that surrounds it. It merely guarantees that no elucidation of the text--not even the author's own exegesis--can ever attach itself permanently to it, or pretend to be an integral or necessary condition of experiencing it.... (Rosen 1977/1991, 170)

More important than any *theory* of autonomy is the *practice*. The strong tendency to disregard the social, economic, and political context of art works considered autonomous is a well-understood convention. It could be that *who* is making the comparison may determine what becomes prominent and what recedes into the background, who or what groups are advantaged or disadvantaged. As long as such issues as the personal, biographical, economic, or sexual are cordoned off as "external," out of bounds, irrelevant to a text's interpretation or criticism, then one need never address

matters of, for example, unequal access to educational facilities and publishing opportunities, or patronage or gender prejudice.

Feminism, which probes for gender implications in all conceptual schemes, strikes at the heart of disinterested artistic contemplation. In her introduction to *Aesthetics in Feminist Perspective*, Carolyn Korsmeyer writes,

> Because awareness of gender necessarily directs one's attention not only to the act of perception but also to the perceiver and her or his position within a social and political context, one of the revisions that feminism implies is the abandonment of the doctrine that a disinterested state of contemplative attention characterizes aesthetic appreciation and appropriate apprehension of art. (Korsmeyer viii)

In the place of the singular act of appreciation of the complete, independent art work is awareness of a more complex model that acknowledges readers, viewers, and listeners whose histories, age, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, class, education, and a host of other personal or cultural variables, interact to produce a wide range of interpretations and value ascriptions.

Disinterested, autonomous art has been a consistent target of feminist theory from such early twentieth-century exponents as Virginia Woolf right through to the latest postmodern polemic. Feminist music critics have targeted musical autonomy, sometimes designated "absolute music," with none being more dynamic in their critique than Susan McClary:

> I am especially concerned with deconstructing the Master Narrative of "Absolute Music" with removing that final fig leaf for open critical discussion, for I believe that it is this denial of meaning in the instrumental

> repertory that has systematically blocked any attempt at feminist or any other sort of socially grounded criticism. (McClary 1991, 55)

The Introduction to her *Music and Society* provides clarification for the concept of autonomy and its centrality to musical scholarship:

> The disciplines of music theory and musicology are grounded on the assumption of musical autonomy. They cautiously keep separate consideration of biography, patronage, place and dates from those of musical syntax and structure. Both disciplines likewise claim objectivity, the illusion of which is possible only when the questions considered valid are limited to those that can, in fact be answered without qualification. (Leppert and McClary xiii)

If the independence of organisms in contrast to machines prompted the early metaphorical comparison of organisms and art works, other characteristics of organisms were repressed, pushed into the background. The autonomy principle is itself the product of a time (the mid-eighteenth century to the twentieth) and place (Western Europe) and it served the interests of those wishing to emulate philosophers and scientists who embraced the radical mind/body split. An orientation to autonomous art stemmed from the "mind" pole, claiming to transcend contingencies such as history or place. All that which was associated with the "body" (the senses, particularities of history, personal markers of gender, race, etc.) could be set aside in a contemplation which mimicked religious devotion. Attention to what was intrinsic or "inside" the art piece was predicated on a rejection of any context or what was "outside" the art product. Not much reflection is needed to see that disinterested autonomous art serves particular economic, political, and

gender interests while it excludes others. The role of feminists in debunking the autonomy myth cannot be minimized.

2. Unity

In his article, "Art Has Its Reasons," Charles Rosen writes, "The unity of a work of art is the oldest critical dogma that we have..." (Rosen 1971, 34). In the introduction to his book, *A Guide to Musical Analysis*, Nicolas Cook echoes this conviction when he states, "It [the book] reflects the overriding interest most analysts have in what gives unity and coherence to musical masterpieces, with the answers being sought mainly in the formal and harmonic structures of individual compositions" (Cook 1987, 4). Up until recently, the engrained championship of unity over diversity has rarely been challenged. In his article, "Superior Myths, Dogmatic Allegories: The Resistance to Musical Unity," 1989, Alan Street writes:

> The fact that this kind of traditionalist belief still represents the standard critical yardstick is something which cannot help but seem anachronistic in the face of subsequent compositional vicissitudes between the completely determined and the wholly random. (Street 79)

Feminist theory's unmasking of oneness as associated with the masculine, and multiplicity with the feminine, challenges theories based upon organic unity. The title of Luce Irigaray's book, *The Sex Which is Not One*, repudiates what its author considers phallic standards of oneness. Drawing upon the discourse of philosophy and psychoanalysis, she points out the unequivocal association of oneness, unity, "reduction of

the other in the Same," with phallocentrism; and of plurality, multiplicity with the feminine.

The subject of Irigaray's article "The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine," in *The Sex Which is Not One*, is directed principally at philosophical writings. Nevertheless, the following passage can be read with little alteration as a critique of analytical procedures in music:

> Now, this domination of the philosophic logos stems in large part from its power to *reduce all others to the economy of the Same*. The teleologically constructive project it takes on is always also a project of diversion, deflection, reduction of the other in the Same. And, in its greatest generality perhaps, from its power to *eradicate* the *difference* between the *sexes* in systems that are self-representative of a 'masculine subject.' (Irigaray 74)

Irigaray assumes "disrupting" strategies derived from what social registers have deemed feminine as a means of creating a feminine "specificity" which is not defined as "lack," "deficiency," or "atrophy" (76).

In her article "Refining Feminist Theory: Lessons from Aesthetics," Hilde Hein writes:

> If the essence of theory is to unify, and if gender entails a binary order (at least), then gendered theory is a contradiction, yet one that we can hardly avoid. Feminism has no choice but to recast theory; yet in so doing, it makes apparent nonsense of the very concept of theory. Or at least suggests yet another turn from the one to the many. (Hein 6)

Compare this statement by music theorist, Nicolas Cook--Schenkerian analysis "aims to omit inessentials and to highlight important relationships" (28)--with the following one by Hein: "Some feminists advocate a new definition of theory that decenters, displaces, and foregrounds the inessential..." (Hein 6).

There are a number of ways that music theory reinforces a masculine narrative, via its interest in musical unity. The association of the feminine with detail, the ornamental, or the "inessential" and their subsumption or disappearance in analytical exercises dramatizes the absorption or reduction of the symbolic feminine by its masculine counterpart. The gendering of formal functions in musical analysis reinforces gender stereotypes.

This aversion to the ornamental can be seen in a bracketed sentence by Dahlhaus in his *Between Romanticism and Modernism*, regarding the commonality of Schoenberg's and the Viennese architect, Alfred Loos's, aesthetic views: "(Schoenberg shared Adolf Loos's hostility towards ornamentation)" (54). Naomi Schor's *Reading in Detail* documents the "detail as negativity." She describes this connection as part of a

> larger semantic network, bounded on the one side by the *ornamental*, with its traditional connotations of effeminacy and decadence, and on the other, by the *everyday*, whose 'prosiness' is rooted in the domestic sphere of social life presided over by women. (4)

Jeffrey Kallberg calls upon Schor in his *Chopin at the Boundaries: Sex, History, and Musical Genre*. He expands Schor's insights, explaining how the "flood of detail" becomes a threat to "the relationship of the periphery to the center." Details have a tendency to "subordinate the background to the foreground" (Kallberg 39). This comment holds interest for a musical theory that builds on the primacy of the background. Writing of the gradual disassociation of the piano "nocturne" from the feminine, Kallberg observes: "Analyses like Schenker's that sought to lay bare the background structure of a musical

work glossed over the same sense of detail that helped link the nocturne with the feminine in the first place" (44).

The practice of labelling musical themes by gender, with the main theme protagonist termed masculine and the contrasting subordinate theme, feminine, enacts the feminine being brought under masculine control with the return of the subordinate theme to its "home" key (McClary 1991, 11). The mapping of gender distinctions onto tonality becomes inextricably entwined with wholeness and unity. It is not difficult to recall the societal practices of a patriarchal structure where women's activities are trivialized and hence eliminated from historical records as "inessential," or where the woman is considered to be under the control of the male head of the household in the home. The relationship of the symbolic feminine and masculine to the worlds of real women and men is not absolute; neither is the relationship meaningless. These gendered depictions hold powerful sway both in reflecting social practices and maintaining them.

3. Nature

> They are deprived of the worth of their sex. The important thing,...is that no one should know who has deprived them, or why, and that 'nature' be held accountable.
>
> Luce Irigaray[3]

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[3]"The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine" in *The Sex Which Is Not One*, 71.

Nature is central to organicist concepts. Indeed, the metaphorical fusion of art and organisms rests squarely on the 'nature' component in the organic constellation. That nature is traditionally gendered feminine in historical literature and the popular imagination is also fairly well recognized (Merchant 1989). What is less clear is the implications of a gendered nature as a basis of the metaphorical comparison. How then, if at all, has the gendering of nature as feminine affected the organic model in aesthetics? What is the import of the comparison of art works to nature in terms of gender?

This is a difficult question for which I found little help in feminist literature. I was unable to locate any feminist authors who specifically examine the linkage of organicist aesthetics, nature, and woman. Included in my sources on woman and nature were Sherry Ortner's "Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture," 1974; Marilyn Strathern's anthology, *Nature, Culture and Gender*, 1980; Carolyn Merchant's *The Death of Nature*, 1983; and Val Plumwood's *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, 1993. All acknowledge and problematize the woman-nature conflation. Plumwood writes, "The connection between women and nature and their mutual inferiorization is by no means a thing of the past, and continues to drive, for example, the denial of women's activity..." (Plumwood 21). The powerful dualisms of woman-nature and man-culture are the subject of Ortner's and Strathern's work.

It was only in Donna Haraway's work that I found a sustained analysis of organicism and women with consideration of the woman-nature connection. While her orientation is not aesthetics, Haraway's biological grounding is not unrelated to organicist

aesthetics. In her early, detailed historical analyses of organicism in *Crystals, Fabrics, and Fields: Metaphors of Organicism in Twentieth-Century Developmental Biology*, 1976, Haraway argued that ideas promoted by organic imaging were essential to modern biology. Her *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 1991, represents an about-turn, a polemic against any organicizing tendencies or appeals to nature. Haraway identifies organic wholes as a product of patriarchal and colonialist strategies. She does not attempt to track the life of this metaphor. What is always clear is the opposition of organicism to feminism. The following collage of quotations illustrates this theme:

> The examination of the debates about 'scientific objectivity' in feminist theory argues for a transformation of the despised metaphors of organic and technological vision in order to foreground specific positioning, multiple mediation, partial perspective, and therefore a possible allegory for feminist scientific and political knowledge. (Haraway 1991, 3)

> The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity. (150)

> The theoretical and practical struggle against unity-through-domination or unity-through-incorporation ironically not only undermines the justifications for patriarchy, colonialism, humanism, positivism, essentialism, scientism, and other unlamented -isms, but *all* claims for an organic or natural standpoint. (157)

In opposition to the infamous binarisms of nature/culture, male/female, or even human/animal, Haraway constructs the myth of a "cyborg," a theorized, fabricated creature made up of both machine and organism. The cyborg is "uncoupled from organic reproduction" and the destructive logic of polarities and hierarchical domination. The

cyborg "fiction" embodies Haraway's values and is designed as a "blasphemous" resistance to oppressive discourses of gender, race, and class which is nonetheless faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism. She writes:

> Gender, race, or class consciousness is an achievement forced on us by the terrible historical experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, and capitalism. (155)

According to Haraway, it is the "naturalized" functioning of these systems of exploitation that supports "a dominant cultural group with immense power to make its stories into reality" (2). The following passages juxtapose organicism and gender in strong terms:

> We must never again connect as parts to wholes, as marked beings incorporated into unmarked ones, as unitary and complementary subjects serving the one Subject of monotheism and its secular heresies [organicism being one heresy]. (3)

> Cyborg feminists have to argue that `we' do not want any more natural matrix of unity and that no construction is whole. (157)

How then does gender factor into the organicists' elevation of nature with respect to the creative processes? Logic would suggest that the high valuation of nature as a model or source of creativity, coupled with the traditional gendering of nature as feminine, would provide a positive boost for the feminine. Indeed, music theorist Robert Snarrenberg draws this inference in his analysis of Schenker's procreative metaphors in an essay discussed in Chapter Seven. No such enhancement occurs. Creativity in the arts is a male prerogative and any borrowing from the symbolic feminine is predicated on the exclusion of women themselves from this domain.

Logic would also seem to suggest that in using nature as vehicle in the art-as-organism trope, some of nature's other dimensions would be explored: nature's power, violence, wildness. The concept of the Kantian sublime reflects this aspect, but nature's femininity is lost in this emphasis. I think the backgrounding of this other side of nature, coupled with the foregrounding of those qualities desirable in art, reflects what Black describes as suppressing some details and emphasizing others. The view of art or music is influenced by the metaphor's ability to evoke selected features ascribed to nature.

Nature as female seems to play no role in critical discussion of creative functions or products apart from the appropriation of birth metaphors. Creating natural models after nature's processes was the exclusive function of the male genius. If one returns to the foregrounding and backgrounding functions at work in metaphor, it would seem that the metaphor "woman as nature" comes into the "art as nature" metaphor in drag--the male genius who dresses up in women's "natural" creative capacities.

4. Genius

> The Romantic dream envisions the unity of art and nature, poetry and philosophy, imagination and reason, all achieved as an emanation of organic, creative genius.
>
> Christopher Norris[4]

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[4] *Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory*, 1991, 7.

That genius was a most compelling construction of the German, French, and English romantic period and the decades preceding it, is an historical commonplace. In 1786 the Westphalian conservative civil servant Justus Möser described the "mania for genius" as an "epidemic" (Schaffer 82). Goethe joined his friend, Möser, in bemoaning the widening and hence, corruption, of the word: "It seemed almost necessary to banish it entirely from the German language" (Schaffer 82). The term itself underwent a turbulent period of shifting meanings and alliances during the last half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. What is of interest for this study is its proliferation of meanings during the years surrounding the *Sturm und Drang* in Germany and the French Revolution--from its Latin signification of a guiding personal spirit which guarded a person's fate, to include the spirit of an age, personal abilities, and, more importantly, "not as a peculiar capacity possessed by a creative artist, but as the power which possessed him" (Schaffer 83).[5]

Genius became aligned with popular forces, natural power, Jacobinism, and the *sans culotte* during the last decades of the eighteenth century. Some of the texts which were used to resist the forces of Jacobinism actually preceded the popular movement chronologically but were called upon as needed to buttress growing fear of the masses. These included primarily Edmund Burke's *Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and the*

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[5]Simon Schaffer's account of the complexities of the twists and turns of genius in his article, "Genius in Romantic natural philosophy," traces some of the political affiliations of "genius" in some intellectual circles in Germany, France, and England.

*Beautiful*, 1756 (translated into German in 1773), itself engaged in the English debates prompted by three particular works: Edward Young's *Conjectures on Original Composition*, 1759, Joshua Reynold's *Discourses on Art*, delivered at the Royal Academy from 1769 through the early 1770s, and Alexander Gerard's *Essay on Genius*, 1774 (Schaffer 85).[6] Notwithstanding the importance of skill and training (something Young was less eager to acknowledge), Reynolds and Gerard identified in genius what they termed the faculty of the mind closest to nature. The dichotomy between acquired technique and genius became mapped onto the contrast between the mechanical and the organic. Schaffer writes, "The nature which Gerard envisages was organic, and the power in nature to which genius was closely allied was that of vegetable growth" (85).

The expressions of creative genius formed no singular concept in musical discourse. From E. T. A. Hoffmann's championship of Beethoven's genius (a combination of inspiration and rational construction),[7] to Schenker's disclaimer--"I would not presume to say how inspiration comes upon the genius--" accompanied by his specifics of compositional techniques worthy of genius (Schenker 1979, 9), one can see divergence among interpretations of creation in music. That the composers of the great masterpieces were geniuses is not, however, questioned. Apart from the particularities of how this composition took place, whether from a germinal motive or an *Ursatz*, for example, the

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[6]Gerard's work was written in 1759 but not published until 1774. Gerard was a divinity professor from Aberdeen, Scotland.

[7]For an in-depth discussion of this matter, see Ian Bent's "Plato--Beethoven: A Hermeneutics for Nineteenth-Century Music?"

concept of musical genius participated in the same awe and wonder accorded genius in the broader culture of whichever century it was expressed.

While it becomes clear that the idea of genius occupied a pivotal place in the aesthetic logic of organicism, it is not always as easy to demystify what its appeal to nature conveyed. The earlier political affiliation of genius with "the people" was lost as it was appropriated by more conservative forces who saw dangers in, for example, the unruly tendencies of the French Revolution. The notion of genius in the present inquiry is focused more particularly upon its aesthetic usage, not forgetting its political connections.

The genius concept ostensibly provided a means of bridging the gulf created by two contradictory requirements of the artist: freedom and naturalness. The true artist, that is, the genius, acted according to nature, and only free geniuses had this ability, men like Shakespeare or Beethoven. According to Kant's formulation, "*Genius* is the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to art" (Kant 1790/1951, 150). The organic genius bridged the freedom-necessity gulf creating his own rules. Involved in this creative process was a harnessing of the unconscious in a manner also unique to genius. Heinrich Schenker's early introduction of organicism into music revolved around the special ability of the genius to compose from his *unconscious*, an idea Schenker equated with true organic composition (Schenker 1895/1988, 100).[*]

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[*]Schenker's essay, "The Spirit of Musical Technique," is translated by Pastille in *Theoria*, 1988.

No one was more alert to the periphery of the conscious than the opium-addicted Coleridge, the author of the fear-driven Ancient Mariner, whose fascination with his own *terra incognita* was life long.[9] This glimpse into the irrational, subterranean, or mad side of genius points away from the table of binary oppositions which aligned men with reason and women with emotion. The qualities marking the genius are sounding more like the symbolic feminine: passion, passivity, emotion, occult. In his book *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche expresses this fear:

> Just as we now feel justified in judging genius as a form of neurosis, we may perhaps think the same of artistic suggestive power,--and our artists are, as a matter of fact, only too closely related to hysterical females!!! (Nietzsche 1883-8 §811, 255)

Earlier in §811 Nietzsche refers to the physiological condition of the artist as "intoxication, the feeling of enhanced power" (254).

The question becomes then, how to protect the masculinity of the genius as he appropriates feminine attributes? One way was to maintain a sharp division between male and female creativity: men control the public sphere of artistic production and women use their bodies to create physical life in the private sphere. These ideas are elaborated all too precisely by Nietzsche in *Beyond Good and Evil*:

> To be wrong on the fundamental problem man-woman, to deny the abysmal antagonism, the necessity of a forever hostile tension, to dream of equal rights, equal education, equal claims and obligations--is a *typical* sign of short-sightedness. (§238, 166)

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[9]Kathleen Coburn discusses Coleridge's avid interest in the "below consciousness" in her introduction to his *Philosophical Lectures*.

> Almost everywhere they [male, woman-sympathizers] ruin her nerves with the sickliest and most dangerous music (our latest German music) and make her daily more hysterical and less and less capable of her first and last professional activity, the bearing of healthy children. (§239, 168-69)

Are we witnessing the progeny of Nietzsche's thought when in 1949 the *Ladies Home Journal* observes: "A world full of feminine genius, but poor in children, would come rapidly to an end...Great men have great mothers" (*Ladies Home Journal* 1949)?[10]

The following personal anecdote recorded by the nineteenth-century French novelist, George Sand, along with the above quotations, illustrates the either/or choice available to women:

> Mr. de Karaty followed me into the anteroom in order to debate with me, at yet greater length, his theory concerning the intellectual inferiority of women. It would be impossible for even the most intelligent woman to write a good work. And as I wanted to leave then, he ended his speech with a Napoleonic stroke, which was to shatter me. "Believe me," he said in a weighty tone, as I was about to open the last door of his sanctuary, "bring children into the world instead of books!" "My dear," I answered, thinking I would choke on my laughter and slamming the door shut in his face, "follow your advice yourself, as well as you can!"[11]

It is interesting to juxtapose the voice of George Sand with Nietzsche's views on Sand:

> It reveals corruption of the instincts...when a woman points to Madame Roland or Madame de Staël or Monsieur George Sand as proving

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[10]Betty Friedan quotes writer Dorothy Thompson in the March issue of *Ladies Home Journal* 1949, as part of her project to trace images of women through American magazines in her book, *The Feminine Mystique*.

[11]Sylvia Boveschen quotes Sand in her article, "Is There a Feminine Aesthetic?" 114. This careless advice obscures the risk involved in childbirth for women. Charlotte Bronte and Mary Wollstonecraft succeeded in bringing books into the world, but pregnancy and childbirth cost them their lives.

> something in *favor* of "woman as such." Among men these three are the three *comic* women as such, and nothing more! They are the best involuntary arguments *against* emancipation and feminine autonomy. (Nietzsche 1886/1955, §233, 163)

In her detailed study, *Gender and Genius*, Christine Battersby illustrates how that policing the public domain of the artist to exclude women did not extend to feminine qualities:

> One thing that the history of the concept of 'genius' reveals is that being a woman and being 'feminine' are radically different things. It is *women* who have been excluded from culture; not the 'feminine.' (Battersby 138)

This involved a careful protecting of the territory of art from incursion by real women.

How does the organic metaphor organize gender with respect to genius? It foregrounds the symbolic feminine while it backgrounds women themselves to the point of excluding them from creative activity. This theoretical exclusion of women from the field of artistic production creates a forbidding climate for them. Strikingly, the use of birth metaphors was one of the most daring appropriations of women's capacities in the operation of genius.

## BIRTH METAPHORS IN ORGANICISM

> Woman gives birth to human beings; man gives birth to the work of art... Man emerges from love pregnant with the work of art; woman emerges from love pregnant with the child.
>
> Johann Wilhelm Ritter[12]

> As with other products of divine activity, the father of a poem is much more difficult to identify than the mother. That the mother is always nature, the realm of the objective considered as a field of communication, no serious criticism can ever deny... But the poet, who writes creatively rather than deliberately, is not the father of his poem; he is at best a midwife, or, more accurately still, the womb of Mother Nature herself: her privates he, so to speak.
>
> Northrop Frye[13]

> [The changing attitude toward] the childbirth model, is symptomatic of the greater polarity developing in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries between mechanistic and organic ideals, between the poetics of objectivity and poetics of expression.
>
> Terry Castle[14]

> At the heart of a literary movement which allows true pregnancy--inventiveness, meaningfulness--to be solely masculine property, we detect a subtle misogyny....
>
> Elizabeth Sacks[15]

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[12]"Natural Philosophy of Femininity," 1810, 396. Ritter was a physicist and member of the Jena circle, a group of early German Romantics including A. W. Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, Caroline Schlegel-Schelling, and Dorothea Veit-Schlegel.. His work lay in the field of galvanism.

[13]*Anatomy of Criticism*, 1957, 98.

[14]"Lab'ring bards: Birth *Topoi* and English Poetics 1660-1820," 1979, 206.

[15]*Shakespeare's Images of Pregnancy*, 1980, 103.

The mapping of male and female onto the division of mental and physical creativity respectively demonstrates one of the most powerful prohibitions against women's participation in artistic creativity. Attitudes to childbirth were woven into aesthetics and had far-reaching implications. Lest one think it "merely" figurative, this chapter will demonstrate the social ramifications of ideas as it seeks to untangle some of the twists and turns of organicism and gender.

The etymological connections of mental and physical "gestation" seen in such words and their derivatives as concept, text, abortion, embryo, labour, issue, fertility, brainchild, womb, nurse, bear, brood, and birth extend as far back as the Old Testament, giving witness to a complex and sometimes confusing relationship. In fact, it is almost impossible to find a vocabulary for abstract thought which is not dependent in some way upon generative language in all the literature I consulted.

It is not surprising then to find birth imagery in the English romantic poets. Wordsworth writes of those productive poetic moments: "his mind, best pleased/ While she as duteous as the mother dove/ Sits brooding" (*The Prelude* Book One, lines 139-41). In his *A Defence of Poetry*, Shelley is more explicit: "the [poem] grows under the power of the artist as a child in the mother's womb..." (Quoted in Abrams, 192). If it is not unusual to discover romantic writing littered with birth metaphors because of the long tradition of mental and physical "birthing," their prominence *is* striking in light of the Enlightenment's repulsion of linking mental and physical parturition. That there was a dramatic shift in attitudes towards bodily functions, including giving birth, during the Age of Reason, is of

interest for the relationship between organicism and gender. The correlation between, on the one hand, the machine metaphor so favoured during the Enlightenment and the negative valuing of physicality, and on the other hand, the organic metaphor and positive valuing of reproductive figures, is no small coincidence.

Historical Shift in Valuation of Birth Imagery

In tracing the changing evaluation of birth metaphors, one finds a relationship between aesthetics and lived experience. Sources in literature provide a more accessible means to follow these developments; however, parallel trends are evident in music history as well. During the Enlightenment, the emphasis upon reason and invention challenged theories of artistic creation which bypassed the mind, favouring supernatural explanations of inspiration. Literary organicism's enchantment with Shakespeare may have contributed to the reclaiming of a more positive view of birth imagery, given Shakespeare's favouring of birth rhetoric.

By the late seventeenth century childbirth as a stock, but much-vaulted figure had become a cause for abuse and ridicule. In his satire, *MacFlecknoe*, 1682, Dryden mocks the biological parent/poetic coupling, associating biological birthing with the making of bad poems. Terry Castle notes, "After Dryden it becomes conventional to use the trope as a negative model for the work of the bad artist" (198). Negative attitudes towards poetic birth can be seen in the poets Jonathan Swift and Alexander Pope and are echoed in the

critics Addison, Sir Joshua Reynolds, and Samuel Johnson.[16] Castle observes "a persistent tendency to associate the human birth process with malignant or deformed poetic productivity" (201).

What might account for this significant departure in attitude? In his *Peri Bathous*, Pope elicits the birth trope as an instance of a useless theory of poetic invention. His argument is that to link the creative process with biological forces is to threaten intellectual independence and abandon reason, making the poem a "natural," uncontrolled production. In his discussion of eighteenth-century psychology, or theories of literary invention, Abrams does not address childbirth metaphors, but he does analyze the connection between these theories of invention and Newtonian science:

> There is a conspicuous parallelism between this basic pattern of mental activity and the elementary concepts of matter, motion, and force composing Newton's science of mechanics--although shorn, naturally, of the quantitative aspects of Newton's formulation. (Abrams 163)

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[16]The following excerpt from Edward Young's *Conjectures*, 1759, a work considered to have anticipated by decades many of the early romantic theories of genius and creativity, reinforces the break with figures like Dryden and Samuel Johnson in favour of Shakespeare:

> *Dryden*, destitute of *Shakespeare's* Genius, had almost as much learning as *Johnson*, and, for the buskin [doubtful], quite as little taste. He was a stranger to the Pathos, and, by number, expression, sentiment, and every other dramatic cheat, strove to make amends for it; as if a Saint could make amends for the want of conscience; a Soldier, for the want of valour; or a Vestal, of modesty. The noble nature of tragedy disclaims an equivalent; like virtue, it demands the heart; and *Dryden* had none to give. (82-83)

For Pope and his contemporaries, the artist is a "builder of orderly systems" who "bears indeed not a little resemblance to the Newtonian God--the creator as mathematician" (Castle 201). Similar attitudes occurred in interpreting the compositional process in music. Allen writes:

> Eighteenth-century rationalists had extolled early musicians as *inventors*, men who had advanced the art and science of music because of their reasoning powers, and as a result of their conscious efforts. (Allen 86, 87)

Neoclassic literary critics and poets reject the biological model of creativity as incapable of conscious control, as closer to the function of animals. It is surely no coincidence that during this same timeframe childbirth itself came to be considered animalistic, and the physical nursing of a child a disgusting act, something to be quickly delegated to someone of lower social standing than the mother. In her article "Maternal Indifference," Elisabeth Badinter questions a widely held historical interpretation that mothers maintained a detached attitude to their newborns as a defence mechanism against the high mortality rate amongst infants.[17] She turns this assumption on its head when she suggests that the frequent deaths of infants was a direct result of maternal neglect,[18] this latter being directly related to a kind of revulsion of the body. Breast-feeding was disparaged: "Beyond the fact that it would encourage an animalistic image of the woman as milk-cow, it was considered immodest" (Badinter 159). The practice of sending one's

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[17]Badinter quotes Montaigne's famous comment in this regard: "I lost two or three children during their stay with the wet nurse--not without regret, mind you, but without great vexation" (quoted in Badinter, 153).

[18]This was a rate of 25 per cent in France in the years 1740-89 (Badinter 170).

infant off to a nurse for an average of four years, never seeing or writing the nurse, was common.[19] By contrast those who nursed their own babies experienced dramatically lower mortality rates. In Lyon, for example,

> Mothers who nursed their babies and were aided by the charitable board between 1785 and 1788 lost, as a group, only 16 per cent during the first year. In contrast, according to Dr Gilibert, the mortality rate for children entrusted to nurses was devastating: "We found that the inhabitants of Lyon, both bourgeois and artisan, lost about two-thirds of their children under the care of hired nurses." (Badinter 172)

This short excursion into the history of family practices in France in the eighteenth century is a stark reminder of the relationship between lived experience and philosophical and aesthetic systems.

During romanticism birth metaphors flourished in no small part because Reason lost its place of primacy as the controlling instrument in creative production. Thus Shelley writes, "Poetry...differs in this respect from logic, that it is not subject to the control of the active powers of the mind, and that its birth and recurrence have no necessary connection with the consciousness or will" (*A Defence of Poetry* 43-44). Edward Young in his *Conjectures on Original Composition* asks, "For what, for the most part, mean we by

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[19]Badinter's archival work in Paris and Lyons during the eighteenth century uncovered reports such as these:

> One agent took six babies in a little cart and fell asleep, not noticing when one baby fell out and was crushed to death. Another, entrusted with seven infants, lost one so completely that no one was ever able to find out what happened to him. One old woman found herself with three newborns, not knowing where to place them. (163-64)

Genius, but the Power of accomplishing great things without the means generally reputed necessary to that end?" (26).

The critical rehabilitation of Shakespeare at the hands of the likes of A. W. Schlegel, Tieck, and Coleridge may have contributed in some way to the re-introduction of birth imagery in a more positive vein. Shakespeare's reliance upon childbearing tropes is so extensive that Elizabeth Sacks has devoted a whole book to their investigation, *Shakespeare's Images of Pregnancy*, 1980.

So widespread was the use of female generative imagery by poets and writers during the Renaissance that Sacks refers to this syndrome as "male womb-envy." Thomas Raynalde's book, *The Byrth of Mankynde, otherwyse named The Womans Booke*, written in 1560, describes woman's superior creative powers in a manner that might provoke masculine angst. The poet and critic Philip Sidney expresses particular fondness for birth imagery to depict the pregnant imagination and the travail of poetic agony. He refers to himself as "great with childe to speak," and in the dedication to his posthumous *Arcadia*, 1590, he offers his work, "this child, which I am loath to father" (Sacks 5-6). Reinforcing the idea of a "conception" in the brain was Renaissance medical language that compared the brain to the womb. The Old English term, "wamb," had two meanings which tended to converge: the cavities of the brain, of "ventricles" which also meant "little belly" or "little womb" (Sacks 2-4).

It is Sack's thesis that pregnancy functions as a primary creative principle throughout the work of Shakespeare. It forms a network of related figures underlining key

themes and animating the characters. For example, in *Measure for Measure*, "the tension between real and metaphorical pregnancy propels the drama forward" (53). Sacks traces the coalescence of the physical and spiritual--"man's ability to create a baby sexually and to conceive a brainchild cerebrally"--as the central spring of the play.

As one of the prime bearers of organicism in English literary criticism, Coleridge was not adverse to birth imagery. While I am not aware of anywhere in his Shakespearean criticism that Coleridge consciously explores generative imagery in the plays, Coleridge himself draws heavily upon them: "the everlasting broodings...of Hamlet's mind" (273),[20] the "dreadful conceptions" of Lady Macbeth's imagination (280), Mercutio--"the child of meditation" (246), *The Tempest*--"a birth of the imagination" (262), "The character of Caliban is wonderfully conceived" (266). One can only speculate that the ubiquity of images of pregnancy and birth in body and mind in Shakespeare's writings may have influenced the language of his critics, however unconsciously.

Sacks concludes her study of pregnancy images in Shakespeare with a marked shift in tone in the second last paragraph of her book, as though an insight long simmering had suddenly erupted:

> The poet views her [woman] as a distant, austere object while appropriating her biological function to describe his own literary excellencies. This appreciation of woman as silent and motionless, however physically appealing, contrasts oddly with the poet's unfettered adoration of his own fertile mind. The metaphor of generation served as the vehicle wherein

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[20]All of the references in this paragraph are drawn from *Coleridge: Poems and Prose*, selected by Kathleen Raine, 1957.

> writers displayed the infant products of their fertile genius to the public (103).

The interjection of this very feminist tone at the conclusion of Sack's book serves as a transition to the last section of the chapter.

## Feminist Investigation of Birth Imagery

In her 1989 study, *Gender and Genius*, Christine Battersby identifies misogyny at the centre of genius as outlined by Nietzsche:

> Since artistic creation is envisaged as an organic process, Nietzsche appropriates language associated with human gestation for the cultural tasks of the males. Creators are 'male mothers', caught up in 'spiritual pregnancy'.... (121)

Germaine Greer observes the irony in the male annexation of female reproductive powers:

> The poetic pregnancy motif is a pleasing paradox when applied to the male poet; its resonances when applied to the sex that regularly risked its life and health in actual childbirth can be unnerving. (Greer 1996, 22)

Pockets of feminist treatment of birth imagery are in evidence generally as part of the larger issues of women and nature; there is not a substantial body of literature addressing the subject in any depth. Susan Stanford Friedman's article, "Creativity and the Childbirth Metaphor: Gender Difference in Literary Discourse," takes into account the positionality of the reader and the author of creative childbirth tropes, and therefore presents a hitherto unexamined perspective on the subject. She claims, "This essay will contribute to it [the debate] by examining the ways in which women and men have encoded different concepts of creativity and procreativity into the metaphor itself" (74).

Friedman begins by noting an inconsistency at the heart of the metaphor. While the idea of procreation may spur men on to great works, physical procreation acts to inhibit women's creativity in the arts. Friedman writes, "The linguistic, religious, and historical resonance of the childbirth metaphor contradicts the fundamental comparison the metaphor makes" (76). It reminds one of the eternal feminine, which is the obverse of female reality.

Friedman makes the point that the reader's response to the metaphor is affected by knowledge of the author's sex. When the author is male, there is more at issue than the usual play of same and different involved in metaphorical tension: "The male metaphor is an analogy at war with itself" (78). The French word, *couvade*, conveys the operation. This is a primitive custom in which the husband of a wife in childbed, also takes to his bed and suffers a laboured, symbolic parturition. Friedman includes a short passage by Rev. Sidney Smith which satirizes the borrowing:

> He produced a couplet. When our friend is delivered of a couplet, with infinite labour, and pain, he takes to his bed, has straw laid down, the knocker tied up, and expects his friends to call and make inquiries. (79)

By contrast when the reader encounters a female author using the procreative metaphor, the biological and historical resonances no longer reinforce the barrier between creativity and procreativity like in a male text. "The intensification of collusion and congruity in the female metaphor allows the tenor and vehicle to mingle and fuse, while the same elements in the male metaphor remain irrevocably distinct" (Friedman 80).

The example of Katherine Philips' sixteenth-century poem, "The Matchless Orinda," an elegy for her child who lived just forty days, involves less tension because it is by a

woman whose personal experience serves to authenticate the poem. Both "labours" produce a poem that rebirths the son, affirming his immortality. Friedman concludes that "The distinction between female and male discourse lies not in the metaphor itself but rather in the way its final meaning is constituted in the process of reading." Friedman, however, fails to make a distinction between male and female readers of these metaphors, emphasizing exclusively the sex of the author and the differences in response this may evoke. Clearly she reads here as a woman in each interpretation.

In examining the writing of the childbirth metaphor, Friedman considers the notion that female procreativity is equal to male creativity. She rejects this as an idealizing of woman while her "real lack of authority to create art as well as babies" is obscured (84). On the contrary male appropriation of birthing imagery serves to perpetuate women's confinement to procreation.

Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* provides a unique exploration of male and female creativity. The monster produced from the womb of Frankenstein's brain was no beautiful human child. Shelley, whose famous mother Mary Wollstonecraft died giving birth to her, seems to be raising anxiety-ridden questions about both creative processes. What happens when men really appropriate women's procreativity, and what might happen if she, a female author, tries to create like a man?

In exploring childbirth tropes for male creativity, the impact upon women has been touched upon. What would happen if men used male images of procreativity? Would a refusal to appropriate women's reproductive functions be better? Apparently not. Sandra

Gilbert and Susan Gubar's *The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination* addresses what the authors consider to be the primary metaphor of artistic creativity, the phallus. They open their book with the question, "Is a pen a metaphorical penis?" and leave no doubt for any reader who scans their impressive 700 pages of documentation that the answer is yes. Their thesis is: "In patriarchal Western culture, ...the text's author is a father, a progenitor, a procreator, an aesthetic patriarch whose pen is an instrument of generative power like his penis" (6).

The long tradition of male use of female procreativity seems to have vanished in Gilbert and Gubar, but the results are no less inviting for women. Are male appropriations of childbirth metaphors or male generative metaphors just two sides of the same coin in the hands of male authors? I will refer to James Joyce's *Ulysses* in trying to assess this question:

> "Fatherhood, in the sense of conscious begetting, is unknown to man," Stephen [Dedalus] notes. "It is a mystical estate, an apostolic succession, from only begetter to only begotten. On the mystery and not on the madonna which the cunning Italian intellect flung to the mob of Europe the church is founded and founded irremovably because founded, like the world, macro- and microcosm, upon the void. Upon incertitude upon unlikelihood. *Amor matris*, subjective and objective genitive, may be the only true thing in life. Paternity may be a legal fiction." (Joyce 204-5)

Gilbert and Gubar utilize this passage as evidence of male anxiety over paternity and the need this creates for reassurances of male superiority and "compensatory fictions of the Word" (5). By contrast, Friedman quotes from a letter from Joyce to his wife Nora upon the completion of *Ulysses*:

> I went then into the backroom of the office and sitting at the table, thinking of the book I have written, the child which I have carried for years and years in the womb of the imagination as you carried in your womb the children you love, and of how I had fed it day after day out of my brain and my memory. (Joyce in Friedman 79)

Friedman also refers to Joyce's extended birth metaphor in the episode "Oxen in the Sun," in which Mrs. Purefoy labours for three days to produce a baby. During this time the narrator charts the gestation of literary styles from the earliest English poetics right up to its most recent modern manifestations according to the nine months of pregnancy, each style paralleling the stages of fetal development. Friedman observes that this comparison, far from comparing favourably the two functions, reinforces the sexual division of labour and the mind-body split. Gilbert and Gubar do not refer to this episode. It might challenge the singularity of the phallic metaphor if they did, but the results seem not to be influenced by creative metaphors of birth or phallus. Whether the model of creativity is God the Father creating the world ex nihilo, the phallus as pen, or the male appropriation of female procreativity, women are not taken seriously as creators of art.

The question of the relationship between symbols or myths of femininity and masculinity, and the lived experience of women and men, is a difficult one. There is definitely not an exact correlation; neither is there no relation at all. "No human creature can be completely silenced by a text or by an image" (Gilbert and Gubar 16). On the other hand, images can be very potent.

I would like to think that musicologists from the last two decades who question organicism include its genderedness as part of their investigation. With few exceptions,

this has not been the case. The last two chapters explore writings from the 1980s and 1990s which are marked by attention to organicism's centrality in musical studies, finding, however, very little awareness of how organicism has helped to organize social views of gender either within the discipline of music or beyond.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

## *MUSICOLOGICAL WRITINGS, 1980s-1990s: SOME ORGANICIST CONCEPTUALIZATIONS*

> In recent critical analyses, the celebration of heterogeneity, the description of texts as grafts or intertextual constructs, the interest in teasing out incompatible strands of argument or logics of signification, and the linking of a text's power to its self-deconstructive efficacy have all worked to deny to the notion of *organic unity* its former role as the unquestioned telos of critical interpretation. [my emphasis]
>
> Jonathan Culler[1]

In this chapter I will address musicological writings which grapple with the dependence of musical studies upon organicist imagery. If Solie's and Kerman's work indicated an increasing self-consciousness of organicism in musical discourse, how have subsequent analyses furthered the debate? Have the musical disciplines benefitted from the insights of other critical discourses which have questioned the network of assumptions evoked by the organic metaphor? In other words, how do musical writings measure up to the historical, feminist, and linguistic critiques of organicism outlined in the preceding chapters?

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[1]Jonathan Culler, 1982, 199-200.

By conducting library searches and tracking references in dissertations, books, and journal articles which address the topic of organicism in musical studies, I have been able to locate twenty some writings. With no book-length study of musical organicism available, all of these are articles from journals or anthologies, or chapters in larger works. There are many passing comments about the interconnection between organic figures and the various musical disciplines to be found in recent publications, but I have included only those which offer some sustained inquiry into the subject.[2] By "sustained," I understand

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[2]An example of a feminist musicological critique of autonomy, an important component of organicism, is found in Susan McClary's article "The Blasphemy of Talking Politics during Bach Year," in the anthology *Music and Society*, co-edited by McClary and Richard Leppert:

> Theories of music try to account for all events in a piece of music as manifestations of self-contained order, rather than as a more complex dialectical relationship between conventional norms and codes on the one hand and significant particularities and strategies on the other. (18)

While McClary targets a number of organic elements, such as autonomy and male genius, she does not address organicism in any concentrated manner. Her advocacy of socially-contexted music, however, stands in clear opposition to many organicist assumptions.

Similarly, the work of Lawrence Kramer approaches music from the broader context of cultural critique, being out of sympathy with a narrow organicist paradigm. An example of his resistance to organic models is seen in the chapter, "Beethoven's Two-Movement Piano Sonatas," in his book *Music as Cultural Practice 1800-1900*, 1990:

> Romantic esthetic theories typically posit a human creative faculty based on organic metaphors: a "blending, fusing power," as Coleridge described it, that animates the parts of a whole as life animates a body, so that the whole and the parts are vitally interdependent. Expressive doubling marks the blind spot in this organic model. Far from blending or fusing, it concentrates, repeats, reinterprets. (30, 31)

Kramer does not tackle organicism in a concentrated or extended manner, however rich his insights in opposition to many organicist components, spread throughout his oeuvre.

an article or chapter which devotes considerable space to the topic. I have tried to resist the pull of the expansive literature surrounding Schenkerian theory, much of which cannot avoid issues relating to Schenker's accent on the organic metaphor; if these articles did not address organicism directly or could add little to the debate, they were not included.[3]

In an effort to organize these materials so as to benefit most fully from their new insights into organicism, I have divided the inquiry into two parts which comprise Chapters Seven and Eight respectively: 1. Organicist Conceptualizations and 2. Critical Awareness of Language and Metaphor. These two headings are what rose to prominence from an initial grid of some 15 categories I used to query the articles. In addition to identifying engagement with the cluster components--unity, autonomy, totality, genius, nature, soul, growth--I noted where the writers pursued such topics as historical context (mechanicism, metaphysics/ideology, New Criticism, religious affiliations); language (rhetoric, metaphor, definitions of organicism, specific vehicle--plant, animal, human); and gender (feminist critique). At this point, some writers were eliminated (see footnote 3). The historical perspective was valuable, but did not add substantially to the investigation undertaken in Chapter Two. Broadening the category of "definitions of organicism" to "conceptualizations of organicism" permitted taking into account individual contributions

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[3]Among this genre are Keiler, "The Origins of Schenker's Thought: How Man is Musical," 1989; Pastille, "Music and Morphology: Goethe's Influence on Schenker's Thought," 1990; Cook, "Music Theory and 'Good Comparison': A Viennese Perspective," 1989; Benjamin, "Schenker's Theory and the Future of Music," 1981; Don, "Music and Goethe's Theories of Growth," a Ph.D. dissertation--all works which I have consulted.

which were relevant to an understanding of organicism but which were not strictly speaking definitions. It became clear from the heavy concentration of entries under "language" that great potential for a deeper study lay in this direction.

In exploring how musicologists have constructed organicism in recent years, I hope to foreground some of the central meanings and concerns surrounding the term, recognizing that, apart from specific times and places, defining organicism is an impossible exercise. The problem is not simply to identify various conceptualizations, but to learn to what extent musical scholars have engaged with the term's complexities. Some sources focus upon one or more components of organicism, such as "growth," "organic unity" or "organic coherence," while "organicism" as a more broadly defined cluster such as I have delineated, receives short shrift. The second category "Critical Awareness of Language and Metaphor," indicates both the concentration of interest in the sources themselves along with my judgement that it is in attention to rhetoric that some of the more astute evaluations may be found. With two exceptions, Snarrenberg's and Korsyn's articles, to be discussed in the next chapter, gender is not mentioned; therefore, no separate section could be allotted for this aspect of organicism.[4] Gender is still a blindspot on the land-scape of organicist aesthetics in music.

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[4]Korsyn acknowledges the importance of gender by referring his readers to other sources such as Lawrence Kramer that treat the subject more extensively. Snarrenberg's discussion of gender merits more analysis by virtue of the emphasis he gives it.

# CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF ORGANICISM

Nine authors make some effort to define organicism: Kassler, Bonds, Broyles, Montgomery, Bent, Lubben, Meyer, Hubbs, Levy. Some are very precise and others dwell on markers or signals that point to organicist devices. The order of presentation moves generally from more concise definitions to broader-based ones.

In her article "Heinrich Schenker's Epistemology, Philosophy of Music: An Essay on the Relations between Evolutionary Theory and Music Theory," 1983, Jamie Croy Kassler attempts to place Schenker in the broader intellectual tradition of his time by relating his theories to the evolutionary currents which influenced him. Kassler makes the assumption that an understanding of Schenker's historical-philosophical-scientific horizon will lead to a grasp of Schenker's reasons for his theory: "In the following essay we present the historical matrix which explains why Schenker adopts a particular solution to the music-theoretic problem" (223). It is Kassler's stated intention to demonstrate Schenker's particular brand of evolutionary development as a "creative theory," one distinct from evolutionary processes that are reduced "to natural selection, to dialectics or to any other mechanistic principle":

> To describe creative evolution, Schenker employs a psychological parallelism for he treats music as the image of human consciousness....Schenker holds that mind is an epiphenomenon of the physical world: ideas create our world; and music, as an image of consciousness, also creates, since the causes of its unfolding are immanent within the system of tonality itself. (247)

Kassler's definition of Schenker's organicism is formalistic and commences with a focus on "coherence":

> The first concept, organic coherence, refers to the interrelatedness of all parts constituting a whole composition. According to Schenker, such interrelatedness arises from, and is maintained by, the background of a composition. (223)

Elsewhere in the article, many other components of the organic cluster are mentioned, without, of course, being identified as participating in any organicist network. They are found primarily in its first two sections which trace Schenker's musical theory in its historical context. A connection to *spiritual qualities* is evident--"Only by means of organic coherence does music `drive toward the organic human soul'" (Schenker in Kassler 226); implicit in Schenker's organicism is the *teleological principle* where each stage "develops into the next by its very nature and cannot develop into any other" (232). The *Ursatz* always "signifies movement toward a specific goal" (Schenker in Kassler 225). *Unity* is uppermost in music's organic character: "Then, there is organic coherence, which Schenker believes to be the highest goal of music, since by means of organic coherence does music `drive toward the organic human soul'" (226). *Nature* plays no small role: "In Schenker's view of things, music could advance only when it conformed to nature..." (227). The *totality* of a musical work can be seen in Schenker's explanation of the Schopenhauerian "will": "By the term `will' Schenker denotes music's tendency toward becoming a self-contained organism...`a likeness of itself, without having recourse to outside associations'" (228). *Growth* is a characteristic common to both organisms and

music: "It should have been evident long ago that the same principle applies both to a musical organism and to the human body: it grows outward from within" (Schenker in Kassler 230). At the heart of Schenker's music theory is the *genius*: "Such a soul [predisposed to accept the background], which constitutes a peculiar enhancement of nature in man--being almost more art than nature--is given only to genius" (Schenker in Kassler 229). The composition as full of "secrets" is an ongoing theme (232, 234).

Kassler does not offer the configuration of a cluster to assist in understanding organicism. Her multiple references to music's comparison to organisms and description of Schenker's theory does not lead her to articulate a group of ideas functioning under the umbrella of a philosophical system termed "organicism." Kassler's recognition of the metaphorical dimension of Schenker's theory occurs in the context of identifying philosophical precedents, specifically Schopenhauer and Goethe (231-41). According to Kassler, Schenker's goal was to represent "both the permanence of the *Ursatz* and the flux of the transformation" (241). This he found in the metaphor, "Music is an organism with a life of its own" (240).[5]

Despite Kassler's sexually burdened citations, the gender and nature relationship fails to raise questions: "Schenker asserts that `nature will endure, indeed will conquer, in music also; *she* has revealed *herself* in the works of the *masters* and, in this form, *she* will

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[5]I found a new collection edited by Kassler in 1991 too late to include in this study, *Metaphor: A Musical Dimension*. My quick perusal of her article, "Man à la Mode: or Reinterpreting the Book of Nature from a Musical Point of View," suggests that her views have taken a different direction.

prevail" [my emphasis] (Schenker in Kassler 228). Other gender-laden language is also ignored--"procreation" (228), "birth," "born" (231), "pregnant" (232). Schenker's emphasis upon genius, always assumed male, also escapes examination: "Such a soul, which constitutes a peculiar enhancement of nature in *man*--being almost more art than nature--is given only to *genius*" [my emphasis] (229). The notion of "seed" as the mysterious essence of music's creative force also represents a masculine image: "The seed, by the grace of God, remains inaccessible even to metaphysics" (Schenker in Kassler 246).

Mark Evan Bonds's book *Wordless Rhetoric: Musical Form and the Metaphor of the Oration*, 1991, offers a second definition of musical organicism. This book appears to make an interesting parallel study to this dissertation, concerned as it is with metaphor and music. His definition occurs in Chapter Three, "Continuity and Change in Later Metaphors of Form," under the sub-heading "The Organic-Generative Concept of Form":

> According to this outlook, the component elements of every successful work of art must articulate in a manner analogous to the constituent parts of a living organism. The process of growth within a work, moreover, must be internally motivated. The shape of an organic whole is often held to be inherent in its germinal unit, with the whole existing in the part just as the part exists in the whole. (142)

Building on an anonymous writer of 1827, Bonds notes, "What grows and blooms in a musical movement is its central idea, usually the opening theme. It is this germinal unit that gives the movement its generative force." (143). Bonds draws attention to an important difference between the older oration metaphor and the organic figure:

> As an organism, the musical work is an object of contemplation that exists in and of itself. As an oration, the musical work is a temporal event whose purpose is to evoke a response from the listener. (145)

Bonds does not pursue how it is that a musical theme can actually "generate" a whole movement. He does not interrogate how works "grow."

Three other writers emphasize the "commonplace" quality of musical organicism: Broyles, Montgomery, and Bent. In his article, "Organic Form and the Binary Repeat," 1980, Michael Broyles underscores the "organic nature" of musical structure "as a fundamental point of departure" (339). He writes, "This is assumed as a characteristic of at least Western tonal music for the past several centuries, and it has become the principal frame of reference by which musical works are discussed and analyzed" (339).[6]

Broyles's argument is that the growing disinclination to repeat the second halves of binary structures was a direct result of the increasing adherence to the "organic metaphor" which made nonsense of such repetition. Broyles writes:

> For many years, musicologists, criticism theorists, and performers have had as a fundamental point of departure the organic nature of musical structure. This is assumed as a characteristic of at least Western tonal music for the past several centuries, and it has become the principal form of reference by which musical works are discussed and analyzed. (339)

The logic of classical forms may have called for repetition of sections in the interests of symmetry and proportion, but a structure driven by teleological development cannot

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[6] Ian Bent would disagree with this sweeping statement, positing other models--rhetoric, syntax, anatomy, and mechanics--as important paradigms prior to organicism's establishment (Bent 1994, 1).

justify large-scale repetition (356). Broyles's observation provides a concrete example of composition and/or performance practice change resulting from an organicist orientation to music.

David L. Montgomery traces musical organicism, not to Goethe, to whom the credit usually falls, but to Jean Baptiste Robinet (1735-1820), a prolific author, early evolutionist, historical and natural philosopher (61). In his 1992 article, "The Myth of Organicism: From Bad Science to Great Art," Montgomery argues that the nineteenth-century organic metaphor should be used for the music it first served and that the effectiveness of that service be examined (24). Robinet's concept of a "small primal element" preceded Goethe's *Urpflanz* or "generating plant" by twenty years and, according to Montgomery, was the intellectual model that nourished the nineteenth-century concept of organic development, notwithstanding the credit accorded Goethe for the preponderance of organic models (20).[7] By mid-nineteenth century, this view was deemed whimsical by biologists, according to Montgomery. Montgomery offers Robinet's version of a cell possessing a will to develop:

> All beings differ one from the other, but all those differences constitute natural variations of a prototype that may be regarded as the generating element of all beings....It is a germ [cell, monad] that has a natural

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[7]Unfortunately, Montgomery provides no evidence for his claim that "Robinet's simple prototype is the one most widely recognized to date as the basis of organic connections between musical movements and between parts of movements" (27). I was able to locate his name in a list of German *Naturforscher* ("investigators of nature") in *Romanticism and the Sciences*, edited by Cunningham and Jardine, but there was nothing to suggest the prominence Montgomery affords him (57).

> tendency towards self-development ....The cell develops itself thus, and every level of development produces a variation of the prototype--a new combination of the fundamental universal plan. Each level provides passage to a successive level.... (Robinet in Montgomery 18)

The musical counterparts to the prototypical cell are wilful, form-generating motives whose attraction is so compelling that they have "survived into the present day as a commonplace doctrine of theoretical musicology" (25).

If organicism is "a commonplace doctrine of theoretical musicology," it is not exactly clear what is meant by it: "Despite a long-standing recognition of organicism in nineteenth-century music, scholarship has not progressed much towards the classification of its diverse forms" (26). According to Montgomery, the biologically-derived prototype held great potential in music theory as a pure idea, its value as valid science having been discredited by the mid-nineteenth century (23).

What Montgomery objects to in the application of organicism to musical analysis is its extension to include "structural processes" as well as content:

> Thus, in identifying a phenomenon often called "organic form," many musicologists imply that a given structure actually arises from and derives its logic from the original motivic material instead of from a larger formal plan. (24)

The composer's careful arrangements and the "time-honored plans" of structures point to the illusory nature of these claims. Montgomery therefore rejects the following statement by Dahlhaus which appears to extend both prior to and after the nineteenth century:

> This [analysis of Liszt's *Hamlet*] lends more support to the theory that conceptions of musical form are based, in each era, on the characteristic types of thematic material, of melodic invention, than to the opposing

> notion, that thematic types are produced by formal ideas. (Dahlhaus quoted in Montgomery 26)[8]

Montgomery does not completely exclude the possibility that a complex motivic structure may foreshadow a large formal movement. He writes:

> It [a small, compact motivic cell] is transformed metaphorphically and developed throughout an artwork, imparting both unity and heightened thematic significance to hitherto unrelated structural sections and diverse events. (27)

Even in such cases, as for example, Beethoven's String Quartet, op. 135, the structure remains that of sonata form (30). It was only Schoenberg's pupil, Anton Webern, who was able to incorporate the idea of a motivic source becoming the determinant of a work's structure: "Only when the basic row types...began to be inseparable from motivic and thematic intentions may the idea of total variation indeed have come to pass" (39).

Montgomery brings to the fore the tension between claims that organic unity demands musical forms evolve from generative opening themes (or even inchoate, prototypes such as are posited for Beethoven's Ninth Symphony), and the composer's obvious dependence upon historical formal structures. This is the tension addressed by Dahlhaus between what he termed the schematic and the functional approaches to form. It is not clear that Montgomery identifies the pseudo-solution of organicism: the organism appears to embody both structural schema and functional units, thus solving the tension, but it is only solved figuratively, rhetorically.

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[8]Dahlhaus, *Between Romanticism and Modernism*, 47.

Montgomery's subsequent analyses of specific pieces, using the working out of the music according to organic prototypes as a means of evaluation, are problematic. There is a difference between analyzing a work to see if and how it might relate to the idea of prototypes, and in then judging the work on the basis of what has been converted into an aesthetic standard.

In the General Introduction to *Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. I, Ian Bent cites a statement of A. B. Marx, excerpted from his *Ludwig van Beethoven: Leben und Schaffen*, 1859, as typifying "the organic view of compositional process:"

> Each musical creation evolves, just as do organisms in nature, from a germ [*Keim*], which however, like vesicles or cells in plants and animals life-forms, must itself be a formation, a union of two or more elements (notes, chords, rhythmic units), an organism, if it is to be capable of propagating organisms. Such a germ is called a `motif'. Every composition rests upon one or more motifs. (Marx in Bent 14)

Bent observes, "Thereafter, the analogy with organisms becomes a commonplace in writing about music in the later nineteenth century" (14). Marx's imagery of "propagating organisms" resulting from "a union of two or more elements" is ripe for gender analysis, but Bent does not pursue gender. Bent's treatment of musical organicism is not about critique. He credits primarily Schenker and Schoenberg, two diehard organicists, with the transmission of "the organic model, aesthetic, and technical array of tools" directly into the twentieth century from the previous two centuries (17).

In his Ph.D. dissertation "Analytical Practice and Ideology in Heinrich Schenker's *Der Tonwille* and *Cantata Harmonia Munde*," Robert Lubben devotes one chapter to

"Philosophical Imagery and the Role of Metaphor." He critiques previous research which seeks to align Schenker with a particular philosophical school, producing what Lubben describes as "a collection of conflicting claims about Schenker's true intellectual lineage"(46).[9] Lubben sees these studies of Schenker's philosophical roots as "some hint of the breadth and depth of Schenker's intellectual ancestry" (46). It would be interesting to consider the absence of specific intellectual influences in Schenker's work. Missing is any significant attention to Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud.

What is unique about Lubben's definition of musical organicism is his nuancing of Schenker's use of it. Lubben offers two short passages from *Der Tonwille* as illustrations of Schenker's "literally biological type of organicism";

> Even the *Urlinie* obeys the laws of procreation--that is, of repetition--and with this primal drive is integrated into Nature--which is always growing and increasing--as a living component thereof. (TW I, 22)
>
> It is immediately evident here that the *Urlinie* has the form of a fundamentally three-note motive, whose reproductive urge gives birth to countless repetitions. (TW I, 38) [Lubben 49-50]

Lubben finds two "underlying assumptions" in Schenker's statements. The first locates in the *Terzzug*, the three-note motive, "the agent of unity in the composition" (50). Schenker

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[9]These include: 1. on Goethe--Gary, "Goethe and Schenker"; Pastille, "Music and Morphology: Goethe's Influence on Schenker's Thought"; 2. on Hegel--Michael Cherlin, "Hauptmann and Schenker: Two Adaptations of Hegelian Dialectics"; 3. on Kant--Kevin Korsyn, "Schenker and Kantian Epistemology"; 4. on Neo-Platonism--Jamie Kassler, "Heinrich Schenker's Epistemology and Philosophy of Music: An Essay on the Relations Between Evolutionary Theory and Music Theory"; 5. on Schopenhauer-- Nicholas Cook, "Schenker's Theory of Music as Ethics."

identifies in this motive what Lubben describes as "a paradigm for the melodic structure of every section of the piece" (50). The second assumption is about the composition process itself, the passive role of the "unconscious genius" in acting as the conduit for transmission of "the natural will--here the reproductive urge--of the tones" (50).

A more substantial passage from Schenker is offered to illustrate the second aspect of organicism subsequent to the earlier, literal, biological type:

> But how limited all of this richness is when compared to the surpassing richness of fantasy by which the Master conveys the *Urlinie* from its ethereal world into reality! In relation to a genesis [*Lebenswerdung*] that causes original creations to arise and blossom, on account of whose beauty and multifariousness one remains completely unaware of the fundamental dictate of the idea, in relation to such a genesis, how cheap and shallow are the words ornamentation and diminution!
> Let us step closer to this world of wonder! (TW I,39) [51].

Lubben interprets this passage as celebrating the diversity and complexity of the surface materials developing from the *Terzzug*-kernel. He sees the possibility of this passage supporting a number of philosophical antecedents--Hegel, Aristotle--but more importantly, he is convinced that Schenker "simply wishes to convey to the reader the vitality of this subject" (52).

Lubben describes two passages from *Der Tonwille* as examples of an ontological assumption associated with organicism, "that ultimate reality is located in the *Urlinie* and in deep-level voice leading, not in the shifting appearances of the foreground" (52). Reality is located in the background and appearance in the foreground. Neo-Platonic overtones are not difficult to recognize here. The composer/seer grants to his notes a life

rich in themselves yet in perfect agreement with a life existing behind and above them (52). Schenker captures this reality/appearance dichotomy in further contrasts of listening and analysis: "mystery and epiphany" and "deception and revelation" (53). A well-known example of this phenomenon is Schenker's explanation of harmonies that are dissonant on the local level but are consonant in the background.

While Lubben interprets the studies mentioned above on Schenker's philosophical roots as evidence of "the breadth and depth of Schenker's intellectual ancestry," what the proliferation of research also highlights is the difficulty of determining this "ancestry." Given that these ideas circulated so widely in the intellectual environment of Vienna during Schenker's time,[10] it is at least not unflattering to place Schenker in the company of Leibniz, Kant, Goethe, and Schopenhauer.

Lubben does not call into question Schenker's "literally biological type of organicism," or the troubling practice of eliminating the tension between the tenor and vehicle, between the music and the metaphorical organism. When all distance is denied, the musical work becomes as it were a metaphysical specimen, available to believers. This wholly naturalizing operation of language which turns one mode of being, music, into another mode of being, nature, is the essence of aesthetic ideology.

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[10]*Wittgenstein's Vienna* by Janic and Toulmin bears out this observation.

Although his views have not been uniform on the subject, Leonard B. Meyer's writings have expressed an interest in the aesthetic problem of unity over many years.[11] Meyer addresses issues of musical unity in the chapter "Romanticism--The Ideology of Elite Egalitarians," in *Style and Music: Theory, History, and Ideology*, 1989. He notes, "Organicism was crucial for the history of music because it furnished the central metaphors of Romantic aesthetics" (190). Meyer ties the high value of aesthetic unity to social and psychological needs:

> The search for--and the importance accorded to--underlying processes and principles was (and continues to be) significantly a consequence of the need to stabilize the 'conceptual/behavioral' world for the sake of envisaging and choosing. This need became especially pressing because of the presence of rapid and radical cultural change beginning with the second half of the eighteenth century. (195)

In "A Pride of Prejudices; Or, Delight and Diversity," 1991, he produces his strongest criticism of the principle of organic unity in music. His definition of organicism is quite extensive:

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[11]In his *Explaining Music*, 1973, Meyer identifies the circular nature of Reti's arguments about unity:

> His position virtually compels him to discover the kinds of relationships he has hypothesized. For if the value of a work depends (as it does almost by definition) upon unity, and if unity in turn depends upon the 'variation of one identical musical thought,' then, if an acknowledged masterpiece is being analyzed, the hypothesized thematic process must willy-nilly be uncovered. (64)

Meyer does not go so far as to reject the need for unity. Rather, he puts it on an entirely different footing than Reti's: "Though this function of conformance may be important, its significance is *psychological* and generic rather than aesthetic and specific. It is a necessary condition for comprehension, not for aesthetic relationship" (70).

> A composition is considered to be more coherent and intelligible, more significant and aesthetically valuable, if every pitch and every pattern can be traced to a single germinal cell, and if all relationships can be understood as instantiations of a single, underlying principle or scheme. In the Romantic view, the oneness of art is organic, and the belief is bedded with others growing in the ideological garden---for instance, nourishing notions about a composition's logic and inevitability, a bourgeois infatuation with the virtues of artistic economy, and, above all, a deeply rooted belief in the fertile force and necessity of natural relationships as opposed to the contingency and conventionality of cultural constraints. (241)

Meyer clearly recognizes the connection between musical "coherence" and aesthetic "value." He insists that until some explanation, rather than a description of how musical "growth" occurs, one cannot escape circular reasoning (246). The biological vocabulary highlights the relations of organicism to this model from the life sciences: "germinal cell," "bedded with others growing in the ideological garden," "natural relationships."[12] "Inevitability" is another component Meyer associates with biology, what I have termed "teleology": "In addition to being gradual and necessary, organic processes were conceived of as being goal-directed, a view that was also incorporated into nineteenth-century biological theory...(*Style and Music*, 195).

While acknowledging the metaphorical quality of organicism, Meyer does not capitalize on this insight. What Meyer does articulate is the mediated nature of all cultural experience--"There are no innocent eyes or naive ears for any member of any culture"

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[12]Meyer attributes organicism in music to a biological source repeatedly: in *Style and Music*, "The core metaphor of organicism is that of a seed germinating and developing into a full-blown flowering plant." Here he quotes Coleridge's illustration of a crocus (192). See further 195, 196.

(250); however he does not draw attention to the role of language in participating in this mediation. His recognition of the cluster effect of organicism is reflected in the phrase "bedded with others growing in the ideological garden," followed by a list of some of these components. The "bourgeois infatuation with the virtues of artistic economy" illustrates Meyer's emphasis upon the historical and cultural forces at work in musical composition, an idea he pursues with conviction.

A most telling example of the usefulness of an historicist orientation can be seen in Meyer's treatment of the different expression of musical unity stemming from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[13] Whereas the eighteenth century established musical unity through its recognition of "functional, syntactic hierarchies" and "conventions of form and genre," the nineteenth century's repudiation of conventions and new interest in diversity called for different mechanisms of unity. According to Meyer, these were located in "similarity relationships--usually through derivation from, or transformation of, a single germinal motivic seed or cell" (242).

The attraction to "natural relationships" at the expense of "cultural constraints" is an outstanding mark of musical organicism. In elaborating on another organic component, autonomy, and its related method of formalism, Meyer returns to this dichotomy:

> Behind such unmitigated formalism lies a profound faith in the primacy of nature, in the proposition that the perception, comprehension, and response

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[13]It is interesting to compare Dahlhaus's chronology with Meyer's here. Dahlhaus situated the "functional" in the twentieth century and the schematic in the nineteenth.

> to music is not dependent on learning, experience, and knowledge, but solely on the gift of innate, natural sensitivity. (248)

Missing in Meyer's discussion is something more than a passing reference to the importance of language in organicism and any recognition of gender.

The next two writers who consider definitions, Hubbs and Levy, reflect the fluidity of organicism over time, its cluster character as a constellation of interconnected ideas, all of which are linked in various ways to historical and philosophical influences.

Hubbs devotes almost one half of her 126-page Ph.D. dissertation "Musical Organicism and its Alternatives," to "Defining the Organic Principle," her Part One, in effect, more like an investigation of the organic principle. Hubbs offers the designation "ubiquity paradox," for what she sees as "the strength in silence exercised by the organic principle" (8). Rarely given conscious attention, organicism nonetheless "remains a core value in our creative and critical activities, whether or not we recognize its tenets and manifestations" (7). Hubbs's preliminary definition is stated early in the study:

> Current organic aesthetics has evolved from historical prescripts that a work of art should exhibit the characteristics of a living organism....I shall define organicism here in terms of a dialectic principle that embraces unity (of parts and whole) and growth, and gives rise, in some organicist thinking, to several secondary attributes and dispositions.... (3)

By "attributes," Hubbs indicates the "necessary and adequate conditions for the presence of organicism in a musical work;" by "dispositions," she refers to the "attitudes that may accompany organicist thought" (29, 30). I have extracted the attributes and dispositions into columns:

*ATTRIBUTES*

UNITY of parts and whole
"the most essential attribute of organicist thought" (12)

Secondary Attributes of UNITY:(29)
necessary form
essential permeation
greater whole than sum of parts (13)

Other aspects of unity:
closure & autonomy (17)

GROWTH (13)

Secondary Attributes of GROWTH
metamorphosis (14)
teleology (14)

*DISPOSITIONS*

natural-law rationale of beauty
opposition of the organic and mechanical
artist as unconscious genius (30)
organism metaphor (30)

Hubbs claims along with Orsini that the "attributes" of organicism are not derived from the metaphor but from "'the relation of the parts to the whole'" (Orsini in Hubbs, 29). While "only attributes can be ascribed to the abstract structure of an artwork,...the dispositions can be ascribed to the individual or culture of which the artwork arises" (30). Hubbs separates the attributes and dispositions, acknowledging a "relationship of interdependence" between them. By contrast, Pastille 1984 identifies the inseparability of Schenker's organicist attributes with his disposition of the "artist as unconscious genius" (Pastille 30). Hubbs continues:

> The organism metaphor was the launching site of the organic principle, whence all development of organicist doctrine originated; but the organic principle, early inextricable from the metaphor, has taken on a life of its own such that its manifestations now can be identified and discussed in absence of any organism metaphor. (30)

Hubbs distinguishes between the organic principle, "a dialectic of *unity and growth*," and the organic metaphor derived from "scientifically untenable notions of organic constitution" (28).

In her explication of nature and genius in which she quotes many passages from Goethe, Webern, Schoenberg, and Schenker, among others, Hubbs never questions the ideas raised, choosing rather to report on them. Her treatment of the organic "dispositions," supposedly separate and unessential to the organic "attributes," presents an explanation of organicism quite at odds with mine. As she probes the various "dispositions," they become more and more difficult to extricate from the "attributes." Her following statement has the effect of undoing the separability of the two by making the "disposition" of genius into an "attribute": "Implicit or explicit in all of these conceptions of the artist as unconscious genius is a view of the work of art as a somewhat self-generating natural entity that best thrives with minimal intervention on the part of the artist" (36).

Hubbs's divorce of the organic metaphor from the organic principle is less than convincing, especially when one looks more closely at the attributes which are claimed to derive from "the relation of the parts to the whole," not the metaphor. Her dependence upon Orsini's understanding of organicism merits a closer look. This is the passage from

Orsini which supports the distinction considered "crucial" by Hubbs between the organic "principle" and the "metaphor":

> This principle [of organic unity] is sometimes referred to as the organic "simile" or even the organic "metaphor," particularly by critics who want to get rid of principles in general and reduce all ideas to metaphors, and thence to nonsense....The organic principle can easily be distinguished from the accompanying metaphor: the principle defines the relation of the parts to the whole, using terms that are not derived from animal life--but more general, and the simile points to its analogy in members of a living body, but they are not one and the same. (Quoted in Hubbs, 28)

Orsini represents the view that ideas couched in metaphors are bereft of cognitive meaning and risk being reduced to "nonsense." This position harks back to the philosophical desire to exclude rhetoric from the serious business of philosophizing. According to his criterion, Orsini needs to eliminate the metaphor in order to legitimate his aesthetic principle. However, in distinguishing the "organic principle" from the "metaphor," he is unable to avoid falling back onto the metaphor. First, regarding "the principle defines the relation of the parts to the whole": the two competing depictions of this relation of parts and wholes depend upon two tropes: the machine and organism. I doubt that Orsini endorses a mechanistic relationship of parts and wholes. This has historically been the alternative to organicism in aesthetics. Second, "using terms that are not derived from animal life but more general," does not really explain what the "more general" option not derived from animal life might be. Third, the passage, "the simile points to its analogy in members of a living body, but they are not one and the same," suggests a figural comparison not unlike a metaphor. Toning down the comparison from being a metaphor

to a "simile" or "analogy" may be an attempt in the direction of distancing, but it is less than convincing, especially in light of how Hubbs proceeds to utilize this explanation. Both the secondary attributes of unity and growth point to "natural" features: "necessary form," "essential permeation," "metamorphosis," and "teleology." Clearly "growth" itself is a metaphor when applied to art. Neither musical motives nor poetic lines can grow in and of themselves. When the organic principle is defined as "a dialectic of unity and growth," in effect it has just displaced the organic metaphor onto the growth metaphor. Rhetoric continues to reside at the heart of the organic principle.

In discussing the dispositions of organicism in more detail, Hubbs runs into some difficulty in explaining the "organism metaphor" as non-essential to the concept. She writes, "The term metaphor is construed in the broad sense here, subsuming all manner of simile or analogy" (37). This concession drains Orsini's distinction of all vitality; the "analogy" of a "living animal" is designated metaphorical by this broader definition of metaphor. The following passage illustrates Hubbs's problem in trying to extricate the organism metaphor from the principle, being unable to ignore the pronouncements of one of the leading exponents of musical organicism:

> Arnold Schoenberg...invokes no organic attribute or disposition other than the organism metaphor: the ascription of meaning to the "living organism" is left to the reader.
>
> > "Used in the aesthetic sense, form means that a piece is *organized*; i.e., that it consists of elements functioning like those of a living *organism*." [emphasis in text] (Schoenberg quoted by Hubbs, 37, 38)

In trying to maintain the attributes of unity and growth as more fundamental to the metaphor itself in Schoenberg's statement, Hubbs produces this explanation: "One might conjecture that notions of unity and growth are implicit in Schoenberg's 'living *organism*,' although only the disposition of the organism metaphor is explicit here" (37). The inescapability of "organic" metaphors--growth, teleology, "living bodies," metamorphosis--points to the intrinsicality of the organism metaphor, rather than any easy separation from its aesthetic principle. The substitution of a new set of nature-dependent metaphors for the primary organism leaves untouched whatever embarrassment reliance upon a metaphor originally created.

In her article "Covert and Casual Values in Recent Writings About Music," Janet Levy performs some very deft discourse analysis, even if she does not call it that. Whereas Hubbs tries to separate out parts of the organic system, Levy puts any definition of musical organicism in an unavoidably composite configuration. She chooses "package" rather than "cluster." The following explanation appears in a footnote but is, I believe, central to her whole treatment:

> A perhaps crude analogy between the traveler's "tour package" or "package deal" and the "package" of metaphoric vocabulary that goes with the organic metaphor may be suggestive. The tourist buys the package and does not choose the individual parts (for example, the hotel, the length of stay in a given place, the place of the meals that are included, etc.). One's faith is in the overall quality of the package. Similarly, once the organic metaphor is invoked, the vocabulary of much of the rest of an analysis is given. The initial value judgment--say, that the work is good--is made and once any of the metaphors of organicism is used all the rest are automatically legitimate; the component parts, as with the component parts of the tour package, are not individually chosen. Thus, for instance, the

> basis for value as resident in one musical event's *foreshadowing* another goes unquestioned because "foreshadowing" is part of the organicist package. [emphasis in text] (4)[14]

Levy is not so concerned to define organicism, as to track how it actually functions to inhibit criticism, by terminating careful critique once some aspect of it has been evoked. Her interest is in tracing the "covert values" carried along by the metaphor, with music criticism and analysis derived from organicism passing too often as "objective description" (4). Her language analysis will be explored later, but her depiction of the organic metaphor as a package of components always valued positively, is a presentation with parallels to my cluster designation.

It would have strengthened Levy's argument if she had explained that the parts of the organic group cohere not through some kind of organic necessity itself, but as a result of historical, philosophical, and metaphorical entanglements which are very persistent. These organic components lie not too far beneath the surface even in more sanitized structuralist versions of organic musical analysis, as Kerman has demonstrated.

Broyles and Bent emphasized the widespread scope of organicist dependency in musical scholarship, its status as "commonplace." Montgomery's discussion of Robinet's cellular prototype highlighted the tension between composers' work within established musical forms and the organicist claim that content and form are fused. If his exposition was lacking in precision, Lubben's effort to suggest some variation within the organic

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[14]"Foreshadowing" is premised upon teleological assumptions embedded in organicism.

model in Schenker's theory was a rare recognition of the lack of singularity of the metaphor. Meyer also drew attention to the changing perceptions of musical unity, connecting these to historical and cultural contingencies. Hubbs's attempt to break down the organic components into necessary and contingent parts might have been better served by a depiction that allowed for the parts to come and go, or to move in and out of a position of prominence. Her insistence upon the separation of the organic principle from the metaphor was unconvincing and succeeded only in drawing attention to the inadequacy of her grasp of the language dimension of mediation in representation. Levy's "traveller's package," as an analogy of the organicist package, evoked the idea of elements within the package going along without conscious choice.

In attempting to define organicism, none of the writers above hint at any problem with the transformation of modes of being from the domain of nature to music via language, although Meyer is clearly uneasy with the organicist dependence upon "natural" explanations. Hubbs and Levy express some disquiet with how this works in analysis and criticism, but they are vague about the role of language even while they express other insightful observations. There is a complete silence on discussion relating to gender, all the while the discourse is rife with sexual imagery, especially relating to propagation.

The historical component receives by far the most careful treatment as is seen in Broyles, Bent, Kassler, Lubben, Meyer, and Hubbs. What is missing in historical treatments is any attempt to discover what issues gave rise to organicism. The focus on origins or intellectual ancestry does not necessarily point to how organicism functioned or

why it was appealed to in different times and places. For example, demonstrating the resonance of Schenker's organicist philosophy with Goethe, Kant, or Schopenhauer places this early twentieth-century figure in the thought of the previous century and reveals very little about his musical theories which resonate more with the eighteenth century.

# CHAPTER EIGHT

## *MUSICOLOGICAL WRITINGS, 1980s-1990s: CRITICAL AWARENESS OF LANGUAGE AND METAPHOR*

This chapter forms the second half of the investigation of musicological writings. Here it is the musicologists' linguistic analyses of musical literature that I am assessing. Whether one terms their operation a deconstructive move, a close reading, discourse analysis, or claims no nomenclature whatsoever, the procedure involves a careful scrutiny of language--especially figures of speech--with a view to locating logical inconsistencies or gaps in the argument. Often the seemingly marginal takes on a new significance as attention to it puts central assumptions in a different, sometimes opposing light to the main ideas. But it is not just the musicologists' criticism of other texts that is at issue; sometimes it is the critics' rhetoric that becomes the focus.

Fred Maus's article "Hanslick's Animism," 1992, offers a recent example of a reading that pays close attention to metaphors and other figures of speech to see how they support, weaken, or even damage the line of an argument (278, 282). Maus reveals an unsettling disjunction between Hanslick's expressed adherence to music's purely formalist properties (music as "sounding form") and imagery which points to issues of gender and sexuality. Maus suggests that one of the things contemporary scholars can learn from a critical study of Hanslick is that other musical experiences are lost in a view which

privileges musical structure over emotion. Exclusive focus upon music's formalist properties potentially obscures what Maus has revealed as embedded in Hanslick's musical discourse, if denied in his theories, namely "the animistic and erotic qualities that listeners find in music" (292).

How have musicological writings on organicism since 1980 taken linguistic phenomena into account? I will review the writings in three groups: 1. those that do not express a concern for the role of language in organicism; 2. those that acknowledge a linguistic dimension to the study of organicism, if minimally; and 3. those that implicate language centrally in explaining organicism's pervasiveness in musical studies. It is to this third group that I will direct most of my attention.

Among the *first group* I have included Kerman 1980 and Kassler 1983. While Kerman does not talk about language as such, he does make note of the disparity between Forte's meticulous exclusion of "all affective or valuational terms" in *The Compositional Matrix*, and Forte's musical evaluations conveyed through a selection process that is undeclared. If the self-conscious treatment of linguistic components in relation to organicism in these writers is negligible, it is also the case that much can be gleaned by focussing upon the language of the essays themselves. This is especially relevant with regard to Kassler's article which is concerned to demonstrate Schenker's model of human consciousness as organic. Because Snarrenberg's 1994 essay also has Schenker's orientation to human consciousness as its subject, I shall postpone dealing with Kassler's essay here and examine it later in conjunction with Snarrenberg.

The *second group* includes Solie, Broyles, Pastille, Hubbs, Bent, and Lubben. Solie's placement of her discussion within a linguistic framework has already been noted:

> As linguists have been telling us for some time now, language is not merely reflective but actually constitutive of our awareness, constellations of language like that surrounding the figure of the organism tend to shape and control the observations of the analyst using them. (Solie 1980, 147)

Her attention to the metaphorical orientation of the organicist system revealed other suppositions in operation evoked by the metaphor, if not always derived directly from it. German and English idealist philosophy are among these ideas implicated (149). Broyles's formulation of the problem of repeat signs in sonatas illustrates a unique approach to the subject. Tracing a decline in the repeat of the development and recapitulation to the 1780s, with its near demise by 1800, Broyles proposes a relationship between a changing "aesthetic base" derived from a dynamic organicism and a pattern of repetition which no longer fits the new model (344-45). While his focus is not particularly on vocabulary, he does note a similarity in the depiction of music as organism, with music as drama, especially in connection with the sonata form when it comes to descriptive terms: "Other related words, such as inevitability, inner logic, compulsion, teleological, dynamic, coherence, and intensity also appear frequently in the modern literature and with such ubiquity as to preclude precise citation" (352). Broyles identifies the metaphorical character of organic aesthetics (340, 354), but like Solie, he does not pursue the linguistic thread.

In his article, "Heinrich Schenker, Anti-Organicist," William Pastille charts Schenker's change from scepticism regarding organicism in music to total embrace of it. Pastille draws attention to an important point: that it was Schenker's understanding of genius, as operating at its fullest capacity when working unconsciously, that enabled music to be organic. As a product of organic genius, the music therefore could be organic. The transfer of a mental process (an unconscious one within a genius) into a musical work by means of a linking metaphor involves an ontological understanding that is theological in nature. Pastille refers to the "organic analogy" (31) and the "organic metaphor" (32), but does not develop any language-based insights from this observation.

Hubbs's concentration upon defining organicism in Part One of her dissertation, "Musical Organicism and Its Alternatives," does problematize the role of language. Hubbs recognizes the organic metaphor as a conduit for unexpressed assumptions, a situation where the ubiquitous expression of organicist imagery and presuppositions invades musical discourse without declaring itself. She writes:

> For all its prevalence, musical organicism receives surprisingly rare conscious attention, but this has not loosened its grasp on our collective aesthetic consciousness: organicism remains a core value in our creative and critical activities, whether or not we recognize its tenets and manifestations. (7)

Having remarked upon some role for language in preserving the organic viewpoint, Hubbs does not pursue linguistic models; her orientation is primarily historical and analytical.

Ian Bent is a music theorist who initiates discussion of the rhetoric of music analysis. I have already noted his reference to rhetoric as an important clue to theories in

the introduction of the previous chapter. Bent carries this observation a step further as he records the social implications of Schenker's language and ideas in his article, "History of Music Theory: Margin or Center?"

> It can be demonstrated that Schenker saw the dynamic relationship of foreground and background as playing out not only in music, nor yet only throughout the arts, but also in human society. Foreground associates in his mind with the teeming organic life, the synthesis and the chaos of the human race; background with the elevated mental and spiritual activity of certain superior human beings....I am proposing...that the notion of background in Schenker's writings has a valency that extends far beyond its implications for music alone. (Bent 1992, 20)

Bent's writing which specifically addresses organicism is found in the "General Introduction" to volume I of *Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century*. In his Preface, Bent quotes Hans Keller's chastisement of those who confuse description and analysis: "'The description is senseless, the metaphorical usually nonsense'" (xi). Bent does not build on Keller's comments regarding the metaphorical. Rejecting Keller's distinction, Bent proposes a different criterion for analysis: a writer's self definition. In other words, if a writer claims to be doing analysis, then he is doing analysis. A few pages on, he notes positively some work on a "systematic investigation of metaphor in analytic discourse about music." In the next paragraph he writes, "A significant group of thinkers is nowadays prepared to acknowledge that figurative writing containing these categories of language usage [a mixture of technicality, simile, metaphor] has a legitimate place in analytical discourse" (xv). As noted earlier, Bent describes the centrality of the organic figure in 1859 prompted by a criticism by A. B. Marx.: "Thereafter, the analogy with

organism becomes a commonplace in writing about music in the later nineteenth century" (14). However, Bent's orientation is primarily historical. He does not use this introduction as an opportunity to emphasize the unique role of language.

Robert Lubben's chapter "Philosophical Imagery and the Role of Metaphor" is sprinkled with references to Schenker's metaphorical language, in particular his dependence upon music as organism (47, 50, 52-54). Lubben's focus is upon how Schenker used his metaphors, not upon what wider meanings are produced by the metaphorical language. His aim is to critique accounts of Schenker's philosophical underpinnings which narrow influences to a single source, such as Goethe or Kant (55), not to challenge any ideas which might be related to Schenker's philosophical assumptions via metaphors. Thus Lubben cites an assumption of the organic metaphor whereby a "'three-note motive, whose reproductive urge gives birth to countless repetitions'" involves "the close association between organicist thought and Schenker's theory of unconscious genius" (Schenker and Lubben 50). The Schenker passage with its metaphors of "reproductive urge" and "birth" linked with passive genius prompt no further discussion from Lubben.

The *third group* includes Bonds, Levy, Snarrenberg, Kassler, Street, Kingsbury, Korsyn, and Meyer. Bonds's *Wordless Rhetoric: Music Form and the Metaphor of the Oration* addresses the timeframe just prior to the full expression of musical organicism. Bonds traces "the shift in the metaphors used to describe form" as a key to understanding "basic premises of form" (3). Based upon the metaphor of music as language, instrumental music (textless, non-programmatic music) was portrayed as "a kind of wordless oration

whose purpose was to move the listener" (4). Bonds explains this historical aesthetic shift: "While parallels between music and rhetoric had long been recognized, it was not until the eighteenth century that music came to be described as a language in its own right, independent of any verbal text" (4).[1]

Bonds explores some of the implications of this model. As an oration, music was understood more as a temporal phenomenon viewed primarily from the perspective of the listener. The change to the metaphor of an organism witnessed the centrality of the work as an integrated whole with an emphasis upon the spatial perspective rather than the temporal. The ascription of spatiality to organic form is a function of the depiction of a work as "a simultaneously integrated whole" (4).

Bonds then considers some of the issues deriving from the metaphorical status of oration. He quickly dispels the old philosophical notion that "mere" metaphors are to be eliminated as an inferior mode in favour of a literal meaning, insisting that some ingrained metaphors function as "cognitive instruments, actively shaping our apprehension of the broader network of ideas related to the original metaphor" (6-7). Bonds's distinction between music as oration and music as organism is instructive:

> As an organism, the musical work is an object of contemplation that exists in and of itself. As an oration, the musical work is a temporal event whose purpose is to evoke a response from the listener. (145)

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[1]Bonds provides an expansive historical treatment of the musical oration in his Chapter 2, "Rhetoric and the Concept of Musical Form in the Eighteenth Century," 53-131.

Bonds sees the schematic, structural, spatial representation of music as undermining its fundamentally temporal nature (147).

I found Bonds's book to be most insightful in tracking the shift to instrumental music and the changing aesthetic base which accompanied it. His initial attention to metaphor notwithstanding, this book does not engage in linguistic analysis. For example, he uses the term "generative" repeatedly without connecting it to its very biological roots, meaning procreative: "The generative approach to form...has proven its analytical value so consistently that it needs no defense, here or elsewhere" (16). He does not address the inconsistency in discussing "generative" form within an oratorical paradigm.

Broad philosophical implications entangled with language are not the subject of the study. Bonds seems to be unaware of the problems associated with reducing the distance between tenor and vehicle. For example, he writes, "Metaphors are necessarily limited, for a total congruence of characteristics between terms or objects would amount to nothing less than identity" (6). This statement indicates the need for difference in metaphorical comparisons, but it does not address the complexities of metaphorical function. It would have been interesting for Bonds to have explored further the relationship between the spatial/temporal dimensions and the oration and organic metaphors. The larger issue of referentiality is evoked in these comparisons. The "limited" nature of metaphors to which Bonds refers and the inappropriate identity to which a complete fusion of tenor and vehicle would lead relates to the contrast between metaphor or symbol and allegory. As de Man explains:

> Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference. (de Man 1983, 207)

Earlier on the same page de Man writes, "Their relationship [of the symbol and image] is one of simultaneity, which, in truth, is spatial in kind, and in which the intervention of time is merely a matter of contingency, whereas, in the world of allegory, time is the originary constitutive category" (207).

Bonds's considerable contribution is in music history, one which has neglected the oration metaphor. While informed by more recent studies in metaphor, the latter are not a principle focus but rather a platform from which to launch his historical study.

In her essay, "Covert and Casual Values in Recent Writings About Music," Janet Levy takes up where Joseph Kerman left off in his paper, "How We Got into Analysis, and How to Get Out," with the refusal of "sophisticated and serious scholars" to make "*explicit* value judgments" (3). Musical evaluation is assumed in the choice of repertoire to be analyzed, according to Kerman. Levy insists that there are not only "casual values" after the manner of Kerman's description, but also "covert" ones which are by definition suspect. Levy describes her writing as "a modest effort in consciousness-raising"; she is participating in what literary theory has been doing for sometime--raising questions about rhetoric and about underlying ideologies via attention to language. Her interest is in:

> how certain values--whether those that can be broadly viewed as under the influence of the organic metaphor or other values that have more eclectic sources--are covertly used in recent writings about music. (5)

Levy traces many of the most persistent covert values to the organic metaphor, what she terms the "flowering-from-seed" metaphor. Its more open manifestations include: "germ," "kernel idea," "seed," or the ideas "created continuity," "foreshadowed," "unified," "prefigured," among many others (4). Its less "flowery guises" make it more difficult to identify when they appear in musical analyses. The word "generative" is a favourite, suggesting a work's opening somehow determines or calls forth the rest of the piece. This vocabulary coupled with an analytic demonstration is presumed to demonstrate a work's unity or "goodness" (5, 6). Levy illustrates her point with excerpts from Carl Schachter, Allen Forte, Kofi Agawu, Mosco Carner, and Charles Rosen, all of whom draw attention to the unfolding of a work from opening motifs (6).

Another term frequently met which involves "unquestioned" value is "economy," one not invariably, but more often than not, "connected with an organicist orientation through the notion that nature is economical" (7). Economy is also related to organic unity in the sense that, "The presumed `demonstration' of organic unity is also a demonstration of underlying or concealed economy" (8). Levy's treatment of "economy" as a covert value illustrates some of the insights available through careful attention to one word.

Levy examines four different expressions of economy in music: thematic, textural, orchestral, and idiomatic writing for an instrument. Thematic economy is prized very highly and therefore I have chosen this one to explore. Thematic economy was associated early on with Haydn's symphonies which Paul Henry Lang describes: "The themes were

whittled down to their most elemental and plastic simplicity, permitting an unlimited thematic use" (Lang in Levy 7).[2] What prompted Haydn to produce themes allowing greater potential for variety and spontaneity may have had nothing to do with the value of economy as a social practice. It was in the critics' description of them as economical that the social value became mapped onto the musical technique.

Levy identifies four problems related to acceptance of "economy" as "an explanation of what is special and valuable in Haydn's music" (8). First, an emphasis upon economy could interfere with finding other musical qualities of value. Second, the non-specificity of economy as a sufficient reason without further explanation is unsatisfactory. Third, some works exhibit economy which are not good works. Fourth, Levy asks, "If economy is an *a priori* valuable, then how can a piece or a movement with many different themes--for instance, many piano concerti of Mozart--be good?" (8). This seeming contradiction is resolved by reducing the surface multiplicity of Mozart's themes to an underlying thematic economy. If economy is left as such a non-specific value, it can be used quite irresponsibly, that is, with little or no justification other than itself.

Levy ponders the larger context of economy as a Western value: "Great from small, full and grand from a tiny cell, husbanding energies or possessions, the most from the least, complex from simple--all of these images seem to reflect real values in everyday life" (10).

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[2]Lang, *Music in Western Civilization* (New York, 1941), p. 632.

Thus a judgment dependent upon a particular cultural value became entrenched in musical aesthetics.

A fifth problem related to reliance upon "economy" as an unexplained aesthetic criterion is illustrated by Munroe Beardsley. He draws on visual art's use of economy: "Consider a typical statement: 'In Rembrandt's drawing *Girl Sleeping*,...the end has been attained by very economical means'" (Beardsley 1958, 78). Beardsley criticizes what he considers to be a careless use of the word:

> If the lines were different, if they were longer or shorter, or thicker or thinner, or there were more or fewer, then the general character of the whole drawing would be different. It makes no sense to say that the 'means' were most economical when no less economical means would have achieved the *same* end. (79)

Here the "most economical" does not equal the least expensive as is commonly understood and, therefore, it is inappropriate.

Robert Snarrenberg's article, "Competing Myths: the American Abandonment of Schenker's Organicism" 1994, challenges the notion that the "Americanization" of Schenkerian theory, which involved the laundering of Schenker's rhetoric, succeeded in eliminating figurative language. He insists that the preference for the vocabulary of science was no less figurative than what it replaced. Snarrenberg states his goal:

> In this essay I shall demonstrate that the reaction of the Schenkerians was not an outright dismissal of figurative speech, but rather a dismissal of figures considered discordant with the prevailing myths of the academy, and, as a result, a partial abandonment of Schenker's aesthetic. (30)

In this declaration Snarrenberg attacks the premise of current theoretical assumptions expressed so clearly in Allen Forte's claims: that one can remove the ideological base reflected in Schenker's linguistic "excesses" without affecting the theoretical propositions. It is Snarrenberg's conviction that American Schenkerians have strayed from the original intention of Schenker's musical theory, substituting images of botany (plants), scientific objects, and architecture for the procreative trope which infused music with "subjectivity" and "soul."[3] Not a "thing" but a "process," "Schenker's dynamic, personifying metaphors...expressed his belief in a connection between the events of musical masterworks and the events of our own lives" (48-49). As seen earlier in the chapter, Ian Bent put a different interpretation on the "connection."

In attempting to foreground the "aesthetic commitments" of Schenkerian writers which are rarely as manifest as Schenker's, Snarrenberg lights on a method to coax them out: attention to the "metaphorical weave of the texts" (31). He will evaluate these Schenkerians by the proximity of their rhetoric to Schenker's which he accepts as the standard. He commences with "one of Schenker's favourite rhetorical figures--the metaphor of human procreation," tracing its replacement and transformation in the literature up to the publication of *Free Composition*, 1979. Snarrenberg articulates his aim in narrowing the focus to a particular metaphor, not primarily as a means of redressing the

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[3]Snarrenberg seems to have overlooked the occasions on which Schenker drew upon architectural imagery. And is organicism itself not drawn from science--biology--at least in part?

"misunderstandings" arising from inattention to Schenker's rhetorical patterns, "but more to exemplify a point that is pressing for the future of theoretical discourse, which is that the central metaphors by means of which authors shape their musical conceptions inescapably affect the kinds of activities and aesthetic attitudes that readers find themselves invited to adopt" (31). While Snarrenberg's expressed aim suggests that this exercise in discourse analysis is driven by its potential contribution to the future of theory, the details of Schenker's metaphorical weave being but an instance of this practice, further reading reveals a stronger drive to set the record straight on Schenker's commitment to a humanizing dimension to the art of music via the procreation metaphor. Snarrenberg's sympathy with Schenker has led him to champion views which he sees as seriously sub-verted in the hands of such Schenkerians as Adele Katz, Felix Salzer, Arthur Waldeck, Nathan Broder, Milton Babbitt, Allen Forte, and Carl Schachter, among others (45-51).

Snarrenberg locates the procreative metaphor at the heart of Schenker's organicist system, one which gained even greater prominence in the later writings (32-35). Snarren-berg finds "a shift in aesthetic ideology" in the transformation and/or disappearance of not only the procreative metaphor, but also of organic imagery in general, in the writings of Schenker's American followers (45). Snarrenberg quotes the following passage from Katz's text, *Challenge to Musical Tradition: A New Concept of Tonality*, 1945, as an example of writing which has relinquished "Schenker's dramatic and procreation metaphors" in favour of "a colourless application of general terms." (46, 47). This excerpt

illustrates what Snarrenberg describes as a remaining "allusion to very early steps in the chain of evolution."

> The single all-embracing structural outline is the *primordial structure*, the protoplasm out of which all structural and prolonging motions evolve. As the fundamental source from which all further melodic and harmonic activity springs, it is the synthesis of all other motions that are offshoots of it. (Katz 23/Snarrenberg 47)

A further illustration is Katz's description of Beethoven's compositional technique: "She says that he 'selects a fragmentary phrase as the germ plasm from which every melodic impulse springs'" (Katz 155/Snarrenberg 47).

Other theorists who have contributed to the change in Schenker's rhetoric are: Arthur Waldeck and Nathan Broder ("they even mix biological and architectural figures of speech"); Milton Babbitt ("Babbitt draws on rhetorical sources more closely identified with the natural sciences than with descriptions of experiences such as birth or travelling...or mental equilibrium"); and Allen Forte ("The scientistic transformation of Schenker is evident right at the outset of Forte's 1959 essay on Schenker") (45-51). The organic-dependent language of Katz--"protoplasm," "evolve," "offshoots," "germ plasm"--seems obvious to my understanding of organicist rhetoric, if not so clear to Snarrenberg. Salzer persists in the use of "organic" figures, what Snarrenberg calls "the buzzword 'organic.'" Snarrenberg writes, "For Salzer, structure and growth are intertwined in the essence of the tonal organism" (47). In Part I of Chapter Two in Salzer's *Structural Hearing*, I counted 23 uses of some variant of "organic" in 21 pages, for example: "organic musical idea," "organic whole," "organic unity," "organic structure," "organic coherence," "musical

organism," "structural organism," "organic details," "organic expression" (11-31). A tracking of the terms favoured by Salzer, Forte, et al, reveals a heavy dependence upon "function" and "structure," words that are not inimical to organicism. While a pursual of these terms is outside the scope of this study, it should be noted that their connections to organicism are not obscure. "Function" carries the meanings of "end or purpose" (teleology), "criteria determined by use," and "any quantity, trait or fact that depends upon and varies in accordance with another" (reminiscent of organic parts and wholes). "Structure" has even stronger organicist overtones: "Something (e.g. a building or an organism) made of parts fitted or joined together," "the way in which constituent parts are fitted or joined together, or arranged to give something its peculiar nature or character, *plant structure*" (*The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary* 1991 ed., s.v. "function," "structure").

These examples of the above theorists are interpreted by Snarrenberg as an abrupt turn from Schenker's explicitly procreative figures. He criticizes Salzer as well, who studied with Schenker in the early 1930s, as equating "organic" and "structure" in a manner Schenker would not have approved: "For Salzer, structure and growth are intertwined in the essence of the tonal organism" (47). The fusion of form and content--a hallmark of organicism--wherein the coded seed develops into a form predetermined by its growing content is not, according to Snarrenberg, the true organicism Schenker promoted.

It is in the procreative metaphor that Snarrenberg locates one of the principal sources of "Schenker's humanising of music" (42). Accordingly, I shall examine the first

heading, "Schenker's Metaphors of Procreation," 31-44, which makes up one half of the article.[4] I begin with a passage towards the end of the essay which both captures Snarrenberg's position and provides the basis for my critique of it:

> These differences in belief are given expression in the contrasting images of procreation and natural science. Each image is more than just an isolated analytical fiction, more, that is, than a story created to represent one's interaction with a particular composition. Rather, each image is a source that funds a repertory of analytical fictions. And they can do so because authors find in them something which accords with their beliefs about what analysis does and what music is. Such images have a cultural function akin to myth. A myth is a repertory of rhetorical imagery that can be used to describe coherently the actions and roles of various members of a society--in our case, the musical society of listeners, composers, performers, analysts and readers. The representation of relations among cultural actors is what might be called the internal social dimension of myth. (52, 53)

Snarrenberg commences his discussion with an early articulation by Schenker of the nature of music, 1895, paraphrased as: "the true nature of music consists in the free play of the composer's imagination giving birth (*hervorbringen*) to melodic content" (31, 32).[5] Schenker makes a distinction between the "proper" and "improper" uses of *organisch*. He accuses some of labelling music "organic" in order to make what is produced by "artifice," that is, by the composer's construction, appear "natural," or of necessity. But without any

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[4]Other headings include: "The American Abandonment" 45-52, "Competing Myths" 52-56.

[5]Schenker's essay, "Der Geist der Musicalischen Technik" is the source for this formulation. Part of this essay is translated as an appendix to Pastille's article, "Schenker, Anti-Organicist." It is reprinted in Hellmut Federhofer's *Heinrich Schenker: Nach Tagebüchern und Briefen in der Oswald Jonas Memorial Collection, University of California, Riverside* (Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1985): 135-54. A complete English translation can be found in *Theoria* Vol 3 (1988): 86-104, entitled, "The Spirit of Musical Technique," by William Pastille.

demonstrable causal connection to govern melodies, music cannot be described in terms of organisms. Snarrenberg sums up Schenker's initial hesitations regarding attributing organic qualities to music:

> Insofar, then, as it assumes a law of cause and effect, the natural-scientific notion of the organic has no application to the internal chronology of the musical artwork; we would be deluded to think that the artifices of harmony and counterpoint are anything more than simulations of causality. (Schenker quoted in Snarrenberg, 33)

One wonders, if Schenker's subsequent use of the organic metaphor were purely figurative, why did he feel the need to demonstrate music's literal, causal relations? In the sentence preceding the first one quoted on page 33, Schenker writes, "Nevertheless, I do recognize one aspect of the musical imagination that seems to correspond quite accurately to the scientific notion of the 'organic.' It is very difficult to substantiate, but I am convinced that it is a fact" (Pastille's translation of Schenker 1984, 36). The insight which enabled Schenker to embrace organicism in music was his observation that the composer's imagination gives "birth" to or generates specific "entities" or patterns which return in the music in different guises unconsciously.[6] Schenker concludes later in his "der Geist" essay: "'it is assumed that every similarity the composer has *not willed* actually arose *organically* in the imagination'" (Schenker quoted in Snarrenberg 33). The key then to music's organic quality is the "unconscious" imagination of the composer.

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[6]Snarrenberg translates "give birth to" while Pastille translates "generates." Similarly Snarrenberg uses "entities" to Pastille's "patterns."

The organicity of the compositional process is dependent upon the "scientific notion" that the imagination, the composer's mind, actually "conceives," "gives birth to," "propagates," "generates," "procreates." In part, I presume, because "imagination" is a feminine noun in German (*die Phantasie*), and in part because the imagination performs acts of reproduction of which only females are capable, Snarrenberg designates these acts and their source--the imagination--to be feminine and therefore affirming of a feminine element. Within the same paragraph, Snarrenberg designates the imagination as masculine: "the composer's imagination" and "his imagination" (34). Snarrenberg does not show any acquaintance with the very widespread practice amongst male artists of describing their creative acts in the borrowed terms of female procreation.

Snarrenberg traces the increasing masculinization of Schenker's imagery from "Der Geist" to *Free Composition*. In "Der Geist" he describes Schenker's portrayal of the imagination "as a feminine figure who propagates a species of melody" (34). Snarrenberg comments on a passage from *Harmonielehre* written eleven years later: "Schenker leaves the reins of power clearly in the hands of a feminine figure, Nature" (37). This is the passage:

> So the system as a whole is to be comprehended only as a compromise between Nature and Art, a mixture of the natural and the artistic, though, to be sure, with the power of Nature overwhelming, which of course had been the point of departure. (Schenker quoted in Snarrenberg 37)[7]

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[7]*Harmonielehre* 59, §19.

In another excerpt Snarrenberg concludes that Schenker "casts the horizontal element in a feminine role: 'The temporal-horizontal element of musical motion, *no matter how one wishes to explain its laws*, is therefore that which alone gives birth [*Hervorbringen*] to musical content and secures its organic coherence'" (40, 41). Snarrenberg does not explain how he comes to conclude that the horizontal element is feminine apart from the obvious association of the female with birth. It would seem logical that if "birth" is used metaphorically so also is the "feminine" when employed by male composers or theorists. A masculine creative birth is not a feminine event.

Snarrenberg refers to other feminized portrayals by Schenker: the "passive triad," Nature as "godmother," the *Urlinie* as a "motherly womb" (39, 40). The agency of the composer, what Snarrenberg terms the "masculine element," takes on a greater importance in the metaphorical language that Schenker uses later. In an earlier depiction Schenker includes both masculine and feminine elements, "seed and womb": "The scale degree is a triad, a feminine figure, who, when fertilised with passing tones, gives birth to content (linear progressions, thence melody)" (40). In the following portrayal from the first yearbook of *Das Meisterwerk*, masculine features have gained as "music is cast in terms of the composer's activity and its musical manifestations":

> The law of all life--motion--which as a procreation transcends the limits of individual existence, is borne by *man* into the chord which Nature has prescribed in advance in his ear. Everything in music depends on this motion, on this procreation. [my emphasis] (Schenker quoted in Snarrenberg 40)

Snarrenberg comments, "Schenker thereby restores the order that he sorely missed in the world around him: at least man's rightful place in the world of tone is assured: the husband is rightly valued more than the wife" (41).

However motivated he may be to affirm a more gender-equal agenda, Snarrenberg's tendency to take every reference associated with the feminine as positive--whether it be feminized because of grammar or custom--neither accords with historical realities nor the general tenor of Schenker's gender assumptions. The collusion of mental and physical reproduction has an ancient pedigree and it is no surprise to find it in Schenker, who so clearly embraced the German idealist, romantic tradition. The grammatical gender of the German "imagination" notwithstanding, the genius within whom this imagination operated, thus enabling the musical product to be scientifically organic, was not female. Snarrenberg's depiction of imagination, muses, or nature as feminine is an idealizing of woman which collides with the reality of her exclusion from the canons of great music, not to mention the reality of risk involved in her giving physical birth. The subtle appropriation of feminine passivity in the creative mystery of genius, far from allowing space for women, acted to reinforce the sexual division of labour.

Another way of understanding birth imagery, in addition to the above discussion, is to consider the use of the metaphors, organism and birth, as layered. Procreation is a function of organisms, just as, say, photosynthesis is of plant organisms. Growth and teleology are also sub-metaphors or components of organisms. The first or primary layer is that of the organism; the secondary one, that of procreation. The primary level controls or inflects the second. Thus when procreative metaphors are appealed to within the organicist

aesthetics, the imagery ceases to be "feminine" as procreation becomes the sole property of males. Snarrenberg misses the deep-seated misogyny of Schenker's birth metaphors. Not surprisingly, there is not a single reference in his 82 footnotes to feminist theory.

In his second section, "The American abandonment," Snarrenberg makes the case that the changing imagery of organic procreation to that of structures (architecture) and science reflects a replacement of "Schenker the artist with Schenker the scientist" (52). Snarrenberg refers to Felix Salzer who, while continuing organic imagery, equates the organic with structures. This change is also seen in the translation of *Der freie Satz*, where English equivalents transform Schenker's "dynamic" language into spatial vocabulary (49). Important essays by Babbitt and Forte continue this process (50-51).

Does Snarrenberg overlook Schenker's appeal to the science of his day when, in the "Spirit of Musical Technique" Schenker described the "notion of the 'organic'" as "scientific?" (Pastille's translation of Schenker 1984, 36). If Schenker's use of organicism was not derived exclusively from contemporary science, neither was it unrelated to it. Kassler, Hubbs, and Don find scientific models to be of great significance in shaping Schenker's thinking.

In his third section, "Competing myths," Snarrenberg draws out conclusions from this change of metaphors. In this shift of metaphorical language, Snarrenberg finds a difference in belief systems, not just about music theory, but about music and the larger culture. One effect of the change in musical discourse has been the marginalization of the composer and a corresponding elevation of the "activity of the analyst": "This rhetorical move--a strong self-depiction of the analyst at the expense of composition, composer, and

performer--invites the reader to contemplate the actions of a master analyst" (53, 54). McCreless's article discussed in Chapter One confirms this observation.

Snarrenberg admires Schenker's portrayal of music as human consciousness enabled by the procreation metaphor, being apparently untroubled by Schenker's insistence on the work as a product of the composer's "unconsciousness":

> The central character is the living musical work, on whose behalf Schenker's synthesist labours as a dedicated biographer, revealing and chronicling the life histories of the masters' works in order that we might marvel at them and learn from them how to live out the tensions of our own lives....Just as importantly, the procreation myth allows readers to adopt any of a number of different roles. (53)

Given Snarrenberg's complete lack of critique of the social practices Schenker openly champions, it would not be difficult to demonstrate that the "we" Snarrenberg identifies with is the Schenker who is male, white, German, and upper class. Snarrenberg proposes that this depiction of the musical work as "procreation myth allows readers to adopt any of a number of different roles" (53). The different responses of men and women to procreation metaphors is not a factor in his analysis. These choices include identification with the composer, analyst, performer, or as listeners. It would be difficult for a female listener to identify with a "master composer," "master analyst" or any other stance which assumes gender neutrality under a clearly masculine designation. Until Snarrenberg is able to overcome Schenker's exclusiveness as it relates to gender, race, and class, his arguments about the humanizing of metaphors have a hollow ring.

Snarrenberg's focus upon Schenker's procreative metaphors glosses Schenker's own use of imagery which compares music to language, science, architecture, botany, and

religion. It is curious that Snarrenberg approves of Schenker's use of the ideas and vocabulary of his own late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Vienna to explain and champion music, but disapproves of Schenker's American followers' use of the language and ideas of their own mid and late twentieth-century intellectual milieu of structuralism to express their understanding of music. Is this nostalgia?

Snarrenberg refers positively to Kassler's article discussed earlier, "Heinrich Schenker's Epistemology and Philosophy of Music," as one which shares in his conviction of Schenker's model for music as human consciousness (43). The dependence of "organic music" upon the unconscious production of genius is not addressed in light of the music as model of "human consciousness." Kassler's essay shows no interest in Schenker's language per se, but curiously, the passages she excerpts from Schenker reveal other models for music that do not stem from human organic metaphors. Here Kassler quotes Schenker to show his affinity to Goethe's theory of generation (a scientific theory), one that was derived from the model of a plant (233):

> I then pursue the exfoliation, so to speak, of the first horizontal (elements) in *prolongations*....I pursue the ways in which they blossom, ever-increasingly, self-expanding into ever new voice-leading strata.... [my underlining] (Schenker quoted in Kassler 240)

"Exfoliation" and "blossoming" are associated primarily with plants, not humans. If one could do an exhaustive metaphorical analysis of Schenker's metaphors, I do not think their connection to plants, animals, or humans would be a determining factor in explaining Schenker's organic music theory. The notion of organicity extends beyond particular examples of organisms to incorporate characteristic functions of inter-relatedness distinct

from machines. In terms of its translation into musical solutions, Schenker's references to human procreation are just as readily served by plant or animal imagery. The metaphysical overtones or social implications, that is, those aspects more problematic for current Anglo-American sensibilities, may be more dependent upon the human organism.

This non-specificity of the vehicle, organism, is in line with Abrams's and de Man's treatments which acknowledge on occasion the preference for a plant or tree (especially in Coleridge and Kant), but focus on the generic "organism" and its commonly evoked characteristics. Similarly, Black's example of the "wolf" vehicle in relation to the tenor, "man," depends not upon which of the 41 species of wolves is indicated, fur colouring, or the role of the adult male in caring for the pups. Only those stereotypical, commonplace qualities of wolf in relation to man are evoked in the metaphor, some of which may not even be accurate. As the vehicle in relation to the tenor of music, an organism is typically not specified in calling up the commonplace associations of organisms. Nor does the success of organicist aesthetics bear much relation to varying scientific understandings of organisms which have changed dramatically since the eighteenth century.

It is my observation that this confusion of organic genre--whether human, plant or animal--points to another confusion: the conflation of musical and cultural issues. By declaring music to demonstrate human subjectivity, Snarrenberg proposes that Schenker demonstrates the high value he places on (some) humans by his transfer of these qualities--soul, reproduction, life--to music. This tendency reflects the custom of drawing upon society's highest values and models as a means of elevating artistic products. The stress on human qualities is especially not surprising in the age of Darwin, when what it meant to be

human was under question. However, there seem to be more obvious, less problematic means of conveying music's human element. As a non-natural object, music embodies the intentions of its builders. However impossible it may be to have access to these intentions, it is clear that the mental work of a human, along with many other undefinable human factors of the body, society, musical tradition, economics, etc., directed the work's production. An emphasis upon the intelligible effort and education of the composer can more readily foreground the human element in a work's construction than appeals to the mysterious workings of "musical organisms."

Alan Street's "Superior Myths, Dogmatic Allegories: The Resistance to Musical Unity," 1989, published five years prior to Snarrenberg's essay, displays a broader grasp of matters of referentiality and representation in language. Gender, however, does not register in Street's account. What Street and Snarrenberg have in common is the word "myths" in their titles. Thereafter, the similarity ends. One reason Street's approach is different is his sources, the most influential being the writings of Paul de Man.

Street's article comprises 46 pages divided into 12 unequal sections with no headings. It is not a very accessible text, assuming a knowledge of German philosophy and aesthetics, Schenker, current musical analytical practices, and the linguistic theory of Paul de Man. However, it is well worth the effort to read, given its unique engagement with de Man in musical aesthetics.

Street commences by establishing the importance of "unity" in "critical orthodoxy," drawing upon the writing of Anton Webern's lectures of 1932-33, *The Path to the New Music*. Linked with organicism and variety after the manner of Goethe's primeval plant,

the idea of musical unity became a commonplace in such diverse writers as Schoenberg, Dahlhaus, Schenker, Langer, and Adorno (77-79). In light of contemporary composition, which exhibits a range including the "completely determined and the wholly random," Street finds this adherence to aesthetic unity "anachronistic" (79). He ponders why "loose anarchy" should not "set its own terms of reference," or why unifying properties of music should be "self-evident?" (79). The fact that unity is dependent upon variety gets lost in the drive to unity. Street maintains, "The championship of unity over diversity represents none other than a generalised state of false consciousness: illusion rather than reality" (80).

Part II involves a brief excursion into nineteenth-century philosophy, an acknowledgement of the not so easily erased connection to "metaphysical contemplation" which flourished in aesthetics. One can hear echoes of Derrida's notion of the palimpsest in this statement by Street: "It does not follow that aesthetic principles forever arise from anterior philosophy concerns only to float free of them as the analytical context so often assumes" (80).[x] The quest for reconciliation of the subject-object dichotomy or synthesis of the mind-body split invited imaginary solutions to these tensions in the field of art (81). Binary opposition could be resolved at the "transcendent" level, while the "fragment" prompted "an organic cultivation of the inner spirit" (82).

One of the critical concepts related to organicism, synthesis, and creativity is that of the symbol, what Street describes as their "quintessential formulation" (82). The uniqueness of the symbol lay in its function as both a part of and a signifier of the whole. It

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[x]In his essay "White Mythology," Derrida offers the image of the palimpsest, the traces of earlier writings still operant long after other meanings have been superimposed over the previous ones (Derrida 1982, 268).

captured the "genuine duality of subject/object, observer and observed" (82). Only genius was deemed capable of holding together such diversity. By contrast, allegory appeared impoverished with its mere "arbitrary signification," its detachment and inability to overcome duality (82).

It was during the same time, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, that music was depicted in the writings of Wackenroder, Hoffmann, Tieck, and Schelling as the "apogee of aesthetic experience," rivalling poetry in its symbolic mode. In its ability to surmount the division between thought and perception, "music too might be understood as capable of converting culture into nature" (82). Appeals to the language of nature in this century too (Webern, Schoenberg, Schenker, Langer, Adorno) lent both an innocence and authority to musical representation.

Street terms this conversion of culture into nature "the authoritarian hegemony of organicist thinking" (83). Kerman's critique of organicism as the root for the out-growth of an unreflective "belief in unity" leads Street to note some omissions in the diagnosis. First, Kerman had not addressed what prompted the development of organicism in the first place, and second, he did not go far enough in challenging the "aesthetic bias" within the music analytical discipline. In his defence of the German instrumental tradition so dependent upon an organicist aesthetics, Kerman in effect, was complicit with the ideology he critiqued, according to Street (83).

Recalling Dahlhaus's criticism of "uninterrupted functionality," Street notes his failure to throw off the tyranny of integration. By problematizing the living/dead dichotomy tied to work/analysis derived from the organic model, and by converting the

work into a textual model, Dahlhaus does not escape traditionalist ideals. Street cautions: "A warning against unremitting functionality, for instance, leaves untouched the fact that deliberation between the 'same' and 'different' will, in all likelihood, ensure an approximation towards unity in diversity" (85).

In section IV, Street touches upon a number of contrasting analytical methods--Schenkerian analysis, Dahlhaus's work, L. B. Meyer's implication-realisation model, pitch-class set theory, and Nattiez's music semiotics. He makes the distinction between those methods which take what is a single property of music, that is, unity, and make it a subject, and others which recognize their constructions as products of a method, a mental work of arrangement. Regardless of these important distinctions, the tendency to make wholes out of diverse parts is a strong current that blurs what would resist its flow. However distinctive the details of musical theories and methods might be, the lure to unity characterizes them all. Street observes, "It is...difficult to believe that criteria of whatever kind could prompt these or any other empirical methods to advocate a unified notion of structure with such habitual regularity" (87).

In Part V, Street zeroes in on the main thrust of his article: the complicity of language in the aesthetic ideology, regardless of the seeming plurality of aesthetical perspectives. The first reference made to de Man is in defining ideology: "'the confusing of linguistic with natural reality, of reference with phenomenalism'" (Quoted in Street 88).[9] "The logocentric assumption that the categories of language are capable of articulating

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[9]Street's source for de Man is the article "Resistance to Theory," in *The Pedagogical Imperative, Yale French Studies*, Vol. 63 (1982): 11. The article is also published in de Man's book by the same title.

together in order to facilitate some discussion of thought and experience" pervades all of Western philosophy (88). Street's line of argument is as follows: language always mediates in instrumental reason; language involves the non-coincidence of work and concept, signifier and signified; objective explanation based upon instrumental reason is, therefore, illusive. Rhetorical formulae are the true source of dialectic or reason.

Street concludes with Christopher Norris that texts must be the medium of analysis and any theoretical reflection must acknowledge its dependence upon "*textual* understanding."[10] Building on Norris's advocacy of "a rigorous close reading," Street transcribes this advice to the present: "Textual critique would certainly appear appropriate to the demystification of methodological rhetoric..." (88). Lying directly beneath the more recent discussion of narratives or plots is the reification of a piece of music: "In effect, every composition becomes a solid structure--virtually indistinguishable from its notionally fixed representation as score" (89). Regardless of the artistic medium, the "formalist belief in each work as something hypostatised and distinct" prevails (89). Even granting the methods which designate the musical work as textual (semiotics, Dahlhaus), Street claims "the current materialising habit is sufficiently widespread to falsify those counterclaims which otherwise hold analysis to be a purely perceptual act" (89). The temporal aspect is "squeezed out" in the "cause of objective reference and aesthetic autonomy" (89). This format enables the production of "strictly corrigible propositions about an acknowledged masterpiece" (Kerman 1980, 313). The underlying assumption of wholeness or unity

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[10]Norris, *The Contest of Faculties: Philosophy and Theory After Deconstruction*, (London: Methuen), 1985: 226.

inevitably works to maximize the coherence identified by the interpreter's activity. Street concludes:

> Thus an apparent diversity of epistemological alternatives is ultimately bound together by the progression towards atemporal formalism, a doctrine whose authority increases across time, both conceptually and historically, from organicism to structuralism and beyond. (89)

Street further documents this claim with a detailed examination of work by Jonathan Dunsby,[11] Arnold Whittall,[12] and James M. Baker[13] (92-101 and 109-18). In addition to their failure to escape organicist assumptions, what all of the writers Street reviews overlook is the inability of language to reflect, express, or contain experience by virtue of formalist analysis being itself constitutive of language (101). This is the organicist aesthetic illusion of "false consciousness" or ideology.

The language of an organic aesthetics acts to heal the gulf between the two types of being--subject/object, mind/matter. Street writes, "The essence of formalism can be seen as the symbolic wish to identify the wholeness and integrity of the interpretative image with that of the work itself" (102). This tendency is illustrated most dramatically in Schenker's writing where he categorically states:

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[11]"The Multi-Piece in Brahms: *Fantasien* Op. 116" in *Brahms: Biographical, Documentary and Analytical Studies*, ed. R. Pascall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1983.

[12]Street refers to two articles by Whittall: "Webern and Atonality: The Path from the Old Aesthetic," *Musical Times* Vol. 124 (1983): 733-37 and "The Theorist's Sense of History: Concepts of Contemporaneity in Composition and Analysis," *Journal of the Royal Musical Association* Vol. 112 (1987): 1-20.

[13]"Coherence in Webern's Six Pieces for Orchestra, Op. 6," *Music Theory Spectrum* Vol. 4 (1982): 1-27.

> The musical examples which accompany this volume are not merely practical aids; they have the same power and conviction as the visual aspect of the printed composition itself (the foreground). That is, the graphic representation is part of the actual composition, not merely an educational means. (Schenker 1979, xxiii)

In his "Introduction to the English Edition," Allen Forte comments upon this statement by Schenker:

> In this remarkable statement, which at first seems puzzling, Schenker dramatizes the significance of the graphs: they are not to be regarded merely as pedagogical devices but rather as accurate representations of the musical structures. (xix)

While rejecting Schenker's metaphysics, Forte accepts without question Schenker's claim to represent the musical structure in graphs, such that the graphs themselves are a "part of the actual composition." However, one difference between Forte and Schenker here is Forte's nuance that the graphs *represent* the "musical structure"; what Schenker says is that the "the graphic representation is part of the actual composition"--quite different from Forte's explanation. Schenker's belief expresses the "epitome of symbolic musical expression," according to Street (105).

The problem of music's lack of signifying power as a language is something Street addresses. Seeing it as a possible objection to his argument because of its difference from language, he suggests that the main point of his criticism derives from the matter of unity rather than from "the uncertainty of what constitutes a language." He continues, "As such, the principle of signification holds no special distinction; the matter really boils down once again to one of interpretative wholeness" (108).

Street endorses de Man's preference for allegory as a means of escaping the symbolizing drive of organicism and confusion of ontology it entails. Allegory's attention to separation, temporality, and difference of being make it an apt mode for musical discourse. Street concludes:

> More than painting and literature, music is bound to the condition of its allegorical confinement. In the shadow of its own history, therefore, music analysis above all has reason to appreciate de Man's paradoxical insight that 'form is never anything but a process on the way to its completion.' (109)

Street could push even further than he does on the matter of gaps in musical signification which all disappear in Schenker's assumption of immediacy and self presence. The musical score and its sounding realisation bear no exact relationship: "Musical notation has no inherent relation to its sounding reality" (106). Analysts' or critics' written interpretations can be at great odds with one another, even with similar presuppositions about music's objectification and attempts at minute, note-by-note totalizing explanation. The only agreement might be in the suppression of details that do not fit the mould of unified meaning.

Street offers an alternative to the formalist enterprise of musical analysis which is grounded in a symbolism that claims the unity of "critical thought, descriptive language and musical reality" (106). In allegory Street locates an interpretive paradigm or model of reading that refuses closure and acknowledges in its own disjunct, dualistic structure the impossibility of merging "sign and sense" (102, 106). Allegory understands criticism to be a temporal process marked by its ongoing, open, accumulative awareness. Street writes:

> While Symbolist belief reaches the height of its formalist ambitions in the realisation of the artwork as spatial figure, allegory prolongs its interpretative message in recognition of a continuous and ineluctable temporality. From this viewpoint, music could be said to take its place as the allegorical art *par excellence*; in de Man's words, it becomes 'the diachronic version of the pattern of non-coincidence within the moment'.... (Street 103; de Man 1983, 129)

Henry Kingsbury is not a musicologist, but rather an anthropologist specializing in an ethnomusicological orientation to Western music. His valuable contributions in "Sociological Factors in Musicological Poetics" reflect his familiarity with Culler, de Man, Kerman, Schenker, Schoenberg, Solie, Snarrenberg, Treitler, and Hayden White:

> I will be looking at the sociological implications of musicological writing and the social configurations implicated in the rhetorical imagery of musicological discourse. The underlying argument of this paper is that the figurative diction of musicology has sociological...as well as literary significance (195).

While acknowledging the "centrality of organismic metaphor in musicology," his focus is trained on the social practices of music departments and conservatories as they relate to musical discourse. Integral to his study is the "metaphorical character" of musical practices which are "frequently overlooked or forgotten. The act of calling attention to their metaphoric character thus can have the effect of replacing the appearance of inevitability with an awareness of contingency and of opening at least the possibility of change" (205).

Another point Kingsbury makes concerns the literalizing of metaphors, their over-frequent use having rendered them "dead" metaphors from the perspective of the music theory community. He writes:

> The community in question is the musicians and music theorists who, over time and through continual interaction in terms of these conceptualizations, have come to experience these images not as metaphors but as actual

> references to the essential phenomena: "the actual" structure, "the actual" material of the composition "itself." (205)

Kingsbury speaks in strong tones of the relationship between language and the social practices of those whose stakes in the continuity of certain traditions are high, even relating hiring, promotions, and raises to who has the "license to exegesis" (213).[14] Here is one example he offers of this interrelationship:

> Specifically, the musical/musicological preoccupation with *urtext* editions and "authenticity" in musical performance has important homologies with the legal concern with "original intent" and "strict construction" of the constitution. (211)

Kingsbury links the language of musicology with institutional control and legal interpretation.

In his article "Brahms Research and Aesthetic Ideology," Kevin Korsyn examines the concept of organicism in music to indicate how prominent musical scholars who presented papers at the International Brahms Conference, 1983, "use art to recuperate stable and reassuring ideas of selfhood" (91).[15] Korsyn notes the transference of theological ideas surrounding the soul to art through metaphor, linked principally with organicism:

> One began to speak of works of art in terms formerly reserved for the soul. Thomas McFarland describes the 'numinous transfer of the predicates of soul' to a complex of terms that includes not only 'organicism' but also 'genius', 'originality', 'imagination', 'symbol', and 'the sublime'. Thus in

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[14]This phrase, "license to exegesis," is borrowed by Kingsbury from Frank Kermode's article, "The Institutional Control of Interpretation," 1979.

[15]The volume, *Brahms Studies: Analytical and Historical Perspectives*, edited by George S. Bozarth, is a compilation of 22 authors who gave papers at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC in 1983.

> Romantic discourse, the work of art acquired something like a soul. It was not merely coherent or unified; it was alive, it had the unity of a mind or consciousness (91)

He observes that "it is often our own unity that is at stake" (92).[16]

Korsyn establishes a critical framework within which he will assess some key Brahms scholars for underlying assumptions. He attempts an identification of their ideology with metaphysical commitments, on the basis of close readings of their texts as published in *Brahms Studies*. Korsyn draws upon the work of Paul de Man who supplies the critical orientation with his attention to a "naive phenomenalism" which allows for a convergence of consciousness and materiality, what has been referred to repeatedly in this study as "aesthetic ideology." It is this confusion of language with its object that attempts a synthesis of ontological disparities: "mind and nature, subject and object, time and eternity, freedom and causality" (92).

Without duplicating the details of Korsyn's close readings of various analysts, I will offer an illustration of the critique using the text of the keynote speaker, Karl Geiringer. The address is titled, "Brahms the Ambivalent." Geiringer documents at some length "a catalogue of contradictions, suggesting the double nature of Brahms's personality" (92). In a self-consciously de Manian manner, Korsyn attends to Geiringer's rhetoric, and concludes:

> Rather than allowing art to include the problems of division, alienation and anxiety which pervade life, Geiringer unconsciously accepts an ideology that proclaims art the place where these conflicts are transcended, where all bad antinomies fall away. Indeed, critics alert to the relationship between

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[16]References to McFarland regarding the soul and the longing for unity can be found in Chapter Two.

> rhetoric and psychic defence might argue that Geiringer's repeated insistence on fusion, unity, reconciliation and absence of conflict indicates a repressed awareness that the opposite may be true; hyperbole often signals repression. (93)

Two more authors, David Lewin and David Epstein, are subjected to scrutiny, with similar results.

In his penultimate paragraph, Korsyn acknowledges the work of Lawrence Kramer, and Jordan and Kafalenos, all of whom challenge ideological structures in a manner not unlike himself. He notes that Kramer has paid greater attention to gender issues, in particular the "feminine" as it relates to Brahms research. He concludes that all of these new insights involve "a willingness to cross traditional disciplinary boundaries....It is ideology, after all, that keeps us in our places" (101).

The last writer whom I will examine is Leonard B. Meyer. His article "A Pride of Prejudices; Or, Delight in Diversity" was met earlier during the discussion of definitions of organicism. The title does not particularly prepare one for an in-depth encounter with the trope of organicism. Nor does the status of this musicologist as an elder statesman of music lead one to expect a deft deconstructive manoeuvre collapsing the claimed synchronic/diachronic qualities of Walter Frisch's "*thematic transformation* (synchronic) and *developing variation* (diachronic)" (244). But this is precisely what Meyer does, minus the jargon of poststructuralism.

A peculiar feature of this 10-page essay I noted was the repetition of the words "constraint(s)" and/or "constraining." I counted 38 uses of the term. What Meyer seems to be after in his preoccupation with "constraints" is some precision on the part of

composers, theorists, or analysts in explaining what they mean. In a sense, this is a critique of language resulting from Meyer's pushing writers to deliver on something more substantial than rhetoric. He presses texts committed to this distinction between thematic similarity and a more temporally oriented developing variation to state clearly what is the difference between them. The latter view makes greater claims involving the specific ordering of themes in a certain succession. Meyer complains, "But I have not, thus far, been able to find any discussion of the constraints that govern the nature of the succession of variants, although such a theory would appear to be *sine qua non* of an adequate account of diachronic motive change--of development and variation" (245). What one sees instead are techniques of, for example,

> inversion, diminution, augmentation, rhythmic modification--nothing is said about the principles governing the probable (or necessary?) ordering of the variants as a diachronic development. This is so despite the fact that many of these writers regularly, almost ritually, invoke the flowery language of organicism. (245, 246)

Without some constraining elements indicated in this diachronic ordering, what is left is mere description and no explanation. This failure to account for the diachronic ordering of themes collapses the synchronic and diachronic distinction, leaving no difference apart from rhetoric.

Meyer continues his critique of organicism and its insistence upon finding relationships:

> Like the prizing of unity and economy, and of necessity and inevitability, the diligent search for high-level schemes and over-arching tonal coherence are outgrowths of the organic branches of Romanticism. (248)

His strongest words target the denial of culture and history associated with organicism, one met most incessantly in the insistence upon musical autonomy:

> Each work contains its complete meaning within itself and, correlatively, the principles appropriate to its own analysis. These attitudes still pervade music theory and criticism, leading to the belief that latent in every good composition are the principles needed for its apprehension and its analysis. (249)

These desires for unity, similarity in diversity, patterning, and closure are more reflections of human psychology than anything else that might be posited (250). Meyer emphasizes the impossibility of unmediated experience in art, arguing for the recognition of cultural and historical factors in musical understanding.

To summarize: Bonds's study of oration as metaphor documented the shift to instrumental music in conjunction with a preference for organic metaphors. He drew attention to the importance of metaphor in shaping a whole network of musical perceptions. As an organism, the work becomes spatialized, with the piece totalized for inner contemplation; as an oration, the work reflects music's temporal dimensions and seeks response from the audience or listener.

Levy's attention to language reveals how value judgements about music parade as analytical statements. What is taken to be a technical evaluation of a theme--its extreme economy--is related to unexpressed social values. The failure of "economy" as a valid aesthetic criterion can be seen in the ability of an inferior work to demonstrate musical economy and in the lack of economy, or proliferation of themes, in such composers as Mozart.

Snarrenberg's critique of American Schenkerian theory stems from his observation that Schenker's procreative metaphors have disappeared from these texts. It is Snarrenberg's premise that Schenker's rhetoric of propagation, procreation, generation, birth, conception, fertilization, nature, wombs, seeds, etc. signifies the humanizing of music. The movement of Schenkerians to figures of science or a non-human organicism marks a change in belief systems not just about music, but life in the large culture. The matter of Schenker's views about society are debatable, so it is not clear what Snarrenberg wishes to recall apart from some humanist emphasis. This "human" orientation has a very masculine ring to it. Snarrenberg seems unable to grapple with the twisted gender inflections which deny women a role in musical creativity while their reproductive capacities are metaphorically appropriated. A return to a Schenker-type vocabulary of procreative imagery is a mind-boggling proposition. Snarrenberg's exclusive interest in procreative metaphors allows him to escape the larger implications of organicism in music.

Kassler's similar attention to Schenker's picture of music as human consciousness was untroubled by his reliance upon the science of biology to assist in theorizing about music. One passage excerpted from Schenker foregrounded botanical metaphors, suggesting the success of organicity depends less on the actual genre of organism--plant, animal, or human--than on the "dynamic" interrelations of parts and wholes. This bifurcation of imagery in conjunction with the argument that Schenker's metaphor demonstrates his humanist emphasis suggests more than one operation in action. Any generic organic imagery could produce the same results musically; the organism need not be human. Using human consciousness and procreation as model of music's unfolding has

less to do with music and everything to do with Schenker's larger views of life, views of race, class, and gender which are highly suspect from the current Anglo-American perspective.

Street turned his gaze to the propensity of widely diversified musical theories to unfailingly privilege unity over disjunction. This pull to organic unity across the spectrum of different theories betrays the desire to fuse the interpretive image with that of the musical piece itself. Recourse to an allegorical mode solves the symbolist illusion by foregrounding the distancing work of language which mediates between the work and the listener.

Kingsbury's elaboration of the relationship between musical discourse and the social practices of conservatories and music departments was illuminating. He provided yet another illustration of the confusion between metaphors and "essential phenomena."

Korsyn's examination of the rhetoric of Brahms's scholars revealed the preoccupation with ultimate unity in a work. According to Korsyn, this fixation on unity has everything to do with our own concerns with resolution of conflict, a repression of personal fears of division or alienation.

Meyer's repetition of "constraints" illustrates his struggle to articulate what it is that organic development really explains musically. The techniques of inversion, diminution, etc. do not account for any necessary order. Saying the order is "organic" and therefore necessary is no real "constraint." If probing into organicism produces a shift to musical techniques, then culture has not been transformed into nature, and all the talk about music as organisms may reflect psychological needs for completion.

**AFTERWORD**

> In its linear progressions and other comparable tonal events, music mirrors the human soul in all its metamorphoses and moods....
>
> Heinrich Schenker[1]

> The human compulsion not only to say, do, and make but also to understand what we say, do, and make enforces a discourse about these processes and products of consciousness, intention, purpose, and design.
>
> M. H. Abrams[2]

> The capacity of art to seem alive seems to me one of the great glories.
>
> David Lidov[3]

This study participates in a burgeoning interest in the historical, philosophical, and cultural environments which have fostered current practices in musical scholarship. It also draws upon new theoretical alignments which have dominated this century: feminism and language theory. Such a focus represents a dramatic departure from what have been up until recently prevailing assumptions that sever a work or musical theory from its primary historical horizon, a context nourished by social practices, politics, economics, religious affiliations, etc., often deeply at odds with present sensibilities. The language in which musical discourse is couched has for the most part been taken as a transparent reflection of the music itself, not as something ontologically different from music that indeed constitutes

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[1]Free Composition, xxiii.

[2]*High Romantic Argument*, ed. Lawrence Lipking, 173.

[3]Personal communication, October 1998.

and shapes our musical understanding. The unwieldiness of interpretive language that might behave in ways beyond a writer's control has not been a major consideration. When these influences are undeclared, unexplored, or even denied, they tend to operate from a submerged position which is all the more potent for its concealment.

This dissertation has attempted to probe one of the most persistent and pervasive paradigms of musical discourse from the three-fold perspective of history, language, and gender. It represents an effort to flesh out the rich complexities of a little-understood metaphor that still governs many of our presuppositions in aesthetics, criticism, history, theory and analysis. Sometimes it is the case that while organicist philosophical commitments have been rejected--such as the picture of history developing as a teleologically-driven organism--the residue of a standard musical canon which continues to circumscribe course work and student repertoire remains intact. On the other hand, the ongoing fixation with unity derived from musical "growth" and "development" which is "generated" by large, underlying principles or "germinal" motives, obscures other musical parameters or whole realms of music which operate from different orientations. The problematic dynamics of women composers writing in face of the still operant values of music as nature which is autonomous and the product of genius, have not been fully addressed. Birth metaphors remain popular and uninterrogated.

Linguistic theory which grapples with the functions of metaphor, problems of referentiality, and the rhetorical nature of all language has much to offer an investigation of musical organicism. Not infrequently the recognition of metaphor in musical discourse led

to attempts to excise the offender, the metaphor itself, often replacing it with simply different ones, possibly more amenable to the writer's personal commitments. Metaphors of life, growth, development, and generation were particularly intransigent, even for those alert to the metaphor of organicism (Allen, Bonds, Dahlhaus, for example). What is needed is not a language devoid of metaphor, but readers and producers of language who acknowledge the intervention of language in all discursive interaction and who are alert to its nuances. Such an awareness of how evocative, controlling, and yet, paradoxically unmanageable language can be leads potentially to a heightened consciousness of its functions, such that one can work with it, rather than in spite of it, knowing full well the failure of words to ever capture precisely our meanings in conjunction with our inescapable reliance upon them.

It is my conviction that questions about music are ultimately questions about humans. They are not limited to the sphere of language (a view in which language is about nothing but itself), but engage real people with concrete concerns however slippery the medium of this discourse. Are we machines, organisms, cyborgs, spiritual beings, or some combination? Is the art we produce, like the products of other "natural" creatures, also "natural"; can it be only artificial, constructed; or does art combine nature and artifice? Each choice points to different views about both life and art which inescapably connect to metaphysics and matters of being, consciousness, and purpose. The special spaces reserved for a nation's greatest treasures--its galleries, libraries, museums, and concert

halls--conspire to celebrate what are considered superior *human* capacities of intellect, imagination, and skill.

The metaphor of the organism represents one way of expressing the human value of "life." In its most direct manifestation, this consists in simply declaring music considered meritorious to be alive. Adjudicators around the Western world admonish their young musical cohorts to make the music *live*. What this means is rarely explained, being always a bit beyond words, a skill that emanates only from the most gifted. Organicism offers two means by which life can be borrowed metaphorically: as living organism and as living spirit. Either organic component--nature or spirit--serves to effect music's transformation.

The metaphorical element involved in evoking "life" in relation to music is rarely recognized. In addition to announcing the highest evaluation for the music in question, this vehicle of life suggests mystery and awe, while the ones making the pronouncement attract not a little of the congratulatory glow such a vague judgement generates. However clichéd the terms "living" and "organic," they continue to signal critics of distinction, people who are considered knowledgeable in their discursive community and who generally have a great love for music, desiring to infuse it with the most basic human attribute, "life."

Should organicism be exorcised from musical discourse? Can it be redeemed, modified, reintroduced as an heuristic device? Murray Krieger and John Daverio would argue for a more nuanced organicism, one tracing its lineage to Friedrich Schlegel rather than the more totalizing organicist theories of August Wilhelm Schlegel. Nevertheless, it has been predominantly the August Wilhelm variety that has infected aesthetic theories and

practices. No, I do not believe rehabilitation or some more "authentic" version of organicism can be justified, given its historical trajectory and its aesthetically and socially limiting propensities. The seductiveness of organisizing metaphors that promise life, unity, and spiritual infusion has not lost its appeal.

There is another alternative that I would underscore in keeping with de Man's emphasis, and that is an allegorical mode of reading and interpreting music. Refusing the synthesizing manoeuvres of metaphor and its symbolizing tendencies that blur difference, allegory acknowledges distance, temporality, the impossibility of ever becoming one with another ontology. It always calls attention to its own rhetorical mode, undoing fusions and confusions as it highlights the fictional, textual nature of language. Relying upon organic assumptions as a means of musical understanding deeply contradicts an allegorical approach. The nostalgia for being at one with music, whether through Dahlhaus's "analogue of the ego" or Nietzsche's musical "maternal womb," represents an illusory desire to coincide with something outside of itself, one that calls for the hard remedy of allegory: "In so doing, it prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self, which is now fully, though painfully, recognized as a non-self" (de Man 1983, 207).

I will close with what seems to me to be an eminently sensible critique of the organic viewpoint in music from an article written in 1895. This writer clearly understands the valorizing role for which the term "organic" has been co-opted. He is clear about the labour and choices involved in a composer's construction of a work, pointing out the rejected portions found in any composer's "studies and sketches." He refuses music any

teleology, denying any "necessity" in the musical sequences: "I do not think it is wise to assume that mood B follows mood A organically simply because it actually follows it directly at some point...":

> Granting the benefit of the doubt to those who use the word "organic," I assume at the outset that they do not mean to challenge its scientific meaning. Rather, they believe they are paying music a very high compliment with a simple analogy.
>
> But this simple analogy leads to misunderstandings, just as it arose from a misunderstanding. Careless use of the word "organic" by the general public soon contaminates any work to which it is applied. For we obviously never call a work we dislike "organically constructed." And yet, why should a work that we consider inferior not also be organic? The question itself suggests part of the answer. If we apply the scientific sense of the word "organic" only to those works to which we can listen with uninterrupted interest, excitement, and pleasure, then it is clear that we transfer our pleasure, which we indicate by the word "organic," to the content that afforded the pleasure. In this way, a beautiful piece comes to be thought of as organically constructed. And the misunderstanding is exacerbated by the great ignorance that exists concerning what is commonly called "form."
>
> In reality, musical content is never organic, for it lacks any principle of causation. An invented melody never has a determination so resolute that it can say, "Only that particular melody may follow me, none other." Rather, as part of the labor of building content, the composer draws from his imagination various similarities and contrasts, from which he eventually makes the best choice. (Schenker 1895: 98, 99)

Heinrich Schenker's grasp of genius as the operation of imagination "untainted by consciousness," and therefore, corresponding "accurately to the scientific notion of the 'organic,'" changed all of the above. It is difficult to account for Schenker's about-turn on so many of these matters. Most would agree his new organic blindness has greatly enriched the musical community. But at what cost?

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