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Disputed State, Contested Nation:

Republic and Nation in Interwar Catalonia

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——————————————— **ABSTRACT** ———————————————

Explanations of sub-state nationalism that draw on the effects of patterns of uneven economic development suffer from two conceptual problems: (1) they fail to explain why state actors are not able to adopt and implement long-term strategies to correct these effects and (2) they fail to account for the range of ideologies that can be used by sub-state actors to mobilize against the state. In this dissertation, I use an institutional analysis to overcome these problems by specifying the structural conditions under which a range of counterhegemonic groups can emerge to challenge state nationalism. The analysis is applied to a case study of interwar Catalonia, which examines three separate campaigns for political autonomy: 1906-1908; 1917-1919; and 1930-1932. Two modes of analysis are used. First, an institutional analysis is used to determine the structural conditions for the emergence of counterhegemonic movements. I argue that levels of institutional incorporation in a state can determine both the conditions under which a counterhegemonic group can emerge and the range of ideologies that can be used to organize against the state. Institutional incorporation refers to the variable level of institutions that together constitute the corporate structure of the state. The institutional analysis is applied to Southern Europe generally and Spain specifically, in order to identify the political groups in early twentieth-century Catalonia which challenged state nationalism by mobilizing around alternative state projects. Second, a rational actor approach is used to examine the strategic interactions of two sets of political actors in Catalonia, nationalists and republicans, in order to specify the conditions under which they attempted to gain political power and obtain political autonomy for Catalonia on three separate occasions. The combination of an institutional approach at the macro-level and a rational actor approach at the micro-level brings to light the importance of republicanism for structuring sub-state mobilization in Catalonia and political development paths more generally.

──────── **RÉSUMÉ** ────────

Les analyses du nationalisme régional soutiennent que celui-ci est la conséquence d'un développement économique irrégulier. Ces analyses économiques ne parviennent pas à expliquer (1) pourquoi les élites de l'État ne peuvent pas adopter et éxécuter des stratégies à longue terme pour pouvoir rectifier ces processus de développement économique irrégulier et (2) le fait qu'il éxiste une gamme d'idéologies—et non seulement le nationalisme—qui puissent servir comme base organisatrice pour une mobilisation au niveau régional contre la légitimité de l'État. Je développe une analyse institutionnelle pour surmonter ces problèmes afin de proposer des conditions structurelles qui déterminent l'émergence de 'contre-hégémonies' qui lancent un défi contre l'État. Le cas du Catalogne d'entre-deux-guerres forme la base empirique de la thèse. Deux approches analytiques sont employées. Dans un premier temps, une analyse institutionnelle est employée pour préciser les conditions structurelles qui déterminent l'émergence des contre-hégémonies. Je soutiens que le niveau d'incorporation institutionnelle d'un État puisse établir à la fois les conditions structurelles et la gamme d'idéologies que les mouvements régionaux puissent utiliser pour organiser contre le nationalisme de l'État. 'Incorporation institutionnelle' est le niveau variable d'institutions qui ensemble sont le 'corps constitué' de l'État. L'analyse institutionnelle est employée ici pour l'Europe du Sud et l'Espagne pour faire l'identification des groupes politiques qui ont mobilisé contre les États de la région au cours du 19e siècle et au début du 20e siècle. Dans un deuxième temps, je développe une analyse rationnelle pour examiner les interactions stratégiques entre deux 'contre-hégémonies' catalanes, nationalistes et républicains, lors de trois distinctes campagnes politiques pour l'autonomie (1906-1908, 1917-1919 et 1930-1932) afin de préciser les conditions sous lesquelles celles-ci ont tenté de gagner le pouvoir politique et obtenir l'autonomie régionale. Ensemble, les deux approches analytiques, l'une macro-structurelle et l'autre, une micro-analyse, démontrent l'importance du républicanisme pour expliquer la politique catalane et, plus généralement, le développement politique de la région.

CONTENTS

AC	Acció Catalana
ASR	Agrupación al Servicio de la República
AR	Alianza Republicana
ARC	Acció Republicana de Catalunya
BOC	Bloc Obrer i Camperol
CAP	Comissió d'Acció Política of the Lliga Regionalista
CEC	Centre Escolar Catalanista
CNC	Centre Nacional Català
CNR	Centre Nacionalista Republicà
CNT	Confederación Nacional del Trabajo
DLR	Dreta Liberal Republicana
EC	Estat Català
ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
FMA	Federació Monàrquica Autonomista
IC	Iniciativa per Catalunya
LR	Lliga Regionalista
ORGA	Organización Republicana Gallega Autonomista
PCR	Partit Catalanista Republicà
PI	Partit per la Independència
PP	Partido Popular
PR	Partido Reformista
PRC	Partit Republicà Català
PRDF	Partido Republicano Democrático Federal
PRR	Partit Republicà Radical
PRRS	Partido Radical República Socialista
PSC	Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Española
UFNR	Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana
UGT	Unión General de Trabajadores
UMN	Unión Monárquica Nacional
UR	Unión Republicana
UdR	Unió de Rabassaires
USC	Unió Socialista de Catalunya

───────────────────── **Introduction** ─────────────────────

Nationalist mobilization at the end of the twentieth century has renewed our

interest in the origins of nationalism and processes of state formation and nation

building. Recent studies of transitions to modernity in international relations have

challenged some of our earlier assumptions about the emergence of states and state

systems,[1] while research in the sub-fields of comparative politics[2] and political

theory[3] has called into question the claim that nationalism is the original form of

popular sovereignty. In examining transitions to modernity, some political scientists

have argued that republicanism was the first popular challenge to dynastic principles

in Western Europe, the effects of which can be traced in patterns of state formation

and political mobilization in Western Europe and the new world. To date, there has

been no systematic examination of the role played by republicanism in shaping

patterns of political mobilization in the literature on the comparative politics of

Western Europe. Furthermore, there has been no consideration of how

republicanism shaped the political development path of states. This dissertation aims

to contribute to the emerging inquiry into the relationship between nationalism and

republicanism in comparative politics by examining the way in which republicans

and nationalists competed politically in Catalonia between 1901-1932.

In many European states, modern nationalism has not only been marked by republicanism, it has actively competed with republicanism in the political arena. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nationalism and republicanism were organized as alternative state projects in France, Southern Europe and Ireland. What causal phenomenon can explain patterns of mobilization around these alternative state projects? What factors can predict when these projects will be politically successful? This dissertation addresses these questions through an examination of the structural conditions that gave rise to these political projects in Southern Europe and the development of a model of political mobilization that specifies the conditions under which groups can achieve their political objectives. The model is applied to Catalonia, where a series of campaigns for political autonomy between 1901 and 1932 provides fertile ground for examining how republicanism structured political outcomes.

Catalonia, 1901-1932

Catalonia has been studied as a classic example of minority nationalism in Western Europe.[4] Catalonia's distinct language, culture, legal system, political institutions and economic development path are frequently cited as reasons for "the denial of the idea of exclusive nationality" represented by the image of a unified

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[4] César Díaz-López, "Centre-Periphery Structures in Spain: From Historical Conflict to Territorial Consociational Accommodation?" in Yves Mény and Vincent Wright (eds.), *Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985); Salvador Giner, "Ethnic Nationalism, Centre and Periphery in Spain," in Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents (eds.), *Spain: Conditional Democracy* (London: Croon Helm, 1984); David Laitin, Carlota Solé and Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Language and the Construction of States: The Case of Catalonia in Spain," *Politics & Society* 22 (1994), pp. 5-29; Michael Keating, *Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland* (London: Macmillan, 1996); Juan J. Linz, "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalism against the State: The Case of Spain," in S.N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Building States and Nations*, Vol. 1 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973); Stanley Payne, "Catalan and Basque Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 6 (1979), pp. 15-51.

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Spanish nation that historically has been promoted by the Spanish state.[5] Nationalism, however, was not the first expression of Catalan opposition to Madrid nor has it always been the most important. In the late nineteenth century, republicans joined forces with anarchists in Catalonia and other parts of Spain to produce the First Republic (1873) and much the same alliance brought the Second Republic to Catalonia in 1931. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, republicans and nationalists actively competed for electoral support, a competition which culminated in the republican victory of 1931 that placed Catalan nationalists on the sidelines of political power.

Compared to other regional nationalities that mobilized for autonomy in the interwar period, Catalonia is one of two important outlier cases. Among national minorities in interwar Western Europe, only the Catalans and Irish obtained extensive political autonomy. Against the background of the interwar period, Catalonia stands out because it achieved political autonomy in Western Europe, where states were considered to be both consolidated and integrated and therefore not susceptible to political challenges from the periphery. For the republican victors in the elections of 1931, however, the advent of the republic was a revolutionary outcome at the same level as the creation of nation-states in East-Central Europe following the dissolution of empires. Republicans had seized upon the end of the Bourbon monarchy to declare a Catalan republic and an Iberian federation of states in the hopes of redrawing the map of the Iberian peninsula—although what they eventually obtained was far more modest. Nevertheless, the opportunity for political autonomy in Catalonia was similar to those opportunities provided by the end of

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[5] Keating, *Nations against the State*, p. 19. Keating distinguishes between state and anti-state

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wars: The abdication of King Alfonso XIII and the constitution of a republic marked an important change in the European state system that raised expectations about possible political outcomes. Both in Spain and elsewhere in Europe, the impression was that for Catalonia "'republic' mean[t] separatism or it mean[t] nothing at all."[6]

Despite the extensive historical literature on the Second Republic, and its subsequent breakdown, the origins of the republic in Catalonia are less well-known and have been almost entirely overlooked by political scientists working in the fields of nationalism and political development. The role of republicanism is poorly theorized and there has been no systematic study in political science of the role of republicanism and nationalism in structuring Catalan politics. The model of political mobilization that I develop demonstrates that nationalist and republican mobilization in Catalonia can be analyzed in much the same way as we examine how ideological movements, such as socialism, attempt to compete in electoral politics as minority parties. Nationalists and republicans in Catalonia faced electoral constraints that were heightened by the region's fractured party system. How they managed these constraints can largely explain political outcomes.

The study of nationalist and republican mobilization I develop is intended to fill certain gaps in the literature on Catalan politics. Catalan nationalism has been compared to Basque nationalism,[7] but there has been no comparative study of the

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nationalism and I follow his distinction here.

[6] *Corriere della Sera*, 16 April 1931, in Ferran Soldevila, "Organismes i Partits Davant la República" [Organizations and parties before the republic] *Revista de Catalunya* 13 (May 1931), p. 486. This and all subsequent translations are mine.

[7] Daniele Conversi, *The Basques, The Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997); and Juan Díez Medrano, *Divided*

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way in which republicanism and nationalism structured political outcomes in the battle for autonomy in Catalonia until 1931. The coming of the Second Republic is frequently related to the radicalization of nationalist politics in Catalonia after 1930. In fact, the transition to a republic was due to the radicalization of republican forces; nationalists meanwhile, remained conservative. Juan Linz has argued that peripheral nationalisms contributed to the breakdown of Spanish democracy in 1936;[8] without an accurate understanding of the nature of peripheral nationalism in Catalonia, the political significance of this role is overlooked. These omissions are surprising if we consider the analytical significance that has been ascribed to the democratic experiment of 1931-1936 in studies of the transition to democracy in 1976-1978.[9]

There is now archival material that will allow us to redress these omissions through a more detailed investigation of the republican and nationalist background of the Second Republic in Catalonia. This material, moreover, challenges the assumption in the literature on nationalism that, under certain structural conditions, national minority groups will mobilize against state nationalism using an alternative nationalism. As I will show, there were other ideological alternatives besides sub-state nationalism in Catalonia. Second, in demonstrating how republicanism

Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

[8] Juan J. Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978), pp. 142-215.

[9] Andrea Bonime-Blanc, Spain's Transition to Democracy: The Politics of Constitution-Making (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987); Richard Gunther, "Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain," in Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon (eds.), The Politics of Constitutional Change in Industrial Nations: Redesigning the State (London: Macmillan, 1985); Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad, Spain after Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); and José María Maravall and Julián Santamaría, "Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (ed.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1986).

structured political outcomes, I will also suggest that some of the assumptions about the role of liberalism in the literature on political development need to be revised.

The force of Catalan republicanism is today much distilled, but it is still noteworthy in one important respect: Catalan republicans, organized as the Partit per la Independència, are separatist, while Catalonia's two ruling nationalist parties, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya, are committed to the Spanish state. An investigation of nationalism and republicanism at the beginning of the twentieth century can therefore shed some light on patterns of mobilization in Catalonia at the century's end.

The research project and competing explanations

The role and nature of republican political mobilization in Catalonia and elsewhere in Western Europe cannot be explained by the existing literature on the formation of nation states[10] nor by the literature on sub-state nationalism in Europe. This literature relates sub-state nationalism to patterns of uneven economic development or industrialization.[11] This structural approach is consistent with certain assumptions underlying the literature on state modernization and political development; namely, that industrialization, and the market economy generally, have the effect of homogenizing domestic populations, thereby removing local differences and promoting social mobility by downplaying the significance of

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[10] Brian Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[11] Ernest Gellner suggested that there might be a link between uneven industrialization and nationalism in *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964).

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linguistic, racial and ethnic differences.[12] But some local cultures persist despite the spread of industrialization and state modernization. This phenomenon has been explained by reworking some of the assumptions in the earlier models of modernization to take account of the problem of economic backwardness outlined by Gerschenkron.[13] Late or uneven industrialization in certain regions of Europe can explain the continued existence of local cultures. These cultures escape the homogenizing effects of state nationalism and national markets and transform their culture into a rival form of nationalism.[14]

Explanations of the structural conditions under which sub-state nationalism is most likely to emerge cannot explain the emergence of republicanism, especially when the two coexist as alternatives within a state. The problem is not with structuralism itself, since the existence of nationalism, republicanism and other state projects is related to broader social and political developments. The problem, rather, is with the posited conditions themselves; they are too narrow. Economic conditions alone will not determine the range of alternative state projects that might emerge at the sub-state level. I am not disputing the relevance of socio-economic analyses of the organization and mobilization of nationalist movements, but when 'class' and 'nation' are used almost exclusively to explain mobilization against the state, other forms of organization that do not fit within these concepts, such as

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[12] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationalism* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953).

[13] Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1966).

[14] Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and Tom Nairn, *The Breakup of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London: New Left Books, 1977). The argument also exists in reverse: economic overdevelopment in the periphery is posited as a structural condition for nationalism. See Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "The Reemergence of 'Peripheral Nationalisms':

republicanism or anarchism, will necessarily drop out. Groups which challenge state nationalism dispute the existing territorial organization of the state, the conception of state-society relations promoted by the state nationalism and forms of self-rule. It is possible for a group to challenge state nationalism without being motivated by economic interests.

What causal phenomena can explain patterns of mobilization around alternative state projects such as nationalism and republicanism? I argue that levels of *institutional incorporation* in a state can explain the range and type of alternative state projects that might usefully be deployed to challenge state nationalism. Institutional incorporation refers to a variable range of institutions that together constitute the corporate structure of the state. The higher the level of institutional incorporation in a state, the less likely an alternative state project can emerge to challenge state nationalism. When a state enjoys a high level of institutional incorporation, the central state authority will be able to introduce, reproduce and monitor a nationalist project across the territory. In states with low levels of institutional incorporation, by contrast, the inability of the central authority to supplant certain local institutions with state institutions under its control will work against the diffusion and consolidation of state nationalism across the territory.

Since levels of institutional incorporation vary across states, institutional incorporation is a variable that can be tested across a range of cases and across time for comparative purposes. In testing for levels of institutional incorporation in this way, we might be able to shed some light on questions that have gone unanswered in explanations of sub-state nationalism that focus on economic under or

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Some Comparative Speculations on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and

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overdevelopment: What is the relationship between patterns of economic development and state structure? Under what conditions can the central state authority intervene to compensate for the effects of uneven economic development? For the purposes of this dissertation, I examine levels of institutional incorporation for a type of state: that of Southern Europe. The pattern of state formation in Southern Europe is distinct from that found in Northern Europe and I expect that this fact will yield a particular range and type of alternative state projects and forms of social relations. Collectively, I refer to these alternative state projects as *counterhegemonies*, groups which challenge the dominant or hegemonic view of state-society relations.[15]

Structuralist approaches to the study of sub-state nationalism suffer from a methodological problem. In many cases, the link between the dependent variable—nationalist mobilization or political outcomes (decentralization, federalism, independence, and so forth)—and the independent variable—uneven economic development or late industrialization—is not established. There is usually a considerable time lag between the processes that produced the independent variable and the dependent variable itself. As a result, the causality between the two variables is not always clearly established or the evidence is not sufficiently compelling. Moreover, because of the time lag, the number of variables that could intervene to

Economic Growth," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21 (1979), pp. 303-22.

[15] For a discussion of hegemony and counterhegemony as concepts in sociology see, Joseph Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). For an application of these concepts in political science see, David D. Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); and Ian S. Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). For a discussion of counterhegemony and mobilization see, Hudson Meadwell, "The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec," *World Politics* (1993), pp. 203-41.

explain the dependent variable is quite large. Scholars of nationalism have not been entirely successful at overcoming this methodological problem in part because divisions within the field over deductive and inductive approaches have obstructed methodological innovations. The move away from general theory and deductive methods in comparative-historical sociology has produced detailed case studies that use inductive methods to arrive at specific conclusions.[16] These conclusions, for the most part, cannot be generalized beyond one or two cases, since the intervening variables that explain a particular outcome are case specific. The inductive approach used in comparative-historical sociology brings to light what is unique in each case or a group of cases, but it seriously compromises our ability to advance our understanding of general causal relations and causal mechanisms.

This dissertation seeks to uncover the relationship between two macro-level structural variables that are separated by time. However, unlike inductive studies, I analyze political mobilization using a deductive approach. I begin with some general hypotheses about forms of mobilization that are then tested at the micro-level in order to determine the causal mechanisms that are at work. I introduce this methodological innovation in the form of a micro-level intervening variable: Forms of competition and cooperation among counterhegemonic groups. Using a rational actor approach, I assess how political actors avail of the structural conditions that gave rise to forms of counterhegemony in order to mobilize against the state. For the Catalan case study, the counterhegemonic groups I will examine are republicans

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[16] For a critique of this approach see, Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, "The Role of General Theory in Comparative-historical Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* 97 (1991), pp. 1-30. For a defence of this approach see, Jill Quadagno and Stan J. Knapp, "Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory? Thoughts on the History/Theory Relationship," *Sociological Methods and Research* 20 (1992), pp. 481-507.

and nationalists. Although other counterhegemonic groups existed, only republicans and nationalists had alternative state projects with which to challenge Spanish state nationalism.

Any counterhegemonic group which uses parliamentary channels to challenge the hegemonic conception of state-society relations will be faced with an electoral constraint. These groups have minority status in political systems of representation based on majority rule. The only way in which a counterhegemonic group can manage this constraint is either by expanding its support base or by forming an alliance with other counterhegemonic groups. Either strategy brings with it the problem of ideological compromise. The only way for a group to expand its support base is by diluting the ideological message which is directed at its core membership. Similarly, an alliance with other counterhegemonic groups raises the possibility that one partner to the alliance will be forced to compromise on the content of its ideological message. Electoral constraints need to be overcome in order for a group to achieve its political objectives, however these may be defined.

For republicans and nationalists in Catalonia, these objectives were twofold: in the short-term, they sought political autonomy; in the long-term, they sought to consolidate themselves as the new hegemon using new governing institutions which they would design. Since political support was fragmented along multiple ideological lines, counterhegemonic groups were forced to form cooperative alliances in order to increase their parliamentary representation. But this strategy, to the extent that it involved ideological compromise, conflicted with the strategy that was required for fulfilling a counterhegemonic group's long-term objective. In order to consolidate itself as the new hegemon, nationalists or republicans needed to reduce political

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competition by keeping rival state projects off the public agenda. The strategies that they devised to do so were antithetical to cooperation.

The electoral constraints imposed on counterhegemonic groups in parliamentary systems based on majority rule are not unique to Catalonia. By introducing the logic of electoral competition into the analysis of counterhegemonic mobilization, it is possible to identify intervening variables that can be applied across cases. I specify two intervening variables related to electoral politics, competition and cooperation, that allow me to assess actors' different motivations for strategic action. More precisely, I can specify the conditions under which different motivations for action will be dominant.[17] These intervening variables will allow me to test hypotheses that can also be applied to cases beyond Catalonia in order to determine the level of generality of the causal mechanisms I have identified. The methodological approach I use to test these variables is the analytical narrative, the purpose of which is to combine "detailed research of specific cases with a more general model capable of producing hypotheses about a significant range of cases outside the sample of the particular project."[18] Using extensive archival material from fieldwork in Catalonia, much of which has not been used elsewhere, I will recount how Catalan republicans and nationalists mobilized for political autonomy at three different moments of counterhegemony: 1906-1908; 1917-1919; and 1930-1932. The narrative I develop does not aim to provide a total explanation of historical events associated with each period; instead, I limit my narrative to an

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[17] Edgar Kiser, "The Revival of Narrative in Historical Sociology: What Rational Choice Theory Can Contribute," *Politics & Society* 24 (1996), p. 259.
[18] Margaret Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 6. This method will be discussed in more detail in chapter 1.

analysis of how nationalists and republicans managed the constraints associated with their short- and long-term objectives.

The approach I use to analyze the micro-level intervening variables is obviously quite different from purely structuralist approaches but it is also distinct from approaches to the study of state nationalism which purport to introduce micro-level analyses. Compared to the other approaches, I state at the outset what I take to be the political objectives of nationalists and republicans based on an extensive reading of the political writings and speeches of the major political intellectuals and political protagonists of the period. I use this method because I question claims that, for nationalist programmes, political choices are shaped almost exclusively by economic and social interests. In his comparative study of Basque and Catalan nationalism, Díez Medrano has argued that "to understand political behaviour in peripheral regions, one...needs to focus on the class structures of these regions."[19] Political choices about state and regime and, more specifically, about the relationship of the periphery to the centre, cannot be read off from one's social position. In Catalonia, liberal professionals (lawyers, notaries, doctors and architects), were just as likely to join the nationalist Lliga Regionalista (LR) as the republican Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). During the Second Republic, land and property owners were almost evenly represented in the Lliga and two republican parties, ERC and the Partit Republicà Radical (PRR). Businessmen fielded more candidates in the Partit Republicà Radical during the elections between 1931-36 than in the conservative Lliga.[20] The LR was the party more clearly identified with

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[19] Díez Medrano, *Divided Nations*, p. 11.
[20] See the data in Isidre Molas, *Lliga Catalana: Un Estudi d'Estasiologia*, Vol. 1, *Lliga Regionalista*, Collecció estudis i documents, 18 (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1972), pp. 329-44.

the interests of industrialists and property owners, but the large presence of liberal professionals, writers and businessmen in both nationalist and republican parties suggests that class and ideology were not so neatly linked. There are, as Hechter has argued, other forms of group solidarity besides class.[21] I argue that the principles of group solidarity among like-minded nationalists and republicans are more clearly related to their position on state and regime than pure class interests.

The micro-level analysis that I develop can also be distinguished from other similar analyses in that I do not view competition and cooperation in structural terms. Diez Medrano, who examines intragroup competition in his comparative study of Basque and Catalan nationalism, has argued that "the relationship between socioeconomic structure and political-competition structure is quite close."[22] Although he claims that with time the political sphere acquires autonomy from the socio-economic sphere, the intervening variables that he tests in his comparative study are still structural. The success of political entrepreneurs in shaping people's perception and gathering support, he argues, is dependent on the *structural conduciveness of a particular environment.*[23] The analysis of competition and cooperation that I develop does not view structure as a determining factor of the political action of entrepreneurs. However, I recognize the role played by structural *constraints*, particularly those related to governing institutions, and these are analyzed in detail where necessary. Indeed, I pay particular attention to the role of institutions since the actors I am examining are ultimately interested in institution-building. My analysis demonstrates when governing institutions facilitate or constrain political

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[21] Michael Hechter, *Principles of Group Solidarity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), .

[22] Diez Medrano, *Divided Nations*, p. 12.

action, but this is not the same as saying that institutions determine political action. In paying attention to the role played by institutions and the concept of institutional incorporation, I also seek to contribute to the literature on historical institutionalism through an examination of the relationship between state institutions and the diffusion and consolidation of a hegemonic culture.

Principal findings

At the macro-level, there are three sets of findings. First, high levels of institutional incorporation are required in order to reproduce a national culture and build consensus around the state's legitimacy. Second, levels of institutional incorporation can determine the range and type of alternative state projects or patterns of social relations that can be used to challenge state nationalism. Finally, an institutional analysis can specify the types of political issues around which groups mobilize at the micro-level. There are two principal findings at the micro-level. First, the examination of strategic interaction among actors reveals that issues related to state and regime can better explain political competition between Catalan nationalists and republicans than issues related to class and economy. Second, the analysis shows that in Catalonia, republicanism and nationalism were political alternatives, while in Spain, republicanism and liberalism were.

Outline of the Dissertation

In order to pave the way for a detailed analysis of political competition between republicans and nationalists in the period 1901-1932, chapter 1 introduces the model of counterhegemonic mobilization through a deductive inquiry that draws on the literature on state formation and nationalism. In order to explain the

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[23] *Ibid.*, p. 13 (emphasis added).

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structural conditions under which counterhegemonic movements emerged and the strategies used by actors to mobilize against the state, I develop a series of hypotheses that will be tested in the remainder of the dissertation using the methodological approach that I will outline.

Chapter 2 develops a theoretical argument about the structural conditions for the emergence of counterhegemonic movements through a discussion of the relationship between state power and institutional incorporation. In chapter 3, I apply this argument to processes of state formation in Southern Europe and show how variation across three dimensions of institutional incorporation—state centralization, state infrastructure and regime type—can account for patterns of counterhegemonic mobilization in the region.

In the second part of the dissertation, I apply the arguments developed in the first part to Spain and Catalonia. In chapter 4, I examine processes of state formation in nineteenth-century Spain in order to set out the structural context in which Catalan political actors mobilized at the beginning of this century and set the stage for the micro-level analysis of chapters 5 through 7. Each of these three chapters examines a distinct moment of counterhegemonic mobilization around political autonomy through the application of the model of counterhegemonic mobilization developed in chapter 1. The conclusion summarizes the principal findings of the research and considers their implications for our approach to the study of sub-state nationalism, political development and contemporary Catalan politics.

Conceptualizing Mobilization: Hegemony and Counterhegemony

Introduction

In the Introduction, I argued that structural arguments about the emergence of sub-state nationalism are not able to explain republicanism or, indeed, any other alternative state project or form of social relations besides nationalism. A second, methodological, difficulty with purely structural approaches to the study of nationalist mobilization is that they fail to specify the causal mechanisms linking structural conditions to political outcomes. In this chapter, I introduce a model to overcome the first difficulty and a method to deal with the second one.

The model that I introduce is a 'life-cycle' of a counterhegemonic movement. It specifies the structural conditions under which a counterhegemony can emerge; the structural-institutional conditions under which a counterhegemony can hope to consolidate itself as the new hegemon; and the causal mechanisms linking initial structural conditions to the final institutional objectives. As I made clear in the Introduction, the approach I use is deductive since one of the purposes of this dissertation is to stimulate debate around the conditions under which counterhegemonic movements mobilize and the strategic constraints which they face.

The purpose of the model of counterhegemony developed here is to enable us to account accurately for the nature of political opposition to state nationalism at the sub-state level. The need to account accurately for the nature of the political forces that structure outcomes as well as their patterns of political mobilization is self-evident: without such accuracy we run the risk of incorrectly classifying actors,

events and outcomes. The literature on twentieth-century Spanish political development suffers from such inaccuracies, particularly as regards Catalonia. In the first section of this chapter I review this literature to show that several influential approaches to political development in Spain do not provide an accurate account of the political cleavages which produced the transition to a republic in 1931, on the one hand, and the way in which these cleavages influenced the course of Spanish politics before the civil war, on the other. In the second part of this chapter, I present the research question that will be the starting point for a model that, in overcoming these inaccuracies, can explain the Catalan case and other examples of counterhegemonic mobilization against the state. In the second section, I also introduce the methodology that will structure the case study of Catalonia in the second part of the dissertation.

1. Political development in twentieth-century Spain

The most influential accounts of the political development of early twentieth-century Spain focus on two events: the breakdown of democracy during the Second Republic and the emergence of a fascist regime following the civil war. There are two explanations of these events: the first focuses on the balance of class forces while the second examines the nature of political cleavages. These two approaches to Spanish political development, which I will consider in detail below, are concerned with the effects of the failure to thoroughly modernize Spanish society in the nineteenth century through industrialization, secularization and the integration of regional interests. It is this failure which marks off Spain, and other Southern European states, from Northern Europe.

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Both of these approaches to Spanish political development build on Gabriel Almond's use of sociological concepts for explaining the essential differences between political systems.[1] Almond defined a political system "as the patterned interaction of roles affecting decisions backed up by the threat of physical compulsion."[2] Every political system "is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action" which Almond refers to as political culture.[3] The Continental European systems,[4] according to Almond, are characterized by a fragmentation of political cultures which arises from the "failure on the part of the middle classes in the nineteenth century to carry through a thorough-going secularization of the political system itself."[5] Furthermore, the persistence of various sub-cultures in Continental Europe has destabilized these political systems since political actors have "conflicting and mutually exclusive designs for the political culture and political system."[6] Politics in the Continental European systems is often stalemated as a result. The only force which can break through this impasse is a movement of charismatic nationalism which uses coercive action to build a 'synthetically homogeneous' political culture. Generally, the Continental European system, according to Almond, has a strong totalitarian potential.

Both the balance of class forces and political cleavages approaches to Spanish political development modify Almond's use of sociological concepts but do not alter his conclusions regarding the totalitarian outcome in Spain. The first of

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[1] Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics* 18 (1956), pp. 391-409.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 395.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 396.
[4] Almond includes France, Italy and Germany in this system. Based on his description of this system, it can also be applied to pre-1975 Spain.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 406.
[6] *Ibid.*

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these approaches argues that a certain balance of class forces determined the fascist outcome in Spain. This approach is exemplified by Barrington Moore's outstanding contribution to the literature on political development, in which he charted three different routes to the modern world: democracy, fascism and communism.[7] Moore's analytical focus was the changing relations between lord and peasant as the agrarian economy was transformed in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by patterns of economic modernization. As the state penetrated the countryside, the nature of the lord-peasant relationship changed; how it changed can largely account for which route a given country would follow to the modern world. For each route, the class struggles that ensued after the onset of modernization climaxed in a particular type of revolution: a bourgeois revolution for the democratic states; a revolution from above for the fascist states; and a peasant revolution for the communist states.

Moore's seminal analysis of political development paths is not able to account for the range of regimes that were "the byproducts of four routes from preindustrial politics to the crises of the 1920s and 1930s": pluralist democracy, socialist or corporatist democracy, traditional dictatorship and fascism.[8] This was Gregory Luebbert's contention and he attempted to fill this gap in the literature by arguing that these four regimes of historical importance were actually alternatives to each other. What determined a particular outcome was not the balance of class forces at the onset of modernization but, rather, the timing of the incorporation of labour into the institutions of state around the interwar period. In Lubbert's analysis,

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[7] Barrington Moore, Jr., *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon, 1966).

regime outcomes are related to a distinct indicator of modernization: the dominance, or lack thereof, of a liberal party before the First World War. Where liberal parties were dominant, the incorporation of workers into the political process occurred before the outbreak of the war. Where liberal parties were not dominant, by contrast, "modern political orders had yet to be created," and corporatism would be required to stabilize class politics in the interwar period. Luebbert has concluded, *contra* Moore, that for the interwar period, there was no correlation between the rural social structure and the regime outcome.[9]

In its application to the Spanish case, the balance of class forces approach encounters a conceptual difficulty in its treatment of the civil war (1936-1939). Luebbert, for example, tends to treat the civil war as yet another instance of the class conflict he is considering for the entire period he is examining. However, as Linz has shown, "regional, cultural and linguistic cleavages played a role in the breakdown of democracy" that led to civil war, not class conflict.[10] Therefore, it is worth considering a second approach to Spanish political development, one that can account for these political cleavages to which Linz refers. Here I use Seymour Martin Lipset's classic 1959 article, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy,"[11] which argues that in the absence of cross-cutting cleavages, a pluralist society will encounter political polarization that can escalate into violence. I also examine an

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[8] Gregory Luebbert, "Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe," *World Politics* 39 (1987), p. 451.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 477. See also, Gregory Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[10] Juan J. Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978), p. 142.

[11] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959), pp. 69-105.

influential response to Lipset's statement on pluralism, that of Arend Lijphart in *The Politics of Accommodation*.[12] The potential application of the consociational solution to Spanish politics that Lijphart introduced into the political development literature has been analyzed by Linz:[13] Thus, I want to consider whether Linz' conceptualization of social and political cleavages provides a more precise account of interwar Catalan politics than the approaches used by Moore and Luebbert.

Balance of class forces

Spain is not included amongst Moore's case studies in *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, but where it is mentioned at all, it is usually in relationship to fascism.[14] Reference to the 'revolutionary' nature of the end of the monarchy in 1931 at the hands of republicans is omitted because this regime transition is not the product of those types of class struggles which Moore is examining. Instead, Moore views Spain as part of a group of cases which experienced a 'revolution from above': in the Spanish case this was the Franco regime that came to power following the republican defeat in the civil war. This type of revolution, according to Moore, is the product of a certain sequence of factors:[15] first, a highly stratified society, with a self-important aristocratic class, continues into the twentieth century; second, as modernization takes hold, the landed élite attempts to preserve its privileged position by forging a coalition with the new commercial and manufacturing bourgeoisie; third, the landed élites use political levers to further entrench their

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[12] Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
[13] Juan J. Linz, "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State: The Case of Spain," in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Building States and Nations*, Vol. 2 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973).
[14] Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, pp. 184, 197.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 438, n4.

power when international competition endangers the form of labour-repressive agriculture which they control; and, finally, the coalition of landed élites and commercial bourgeoisie, once they have established themselves in the seat of political power, attempt "to extend democracy which, toward the end, succeeded in establishing unstable democracies."[16] When these unstable democracies were no longer able to respond to or control the series of popular political demands, "the door to fascist regimes was opened."[17]

While the Second Republic was certainly an unstable democracy,[18] it was not led by a coalition of landed upper classes and the emerging commercial class. This point is significant because, had such a coalition won the elections in April 1931, the monarch would never have abdicated and Spain would have continued with some form of weak parliamentary government and constitutional monarchy. Spain's unstable democracy was the product of an alliance that was different from that which Moore describes in his preconditions for a revolution from above: the coalition of forces that won the elections of 1931 was made up of republicans and socialists. Moreover, the alliance that produced the republic came to power for a purpose distinct from that of preserving a labour-repressive agricultural economy. The alliance of middle-class republicans and urban or rural labour, depending on the particular region of the country, sought power for the purpose of overthrowing what was perceived as a conservative and oligarchic dynastic parliament and modernizing Spain through a democratic republic. This peaceful revolutionary break with the past suggests that one of Moore's preconditions for the democratic route

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[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 437-8.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 438.

to the modern world—"*the prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the peasants and workers*"[19]—was actually present in Spain. In the end, Spain does not conform fully to either the democratic or the fascist route to the modern world. We therefore require the analytical tools that will explain the significance of the 1931 regime for outlining Spain's particular development path. Moore's method of analysis can take us only part of the way, although it is worth determining at what point this analysis breaks down.

Consider first that Spain, like other countries in Europe which ended up as fascist states, was a late developer. It is also true that economic development was uneven around the peninsula and that the 'commercial impulse' around the country varied in strength as did the class structure which responded to this impulse. The commercial impulse was far stronger in Catalonia than elsewhere in the peninsula but the commercial class of Catalonia, while economically influential, was politically weak in Madrid. The ability of this class to influence economic policy was severely curtailed by its political opponents in Madrid, who represented the interests of the landed classes of Castile and Andalusia. The alliance between landed élites and the commercial bourgeoisie that figures among Moore's preconditions for fascism was not possible in Spain because the most influential among the Catalan commercial class were members or supporters of regionally-based political parties with which the landed élites in Madrid generally refused to cooperate.[20] The Catalan bourgeoisie supported the monarchy, but not the centralized state; the landed élites, by contrast,

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[18] For a thorough account of the instability of the Second Republic see, Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War," pp. 142-215.

[19] Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, p. 431 (emphasis in original).

supported both. The Catalan bourgeoisie, through the Lliga Regionalista (LR), joined forces with other non-dynastic parties—republicans and socialists—in an attempt to reform the political system in 1917, but as the movement moved to the left, the LR withdrew its support but did not switch and form an alliance with the dynastic parties. The Catalan commercial élites pursued a different strategy. As a minority party in the Cortes (parliament) in Madrid, they sought a constitutional arrangement that would give them majority decision-making power in Catalonia: regional autonomy. The Catalan bourgeoisie could pursue this goal because of the strong support for Catalan national institutions in Catalonia. The quest for regional autonomy was cast in nationalist and republican, not class, terms and was the catalyst for a distinct form of political mobilization in Catalonia at the beginning of this century.

Catalan regional interests assumed two distinct forms: nationalist and republican. Patterns of Catalan political mobilization were distinct because nationalists and republicans competed against each other for power. Republicans were concerned with political freedom, which explains their attack on the corrupt constitutional monarchy and their commitment to constitutional reform, both of which brought them into conflict with Catalan nationalists of the LR, who claimed to have no position on regime type but who, in fact, preferred the monarchy over a republic. It was the victory of the republicans in 1931 which transformed Catalan politics overnight and produced the republican outcome which Catalan nationalists considered disastrous for their cause. The complexity of the Spanish case, which

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[20] There were some attempts at cooperation between these two forces when the monarchical regime was weakened politically after 1917, but these were not alliances of the type that Moore emphasizes. See chapter 6 for a discussion of these attempts.

Moore's analysis cannot pick up, is exemplified by the political cleavages and political issues that emerged in Catalonia at the beginning of this century: superimposed over a matrix of class interests were those groups seeking to restructure the Spanish state. Catalan republicans were prepared to redraw the map of Spain in order to obtain political freedom for Catalonia. Their nationalist opponents, by contrast, continued to believe that freedom was attainable through limited political reform negotiated with Madrid.

To summarize the discussion so far, Moore's approach does not properly capture the dynamic of Spanish politics in the Second Republic for three reasons. First, the coalition which produced Spain's unstable democracy that opened the door to fascism was other than that provided by Moore in his preconditions for a 'revolution from above.' In fact, the coalition that produced the republican outcome more closely resembled that associated with a bourgeois revolution. Moreover, the nature of the political competition that produced the republic had less to do with class conflict and more to do with ideological conceptions of state and regime.

Secondly, the coalition which produced the republican democracy did not seek power in order to protect the interests of the landed élite, another of Moore's preconditions for fascism. Indeed, one of the first pieces of legislation introduced by the republican-socialist coalition was an agrarian reform bill which sought to dismantle the labour repressive economy held in place by the dynastic parliamentary system. The republic not only threatened the economic base of the landed élite, but also its conception of a unitary Spanish nation-state by permitting extensive regional autonomy in Catalonia. From the perspective of the landed élites, then, the republic

represented a revolutionary overhaul of Spain, the results of which they refused to support.

Finally, Moore's approach pays no attention to regional politics and the way in which it contributed to the instability of republican democracy. Specifically, the ideological differences within Catalonia over state structure and regime type had the effect of polarizing political parties and groups and producing political alliances that undermined the stability of the Catalan Generalitat (parliament) after 1932. Democratic instability in interwar Spain had a particular regional dynamic which needs to be brought into focus in order to explain opposition to Catalonia during the civil war and the Franco regime.

An approach to Spanish politics that can account for these regional cleavages might be better placed to explain the political dynamic in interwar Spain. This is what Luebbert attempts to do in his study of the social origins of regimes in interwar Europe.[21] We noted above that Luebbert uses liberal parties as one indicator for determining which of the regime types would emerge in a given country: "where liberal parties had failed to establish responsible parliamentary institutions before the [First World] war, it would prove impossible to stabilize a pluralist democracy afterwards," thereby opening the door to corporatism in either its social democratic or fascist form.[22] Because of the weakness of liberal parties in Spain, Luebbert, like Moore, analyses Spain in terms of its fascist outcome. Methodologically, Luebbert's focus on liberal parties prevents him from examining alternatives to liberalism, such as republicanism, and leads to certain errors in

[21] Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy.*
[22] Luebbert, "Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe," p. 449.

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explanation. As with our consideration of Moore's analysis, above, it is worth identifying at what point in Luebbert's examination these errors occur.

Unlike Moore, Luebbert seeks to explain the weakness of liberalism in Spain through reference to the persistence of pre-industrial cleavages in the twentieth century. In Luebbert's comparative historical analysis of regime transition in interwar Europe, Spain holds a special status as "the dividing line between Western and Eastern experiences," which are distinguished by their levels of economic backwardness.[23] In Spain, pre-industrial cleavages—clericalism, language and regionalism—divided the middle classes, thus preventing the consolidation of a liberal movement. A consequence of these divisions was that they trumped the possibility of a liberal-labour ('lib-lab') alliance, guaranteed the continued exclusion of the working classes from political competition and fostered ideological polarization. The political openness and proliferation of political parties during the Second Republic exacerbated this polarization so that fascism was the only political movement that could stabilize the situation.

The culprits in the Spanish case appear to be the middle classes, especially the Catalan middle classes, which were nationalist. According to Luebbert, after 1898, "Catalan nationalism [was] a powerful and disintegrative force in Spanish politics" because regional nationalism, along with other pre-modern cleavages, such as ethnicity and clericalism, divided the middle classes and prevented a hegemonic

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[23] Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy*, p. 99. On Spanish political development more generally, see, Juan J. Linz, "The Party System of Spain: Past and Future," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York and London: The Free Press and Collier-Macmillan, 1967); *idem*, "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State: The Case of Spain"; and *idem*, "A Century of Politics and Interests in Spain," in Suzanne Berger (ed.), *Organizing Interests in*

liberal coalition.[24] This statement is made up of two claims, neither of which are

entirely correct and both of which raise doubts about the validity of Luebbert's

approach for understanding regime change in Spain. The first claim is that regional

nationalism, as a manifestation of center-periphery tensions, was a legacy of the pre-

industrial period and therefore not modern. Nationalism, however, was a modern

movement having roots in the economic ambitions of Catalan industrialists who,

after 1898, were frustrated by the regime's unwillingness to introduce political and

economic reforms.[25] After 1898, Catalan nationalists, through the Lliga Regionalista,

pursued a policy of modernization and political reform, but always from within

Spain. Catalan nationalists sought to 'regenerate'—not disintegrate—Spanish

politics.

The real disintegrative force in Spanish politics in the interwar period was

Catalan republicanism. Unlike Catalan nationalism, which was prepared to accept

administrative decentralization or autonomy under the monarchy, Catalan

republicanism linked political autonomy to a regime transition and, in its most

extreme form, to political independence. Catalan republicanism, rather than

nationalism, was the stronger opposition movement in Spanish politics through its

challenge to the existing structure of the state. This was even the case during the

Second Republic, when republicans ruled in Madrid. Luebbert overlooks the role

Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[24] Luebbert, _Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy_, p. 102. Luebbert writes (p. 63) that "liberal movements in these societies [where liberalism failed] were crippled by divisions within the middle classes that originated in the preindustrial epoch. Conflicts of national territory, religion, the center versus the periphery, the city versus the country, and national communities remained divisive at the time of mass mobilization."

[25] The best-known account of this version of Catalan nationalism is Jordi Solé-Tura, _Catalanisme i revolució burgesa: la síntesi de Prat de la Riba_, Llibres a l'abast, 47 (Barcelona:

played by Catalan republicanism because his interest in political-economic regimes in interwar Europe prevents him from considering those regime outcomes—such as republicanism—that were not so obviously the product of class alliances in the electoral arena. In focusing on the economic project of Catalan nationalists, and not their political project, Luebbert ignores the two most important political debates that took place in interwar Catalonia—the nature of the state and regime and Catalonia's relations with the Spanish state.

Luebbert's second claim is that there was a liberal force in the country but that it could not consolidate its position because of the pre-industrial legacies— regionalism and the Church—which continued to divide the middle classes. There are several problems with this claim. First, the only Liberal party that existed in the period which is of importance for Luebbert's analysis was the dynastic Liberal party of the Restoration period (1876-1923) which, as Luebbert himself acknowledges, was liberal in name only.[26] There was no liberal party in Spain that was strong enough such that the principal cleavage preventing it from consolidating its hegemonic position was Catalan nationalism.[27] Nor were nineteenth-century Spanish liberals prepared to tackle issues such as the division of church and state. To the extent that Luebbert is correct in naming clericalism as the "pivotal conflict" of the nineteenth

Edicions 62, 1967). In chapter 4, I will show that the roots of Catalan nationalism were also extended to a professional and intellectual class.

[26] Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy*, p. 152.

[27] The origins of Spanish liberalism are to be found in the Napoleonic invasion of Spain. The Liberal party attempted to prevent revolution by consolidating forces around the constitution it created in 1812. The deputies which drafted and debated the constitution never considered separating church and state, although they eventually abolished the Inquisition. After the revolution of 1820-23, the Liberals divided into *Moderados* (mercantile and capitalist interests) and *Progresistas* (professionals, shopkeepers and craftsmen). *Moderados* and *Progresistas* evolved into the Conservatives and Liberals of the Restoration period, alternating in power through a *turno pacifico* that ensured the continued hegemony of the

century, it is because clericalism marked off the dynastic parties—Liberals and Conservatives—from the anticlerical republicans. The more pivotal conflict of the nineteenth century was that between the dynastic parties and Carlists—who contested the Isabelline monarchy—on the one hand, and monarchists and republicans, on the other. These two conflicts centered on questions of monarchical succession and monarchy versus republic.

Second, it might be that Luebbert regarded republicanism as the liberal movement in Spain, but he is not clear on this point. For example, he maintains that "the problems of a Lib-Lab alliance in Spain were those of an alliance between an infant socialist movement with a residual middle-class cause in pursuit of electoral victories in a country where elections counted for little."[28] Later, he refers to republicans as the "great residual of middle-class politics," which seems to suggest that they are the 'liberals' in the lib-lab alliance. Still later, however, he distinguishes between liberalism and republicanism when he writes that "[r]epublicanism was kept a peripheral strand of middle-class alienation for all the same reasons that a liberal movement was always crippled: by Spain's backwardness and the conflicts between clericalism and anti-clericalism, regional nationalism, and Castilian hideboundness."[29] Luebbert never states explicitly that in his examination of Spain he considered republicans to be equivalent to liberals elsewhere in Europe. It does not seem possible that they could be equivalent: If republicans were simply liberals by another name, their electoral victory in 1931 would not have resulted in the abdication of the king. Liberals and monarchists had cooperated in power since the beginning of the

upper classes. Neither party considered abolishing the monarchy nor separating church and state.
[28] Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy*, p. 151.

Restoration system (1876), but when republicanism was triumphant in Spain in 1931, the monarch realized that abdication was his only political recourse.

If liberals and republicans are distinct (and I think Luebbert probably recognizes this because he refers elsewhere to the dynastic Liberal party) Luebbert is at a loss to account for the popular support for the republican movement. It seems remarkable that a republican movement which "never amounted to much until the fall of the monarch in 1930 [sic],"[30] could have mobilized sufficient support in the short time between the end of the Primo dictatorship in 1930 and the elections of April 1931 to emerge victorious, win the approval of the armed forces and *cause* the fall of the monarchy. There must have been more to republicanism than Luebbert will allow. Luebbert overlooks the ideological attraction of republicanism for political groups ranging from anarchists to intellectuals. This attraction, moreover, extended far beyond republicanism's anti-monarchism: these groups held a vision of a modern and progressive Spain that included a conception of social and political life that required radical changes to the Spanish state.

Since liberalism and republicanism were distinct political forces, there was no opportunity in Spain for a lib-lab alliance of the type that existed in Britain, although Luebbert claims that the stumbling block in Spain—in addition to a weak liberal movement—was "an infant socialist movement."[31] He does recognize that in the late nineteenth century, republicans and socialists attempted a national alliance and that they tried to include Catalonia in this alliance on two occasion before the military dictatorship of 1923, but failed. Aside from the errors of fact in Luebbert's

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[29] *Ibid.*, p. 152.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.*

two examples,[32] he misrepresents the nature of the Catalan labour movement in his search for evidence of lib-lab relations in Catalonia. Labour in Catalonia was not socialist, it was anarchist. The problem was not that socialism in Catalonia was in its infancy, but rather that socialism, generally, had never taken root in Catalonia.[33] The only alliance that was possible was a republican-anarchist one. In 1931, anarchists supported republicans in their bid for power and in this way contributed to the republican victory in Catalonia.

We can summarize the discussion of Luebbert's analysis by noting that the liberal lens through which he approaches the study of regime change in Western Europe does not work so effectively for the Spanish case. Luebbert's search for the reasons for liberalism's failure in Spain prevents him from identifying those political cleavages that in fact structured Catalan politics in the interwar period. Neither the approach used by Moore nor that used by Luebbert can correctly account for the role played by Catalan politics in structuring political outcomes in Spain. What is significant about Catalan politics is that it was organized around a cleavage that was distinct from that found in the rest of Spain. At the same time, many of the problems faced by the Spanish republic—the social question, land reform, church-state relations—were also part of the political landscape in Catalonia. Political

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[32] Luebbert maintains that republicans and socialists were part of an electoral coalition, Solidaritat Catalana, in 1909. Actually, the coalition broke-up in 1909 when republicans decided to run alone in municipal elections in Catalonia. Republicans were part of the coalition for the 1907 elections to the Cortes, but socialists were never part of the alliance nor was Lerroux' radical republican party, although Luebbert includes this party too. The second possibility for a republican-socialist alliance, according to Luebbert, was in 1917, during the Assembly Movement. The socialists did indeed participate in this assembly along with Catalan nationalists, but as there was only one socialist deputy for all of Spain, it was hardly the beginning of a lib-lab alliance. Chapter 5 examines Solidaritat Catalana and chapter 6 discusses the Assembly Movement.

[33] See, Albert Balcells (ed.), *El arraigo del anarquismo en Cataluña (Textos de 1926-1932)* (Barcelona: Collección Beta, 1973).

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cleavages thus cut two ways in Catalonia: one cleavage—nationalist/republican—

separated Catalan politics from the rest of Spain and was institutionalized in the

Catalan Generalitat. Other cleavages—class, clerical—integrated Catalan politics, to a

certain extent, with Spanish politics. It is conceivable that an approach to the study

of political development that is based on an analysis of social cleavages in pluralist

societies might be better able to explain the role played by Catalan cleavages in

structuring regime outcomes in Spain. In the next section, I consider this possibility.

Social and Political Cleavages

Gabriel Almond argued that the existence of various sub-cultures—some of

which were pre-industrial—in Continental European systems destabilized politics in

these countries because there were few, if any, points of agreement across the sub-

cultures that could be the basis for consensual politics. Almond's ideas have been

reworked by, among others, Lipset,[34] Rokkan,[35] Lijphart[36] and Linz.[37] In this section,

I consider some of these arguments in three stages. First, I examine Lipset's classic

statement on social cleavages and the interwar period; next, I consider Lijphart's use

of consociational democracy as a response to Lipset's claim; and, finally, I look at

Linz' consideration of the possibility for a consociational solution to ethnic diversity

in Spain.

There is a strong consensus that the way in which three major historical

issues identified by Lipset in "Some Social Requisites of Democracy" were resolved

by West European states by the interwar period influenced their path of political

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[34] Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy."
[35] Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967).
[36] Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*.
[37] Linz, "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalism Against the State."

development. These issues were the role of religion in the state; citizenship rights for the working class (such as the right to vote, to organize and to bargain collectively); and issues of economic redistribution. Lipset showed that the way in which these issues were resolved had a significant impact on the existence of social and political cleavages within a society. That is, if these issues were resolved one at a time, this would contribute "toward a stable political system."[38] The resolution of these historical issues facilitated the creation of cross-cutting cleavages which Lipset and others have shown to be essential for stable democracy.[39] Where these issues remained unresolved, the result was polarization across different social and political groups and an absence of toleration; a poor basis for stable democratic government. Lipset emphasized that where historical issues were not resolved, a *weltanschauung* politics results, "which is sustained by the systematic segregation of different strata of the population in organized political or religious enclaves."[40]

In *The Politics of Accommodation*, Arend Lijphart made a fundamental contribution to the literature on political development by explaining how stable democracy *could* exist in the absence of cross-cutting cleavages, using the Netherlands as a case-study. Lijphart analyzed the picture of a society divided along class and religious lines, producing four 'pillars': Calvinist, Catholic, Socialist and Liberal. Each pillar encapsulated distinct political organizations, labour unions, forms of civil association and organs of communication that served as barriers to the development of associations cutting across the four pillars. Lijphart showed how the

[38] Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 92.
[39] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Classes and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959).
[40] Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 93.

"basic pattern of accommodation"[41] in the Netherlands emerged between 1878 and 1917 when the different pillars in Dutch society had to respond to three divisive issues: the question of church and state as it affected education, the extension of the franchise and collective bargaining as a right of labour.[42]

The emergence of these issues served as the catalyst for the creation of political parties and political interests, which had the effect of entrenching the four pillars and bringing Dutch society to the brink of a political breakdown. The Dutch settlement of these issues preserved the four pillars and "helped the blocs to become more firmly entrenched within their own spheres by giving them secure and exclusive control over their parties and schools."[43] Recognizing the need to preserve the culture and forms of organization within each pillar, Dutch élites were persuaded to arrive at a solution to the problem of state funding for education and universal suffrage for the sake of preserving their political system. The will to develop a process of accommodation stemmed from a common loyalty to the Dutch nation which cut across the four blocs. This collective will, further, led to the institutionalization of the process of accommodation and the development of the 'rules of the game,' the respect for which ensured the viability of the system.[44] The importance of Lijphart's work was to demonstrate that under certain conditions, which Dutch élites devised and respected, democracy, consociational rather than liberal, could be stabilized in the absence of cross-cutting cleavages.

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[41] Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*, p. 104.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 116.
[44] The rules of the game, as outlined by Lijphart, include: the business of politics; the agreement to disagree; summit diplomacy; proportionality; depoliticization; secrecy; and the government's right to govern.

Linz is certainly correct when he maintains that one of Lijphart's conditions for a consociational outcome, internal cohesion within subcultures, was not present in Spain.[45] Linz maintains that class and ideological divisions in Catalonia prevented the emergence of a leadership which could claim to represent the Catalan 'subculture' in Madrid. However, Catalonia is more than a subculture; it is a nation. In the Dutch case, the different subcultures were committed to the concept of a Dutch nation; this is what made consociationalism a possibility. In Spain, by contrast, there was no comparable commitment on the part of all members of the peripheral nations. Some Catalans were committed to remaining in Spain; others would only commit to a federal Spain; and still others would only commit to independence.

In order to bring out what is distinct about relations between Catalonia and Spain, Linz would have to focus on the ideological divisions within Catalonia. But in his analysis of intra-Catalan divisions Linz, like many others, focuses almost exclusively on class and fails to account for the significance of ideological divisions. Some ideological divisions—anarchist/nationalist—were also class related, but others—nationalist/republican—were not. He treats the nationalists of the Lliga Regionalista as rightist and the republicans of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya as leftist and claims that their antagonism "created a unique pattern of politics."[46] However, the history of political party competition and class conflict in West European political development tells us that conflict between the left and right is anything but unique. In his analysis, Linz fails to identify the cleavages that produced a distinctive pattern of politics in Catalonia. Nowhere, in fact, does he state the

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[45] Linz, "Early State-Building and Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State," p. 68.

source of the antagonism between nationalists and republicans, outline their patterns of mobilization or describe their support bases, leaving us to wonder in what way, precisely, Catalan politics was unique.

Catalan politics was unique because political differences struck at fundamental issues not entirely picked up in the classic work on political development and political mobilization that I have thus far discussed. Not all Catalan élites were even committed to the idea of a Spanish state or nation, unlike their counterparts in the Netherlands. Indeed their degree of commitment to Spain is what separated Catalan nationalists—clear supporters of the Spanish state—and republicans—less committed supporters of the Spanish state—and prevented the emergence of consociationalism. The identification of the Second Republic with the left further exacerbated polarization between nationalists and republicans with the result that Catalan nationalists—who were more to the right than republicans—felt doubly excluded from politics. In Catalonia, then, the republic had the effect of segregating groups according to class and regime preference. Over the course of the Second Republic, the different understandings of the structure and role of the Spanish state would divide political forces and contribute to political collapse and, eventually, civil war.

None of the approaches to Spanish political development that I have examined can provide an accurate assessment of the nature of the competition between the political cleavages that produced the republican outcome in Catalonia in 1931, on the one hand, and the way in which these cleavages influenced the course of Spanish politics, on the other. Furthermore, since Catalan nationalism is

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[46] *Ibid.*

considered to have been a contributing factor in the breakdown of democracy, it is essential that the nature of nationalist mobilization in the periphery be understood clearly.[47] Linz, for example, maintains that "the overthrow of the monarchy was more the result of a vacuum of support than of the organized strength of its Republican opponents, who benefited nonetheless from a widespread and diffused feeling that a change was necessary."[48] Linz is not able to explain why voters chose republicans—arguably the most radical of parties appearing on the ballot—over more moderate parties. The belief that the overthrow of a 200 year-old monarchy was necessary could hardly have been 'diffuse'; such a revolutionary change could only have been produced through the organized mobilization of supporters.

The model of counterhegemonic mobilization that I develop in the next section will help to solve these problems by specifying the range of political movements that shaped outcomes in the interwar period, their patterns of mobilization, and competition among them. The application of the model, however, is more general.

2. Research question and methodology

This dissertation addresses the following question: What causal phenomenon can explain patterns of mobilization around alternative state projects in Southern Europe? The model that I develop in this section is intended to explain the dependent variable in the research: *challenges to state nationalism*. For the dissertation, the dependent variable can be restated as the *range and type of Catalan challenges to state nationalism in Spain*. In this section, I develop a model that can define the range of

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[47] Linz maintains that "the peripheral nationalisms, particularly the Catalan, that have contributed to so many crises in modern Spain were also a factor in the crisis of the Republic." See Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War," p. 155.

alternative state projects in Southern Europe and analyze how groups managed the particular constraints associated with mobilizing against the state. The model will then be applied to Spain and Catalonia in order to explain how republicans and nationalists mobilized for political autonomy and competed with each other in a bid to realize their respective political objectives. The model and the hypotheses used to test it are derived deductively by considering certain assumptions in the literature on nationalism and state formation. Therefore, the model is intended to be sufficiently general to be relevant for other examples of counterhegemonic mobilization, under certain conditions which I will state in the section on methodology. In this dissertation, the model will be applied to three different moments of counterhegemony in Catalonia: 1906-1908; 1917-1919; and 1930-1932.

A model of counterhegemonic mobilization

The objectives of a counterhegemonic movement are to oppose the dominant, or hegemonic, conception of state-society relations, displace the hegemonic culture, and to consolidate itself as the new hegemon. By conceptualizing and analyzing movements which oppose the hegemonic culture as forms of counterhegemony, we can give greater weight to their ideological foundations and explain more precisely the nature of political competition among these. David Laitin, drawing on the work of Antonio Gramsci, has defined hegemony as "the political forging—whether through coercion or elite bargaining—and institutionalization of a pattern of group activity in a state and the concurrent idealization of that schema into a dominant symbolic framework that reigns as common sense."[49] Other

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[48] *Ibid.*

[49] David D. Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 19.

definitions which also draw on Gramsci, such as that of Joseph Femia, do not consider coercion a legitimate means of achieving hegemony: "Hegemony is…the predominance obtained by consent rather than force of any one class or group over other classes; and it is attained through the myriad ways in which the institutions of civil society operate to shape, directly or indirectly, the cognitive and affective structures whereby men perceive and evaluate problematic social reality."[50] In this dissertation, I am interested in cases where consent is achieved without resorting to violence.

A hegemonic culture is a dominant culture whose status, I will argue below, requires high levels of institutional incorporation. The hegemonic culture is not necessarily a linguistic or ethnically-based culture; it can be, for example, a republican political culture, as the American and French cases demonstrate. For the purposes of this dissertation, the hegemonic culture which I am interested in examining is state nationalism. A counterhegemonic movement challenges the dominant culture using an alternative ideological framework for 'common sense'. In this dissertation, I am interested in counterhegemonic movements that mobilize supporters around an alternative state project that aims to change the territorial organization of the state.

Counterhegemonic groups challenge the state's dominant ideology and attempt to move through the three stages of what I call the 'life-cycle' of a counterhegemonic movement: (1) socializing members through social and political institutions and organizing a challenge to the hegemonic culture; (2) competing with the hegemonic culture and with other counterhegemonic groups for supporters; and (3) consolidating a new hegemonic culture. Each stage corresponds with certain

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[50] Joseph Femia, "Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci,"

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organizational and strategic requirements. In order to be able to recruit supporters in the first stage, counterhegemonic groups require a set of institutions through which to socialize members and an alternative ideology around which to organize. In the second stage, counterhegemonic groups must successfully compete for support against both the hegemonic culture and other counterhegemonic groups in order to displace the former. As we saw in the Introduction, counterhegemonic groups encounter various constraints at this stage which they must manage in order to meet their political objectives. If a counterhegemonic movement successfully moves through the second stage, it needs to consolidate its position as the new hegemon, using new institutions which it has designed. These stages are not necessarily linear: groups are often forced to retreat to a previous stage or they are not able to progress beyond a certain stage. In the remainder of this section, I discuss each of these stages and their related requirements and set out the hypotheses that emerge from the discussion.

The antecedent and independent variables

Structural explanations of sub-state nationalism argue that uneven economic development is one reason for which some local cultures are not fully integrated into the 'national' state and market. These explanations leave unanswered the question why, in states marked by uneven development, the central authority cannot smooth over the effects of uneven development in order to enforce a national culture using state institutions which it controls. Peter Gourevitch has suggested that there might be a relationship between political leadership and peripheral nationalism. That is, where political and economic leadership is located in the centre, ethnic nationalism

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in the periphery is unlikely since, "so long as the core appears viable, the peripheries appear to accept their situation, even if they are poor and dominated."[51] I agree with Gourevitch that the strength of the centre is related to the ability of the periphery to mobilize around an alternative state project. The way in which I understand state strength, however, is not in terms of political or economic *leadership* but, rather, in terms of the institutional bases of state power.

States require a range of institutions for extracting revenue and monitoring citizens. In order to consolidate state power, the central authority must have a monopoly on coercive, economic and political resources. Margaret Levi has argued that rational and self-interested rulers will attempt to maximize revenue by "establish[ing] de facto policies within the constraints of their bargaining power, transaction costs and discount rates."[52] A condition for enforcing policy is the quasi-voluntary compliance of citizens.[53] I want to suggest that on one reading of the literature on states and nations, nationalism can be considered a condition for citizen compliance with government policy.

Ernest Gellner has argued that modern industrial societies require nationalism because the level of literacy, technical knowledge, shared standard meanings and high levels of communication can only be provided by a 'national' culture. The reproduction of culture at the local level will not fulfill these requirements. Membership in a local culture, further, will not fulfill the conditions

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51 Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "The Reemergence of 'Peripheral Nationalism': Some Comparative Speculations on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and Economic Growth," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21 (1979), p. 304.
52 Margaret Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 183.
53 *Ibid.*

for social mobility in a modern society.[54] We might disagree with the functionalism of Gellner's argument—that industrial society *requires* nationalism—but his basic thesis about modern societies and social mobility is still valid. It is true that state modernizers must "break down the segments of the traditional order to create a common culture capable of integrating all citizens."[55] However, it is also the case that citizens must be full members of the common culture in order to benefit from the promise of upward mobility held out by modern society.

Where there is a national culture and related institutions for socializing members into this culture and reproducing it, citizens will assume that membership in the national—or common—culture will act as a guarantee of upward social and economic mobility. It is the national culture which provides all the tools—education, language and customs—that allow citizens to access social and economic opportunities. If there is a national culture into which all citizens can be integrated without prejudice or, stated differently, which all citizens can join, then citizens are more likely to perceive the political system as being fair. Opportunities are not withheld because someone has a distinct cultural background. Therefore, under the condition of an inclusive national culture, citizens will be more likely to comply with government policy.

A national culture can only be maintained through state institutions. Even if citizens reproduce the national culture in non-state institutions, they must first learn it in state institutions, such as educational institutions or the military. State élites must create a full range of institutions across the territory that will socialize citizens. By participating in these institutions, citizens will also reproduce the national culture

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[54] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 33-34.

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on a daily basis. For the purposes of compliance, state institutions must, as far as is necessary, supplant local institutions that reproduce local cultures instead of the national culture. For example, Scotland's incorporation into the United Kingdom in 1707 allowed for the continued existence of Scottish ecclesiastical, educational and legal institution where a distinct Scottish culture was learned and reproduced. The incorporation of Quebec into British North America and, later, Canada, was not a process of assimilation but, rather, accommodation, which allowed Quebec to retain certain cultural institutions, such as the Roman Catholic Church, educational institutions attached to the Church, and some political autonomy. Until the postwar period, Quebec's Roman Catholic culture was the basis of its distinct national identity within Canada. Similarly, it is in the state's interest to ensure that citizens do not have the material resources to sustain these local institutions. The Basque Country retained certain local, including fiscal, privileges—collectively known as *fueros*—long after these were abolished in the rest of Spain and these posed "the major challenge to administrative unity" for the state.[56] The restoration and, later, the extension of *fueros* has been a central demand of Basque nationalists in this century. In contrast to these examples, the centralization of the French state is one reason for which "there is a weak sense of territorial identity and a lack of a tradition of independent existence" among regional national groups in France.[57]

Nation-building then, requires state institutions for the creation of a national culture, its diffusion and reproduction. State institutions, in turn, are the result of

[55] John A. Hall, "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained," *Daedalus* 122 (1993), pp. 4-5.
[56] Marianne Heiberg, *The Making of the Basque Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 3
[57] Michael Keating, "The Rise and Decline of Micronationalism in Mainland France," *Political Studies* 33 (1985), p. 17.

processes of state formation and the consolidation of state power. The literature on state formation argues that state power is a variable: not all states will possess the same ability "to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm,"[58]—what Michael Mann has referred to as infrastructural power. An important antecedent variable in this dissertation then, is the *level of state power*. The level of state power should tell us something about the state's ability to build institutions. In chapter 2, I draw on the literature on state building to set out three indirect measures of state power:

(1) Sources of state revenue

(2) Forms of resistance to state rulers by local nobles

(3) The ruler's ability to enforce compliance

The antecedent variable directly affects the independent variable in the research, which is a state's *level of institutional incorporation*. Institutional incorporation refers to the variable range of institutions that together constitute the corporate structure of the state. Therefore:

Hypothesis 1

(1) The greater the level of state infrastructural power, the more likely a state will develop a high level of institutional incorporation.

The level of institutional incorporation in a state can tell us something about the possibilities for, range and type of, counterhegemony. States with high levels of institutional incorporation will be more successful at reproducing cultural norms across the state territory and at regulating and monitoring the use of these norms

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[58] Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *Archives européenes de sociologie* 25 (1984), p. 189. Mann distinguishes between despotic and infrastructural power. This distinction will be examined in chapter 2.

than states with low levels of institutional incorporation. In the second case, alternative cultures can emerge in response to the absence of a strong national culture. That is, low levels of institutional incorporation point to a weakly centralized and organized state against which alternative cultures—counterhegemonies—can organize. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 2

(2) The level of institutional incorporation will determine the range and type of counterhegemonic movements which can challenge the hegemonic culture.

Towards mobilization: Political actors and contextual factors

The antecedent and independent variables in the research set out the structural conditions for the emergence of counterhegemonic movements. The organization and mobilization of these movements is not dependent on structural conditions but, rather, the political strategies and actions of political actors. In this section, I will explain how these actors attempt to organize and mobilize supporters around alternative and competing state projects. The literature on the new institutionalism—both its historical and rational choice variants—argues that political actors are constrained in their strategic actions by the rules, norms and procedures of the institutions in which they operate.[59] In other words, "the structure of political opportunities will shape the strategies of organized interests and their beliefs regarding the efficacy of different types of political action."[60] Political opportunities can be shaped by the institutional context but they can be explained

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[59] For two recent comparative analyses of the different approaches within the institutionalism literature see, Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism," *Political Studies* 44 (1996), pp. 936-57; and Ellen M. Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," *Politics & Society* 26 (1998), pp. 5-34.

[60] Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," p. 21.

by "historically generated context" which "may affect the functioning and salience of institutions."[61]

In order to situate politically the context in which counterhegemonic groups in Catalonia mobilized, I preface my explanation with a discussion of the concept of *hegemonic breakdown*. Contextual factors, particularly institutional ones, can be analyzed on a general level across cases. Historically generated context can also be analyzed more generally. For example, a war is a historically generated context which can affect several states at once and we can compare and contrast the different effects of this context across cases. A historically generated context affected counterhegemonic mobilization in Spain at the turn of this century: Spain's military defeat in the Spanish-American War, which brought its empire to an end. The effect of the war was to produce a particular context in Spain, which I refer to as a *hegemonic breakdown*.

Hegemonic breakdown. A hegemonic idea begins to break down when a severe internal or external political crisis exposes the gap between the hegemonic idea and existing social and political reality. A hegemonic breakdown can be said to have occurred when the interpretation of reality held up by the hegemonic culture's conception of state-society relations is no longer considered by individuals to be the only possible interpretation of reality. The breakdown provides the opportunity for the leadership of a counterhegemonic movement to mobilize and to campaign as a possible alternative to the existing hegemonic culture. Hegemonic breakdowns can be conceptualized as a switch-point between the structural conditions for counterhegemony and counterhegemonic mobilization. The concept of a hegemonic

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[61] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

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breakdown also has some methodological benefit in that it can explain the time lag between the structural processes which produce counterhegemony and counterhegemonic mobilization.

Not all crises will displace the hegemonic culture: it might be able to withstand the crisis; to defeat or coopt its opponents; or, to incorporate the critiques of the hegemonic culture into a reformed conception of state-society relations. In other cases, by contrast, the hegemonic culture might survive the crisis but be weakened by the experience: certain groups might withdraw their support for the hegemonic culture and transfer their allegiance to a counterhegemonic movement that, because of the role it played during the crisis, is now considered to be a legitimate alternative to the hegemonic culture. Whatever outcome emerges as a result of the hegemonic breakdown, the breakdown itself is an important switch-point in the life-cycle of a counterhegemonic movement since it provides a political context in which the alternative state project of a counterhegemonic group can gain political relevance and legitimacy and expand its support beyond a core group. Hegemonic breakdowns provide leaders of counterhegemonic movements with an opportunity to promote political concepts for their own purposes. Mobilizing for change while the hegemon's status is stable and its support base is secure is costly and likely to fail. The cost of mobilization is reduced considerably when the hegemon is in a weakened position or when it is actively promoting a public debate and campaigning for new ideas.

Political leaders and the role of ideas. A counterhegemonic movement mobilizes against the hegemonic culture in anticipation of eventually displacing it and consolidating itself as the new hegemon. In order to do so, a counterhegemonic

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group must first become a legitimate political player and alternative to the hegemon. It can only do so by expanding the public political discourse so that its political objectives are placed on the public agenda. In order to broaden the public political discourse around alternatives to the hegemonic state project, leaders of counterhegemonic movements need to be able to redefine political options for members and potential members of the group; reshape the political values of group members; and mobilize members for change. Counterhegemonic leaders must be able to manipulate public discourse by introducing new concepts or redefining existing ones.

James Farr has argued that political acts are often carried out both *in* and *through* language. Actors use language to describe their political actions and they use discourse—speeches, newspaper columns, pamphlets and so forth—to convince others of the validity of their actions.[62] As Farr notes: "[T]hat actions might be commended in and through language points to the [fact that] political concepts partly constitute the beliefs which inform action and practice."[63] Counterhegemonic leaders develop political concepts to which they attach a particular set of political actions that they seek to carry out through the mobilization of supporters. Counterhegemonic leaders need to convince supporters of the reality and desirability of those concepts which are attached to a particular ideology. For example, that the *nation* exists; that *virtue* can be realized in a republic; that the *monarchy* has a moral authority which legitimizes its rule; or, that *freedom* is only possible through anarchism. In exploiting the gap between existing reality and the hegemonic

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[62] James Farr, "Understanding Conceptual Change Politically," in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 27.

conception of state-society relations, counterhegemonic leaders rely on conceptual innovation to convince supporters of the political advantages associated with reconstituting state-society relations.

All concepts, as Farr argues, have a history: They change over time, depending on how they are defined by different groups, how they relate to other concepts, the context in which they are applied and the range of political examples to which they can be applied.[64] Indeed, concepts are frequently manipulated for particular purposes since counterhegemonic leaders must convince supporters of the link between the concepts which they are promoting and the need for political action. Sometimes this involves the manipulation of the conventional use and understanding of a concept in order to incite supporters to action.[65] Counterhegemonic leaders need to be able to draw out certain political implications of the existence of a concept (the nation, republic or monarchy, for example) in order to convince supporters that bringing about that which the concept promotes requires a commitment to a certain type of political action, which the leaders define. For example, the existence of the nation might imply the need to mobilize for self-determination while a belief in the political benefits of republicanism implies the need to overthrow the monarchy and establish certain political institutions and practices that guarantee freedom and virtue.

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[63] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[65] See, James Tully, "The pen is a mighty sword: Quentin Skinner's analysis of politics," in James Tully (ed.), *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

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The intervening variables: Competition and cooperation

Hegemonic breakdowns provide certain opportunities for counterhegemonic leaders but they do not completely remove institutional constraints. Counterhegemonic groups which decide to contest power through parliamentary channels face some of the same electoral constraints experienced by class-based parties: they have minority status in political systems of representation based on majority rule. Historically, this constraint has been analyzed in terms of an electoral trade-off. Adam Przeworski has argued that in order for socialist parties to win elections they have to extend their support base beyond their core group of workers.[66] The only way in which they can do this is by diluting the very ideological message which is directed at workers, thereby running the risk of eroding their core group of supporters.[67]

Counterhegemonic movements face a similar dilemma. Regionally-based counterhegemonic groups such as those found in Catalonia will always have minority status in parliamentary institutions. Counterhegemonic projects, particularly when their objectives are to change the territorial structure of the state, are carried out over the long-term. Therefore, when such a counterhegemonic movement decides to pursue its political objectives via the parliamentary route to reform, it knows in advance that its project can only be realized over the long-term, if at all. All counterhegemonic groups must devise strategies to manage this *electoral constraint*.

Electoral constraints bring counterhegemonic groups face to face with the problem of *ideological compromise*. Counterhegemonic groups are what Martin Shefter

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[66] See, Adam Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy* (Cambridge and Paris: Cambridge University Press and Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1985).
[67] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

has termed 'externally mobilized' parties because they are founded by political outsiders who neither occupy public office nor are associated with élites who do. Externally mobilized parties are organized by political outsiders "in an effort to gain entry into the political system for themselves and their supporters or in an effort to overthrow the system."[68] Because these parties are trying to gain access to the political system, the leaders of externally mobilized parties do not have access to the spoils of power. In the short-term, they are unable to reward supporters with patronage and must instead rely on other means for retaining supporters within the movement. Shefter has argued that political parties which cannot distribute patronage to their supporters "are compelled to rely upon ideological and solidary incentives *before* coming to power."[69]

Externally mobilized parties—what I term a counterhegemonic movement—display certain organizational features which distinguish them from movements which are organized by leaders with direct or indirect access to power. First, members join such a movement because they are ideologically committed to its objectives. Shepsle and Bonchek have conceptualized ideological commitment as an example of experiential behaviour.[70] Compared to instrumental behaviour—which is "motivated by and directed toward some purpose or objective"—experiential behaviour is characterized by people doing things "because they like doing them—they feel good inside, they feel free of guilt, they take pleasure in the

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[68] Martin Shefter, "Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy," *Politics and Society* 7 (1977), pp. 403-51, reprinted in John A. Hall (ed.), *The State: Critical Concepts*, Vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 112.
[69] *Ibid.*, p. 109.
[70] Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek, *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 247-48.

activity for its own sake."[71] Pure instrumental behaviour can be seen as an investment activity—individuals pursue certain actions in the present in order to gain benefits in the future. Experiential behaviour is more like a consumption activity—individuals participate in an activity because they believe that the activity itself is beneficial apart from any consequences that might transpire.[72]

Second, joining a counterhegemonic movement is an example of experiential behaviour but it is not entirely without instrumental purposes since membership is an investment, albeit a long-term one. In order to maintain the ideological orientation of the party over the long term, these parties have an organizational structure that tightly links leaders and followers in order to reinforce the ideological value of membership and monitor how members reproduce this ideology.[73] Without a strong organizational structure, the content of the counterhegemonic ideology will not be transmitted between leaders and followers and members will quickly lose sight of the objectives of the movement.

When ideologically-based parties enter the electoral arena they will be forced to compromise on the purity of their ideological message in order to broaden their support base. There is no other path to power for such parties through parliamentary structures. The extent to which counterhegemonic groups will be forced to compromise on their ideology depends on electoral and parliamentary rules and procedures: proportional representation and coalition government, for example, can reduce the need to dilute the content of a party's ideology.

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[71] *Ibid.*, p. 247.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 248.
[73] Shefter, "Party and Patronage," p. 113.

Regionally-based counterhegemonic groups will almost certainly be faced with the problem of ideological compromise in their attempts to manage the constraint associated with electoral politics in majoritarian systems. The only way in which a regionally-based counterhegemony can hope to win an election is by forming an electoral alliance with other parties. I refer to electoral alliances as forms of *cooperation*. Electoral alliances, however, will almost certainly entail some ideological compromise. Two or more parties cannot appear together on an electoral ticket or pool their resources without explaining to their supporters and voters generally how the alliance will affect a party's ideological objectives. Leaders will be forced to explain how the alliance is an effective strategy for realizing the party's short *and* long-term objectives. For example, even if an electoral alliance will not result in an electoral victory, it can increase a regionally-based counterhegemony's parliamentary representation, which might have benefits for legislative initiatives, depending on the rules for membership on committees and so forth. An electoral alliance, therefore, can be an appropriate strategy for meeting a counterhegemonic group's short-term objective, such as the pursuit of reform through parliamentary channels.

To the extent that an electoral alliance requires ideological compromise, it can work against a counterhegemonic group's long-term objective, which is to displace the hegemon and consolidate itself as the new hegemon by reproducing its state project through institutions it has created. These institutions also set limits on rival state projects by keeping them off the public agenda. A new hegemonic group must set limits on its political *competition* by designing certain institutional rules and procedures which will reinforce its own status.

Cooperation, a short-term strategy and competition, a long-term strategy, can pull a counterhegemonic group in different directions; it will really depend on the amount of ideological compromise that cooperation requires. Counterhegemonic leaders need to be able to convince members that in joining the alliance, the movement's ideological project will not be pushed aside. At the same time, counterhegemonic leaders need to convince their alliance partners that their commitment to their movement's ideological project will not impede cooperation. Counterhegemonic leaders can say one thing to their followers and another to their alliance partners; this might be the only way that they can manage the tension between cooperation and competition.

The variable labels *cooperation* and *competition* are short-hand for the particular strategies used by counterhegemonic movements in Catalonia between 1901-1932 in response to the institutional constraints which they faced. In chapter 5 through 7, I examine the factors that motivated Catalan nationalists and republicans to use these strategies, given the inherent tension between them. I identify two distinct motivations, which I will introduce in the form of hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3

(3) Counterhegemonic groups will enter into a cooperative alliance with other groups when there is an overlapping ideological commitment in their respective alternative state projects.

In this case, actors are motivated to join an alliance because they calculate that the amount of ideological compromise required is minimal or non-existent. Even where the groups are ideologically similar, it is possible that cooperation will entail some ideological conflict. For example, alliance partners might represent moderate and

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radical strains of a particular ideology. The nature of the conflict will be determined by the balance of power between or among partners. What happens when alliance partners represent different ideologies? In such cases, I hypothesize that

Hypothesis 4

(4) Counterhegemonic groups will enter into a cooperative alliance with other groups so long as the ideological compromise that results does not cause the defection of their core support base.

In this case, actors' motivations are more difficult to discern, since ideological compromise is inevitable. It is possible to imagine, however, that leaders and followers will accept some ideological compromise because they view the alliance as an effective means for monitoring and controlling the actions of their alliance partners/ideological rivals. That is, the alliance itself becomes an institution with rules and procedures. This suggests that a counterhegemonic movement can handle a certain amount of ideological compromise before supporters will begin defecting. The challenge facing party leaders is to determine at what point defection will occur and to avoid being pushed beyond that point by their alliance partners. I assume that counterhegemonic leaders are as committed to a movement's ideology as the core group of supporters. Moreover, the tight organizational link between leaders and followers in counterhegemonic movements means that leaders will almost certainly be aware of a possible defection by followers. When defection seems likely, counterhegemonic leaders will be forced to pull out of an alliance, even though this means abandoning, for the time being, the group's short-term objectives.

Methodology

This dissertation employs two different methodologies: a comparative-historical inquiry for the macro-level analysis and a case study of Catalonia using the method of analytical narrative for the micro-level analysis.

Macro-level analysis. The antecedent variable, *levels of state power*, is operationalized in chapter 2 through a discussion of the sources of state power from the literature on state formation. In chapter 2, I also analyze the consequences of low levels of state power for *institutional incorporation*, the independent variable, through a discussion of the assumptions about the role of institutions for structuring rules and procedures from the literature on the new institutionalism.

The hypotheses that are derived from the theoretical discussion in chapter 2 are then applied to Southern Europe and Spain in chapters 3 and 4. In chapter 3, I use the comparative-historical method[74] to examine processes of state formation in Southern Europe in order to specify the limits of counterhegemonic ideologies and forms of anti-statist social relations. I draw on an extensive secondary literature on state-making and political ideologies in order to do this. I implicitly compare the Southern European experience to patterns of state formation in Northern Europe, where state consolidation conforms more closely to the ideal-type Weberian state. Adopting an institutionalist approach, I outline the consequences of a distinct pattern of state formation in Southern Europe for three dimensions of institutional incorporation: state centralization, state infrastructure and regime type.

In chapter 4, I examine the sources of state power in nineteenth-century Spain through an analysis of state-building processes that focuses on the relationship

between levels of state power in Spain and levels of institutional incorporation at the turn of the twentieth century. I then introduce a historically generated context, *hegemonic breakdown*, and draw out the effects of this context for levels of state power and institutional incorporation. The analysis in chapter 4 sets out the particular institutional context in which Catalan political actors operated during the first three decades of this century and the constraints produced by this context for strategic action. In this chapter, I draw on the secondary literature on Spanish state formation as well as the literature on political and social development in nineteenth and early twentieth-century Catalonia.

Micro-level variables. Having set out the macro-level institutional context in chapter 4, I move to a micro-level analysis of Catalan politics in chapters 5 through 7. The decision to use a single-case study requires some justification since one of the purposes of comparative politics is to build generalizations and "a single case study can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the grounds for disproving an established generalization."[75] However, the Catalan case is one of two deviant cases in interwar Western Europe—Ireland is the other: No other national minority moved as far down the road to political autonomy as did the Catalans and the Irish. Deviant cases have a potential theoretical value to the extent that "they suggest a modified proposition that may be stronger" than the theoretical proposition they have challenged or contradicted.[76] Alexander George, moreover, maintains that the single case study can contribute to theory development under

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[74] Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 (1980), pp. 174-197.

[75] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65 (1971), p. 691.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 692.

certain conditions: first, it must use the method of 'disciplined-configurative' analysis, which "employs available general hypotheses (whether cast in the form of general laws or statements of probability) to explain the outcome in a particular case."[77] Second, the investigation must be explicit about the type of event of which the case is a particular instance in order that we may be clear about the phenomena for which we are generating theoretical explanation. Third, the researcher must "be selective and focused in his treatment of a case."[78] That is, those aspects of a case which are selected for analysis should be related to the event under examination as well as the theoretical explanation that is being constructed.

This dissertation attempts to contribute to theoretical development by respecting George's three guidelines in the following way: First, in classifying the Catalan case as an instance of counterhegemonic mobilization in the periphery, I have avoided the pitfalls of attempting to explain the uniqueness of the Catalan case through a purely descriptive and 'configurative-idiographic' account.[79] Instead, by employing general hypotheses and variables, my argument can be applied to a range of cases for the purposes of theory-building.

Second, I have selected a type of event for investigation—counterhegemonic mobilization in the periphery—which is a central theoretical preoccupation in the literature on sub-state nationalist mobilization. Nationalist mobilization has been analyzed extensively in the literature and there are several established hypotheses and typologies that have been used to explain the conditions under which such

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[77] Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused, Comparison," in P.G. Lauren (ed.), *Diplomatic History: New Approaches* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 51.
[78] *Ibid.*, p. 50.
[79] *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

mobilization occurs. However, these analyses cannot explain all forms of counterhegemonic mobilization. These generalizations, further, cannot explain the political outcome in interwar Catalonia, as I argued in the Introduction to this dissertation. Consequently, as regards these established arguments, the Catalan case can reveal some of their shortcomings while suggesting how they might be modified in order to explain a larger group of cases of sub-state mobilization.

Third, I will use the method of 'structured-focused comparison' in that I will not examine all aspects of my case but only those that are relevant for the hypotheses that I am testing. Moreover, I attempt to solve the methodological problems associated with a single case study by maximizing comparability through a diachronic analysis that forces me to be both structured and focused.[80] I select three moments of counterhegemonic mobilization in the Catalan periphery which are separated by time, but which are not completely independent from each other because of their temporal proximity. Historical sociologists claim that the order in which events happen will affect outcomes.[81] The way in which I conceptualize the importance of sequence in my research is to note that it diffused innovation over the three counterhegemonic moments. Actors learned from previous moments of mobilization and adjusted their strategies where necessary and possible. I do not consider the temporal proximity of the three moments in my research to be problematic methodologically since, as Edgar Kiser has argued, "the condition of independence of cases is not necessary if the theory includes an adequate model of

[80] Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," p. 689.
[81] For an assessment of temporality in historical sociology see, Larry J. Griffin, "Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction," *Sociological Methods and Research* 20 (1992), pp. 403-27; and Ronald Aminzade, "Historical Sociology and Time," *Sociological Methods and Research* 20 (1992), pp. 456-80.

diffusion."[82] I include such a model in my analysis by examining the way in which innovative ideas and experiences were diffused over time by political actors and élites through political manifestoes, speeches, journalistic writings and political memoirs. I also pay attention to the way in which political actors adopted strategic innovations in light of new ideas and past experiences.

The method I use to examine the three counterhegemonic moments is the analytical narrative, which is particularly suited to the investigation of a sequence of events as well as to a consideration of how innovation is diffused over time. This method combines "detailed research of specific cases with a more general model capable of producing hypotheses about a significant range of cases outside the sample of the particular project."[83] For the Catalan case, the detailed research is from archival material from fieldwork in Catalonia. I have drawn on four different types of sources. The first of these are the political works and memoirs of major intellectuals in the three periods, who were also leaders of the political movements that will be investigated. The writings provide us with an account of the intellectual background and influences acting on each movement. I have read the political writings, collected newspaper articles, public speeches, debates and memoirs of these political personalities. The development of the party system in Catalonia in the first three decades of this century was complicated: ideological debates provoked many factions, splinter groups and new party formations. So, secondly, I have identified the main causal factors for the formation of new parties and divisions within parties by reading party manifestoes, the minutes of party congresses and party newspapers.

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[82] Edgar Kiser, "The Revival of Narrative in Historical Sociology: What Rational Choice Theory Can Contribute," *Politics & Society* 24 (1996), p. 254.

The third type of source are the parliamentary debates from the Cortes in Madrid and the Generalitat in Barcelona, particularly in the crucial period 1931-1932, when the Spanish Constitution and Catalan Statute of Autonomy were debated. An examination of the parliamentary sessions allows us to determine how Catalans with different ideological commitments defended their conception of Catalan autonomy when the stakes were highest. Finally, I have read the principal newspapers and magazines of the period and examined forms of propaganda, such as handbills and posters, for an account of the unfolding of political events.

Analytical narratives combine detailed research with general theory. As Kiser has argued, narrativists need to introduce historical scope conditions in order to specify "the range of situations within which the theory can be legitimately tested."[84] The hypotheses (1 and 2) related to structural conditions for the emergence of counterhegemony can be applied to other cases in the developed West. The micro-level hypotheses (3 and 4) can be applied to all cases of counterhegemonic movements that contest power through parliamentary channels. The scope conditions that I introduce are bound by place (parliamentary structures in the developed West) but not by time. Therefore, these conditions are sufficiently abstract that the hypotheses can be transported to other cases.

In the next chapter, I develop the macro-level hypotheses in greater detail through a discussion of the sources of state power and the relationship between power and institutional incorporation.

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[83] Margaret Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 6.
[84] Kiser, "The Revival of Narrative in Historical Sociology," p. 257.

Part I

Institutional Incorporation and Nation-Building

State Power and Institutional Incorporation

Introduction

There is no available argument that discusses both the structural conditions under which a counterhegemonic movement can exist and the range of ideologies to which these conditions give rise. In this chapter, I take up the first challenge; in chapter 3, I will address the second one. Arguments about sub-state nationalism offer some partial insights into the problem addressed in this chapter since the central theoretical concern of these is to explain why sub-state nationalism exists in spite of the assumptions about the effects of modernization in the literature on nationalism. States makes nations, according to this literature, through the diffusion and imposition of a national culture that radiates out from the centre to the peripheries, assimilating local cultures along the way and thereby forging a cultural unity within the borders of the consolidated territorial state. But the persistence of local cultures and forms of political mobilization in Britain, France and Spain— Western Europe's first nation-states—suggests that the posited outcome in the centuries-long process of state building—a consolidated state with a unified national culture—is more often assumed than demonstrated.

Theories of nationalism which draw on the effects of uneven industrialization or patterns of industrialization to account for sub-state nationalism do not manage completely to fill the theoretical gap because they fail to explain why state-led nation-building projects were unable to smooth over these effects. In other words, these theories do not explain why the state was unable to impose state nationalism over the territory using the institutions that it controlled. In this chapter,

I develop such an explanation through an argument for the importance of *institutional incorporation*, which refers to the variable range of institutions that together constitute the corporate structure of the state. The only means available for the political élites of a state to diffuse and reproduce a national culture is through a network of institutions. If we can estimate the capacity of a state's institutions for reproducing a national culture, we might be able to determine the structural conditions under which alternative cultures—counterhegemonies—emerge. J.P. Nettl first suggested such an approach by arguing that "more or less stateness" is an important variable for comparing Western societies. Moreover, Nettl maintained that "Where [states] succeed in diffusing a high degree of internalized norms, the articulation of dissent accordingly finds it harder to structure itself effectively."[1]

The analysis of state power and institutional incorporation is built around a threefold argument. First, while the sovereign territorial state proved to be the winner in a battle between competing forms of political organization,[2] this competition produced different types of nation-states with varying capacities for sovereign rule. Drawing on Michael Mann's distinction between infrastructural and despotic power, I suggest that some states will have only *weak* infrastructural power which will negatively affect their ability "to actually penetrate civil society, and to

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[1] J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20 (1968), p. 578. Elsewhere (p. 571), Nettl argues that dissent is more likely in cases with strongly developed states. This is not the same thing as saying that dissent is more likely in cases where the state has a high level of institutional incorporation, which would be contrary to the argument I develop in this chapter. Nettl was interested in, among other things, distinguishing between states with a well-developed sense of stateness and states, such as the United States and Great Britain, which have often been characterized as having no state at all. Anti-system dissent was unlikely in the latter because there was no state to oppose. I agree with Nettl's distinction but do not pursue it here.

[2] Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

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implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm."[3] I assume, along with John Brewer, that even when a state possesses strong despotic power it will lack "the organization to put its despotic power into effect," when it possesses only *weak* infrastructural power.[4] A combination of weak infrastructural power and a concomitant weakened ability to deploy despotic power will necessarily weaken processes of state consolidation. This point has not been argued sufficiently for Western Europe. Second and related, I hypothesize that levels of state power will directly affect levels of institutional incorporation in a state. Therefore, I expect that states with low levels of infrastructural power will have low levels of institutional incorporation. Drawing on the literature on historical institutionalism, I argue that these types of states are less likely to develop institutions that are capable of producing regularized patterns of behaviour and structuring strategic action among political actors. These institutions, I argue further, are likely to persist over time because institutions generally "are resistant to redesign ultimately because they structure the very choices about reform that the individual is likely to make."[5] Finally, the effects of low levels of institutional incorporation should be evident during the nation-building projects of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries since these require a full range of state institutions for the reproduction of the national culture across the territory.

My discussion proceeds in four parts. First, I discuss the relationship between nationalism and modernization, as it has been presented in the literature.

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[3] Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *Archives européennes de sociologie* 25 (1984), p. 189.
[4] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. xx.

Second, I examine and discuss the sources of state power that are found in the literature to show that it is possible for states to emerge from the state-making process with low levels of state power. Third, I use an institutionalist perspective to theorize the consequences of low levels of state power for state consolidation. Finally, I theorize the consequences of low levels of institutional incorporation for the reproduction of a national or, hegemonic, culture.

1. Modernization and nationalism

Modernization theory argues that the transition from a traditional to a modern society[6] is a global, systemic, homogenizing, irreversible and progressive process.[7] The diffusion of knowledge and tradition within Europe and, later, outward to other parts of the world, directs all societies along the path to a modern,

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[5] Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies* 44 (1996), p. 940.

[6] The tradition-modernity dichotomy is well-established in the literature and does not need to be examined in detail here. See, Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937); *idem, The System of Modern Societies* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971); and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). For an overview of development theory see, Leonard Binder, "The Natural History of Development Theory," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 28 (1986), pp. 3-33. Traditional societies are marked by local kinship structures that serve a multiplicity of social functions; forms of social authority which are embedded in this structure; patterns of association which are highly ascriptive and diffuse; low levels of social mobility due to an occupational structure which is not very differentiated; forms of political authority which are hierarchical and elitist; and an economy based on self-sufficiency and limited exchange. Modern societies, by contrast, are characterized by smaller family structures that serve more limited functions than the kinship structure; a less hierarchical form of social authority; a high degree of social mobility due to a highly differentiated occupational system; a network of associations in civil society that are not based on ascriptive membership; a highly differentiated and functionally specific political structure marked by universalistic, specific and achievement norms; and economic production almost exclusively for exchange.

[7] See, Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics," *Comparative Politics* 3 (1971), pp. 283-322. See also, Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); David Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, 1958); Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, 1967). On modernization and political development see, Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A*

industrial society with a highly differentiated and functionally specific political system. The passing of traditional society, according to modernization theorists, is both inevitable and welcome—since it enhances our overall human well-being— even if the transition between tradition and modernity is sometimes lengthy and difficult.

The relationship between modernization and nationalism that is posited in the literature is straightforward: modernization requires nationalism. The functionalism of this conclusion need not obscure the complexity of the argument itself. Since "the central mistake committed both by the friends and the enemies of nationalism is the supposition that it is somehow *natural*," it is important to be clear on the origins of this confusion.[8] The origins of nationalism are located in the new social order that emerges in the transition from a traditional to a modern society. There are different ways of conceptualizing the role of nationalism in this transition. Karl Deutsch, for one, views nationalism as a way of smoothing over the difficulties associated with the transition itself. The rise of industrialism and the market economy has a transformative power: it breaks down local cultures, uproots people and produces individuals who are "tense and insecure" in the face of technological change. At the same time, communities are brought together as economic development brings new opportunities for communication between previously isolated groups. Social communication is the process by which these communities share their common experiences and begin to 'imagine' themselves as a people.[9]

Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

[8] Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 150.

[9] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationalism* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953), pp. 95-97.

For Ernest Gellner, the roots of nationalism lie in the importance of culture for modern society. Industrialism has produced a particular division of labour which is mobile because it is "persistently, cumulatively changing."[10] This new occupational and social mobility holds out the promise of egalitarianism which can only be sustained, however, by continuous economic growth. In order to meet this demand, a modern economy requires, among other things, a high level of literacy and technical competency in a shared language and culture. In the absence of the structures of traditional society—where social and occupational positions are ascriptive and culture flows easily from structure—culture becomes its necessary replacement in a modern society.[11]

A national culture is not just a by-product of industrialization. There are also several political dividends from perceiving oneself as a member of a people, or nation. First, nationality facilitates the consolidation of political power. Political power requires a basis of legitimacy which nationality—or membership in a people who share a common past and present—can provide. Nationality, by promoting a shared history and social communication, is a means of overcoming social and ethnic differences by aligning "large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse."[12] This orientation, according to Deutsch, facilitates the production, use and distribution of power because it provides the basis for forming and executing the political will.[13] Second, nationality promises economic and social opportunity. Membership in a national group

[10] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 24.
[11] See the discussion on pp. 154-56 in Gellner, *Thought and Change*.
[12] Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, p. 101.

constitutes "an implied claim to privilege" and restricts the benefits available to non-members. Within the group nationality promises to remove barriers to mobility created by class, ethnic and linguistic divisions and instead places barriers between insiders and outsiders.[14]

Nationalism, then, is contingent on industrialization. But since "industrialisation and modernisation notoriously proceeded in an uneven manner," so too can the results of these processes, from the perspective of nationalism, be somewhat uneven.[15] When industrialization moves unevenly across a state's territory it produces varying fortunes for its citizens. Where these fortunes vary along ethnic lines and the more fortunate do not share their benefits with the less fortunate, sub-state nationalism can be the result. Deutsch argues that nationalism holds out the promise of upward mobility despite difference; in this case, difference would become the basis for excluding some citizens from the economic benefits that membership in a national culture provides. When ethnic or linguistic differences create economic differences, there is the potential for the less privileged to conceive and organize themselves as a nation and seek a political solution to the problem of inequality.

It is practically impossible to predict where such a nation will emerge, according to Gellner. Nevertheless, he concludes that cultural minorities will not develop effective nationalism where they have little chance of success, either because

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[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 74-78.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 102. Deutsch does not expressly state that this will come at the cost of assimilation; he is, in fact, unclear on this point. Gellner makes a similar link between political legitimacy and modernization when he states that there are two conditions under which a government "has rightful claims on the loyalty of members of the society": first, when it is creating or sustaining an "industrial affluent society" and, second, when rulers and ruled are members of the same culture. See Gellner, *Thought and Change*, p. 33.

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they are small, the central power is strong or, the central power would be likely to offer the cultural groups some concessions.[16] Therefore, it seems possible that the state can intervene to correct the effects of the structural processes which produced the conditions for sub-state nationalism. States can adopt and implement long-term strategies to correct uneven development. The success of these strategies depends on the state's capabilities. These capabilities, however, are related to structural factors since they are the outcomes of processes of state formation. One way of comparing the effectiveness of different nationalist groups, then, is through a comparative analysis of the state's central power. In the next section, I conceptualize state power as a variable and identify its sources for Western Europe.

2. Sources of State power

Sources and types of state power

A state is distinguished from other forms of rule by (1) the centrality and territoriality of its rule which is represented by (2) a set of institutions having sovereign jurisdiction over the entirety of the territory and (3) is enforced by a monopoly on the legal means of violence. Compared to the juridical fact of states, which is based on a principle of equality and mutual recognition, the empirical fact of states needs to be measured. States are not equal; they possess different capabilities, which does not only mean that they do the same things differently but also, that they cannot all do the same things. We might get a better handle on this distinction by introducing Mann's differentiation between the despotic and infrastructural power of the state, both of which flow from the state's peculiar

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 166.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 174-75.

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territorially-centralized form of organization.[17] Despotic power, according to Mann, is "the range of actions which the [state] elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups." The infrastructural power of the state refers to its "capacity...to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm."[18]

The differences between the two types of power are significant and their effects perhaps, at first glance, counterintuitive. The despotic power that flows from the state appears formidable, but the foundations of such states can, in fact, be very weak. Where such states are unable to construct an infrastructure to penetrate the state territory, they foreclose the option of shaping and coordinating social relations and building strong loyalty to the state. Moreover, enforcing the achievements of the state is costly under such conditions since, in the absence of effective institutions, states are forced to rely entirely on coercive means, which depletes material resources and has a tendency to erode the state's legitimacy. Finally, as Stein Rokkan has noted, the construction of effective state organizations in the early modern period gave rulers "a chance to solve some of the worst problems of state-building before they had to face the ordeals of mass politics."[19] But, beginning in the nineteenth century, if states did not take advantage of that opportunity and instead relied exclusively on despotic power, they would be ill-equipped to face the second challenge of state making in the aftermath of the French Revolution: "the strengthening of national identity at the mass level, the opening of channels of mass

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[17] Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State," p. 183.
[18] Ibid., pp. 188-89.
[19] Stein Rokkan, "Cities, States, and Nations: A Dimensional Model for the Study of Contrasts in Development," in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Building States and Nations, Vol. 1 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), p. 94.

participation, the development of a sense of national economic solidarity, and the establishment of a workable consensus of the need for a redistribution of resources and benefits."[20]

States with infrastructural power, by contrast, would be better able to meet the challenges of nation building and political inclusion in modern Europe because of their success at territorial consolidation in the early modern period. When states are successful at increasing the territorial boundedness of a state through the regulation of social and political-economic relations it is because, as Mann reminds us, they have managed to acquire or exploit the social utility that they need to expand their infrastructural power. The ideological, economic and military powers of the state are not unique: they first existed in civil society but were later appropriated or regulated by the state. This change occurred because societal actors sought to extend their influence over a given territory but did not possess the means to do so. The advantage that the state has over societal actors in this regard is that it is territorially-centralized: its power ranges out from the centre and extends to every part of the territory. The socio-spatial organization of the state is its source of autonomous power. Societal actors "will entrust power resources to state elites which they are incapable of fully recovering, precisely because their own socio-spatial basis of organisation is not centralised and territorial."[21] At the same time, however, any increase in the state's infrastructural power will also enhance that of groups in civil society: the institutions which the state uses to penetrate civil society and to regulate its activities are also those through which civil society groups seek to

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[20] *Ibid.*
[21] Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State," pp. 210-11.

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influence the policies of the state. Infrastructural power produces important feedback loops which are the basis for effective democracy.

A state's 'stateness', then, is enhanced by its capacity to penetrate civil society through rational bureaucratic structures, increase its political legitimacy, and establish a politico-spatial arena that is the source of its autonomous power. In general terms, we may say that some states will be better able to develop infrastructural power than other states but that all states will use what infrastructural power they possess to regulate social relations. The differences in levels of infrastructural power across states is related to processes of state formation. Below, I identify some of the sources of variation in state power that are found in the literature and argue that weak forms of state power is a possible outcome in the process of state formation.

Explaining variation in state power

There are three sources of variation in state power, as described in the literature on state formation in historical sociology and political science: the fiscal-military impetus; crown-noble bargaining; and the problem of compliance.

Fiscal-military impetus. According to arguments found in the works of Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, Brian Downing and John Brewer, the type of revenue available to rulers, as well as the scope and nature of military conflict, are key for explaining variation in state power: "Variations in the difficulty of collecting taxes, in the expense of the particular kind of armed forces adopted, in the amount of war making required to hold off competitors and so on resulted in the principal

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variations in the forms of European states."[22] The link between war making and state making was meditated by sources of revenue, as Brian Downing concluded in his study of the development of the institutional, legal and ideological bases of European liberal democracy from the medieval period to the eighteenth century.[23] Domestic revenue, such as direct taxes on land, indirect taxes on agricultural output and, generally, all excise and commercial taxes, increased the crown's dependence on parliaments and nobles, whose cooperation was required for the collection of these taxes. By contrast, revenue from empire, from the confiscation of church property, from royal monopolies or from royal marriages, increased the independence of the crown vis-à-vis the nobility.[24]

These different revenue bases mattered for waging war and, eventually, for the types of states that would emerge in Europe. Late medieval Europe was predisposed to liberal democracy where representative institutions were present. But the military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries intervened to alter the fate of those countries that relied on domestic sources of revenue for waging war. In these cases, the limitations for revenue collection imposed by recalcitrant local assemblies forced rulers to do away "with medieval constitutionalism and buil[d] expansive autocracies, demolishing the fortuitous predisposition" to liberal democracy.[25] In those more fortunate countries that were either able to finance war

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[22] Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crimes," in Peter D. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 172.

[23] Brian Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

[24] See the discussion in Edgar Kiser, "The Formation of State Policy in Western European Absolutisms: A Comparison of England and France," *Politics & Society* 15 (1986-1987), pp. 259-96.

[25] Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, p. 3.

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through mostly non-domestic sources of revenue or, were able to avoid war altogether, constitutional government was preserved and liberalism assured. But even those states that had sizeable external revenues, such as Spain, could be made near-bankrupt by their military commitments and would be forced to turn to domestic sources of revenue. It is the changing nature and growing cost of war over time, then, that changed the fate of many European states.

The fiscal-military impetus for state making suggests that the nature of a state's revenue—domestic or military—as well as the extent of its military engagements, is a first indirect measure of a state's power.

Crown-noble bargaining. Although power holders did not set out to make war in order to create nation-states—in Charles Tilly's words, they were self-seeking entrepreneurs—their military ventures forced them to improve their capacity for extraction, which led to the build-up of the state and military apparatuses. Over time, rulers' revenue requirements, mediated by the emerging state apparatus, forced them to interact with nobles, merchants and new social classes. The fiscal-military impetus, then, is key for understanding the role played by the crown and nobles in shaping political outcomes in the state-formation process.

Local notables and their institutions of government could play an instrumental role in the formation of states in at least two ways. First, where cities played a role in the formation of states—through the provision of much-needed capital to rulers—the ruling classes retained a certain amount of autonomy from state makers through representative institutions at the municipal or regional levels. These institutions were simply "the price and outcome of bargaining with different members of the subject population for the wherewithal of state activity, especially

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the means of war."[26] Second, in the early stages of state building, Estates and Cortes were an important institutional channel between monarchs and subjects in distant territories. Nicholas Henshall has argued that "As repositories of regional loyalties and experts on local conditions, their [Estates and Cortes] assessment of a problem was more finely tuned than any government agent's. The crown had everything to lose and nothing to gain by smashing them."[27]

As the monarch moved to consolidate his rule, however, the challenge was to extend his direct reach to areas controlled by local institutions of government, such as the fiscal powers which resided with Estates and Cortes. In the presence of encroaching monarchs, these institutions became important power centres in the campaigns waged by local élites to get rulers to respect local privileges and liberties. Indeed, Tilly has noted that if "in 1500 the governments of Europe bore considerably greater resemblance to one another than two or three centuries later," it was due to "the varying course of the contest between the central power and power-wielding assemblies from the sixteenth century onwards."[28]

The relationship between institutions of local government and political outcomes has been examined by Thomas Ertman in his study of states and regimes in early modern Europe. Ertman concludes that representative institutions at the local level not only shaped local politics but also "helped to determine the type of representative assembly and ultimately the kind of political regime (absolutist or

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[26] Charles Tilly, "Entanglements of European Cities and States," in Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans (eds.), *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 24.

[27] Nicholas Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy* (London: Longman, 1992), p. 11

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constitutionalist) that would emerge centuries later within a given state."[29] Ertman argues that of the two types of representative institutions that existed in early modern Europe—the two-chamber or territorially based institutions and the tricurial or status group ones—the territorially based ones were better able to resist the encroaching interests of the monarch for two reasons. First, these institutions were not based on status groups and members of different orders were mixed in the two chambers. It was difficult for monarchs to play one group off against another, as they did with the tricurial institutions. At the same time, because of the mixed representation within each chamber, cooperation at the level of the general assembly was easier to achieve than in the tricurial system. Second, territorially based assemblies were linked to the institutions of local government which could provide the former with the resources needed to oppose an ambitious monarch. As a result, Ertman finds that absolutism was a less likely outcome in states where territorially based forms of government existed at the local level.

Ertman's path-dependent approach to European political development leads him to conclude that if states get it right, right from the start, they will be better equipped to handle the various challenges of state consolidation: economic growth, the expansion of state infrastructure, political participation and successful geopolitical competition.[30] Not all states will manage this and so much the worse for patrimonial states, since their infrastructures have a tendency to persist over time,

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[28] Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 22.

[29] Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 24-5.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 324.

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which can have "nagging long-term consequences."[31] Ertman's findings are suggestive: not only did states with inefficient structures persist over time, but so did the inefficient structures themselves.

The relationship between the crown and the nobility points to a second indirect measure of state power: Forms of resistance by local notables, as measured by the type of local assemblies and the constitutional relationship, if any, between the centre and the periphery.

Creating compliance. Eventually, rulers won out over local nobles but not before these left their mark on the structure of the state and the type of regime that emerged. Nobles could leave their mark in other ways: they could, for example, refuse to comply with the new regime or they could, as the Spanish saying goes, "comply but not obey" (*cumplo pero no obedezco*). Rulers had to strike a balance between conquest and coalescence: the process of integrating political rivals into a new territorial structure depended on "not just the conquest and absorption of the small by the large but also the coalescence and continuity of local and wider interests within a larger political framework."[32] The challenge was to persuade nobles of the legitimacy of the new regime in the least costly way possible or, in other words, to create compliance.

Without compliance, rulers are forced to implement policies in very costly ways. Since rulers are interested in maximizing revenue as well as holding onto power, they will search for the least costly way of enforcing their rule. This is the thrust of Margaret Levi's argument in her model for understanding variation in state

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[31] *Ibid.*, p. 322.

power. All rulers seek to maximize revenue under certain constraints, which she defines as their relative bargaining power, transaction costs and discount rates.[33] In order to do so, rulers must attempt to reduce the costs of compliance through the creation of institutions that promote cooperation. Once they have done so, they can implement policies and enforce sanctions where required. If they are not able to do so, the legitimacy of their rule will be undermined.

The problem of creating compliance points to a third indirect measure of state power since, without compliance, rulers will be forced to use costly coercive measures and thereby deplete their fiscal reserves. Compliance can be measured indirectly by the number of revolts, insurgencies, civil wars and succession struggles, as well as by more subtle forms of compliance, such as tax evasion or the size of the gray economy.

Summary

Rulers are engaged in a power struggle with nobles, parliamentary institutions, the Church and other political actors in a bid to consolidate their rule. State making can be conceptualized as a game between rulers and other political actors, much in the same way that David Laitin has conceptualized political linguistics and state making.[34] The game takes place over time and, with certain actors, it is also an iterated game. The outcomes of these various games would be in

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[32] Mark Greengrass, "Introduction: Conquest and Coalescence," in Mark Greengrass (ed.), *Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe* (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), p. 7.

[33] Margaret Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 1. Relative bargaining power is determined by the balance of revenues owned by rulers and rivals; transaction costs are the costs associated with bargaining and implementing a policy; and discount rates are the extent to which rulers value the future (high when they do not, low when they do).

[34] David D. Laitin, "Language Games," *Comparative Politics* 20 (1988), pp. 289-302

equilibrium when no player has an incentive to deviate from the result because to do so would make him worse off.

These outcomes are the results of bargains between rulers and political actors and most bargains will have certain transaction costs. An example, here of rulers and nobles, will make this clear. Say a ruler is engaged with local nobles in negotiations over fiscal privileges. The ruler would like to eliminate the fiscal privileges enjoyed by nobles while nobles would prefer to retain these. The ruler's power would be increased considerably if he could eliminate local privileges; nobles' power, by contrast, rests on the continuation of these privileges. If a ruler can eliminate nobles' fiscal rights he will not only have increased his revenue but he will also have set in motion a process of undermining one of the nobles' most important sources of power. Once their source of revenue is removed, nobles will not be able to finance the maintenance of local representative institutions, unless they can strike a deal on this front with the ruler. Nobles might realize that they will lose their fiscal privileges but will attempt to negotiate a trade-off with the ruler.

In most cases, it will be in the interest of both rulers and nobles to bargain, since conquest is costly for both of them. Generally speaking, bargaining itself entails costs that will affect each of the indirect measures of state power discussed above. These costs are manifested in the types of rules, norms and institutions that emerge from the bargaining process; that is, they are built into the constitutions of states themselves. Rulers will almost always emerge from the state-making process in a position of strength relative to other political actors. However, the amount of relative strength enjoyed by rulers is dependent on the costs incurred from bargaining. Where the costs are high, state power will weakened; where the costs are

low, state power will be comparatively stronger. If the cost of bargaining between rulers and other political actors is built into the institutions of state and the rules of the game, then the effects of bargaining during state making will be experienced over time.[35] Institutional outcomes which are the result of weak state power—or, high bargaining costs—will also endure over time. The possibility that institutional outcomes—and, weak institutional outcomes—will endure in this way has not been sufficiently considered by two standard approaches to political outcomes. I examine these in the next section and then suggest an alternative, institutionalist, approach to outcomes in section four.

3. Structural-functionalist and utilitarian approaches to political outcomes

According to one influential student of institutions, "the renewal of interest in institutions is a response to the blinders worn by" behavioral and rational choice approaches in political science.[36] The 'discovery' (or rediscovery) that institutions matter for structuring political outcomes is a reaction to both the structural determinism of systems theories and functionalism, on the one hand, and the focus on individuals in rational choice approaches, on the other. In contrast to these approaches, institutionalism argues that institutions act as constraints on actors and help structure outcomes by determining the range of possible actions within a given context.

For structural-functionalists, institutions were important in two ways. First, institutions were the embodiment of roles, which themselves were composed of

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[35] For a discussion of the relationship between asymmetries of power and institution building, see Jack Knight, *Institutions and Social Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
[36] Kenneth Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1 (1989), p. 133.

norms or, "the statements the members of a group make about how they ought to behave, and indeed do behave, in various circumstances."[37] Second, the consequences of an institution, understood to be its functions, were important for determining whether a society was stable or not. Institutions, as sites of iterated action, were used to explain the regularity of forms of behavior in the social and political order. Despite the fact that structural-functionalists considered roles to be "deeply embedded in institutions that structure the range of roles available and structure how particular roles are to be played," the real focus of their analysis—and the approach's more lasting contribution—was the study of roles.[38] The relations between roles provided the structure of society. If these roles could be identified and defined, then there was little reason to study the institutions themselves. Structural-functionalists were interested in studying institutionalized *behaviour*, the objects of their empirical analysis were the different roles that individuals assumed.

Structural-functionalists never explored in any depth how roles might be constrained by institutions. Instead, they argued that institutions adapt to their environments since all social systems must remain in equilibrium in order to survive. When the balance tilts toward instability, and change is therefore recognized as necessary, a 'new' institutional structure will be the outcome of conflict-resolution processes initiated by forward-thinking actors.

The reality, however, is often otherwise: forward-thinking actors who can conceptualize more efficient ways of doing things are sometimes the prisoners of those who cannot. Only a consideration of how roles are constrained by institutions

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[37] George C. Homans, "Bringing Men Back In," *American Sociological Review* 29 (1964), p. 809.
[38] Donald D. Searing, "Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism," *American Political Science Review* 85 (1991), p. 1245.

can make this clear. Let me make this point through reference to the discussion of the previous section: How could rulers gain access to domestic sources of revenue when local institutions of government had fiscal privileges? The dilemma faced by rulers was, in many cases, one of military survival: they needed to finance standing armies in order to guarantee a state's survival in the interstate system and, at the same time, the stability of its domestic social system. An example will show that institutions did not always adapt in the way that structural-functionalists assumed. In early seventeenth-century Spain, the Count-Duke Olivares, the King of Spain's first minister, devised a plan to unite the kingdoms of Spain in order "to give institutional form to the mutual assistance [which was] regarded as essential for the survival of a 'scattered empire.'"[39] The Union of Arms is precisely the type of plan that, had it worked, would have helped shore up the near-bankrupt Spanish monarchy, paid for a standing army and stabilized Castile's rule over the Iberian peninsula. The political environment of Europe called for such reforms in Spain but Olivares was forced to struggle "against deeply entrenched values which...impeded the kind of changes [he] considered essential for survival in a highly competitive world."[40] It would take another hundred years, a major European war and a change from a Habsburg to a Bourbon monarch before Olivares' reforms were introduced in Spain.

Olivares was constrained by the institutions that structured relations between Castile and the other kingdoms on the Iberian peninsula, the very ones he sought to change in order to stabilize a very unstable political situation. Structural-functionalists would miss this outcome, since they are "inclined to see history as an efficient mechanism for reaching uniquely appropriate equilibria, and less concerned

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[39] J.H. Elliott, *Richelieu and Olivares* (Cambridge: Canto, [1984] 1991), p. 73.

with the possibilities for maladaptation and nonuniqueness in historical development."[41]

Utilitarianism approaches institutions in a different way. First, roles are replaced by individuals. Actors, from a utilitarian perspective, are not constrained by institutions; in fact, these don't really enter into any calculation of the most effective strategy for achieving one's goals. As in structural-functionalism, the institutional basis of society is not an analytical factor: institutions are fluid and very much in the background. As such, the institutions that emerge from any power struggle are viewed as optimal until such time as actors' preferences shift in response to changing incentives, necessitating a corresponding change of institutions. There are some exceptions to this version of utilitarianism. First, there is game theory, which can explain sub-optimal outcomes. A second alternative is that offered by Douglass North's neoclassical theory of the state, which can account for inefficient property rights through a consideration of the competitive constraints and transactions costs which limit a ruler's attempt to maximize revenue.[42] However, North, like other utilitarians, considers that rulers will have some room for manoeuvre to change the situation since constituents will almost always be unable to oppose the ruler due to collective action problems. By contrast, the ruler, who does not face the same problem, "will...continue to innovate institutional change to adjust to changing relative prices."[43]

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[40] *Ibid.*, p. 82.
[41] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), p. 3.
[42] Douglass C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: Norton, 1981), chapter 3.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

Utilitarian approaches are concerned with the ruler as an individual, not as a *ruler*. The possibility that the ruler would be constrained in his attempt to maximize revenue by certain duties and obligations that come with his office is not given sufficient consideration in utilitarian approaches. North, Levi and Kiser, for example, define a ruler's constraints relative to the power and influence of his rivals. But one aspect of this power and influence is the nobles' ability to hold a ruler to his 'word', that is, the constitutional relationship between ruler and nobles. Let me illustrate this point with reference to state making in Spain and France. Rulers were very much constrained by both rules and obligations in their dealings with Estates and Cortes. As J.H. Elliott notes in his comparative historical study of Cardinal Richelieu and the Count-Duke Olivares, neither man had much respect for representative assemblies but while Olivares "toyed with the idea of dispensing entirely with the Cortes of Castile, [Richelieu] seem[ed] to have felt that on balance it was wiser to humour Parlements and Estates in small matters than to precipitate a major constitutional conflict by attempting to abolish them."[44] Utilitarian approaches would have some difficulty accounting for this because, as March and Olsen have noted, they are "inclined to see action as stemming from calculated self-interest [but] less inclined to see action as a response to obligations and duties."[45]

Neither structural-functionalism nor some versions of utilitarianism assign an independent role to institutions in explaining political outcomes. However, a consideration of the historical durability of institutions in the political development of states suggests that we need to consider seriously *why* institutions endure despite the way in which they force actors to respect the constraints associated with the

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[44] Elliott, *Richelieu and Olivares*, pp. 45-46.

roles which they assume. Put differently, why is it that institutional choices made at some point in the distant past continue to constrain strategic action and why do institutions resist change? In the next section, I address these questions from an institutionalist perspective.

4. Institutions: Their function and durability

The assumptions about institutions that are found in the literature on the 'new' institutionalism provide a different perspective to these questions; I will elaborate on the consequences of these assumptions for state consolidation and nation building in the last part of this section.

Approaches to the study of institutions

There are three approaches to the study of institutions in the new institutionalism literature: historical, sociological and rational choice.[46] Institutionalist analyses have attempted to build a bridge between the state-centered and society-centered approaches to studying political outcomes by demonstrating that in their capacity to structure strategic interactions between societal actors, institutions are an important additional variable for understanding political outcomes. Institutions operate at the intermediate-level: they don't replace actors or macrostructural processes; they mediate between them and demonstrate *how* they are related, which neither the structural-functionalist nor utilitarian approach managed. Methodologically, institutionalism, particularly historical institutionalism, lends itself well to comparative historical investigations that seek to make sense of continuity

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[45] March and Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions*, p. 3.
[46] For a survey of these, see Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms"; and Ellen M. Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalisms," *Politics & Society* 26 (1998), pp. 5-34. In this chapter, I am concerned with historical and rational choice institutionalism only.

and variation in political outcomes both within and across countries. Institutionalism can take otherwise similar macrosocial categories—such as class or the economy—and show how they differ across cases by examining the institutions through which they interact. If institutions can make this type of analytical contribution, it is because the way in which they become embedded in a social context means that they have an enduring role to play in structuring interactions and outcomes.

Institutionalism, particularly the rational choice variant, attempts to get at the agency-structure debate inherent in utilitarian and functionalist approaches by attacking it from the middle: agents continue to determine outcomes, not as individuals, but in the roles they assume; their utilitarian self-interest has been replaced by a form of self-interested behaviour that is structured by institutions. Institutions are an important intervening variable that help us draw a distinction between utility-maximizing agents and agents who are constrained by their perception of what is appropriate political behaviour in their particular socio-cultural context. As March and Olsen have claimed, because "actors are driven by institutional duties and roles as well, or instead of, by calculated self-interest," their political actions are not willful; they are not simply utility-maximizers. If, in the historical institutionalist variant, it is less clear "whether the intentions of individuals or the constraints imposed by institutions shape outcomes,"[47] it is because institutions are perceived as playing a more determinant role in shaping interests than in rational choice institutionalism. In their attempt to confront the agency-structure problem, historical institutionalists have made the line between individual

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[47] Thomas A. Koelble, "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology," *Comparative Politics* 27 (1995), p. 39.

autonomy and institutional determinism very blurred but generally, compared to rational choice institutionalists, they assign a greater role to structure than agency.

The influence of institutions

Wherever they fall in the agency-structure debate, arguments for the importance of institutions from both the rational choice and historical school make two claims that are relevant for the purposes of the argument developed in this chapter: institutions (1) shape actors' identities and interests and (2) provide the rules and norms that constrain the strategic behaviour of actors. When taken together, these two claims present us with an ideal-type institution against which we can compare weak institutions and make some inferences about how these structure political outcomes.

The first claim is that institutions shape actors' self-identity and preferences. Stephen Krasner has suggested that "the way in which individuals identify themselves is affected or determined by their place within an institutional structure."[48] This is because, as March and Olsen argue, individuals make sense of their world through institutions. They do this in three ways. Individuals, first, use institutions as a way of understanding and bestowing legitimacy on their past experiences and future realities. Second, actors use institutions as a means of comprehending the world: they undertake or initiate action through institutions based on their beliefs about their environment. Over time, these repeated actions have a way of *creating* actors' own environment regardless of whether actors' initial perceptions were accurate. Finally, an institutional view of politics is not restricted to a consideration of outcomes; it is sufficiently broad to view politics as a *process*

whereby actors create, confirm or modify their interpretations of life. For example, Immergut writes that institutions "act as filters that selectively favor particular interpretations either of the goals toward which political actors strive or the best means to achieve these ends."[49]

Political reality, from an institutionalist perspective, is socially constructed. Structural-functionalist and utilitarian approaches view man as atomistic. Institutionalism corrects this by arguing that institutions are what embed people in society. Institutions, in other words, are "the social glue" that is missing from these other approaches. Within a socially-constructed political reality, institutions play a central role because, under certain conditions, they can determine individuals' cognition which in turn decides what is meaningful or not; in other words, what is part of the social reality. The condition, Krasner suggests, is institutional depth, which "refers to the extent to which the self-identities of individuals are determined by their participation in some larger social arrangement."[50] If institutions structure actors' self-identities and give meaning to their worldviews, it would not be too much to say that they also play a role in structuring their preferences. Historical institutionalists assign a role to institutions in the structuring of interests while rational choice institutionalists view institutions as strategic constraints which sometimes cause actors to choose sub-optimal outcomes. Both types of institutionalism view institutions as structuring options through rules. Institutions, as the embodiment of norms and rules, instruct actors about what is acceptable or not in their social reality. Institutions are, at the same time, representations of actors'

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[48] Stephen Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," in James A. Caporaso, *The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989), p. 77.
[49] Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," p. 240.

meaning and instruments for the enforcement of this meaning. This does not mean that preferences are fixed or that they can be read off from a particular institution. Instead, institutions allow for a certain latitude and preferences emerge from the way in which different groups or interests interact within the institutions.

The rational choice approach to institutions does not take preference formation to be endogenous to institutions. Still, this approach has factored in the role of institutions for explaining outcomes as, for example, in Kenneth Shepsle's structure-induced equilibrium.[51] In this approach, an institution is a game in extensive form, which is a way of understanding the full range and sequence of possible moves players can make. Institutions affect outcomes by specifying certain rules which determine the sequence of moves undertaken by actors and by privileging certain individuals, which means that the identity of individuals will matter for determining who can do what and when. Each player is faced with a set of alternatives at every stage in the game, as well as her own preferences, which are exogenous to the institutions. The choices each player makes, as determined by the structure and procedure, produce outcomes.

Rational choice institutionalism has elucidated the importance of rules and procedures in agenda-setting institutions, such as legislatures. Shepsle and Weingast have argued that the "locus and sequence of agenda power...provide the building blocks from which legislative institutions are constructed."[52] Depending on who has

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[50] Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," p. 79.

[51] See Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (1979), pp. 27-60; and Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry Weingast, "Structure-Induced Equilibria and Legislative Choice," *Public Choice* 50 (1981), pp. 503-19.

[52] Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry Weingast, "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," *American Political Science Review* 81 (March 1987), p. 101.

the power to propose legislation, motions and amendments, and in what order, and who, if anybody, may exercise veto power, and at what point in the proceedings, matters for the type of building blocks that will emerge. The empirical investigation carried out by Shepsle and Weingast suggests that "the different mixes of these institutional building blocks lead to different outcomes and, correspondingly, to significantly different political behaviour."[53] Shepsle and Weingast have argued elsewhere that rules of procedure in a legislature are not exogenous constraints but "rather, they are chosen in advance of substantive deliberations—they are endogenous to the system—and it is the purposes that guide these choices that are of interest."[54]

Whether preference formation is viewed as exogenous or endogenous to the institutional structure, the rational choice and historical variants agree that institutions play an important role in shaping the strategic action undertaken by actors to realize their preferences. This is the second claim made by institutionalism which we need to consider. The obvious reason for this is that institutions are an embodiment of norms and rules. Institutions are rules of conduct, routines and repertoires of procedure, in March and Olsen's terms, and political action is the fulfillment of the duties and obligations that are inherent in these rules and norms. Rules and norms, where they are perceived as legitimate by all the players involved, ensure a high level of stability in the polity by establishing parameters for right and wrong behaviour. Through a form of trust that is engendered by institutions, actors

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[53] *Ibid.*
[54] Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, "When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?" *Journal of Politics* 46 (1984), p. 208.

have "confidence that appropriate behaviour can be expected most of the time."[55] This type of behaviour can be expected because institutions provide actors with information regarding the likely behaviour of other actors, making it easier to enter into cooperative strategies. By drawing our attention to the way in which institutions structure strategic interaction, institutionalism can inform us about the range of possible alternative outcomes.

Institutions can help us predict outcomes in a second way. As the sites of iterated interactions among actors, institutions reinforce certain patterns of action, rules, procedures and trust. A concomitant benefit is that reiterated action contributes to an institution's depth: the more actors repeat actions in an institution the more likely such an institution will become embedded within social reality and the more difficult it will be to dislodge it. This suggests that institutions are not simply our objects of choice: they are capable of acquiring an independence of their own. Robert Grafstein has attempted to account for the independence of institutions by arguing for an approach—institutional realism—that "does not find it necessary to define an institution by the participants' beliefs and intentions in order to make sense of its constraints on the individual."[56] Actors obey conventions, Grafstein argues, without always recognizing how their actions reinforce institutional regularities. By separating out conventions and institutions according to the level of human knowledge that is involved when an actor interacts with each, Grafstein

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[55] March and Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions*, p. 38.
[56] Robert Grafstein, *Institutional Realism: Social and Political Constraints on Rational Actors* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 28.

bestows an ontological foundation on institutions, which gives them an identity that is independent of actors' preferences and beliefs.[57]

Rational choice institutionalists allow for transformations within institutions, or 'games within games.' Generally, an institution can be considered permanent or, 'renegotiation proof' in Shepsle's words, if "no decisive coalition of agents wishes to alter it."[58] While rational choice institutionalists continue to place the momentum for change squarely on agents—and curiously avoid any discussion of politics— historical institutionalists would argue that institutions are fairly permanent structures which often outlive the purposes for which they were originally created. There are several arguments for the durability of institutions. First, Krasner has argued that institutions often persist through 'inertia' by altering social relations or recruiting personnel in such a way that the political environment is reorganized around them. Second, the transaction costs involved in changing institutions are often too high and actors would prefer to live with imperfect institutions rather than face an outcome that could not be predicted in advance. Third, institutions "may determine the future trajectory of development because of path dependencies generated by increasing returns."[59] Finally, institutions persist because of what DiMaggio and Powell refer to as "institutional isomorphic change." Institutions might need to fit into a larger complex because of expectations and pressures from other organizations; they might persist because they have successfully imitated

[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.
[58] Shepsle, "Studying Institutions," p. 142.
[59] Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutionalist Perspective," p. 88.

existing institutional forms through mimicry; or, they might persist due to normative pressures.[60]

Summary: Weak institutions and state consolidation

There are two conclusion we can draw from this discussion of institutions for the consolidation of states with weak institutions. First, when state institutions are weak, they are unable to embed themselves fully in the social sphere and structure the self-identities and interests of actors. The institutional depth in such a state is not extensive. We might say, in other words, that there is not full institutional incorporation in such states. In cases where the institutions of state are very weak, we might imagine that actors' identities and social realities are constructed either on the periphery or outside of the institutional complex. Actors might fall back on patterns of social relations that existed before the institutions of state were introduced. Where the institutions of state are not highly rational bureaucratic structures because, perhaps, they are weak and poorly managed, actors might appropriate them and adapt them to these earlier forms of social relations. In this way, for example, patrimonial relations can actually be prolonged through state institutions.

In some cases, actors' identities can be structured by institutions in a more perverse way. Some actors might regard an institution or institutional structure as illegitimate and construct their identity in opposition to that institution or structure. In such cases, the institution continues to influence an actor's self-identity but not in a way that will enhance the political legitimacy of the state. Anarchists and sub-state

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[60] Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," *American Sociological Review* (1983), pp. 150-154.

nationalists are two examples of actors who define themselves in opposition to existing state structures. Their programmes are based on a critique of these structures and their ability to gather supporters is related to the way in which they can demonstrate that an institution is corrupt, inefficient or ineffective. But while anarchists will not participate in these institutions, sub-state nationalists might, for strategic reasons. For example, if the goal of sub-state nationalists is to acquire political power by legal means, then they will have to participate in the institutions of state. Even if sub-state nationalists' goal is to change legally the distribution of power through devolution, autonomy or independence, they will be forced to participate in the institutions of state to realize this goal.

A second consequence of weak institutional incorporation is that because institutions cannot fully penetrate civil society, the rules and norms they embody will not necessarily represent the cognitive structures of all groups in civil society, which raises the question of the basis of their legitimacy. Even where institutions are, even partially, representative of social actors' world views, they might not be effective, because they are chronically weak, at structuring strategic interaction. If institutions are subject to frequent turnover in personnel (or personnel inertia and disinterest), a short supply of financial resources (or an abundance of resources but no rules for redistribution) or the threat of military takeover (or military occupation), they will not be reliable predictors of actors' behaviour. These institutions will not build trust because they will lack patterns of routinization. Consequently, the type of information they supply might not be reliable and actors will have a difficult time predicting outcomes from the way in which institutions mediate their affairs. Actors need to overcome the limitations presented by these types of institutions by either

appropriating them, overturning them or creating new ones. Because institutions have a built-in tendency to endure over time, these types of projects will be difficult to enact.

We might hypothesize, then, that where state institutions are weak such that they cannot fully penetrate society, achieve depth and contribute to the construction of actors' self-identity and social reality, actors will construct identities outside of the corporation of institutions or against these institutions. Moreover, since this situation is not temporary, but more or less permanent, these alternative identities will have the opportunity to take shape over time. In some cases, actors will even be able to use the institutions of the state to construct this alternative identity.

5. Institutions and Hegemony

In this section, I examine the consequences of weak state power and low levels of institutional incorporation for the reproduction of a national culture. The relationship between state power, institutions and a hegemonic culture can be described as follows. First, a ruler needs to be able to create and enforce compliance in order to consolidate his position and maintain social stability. Without compliance, a ruler is forced to implement state policies in very costly ways. Second, the cheapest way of creating and enforcing compliance is by forging consent over the legitimacy of the ruler's position. Third, one way of forging consent in the modern state is through the creation of a national culture. Fourth, a national culture must be systematically reproduced through state institutions which shape actors' identities and preferences.

If the dominant culture—the one that seeks to consolidate its hegemonic position—cannot reproduce its culture through the state's institutions, two

consequences arise. The first consequence relates to the importance of a hegemonic culture for social stability. When the hegemonic culture is not able to impose a stable framework of values, or to adopt the language of this chapter, of rules and procedures, its ability to stabilize the social order is compromised. When state institutions are unreliable predictors of outcomes, individuals are uncertain about the actual content of such a framework. The dominant culture will therefore be viewed with suspicion or, worse, contempt, by some citizens. Moreover, the members of other cultural groups might begin to question whether the hegemonic culture has not imposed two frameworks of rules and procedures: one for members of the national culture and one for everybody else. It might appear that when members of the dominant culture participate in the institutions of the state the political outcomes provide them with certain advantages which do not materialize when members of the other cultural groups participate.

A second consequence of the inability of the dominant group to reproduce effectively its culture through the state's institutions is that it can create the conditions for the reproduction of alternative cultures. In hegemonic theory, other cultures can exist alongside the hegemonic one but only the latter is reproduced at the state level. The fact that one culture is hegemonic, however, does not entail that the elite of this cultural group will enjoy a hegemonic position in all of its relations and alliances with other cultural groups.[61] In other words, it is theoretically possible that alternative hegemonies exist. Adamson has asked whether such an alternative could presuppose a social order where the hegemonic apparatus is not so strong as to deflect a challenge from organized movements emerging from other cultural

groups "and yet is sufficiently dependent on that hegemonic apparatus for its stability so that an alternative hegemony would pose a serious threat."[62] I believe we can imagine such a social order if we consider what the literature on nation building has to say about the importance of a national culture for social stability as well as the argument that strong sub-state national cultures pose a threat to social stability. National cultures require state institutions through which this culture is reproduced: in this sense the social order which the national culture seeks to stabilize is dependent on the hegemonic apparatus. Where sub-state nationalist cultures and political organizations exist, they are a direct challenge to the national culture—and, therefore, to the social order—and one which the hegemonic culture does not appear powerful enough to prevent.

A sub-state nationalist organization is a possible alternative hegemony in its own territory but its culture is not reproduced at the state level. A sub-state nationalist group's bid to establish itself as an alternative hegemony in its own territory will be strengthened if it also has access to a set of institutions through which to reproduce its own culture at the sub-state level. It can, when these conditions are met, establish its own social order without displacing the state's social order—although it will certainly have weakened it. Even when a regional hegemony establishes itself via legal means in a federal political system, it is still possible that it can weaken the national culture of the state and the basis of its social order through various challenges to the state's authority and legitimacy.

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[61] Walter L. Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 177.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 179. Adamson maintains that such a situation is unlikely and is at odds with Gramsci's understanding about the nature of advanced capitalism.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued for the need for an approach that considers the role played by states in correcting the effects of those processes that are assumed to give rise to sub-state nationalism: patterns of uneven economic development. The state's ability to correct uneven development is related to its level of infrastructural power. I argued that in cases where state-making was marked by high transaction costs in the bargaining processes between rulers and political actors, state power was weakened. These transaction costs, moreover, were built into the institutional and constitutional outcomes of state-making. Drawing on the assumptions about the function and durability of institutions in the literature on the new institutionalism, I considered the consequences of weak institutions and low levels of institutional incorporation for state consolidation and the reproduction of a national culture. I concluded that in some states, weak state power will work against full institutional incorporation and that this will impede the reproduction of a national culture. One possible consequence of this is that it creates the conditions for the reproduction of an alternative culture at the local level. In the next chapter, I examine the implications of what I have argued here for Southern Europe.

Patterns of State Formation in Southern Europe

Introduction

When a state has low levels of institutional incorporation, I argued in chapter

2, it will be less capable of reproducing a dominant culture over the territory. In this

chapter, I hypothesize that the level of institutional incorporation in a state will

determine the range and type of alternative state projects that can be used to

challenge state nationalism. By linking the potential for counterhegemonic

movements to the levels of institutional incorporation in a state, I am arguing that

these movements are related to the structure of the state. Indeed, in this chapter, I

argue that the range of alternative ideologies or in some cases, forms of anti-state

social relations, that are available for counterhegemonic activity in a given state is

limited. The limits of a range of ideologies can be specified through a consideration

of patterns of state formation within states or within a type of state. Here, I specify

these limits for Southern Europe[1] from the mid nineteenth to the early twentieth

century.

In political science and sociology, Southern Europe is traditionally marked

off from Northern Europe in terms of patterns of state-society relations, social

stratification, the timing of industrialization and forms of collective action.

Compared to Northern Europe, primary forms of association, such as the family,

church and patron-client relations, prevailed longer in the southern part of the

continent (France being the notable exception). By the beginning of the twentieth

century, exclusionary political systems, presided over by a declining aristocracy, had

the effect of radicalizing the middle and lower-classes in their bid to enter the political arena. Where regionalism was also an important political variable, as it was in Spain and Italy, political cleavages were made more complicated. The turn to corporatism in Italy, Portugal and Spain was a particular ideological solution in the region to the growing pressures for economic and political participation.[2] Because of these distinct patterns of state development, socio-economic structures and patterns of political mobilization, a separate literature has emerged on Southern Europe.[3] There is strong justification, therefore, for considering patterns of political development in the region as a whole in order to define the limits of the range of movements and social relations that could organize against the state.

Since "ideologies depend, not on the capitalist state in general, or even on the social classes alone, but on the socio-political setting"[4] in which they operate, I use state structure as the departure point for my analysis. State structure is both an important source of counterhegemonic movements and an important independent variable in the analysis of these: "Political movements of dissent appear to focus on the state as the object of disaffection and are thus indirect evidence for the

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[1] By 'Southern' Europe, I mean all those states that give on to the Mediterranean although I am principally concerned with Italy, Portugal and Spain. I will also refer to France where appropriate.

[2] Salvador Giner, "Political Economy, Legitimation, and the State in Southern Europe," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[3] Juan Linz, "Europe's Southern Frontier: Evolving Trends Toward What?" *Daedalus* 108 (1979), pp. 175-209; O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*; Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), *The New Mediterranean Democracies: Greece, Spain, and Portugal* (London: Frank Cass, 1984); and James Petras, Richard Gunther, P.N. Diamanduros and H.J. Puhle (eds.), *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

[4] Pierre Birnbaum, "States, Ideologies and Collective Action in Western Europe," *International Social Science Journal* 32 (1989), p. 683.

variableness of the development of stateness in different societies."[5] Finally, the privileged position of the state as the centre of political activity means that it "occupies a crucial political position in determining not only the generation of regionalist aspirations, but also their content and likely prospects of success."[6] Most accounts of sub-state mobilization found in the literature on nationalism tend to assume that all counterhegemonic movements at the sub-state level are nationalist. This assumption is flawed methodologically because it takes for granted what actually needs to be explained: the ideological orientation of counterhegemonic movements at the sub-state level. The approach used here is intended to address this conceptual problem.

The advantage of a statist approach is that it can provide a more accurate account of counterhegemonic ideologies without ignoring questions of class—which have been central in most analyses of sub-state nationalism. Instead, it subsumes class issues, since the nature of the state presupposes something about the balance of class forces.[7] The disadvantage of a statist approach is that it runs the risk of being too particularistic unless we can specify types or categories of states for investigation, in order to build hypotheses about general relationships and patterns

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[5] J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20 (1968), p. 571.

[6] Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, "Introduction: Centres and Peripheries in Western Europe," in Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin (eds.), *The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism* (Berverly Hills: Sage, 1982), p. 4.

[7] This point is taken from Aristide Zolberg's argument that variation in the patterns of working-class politics is related to whether labour faced an absolutist or liberal state at that moment when it was integrated into the economic structure: "This politically fundamental variable subsumes [Seymour Martin Lipset's social class system variable] because the prerequisite for the institutionalization of a liberal regime was the emergence of a significant counterweight to the aristocracy, that is, a gentry or a bourgeoisie." See Aristide R. Zolberg, "How Many Exceptionalisms?" in Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg (eds.), *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 450. For Lipset's argument, see Seymour Martin Lipset,

across cases. In this chapter, I attempt to minimize this potential drawback by considering a type of state—that of Southern Europe.

The chapter is divided into three parts. First, I trace the outlines of the state in Southern Europe by considering three dimensions of the state: state centralization, state infrastructure and regime type. Second, I define and discuss the range of ideologies or forms of anti-statist social relations that emerged in the states of Southern Europe.

1. The State in Southern Europe

Within Western Europe, states in the southern part of the continent can be distinguished from states in Northern Europe along three dimensions: their degree of centralization, the nature of their state infrastructure and their regime type. Stein Rokkan has argued that the distinct patterns of state formation in these two areas of the continent are related to the distribution of city networks and the location of trade routes.[8] For commercial reasons, cities were more densely concentrated around the Mediterranean but there was a 'city-belt' which extended from this region in a northwesterly direction towards the Rhine and the Danube. This concentration of cities was also the stronghold of the Roman Catholic Church: commercial centres coincided with ecclesiastical ones. As a result, no core areas emerged along this trade route that could consolidate power in the region. By contrast, on the edges of the former empirical structures in the region, where there was a smaller concentration of cities, core centres were able to emerge and

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"Radicalism or Reformism: The Sources of Working-class Politics," *American Political Science Review* 77 (1983), pp. 1-18.
[8] See Stein Rokkan, "Cities, States, and Nations: A Dimensional Model for the Study of Contrasts in Development," in S.N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Building States and Nations*, Vol. 1 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), pp. 73-97.

consolidate their power over the territory in what would later become Scandinavia, France and England. A second-wave of what Rokkan refers to as 'centre-building' emerged in Austria, the German Empire, Prussia and Sweden. The Mediterranean world remained a region of city-states, thereby complicating the establishment of a dominant core and ensuring that it would be challenged by other cities. Political power in the states that emerged in the Mediterranean world was polarized as a result.[9]

In what follows, I outline the consequences of a distinct pattern of state formation in Southern Europe for three dimensions of a state's 'stateness': state centralization, state infrastructure and regime type.

State centralization.

Delayed centralization. The centralization of the state's power is the *sine qua non* of effective rule over a territory in the literature on state formation. Compared to Northern Europe, state centralization arrived late in Southern Europe and, even in this century, has been incomplete. State centralization was either delayed or interrupted in the region by the late seventeenth-century Napoleonic invasion of Italy and the early eighteenth-century Peninsular War, both of which displaced weak monarchies and marked the beginning of attempts by liberal forces in the region to

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[9] Rokkan also distinguished states in Western Europe by their ability to build nations. Two variables can explain variation in nation-building: vernacular standards and the Reformation. The former "prepared the ground for the later stages of nation-building at the mass level," while the Protestant power that the Reformation introduced "endeavoured to acquire territorial control over one linguistic community." Catholic Europe, by contrast, pursued the 'supraterritorial ideal' associated with the Church. See Rokkan, "Cities, States, and Nations," pp. 80-84. For an account of the emergence of nationalism in Europe that uses a different set of variables, see Michael Mann, "The Emergence of Modern European Nationalism," In John A. Hall and Ian C. Jarvie (eds.), *Transitions to Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

reform the political systems.[10] The restoration of these monarchies after the retreat

of French forces, and their refusal to honour the constitutional reforms that had

been introduced in their absence, produced the first important nineteenth-century

political cleavage in the region, namely, liberal reformers against absolute monarchs.

In Italy, Spain and Portugal, liberal reformers attempted to set constitutional limits

on the sovereign's rule and consolidate centralized rule through administrative

reform or, as in the Italian case, by uniting the peninsula. The liberal revolts that

engulfed the region between 1820-23 were the first of a series of armed political

conflicts around these issues.

The failure of these revolts did not settle the issue of state centralization;

indeed the cleavages would become more complicated as the century wore on. Over

the course of the nineteenth century, the intransigence of the monarchy, the failure

of liberal reformers to consolidate state centralization and modernization and, the

eventual fusion of liberal and monarchist interests in contrived parliamentary

systems,[11] produced an alternative political solution to the problem of state

rationalization: republicanism. Republican secret societies emerged in all three

countries as a direct challenge to the way in which the contrived parliamentary

systems excluded other parties and groups. Republican influences had filtered into

the region after the French Revolution, but it was only after liberal initiatives at

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[10] See Isser Woloch (ed.), *Revolution and the Meaning of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

[11] This contrived system, by which two dynastic liberal parties alternated in power with absolutely no regard for electoral results, was supported by the monarchy in all three cases. In Italy, Left and Right Liberals alternated in power in a system knows as *trasformismo* and purposefully excluded other groups from power, such as republicans and socialists; in Portugal, the *Partido Regenerador* (Regenerators) and the *Partido Progressista* (Progressives) rotated in power between 1871-1890 in a system known as *rotativismo*; finally, in Spain, Liberals and Conservative alternated peacefully in power (*turno pacifico*) for most of the Restoration period (1875-1923).

reform had failed that republicanism was transformed into a political force. The Carbonari in Italy, the Carbonária in Portugal and the republican circles in Spain were all secret societies that transmitted the republican message to sympathizers. The transition to republican party politics occurred earlier in Spain and Italy (1840s) than in Portugal (1890s), but in all three cases republicanism was the first effective challenge to the failure of state centralization and the politics of privilege that liberals and monarchists maintained through the use of force. The republican challenge marked off the fight for political inclusion in Southern Europe from the Northern European experience in two important ways. First, the republican message was sufficiently broad—democracy, universal male suffrage, direct parliamentary elections, federalism and municipal autonomy—to attract supporters from among the middle and working-classes as well as regionalists who viewed federalism as the only appropriate response to the failure of state centralization. Second, the republican challenge largely discredited liberalism in the region. Once the contrived parliamentary systems were undone in all three countries, the possibility for liberal party politics in the future was closed.

Because republicanism attracted radical supporters, it polarized politics in Southern Europe and provoked a conservative backlash. This backlash assumed different forms: in the Portuguese and Spanish cases it was associated with the intervention of the military in politics. In Spain, sub-state nationalism was also a conservative reaction to the federal republican movement of the nineteenth century and, in particular, to the radical cantonalist movement that the failed First Republic (1873-74) unleashed in the south and the northeast. Conservative nationalist movements emerged in the Basque Country and Catalonia at the turn of the

twentieth century in a bid to take up some of the issues, on a more reduced scale, that had occupied nineteenth-century republicans. One such issue was municipal autonomy, which was the centrepiece of early twentieth-century Catalan nationalism and, in the Basque Country, the preservation of the *fueros*, those particular municipal and fiscal privileges which had remained in place from the period of composite monarchy in the seventeenth century. The goals of nationalist movements in Spain would expand as the twentieth century progressed but, for the most part, sub-state nationalists have advocated less radical solutions to the problem of state centralization than have republicans.

There was a second conservative response in this century to popular reaction against the failure to consolidate the process of state centralization in Southern Europe namely, corporatism. The corporatist solutions to the problem of popular protest consisted in imposing a form of inclusionary politics from above which, in reality, eliminated all political issues from the public sphere. Arguably, these corporatist regimes were more successful at state centralization than their monarchical predecessors, but such centralization could only be maintained through coercion, repression and the suppression of politics. In the end, fascism was a poor solution for the failure of state centralization in nineteenth-century Southern Europe in that it merely postponed the resolution of those issues that had produced the radical political cleavages to start with, namely, the structure of the state and the constitutional limits on the sovereign's rule. The resolution of these issues in the Italian case would require the assistance of the Allied forces in the immediate

postwar period while in Portugal and Spain, a 'pacted' solution only arrived after the collapse of these corporatist regimes in the 1970s.[12]

Incomplete Centralization. The failure of the central state to resolve these issues and to consolidate fully its power in the nineteenth century meant that, for the period we are examining, state centralization was not only delayed, it was incomplete. Ernest Gellner has suggested that state centralization can be incomplete in two senses: *territorially*, a state may not be able to gain total control of outlying areas; and *qualitatively*, the state may control the entire territory but not possess the technical means (or, as Mann would say, the infrastructural power) to regulate all activities within its jurisdiction.[13] Incomplete centralization produces what Stein and Urwin have referred to as a territorial strain between the centre and the periphery over cultural or economic differences.[14]

In Southern Europe, territorial strain is related to economic and cultural dualism. Economic dualism exists in all three cases but is associated with different cleavages in each. In Portugal, for example, economic dualism between the wealthy commercial port cities of Lisbon and Oporto, on the one hand, and the poor rural regions in the extreme north and south of the country, on the other, produced a republican (urban) and monarchical (rural) cleavage. The effects of this cleavage

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[12] See the relevant chapters in O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*. For a discussion of the role of pacts in transitions to democracy see, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 90-1, 184-5.

[13] Ernest Gellner, "Patrons and Clients," in Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (eds.), *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (London: Duckworth, 1977), p. 4.

[14] Stein and Urwin, "The Politics of Territorial Identity," p. 4.

were vividly played out during the First Republic (1910-1926),[15] when republican élites attempted to extend their control of the territory to monarchical support bases in the rural areas through the construction of a new national identity based on Portugal's role in the discovery of the New World.[16] Since the discoveries were not the sole property of the republicans, monarchists were able to appropriate and reinterpret them to suit their view of history and to respond to the cultural values of their support bases. Republicans' attempt to centralize their control of the entire territory, and thereby overcome the effects of economic dualism, unleashed an unprecedented public debate and political mobilization over the structure of the state and the nature of the regime. The inability to achieve consensus on these issues led to civil war, the intrusion of the army into politics and a corporatist dictatorship.

Territorial strain need not result in regime breakdown, as the Italian case makes clear. In nineteenth-century Italy, economic dualism between the modern industrial and commercial north and the industrially backward south, or *Mezzogiorno*, was superimposed over cultural dualism: forms of social relations and patterns of authority were distinct in the two regions. The centralization of the Italian state that emerged from the mid-nineteenth-century movement for unification, the *Risorgimento*, was incomplete in a qualitative sense: the central state was not able to regulate political affairs in the southern part of the peninsula. In fact, unification perpetuated dualism. Sidney Tarrow links economic dualism in Italy to the particular pattern of national unification during the *Risorgimento* of 1861: not only was

[15] Douglas L. Wheeler, *Republican Portugal: A Political History 1910-1926* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p. 19.
[16] AbdoolKarim A. Vakil, "Nationalising Cultural Politics: Representation of the Portuguese 'Discoveries' and the Rhetoric of Identitarianism, 1880-1926," in Clare Mar-Molinero and

unification imposed on the south by royal conquest from the north, but it also reinforced the political position of the *Mezzogiorno's* socially and economically conservative elite by granting them vast landholdings in exchange for their support. Unification also produced a cultural dualism in the new Italian state in that it resulted in a "juxtaposition of the institutions of the modern state with the social structures and cultural patterns of southern Italy"[17] and essentially excluded the majority of the population from politics. Tarrow argues that one consequence of this juxtaposition was the failure of the new government to establish a basis for its legitimacy amongst the majority of the population in the south, which caused this majority to defect to a form of anti-system authority namely, the Mafia. Filippo Sabetti has argued something similar in his case-study of the Sicilian village Camporano: the new government institutions served as impediments to collective action at the village level, thereby forcing people to pursue individualistic action. The turn to the Mafia as an alternative authority structure represented the most effective form of self-help and self-reliance.[18] In the Italian case, then, unification did not guarantee that the state would possess the institutional means to regulate all forms of political activity in the south of the peninsula, leaving a path open for the pursuit of a distinct form of social and political relations.

State centralization was both delayed and incomplete in Southern Europe, which prevented the consolidation of a modern state. Two consequences emerged as a result: first, questions of the nature of state power and access to state power

Angel Smith (eds.), *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford: Berg, 1997), pp. 33, 52.

[17] Sidney G. Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 89.

remained unresolved at the turn of the twentieth century. This fact explains the prominence of radical forms of politics, such as republicanism and anarchism, compared to Northern Europe. The second consequence was a pattern of cultural and economic dualism which produced certain political cleavages that were not predisposed to compromise. Dualism also forced certain sub-state regions to seek out alternative ways of organizing social and political relations in the face of the state's incapacity to integrate these into the dominant structures.

State infrastructure

States are distinguished one from the other by the *extent* to which their centralized institutions are differentiated and the *relationship* of the state's personnel to the office they occupy. The ideal-type Weberian state is marked by a high degree of differentiation between the three branches of government—executive, legislative and judiciary—as well as a rational bureaucratic structure where procedures are routinized and personnel are recruited and promoted based on merit. The Northern European state most closely approximates this ideal-type and can be contrasted with the patrimonial state infrastructure which is found in the southern part of the continent.

Patrimonial states are distinguished from their bureaucratic counterparts by, first, the tendency of both the state élite and the state personnel to appropriate public office for their personal use. For example, Portuguese politics are characterized by a *personalismo* (personalism) whereby individual leaders are admired because they possess certain respected qualities while little attention is paid to their ability to rule or manage their office. A second noteworthy characteristic of the

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[18] Filippo Sabetti, *Political Authority in a Sicilian Village* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University

Southern European state is the lack of differentiation between the centralized institutions. Restoration Spain (1875-1923) exemplifies in broad relief the problems which beset the region in this regard. The dynastic parliamentary system of the period consisted in a negotiated alternation in office between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Cabinet, in cooperation with the king, ruled the country while the legislature served virtually no purpose. At the provincial level, elected assemblies enjoyed more power, although it was not legislative in nature. Instead, "elected representatives were given responsibility to create and preserve public services, administer some portions of the tax levies and appoint personnel" in the place of recruiting a civil bureaucracy.[19] The judiciary, meanwhile, had become thoroughly politicized after 1882, when a law was passed permitting the recruitment of municipal and provincial judges having no legal training.[20]

Third, the failure to rationalize the state's bureaucratic structure in the nineteenth century necessitated alternative mechanisms for implementing state policies and mobilizing support at the local level. The most widely-used mechanism was to hire a broker, someone who could mediate between the population and the state. These brokers could either provide services that the state could not offer or they could broker access to state benefits for the population. The broker, or middle-man, was at the same time a patron to the population at the local level and a client of the state. The often elaborate system of reciprocity which emerged from these patron-client relations is known as clientelism, which I will examine in greater detail in the third section of this chapter.

Press, 1984), pp. 232-33.

[19] Robert W. Kern, *Liberals, Reformers and Caciques in Restoration Spain, 1875-1909* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), p. 45.

Clientelist systems in the region were elaborate and their effects extensive: many clientelist practices are still evident in twentieth-century Southern Europe. Even if patron-clients relations have been replaced with more impersonal forms of interaction with the state, the effects of clientelist practices linger. For example, Ferrera, in enumerating the characteristics of the late twentieth-century welfare state in Southern Europe, has noted "the persistence of 'institutional particularism', if not outright clientelism and in some cases the formation of fairly elaborated 'patronage' machines for the distribution of cash subsidies."[21] Moreover, just as the nineteenth-century Southern European state was unable to penetrate fully its territory, so today's welfare state is unable to penetrate all sectors of the welfare sphere with the result that there is "a highly collusive mix between public and non public actors and institutions."[22]

Historically, the institutions of the Southern European state have been undifferentiated when compared to those of Northern Europe. The intervention of the military in politics and the importance of the *caudillo* or *cacique* in the 'smooth' functioning of the political system has historically made politics in the south far less democratic than elsewhere in Western Europe. Moreover, there has been a marked tendency in the region for politicians to use public office for their personal use and to rely on clientelist practices to buy support. Finally, the continued relevance of

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 46-48.

[21] Maurizio Ferrera, "General Introduction," *Comparing Social Welfare Systems in Southern Europe*, Vol. 3: Florence Conference (Paris: MIRE, 1997), p. 16. See also, Claude Martin, "Family Policies and Role of the Family," *Comparing Social Welfare Systems in Southern Europe*, p. 327; and, Maurizio Ferrera, "The 'Southern Model' of Welfare in Southern Europe," *Journal of European Social Policy* 6 (1996), pp. 17-37.

[22] Ferrera, "General Introduction," p. 16.

clientelism, even if it is diluted, suggests that the failure to rationalize fully the bureaucracy is an enduring feature of Southern European state.

Regime types

In Southern Europe, state-society relations have been shaped by two distinct regime types, the enduring legacies of which are present today in the contours of the region's welfare state. The first of these is an exclusionary-type regime which encouraged the organization of self-help or mutual aid societies, while the second is a corporatist regime, which coopted societal interests.

In nineteenth-century Southern Europe, the practice of clientelism and, in particular, the way in which the state's clients manipulated electoral outcomes, was an effective means of stifling the use of political parties for interest representation. Furthermore, since one of the purposes of clientelism was to preserve a conservative and traditional hierarchical order, the creation of public associations for the purpose of pressuring the state for change was perceived as a threat to oligarchic rule. But if the state was not open to influence, and if clientelism was part of the problem, then the only recourse was to create self-help groups in civil society. Friendly societies, for example, were a typical nineteenth-century response to the need to provide forms of insurance for members of a community or occupational group. Although these types of societies were not unique to Southern Europe, they were often the predecessors of workers' movements in the region: it was a meeting of thirty such societies in the north of Italy that led to the first Congress of Workers Societies in 1854.[23] Other types of self-help included mutual defence associations, such as the

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[23] Daniel L. Horowitz, *The Italian Labor Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 14.

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late-nineteenth-century Sicilian *Fasci*, which organized for land reform and the abolition of taxes.[24]

Friendly societies could also act as potential support bases for other political movements: the Italian *Società di mutua soccorso*, as the friendly societies were known, "became the organizational instrument through which Mazzini tried to spread his political and social doctrine and to organize support for his position on the basic questions arising out of Italian unification."[25] Similarly, the revolutionary republican Society for the Rights of Man in nineteenth-century France offered the burgeoning workers' movement strike support if it would join the society.[26] The cooperation between republicans and socialist workers marked the first step in the alliance between radicals and socialists that would eventually overcome one of the central dilemmas of French republicanism; namely, that "the possibility of individuals voluntarily organizing themselves to provide social protection or to give social assistance to others was not only perplexing but contradictory to republican values."[27] For the most part though, workers in Southern Europe, including France, were organized along anarchist or syndicalist lines: they preferred self-help to a formal alliance with political parties; propaganda by the deed to electoral hustings; and the general strike to the ballot box.

[24] E.J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), pp. 93-107.

[25] Horowitz, *The Italian Labor Movement*, p. 13.

[26] On the Society for the Rights of Man, see William H. Sewell, Jr. "Artisans, Factory Workers, and the Formation of the French Working Class, 1789-1848," in Katznelson and Zolberg (eds.), *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States*, p. 63. On the republican synthesis, see Ronald Aminzade, *Ballots and Barricades: Class Formation and Republican Politics in France, 1830-1871* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 32-52.

[27] Douglas E. Ashford, "In Search of the État Providence," in James F. Hollifield and George Ross (eds.), *Searching for the New France* (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 153.

Other forms of self-help were more secret than the public acts of protest and violence carried out by workers in Southern Europe. This was the case with republican secret societies, such as the Carbonari in Italy, which pursued more discrete methods of destabilizing the social and political order held together by liberal-monarchical collusion. In Spain, pre-Restoration republicanism was also organized in secret societies but quickly moved into publicly organized republican 'clubs,' which concealed republican political activities behind a mask of cultural events.[28] The fusion of cultural and political forms of association was also evident among anarchists, who organized an alternative way of life based on communities of self-help and socialized members through their own schools, libraries, newspapers and meeting places. The Mafia, finally, organized a system of social and political relations that, while it had its own code of honour and ideals—the *omertà*—was not based on a retreat from the existing social order. Indeed, the Mafia existed in parallel with the legal order and very often used the institutions of the legal government for its own purposes.

Self-help was a nineteenth-century response to the problem of exclusionary regimes in Southern Europe. At the other extreme, the twentieth-century Southern European state has coopted societal interests through state corporatist structures. The fascist experiences in Italy, Portugal and Spain produced a distinct type of interest articulation whose purpose was to link "the associationally organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state" through "compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated

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[28] Antonio Eiras, "Sociedades secretas republicanas en el reinado de Isabel II," *Hispania* 86 (1962), pp. 251-310.

categories."[29] The vertical syndical structures that these corporatist states created were designed to mobilize citizens in support of the regime and the particular breed of state nationalism that it promoted; to reward certain sectors of society for their support, such as workers and the family; to control the articulation of ideas that were in opposition to this state nationalism; and, to monitor the activities of the population.

The demise of these types of regimes and the subsequent transition to democracy did not signal the end of corporatism as a way or organizing interests, but it did transform *state* corporatist groups into *societal* ones. Corporatism, as a way of organizing interests, is an important legacy from the period of fascist rule in Southern Europe.[30] But state corporatist structures never entirely managed to do away with the mutual aid societies of the pre-fascist period. This accounts for the curious mixture of public and private organizations—another form of dualism in the region—that exists in today's Southern European welfare state. For example, Ferrera has noted "an unbalanced distribution of protection across the standard risks, and more generally the various functions of social policy."[31] The low level of benefits that are provided the family, including housing benefits, is due to the fact that primary forms of association—families and small communities—historically tended towards self-help rather than mobilize for state support. Generally, the patchwork nature of state benefits that exists in these states today is the outgrowth of earlier forms of mutual aid; the state has not taken over these traditional spheres of mutual

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[29] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds.), *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation* (London: Sage, 1979), pp. 9, 22.

[30] For the Spanish case, see Victor M. Pérez-Díaz, *The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

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assistance—even where primary associations are no longer very effective—but instead has preferred to fill in certain gaps, such as unemployment insurance or pension schemes.[32] The state has been slow to step into those policy spheres that have traditionally been the domain of the family, the Church or private charities. But in some cases, such as family policy, primary forms of association are no longer effective providers of welfare, given high rates of unemployment and the breakdown of traditional family structures, due to modernization. If the family still performs certain welfare functions it is only because the state has not stepped in to offer any assistance.

The forms of collective action that exist today in Southern Europe reflect the particular trajectory of regime types in the region. Organizations for self-help continue to exist despite the experience of state corporatism. These organizations must adapt to a recently democratized social and political environment, which is still defining itself, and have not yet discovered effective means of lobbying the state. The collective bargaining 'strategy' or pressure tactic most frequently used by these groups is the general strike or the mobilization of entire sectors for demonstrations, which echoes the strategy used by workers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If today's Southern European state has not responded to these tactics it is

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[31] Ferrera, "General Introduction," p. 15.
[32] For example, benefits for single parents in Southern Europe (including Greece) are well below the average for the European Union (pre-expansion), as are benefits for the unemployed youth (only Portugal provides them). Both types of benefits are considered to be the responsibility of the extended family in these societies. See Ferrera, "The 'Southern Model' of Welfare" for the relevant data. Valiente has argued that the absence of family policies in Spain is due 1) to the dismantling of pro-natalist and anti-feminist policies inherited from the Franco period and 2) the unwillingness of the Socialists (who were in power from 1982-1995) to legislate in this area due to pressure from feminist party members not to treat women as caregivers, but as equal citizens. Valiente's observations are also a commentary on the inability of certain sectors to organize for benefits. See Celia Valiente,

because it has rejected state corporatism without yet having replaced it with effective structures through which to conduct tripartite bargaining among workers, employers and the state. The result is an unstructured pattern of state-society of relations that is evident in the patchwork nature of programs and policies.

2. Counterhegemonic Ideologies and Anti-statist Social Relations

Broadly speaking, the failure to consolidate fully the power and legitimacy of the state in a centralized and rationalized bureaucratic structure prevented institutional incorporation and the controlled integration of new interests into the political sphere. State consolidation would have forestalled the radical, sometimes revolutionary, politics that characterized the region. Instead, the failure of state centralization and consolidation anticipated several different types of challenges to state authority. The types of counterhegemonic ideologies that emerged in Southern Europe can be traced to three factors: the persistence of weak monarchical regimes that delayed a transition to democracy; incomplete state centralization; and forms of dualism. Below, I discuss some of the principal ideologies which emerged in the period under examination.

Republicanism. The intellectual heritage of republicanism in Southern Europe was the French Revolution: Italy, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Portugal, felt the effects of events in France by the 1790s. The French invasion of Italy in 1796 led to the conquest of north and central Italy and the recognition by the Austrians of a new Cisalpine Republic in its former territory. Italians had a direct experience of life without a monarch and many Piedmontese benefited from and supported the

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reforms introduced under the French administration.[33] In Spain, the Bourbon monarchy had every right to fear a similar end to the old regime as had occurred in France; to that end, it waged a campaign against the spread of propaganda that French revolutionaries lost no time in sending over the shared border in Catalonia.[34] But it was the war between France and Spain in 1793-95 that drew the principal political cleavages of nineteenth-century Spanish politics: Maravall claims that the "impact of the French Revolution was almost immediate and that modern politics and political parties in Spain are rooted in the events of the French Revolution."[35] The war created a group of francophiles, particularly in Catalonia, who were branded 'traitors' for their republicanism.[36] The Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808 further complicated matters: to be a liberal in the early-nineteenth century, as the drafters of Spain's new constitution at Cádiz were known, was to be a collaborator of Napoleon and a traitor to the Bourbon crown.

Both liberals and republicans in early nineteenth-century Southern Europe challenged the legitimacy of the basis of authority of the monarchy but, eventually, liberals were able to reach a compromise with the monarchy by establishing certain constitutional limits on the sovereign's power in exchange for oligarchic rule. To be a liberal in nineteenth-century Italy, Portugal and Spain was to ensure oneself access to power and privilege. Liberalism in Southern Europe was not of that strand of

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[33] Michael Broers, "Revolution as Vendetta: Patriotism in Piedmont, 1794-1821," *The Historic Journal* 33 (1990), pp. 575-597; *idem*, "Revolution as Vendetta: Napoleonic Piedmont, 1801-1814," *The Historic Journal* 33 (1990), pp. 787-809. This is a study in two parts.

[34] See Antonio Elorza, "El temido árbol de la libertad," in Jean-René Aymes (ed.), *España y la Revolución francesa* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1989), pp. 69-117; and Lucienne Domergue, "Propaganda y Contrapropaganda en España durante la Revolución francesa," in Aymes (ed.), *España y la Revolución francesa*, pp. 118-167.

[35] José Antonio Maravall, "Las tendencias de reforma política en el siglo XVIII español," *Revista de Occidente* XVII (1967), p. 55.

[36] Enric Riera i Fortiana, *Els Afrancesats a Catalunya* (Barcelona: Curial, 1994).

"liberal ideology [which] involved the argument that the centerpiece of social progress was the careful delimitation of three spheres of activity: those related to the market, those related to the state, and those that were 'personal.'"[37] Instead liberals and monarchs colluded to stifle social progress by shutting out republicans and, later, socialists and communists, from power. The real republican challenge to domestic politics in Southern Europe arose, therefore, not with the French Revolution itself, but with the subsequent failure of Southern European liberals to reform the constitutional system and their collusion with the monarchs of the region.

Because republicans were excluded from politics, they attempted to convert supporters to their cause through the development of a republican culture in civil society. Republicans viewed themselves as the legitimate bearers of the ideals of the Enlightenment and the conception of state and society introduced by the French Revolution. Their challenge to the old order consisted in promoting the ideals of social progress that liberals had abandoned. The republican conception of progress made the rational individual—and not the hierarchical authority structure—the principal agent of change. Republicans believed in the liberty and equality of men against the hierarchical social order imposed by the ancien regime and the Catholic church; the legitimacy of the will of the people was their rationale for collective action; democratic politics was their means; and liberty their end.

In Southern Europe during the nineteenth century, republican ideas were first and foremost the basis for an alternative culture since the revolutionary potential of these societies was considered to be underdeveloped. This culture grew

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[37] Immanuel Wallerstein, "The French Revolution as a World-Historical Event," *Social*

up around athenaeums, meeting-places—known as clubs or circles—for the informal exchanges of ideas, newspapers, and cultural events that forged a sense of community amongst like-minded people. The purpose of forging communities of republicans was to promote the virtues of patriotism. Republican patriots valued the republic, its institutions and the way of life—liberty—it promoted. A patriot's love for the republic was based on his commitment to the common liberty of the people. This commitment did not require appeals to a shared language or ethnicity—this would be the language of nationalism at the end of the nineteenth century—but rather to a shared appreciation of man's rightful claim to freedom and equality. The pursuit of common liberty was, in fact, the pursuit of a common good. The institutions that sustained the liberty of the community were for the benefit of all citizens so that each might pursue their own good through active citizenship. Where these institutions were corrupted—because they were used for the pursuit of the exclusive interests of a faction of the citizenry—the possibility of cultivating the virtues that are associated with citizenship did not exist. Hence the need to guard against the usurpation of public institutions by small groups or parties in pursuit of their particular interests through a form of rule that would prevent the monopolization of power.

For eighteenth-century republican thinkers, such as Montesquieu, the growth of particular interests could be curbed where citizens could watch over each other in the interests of the common good. City-states or small republics were, for Montesquieu, well-disposed towards republican politics. The preference for small republican communities has often been misinterpreted to mean that republican

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patriotism can only exist where citizens share a common ethnicity or language.[38] This is incorrect since republicans valued liberty and equality before ethnic bonds. A true republican patriot, for example, would fight for the cause of freedom both at home or abroad: French republicans assisted the Irish republican cause; European republicans fought in Simon Bolivar's army in the republican Wars of Independence in Latin America and; volunteer International Brigades flocked to Spain to fight on the republican side during the Civil War. What was required to be a citizen of a republic was a commitment to the virtues of the republic itself, regardless of one's place of birth. For this reason, republicans were committed to the right to liberty and freedom of all people.

To be truly free, according to republicans, man needs to live amongst those political institutions that will best propel him to be an active citizen in the pursuit of republican virtues. But herein lies one fact and one dilemma which, together, are partially responsible for weakening the republican influence in most of Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. First, where republicanism was a movement for political change, it locked horns with a form of domination—either domestic or foreign—which it sought to overthrow. The most likely and effective form of domination in nineteenth-century Europe was the state. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century republicans were most often engaged in a battle with the state; the most effective way, therefore, of appealing for action against the state was through reference to the right of the people to self-rule. This was a fact that republicans faced and here was their ensuing dilemma: since domination was experienced collectively, how could republicans mobilize support for freedom from domination

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[38] Stephen Nathanson, "In Defense of 'Moderate Patriotism,'" *Ethics* 99 (1989), pp. 535-552.

without appealing to a people's shared history of domination itself? It was, in other words, difficult to avoid reference to the common experience of a particular cultural group or, a nation. Mazzini, for example, "believed that to build a republic, it is not sufficient to appeal to the political values embodied in the classical ideal of *patria*, one must incorporate them into a larger discourse that encompasses also the cultural values of the nation."[39] But Mazzini was not a nationalist and decried the separation of nation and republic, since claims to represent the former could be used as an illegitimate basis for a form of monarchical authority that did not guarantee freedom.[40] But twentieth-century commentators often mistake Mazzini—as well as many other nineteenth- and twentieth-century republicans—for a nationalist and it is not difficult to see why: by the late nineteenth century, "as patriot rhetoric became increasingly assimilated into the emerging vocabulary of 'state' and 'nation', and its central idea underwent a transference to the national, party, and racial doctrines of the modern age, it lost its earlier, critical sting."[41] It was not long before appeals to the shared culture of a nation as a legitimate basis for mobilization and self-rule superseded appeals for a republic of virtue. By the twentieth century, arguments for cultural or ethnic unity replaced arguments for common liberty and the language of patriotism became transformed as a result.[42]

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[39] Maurizio Viroli, *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 144. A patriot in early-modern Europe was someone who defended liberty and equality against tyranny. This was also the meaning of a patriot during the American Revolution. Only later would a patriot become someone who loved his or her country. See the discussion in Mary Dietz, "Patriotism," in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[40] Hudson Meadwell, "Republics, Nations and Transitions to Modernity." *Nations and Nationalism* (forthcoming).

[41] Dietz, "Patriotism," p. 188.

[42] Viroli, *For Love of Country*, p. 8; and Dietz, "Patriotism," pp. 189-191.

Throughout Southern Europe, however, republicanism retained a following through to the twentieth century even though, in Northern Europe, "the republican movement...reached its zenith in 1848."[43] Writing three years before the outbreak of the First World War, Fischer maintained that republicanism was a spent force in Europe because constitutional monarchies had incorporated much of the essence of republican demands. In Europe, constitutional monarchies were the way of the future, he predicted. However, Fischer recognized that the cause of the monarchy was less secure in 'Latin' Europe given the effects of the French Revolution and Napoleonic invasions there. But while it was unlikely that republicanism would triumph in Italy, because of the Papal state, it had a better chance in Spain given the weakness of its monarchy.[44] Fischer was unable, of course, to predict how the popular appeal of the principle of self-determination would incite republican mobilization across the continent in the interwar period nor how republicanism would be eventually eclipsed, not by constitutional monarchy, but by nationalism.

Nationalism. Republicanism was the original form of political protest against weak monarchies in Southern Europe, nationalism was the second. The nationalist challenge that I am interested in considering here came from the sub-state level. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, nationalism emerged as a distinct political option for mobilization against the state. Two developments took place in the nineteenth century to make this possible: a national arena for political activity emerged and states embarked on nation-building projects.

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[43] H.A.L. Fischer, *The Republican Tradition in Europe* (London: Methuen, 1911), p. 284.
[44] *Ibid.*, ch. XII. Fischer was a constitutional monarchist and thought little of Spanish republicanism, because of its association with anarchism and federalism.

The emergence of a national arena had enormous implications for political protest and social action. Tilly has argued that the main distinction between defensive protest movements in the early days of state making and social movements that emerged after the nineteenth century was that the latter directed their activities against the people who ran the state "for the offensive pursuit of new rights and advantages."[45] The development of nation-wide electoral politics, and the collective movements for social action which accompanied this phenomenon, promoted what Tilly calls the 'national social movement' and created a model for social movements at other levels of political action. The autonomous power of the state was transformed into a 'national' arena during the nineteenth century and it was here that battles for political inclusion and economic rights were fought. It was in this arena, too, that protest groups challenged the legitimacy of the state and sometimes defied the boundaries of legal political protest.

In some states, nineteenth-century demands for rights and privileges by cultural minorities could be cast in nationalist terms. Sub-state nationalist groups were protest movements of a special kind: they relied on the availability of a public space in which to socialize members, create collective organizations and, where possible, form political parties. But sub-state nationalism actually required *two* types of public institutions: first, it required a distinct set of public institutions through which it could socialize members and, second, it required access to the public institutions of the state from which it could launch its protest against the state.

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[45] Charles Tilly, "Social Movements and National Politics," in Charles Bright and Susan Harding (eds.), *Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), p. 304. See also, Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 4.

Sub-state nationalism was one type of political protest in the nineteenth century and took its cue from the state's nation-building projects. One purpose of these projects, as I argued in chapter 2, is to develop citizen loyalty to the state at the transition to democratic politics. The construction of a national education system, which could teach a national history, state social programmes, national cultural institutions and other symbols of the nation were viewed as likely avenues for curbing the influence of alternative cultures and promoting loyalty to the state. Nation-building projects, however, require strong institutions for reproducing national culture; where these don't exist, the possibility of deepening the self-identities of individuals and creating national political loyalties is remote. In institutionalist terms, we might say that the nation-building project is constrained by prior institutional choices: states that are not completely centralized and consolidated can only produce a weak national identity.

For Southern Europe, we would expect sub-state nationalism to emerge in ethnically or culturally distinct regions of Italy or Spain. However, leaving aside Northern Italy's latent present-day nationalism, what is distinctive about Italy is that clientelism and agrarian radicalism were used to challenge the state, not nationalism. Spain, by contrast, was the site of sub-state nationalist mobilization in Southern Europe. Heiberg has argued that what determines whether nationalism or clientelism will emerge is the mode of exchange that exists in a society: unbalanced, delayed exchange or, balanced immediate exchange. In societies where the former is the accepted mode of exchange, such as Sicily, "the delay in the exchange and the inequality of things exchanged establishes or consolidates ongoing-creditor-debtor

relations."[46] In the Basque Country and Catalonia, by contrast, clientelism was never so prevalent. According to Kern, clientelism was not possible in Catalonia because the region was marked by "moderate progressivism" due to its urbanization and industrialization.[47] Heiberg has argued that the political and social equality that characterizes exchange relations in the Basque Country prevents the emergence of clientelism there.[48] Since forms of exchange are both a fundamental and integrative part of societies, Heiberg argues that nationalism in cases such as Sicily would only emerge if, through some change, the functioning of the economy came to depend on a type of predictable politics that clientelism cannot guarantee or, if clientelist hierarchies collapsed at the local level. Neither of these conditions emerged in the Sicilian case, which explains, in part, the persistence of clientelism in the region.

Clientelism is unlikely in societies where the preferred mode of exchange is balanced and immediate. In such societies, the moral stress is placed on the equality of individuals and "the insistence that exchange should explicitly reflect the social equality of the individual involved."[49] The nation-building programme that accompanies industrialization is an attempt to standardize cultural experiences and to emphasize certain values, such as individualism, work and literacy. In societies such as the Basque Country and Catalonia, which have their own cultural experience that already emphasizes these same values, an alternative nationalism was the most effective way of creating "the conditions by which the forces of modernization can

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[46] Marianne Heiberg, *The Making of the Basque Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 241.
[47] See Kern, *Liberals, Reformers and Caciques in Restoration Spain 1875-1909*, pp. 29-30.
[48] See the conclusions in Heiberg, *The Making of the Basque Nation*, pp. 240-43.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 242.

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be regulated and shaped to fit pre-existing moral and cognitive orientations and attitudes."[50]

In Southern Europe, sub-state nationalism was a possible challenge to the state when the social order inherent in nationalism was reproduced at the sub-state level. Where values such as equality, individualism and fair reciprocity did not exist, nationalism was not likely since an alternative social order based on hierarchical relations and unequal exchange, clientelism, already existed as a means of protecting a culture against the homogenizing effects of nationalism.

Anarchism and syndicalism. Anarchism and syndicalism emerged as forms of labour organization at the transition from a crafts-based to an industrial economy. In Northern Europe, anarchism is associated with the so-called 'second' industrial revolution of the late-nineteenth century which saw the introduction of new sources of power and technologies.[51] In Southern Europe, including France, where the first wave of industrialization arrived comparatively late and was concentrated in only a few urban centres, anarchism and syndicalism were more properly associated with the effects of a first industrial revolution. Historically, there was no tradition of trade unionism in the region because of the predominance of craft trades and low levels of urbanization.

The predominance of handicraft production in Southern Europe left its mark on working-class organizations in the region since the labour experience of the artisan differed markedly from that of the industrial worker of Northern Europe. The artisan had a more social conception of his labour than a factory worker:

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[50] *Ibid.,* p. 239.

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artisans were employed in small-scale family enterprises and enjoyed an autonomy in the workplace that the factory worker would never know. Second, within the communities where they worked, many craft workers enjoyed the same lifestyle as their employers and came from the same type of families. As a result, craftsmen and family entrepreneurs shared similar values and forms of socialization. Industrial workers, by contrast, were often uprooted from their rural origins and transplanted to urban settings where they were placed in a position of social and economic inequality vis-à-vis their employer and relied on the workplace, not the community, for their socialization and politicization.

The regulation of industry and the introduction of new management techniques that came with industrialization changed the life of an artisan in several ways: the system of internal contract and indirect hiring—which allowed artisans to hire and supervise their own assistants—was replaced with direct employment and bureaucratic control.[52] The consequences were devastating for artisans: production expertise was transferred from workers to employers while new contractual arrangements "lowered earnings and reduced the autonomy of the workers [so that] [e]xploitation was just as intense here" as it was in the industrial sector.[53] The reaction of the artisans in the handicraft sector was to search out a form of organization that would stop exploitation and preserve their autonomy. Their target was the capitalist social order and the state which maintained it; anarchism was their answer.

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[51] Marcel van der Linden and Wayne Thorpe, "The Rise and Fall of Revolutionary Syndicalism," in Marcel van der Linden and Wayne Thorpe (eds.), *Revolutionary Syndicalism: An International Perspective* (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1990), p. 4.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

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Anarchism evolved as a critique not just of the polity, but of contemporary society: it "was more an attitude toward power, a way of conducting one's daily life, than it was an application of a theory."[54] Anarchists sought, above all, to create a new social order either by dismantling the state or retreating from the existing social order. If the social order they espoused was not a direct application of a theory of anarchism—anarchism never produced a theoretician on par with Marx—the movements in Southern Europe were nevertheless influenced by the ideas of important thinkers and activists such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin. From Proudhon, anarchists borrowed an understanding of liberty which was based on a critique of the existing state and social order: workers, according to Proudhon, needed to establish an alternative social order based on reciprocity and mutuality. Moreover, this order needed to be established first at the local level—regions could later be linked up through a federal structure—so that it could respect cultural differences and facilitate active citizenship. As Proudhon's ideas spread throughout Southern Europe, they promoted alliances between workers and federalists as well as between workers and republicans. The Spanish First Republic (1873-74), for example, with its mix of anarchist, republican and cantonalist supporters, was directly influenced by Proudhon's ideas.

The anarchist solution to the commodification of labour was to recreate a social order based on a certain conception of authority, one that was non-compulsory, non-coercive, functionally specific and exercised collectively.[55] The anarchist strategy for bringing about this new order was twofold: in the first place, it

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[53] Sewell, Jr., "Artisans, Factory workers, and the Formation of the French Working Class, 1789-1848," p. 51.

[54] Richard Sonn, *Anarchism* (New York: Twayne, 1992), p. 45.

consisted of a form of conversion through propaganda. Anarchists built their own

culture around cafés, libraries, schools and meeting-places and used newspapers,

pamphlets and discussions in order to transmit their messages. As a result of these

efforts, a culture of anarchism actually existed in most of Southern Europe before

anarchist unions. The second strategy was a result of the influence of Mikhail

Bakunin in the movement: propaganda by the deed. Bakunin moved anarchism

closer to revolution through his attempts to incite supporters to action through

targeted assassinations of political figures. He took his message to the most

backward parts of Europe because he was convinced that the "innate passion of

rebellion was most alive in those who were least fettered by the chains of

civilization."[56]

The association of violence with anarchism overshadowed the real goal of

anarchism namely, a revolutionary break with the existing social and political order.

But the association of violence with anarchism also pointed to a dilemma faced by

the movement: since it rejected the parliamentary road to revolution, it had no other

choice but to instigate one. Since a large scale conversion to anarchist ideals was not

likely, anarchists needed to join forces with other movements whose organizational

structure would facilitate mobilization. In Southern Europe, that movement was

syndicalism. The advantage of joining forces with syndicalists is that anarchists

would have access to "training grounds where the workers [could learn] how to

[55] David Miller, *Anarchism* (London: J.M. Dent, 1984), p. 7.

[56] Sonn, *Anarchism*, p. 29. It was the Bakunist strand of anarchism that was most evident in Spain and which trumped the possibility of mobilizing workers and peasants using Marxism. When the anarchists were expelled from the International Working Men's Association, Spanish anarchists nevertheless remained loyal to Bakunin, despite his efforts to disband his anarchist alliance there. His popularity in Spain would be the issue over which Marx eventually banished Bakunin from the International.

organize themselves and practise solidarity."[57] At the same time, the association might produce the right sort of militant who could spearhead the revolution that anarchists sought.

Anarchism and syndicalism were compatible on both an organizational and tactical level. Organizationally, they both espoused the autonomy of labour and the politics of neutrality. Syndicalist workers were not to collaborate with either employers or government; they were an "autonomous and independent bloc facing the bourgeoisie and its institutions [and] relied on their own strength, not on the good will of others."[58] Syndicates were collective forms of self-help that were organized on two levels: first, at the local level on the basis of their craft, profession or industry. These basic units would then federate with other units at the local level—horizontal federalism—and with units of the same craft, profession or industry at the national level—vertical federalism. While the horizontal federal structures would spread propaganda, the vertical structures would take the lead in coordinating strategies and collective bargaining.[59]

Tactically, anarchists and syndicalists also shared similar techniques based on the principle of autonomy: it was the worker's duty to act for himself. For the anarchist, this duty was fulfilled through propaganda by the deed. For the syndicalist, it was the doctrine of 'direct action': not only must a worker be prepared to act on his own behalf but he also must be prepared to use illegal means, if necessary, to

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[57] Miller, *Anarchism*, p. 129.
[58] F.F. Ridley, *Revolutionary Syndicalism in France: The Direct Action of Its Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 95-96.
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

combat the capitalist class: the strike, sabotage, the boycott, and the 'label'.[60] Of these four strategies, only the general strike became synonymous with syndicalism and later, with anarcho-syndicalism. The strike tactic was an effective weapon in the industrial economies of Western Europe since these had become sufficiently dependent on labour that an interruption in the productive sector would be a threat to the social order.[61] The strike was, as Ridley claims, a 'natural weapon' for syndicalists since, "in the face of the capitalists, the workers possessed nothing but their own labour-power."[62] Syndicalists engaged in strikes over issues related to their material interests; this fact, it was assumed, would guarantee their participation. Furthermore, the cumulative use of general strikes as a technique for securing material gains had a revolutionary potential, since the strike deepened the conflict between the classes at the same time as it made clear that such conflict was inevitable. Only drastic means—a revolution—would overcome the situation.

The marriage of anarchism and syndicalism did not produce the desired revolution. By the interwar period, the experience of the First World War as well as the Bolshevik revolution in Russia dramatically changed the fate of anarcho-syndicalism in Europe. The war had brought out the nationalist—not the revolutionary—allegiances of the working-classes while the Bolshevik revolution "reclaimed the socialist vision of the revolution while exemplifying just how such a revolution could be made."[63] Where anarcho-syndicalism had not already been severely repressed by the state, it was threatened by socialism and faced one of two

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[60] *Ibid.* Labelling consisted in allowing approved employers to stamp their products with the syndicalists' label.

[61] Van der Linden and Thorpe, "The Rise and Fall of Revolutionary Syndicalism," p. 15.

[62] Ridley, *Revolutionary Syndicalism in France*, p. 105. For an extensive discussion of the strike tactic, see pp. 99-119 and pp. 140-164.

choices: it could either join forces with the socialists and, essentially disband or; it could stick to its principles and face the likelihood that it would be totally marginalized in the political arena.[64]

The exception to this trend was Spain, where anarcho-syndicalism thrived until the end of the civil war in 1939. Sonn has argued that "Spain was uniquely the right place" for anarchism as it was "a backward, and developing society in transition toward capitalism."[65] Aside from these structural conditions, anarchism took root in Spain because of the weakness of the central government: from the anarchist perspective, the nineteenth-century Spanish state already appeared to be in an advanced state of collapse. Anarchists and later, anarcho-syndicalists, had always found some common cause with republicans in that both movements sought to overthrow the regime and in Catalonia, it seemed that radical republicans were also prepared to recreate a new social order by changing the structure of the state. As the republican critique of the Spanish state gained ground at the beginning of this century, anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists had good reason to think that the revolution was upon them. Even though they quickly turned on republicans after the proclamation of the Second Republic, anarchists never lost sight of the revolutionary potential of the period and concentrated their strategy on bringing down the republicans. If anarchism lasted longer in Spain than elsewhere in Europe, it was, as Miller has noted, because only the collapse of state power provides anarchists with the possibility of inciting revolution.

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[63] Sonn, *Anarchism*, p. 62.
[64] Van der Linden and Thorpe, "The Rise and Fall of Revolutionary Syndicalism," p. 18.
[65] Sonn, *Anarchism*, p. 70.

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Patron-Client Relations. Gellner defines patronage as a form of social relations that "always belongs to some *pays réel* which is ambivalently conscious of not being the *pays légal.*"[66] Patronage systems are embedded in cultural communities and usually exist apart from the legal bureaucratic structure; indeed they exist to defend the cultural and economic bases of communities against the system of social and economic relations that the state seeks to impose. Patronage exists at the level of the community but the influence of patronage extends to neighbouring communities to encompass whole regions, as in the case of Sicily or, whole countries, as in Spain. The patronage networks in these communities "may be seen as strategies for the maintenance or aggrandisement of power on the part of the patrons and of coping and survival on the part of the clients."[67] Power relations between patrons and clients are based on economic necessity, a system of unequal exchange, a distinct moral basis and code of honour. These relations consist in reciprocal exchanges between patrons and clients. The former could provide, depending on the setting, a stable means of subsistence (land or a job), protection, financial assistance, or influence. Within the community patrons could provide collective services, such as lucrative public works contracts, police protection or forms of public charity. Clients, for their part, could provide labour services or promote the patron's interests.[68]

Patronage is a system of power that is distinct from the power of the state. The condition that most favours its emergence is the absence of an effective

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[66] Gellner, "Patrons and Clients," p. 3.

[67] John Waterbury, "Attempts to Put Patrons and Clients in Their Place," in Gellner and Waterbury (eds.), *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, p. 332.

[68] For a more detailed discussion, see James Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation?" in Gellner and Waterbury (eds.), *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, pp. 23-24.

centralized power. The Sicilian Mafia, according to Hobsbawm, rose "to major power (and abuse) as a Sicilian regional movement of revolt against the disappointments of Italian unity in the 1860s."[69] The *Risorgimento* brought economic and cultural dualism to a united Italy by preserving a form of land tenure in the South that was incompatible with a commercial society. The Mafia was an effective means of defending Sicily against the 'foreign intruders' of Piedmont by developing "an antistate structure of authority, solidarity and mobility with its own cultural system."[70] Sabetti has emphasized how Sicilian villages sought to establish their own self-government as a way of avoiding interaction with the institutions of the legal government, which were considered unreliable for the adjudication of claims and conflicts in the south. Through common consent, villagers agreed to a set of alternative rules and procedures and a coercive apparatus for implementing these. The result was "an outlaw regime" which was "an expression of self-government precisely because its authority pattern derived from, and was built upon, a calculus of consent that was absent in the lawful regime."[71]

The Sicilian Mafia became part of the government system of patronage when, in collusion with northerners, it delivered "safe majorities for whatever government gave sufficient bribes or concessions to the local bosses who could guarantee electoral victories."[72] The same relationship evolved in Spain at the end of the nineteenth century. *Caciques*, or local bosses, differed from the mafioso in that they had been associated, from the start, with the state. In eighteenth-century Spain *caciques* were royal agents but disentailment in the middle of the nineteenth century

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[69] Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, p. 42.
[70] Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy*, p. 91.
[71] Sabetti, *Political Authority in a Sicilian Village*," p. 106.

changed their fortunes considerably, particularly in the south, where most of the church lands had been concentrated. Transformed into wealthy landowners, *caciques* were able to consolidate their position of power over a large peasant population on their *latifundios* as well as over neighbouring villages. At the same time, they were able to offer safe majorities to the highest bidder in Madrid. The elaborate patronage system that emerged in Andalusia was allowed to exist by Madrid in the place of a modern bureaucracy. Institutions of the state were placed at the *caciques'* disposal for the regulation of social relations and the distribution of patronage.

Over the course of the Restoration, *caciquismo* was transformed in two ways. First, Madrid transformed *caciquismo* from a regional system into a national one by using the bureaucracy as a means for recruiting supporters of the regime into key positions of power at the local level. One example of this strategy was administrative reform, by which Madrid consolidated its hold over the Spanish territory by appointing local *caciques* to municipal office. This reform had the effect of linking municipalities directly to Madrid and was the basis for a protest movement by supporters of regional autonomy in the Basque Country and Catalonia.[73] Second, *caciques* organized all political activities at the local level. If the regime could cooperate with the *caciques* it could assure itself an electoral victory.[74] During the Restoration period, all elections were manipulated in this way and the *caciques* were, in effect, the guarantors of the peaceful transition in office of the dynastic Liberal and Conservative parties.

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[72] Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, p. 43.

[73] Kern, *Liberals, Reformers and Caciques in Restoration Spain, 1875-1909*, p. 37.

[74] J. Romero-Maura, "Caciquismo as a Political System," in Gellner and Waterbury (eds.), *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, p. 57.

Agrarian Radicalism. Clientelism in the rural areas of Southern Europe created conditions of extreme dependency for the landless peasant population. Since the state had a hand in maintaining the social hierarchy that allowed clientelism to thrive, change was only possible through large-scale mobilization and radical politics. Indeed, radical agrarian movements on the periphery of Northwestern Europe, according to Edward Malefakis, are related to two failures in the process of modernization: the failure of industrialization to absorb landless peasants and the failure of land reform to transfer ownership of land to the peasant class.[75] In both Southern Spain and Southern Italy, agrarian radicalism can be traced to a system of ownership introduced and supported by oligarchic regimes that preserved the privileged status of the landholding class. In the case of Southern Spain, the focus of Malefakis' study, the system of social and economic relations between peasants and landowners grew increasingly unequal after the sale of Church properties in the nineteenth century consolidated the wealth and political position of the landholding class. In Italy, the consolidation of the landowning class occurred as a result of its support for the initiatives on the part of the capitalist bourgeoisie of the North to unite Italy in 1861: the new state sold Church property and public lands of the old Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to landowners in the south as a way of securing continued support for the new regime. In both Southern Spain and Southern Italy, landless peasants were economic losers in the process.

Agrarian reform was the only solution to the plight of Andalusian and Sicilian peasants; revolutionary activity was the means used to achieve it. In both cases, a movement for land reform was organized by radical movements: anarchists

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[75] Edward E. Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War*

in Spain and communists in Sicily. If the Sicilian peasants proved to be the more successful of the two movements it was "because modern social agitation reached the Andalusian peasants in a form which utterly failed to teach them the necessity of organization, strategy, tactics and patience, [and] wasted their revolutionary energies almost completely."[76] Anarchist agitation for land reform during the Spanish Second Republic coincided with two events: first, a return to the land on the part of workers who had gone to the industrial centres of Spain during the economic boom period of 1914-1918; and, the economic depression in the world market. Both events aggravated unemployment in the *latifundio* areas of Spain and raised expectations for a land reform by the Republican government.[77] But the position of the anarchist union, the *Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores* (CNT) was not to wait for land reform legislation but rather to confiscate, without compensation, the large landholdings of Andalusia. The CNT across Spain had very quickly turned against the Republic after 1931 and resorted to general strikes and insurrections in an attempt to overthrow the regime in Madrid. Although rural Andalusia had been the stronghold of the CNT in the late nineteenth century, industrial Catalonia had taken over by the Second Republic. As a result, organizational strategies reflected the particular circumstances of Catalonia and failed to respond to the economic and political dualism that characterized the areas of anarchist support across Spain. Consequently, during the Second Republic, the CNT's organizational network in Andalusia weakened and there was poor coordination and communication between urban and rural members in the region. The types of anarchist strikes that were

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 4.
[76] Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, p. 91.
[77] See Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth* (Cambridge: Canto, [1943] 1990).

effective in Catalonia only met with severe repression on the part of the Republican government in Andalusia. Coordinated agitation between anarchists, communists and socialists after 1934 proved more effective for the rural strike movement, but this action came too late to achieve results; the civil war brought an end to efforts to confiscate land for the peasants since Andalusia was one of the first regions to fall to Franco's troops.

The CNT never considered developing a strategy for revolution that would take into account economic dualism in Spain. In Italy, by contrast, the strategy of the *Partito Comunista Italiano* (PCI), the *Via Italiana al Socialismo*, was based on a recognition of Italy's social and economic dualism. While leader of the PCI, Antonio Gramsci had shaped a revolutionary program around the organized industrial worker of the north as well as the anarchic peasant of the south. The Gramscian strategy was dualistic in another sense: it involved a parliamentary war of position (undertaken by communists in the north) as well as a guerrilla war of movement (undertaken by peasant communists in the south). Gramsci's revolution required an alliance of workers and peasants which, he predicted, could overcome Italy's dualism. But as the PCI discovered once it started operating in Southern Italy after the Second World War, the particular social stratification (land is the primary sign of social status), social composition (mostly peasants with few workers) and social disorganization (because of clientelist networks) of the region forced the party to abandon class warfare and take up a program of building social solidarity instead. The ideology of the PCI necessarily changed in the process: in order to attract a broad range of supporters it adopted a theme of *rinascita* or rebirth, thereby ideologically isolating communism in the south from communism in the north. The

consequences of these transformations to the PCI in Southern Italy was to strip it of its revolutionary potential and have it focus instead n remedying the backwardness of the south. In his study of peasant communism, Tarrow paints this transformation as something of a failure for the party and concludes that it reveals any party's "dependence on the objective conditions of its milieu."[78]

Anarchism and communism were two responses in Southern Europe to economic grievances against the state. Both Andalusia and Sicily were overrun by clientelism: there was no possibility of reforming the hierarchical social order from within; only revolutionary action could stand a chance at changing the terms of unequal exchange. Anarchism and communism were two such possible revolutionary ideologies since each promoted a social order based on equal exchange and equality between individuals. However, as the Sicilian experience with communism makes clear, once patron-client relations are established as the moral basis for a social order, it is very difficult to dislodge them. The PCI discovered this in Sicily and responded accordingly. Andalusian anarchists, meanwhile, did not. Because of the steadfastness of the clientelist social order, the results of agrarian radicalism were inconclusive in both cases: the peasants accomplished nothing in Andalusia and while their Sicilian counterparts won a land reform, they did not uproot clientelism.

Carlism. Carlism emerged as a political force in Spain over the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the regent Isabel's succession to the throne after the king's death in 1833. Over the course of the nineteenth and early-twentieth century, Carlists challenged the legitimacy of the Isabelline monarchy from the peripheries of

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[78] Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy*, p. 271.

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Spain and acquired important support bases in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Carlism evolved into a conservative political movement that was associated with traditional rural life and anti-industrialism. Although Carlism was the result of a power struggle at the centre of power, the anti-regime message it delivered across Spain attracted supporters from other causes. From its strongholds in the Basque Country and Catalonia, Carlism joined forces with movements on the right, even when these were not anti-modern: in Catalonia, Carlists were part of the electoral coalition *Solidaritat Catalana* which grouped together republicans and nationalists. For the most part, however, Carlists and progressive forces were in opposition. The Carlists' support of the Church, for example, earned them enemies from among the more progressive forces in Spain: Carlist atrocities were often answered by burning church property and killing priests and nuns.[79] As a military force, the civil wars that Carlists waged during the nineteenth century rendered them a force to contend with. They destabilized the regime at the same time as they imposed themselves on the already complicated politics of the Basque Country and Catalonia. The Carlist presence has never completely disappeared in Spain; indeed, Carlism reemerged as a legitimate political force during the civil war since the image of Spain that it espoused—traditional, rural and Catholic—was consonant with that of the Falangist opponents of the Republic. Franco's Nationalists and Carlists joined forces during the civil war and many Carlists were rewarded for their military support through appointments to positions of power in the Franco regime.[80]

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[79] Sebastian Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 118-19.
[80] See George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939* (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 165-74, 266-67.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined the effects of low levels of institutional incorporation in Southern Europe for the emergence of counterhegemonic ideologies and patterns of social relations in the region. The political development of the Southern Europe state is marked by the persistence of weak monarchical regimes that delayed a transition to democracy; incomplete state centralization; and forms of dualism. The extent, duration and combination of these three outcomes of processes of state-formation set Southern Europe apart from the North of the continent. Through a consideration of three dimensions of the state—centralization, infrastructure and regime type—as they relate to Southern Europe, I demonstrated that weak centralization, patrimonial infrastructure and a particular trajectory of regime type (from exclusionary to corporatist) can explain both the limit and range of counterhegemonic ideologies. In the next chapter, I examine processes of nineteenth-century Spanish state formation in more detail in order to show how the failure to achieve high levels of institutional incorporation created the conditions for a distinct form of counterhegemonic mobilization in the Catalan periphery in the early twentieth century.

Hegemonic Breakdown and 'Regeneration':
Political Reform in Catalonia after 1898

Introduction

In 1898, Spain's military defeat at the hands of the United States and the loss

of its last overseas colonies marked the end of its empire and "exposed as a terrible

delusion the belief that Spain was at least a middle-ranking world power, a belief that

was a central component of the national culture."[1] The breakdown of the image of

Spain promoted by the crown and its conservative and liberal allies in government

occasioned a public reexamination of Spanish national identity and a series of

attempts to reform Spanish political life. Across the country, a coordinated

movement to 'regenerate'[2] Spain took aim at *caciquismo* and economic backwardness.

Although the movement generally failed to take root, the notable exception was

Catalonia, where the comparative weakness of the *cacique* system and the region's

industrialized and export-driven economy endowed the movement with a distinct

socio-economic support base. Moreover, there already existed an organized

movement for reform spearheaded by Catalan intellectuals and professionals. After

1898, this movement would become more politicized and broad-based as different

groups mobilized for political change in the face of the Restoration government's

unwillingness to enact much-needed political and economic reforms.

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[1] Sebastian Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 49.

[2] The movement to reform Spain was known in its day as *regeneracionismo* or 'regenerationism.' This term, as well 'regenerator,' is used in all of the literature on *fin-de-siècle* and early-twentieth century Spain and will be used in this dissertation. See, D.L. Shaw, *The Generation of 1898 in Spain* (London: Ernest Benn, 1975). For a sample of regenerationist writings see, Ricardo Macías Picavea, *El problema nacional* [The national problem] (Madrid, 1899); J. Rodríguez Martínez, *Los desastres y la regeneración de España* [The disasters and the

This chapter is structured around two questions: First, why did the Restoration regime not attempt to introduce political and economic reforms in order to redefine Spanish nationalism after 1898? The answer to this question is to be found in the nature of the political bargains that were the basis for state making in nineteenth-century Spain, which I examine in section one. Second, what structural conditions determined that the regeneration movement in Catalonia would be both different and more successful than that found elsewhere in Spain? The answer to this question is to be found in Catalonia's distinct socio-economic system, which I examine in section two.

1. Political Bargains and State-making

State-making in nineteenth-century Spain was obstructed at several turns by challenges to the very nature of the state that was under construction. Beginning with the Napoleonic invasion of 1808 and ending with the loss of Spain's last colonies in 1898, the nineteenth century was marked by civil wars and radical regime changes. These events attest to the failure of the Bourbon monarchy to centralize and consolidate fully its power over the Spanish territory and, by extension, to establish itself as the legitimate authority of the Spanish state. The catalyst for most of the political conflicts of the century was the liberal constitution negotiated at Cádiz in 1812 while King Fernando VII was in exile during the Napoleonic occupation of the peninsula. Upon his return to Spain in 1814, the king declared the Constitution of 1812 null and void, a move that was imitated by monarchs in Portugal and Italy, where similar constitutions had been passed by liberal defenders

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regeneration of Spain] (La Coruña, 1899); and Antonio Royo Villanova, *La regeneración y el problema político* [The regeneration and the political problem] (Madrid, 1899).

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of the crown during the Napoleonic occupations.[3] King Fernando's actions only provoked a wave of support for the constitutional project of the liberals and, by 1820, the constitution was restored after a short revolution that had repercussions in Italy and Portugal.[4] The liberal victory was short-lived, however: in 1823, a French army, fighting on behalf of the Holy Alliance, restored Fernando to absolute rule. From then onwards, "political movements would defend, reject, or modify the constitution of 1812, but it would remain a standard against which they judged their programs."[5]

Liberal supporters of the constitution divided into two camps after 1823: Moderados and Progresistas. The former drew on a support base of mercantile interests and industrialists. Moderados were the least democratic of the two liberal groups, which explains why supporters of royal absolutism and the clergy eventually found their way into this camp. The Progresistas, on the other hand, were the true heirs of the democratic spirit of the constitution of 1812 and drew their support from among Spain's liberal professionals, petite-bourgeoisie and craftsmen. Of the two liberal tendencies, it was the Moderados, with their conservative support base and preference for absolute and oligarchic rule, who were to gain ascendancy during the nineteenth century because of the correspondence between their political objectives and those of the crown. The political power of the Moderados and the crown was maintained through a series of settlements built up over the period 1833-1868 and which anticipated a similar series of bargains that was the political basis for

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[3] Miguel Artola, *Antiguo Régimen y revolución liberal* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1978).
[4] Richard Herr, "The Spanish Road to Parliamentary Monarchy," in Isser Woloch (ed.), *Revolution and the Meanings of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 95-6.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

the Restoration monarchy after 1875. The settlements were a form of exchange between the crown and various groups: the latter would exchange their support of the oligarchic rule of the Moderados for certain benefits. For example, the Queen Regent enjoyed a right of appointment for members of the Senate, the upper house of the Cortes, which she filled with supporters from among "the army, the aristocracy, the clergy and the nouveaux riches."[6] The Church was issued special assurances against the liberalization of the education system through a provision in the 1857 education law, the Ley Moyano, which "conceded to the church the right to review the moral and doctrinal content of teaching and textbooks, mandated religious instruction for primary and secondary students, and recognized the right of private individuals to establish primary and secondary schools."[7] The Moderados ensured their hold on power at the local level through the appointment of supportive mayors and backed this up with the creation of the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) in 1844.[8] Finally, the alliance of Moderados and the crown was held together by *caciquismo*, which was examined in detail in chapter 3.

The purpose of the settlements extended by the crown was to exclude certain groups from power while coopting others. There was little attempt to institutionalize this exclusionary regime, although various initiatives to centralize power were introduced: the creation of provincial administrative units (1833); the Penal Code (1848); the aforementioned Guardia Civil (1844); a local reform law (1845); the aforementioned Ley Moyano (1857); the creation of the Bank of Spain (1847-51); and the standardization of weights, measures and money (1858).

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 98.
[7] Carolyn P. Boyd, *Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875-1975* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 5.

Because the system of Moderados-crown settlements was exclusionary, it was challenged by those groups which were left out of the bargain. The most violent of these challenges was that of the Carlists, supporters of Don Carlos, King Fernando's brother and heir, who contested the changes to the Salic Law that permitted Fernando's daughter Isabel to ascend to the throne. Carlist opposition to the Isabelline monarchy erupted in a civil war between 1833-1839 and coincided with the regime's most ambitious state-making initiative of the nineteenth century: the creation of 49 administrative provinces each ruled by a civil governor appointed by Madrid. As a result, in the Basque Country and Catalonia, the principal centres of Carlist activity,[9] the reforms were not immediately introduced and, after 1840, would require a military, not a civil, governor to put them in place. The Carlist wars produced other casualties, most notably the Church. The Church's support of the Carlist cause during the civil war ensured that Carlist attacks against the state would be returned with violence against the clergy and the destruction of Church property by liberal and republican supporters.[10] As a form of retribution for its support for the Carlists, the crown disempowered the Church by selling mortmain, thereby consolidating an additional support base among new property owners, especially in the South. Although the Isabelline monarchy won the civil war, Carlist forces continued to conduct guerrilla wars until the end of the nineteenth century and remained an organized political force well into the twentieth century.

The Moderados were also challenged by the Progresistas, who relied on supporters within the military to break the Moderados' hold on power in 1836, 1854

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[8] Herr, "The Spanish Road to Parliamentary Monarchy," p. 98.
[9] John F. Coverdale, *The Basque Phase of Spain's First Carlist War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

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and 1868. The Moderados, meanwhile, relied on their own military supporters to regain office in 1843, 1856 and 1875.[11] Clearly, the Progresista challenge was not sufficiently powerful by itself to overthrow the alliance of crown and Moderados; only a violent confrontation with the crown, such as that attempted by the Carlists, could possibly unseat the Moderados. The revolution of 1868, which brought Progresistas and republicans to power during the Sexenio Democrático [Six Years of Democracy] (1868-1874), and the cantonalist insurrections behind the First Republic (1873), which sought to build a federal republic from the bottom up, were two such attempts at unseating the alliance of crown and liberals, but which ultimately failed. The significance of these attempts was that they demonstrated that only a radical form of politics could offer the possibility of challenging the monarchical regime supported by the Moderados. A challenge led by Progresistas acting alone was not sufficient, since their support could always be bought off by the monarchy. The republican challenge, by contrast, was a more potent threat and, when it was teamed up with the federalist and cantonalist movements, alerted the monarchy to the existence of a strong constituency that supported far-reaching changes to both the territorial structure of the state and the ruling regime.

The restoration of the monarchy in 1875 following the failed First Republic was intended to put an end to the political strife that had characterized the nineteenth century by tightly controlling the range of actors who participated directly in politics. After the failure of the democratic experiment of the Progresistas and the First Republic, King Alfonso XIII was of the opinion that "without a doubt, the only thing that will inspire confidence in Spain is a hereditary and representative

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[10] Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire*, pp. 118-19.

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monarch which all classes, from the workers to the élites, can look upon as an irreplaceable guarantee of their rights and interests."[12] The monarchical restoration of 1875 introduced some political order and institutional uniformity, but at the expense of certain regional and class interests, which continued to be excluded from the system. As such, despite the King's ambitions, the parliamentary monarchy of the Restoration period (1875-1923) never managed to represent the interests of the middle- and lower-classes, Republicans or Carlists, even after the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1890. The parliamentary system was contrived in that it consisted in a peaceful alternation in power—the *turno pacífico*—between Conservatives and Liberals—the former Moderados and Progresistas, respectively—with the assistance of *caciques*.[13] The Sexenio Democrático had alerted the Moderados to the need to include the Progresistas in an alliance that would allow "the monarchy to continue in existence without enacting any far-reaching reform of national institutions."[14] The Restoration system was an attempt to consolidate the oligarchic rule of liberals and conservatives; as such, "little effort was...made to penetrate into the society and the territory by the state institutions, to build a

[11] Herr, "The Spanish Road to Parliamentary Monarchy," p. 96.

[12] Alfonso de Borbón, *Manifest de Sandhurst* [Manifesto from Sandhurst], in Marian Carmen García-Nieto París and Esperanza Yllán Calderón (eds.), *Historia de España 1808-1978* [History of Spain 1808-1978], Vol. 3, *Teoría y práctica del parlamentarismo, 1874-1914* [Theory and practice of parliamentarianism, 1874-1914] (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1988), p. 49.

[13] At the beginning of the Restoration period, suffrage was restricted to property owners and those who had completed a high level of education, approximately 5 per cent of the population. Legislation for universal suffrage was voted into law in 1891 but its full implementation was impeded by the manipulation of voters' lists and electoral results. See, José Varela Ortega, *Los amigos políticos: Partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración (1875-1900)* [Political friends: Parties, elections and caciquismo in the Restoration (1875-1900)] (Madrid: Alianza, 1977).

[14] Joseph Harrison, "The Regenerationist Movement in Spain after the Disaster of 1898," *European Studies Review* 9 (1979), p. 3.

national identity and update the pre-existing monarchy as representative of that identity."[15]

Oligarchic liberal and conservative rule was guaranteed by the *caciques* at election time, although these could only return the two dynastic parties to power thanks to an elaborate system of bargaining that had been worked out between the ruling oligarchy and other important groups in Spanish society. The dynastic parties ruled with the consent of a subordinated élite so long as they could provide "the benefits of Empire for commerce, the military, the bureaucracy and the Church; the protection of Spanish industry from foreign competition; the grudging agreement of the military not to intervene in political life; the need to prevent a resurgence of Carlist and Republican unrest; and the fear of revolt from below."[16]

The Catalan part of the Restoration consensus was straightforward: it was an exchange between the regime and Catalan industrialists that centered around tariffs and access to protected markets. Catalan business interests were among the most organized in Spain. Since the late eighteenth century, they had organized as the Comissió de Fabriques [Committee of Manufacturers], the Foment de la Producció Nacional [National Production Development] and, in 1889, as the Foment del Treball Nacional [National Labour Development]. According to Harrison, "with its 2,000 members at the turn of the century, the Fomento del Trabajo Nacional [National Labour Development] was without doubt the most important economic

[15] José Álvarez Junco, "The Nation-Building Process in Nineteenth-Century Spain," in Clare Mar-Molinero and Angel Smith (eds.), *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford: Berg, 1996), p. 99.
[16] Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire*, pp. 60-61.

organization in the whole of Spain."[17] It counted amongst its members Catalonia's

leading manufacturers of cotton textiles, the region's most important industry.

During the first part of the Restoration (1875-1900), no less than eleven of the

Foment's thirteen presidents were elected to the Cortes, according to Borja de

Riquer, and many other deputies from the four Catalan provinces—Barcelona,

Girona, Lleida and Tarragona—were also members of the Foment.[18]

As part of the Restoration consensus, Catalan industrialists, through the

Foment del Treball Nacional, were able to obtain tariff protection and protected

markets from Madrid. Despite its distinction as the industrial centre of Spain,

Catalonia's industrial output was not very competitive on the world market. In

cotton, as in agro-exports and viniculture, the family firm prevailed as the principal

unit of production, which worked against achieving economies of scale in the

production of goods.[19] The lack of natural resources, such as coal and iron ore; their

high input costs (because of the tariff walls which the Catalans themselves needed to

keep out competitors); and the absence of adequate banking facilities for large-scale

borrowing are the principal reasons for which it was not always possible to make the

[17] Joseph Harrison, "The Catalan Industrial Élite, 1898-1923," in Frances Lannon and Paul Preston (eds.), *Élites and Power in Twentieth-Century Spain: Essays in Honour of Raymond Carr* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 47.

[18] Borja de Riquer, "Burguesos, polítics i cacics a la Catalunya de la Restauració" [Bourgeois, politicians and caciques in Restoration Catalonia], *L'Avenç* 85 (1985), p. 31, in Harrison, "The Catalan Industrial Élite" p. 47.

[19] On the persistence of this type of organization of production in Catalonia, see Peter Schneider, Jane Schneider and Edward Hansen, "Modernization and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 14 (1972), pp. 328-350. For a critique of Schneider, Schneider and Hansen's interpretation of noncorporate groups in the Catalan case, see Oriol Pi-Sunyer, "Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean: A Reconsideration of the Catalan Case," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16 (1974), pp. 117-131; and Edward Hansen, Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider, "From Autonomous Development to Dependent Modernization: The Catalan Case Revised: A Reply to Pi-Sunyer," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17 (1975), pp. 238-244.

transition from the family firm to large-scale industrialization. But as McDonogh has explained in his fascinating account of élites in Barcelona, another reason for the failure to effect a transition to large-scale industrialization was the preference on the part of Catalan industrialists for the family firm, to which they subsumed "traditional Catalan values and the kin-based cohesion of the elite."[20] The family firm was preserved through its incorporation as a *sociedad anónima familiar* or a "close corporation...defined by personal (familiar) control achieved through the identification of owners and managers, yet...protected by limited liability."[21] This type of corporation was the most dominant form of organized social and economic relations in turn-of-the-century Barcelona and reflected the importance of family structures for business activity.

Together, the factors noted above contributed to the lack of competitiveness of Catalan exports on the world market and were the reasons for which acquiring overseas markets had been less important for Catalan industrialists than penetrating and controlling the peninsular one. Catalan industry was endowed "with unusual solvency and with a fiercely competitive edge over manufacturers in the rest of Spain,"[22] which allowed it to capture the Spanish market and secure its place as the industrial leader of Spain through import substitution and the manufacture of consumer items traditionally produced by artisans. Despite this predominance, the Spanish market presented certain limitations, given the persistence of patterns of clientelism and a practice of labour exchange that was embedded in clientelism, both

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[20] Gary Wray McDonogh, *Good Families of Barcelona: A Social History of Power in the Industrial Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 82.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

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of which impeded the transition to market relations. During the Restoration period, Catalan industrialists could get around these limitations by setting their sights further afield through various protective measures that were negotiated with the regime. The first of these was the tariff act of 1882 which, for customs purposes only, made Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines part of peninsular Spain with the result that Catalan exports to these three colonies would not be subject to duties. Second, the Foment del Treball Nacional, in an alliance with steel interests in the Basque Country and cereal growers in Old Castile, negotiated a protective tariff in 1892 for goods entering Spain: this would protect each of these sectors against cheap imports from other countries. Finally, a tariff protecting Spanish access to the markets of Cuba and Puerto Rico was also introduced in 1892: goods entering these two colonies from outside of the Spanish metropole were subject to high duties.[23] As a result of these measures, the value of Spanish exports to Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines more than doubled between 1891 and 1898.[24] The share of Catalan exports of cotton thread and textiles to Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines was considerable: around 94 per cent between 1895 and 1897 until it dropped off to 77 percent in 1898, the year of the Spanish military defeat in the colonial wars.[25] The Restoration regime had clearly offered Catalan industrialists new export possibilities and provided them with important sources of revenue for the diversification of

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[22] Jordi Maluquer de Motes, "The Industrial Revolution in Catalonia," in Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz (ed.), *The Economic Modernization of Spain, 1830-1930*, trans. Karen Powers and Manuel Sañudo (New York: New York University Press, 1987), p. 177.

[23] See the discussion of these tariff measures in R.J. Harrison, "Catalan Business and the Loss of Cuba," *Economic History Review* 27 (1974), pp. 431-41.

[24] The value of all Spanish exports to these three colonies in 1891 was 146.1 million pesetas and, in 1897, 365.4 million pesetas. See the data in Harrison, "Catalan Business and the Loss of Cuba, 1898-1914," p. 432.

economic activities at home. From 1882 until 1898, then, "the two main sources of [Catalonia's] growth were Spain's colonial markets, especially Cuba, and Catalonia's progressively greater dominance as the manufacturing center for a peninsular Spain with a gradually increasing ability to consume."[26]

Summary

In this section, I have argued that during the nineteenth century, the sequence of foreign invasions, civil wars and radical regime changes called into question the legitimacy of the central state authority and prevented the consolidation of this authority through a range of state institutions. The failure to build consensus around the regime and to institutionalize this consensus through participatory politics militated against the reproduction of a Spanish national identity. The Restoration regime can be viewed as an attempt to limit the problem of creating compliance, as discussed in chapter 2. The political legitimacy of the Restoration regime could be reduced to a series of bargains struck between oligarchic liberals and conservatives and their supporters around the country and mediated by *caciques*. These bargains were the costs of forging compliance. But the Restoration settlement could easily fall apart if the regime could no longer deliver its part of the bargain; that is, if the revenue and privileges of empire were lost. This is what occurred after 1898: The settlement fell apart although, as we will see, the regime itself did not. In the next section, I suggest why the regime did not fall and consider how the crisis of 1898 affected the Restoration settlement, particularly in Catalonia, in the face of a hegemonic breakdown.

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[25] The data are reported in Harrison, "Catalan Business and the Loss of Cuba, 1898-1914," p. 433.

2. After 1898: Hegemonic Breakdown and 'Regeneration'

The Restoration monarchy had been built on a series of political bargains, many of which could only be upheld by the regime's ability to redistribute the assets derived from its last imperial holdings. The events of 1898, therefore, left the regime in a weakened position since it could no longer exchange the benefits of empire for the consensus of important groups in Spanish society—the Church, the military and exporters. As a result, "the State of the monarchy, the colonial system, the whole canovist system of dynastic parties supported by a monstrous falsification of a parliamentary regime held in place by *caciquismo* and its associated vices," was in crisis.[27]

Reaction to the crisis took the form of an "out-and-out critical revision, the rejection of that which previously had been considered to be established truth, the rethinking of all themes concerning Spain's socio-political reality."[28] Despite this fierce criticism, which would only acquire further momentum during the first part of the twentieth century, the regime was never overthrown. One reason for the regime's immobilism was related to the weak infrastructural power of the Spanish state. The regime existed as a type of superstructure over local political activity which was, ultimately, more important than national politics for most Spaniards. The persistence of clientelism and low levels of urbanization meant that for most Spaniards, politics was focused at the local level. The link between local politics and the regime was the *cacique*; without this middleman, the regime would be

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[26] David Ringrose, *Spain, Europe, and the 'Spanish miracle,' 1700-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 211.

[27] Manuel Tuñón de Lara, *Costa y Unanumo en la crisis de fin de siglo* [Costa and Unanumo in the end of the century crisis] (Madrid: Editorial Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1974), p. 36. The 'canovist' system is a reference to Antonio Cánovas, the architect of the Restoration system.

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disassociated from Spanish political life. The only way of reforming or, at the extreme, overthrowing the regime, therefore, would be to disrupt the practice of clientelism on which it was based and to replace it with a form of market relations. As we will see below, this was the argument for reform made by the regenerationist movement. The dilemma, however, was that the only authority which could conduct such a large-scale transformation was the state itself but in Spain, state actors had no immediate incentive to embark on such a reform.

The reform movement in Spain was in fact two: the first was led by a group of intellectuals—the so-called generation of '98'[29]—and the second by a largely urban bourgeois and professional class that had been excluded from the Restoration bargain. While the former elaborated on Spain's *fin-de-siècle malaise*, the latter organized as a short-lived movement for reform. These middle classes and professionals were really the backbone of the movement for reform for, as Álvarez Junco has noted, "unlike some other pre-existing European states...the Spanish authorities were openly apathetic to the intellectual elites' efforts to create a national identity."[30] Indeed, the military defeat exposed the inability of the regime to defend the interests of the middle strata of Spanish society, who were now no longer willing to be subordinated to the oligarchic regime in Madrid.

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[28] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[29] There is some debate whether the events of 1898 can be said to have marked off a generation of intellectuals from those that came before and after. For the argument that there is a distinct generation of 1898 see, E. Inman Fox, *Ideología y política en las letras de fin de siglo (1898)* [Ideology and politics in the letters of the end of the century (1898)] (Madrid: Colección Austral, 1988). For an overview of the debate see, Tuñón de Lara, *Costa y Unamuno*, ch. 8. See also, José Ortega y Gasset, *Ensayos sobre la Generación del 98 y otros escritores contemporáneos* [Essays on the Generation of 98 and other contemporary writers] (Madrid, 1981).

[30] Álvarez Junco, "The National-Building Process in Nineteenth-Century Spain," p. 99.

Under the combined leadership of Joaquín Costa, Basilio Paraíso and Santiago Alba, chambers of agriculture, commerce and other industrial interests began organizing for reform as early as November 1898, only a few months after the military defeat. Despite certain appeals to the crown and the government for much-needed political and economic change, these different associations, whether acting separately or together, presented no real threat to the Restoration regime. This movement preferred to act as a lobby group, a strategy which made it quite ineffective once the regime realized that it could withstand a small amount of organized dissent. There was much division within the chambers of commerce and the agrarian chambers over whether they should change tactics by joining forces to form a new political party, the Unión Nacional (National Union) in 1900. Industrialists from Catalonia, Asturias, the Basque Country and other regions of Spain would only agree to the move if the Unión Nacional would "support any political party that would appropriate its programme and translate it into laws";[31] in other words, if the party would not take on the dynastic parties directly. When their demand was not met, the industrialists quickly abandoned the Unión. The party was to be the culmination of a movement whose "purpose had been to unite the 'productive classes' in an alliance that would transcend divisions of region and class and sweep aside what was seen as the parasitical oligarchy controlling the state,"[32] but the refusal of most members to engage in politics prevented it from fulfilling its ambitions and the party would not last two years.

One of the major shortcomings of the Unión Nacional was its failure to figure out how to gain access to political power given the effectiveness of *caciquismo*

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[31] Tuñón de Lara, *Costa y Unamuno*, p. 197.

as an instrument for sheltering the regime from outside challengers. *Caciquismo* had first emerged in Spain as a means of linking the so-called 'real' Spain, which existed in the family and local networks that structured social and labour relations for most Spaniards, with the institutions of the newly emerging liberal state after the end of the ancien régime in 1833—the 'official' Spain. As the nineteenth century progressed, *caciquismo* perpetuated and legitimated patterns of patronage that had existed for centuries. *Caciques* were able to guarantee that local élites could continue their political activities as before, *despite* the introduction of new state institutions. There was a certain amount of collusion between local and state élites as regards the purpose of state institutions at the local level. So long as the *cacique* could deliver the political support the regime needed, the latter did not much care whether the provincial assemblies functioned in the same way around the country. The state was able to monitor the activities of the *caciques* through the powerful Ministry of the Interior and the local civil guards. So long as they cooperated with the regime, then, *caciques* made it possible for local élites to conduct their political activities with the assistance of provincial-level institutions. Even as the range of interests expanded over the course of the nineteenth century, "In a largely agrarian and underdeveloped society, organized interest groups were less important than the personal and family links between the political class and large landowners, bankers, railroad magnates, and many new industrialists."[33] As a result, "the centuries-old ability of local oligarchies to resist change persisted."[34]

[32] Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire*, p. 82.
[33] Juan J. Linz, "A Century of Politics and Interests in Spain," in Suzanne Berger (ed.), *Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 372.
[34] Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the 'Spanish miracle'*, p. 387.

Political oligarchs and family networks were a central feature of political and economic life in Spain's urban centres too. As Spain's modernizing middle and working classes became an established feature of the social system, their inability to match their rising social position with political influence reflected the strength of the traditional social system upon which the Restoration monarchy depended, even if the political system itself lacked a legitimate institutional basis. This had been the experience of regenerators such as Joaquín Costa and Basilio Paraíso in their attempts to mobilize shopowners, small businessmen and small-scale agricultural producers through the chambers of commerce and agriculture. The movement was somewhat effective at protecting its interest through large-scale protests, such as withholding taxes.[35] This form of action, it was argued in chapter 3, is exactly what we would expect to encounter in cases where the regime type is highly exclusionary. Indeed, the experience of the regenerators and of the Unión Nacional proved that it would be impossible to open up the Restoration system to republicans and socialists, and non-dynastic parties generally, until the *cacique*, the link between the Restoration system and the traditional social networks that guaranteed the exclusionary nature of the regime, was removed. This relation, I argued above, could only be removed through a complete overhaul of the existing social and economic structure, but there was little incentive for the regime to attempt this.

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[35] Shopowners around Spain refused to transfer to the government the proceeds of a consumption tax introduced in 1899. The protest lasted longer in Catalonia, where it was perceived that the region already gave disproportionately to the state's coffers, than elsewhere and resulted in arrests. For the Catalan case see, Joaquim de Camps i Arboix, *El Tancament de caixes* [The closing of the tills] (Barcelona, 1961).

Commerce and society

In Catalonia, by contrast, it was possible to sever the relationship between the regime and the *cacique* and to transform a movement for reform into a counterhegemony that could mobilize against the Restoration system. There were two principal reasons for this difference: first, the social system upon which *caciquismo* rested was only weakly established in Catalonia;[36] and, second, there were alternative cultural markers in Catalonia which could serve as the basis for political mobilization against the regime.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Catalonia was the most commercialized region of Spain. Even extended family networks, which were as important in Catalonia as elsewhere in Spain, were most often characterized by forms of commercial exchange, not patron-client relations. Catalonia's commercialism was the product of a distinct pattern of economic development in Spain that left its mark on the social system. Industrialization and trade expansion had transformed Catalan society from the eighteenth century onwards in ways that set the region apart from other trading regions in the South of the peninsula. Catalan social and economic relations, unlike those of other trading cities along the Mediterranean coast in Andalusia, were built around the *casa pairal* or *casa industrial*, and not the latifundio. The former, a large rural co-residential and co-productive household, was the site of "the economics of the traditional legal family."[37] The *casa pairal* was the physical site of both economic and familial reproduction and the transfer of family wealth between generations and families joined by marriage, as determined by the Catalan

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[36] Robert W. Kern, *Liberals, Reformers and Caciques in Restoration Spain, 1875-1909* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), pp. 29-30.
[37] McDonogh, *Good Families of Barcelona*, p. 41.

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civil code.[38] The *casa industrial*[39] or urban industrial household, consisted of a family

structure held together by social as well as economic relations and governed by the

same rules of wealth exchange: father-son relations at home were reproduced as

owner-manger relations in the family firm. Extended family structures were used for

the purposes of accumulating capital, diversifying holdings and expanding economic

activity. The result, McDonogh tells us, was that "an economically cohesive power

group emerged, based on interlocking directorates and multiple connections among

bourgeois and aristocratic families."[40]

The patterns of familial socio-economic relations that existed in Catalonia

were commercial, a reflection of the region's role in the Ibero-Mediterranean

network of coastal markets that dotted the Atlantic trade route since the

seventeenth century. As early as the end of that century, Catalonia was "one of the

largest and most economically diverse cities of the western Mediterranean,

coordinating an urban network that included many of the most dynamic parts of

Spain."[41] The diverse nature of the regional economy that Catalonia commanded,

compared to the economic structure of other regions on the Iberian peninsula, gave

it a solid base from which to weather various economic storms by allowing it to shift

its economic activities to adjust to crises.

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[38] For family law practices of the early twentieth century, see Francesc Maspons i Anglasell, *La llei de la família catalana* [Catalan Family Law] (Barcelona: Barcino, 1935); *idem*, *El règim successori català* [Inheritance regime in Catalonia] (Barcelona: Barcino, 1938).

[39] The *casa industrial* was an urban structure but some urban architects, such as Josep Puig i Cadafalch, had the *casa pairal* in mind when they designed urban homes for Barcelona's wealthy families, since this symbolized "the rooted and abiding values of Catalanist conservatism" in the city. For a discussion of the politics of urban planning in early twentieth-century Barcelona, which pitted conservatives such as Puig i Cadafalch against progressive town planners such as Ildefons Cerdà, the designer of Barcelona's famous Eixample district, see Robert Hughes, *Barcelona* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), ch.7. The quote is from Hughes, p. 410.

[40] McDonogh, *Good Families of Barcelona*, p. 83.

The focus of Catalonia's economy was viniculture, textiles and wool. These three economic activities produced many backward and forward linkages that resulted in an integrated and well-developed regional economy. There were, first, backward linkages to agriculture due to the rising demand for raw materials inputs in the agro-export sector (mostly viniculture) as well as an increase in consumer demand for agricultural products that followed a rise in incomes as export activity increased. Since agricultural activity was centred in the Catalan interior, transportation mechanisms and a small service sector were devised to transport agricultural products to the coastal areas, where the viniculture and textile sectors operated. These activities, second, marked the beginning of forward linkages arising from the agro-export and textile industries on the coast. As the coastal industries expanded, agricultural workers had less time for subsistence work in the production end of light consumer products, such as clothing and tools. Increasingly, they turned to the market economy for such goods, which created a small but steady industry in this sector and another forward linkage arising from viniculture and textiles. Finally, when energy-dependent Catalonia developed hydroelectricity after 1880, many industries and workers were moved to the location of this new power source in the Ter Valley, in the Catalan interior. This marked another forward linkage, this time to the construction industry and road-making.[42]

Despite these important linkages, it was the opening of the colonial markets after 1882 which, as we saw above, provided Catalan industrialists, as well as

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[41] Ringrose, *Spain, Europe, and the 'Spanish miracle'*, p. 210

[42] Prior to the development of hydroelectricity, Catalonia's coefficient of external energy dependence (the percentage of primary energy imports in relation to overall gross internal consumption) was 70 per cent. This high coefficient raised production costs and attributed

Barcelona's port, with important growth opportunities. With the loss of the colonial markets, two immediate impediments to growth emerged: first, the Catalan economy lost its most important source of foreign exchange, which thereby limited its ability to import the raw materials required for industrial expansion; and, second, the economic consequences of the war with the United States were to reduce incomes in Spain and put the country on a tight money policy until the national budget recovered.[43] The reduction in the average purchasing power of Spanish consumers weakened the Catalan industrialists' ability to shift those products destined for colonial markets to the Spanish market.

In order to survive the crisis, Catalan industrialists, like their counterparts elsewhere in Spain, attempted to persuade the government in Madrid to introduce certain policy innovations. Soon after the end of the war, the leading business interests in Catalonia raised their proposals with the Queen Regent: a free port; a system of technical colleges for the specialization of skills; assistance in securing new markets; and, the introduction of a new tax system.[44] Some of these issues were considered by the government, but most were not seriously pursued when they clashed with the interests of cereal farmers in Andalusia, who represented the core of the regime's support base. This was the case with the free port, which cereal

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to the lack of competitiveness of Catalan products on the world market. Catalan industrialists pursued protectionism, in part, to compensate for these costs.

[43] Joseph Harrison, "Financial Reconstruction in Spain after the Loss of the Last Colonies," *Journal of European Economic History* 9 (1980), pp. 317-349.

[44] The business interests that presented the proposal to the Queen included: Societat Econòmica Barcelonina d'Amics del País, the Foment del Treball Nacional; the Institut Agrícola Català de Sant Isidre, and the Lliga de Defensa Industrial i Comercial. See G. Graell, *Historia del Fomento del Trabajo Nacional* [History of the National Labour Development] (Barcelona, 1911), in Harrison, p. 436. The proposal to reform the tax system was related to the much-maligned consumer tax on food which the government had introduced after the war. It was this tax, the *consumo*, which was the basis of the protest movement led by Costa and Paraíso.

farmers feared would lead to the dumping of cheap grain from Russia and the United States. Nor was the system of technical colleges a priority for the government in Madrid, which could not even manage to coordinate its normal school system.[45] Catalans would eventually introduce their own *Escola de Treball* [Labour School] under the Mancomunitat. As for new markets for Catalan textiles, the government offered no assistance, but through their own initiatives, Catalan industrialists encountered some success in Latin America and Mediterranean Europe.[46] At the same time, however, the refusal of the government in Madrid to compensate Catalan industrialists for their losses in the colonies meant that there was no money to introduce cost-saving technological innovations so that Catalan products could compete more effectively on the world market. In the end, "the shock of losing the colonial market exploded the cosy relationship between the Catalan bourgeoisie and their patrons in Madrid"[47] and brought to an end the Catalan component of the Restoration settlement.

From the Catalan periphery, the economic crisis had an obvious policy consequence: the Restoration government needed to engage in a large-scale modernization programme in order to raise domestic demand in Spain. But like the regenerators Joaquín Costa and Basilio Paraíso, Catalan industrialists soon recognized that they had no effective means at their disposal to persuade the

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[45] For an account of the education system after the crisis of 1898 see, Boyd, *Historia Patria*, ch. 2, "National Regeneration and Educational Reform, 1898-1923." Boyd argues that a shortage of funds and ideological divisions over the role of the church and state in education created impediments to reforming the system.

[46] See J. Puigdollers y Maciá, *Las relaciones entre España y América: Maneras de fomentarlas* [Relations between Spain and the Americas: Ways to develop these] (Barcelona, 1902); and F. Rahola y Trémols, *Sangre Nueva: Impresiones de un viaje a América del Sud* [New Blood: Impressions of a visit to South America] (Barcelona, 1902).

[47] Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire*, p. 56.

government of the need for reform; indeed, it was clear that the landholding élites whose interests prevailed in Madrid had no incentive to pursue a reform agenda. The commercial protection that the industrialists sought, the Catalan lawyer and intellectual Enric Prat de la Riba[48] concluded, required good government, which "truly civilized states" could provide but "not the Spanish or Castilian state, [which was a] degeneration of a purely agricultural and military state."[49] With insights like this from Catalan intellectuals, Catalan industrialists soon found allies for their reform project.

Culture and Society

Jurists and intellectuals like Prat de la Riba had their own motives for reforming the Spanish state, which were focused on the need to protect the Catalan language and legal system. These objectives grew out of the achievements of Catalonia's mid nineteenth-century cultural renaissance, the *Renaixença*,[50] but were soon transformed into more political objectives following the crisis of 1898. The *Renaixença*, which influenced all spheres of Catalan society owed its existence, in part, to the economic wealth generated by the successes of the industrial sector, since

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[48] Enric Prat de la Riba i Sarrà (1870-1917) was a lawyer who wrote his doctoral thesis (1894) on industrial law using a case study of the relationship between labour law and the Catalan *casa industrial*. As we will see in chapters 5 and 6, Prat de la Riba played a central role in the political campaign for Catalan autonomy.

[49] Enric Prat de la Riba, "La Questió Catalana," in *La Nació i L'Estat: Escrits de joventut* [Nation and State: Writings from his youth], Enric Jardí (ed.), Biblioteca dels Clàssics del Nacionalisme Català, 17 (Barcelona: Edicions de la Magrana and Diputació de Barcelona, 1987), p. 45. Writing in 1898, Prat maintained (p. 45) that Catalan industrialists had declared themselves "resolute supporters of annexation" by France. This "solution was also promoted by a small radical fraction of the intellectual youth of Catalonia." However, (p. 46) annexation was conditional upon "the decentralist and federalist currents that are emerging these days in France acquiring a rapid development that would translate into a reform of the actual unitary and centralist constitution of the French Republic."

[50] The movement was named the *Renaixença* a posteriori, in the 1870s, and took its name from the magazine *La Renaixensa*, which was the mouthpiece of Jove Catalunya [Catalan

some of its more ambitious projects would not have been possible without the patronage of Barcelona's wealthiest families. There were, then, important links between cultural and industrial élites before 1898, but these would be deepened as a result of the breakdown of the Restoration settlement in Catalonia.

The *Renaixença* created institutions for the reproduction of a distinct Catalan culture: the Gran Teatre del Liceu (1844), the Jocs Florals (1859), the Orfeó Català (1891) and the Orfeó's home, the Palau de la Música Catalana (1908). The *Jocs Florals*—the centerpiece of the *Renaixença*—were instrumental for the revival of Catalan history and language. These 'floral games' (so-named because the first prize was a rose) were poetry contests which dated back to medieval Catalonia. When they were reintroduced in 1859 it was with the intention of providing a forum for the many poets who had begun to chronicle Catalonia's history in the form of ballads and legends, just as their medieval predecessors had done. The *excursionistes* or, ramblers, a group of poets, architects, intellectuals and geographers, sought to forge links between the growing catalanist movement in Barcelona and towns in other parts of Catalonia through their bulletins, maps and guidebooks.

The *Renaixença* was all about forging a Catalan culture that could be recognized as distinct from Castilian culture; the Catalan language and history provided the foundation for the range of cultural activities that grew out of this project. In the last part of the nineteenth century, perhaps as a reflection of the region's economic growth, Catalonia distinguished itself as the center of a new architecture and crafts movement, *Modernisme* (1888-1910). The extensive use of glasswork, tiles, tapestries and metalwork in modernist architecture shaped the

Youth], a Catalanist patriotic association. See Albert Balcells, *Catalan Nationalism Past and*

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Catalan equivalent to the Art Nouveau movement in France. The works of the most recognized architects of the modernist movement, Antoni Gaudí, Lluís Domènech i Muntaner and Josep Puig i Cadafalch, have become synonymous with modern Barcelona. Moreover, Puig i Cadafalch and, to a lesser extent, Domènech i Muntaner, were among the most important political figures of the first two decades of the twentieth century: they were just as intent on building Catalan autonomy through the Mancomunitat—a confederation of the four Catalan provinces in 1914—as they were on leaving their mark on Barcelona's cityscape.

The *Renaixença* and *Modernisme* transformed Catalan culture by taking advantage of Catalonia's wealth to construct a city that was unlike any other in Spain. While the achievements of the *Renaixença* were primarily cultural, they were soon translated into political projects. For example, the *Renaixença* had given Catalans a new appreciation of their language, which they sought to preserve and promote against the 'castilianization' of the public service and education system. By the end of the nineteenth century, the renewed interest in the Catalan language was no longer limited to its role as a literary vehicle but was extended to its use as a medium of communication outside of the family sphere.[51] As with the Catalan language, late nineteenth-century Catalan intellectuals viewed the formal codification of Catalan civil law as a means of ensuring a Catalan presence in the public administration and the preservation of the Catalan corporation of notaries, which was unique in Spain. Broadly speaking, Catalan élites viewed the reform of the public administration as a way of reversing the dominance of Castilians in key decision-

Present (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 30.
[51] Kathryn A. Woolard, *Double Talk: Bilingualism and the Politics of Ethnicity in Catalonia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 23-26.

making positions; the *Renaixença* provided much of the impetus for this perspective. Catalan university graduates, lawyers, notaries and educators did not have access to the clientelist recruitment networks through which their Castilian counterparts were guaranteed a position in the state's civil service. The system of administration in the Spanish provinces was heavily controlled from the centre and the most important positions were filled by Madrid. Professional élites therefore had two main concerns: the promotion of the Catalan language and the preservation and codification of Catalan civil law. The former would ensure their control over all the public institutions in the region, including education, which was in the hands of the Church. The second would ensure that positions in the legal sector would be reserved exclusively for Catalans. In the late nineteenth century, there had been a very present danger that the Restoration regime would eliminate Catalan civil law in order to standardize the Spanish civil code.[52] It is no wonder, then, that the political objective of the late nineteenth-century Catalan autonomy movement was the reform of Spain's administrative system through decentralization. By managing and staffing *Catalan* administrative structures at the regional level, Catalans would be able to institutionalize and preserve the linguistic and cultural achievements of the *Renaixença*.

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[52] In the end, article 12 of the new Spanish civil code of 1899 preserved Catalan civil law as well as other foral laws (the *fueros*). Thereafter, the goal was to reform and update the Catalan civil code. Because of the various dictatorships and civil war, this was not completed until 1984 by the Catalan Parliament. See Albert Balcells (with Enric Pujol and Jordi Sabater), *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia* [The Catalan Mancomunitat and autonomy] (Barcelona: Proa, 1997), ch. 9, "La defensa del dret civil català" [The defence of Catalan civil law] pp. 479-488.

Summary

In this section, I have argued that commerce, language and law provided the structural conditions for a distinct pattern of political mobilization that was directed against the Restoration system. Catalan reformers, like their counterparts elsewhere in Spain, sought to dislodge the *cacique* system and to replace it with a rational bureaucratic structure. But Catalans differed from other Spanish reformers in that they sought to use a reformed bureaucratic structure for the promotion of a distinct culture and form of politics in the periphery. Compared to their counterparts in other regions of Spain, Catalan intellectual and industrial élites had a distinctive combination of interests and objectives around which to organize their opposition to Madrid. These interests and objectives were to become the basis for an argument about the existence of a Catalan people or nation and, eventually, of the right of this nation to self-government.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that the challenges to Bourbon rule over the course of the nineteenth century severely compromised the ability of the central authority to build consensus around monarchical rule and to consolidate its power over the territory through a full range of state institutions. However, the Restoration regime's ability to rely on clientelist patterns of social relations as well as an elaborate system of bargains to support its claim to legitimate rule gave the regime a certain immobilism that prevented it from introducing political and economic reforms.

In Catalonia, however, the Restoration regime was more vulnerable to the effects of an organized movement for political reform. As I argued in the second section of this chapter, a distinct pattern of socio-economic development in

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Catalonia meant that clientelism was not as firmly rooted there as in other parts of Spain. After the loss of its last colonies in 1898, the Spanish state was no longer able to provide material benefits to its supporters in Catalonia. Following the hegemonic breakdown of Spanish state nationalism after 1898, moreover, a Catalan movement for reform was able to organize around alternative interests related to commerce, culture and law.

In the remainder of the dissertation, I examine in detail how these alternative markers were used by Catalan political and intellectual élites to organize counterhegemonic movements for reform. In particular, I focus on two broad movements, nationalism and republicanism, and show how these were able to mobilize supporters against state nationalism. The analysis presented in chapter 5 through 7 focuses on how these two movements managed the strategic constraints associated with their short and long-term political objectives.

Chapter 5 examines the political projects of nationalists and republicans and analyzes their motives for entering into a cooperative electoral alliance that had as its final objective regional political autonomy. Since Solidaritat Catalana was an alliance of unequal partners—nationalists dominated it from the beginning—the analysis seeks to uncover the reasons why republican leaders agreed to this alliance, and how they rallied their support base to this choice. As the analysis will make clear, republicans miscalculated the political objectives of their nationalist partners. When this was discovered, republicans had already been betrayed by nationalists and defection was their only recourse.

Chapter 6 examines the institutional conditions under which nationalists were able to establish their dominance in Catalonia after 1914 and sets out the limits

of this dominance by addressing the following puzzle: Why, despite the hegemony of Catalan nationalists after 1914, were they not able to take advantage of the new international discourse on *national* self-determination to eclipse the republican political project? I argue that the failure of nationalists to do so during the autonomy campaign of 1917-1919 was related to their inability to resolve the problem of ideological compromise in their strategies for political action.

Chapter 7 examines the only successful campaign for autonomy during the first part of the twentieth century, the republican Autonomy Statute of 1932. The radicalization of Catalan politics after 1923 was a major impediment to an electoral alliance of republican and nationalist forces after 1930. Instead, Catalan republicans pursued an alliance with Spanish republicans and struck a bargain which linked Catalan autonomy to a transition to a republican regime. In this chapter, I ask why, despite the fact that republicans were hegemonic in all of Spain after 1931, did Catalan republicans not obtain the degree and type of autonomy for which they had bargained with their Spanish counterparts? I argue that parliamentary procedure in the Cortes allowed Spanish republicans to institutionalize their particular conception of the Spanish state, its territorial structure and institutional basis, before the Catalan version of a republic could even be debated. The hegemonic position of Spanish republicanism was established first; Catalan republicans would be forced to adjust their conception of autonomy to this new reality.

Three Moments of Counterhegemonic Mobilization in Catalonia

After the Breakdown: Defining Terms in Catalonia, 1898-1909

Introduction

The breakdown of the hegemonic conception of Spain and Spanish national identity after 1898 was the starting point for the organization of two alternative conceptions of political autonomy and territorial sovereignty in Catalonia: a nationalist and a republican one. In this chapter, I examine in what way these two ideologies differed and consider the political implications of these differences. Neither nationalists nor republicans had a monopoly on concepts such as the 'nation' or 'self-government.' These terms were subject to rival definitions and the different groups which mobilized around these competing terms adopted distinct strategies to achieve their respective political objectives. In the first section, I illustrate how Catalan élites developed a new vocabulary of political concepts in order to create and broaden the set of possible political alternatives in Catalonia and Spain. Between 1901, when these groups first mobilized politically, and Barcelona's 'tragic week' of labour rebellion in July 1909,[1] nationalists and republicans succeeded in supplanting the hegemony of the dynastic party system in Catalonia through a cooperative alliance, but not in making a transition to regional political autonomy. In the second section of this chapter, I examine the link between conceptual innovation and political mobilization around the campaign for political autonomy in 1906-1908.

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[1] The workers' strike began in Catalonia's industrial centres on 6 July 1909 as a protest against the draft for the war in Spanish Morocco. The strike quickly turned into five days of destruction of church property. The most authoritative account of the events of the Tragic Week that also provides an insightful analysis of the political background in Spain and

Counterhegemonic groups in Catalonia faced a double constraint in their bid to attain political hegemony: first, they had to contend with competing versions of political autonomy within Catalonia and, second, with political opposition to autonomy from Madrid. Given the fragmented nature of opposition to Madrid, the most effective strategy available for negotiating these two constraints was a cooperative alliance. Although this strategy was initiated, it could not be sustained. I examine the reasons why this occurred and argue that nationalists and republicans had very distinct conceptions of autonomy and the social order.

1. Defining their Terms: Nationalists and Republicans in Catalonia, 1901-1909

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Catalan élites devoted considerable efforts to redefining the political relationship between Catalonia and Spain by developing a new conceptual vocabulary. The results of their efforts appear in the many books, pamphlets, newspaper columns and published speeches that in turn engendered a lively and often controversial public debate. Popular print media made the debate possible, but meeting places and associations were also important for the diffusion and extension of the debate to different circles in Catalan and especially, Barcelonan, society.[2] The efforts of these élites were not purely intellectual; they were also motivated by political ambitions and the language which emerged from these debates was "politically constituted by the ends to which

Catalonia is, Joan Connelly Ullman, *The Tragic Week: A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).

[2] On the importance of print media for the diffusion of proto-nationalist ideas, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991); and Michael Mann, "The Emergence of Modern European Nationalism," in John A. Hall and Ian C. Jarvie (eds.), *Transitions to Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

it [was] intentionally put or by the consequences which it [was] subsequently seen to entail."[3]

Political leaders took advantage of events after 1898 to mobilize supporters around alternative plans for the territorial organization of the state. But both the ambitions of different political entrepreneurs and the language they used to describe these ambitions was contested at every turn. There were many possible ways to redefine Spain and Catalonia's place within Spain after 1898, Below, I examine the two most important of these politically, republicanism and nationalism.

From republican federalism to Catalan particularism

In nineteenth-century Spain, the principal anti-regime movement was republicanism. But because of the corrupt nature of the institutions of the Restoration regime, an important sector of Catalan republicans rejected the possibility of political participation in these and instead pursued a project to reorganize the structure of the Spanish state through the creation of new political institutions in Catalonia. Self-government would come to Catalonia not just through republicanism; it would have to be *Catalan* republicanism. The emphasis on Catalan republicanism would require some conceptual innovation, since the republican project had been discredited after the violent insurrections that had accompanied the failed First Republic (1873-1874).

The rejection of a federalist project along ethnic or cultural lines by the Spanish Partido Republicano Democrático Federal [Federal Democratic Republican Party] prompted Catalan republicans to pursue a project for republican regional

[3] James Farr, "Understanding Conceptual Change Politically," in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 26.

autonomy that did not require a transition to a republic in the rest of Spain; that is, the Catalan project was compatible with a monarchical Spain because Catalonia would have distinct republican institutions for self-government. This project was best expressed in the political writings and activities of Valentí Almirall,[4] Catalonia's most high-profile republican after Francesc Pi i Margall,[5] the leader of the PRDF. The blueprint for a concerted Catalan challenge to the Restoration regime was set out by Almirall in his 1886 book, *Lo Catalanisme: Motius que el legitem, fonaments cientifics i solucions practiques*, [Catalanism: The motives which legitimize it, scientific foundations, and practical solutions], a nineteenth-century landmark in intellectual thought about Catalan politics and the first attempt to lay out a doctrine of catalanism.[6]

The book was a diagnosis of Restoration Spain, "a nation which is in general so decayed and debilitated that it has nothing left to lose,"—a condition which could be extended to both Castilians and Catalans.[7] While Castilians were incapable of

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[4] Valentí Almirall i Llozer (1840-1904), lawyer, journalist and politician. He participated in the federal-republican revolution that produced the Sexenio Democrático in 1868. He founded *El Estado Catalán*, a federalist newspaper, in 1869 and el *Diari Català*, the first Catalan-language newspaper, in 1879. He was involved directly in several initiatives to secure Catalan autonomy, such as the *Bases para la Constitución federal de la nación Española y para la del Estado de Catalunya* [Bases for the federal Constitution of the Spanish State and the State of Catalonia] (1868) and the *Memòria en defensa dels interessos morals i materials de Catalunya* [Memorandum in defence of Catalonia's moral and material interests], (1885). He published *L'Espagne telle qu'elle est* [Spain as she is] (1886) and, in the same year, *Lo Catalanisme*. See J.L. Trias Vejarano, *Almirall y los orígenes del catalanismo* [Almirall and the Origins of Catalanism] (Madrid, 1975).

[5] See C.A.M. Hennessy, *The Federal Republic in Spain: Pi y Margall and the Federal Republican Movement, 1869-1874* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Antoni Jutglar, *El constitucionalismo revolucionario de Pi y Margall* [The Revolutionary Constitutionalism of Pi y Margall] (Madrid, 1979); and *idem*, *Federalismo y Revolución: Las ideas sociales de Pi y Margall* [Federalism and revolution: The social ideas of Pi y Margall] (Barcelona, 1966).

[6] Valentí Almirall, *Lo Catalanisme* (Barcelona: Llibreria Verdaguer i Llibreria López, 1886; repr., Les millors obres de la literatura catalana, 22. Barcelona: Edicions 62 i "la Caixa", 1994.) A Castilian-language edition was published in 1902.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

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creating a nation, according to Almirall, Catalans, after years of subjugation, had lost sight of their true character, but the *Renaixença* had been a turning point in the regeneration of the Catalan people. The accomplishments of the *Renaixença* were evidence that cultural excellence and improvement were only possible by breaking free from Castilian dominance. For that reason, the regionalist movement in Catalonia proposed "to change the organizational basis of the State by reconstituting it using principles that are not only distinctive but also contrary to those which have heretofore served as a guide."[8]

The principle on which Almirall based his state-making project was 'particularism,' which he defined as an "affection, caring [and] preference for all that which is particular"; that is, that which is part of one's local environment or immediate surroundings.[9] The use of the term reflected Almirall's preoccupation with designing a program for political action that could achieve the same objectives as a federalist project without having to use the terms 'federal' or 'federalism,' which in late nineteenth-century Spain were synonymous with radicalism. The term 'particularism,' "although less precise [than federalism], clearly expresses our idea," he concluded.[10] Particularism was far more general than federalism, in Almirall's estimation, because it could also refer to the separation or complete independence of a territory. Almirall understood federalism to be a halfway point between "the unification of the various parts of a state and their complete separation, the only

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[8] *Ibid.,* p. 98.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 102.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 156.

[term] which reunites the advantages of each and which can produce harmony between liberty and equality," which was the goal of every state.[11]

After the violence of the failed First Republic, Almirall needed to demonstrate that federalism—or particularism—did not always require radical politics to bring it about. His solution was a composite state. Just as federalism found expression in a federal state, so the principle of particularism found expression in a composite state. Appealing to the conservative elements in Catalonia, he argued by analogy that a composite state was an association of several small sovereign states, much in the same way that a company is the association of individuals.[12] While the individual states would have to cede a portion of their sovereignty to a federal authority—what Almirall preferred to call a manager—each state would be able to retain its own institutions of self-government. Their security problems thus solved, these states would be free "to work for progress with much more energy than unitary states."[13] This practical solution, Almirall hoped, would appeal to Catalonia's cultural and industrial élites, for whom social and economic progress was a constant political preoccupation. "Theoretically and practically," Almirall concluded, the composite state "is the only state which can balance all interests, [and] harmonize liberty and equality...The composite state is the practical formula of particularism."[14]

Individual liberty and equality amongst individuals were the cornerstones of Almirall's understanding of politics and a reflection of his republican roots. His understanding of the relationship between the individual and the state or nation

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 157.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 154.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

would mark him off from Catalan nationalists. Almirall maintained that "a people is most free when individual interests have to make only a few concessions to the collective [but these interests] remain, notwithstanding, effectively guaranteed; when [the individual members of a people] can display variety without harming the union."[15] Equality, meanwhile, was a condition of liberty since liberty had to be the same for all individuals in a state: "If a liberty is recognized, it has to be recognized for every person."[16] Almirall understood equality to be the expression of collective interests over individual interests; that is, equality is a means of ensuring that all individuals are equal before the law or that all citizens enjoy the same rights. It was the responsibility of states to provide this guarantee of equality, either through coercive measures or through traditions and customs. But Almirall warned that in order to do this, states did not have to make all citizens the *same*: uniformity was not a condition of liberty nor was it the same thing as equality. For Almirall, there was clearly a tension between liberty—or variety—and equality, which was the responsibility of states to balance. The only way to prevent the state from erring on the side of equality by pushing towards uniformity was to organize a form of resistance using those very institutions at the local level which guaranteed liberty of action.[17]

A tendency towards uniformity, instead of equality, on the part of Castilian rulers of Spain had created a situation whereby the "principal cause of [Catalonia's] degeneration is the lack of spontaneity in the development of our people, subjugated

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14 *Ibid.*, p. 154.
15 *Ibid.*, p. 129.
16 *Ibid.*, pp. 132, 134.
17 *Ibid.*, p. 131.

and subordinated to another people of opposite temperament."[18] The problem was not simply that Castilians and Catalans were different, but that the governing institutions of Spain tended towards authoritarianism. As for the institutions of the Restoration period, Almirall maintained that "the worst of it is that within the present organization of our country one cannot find even a ray of hope for improvement. Since the fall of the ancien regime, which had brought us to the extreme of abjection and decadence, we have attempted one hundred and one different constitutional forms," but none of these had worked.[19]

The only solution, from Almirall's perspective, was to redesign the state in order to create the institutional structures under which liberty could be restored to the Catalan people: a self-governing republic which would federate with other regions in Spain. Almirall rejected the possibility of a monarchical solution for Catalonia, since the Catalan region did not have its own dynasty. A Catalan republic would still be possible within a federal Spain that was ruled by a monarch, however, since Spanish monarchism would not affect the possibility for republican self-government in Catalonia. The institutions of Castile could never guarantee liberty for Catalans since "all the features that form the basis of the Castilian character have produced not only authoritarianism but also oligarchism."[20] By contrast, it was noteworthy that the individualist streak amongst Catalans was the reason for which they rejected the type of personalistic rule that the Castilians favoured and instead placed more faith in democratic institutions than in men: the Generalitat, the Corts catalanes, the Consell de Cent, the senates and corporations of the cities and

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 97
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

towns.[21] These institutions, which Almirall considered to be "the most grandiose events of our history, that for which we are legendary, are, or appear to be, the result of our collective efforts" to guarantee the liberty of all Catalans.[22] Unlike Castilians, who used personal relations and *caciquismo*, Catalans structured their social and political relations via *particular* institutions that preserved individual freedom, *Catalan* freedom. These were the institutions that Almirall wanted to resurrect as part of a composite Spain, the only institutions which could free Catalans of Castilian dominance and restore liberty to all Catalans.

Almirall dedicated *Lo Catalanisme* to the youth movement within the Centre Català[23] and hoped that the book would act as curriculum in their study of Catalan politics. Indeed, the book provoked much debate and, like any landmark study, a certain division of opinion within the movement. The youth wing debated Almirall's position but, very quickly, would develop a new terminology with which to translate its own version of a Catalan solution to the problem of governance in Restoration Spain.

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[21] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] The Centre Català emerged from the *Primer Congrés Catalanista* [First Catalanist Congress] of 1880, which Almirall had organized. Over a six week period, some 1300 participants debated issued related to commerce, language and law and passed three resolutions: (1) establish an academy of the Catalan language; (2) establish a commission responsible for monitoring the Catalan civil code; and (3) found a Catalan centre. The Centre Català was founded in 1882 for the purposes of gathering "Catalans of all religious orientations and political persuasions, constituting itself of all those people who are interested in the regeneration of our character and the improvement of our land." See, "Programa del Catalanisme" [Catalanism's programme] *Butlletí del Centre Català* 12 June 1883; Jordi Galofré, *El Primer Congrés Catalanaista* [The First Catalanist Congress] (Barcelona, 1979); and, Josep M. Figueres, *El Primer Congrés Catalanista i Valentí Almirall* [The First Catalanist Congress and Valentí Almirall] (Barcelona, 1985).

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From particularism to nationalism

Valentí Almirall's main intellectual concern was with the liberty of the individual and the mechanisms by which states could respect variety or in today's terms, difference, while guaranteeing equality before the law. Even when these differences were ethnic, Almirall's concern was still with individual freedom, not with the freedom of the ethnic group. While he spoke of regional differences and particularism, he never referred to these as 'nationalist' nor did he ever refer to these regions as nations. According to Enric Prat de la Riba, Catalonia's most influential twentieth-century nationalist intellectual and member of the Centre Català, this was the main problem with Almirall's political project, since he was not able to "state which entities should form small states and which of these should federate, nor did he concern himself with the criteria by which this selection was to be made."[24] As a university student at the time that Almirall published his book, Prat de la Riba and his cohort were the very audience for which *Lo Catalanisme* was intended. These students were deeply influenced by Almirall's argument that Catalonia's economic success was the product of a legal system grounded in a form of civil liberties that promoted commerce and trade[25] as well as his claim that "a distinct language presupposes a distinct character."[26] They were also convinced by the claim made by Manuel Duran i Bas,[27] perhaps the finest legal mind of nineteenth-century Catalonia

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[24] Enric Prat de la Riba, *La Nacionalitat Catalana*, 2nd ed. (Barcelona: "La Cataluña," 1910; repr., Les millors obres de la literatura catalana, 5, Barcelona: Edicions 62 and "la Caixa", 1978), p. 36.

[25] Almirall, *Lo Catalanisme*, p. 58.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[27] Manuel Duran i Bas, Dean of the College of Lawyers and Faculty of Law in Barcelona and Rector of the University of Barcelona. As Minister of Justice in the Conservative government of Francisco Silvela (1899- 1901) in Madrid, he was a leading member of the late nineteenth-century movement to prevent the Spanish government from eliminating

and the father of Lluís Duran i Ventosa,[28] one of their cohort, that the Catalan civil

code was constitutive of the identity of the Catalan people. Duran i Bas' situated

himself within a legal tradition that could be traced back to the work of the German

Savigny, for whom the origins of a legal system emanated from the customs and

history of a people. Rejecting the possibility that a body of laws was the product of

rational intent on the part of individuals, Duran i Bas argued that Catalan customs

and traditions required protection from the Restoration government's plan to

standardize a civil code for all of Spain. Between the publication of Almirall's *Lo*

Catalnisme in 1886 and Prat de la Riba's *La Nacionalitat Catalana* in 1906, Catalonia's

distinctive legal and linguistic markers became a focal point for organized debates

and political activity and the basis for an argument for the existence of a Catalan

nation.

The institution that was the site of this development was the Centre Escolar

Catalanista (CEC) [Catalan Centre of University Students] which was founded in

1886 by university students for the purposes of organizing conferences and colloquia

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Catalan civil law in its project to codify a standard civil law for all of Spain. His influence is evident in the political writings of his son Lluís Duran i Ventosa and his former student, Enric Prat de la Riba. See Borja de Riquer, "Manuel Duran i Bas i el conservadorisme català sobre la Restoració" [Manuel Duran i Bas and Catalan conservatism during the Restoration], in Albert Balcells (ed.), *El Pensament polític català del segle XVIII a mitjan segle XX* [Catalan political thought from the 18th to the mid-19th century], Collecció estudis i documents, 42 (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1988).

[28] Lluís Duran i Ventosa (1870-1954), lawyer and politician. Founding member and secretary of the Lliga Regionalista and of its strategic centre, the Comissió d'Acció Política (CAP) [Political Action Committee]. He devoted himself to municipal politics and was an alderman in the Barcelona city council for the years 1906-1910, 1916-1920 and 1933. Duran i Ventosa was also a provincial deputy in 1910 and a senator in the Cortes in Madrid between 1919 and 1923. As member of CAP, he was instrumental in a plan to redesign the Lliga after it lost to republicans in the elections of 1931. Duran i Ventosa was also president of the of the Acadèmia de Jurisprudència i Legislació de Catalunya (1916-17) [Catalan Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation]. Duran published *Regionalisme i Federalisme* [Regionalism and Federalism] in 1905.

to promote and discuss different areas of Catalan scholarship.[29] The Centre's

leadership was made up of students who would later occupy leadership positions in

Catalan politics: Enric Prat de la Riba, Francesc Cambó,[30] Josep Puig i Cadafalch,[31]

Lluís Domènech i Muntaner,[32] Narcís Verdaguer i Callís, Manuel Folguera i Duran

and Josep Mallofré. Although the proximate reason for forming the CEC was to

work for the promotion and preservation of the Catalan language and civil code, its

extensive activities and the enthusiasm of its members ensured that it played a

pivotal role in politicizing an important sector of Barcelona's university students and

Catalonia's future political leaders.

The Centre Escolar Catalanista was the birthplace of a new way of

conceptualizing Catalonia and Catalan-Spanish relations and its members were

responsible for promoting the use of the term 'nation' in relationship to Catalonia.

In this they were influenced by events in central Europe, particularly the political

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[29] The Centre Escolar Catalanista was organized into five section: (1) law, philosophy and *belles lettres*, (2) medicine; (3) science and pharmacology; (4) special subjects; and (5) fine arts.
[30] Francesc Cambó i Batlle (1876-1947), lawyer and politician. He was secretary and president of the Centre Escolar Catalanista in 1894-5. He participated in the founding of the Lliga Regionalista in 1901 and was elected an alderman for Barcelona city hall that same year. He dedicated himself entirely to politics after 1901, always through the Lliga Regionalista, and espoused a moderate form of nationalist politics that allowed for participation in the central government as a means of campaigning for Catalan autonomy. Cambó believed in the possibility of a monarchical solution to the problem of the political accommodation of Castilians and Catalans within the Spanish state. For this position see, Francesc Cambó, *Per la Concòrdia* [For an Agreement] (Barcelona: Llibreria Catalònia, 1930).
[31] Josep Puig i Cadafalch (1867-1957), architect and politician. He designed two of Barcelona's most famous landmarks of Modernism: Casa de les Punxes and Casa Amatller. He joined the Lliga Regionalista in 1901 and was president of the Mancomunitat from 1919 until 1924, when it was dissolved by the dictator General Miguel Primo de Rivera.
[32] Lluís Domènech i Muntaner (1849-?), architect and politician. He designed several Modernist buildings in Barcelona, including the Café-Restaurant for the 1888 Universal Exposition, the Palau de la Música (a UNESCO cultural site) and the Hospital de la Santa Creu i Sant Pau. He joined the Lliga Regionalista in 1901 and was elected to the Cortes in Madrid the same year.

campaign of Czech nationalists but also by the strategies used by Irish nationalists.[33]

Wary of introducing a new conceptual vocabulary too quickly, the members of the CEC proceeded cautiously: they began by calling into question the appropriateness of existing terminology by slowly introducing the term 'nation' as a synonym for 'region' and 'particularism.' Eventually, they would abandon these last two terms and use 'nation' exclusively. The first stage, that of debating existing terminology, took place within the CEC itself. Lluís Duran i Ventosa, in his capacity as president of the CEC's section on law, devoted his inaugural address of the academic year 1889 to a discussion of how language, law and history were the sources of "the differences that existed among the nations that formed the Spanish state."[34] The following academic year, in his role as president of the CEC, Prat de la Riba delivered the inaugural address, a discourse on the enslavement of nations, which he entitled, "Catalan patria which, small or large, is our only patria." He separated the terms state and nation and noted that "today, many are those who see clearly that Spain is not a nation, but a State, and who grasp the difference between the *State*, man's creation, an artificial entity, and the *Nation*, a natural entity, a product of the

[33] Jordi Llorens i Vila, *Catalanisme i Moviments Nacionalistes Contemporanis (1885-1901): Missatges a Irlanda, Creta i Finlandia* [Catalanism and contemporary nationalist movements (1885-1901): Messages to Ireland, Crete and Finland], Episodis de la Historia, 271 (Barcelona: Rafael Dalmau, 1988), pp. 8-13. When the CEC was created in 1886, the Irish home rule campaign, under the leadership of Charles Stewart Parnell, appeared on the verge of success. See also, Joan B. Culla i Clarà, "De Budapest a Dublin passant per Cristiània, O sobre alguns models internacionals del catalanisme" [From Budapest to Dublin by way of Cristiana or, on some international models for catalanism], *Revista de Catalunya* 2 (1986), pp. 37-47; and Enrique Ucelay Da Cal, "'El Mirall de Catalunya': Models internacionals en el desenvolupament del nacionalisme i del separatisme català, 1875-1923" ['The Catalan Mirror': International models for the development of Catalan nationalism and separatism, 1875-1923], *Estudios de Historia Social* 28-29 (1984), pp. 213-219.

[34] Lluís Duran i Ventosa, inaugural session of the academic year, 23 November 1889, in Prat de la Riba, *La Nacionalitat Catalana*, p. 53.

spontaneous nature of the development of history."[35] In the late nineteenth century, Prat de la Riba noted, political thinkers referred to a Catalan nationality but they warned that the term 'nationality' was not to be confused with 'nation' since "the nation is a political, sovereign and independent State."[36] Prat de la Riba countered that while these thinkers were on the right track, they failed to appreciate that 'nationality' was simply "the set of elements that make up the nation."[37]

The CEC designed its activities around proving this claim. Although the initial discussions about the elements of Catalonia's distinctiveness took place among university students, the effects were not confined to this exclusive circle: the CEC was a member organization of the Centre Català before it left to join the newly-founded Lliga de Catalunya in 1887. Its activities and influence, therefore, radiated in a wider circle.

Indeed, the members of CEC published opinion pieces, sometimes anonymously, in various newspapers and magazines such as the Centre Català's mouthpiece, La Renaixensa, and, after 1891, the weekly La Veu de Catalunya, which would become the most influential newspaper of the nationalist movement and the Lliga Regionalista's mouthpiece after 1901.[38] The Revista Jurídica de Cataluña [Catalan Juridical Review] was created in 1895 and Prat de la Riba contributed a regular

[35] "Discurs del President del Centre Escolar Catalanista de Barcelona Don Enric Prat de la Riba llegit en la Sessió Inaugural del Curs 1890-1891" [Speech made by the President of the Centre Escolar Catalanista, Don Enric Prat de la Riba, at the inaugural session of the academic year 1890- 1891], in Enric Prat de la Riba, La Nació i l'Estat: Escrits de Joventu [Nation and State; Writings from his youth], Biblioteca dels Clàssics del Nacionalisme Català, 17 (Barcelona: Edicions de la Magrana and Diputació de Barcelona, 1987), p. 13.
[36] Coroleu i Pella i Forgas, Los Fueros de Cataluña (1878) [The foral rights of Catalonia], quoted in Prat de la Riba, La Nacionalitat Catalana, p. 51.
[37] Prat de la Riba, La Nacionalitat Catalana, p. 52.
[38] La Veu de Catalunya [The Voice of Catalonia] was a weekly newspaper published in Catalan between 1891-1899, after which it became a daily.

column entitled "Misceláneas jurídicas" [Juridical miscellany].[39] In their journalistic

writings, as elsewhere, the members of the CEC avoided using the new nationalist

terminology exclusively, Prat de la Riba recalled later: "We still avoided openly using

the proper nomenclature, but we went about destroying peoples' concerns,

prejudices and, with calculated opportunism, we insinuated in a logical fashion the

new doctrines, mixing together the rights of regions, nationalities and patria in order

to slowly accustom the readers."[40] Another example of this strategy was the *Compendi*

de la doctrina catalanista [Compendium of the Catalanist Doctrine], the CEC's first

promotional success, which Prat de la Riba and Pere Muntanyola wrote in 1894 and

entered in a contest sponsored by the Centre Català de Sabadell. Organized as a

series of questions and answers about Catalan nationalism, the *Compendi* introduced

the new nationalist doctrine that was developed by the members of the CEC by

attempting to demonstrate through historical example how Catalans were subjugated

to Castilian rule and that Spain was not the patria of Catalans. The *Compendi* won

first prize: 100,000 copies were made and distributed in private schools throughout

Catalonia.[41] Prat de la Riba and Muntanyola again avoided using the new

terminology—nation, nationality—that was being promoted from within the CEC in

their attempt to avoid too much controversy. They failed: the *Compendi* was quickly

banned by the civil governor, but not after it had been distributed, and its authors

were prosecuted. Finally, on the occasion of a series of lectures delivered to the

Ateneu Barcelonès in 1897 by members of the CEC, the new nationalist

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[39] For Prat de la Riba's discussion of the relationship between nationality and political society and national states and federalism, see *Revista Jurídica de Catalunya*, Tomo III (1897) pp. 825-7. The journal was initially published in Castilian and Prat de la Riba's column was published in Castilian between 1895-1906.
[40] Prat de la Riba, *La Nacionalitat Catalana*, p. 57.

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terminology was introduced to Barcelona's cultural and intellectual élites through a detailed consideration of the nature of the Catalan nation. In his own lecture, entitled, "El fet de la nacionalitat catalana" [The fact of the Catalan nationality] Prat de la Riba concluded that "if there is a collective spirit, a Catalan social sprit that has known how to create a Catalan language, legal system and art, I have said that which I sought to say, I have demonstrated that which I sought to demonstrate: that is, that there *exists a Catalan nation*."[42]

The Centre Escolar Catalanista promoted an understanding of Catalonia that focused on the collective features of its *national* character and argued the necessity of preserving the nation against the artificial construction of the state.[43] Almirall, by contrast, had made no such argument: his focus was on individual liberties and his intellectual preoccupation was how to design the institutional structure that would guarantee these. The young university students of the CEC worked for the recognition of Catalonia's collective character; they were less concerned with individual liberty and political institutions. From the perspective of members of the CEC, as Prat de la Riba made clear years later, the political and cultural challenge facing Catalonia was "not a question of good government or administration; it [was] not a question of liberty or equality; it [was] not a question of progress or tradition;

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 56-7.
[42] Prat de la Riba, "El Fet de la Nacionalitat Catalana," in *La Nacionalitat Catalana*, p. 93 (emphasis in original).
[43] Lluís Duran i Ventosa, *Regionalisme i Federalisme*, with an Introduction by Enric Prat de la Riba, 2nd. ed. (Barcelona: Editorial Catalana, 1922; repr., edited by Francesc de Carreras, Biblioteca dels Clàssics del nacionalisme Català, 29, Barcelona: Edicions de la Magrana and Diputació de Barcelona, 1993), pp. 37-40.

it [was] a question of Patria."[44] By inserting a wedge between state and nation, the intellectuals of the CEC could argue that *nations* had a right to organize as states. Although the solution towards which Prat de la Riba and Duran i Ventosa would gravitate was the same as that proposed by Almirall, a federal or composite state, its organizational basis was quite different. The federal solution proposed by Almirall, as well as by Pi i Margall, gave priority to individual liberty, not the liberty of organic nations. The introduction of the term 'nation' to refer to Catalonia marked the political project of the CEC off from the republican projects of an earlier generation of Catalan politicians, for whom the 'nation' was not an organizing principle for political action.

The use of terminology related to the 'nation' was not only a challenge to the objectives of nineteenth-century Catalan republicanism, but also to the Restoration regime. Increasingly, the objectives of the broader Catalanist movement shifted from a defence of the Catalan language and civil code to the promotion and development of the Catalan nation. During the 1890s, the CEC would grow impatient with the reluctance of the Lliga de Catalunya and, later, the Unió Catalanista,[45] to contest political power. Members of the Unío had successfully taken over the leadership positions of Catalonia's most influential associations and corporations such as the Acadèmia de Legislació i Jurisprudència de Barcelona

[44] Enric Prat de la Riba, "L'Obra d'En Duran [i Ventosa] in l'Evolució del Pensament Polític Català" [The work of Duran in the evolution of Catalan political thought], Introduction, in Duran i Ventosa, *Regionalisme i Federalisme*, p. 18.

[45] This was a union in 1891 of various Catalan groups which had mobilized around the protection of Catalan civil law. The Unió eventually attracted the membership of Catalonia's most important interest associations: the Foment del Treball Nacional [National Labour Development] (industrialists); the Institut Agrícola Català de Sant Isidre [Catalan Agricultural Institute of Sant Isidre] (landowners); the Lliga de Defensa Industrial i Commercial [Industrial and Commercial Defence League] (owners of small- and medium-

[Academy of Legislation and Jurisprudence of Barcelona], the Ateneu Barcelonès [Barcelonan Athenaeum] and the Foment del Treball Nacional, a strategy that allowed it to influence the most important intellectual and economic circles of Catalonia. The more political wing of the Unió wanted to take advantage of these newly acquired support bases to launch a political party that would represent Catalan interests in Madrid.

Unable to realize their ambitions within the Unió Catalanista, the advocates of political participation left the movement and reorganized themselves as the Centre Nacional Català (CNC) [Catalan National Centre] in 1899: Narcís Verdaguer i Callís, Lluís Domènech i Muntaner, Enric Prat de la Riba, Lluís Duran i Ventosa, Josep Puig i Cadafalch, Ramon d'Abadal,[46] Jaume Carner[47] and Ildefons Sunyol, among others. With the help of some financing from Catalan industrialists, the CNC converted *la Veu de Catalunya* [The Voice of Catalonia] into the most influential of early twentieth-century nationalist newspapers, which they used to promote their

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sized businesses); la Societat Econòmica d'Amics del País [Economic Society of Friends of the Country]; and the Ateneu Barcelonès [the Athenaeum].

[46] Ramon d'Abadal i Calderó (1862-1945), lawyer and politician. He joined the Lliga Regionalista in 1901 and was a member of its Comissió d'Acció Política after 1904. He was elected an alderman to Barcelona city hall in 1903 and 1911 and senator to the provincial council in 1907 and 1910. He was president of the Ateneu Barcelonès (1902) and the Acadèmia de Jurisprudència i Legislació de Catalunya (1903-4 and 1911-12).

[47] Jaume Carner (1867-1934), lawyer and politician. A founding member of the Lliga Regionalista, he was elected an alderman to Barcelona City Hall in 1901. Disappointed with the Lliga's orientation and strategy, he left the party and eventually founded the Centre Nacionalista Republicà, of which he was president. Later, he would also be president of the Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana, which was founded in 1910. Between 1907-1915 he was a republican deputy in the Cortes in Madrid. When he failed to be reelected in 1916, he returned to his career as a lawyer and was also a successful businessman. In 1931, he returned to politics and was elected a deputy to the Spanish constituent Cortes as a member of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. In the same year, he was elected president of the committee responsible for drafting Catalonia's Autonomy Statute. In 1932, he was named Minister of Finance in the government of the Second Republic but was forced to retire, in 1933, for health reasons.

political ambitions.[2] This group became the nucleus of the Lliga Regionalista (LR), a party that would come to represent conservative nationalist interests in Catalonia after 1901 and dominate Catalan politics until the Second Republic.

The Lliga Regionalista has been analyzed as the union of the CNC and a bourgeois nucleus made up of Catalan industrialists who were disappointed with the efforts of Spanish regenerators Joaquín Costa and Basilio Paraíso. Molas has argued that the influence of these two groups, each of which was made up of liberal professionals, radiated out to an important sector of Barcelona's bourgeoisie, urban property owners and commercial classes, while Borja de Riquer has argued that the LR's support base was made up of rural property-owners, Catalan industrialists and the liberal professionals of the CNC.[49] Liberal professionals were extensively represented among the LR's membership and occupied key decision-making positions in the party. For example, the Comissió d'Acció Política (CAP) [Political Action Committee], which Molas claims "directed the activities of the whole party,"[50] was made up entirely of liberal professionals: Prat de la Riba, d'Abadal, Puig i Cadafalch, Duran i Ventosa and Cambó—one architect (Puig i Cadafalch) and four

[48] Narcís Verdaguer i Callís, Enric Prat de la Riba, Francesc Cambó, Lluís Duran i Ventosa and Josep Puig i Cadafalch were the founders and principal journalists. The paper was a mouthpiece of the CNC but was also used by Catalan industrialists to promote their political and economic views. *La Veu de Catalunya* was the most important nationalist newspaper in early twentieth-century Catalonia. After the advent of the Second Republic, it became increasingly conservative politically. During the civil war (1937), the paper was confiscated by members of the anarchist Confederación Nacional del Trabajo and ceased publication.

[49] Isidre Molas, *Lliga Catalana: Un Estudi d'Estasiología*, Vol. 1, *Lliga Regionalista*, Collecció estudis i documents, 18 (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1972), pp. 42-43; and Borja de Riquer, "Els corrents conservadors catalans i la seva evolució cap al catalanisme polític" [Catalan conservative currents and their move toward political catalanism], *L'Avenç* 100 (1987), pp. 78-84. Molas also underscores the importance of former members of the dynastic parties, conservative Catholics and carlists among the Lliga's supporters.

[50] Molas, *Lliga Catalana*, p. 180.

lawyers.[51] The CAP was by all accounts the most influential organ within the Lliga: Cambó claims that the CAP was "an oligarchic regime, with the qualification that although its members shared the characteristic of being the best, their status was shaped as much by the voluntary support of the masses as by the staff of the party."[52] Members were appointed for life; they were not accountable to any other sector of the party; and there was no code of procedure governing their actions. Therefore, the claim that the party's conservatism was due to the presence of industrialists and rural landowners does not seem entirely credible since it was liberal professionals who determined the party's orientation. The LR's conservatism, while it might have been supported by industrialists in the party, was the result of the conservative nationalist orientation of members of the CAP, which reflected a traditional conception of Catalonia's social order.

Duran i Ventosa and Prat de la Riba, two members of the CAP, each published key works on Catalan nationalism in the first decade of the twentieth century that left no doubt that the principal difference between their conservative nationalist orientation—and that of the Lliga—and the federal republicanism of Pi i Margall and Almirall was their position on individual liberty. In 1905 Duran i Ventosa published *Regionalisme i Federalisme* as a critique of the central role of the

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[51] These names are from Francesc de Carreras, "Estudi Preliminar" [Preliminary Study], in Lluís Duran i Ventosa, *Regionalisme i Federalisme*, p. xvii. De Carreras maintains that these five men were members of the CAP from 1904 to 1917. Molas, *Lliga Catalana* (p. 180) does not include d'Abadal and claims that Puig i Cadafalch was only appointed after Prat de la Riba died in 1917. Carreras maintains that after Prat de la Riba's death Joan Ventosa i Calvell and Joan Bertran i Musitu were appointed to the CAP. Francesc Cambó has a different set of names: The original members were d'Abadal, Albert Rusiñol, Jaume Carner, Prat de la Riba and Cambó. Within a short period of time Rusiñol and Carner withdrew from the CAP and Duran i Ventosa and Puig i Cadafalch replaced them. Bertran i Musitu, the Marquès de Camps and Lluís Sedó participated in the CAP occasionally; later, Ventosa i Calvell became a permanent member. See Francesc Cambó, *Memòries (1876-1936)*, Vol. 1 (Barcelona: Editorial Alpha, 1981), p. 255.

rational individual in the federalist project promoted by Almirall and Pi i Margall. Duran i Ventosa rejected the possibility that the interests of a *people* could be defined as the interests of the democratic majority, as the federal-republicans maintained, arguing that "the nation is not the sum of the will of individuals that is manifested in a given moment, nor is it the will of the majority. [Instead] the nation is a live organism," which exists above the will of individuals. The national will, Duran i Ventosa argued, cannot be the will of those individuals which make up the nation but rather the will of an entity—the nation—which is quite distinct.[53] Prat de la Riba maintained something similar in his most important work, *La Nacionalitat Catalana* of 1906: "A nationality is an integral society, natural, spontaneous, superior to the will of men, superior to the will of public officials."[54]

The regionalist doctrine which Duran i Ventosa expounded could not accept "that the majority of votes cast by those citizens enjoying the right to vote can represent, in absolute, the nation, especially in the sense that with such a form of representation everything that this majority decides should be considered legitimate while everything else should not be considered legitimate."[55] Democratic majorities could not determine the will of the nation which, in fact, was almost impossible to discern. Therefore, the business of politics should be left to "superior minds" who alone possessed an understanding of the character of the nation.[56] All politics, in fact, was to be reduced to the nation since individuals did not possess universal rights: "freedom of conscience, of thought, universal suffrage, none of these can be

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[52] Cambó, *Memòries*, p. 255.
[53] Duran i Ventosa, *Regionalisme i Federalisme*, pp. 149, 152.
[54] Prat de la Riba, *La Nacionalitat Catalana*, p. 99.
[55] Duran i Ventosa, *Regionalisme i Federalisme*, p. 151.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

appreciated in the abstract or completely independently of the spirit of each country and national needs and aspirations."[57] For this reason, neither Duran i Ventosa nor Prat de la Riba would take a position on regime type nor on public institutions: the decision to adopt a monarchy or a republic really depended on the historical circumstances of a given nation. Compared to republicans such as Almirall, there was very little discussion of Catalonia's former governing institutions—the Corts, the Generalitat—in the work of Duran i Ventosa and Prat de la Riba.

The Lliga Regionalista's self-described 'accidentalism' with regard to regime type was a direct influence of the political thought of Prat de la Riba and Duran i Ventosa. This position was maintained by the party until the Second Republic and would be the principal reason for which the LR could never sustain political cooperation with republicans: "There is no difference between the regionalist and federal program with regards to the reorganization of the state and the autonomy of the region," Pi i Margall noted. "The difference between them and us is that, just as federalists are democratic and republican and will not compromise on the question of the monarchy, they [regionalists] consider themselves to be indifferent to the form of government and do not have the same love of individual rights that we have."[58]

The return of republicanism

The absence of any commitment to regime type by the intellectual leaders of the Lliga was the cause of the first split in the party in 1904. Despite the attempt by Prat de la Riba and Duran i Ventosa to monopolize nationalist discourse through

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[57] Duran i Ventosa, *Regionalisme i Federalisme*, ch. 3.
[58] Speech made by Pi i Margall in the Congress of Deputies (Madrid), 8 February 1900, in de Carreras, p. xxxv.

the LR, an important sector of Catalan political activists, who had been politicized in some of the same political organizations as the leaders of the LR, were committed to a *republican* solution for Catalonia and Spain. While this group accepted that there was a Catalan nation, they disagreed that the rights of the nation existed above the rights of the individual. No longer willing to accept the LR's neutrality on the regime question, a core group, which included Jaume Carner, Joan Lluhí i Rissech,[59] Joan Ventosa i Calvell, Ildefons Sunyol and Lluís Domènech i Montaner, separated from the party and began to mobilize around republicanism and democracy.

This dissident group first organized around a weekly newspaper, *El Poble Català* [The Catalan People] in order to promote a republican and democratic vision of Catalan politics.[60] Supporters of a federal solution, the journalists of *El Poble Català* argued that the transition to a federal Spain required "powerful instruments for action," such as democracy and republicanism.[61] The regime question quickly emerged as the foremost source of antagonism between republicans and the LR and was clearly reflected in the purpose and orientation of the political party which the republicans founded in 1906, Centre Nacionalista Republicà (CNR) [Nationalist Republican Center]. Speaking at the inaugural meeting of the newly-founded party, Carner, the CNR's president, stated the problem directly: "The problem of the form

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[59] Joan Lluhí i Rissech (1897-1944), lawyer and politician. His most influential political activities took place immediately prior to the Second Republic, when he founded the weekly magazine *L'Opinió* (1929) and penned the manifesto of the movement Intelligència Republicana (1930). He was elected the first director of the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and participated in all levels of politics during the republic.

[60] *El Poble Català* [The Catalan People] was a weekly newspaper from November 1904 until June 1906, after which it became a daily. It would become the party newspaper of the Centre Nacionalista Republicà in 1906 and the Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana in 1910.

[61] Jaume Carner, "La Democràcia Nacionalista de Catalunya," in *El Poble Català*, 1 May 1906, reprinted in Jaume Carner, *La Democràcia Nacionalista de Catalunya*, edited with an Introduction by Alfred Pérez-Bastardas, Biblioteca dels Clàssics del Nacionalisme Català, 8

of government in its most strict and practical political aspect is this: let's imagine a particular nation at a certain point in its history, and let's suppose that this nation has certain national needs, certain needs and problems which it must resolve. Given the incarnation of the [Spanish] monarchy in relationship to this people, what would be most useful for satisfying those national needs, for resolving those problems— preserving or changing the institution [of the monarchy]" for republicanism? The answer was straightforward for Carner: Catalonia had always been republican, even its early modern monarchy was more aptly described as "a republic with a hereditary president."[62]

The danger of referring to oneself as a republican in the first decade of the twentieth century, however, was that one could be mistaken for being an anti-Catalan. The Lliga Regionalista had so monopolized the public's understanding of what it meant to be committed to the Catalan nationality and to Catalan autonomy that unless one was a 'catalanist' on the LR's terms, one was a traitor. "All those social and political forces that represent a disassociation of the collective life are destructive forces," Prat de la Riba warned in 1905, "[they] are incompatible with the existence of the nationality, [they] are in combat with this nationality."[63] Prat de la Riba and Carner would engage in a polemical debate over how to define a catalanist and the differences between catalanism and republicanism from the pages of *La Veu*

(Barcelona: La Magrana and Diputació de Barcelona, 1984), pp. 36-37. See also Culla i Clarà, "De Budapest a Dublin passant per Cristiàna," pp. 41-2.

[62] Jaume Carner, "Orientacions Polítiques i Socials del Centre Nacionalista Republicà" [Political and social orientations of the Nationalist Republican Centre], Speech made at the inaugural session of the Centre Nacionalista Republicà on 26 January 1907, reprinted in Carner, *La Democràcia Nacionalista de Catalunya*, p. 59. For a similar statement about Catalonia's republicanism, see Carner, "La Democràcia Nacionalista de Catalunya," p. 37.

[63] Enric Prat de la Riba, "Els enemics de la Solidaritat" [The enemies of solidarity], *La Veu de Catalunya*, May 1906, in Jordi Solé-Tura, *Catalanisme i revolució burguesa: la síntesi de Prat de la*

de Catalunya and *El Poble Català.* Prat de la Riba's insinuation that as a republican

Carner could not be committed to the catalanist cause would force Carner to defend

his true colours: "Everyone knows, and Prat more than anyone else, that while I was

a member of the Lliga Regionalista I was as much a republican as I am now, and

now that I am a member of the CNR, I am as much a catalanist as I was before."[64]

To combat Prat de la Riba's polemics, the CNR campaigned to return the

republican option to the forefront of Catalan politics by mobilizing those Catalans

who supported what was distinctive about Catalonia as much as they supported

democracy and liberty. This was the political project devised by the party's strategic

groups, the Secció d'Estudis i de Propaganda [Study and Propaganda Section], led by

Antoni Rovira i Virgili,[65] the editor of *El Poble Català.* The Lliga's particular brand of

organicist nationalism allowed Catalonia's more conservative sectors to remain

indifferent to the social and political problems that preoccupied the average Catalan;

only republicanism could challenge this indifference by mobilizing all Catalans

around liberty and justice: "We are republicans not only because the republican form

of government is that which today can better mold our traditional sentiments, but

also because republicanism can realize the ideals of liberty and justice [and] provide

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Riba [Catalanism and bourgeois revolution: The synthesis of Prat de la Riba], Llibres a
l'abast, 47 (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1967).

[64] Jaume Carner in *El Poble Català,* 15 January 1908, in Albert Pérez-Bastardas, "Jaume
Carner: La Democràcia Nacionalista de Catalunya," introduction to Carner, *La Democràcia
Nacionalista de Catalunya,* p. xii.

[65] Antoni Rovira i Virgili (1882-1949), historian, journalist and politician. He emanated from
a family of committed federalists who influenced his political orientation. He was editor of
El Poble Català from 1905 to 1914, when he left to found *La Nació* [The Nation] and to join
the Unió Catalanista. He also wrote for *La Veu de Catalunya* and *La Publicidad* (1916-22). In
1922 he became vice-president of Acció Catalana. In 1927, he left the party and founded the
newspaper *La Nau* [The Ship] which would become the organ of his new political party,
Acció Catalana Republicana, in 1930. In 1932, he joined Esquerra Republicana Catalana and
was elected to the Generalitat. He continued to be a journalist, this time for *La Humanitat*

all Catalans with a life in which we can fully realize our nationalist and democratic aspirations."[66]

The CNR's concept of the nation was decidedly different from the collectivist aspirations of the Lliga Regionalista. The arguments for liberty and justice made by Catalan republicans were rooted in an historical institutional configuration that could not be found in the rest of Spain: "Catalonia, profoundly republican, has to create the powerful instrument that will transform the old Spain into the new Spain—free, federal, and democratic."[67] Party members such as jurist Albert Bastardas i Sampere[68] argued that in Spain, only republicanism could guarantee the rule of law and the protection of individual liberties. Moreover, only republican institutions could promote both the rights and the obligations of citizens. Consequently, if one wanted to defend the Catalan language and civil code, one had to be a republican in Bastardas i Sampere's estimation. No other institutions, certainly not those of the Restoration monarchy, could impose on Catalans an obligation to protect their cultural institutions and provide them with the right to do so.[69]

[Humanity]. He went into exile after the civil war and was a member of the Republican parliament in exile. He died in Perpignan.

[66] Carner, "Orientacions Polítiques i Socials del Centre Nacionalista Republicà," p. 60.

[67] Carner, "La Democràcia Nacionalista de Catalunya," p. 37.

[68] Albert Bastardas i Sampere (1871-1944), jurist and politician. He was a staunch advocate of local autonomy and as alderman in Barcelona city hall, successfully defended Barcelona's municipal government against interference by Madrid. He was a founding member of the Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicà, was elected a representative to the Mancomunitat and later became its vice-president. He played an important role in both the creation and management of certain social and juridical institutions, such as the Patronats de Previsió Social de Catalunya i Balears, Caixa de Pensions, Associació Protectora de l'Ensenyança Catalana, Unió Jurídica Catalana, Collegi d'Advocats de Catalunya and the Generalitat Provisional de Catalunya.

[69] Albert Pérez-Bastardas, *Els Republicans Nacionalistes i el Catalanisme Polític: Albert Bastardas i Sampere (1871-1944)*, Vol. 2, Collecció estudis i documents, 40 (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1987), pp. 462-3.

2. The Campaign for Local Autonomy

From an initial position of defending Catalan cultural markers, Catalan political and intellectual élites used their new conceptual vocabulary as a rallying point for organized political mobilization against the Restoration system after 1898. The first moment of counterhegemonic activity in Catalonia after 1898 was a campaign for regional autonomy that took place between 1906-1908 and which was waged by Solidaritat Catalana [Catalan Solidarity], an alliance of nationalist and republican forces. Solidaritat Catalana was formed in 1906 as an attempt to deal with the electoral constraint faced by minority anti-dynastic parties with a reformist agenda. Its immediate objective was to displace the dynastic parties in the four provincial assemblies of Catalonia as well as increase the parliamentary representation in Madrid of those parties that supported autonomy.[70] But the alliance brought together two distinct ideological forces, nationalists and republicans. Therefore, even if they shared a short-term objective, which was to obtain regional autonomy for Catalonia, their ideological differences would make it difficult for them to agree on the institutional nature of this autonomy. Their distinct patterns of recruitment and mobilization meant that they each needed a different type of representative institution for the consolidation of their hegemonic position—their long-term objective.

Solidaritat Catalana was not an alliance of equal partners from the beginning. While the nationalists were organized around the Lliga Regionalista, the republican component of the alliance was represented by several strands of republicanism,

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[70] Various reform projects had been considered since the beginning of the Restoration monarchy (1875) but these acquired a new urgency after 1898. The more important attempts

which was representative of republicanism generally in Spain. Not only was republicanism divided along Spanish and Catalan lines but also along revolutionary and reformist lines.[71] Since membership in Solidaritat Catalana raised the likelihood of ideological compromise, why did republicans join? I hypothesize that republicans would join the alliance in order to meet their short-term electoral objectives but, given the need to address the problem of the coherence of republican ideology, would defect as soon as their alliance with nationalists resulted in ideological compromise and the loss of their core support base. In the remainder of this section, I examine the historical evidence for this conjecture.

Electoral constraint

During the first decade of the twentieth century, both nationalists and republicans were potential alternatives to the dynastic parties of the *turno pacífico*. In order for either the nationalist Lliga Regionalista or any of the republican parties— the Spanish Unión Republicana (UR) [Republican Union] or the Catalan Centre Nacionalista Republicà—to be able to consolidate itself as the hegemonic political force in Catalonia, it would have to defeat convincingly the dynastic Conservatives and Liberals at the polls. A marginal victory would not be sufficient to deter the network of *caciques* but a clear victory would be more likely to be respected by the government, especially a Conservative government, whose electoral rule appeared to

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were found in the bills proposed in 1902, 1903, 1906 and finally, Maura's bill of 1907, which is being considered in this section.

[71] Manuel Suárez Cortina, "La Quiebra del Republicanismo Histórico, 1898-1931," in Nigel Townson (ed.), *El Republicanismo en España (1830-1977)* (Madrid: Alianza Universidad, 1994), pp. 139-163.

be: "where there is political life and opinion, sincere elections; where there is none, the institutions of *caciquismo* will substitute for a non-existent poll."[72]

The distribution of support for nationalists and republicans was almost evenly divided in urban centres such as Barcelona and the two parties formed the principal political cleavage in municipal elections. For example, the Barcelona municipal elections of 1901 returned 11 LR alderman and 10 republicans. Only one alderman, meanwhile, was elected from a dynastic party (Liberal). But for the provincial and general elections, nationalist and republican support was very localized around the region. It was relatively easier to recruit members away from the dynastic parties in the urban centres but in the countryside, where small networks of *caciques* operated, the Liberals and Conservatives would retain their support base and their hold on power.[73] Moreover, there were high rates of voter abstention after years of corrupt elections and this was difficult to reverse in the short-term (see Table 2). The electoral results for the parliamentary elections (Tables 1 and 2) show how power was fragmented across several parties. Because of these electoral constraints, the Lliga Regionalista and the Centre Nacionalista Republicà, two regionalist parties, and the Unión Republicana, an anti-systemic party, would always be limited to minority status in the Cortes and would be unable to promote their reformist agendas. An electoral alliance was an effective instrument for both nationalists and republicans to pool their resources in order to take on the dynastic parties at the polls and promote their reformist agenda in both the provincial assemblies and the Cortes.

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[72] Molas, *Lliga Catalana*, p. 77.
[73] There is only very partial data for provincial elections outside the Barcelona region.

Table 1
Party affiliation of Catalan deputies
elected to the Spanish Cortes, 1901-1910

Party/Year	1901	1903	1905	1907	1910	Total
Monarchists	33	25	26	3	16	103
Lliga Regionalista	6	5	7	16	9	43
Traditionalists[1]	1	0	0	6	2	9
Republicans	4	14	11	19	17	65
Total	44	44	44	44	44	220

[1]Supportes of Prince Jaume (also known as jaumistes), pretender to the throne and heir to the Carlist cause.

Source: Albert Balcells, *Catalan Nationalist Past and Present* (New York: St. Martin's 1996), p. 74.

Table 2
Results of the parliamentary elections held in the city of Barcelona,
1901-1910 (percentage of registered voters supporting each candidacy)

Party/Year	1901	1903	1905	1907	1908	1910
Abstentions	79.8	54.4	71.0	40.1	47.0	42.0
Lliga Regionalista	6.3	9.8	10.2	—	—	11.5
Unió Republicana	4.4	30.6	18.2	—	—	—
Solidaritat Catalana	—	—	—	43.3	29.5	—
Anti-Solidaritat Republicans[1]	—	—	—	17.4	23.4	—
Partit Republicà Català[2]	—	—	—	—	—	22.5
UFNR[3]	—	—	—	—	—	17.2
Monarchists	4.9	—	—	—	—	6.7
Carlists	—	3.6	—	—	—	—

[1]This was the name given to Alejandro Lerroux' republicans, who refused to join Solidaritat Catalana

[2]This was the name given to Alejandro Lerroux' republican movement after Solidaritat Catalana broke up.

[3]Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicà was a coalition of republican forces formed in 1910.

Source: Albert Balcells, *Catalan Nationalist Past and Present* (New York: St. Martin's 1996), p. 81.

The catalyst for forming Solidaritat Catalana was the Llei de Jurisdiccions [Law of Jurisdictions], which the Madrid government had enacted following a military attack on two of the Lliga Regionalista's newspapers, *Cu-cut!* and *La Veu de*

Catalunya. The military had been aggravated by what it perceived to be an attack on its honour after *Cu-cut!*, "the humorous publication most widely read [by] Barcelona's middle-classes," published a cartoon that caricatured the military's recent defeat in the colonial wars.[74] The incident propelled the army to seek and obtain jurisdiction over offenses to the military and the fatherland as well as the declaration of martial law in Barcelona. In Catalonia, these events were interpreted by political élites as an attempt first, to outlaw the expression of Catalan nationalism, which the military viewed as a form of separatism and, more generally, to infringe upon democratic rights. It was Nicolás Salmerón, the leader of the UR who first suggested to members of the Lliga Regionalista during a parliamentary speech that an alliance of republican and catalanist forces work together to oppose the Law of Jurisdictions: "Are you with me? Will we bring peace together to Catalonia? Do you wish for us to go arm in arm, catalanists and republicans...in the saintly and loving lap of our common mother Spain?"[75]

Salmerón's invitation was the outcome of a debate within the recently formed Unión Republicana (1903) over what electoral strategy to take in response to the emergence of the nationalist LR in Catalonia. The LR had quickly become the Spanish republicans' principal electoral rival in Catalonia because it appeared better able to capture the vote of the middle strata through appeals to Catalan nationalist sentiment. Two strategies presented themselves: the UR could either oppose the Lliga from within the Spanish republican movement or, it could take on the Lliga

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[74] Joaquín Romero-Maura, "The Spanish Army and Catalonia: The 'Cu-Cut! Incident' and the Law of Jurisdictions, 1905-1906," *Sage Research Papers in the Social Sciences*, Series 90-033, Vol. 5 (1976), p. 16.

directly on its own turf by challenging it for the leadership of a mass-based Catalan movement for political change.[76]

In suggesting an alliance, the UR opted for the second strategy. It was motivated by several factors. First, Spanish republicanism in Catalonia was monopolized by the populist leader of the working classes, Alejandro Lerroux and the principal support base of Spanish republicanism was labour.[77] Although Lerroux had lent his support to Unión Republicana and its decision to pursue the parliamentary path to reform after 1903, Salmerón and other republican leaders believed that Lerroux was never far from inciting his working-class supporters to violent revolution. In fact, Lerroux was considered to be something of a liability since his personalistic leadership made him an unreliable political partner. Lerroux' demagoguery and populism kept workers loyal to him, but not necessarily to the party.

Second, an alliance with more moderate forces would change the face of republicanism in Catalonia. The Spanish leaders of the Unión wanted to acquire a moderate and reformist middle-class support base in Catalonia that could be organized and disciplined through party structures. They calculated that the support

[75] Nicolás Salmerón, *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de Diputados*, 29 November 1905, in José Álvarez Junco, *El Emperador del Paralelo: Lerroux y la demagogia populista* [The Emperor of the Paralelo: Lerroux and popular demagoguery] (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1990), p. 319.

[76] Albert Balcells (with Enric Pujol and Jordi Sabater), *La Mancomunitat de Catalonia i l'autonomia* (Barcelona: Proa, 1997), pp. 43-44.

[77] Alejandro Lerroux Garcéa (1864-1949), journalist and politician. Lerroux was editor of the Madrid daily, *El País*, founded *El Progreso* (1897); wrote for *El Intransigente*, *El Radical* and *La Publicidad*. After 1901, he moved to Barcelona and recruited the working classes to his brand of republicanism, which was steeped in Spanish patriotism and anti-clericalism. He founded three important republican organizations in Barcelona: Fraternidad Republicana, the Federación Revolucionaria and the Casa del Pueblo. He was elected deputy to the Cortes for Barcelona in 1901, 1903 and 1905 as a candidate for the Unión Republicana. The two most authoritative accounts of Lerroux and his republican movement are, Joan B. Culla i Clarà, *El*

base of the Lliga could be won over to republicanism through the promotion of a reformist agenda for democratic change. Because the UR was a Spanish-wide party, it could bring about a regime change more quickly than a regionally-based party like the LR. But the UR would need the reformist vote in Catalonia to bring down the monarchy; by courting the more moderate wing of the nationalist movement, the UR would gain access to a reformist support base and eventually absorb nationalists into the mainstream of Spanish politics. This move would also diffuse the potential for a separatist platform in Catalonia, which Salmerón saw as a possible reaction to the growing anti-catalanism that was emerging in Madrid and elsewhere following the *Cu-cut!* affair.[78] Finally, there was already a Catalan republican movement with which the UR could cooperate through the alliance.

The Lliga Regionalista's response to Salmerón's overtures was immediate and unhesitant: Francesc Cambó is reported to have told the LR's deputies in the Cortes to "Accept! Accept with your eyes closed, at once!"[79] The LR's objective of restoring social peace and civic order to Barcelona was sufficient grounds to form an alliance to challenge the Law of Jurisdictions. However, the party had other electoral objectives for an alliance with republicans. First, the LR wanted to expand its support base which, for the most part, was on the right of centre. This was a

Republicanisme Lerrouxista a Catalunya (1901-1923) [Lerrouxist Republicanism in Catalonia (1901-1923)] (Barcelona: Curial, 1986); and Álvarez Junco, *El Emperador del Paralelo*.

[78] See Salmerón's speech in the Cortes, which is reproduced in Joaquim Romera-Maura, *'La Rosa del Fuego': Republicanos y anarquists: La política de los obreros barceloneses entre el desastre colonial y la Semana Trágica* [The fire-rose: Republians and anarchists: The politics of Barcelona's workers between the colonial disaster and the Tragic Week] (Barcelona, 1975), pp. 596-603, and discussed in Sebastian Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 150-1.

[79] The original reference is Josep Pla, *Francesc Cambó*, Volume II (Barcelona, 1928-30), p. 139. The quote is reproduced and discussed in, Álvarez Junco, *El Emperador del Paralelo*, p. 319; Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire*, p. 151; and Culla i Clarà, *El Republicanisme Lerrouxista a Catalunya (1901-1923)*, p. 141.

product of a strategy the party had elected to pursue early on, whereby it would "oppose the republicans and erect itself as the bastion of the bourgeois order."[80] In addition to its core support base of conservative intellectuals, lawyers and industrialists, the LR had also attracted former supporters of the dynastic parties and ultra-right Catholic forces. Moreover, the Carlist forces were slowly integrated into the LR in areas outside of Barcelona.

The Lliga Regionalista wanted to shed its image as a conservative force but it was not prepared to actively recruit the working classes. The LR was not opposed to the integration of workers into its ranks; rather, it was opposed to what it considered to be an excessive streak of individualism among Barcelona's anarchist workers. The LR's response to the class conflict had not evolved much beyond Prat de la Riba's nineteenth-century design for a corporatist system which would guarantee the representation of workers' interests through their guilds.[81] The problem was individualism; the solution was the restoration of society's natural organisms. However, given the working classes' firm commitment to anarchism, the LR appreciated that its politics would not attract the popular support that would provide the consensual basis for its project for political autonomy for Catalonia. An electoral alliance with republicans would provide the LR with direct access to the left-leaning support base of the Unión Republicana without having to actually recruit the working classes.

The Lliga Regionalista had a second purpose in entering into an alliance with republicans. The failure of the efforts of Joaquín Costa and Basilio Paraíso to turn

[80] Culla i Clarà, *El Republicanisme Lerrouxista a Catalunya*, p. 51.
[81] Prat de la Riba, "La Qüestió Social i la Política" [The social question and politics], *La Renaixensa*, 1891, in *La Nacionalitat Catalana*, pp. 129-136.

the Unión Nacional into a Spain-wide movement for reform had left the regenerators within the Lliga isolated politically and geographically. By entering into an alliance with the UR, the LR would have access to the republicans' Spanish networks so that the Catalan movement for reform might expand beyond its base and regenerate all of Spain. This was Prat de la Riba's 'imperialist' vision of Catalan-Spanish relations, which was published in the same year as Solidaritat Catalana was formed: "An intense national culture, a general interest for civilization, and a sufficient force to sustain both of these; there are the essential elements of imperialism...Imperialism is...The moment that follows the fulfillment of the" national life.[82]

Ideological Compromise

The Lliga Regionalista and the Unión Republicana had similar purposes in forming Solidaritat Catalana: they each intended to use the alliance to increase their electoral support base. This strategy raised the potential problem of ideological compromise for both parties. The LR managed this problem better right from the start. First, from the perspective of the members of the LR, the alliance was an opportunity to present a united front against Madrid, a strategy which had been a cornerstone of the nationalist party. The only way to affirm the existence of a Catalan nation was to demonstrate the importance of ethnic criteria for unifying a people since, without a common front, Catalonia's demands for self-government

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[82] Prat de la Riba, *La Nacionalitat Catalana*, ch. IX. Molas speculates that this chapter might have been written expressly to promote the idea that Solidaritat Catalana had nation-wide ambitions. See *Lliga Catalana*, p. 71.

would be dismissed by Madrid. All of this satisfied the support base of the LR, particularly since the strategy did not appear to entail any ideological compromise.[83]

Second, the LR sought access to the republicans' support base purely for electoral purposes. The party was not interested in transforming lower middle-class or working-class republicans into Catalan nationalists: "The *Left* which Cambó [and the LR] wanted to *make* was a stunted *left*, with its wings clipped, available at any moment to serve as a pawn or like an awning that would give the LR's initiatives a 'united' or 'national' character but which would be unable to break the monopoly that the Lliga had established over the catalanist movement."[84] Third, from the moment the alliance was founded in February 1906, the LR's mark was clearly stamped on it. The publication of Prat de la Riba's *La Nacionalitat Catalana* in the context of the strong show of popular support for the alliance gave Solidaritat Catalana its ideological orientation—the LR's orientation—and an exposé of nationalist ideas for popular consumption. Moreover, it was Prat de la Riba who wrote Solidaritat Catalana's manifesto, the "Programa de Tivoli." In entering into an alliance with republicans, then, the LR could consolidate its dominant position in Catalonia, avoid ideological compromise on its goals and do away with republicanism. The LR's leaders "intuited [that Solidaritat Catalana] was a magnificent instrument for weakening the Unión Republicana."[85]

The problem of ideological compromise was not immediately apparent to republicans when Salmerón first suggested the alliance. Those Catalan republicans who had left the Lliga Regionalista in 1904 and were organized around *El Poble*

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[83] For an account of the popular support accorded Solidaritat Catalana, see Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire*, pp. 152-3.
[84] Culla i Clarà, *El Republicanisme Lerrouxista a Catalunya*, p. 123 (emphasis in original).

Català saw no reason not to thrown their hat into the ring. They viewed Solidaritat

Catalana as a platform for recruiting Lerroux' republicans to the Catalan cause.

Carner had publicly lamented the fact that "the mass of workers in our land

[Catalonia] observe the nationalist movement with a certain prejudice" and wanted

to reverse this fact.[86] If the Unión Republicana could deliver the workers to

Solidaritat Catalana, Carner and his republican cohort could catalanize them. In

December 1906, some 10 months after Solidaritat Catalana was formed, Carner and

his associates founded the Centre Nacionalista Republicà in Barcelona and the first

indications were that the party would give republicans the support they needed to

gain control of the direction of the alliance: "The fact that in only a few days more

than 900 citizens have signed up to our organization is a sign, a revelation, that this

centre, that this enterprise, has deep roots in the political state of Catalonia."[87]

Pérez-Bastardas estimates that only 50 of these new members had previously

belonged to the Lliga Regionalista, while Molas maintains that around this time, the

LR might have had between 400 and 600 members.[88] It seemed, then, that there was

a ready support base for the republican message.

The leadership of the UR, by contrast, was far less successful than the CNR

or the LR in convincing its members of the benefits of a nationalist-republican

alliance. Many members of the party were concerned that an alliance with the

conservative anti-democratic and pro-monarchical LR would require too great an

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[85] *Ibid.*, p. 142.
[86] Carner, "El nacionalisme i els obrers" [Nationalism and the workers], *Serem* (1905), in Carner, *La Democràcia Nacionalista de Catalunya*, p. 33.
[87] Carner, "Orientacions Polítiques i Socials del Centre Nacionalista Republicà," p. 56.
[88] Pérez-Bastardas, "Jaume Carner: La Democràcia Nacionalista de Catalunya," p. xi.; Molas, *Lliga Catalana*, p. 72, n.10.

ideological compromise. *La Publicidad,*[89] a long-standing republican newspaper in Barcelona and supporter of Alejandro Lerroux, assured its readership that, despite the alliance with the nationalists, "our [political] conduct has not suffered nor will it suffer any variation whatsoever...there is no confusion over dogmas or ideals."[90] But the membership of the party was not convinced, particularly in Barcelona, where only five out of a total of 42 republican organizations supported Solidaritat Catalana. At Barcelona city hall, 15 republican alderman came out against Solidaritat Catalana while only eight were in favour.[91] Solidaritat Catalana's programme was viewed as overly moderate by opponents of the alliance: it proposed to campaign for regional autonomy under the monarchy, thereby leaving to one side the question of regime change. Moreover, many of Lerroux' supporters were workers who were economic migrants to Catalonia from other parts of Spain; for the most part, they would not favour Catalan autonomy. Indeed, the attraction of Lerroux' republican message for workers, particularly migrant workers, was that it promoted solidarity among the Spanish working classes.

Many republican forces in Catalonia opposed Solidaritat Catalana because it weakened the UR's ideological hold over the party's core support base among Catalan workers. Faithful to Lerroux, these forces rallied around his efforts to retain the leadership of the republican movement in Catalonia as a mark of respect for his considerable efforts at organizing and representing the interests of workers at a time

[89] *La Publicidad* was founded in 1875 in Barcelona and was read by professionals, shopowners and property owners with democratic ideals. It was the mouthpiece of the Partido Republicano Nacional (1895); the Fusión Republicana (1897); the Unión Republicana (1903); and Acció Catalana (1922). In 1906, the paper came out in support of Solidaritat Catalana.
[90] *La Publicidad,* 12 March 1908, in Culla i Clarà, *El Republicanisme Lerrouxista a Catalunya,* p. 143.

when no organization or party within the Catalanist movement was even interested in reaching out to this class.[92] Lerroux explained to a journalist his opposition to Solidaritat Catalana thus: "I have fought incessantly, I have put all my energy, all my soul into this endeavour of forming a liberal and republican environment...of creating true supporters of the ideals of progress and liberty. I think, without being a braggart, that I have succeeded...So when, after so much effort, one has reached one's goal and it is suddenly suggested that we retreat,"—the response had to be 'no'.[93] Lerroux saw few benefits for himself and his supporters in an alliance that he suspected would really come under the direct influence of the Lliga Regionalista despite Salmerón's leadership. No amount of persuasion by the pro-Solidaritat republicans in the UR could convince Lerroux and his supporters that the alliance would benefit the republican cause. The party would split into pro- and anti-Solidaritat factions. Although it had been one of the Lliga's objectives to weaken the republican movement, it was not the party's expectation that this would occur before they could have access to Lerroux' support base.

Defection and Betrayal

The decision of Salmerón's republicans and Catalan republicans to continue with Solidaritat Catalana after the defection of Lerroux' republicans is something of a puzzle, since the defection occurred for ideological reasons. The evidence appears to be at variance with the hypothesis with which I began this section; namely, that a counterhegemonic group will enter into a cooperative alliance with other groups so

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[91] Culla i Clarà, *El Republicanisme Lerrouxista a Catalunya*, p. 152.
[92] See Lipset and Rokkan's argument that the party that first brings a social group into the political system retains a privileged hold on this constituency: Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (ed.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York and London: The Free Press and Collier-Macmillan, 1967).

long as the ideological compromise that results does not cause the defection of its core support base. It seems that a group of republicans were willing to continue on with the alliance despite having lost the support of republicanism's base in Catalonia.

In fact, this was not the case, since there was a particular intra-group dynamic within the UR that motivated Salmerón to pursue an alliance with the Lliga Regionalista despite Lerroux' defection. There were two arenas of political activity and calculations in Solidaritat Catalana. The principal arena was an inter-group one (nationalists-republicans). The second arena was an intra-group one (republicans) and was 'nested' within the first.[94] There were actually two sets of games going on: one between nationalists and republicans and another among republicans of the UR. In order to understand why Salmerón pushed ahead with Solidaritat Catalana, then, we need to understand the political dynamic within the UR.

Salmerón wanted to use Solidaritat Catalana to consolidate his position and support base within the UR and to give a clear direction and ideological profile to the party. Salmerón had a loyal following amongst the most important reformist republican parties in Spain. However, Lerroux, and other regionally-based political leaders, were pulling the UR in different directions and threatening Salmerón's attempt to consolidate his leadership position.[95] Lerroux could not be trusted to be loyal to Salmerón and to give his full support to the reformist agenda pursued by Salmerón. Nor could Salmerón always count on the populist Lerroux to deliver the republican working-class vote to the UR. Because of this tension between Salmerón

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[93] Culla i Clarà, *El Republicanisme Lerrouxista a Catalunya*, p. 146.

[94] In nested games, "the observer focuses attention on only one game, but the actor is involved in a whole network of games." See, George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 7.

[95] Suárez Cortina, "La quiebra del republicanismo histórico," pp. 146-47.

and Lerroux, the UR leader would not have considered Lerroux' defection to be a liability. In fact, he might even have wanted Lerroux to defect.

The Unión Republicana had formed in 1903 as a result of a strategic decision to pursue the parliamentary route to reform. The republican ideology that the UR was developing was reformist in character: the monarchy would be 'overthrown' through a resounding republican victory at the polls, not a revolution from below. For this reason, Salmerón did not consider the loss of Lerroux' republican support base to be a sign that the UR had compromised its ideological position. Lerroux' brand of republicanism was directed at the working classes but this was not the political project of Spanish republicanism. Republicanism was not a working-class ideology; the republican cause did not require the support of the working classes to legitimize its political project. Outside of Catalonia, Spanish republicans were attempting alliances with socialists in order to avoid having to recruit directly the working classes.[96] If the UR continued to rely on a working-class support base in Catalonia, the party would eventually be forced to take on anarchists and socialists— who were attempting to make inroads among workers[97]—and this would certainly force republicanism to become a workers' doctrine.

Since the Catalan working class was already republican and anarchist, the UR needed to recruit a more moderate membership base if it wanted support for its reformist project. Therefore, the UR directed its republican project at the reformist core of the Lliga. Salmerón calculated that through an alliance with nationalists, he

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[96] See the discussion in Suárez Cortina, "La quiebra del republicanismo histórico," pp. 149 ff.

[97] David Ballester, *Marginalitats i Hegemonies: La UGT de Catalunya (1898-1936): De la Fundació a la II República* [Marginalized and Hegemonies: The UGT of Catalonia (1889-1936): From

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could eventually persuade this group that parliamentary republicanism was the most likely avenue to political reform. What the Unión Republicana lost with Lerroux' defection could be regained through the recruitment of a more moderate, disciplined and reformist middle-class base.

It was Catalan republicans who had more to lose, ideologically, than their Spanish counterparts as a result of Lerroux' defection. Although the CNR was also reformist, it was perhaps less convinced that it could win over the reformist core of the Lliga than was the UR. Instead, the CNR wanted to be able to recruit republican workers to the Catalan cause. Nevertheless, the initial show of public support for the new Catalan republican party, the CNR, convinced Catalan republicans that they could at least use the public's enthusiasm for Solidaritat Catalana to attempt to build their support base. The strategy of both Spanish and Catalan republicans was risky, since they could emerge from the alliance in a much weakened position. Still, they primarily viewed the alliance as a means of spreading republican ideology to the middle strata of Catalan society, which had remained outside of the political system under the Restoration regime.

Indeed, the loss of support from Lerroux' republicans did not immediately show up in the polls. The public anticipation created by the Solidaritat Catalana was evident during the elections to the provincial council held in March 1907: there was a 51 per cent voter turnout, compared to 25 per cent in the elections of 1903 and 24 deputies from the Solidaritat Catalana were elected, compared to only one 'lerrouxista', the name given to candidates from Lerroux' faction of the Unión

the foundation to the Second Republic] (Barcelona: Columna and Fundació Comaposada, 1996).

Republicana.[98] Solidaritat Catalana's victory facilitated the election of Prat de la Riba to the presidency of the Barcelona provincial council, which was the first important public office secured by the Lliga Regionalista. The popularity of Solidaritat Catalan gathered momentum between March and April 1907, when it ran in the elections to the Cortes in Madrid. The voter turnout in Barcelona was 59 per cent, a record that would not be broken until the elections of 1931. Again, Solidaritat Catalana swept the boards, this time capturing 71 per cent of the vote in Barcelona while the lerrouxistas won the rest (29 per cent). Of the 44 districts in all of Catalonia, 41 were won by candidates of Solidaritat Catalana—of which 21 by republicans—and only three by lerrouxista candidates.[99]

Solidaritat Catalana's first electoral victories fulfilled the short-term objectives of both nationalists and republicans. Cambó was convinced that the alliance could uproot the dynastic parties in all of Spain: "we [Solidaritat Catalana] are worth more than those in the dynastic parties, who are only tolerated because there is nothing stronger to challenge their dominance...We need to go to the provinces and tear open their network [of *caciques*]; we'll make people follow us...And this way we can resolve our problem and the general problem of Spain."[100] Indeed the regime in Madrid must have been convinced of the same thing because it moved quickly to divide and conquer nationalists and republicans. The Conservative prime minister of the day, Antonio Maura, was particularly disdainful of regionalist parties, although he was himself a Catalan from Mallorca: "There does not exist a

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[98] Balcells, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia*, p. 46. The results were as follows: Solidaritat Catalan: 24 deputies; Conservatives: 8; Liberals: 3; Lerrouxista: 1.
[99] *Ibid*.
[100] The opinions of Cambó are reported by Antoni Rovira i Virgili in *Els polítics catalans* (Barcelona, 1929), p. 178.

deeper evil, nor a seed of danger more tremendous for the government to which Spain aspires than a local party, like the catalanist [Lliga Regionalista] party."[101] However, Maura knew that the Lliga Regionalista shared certain political objectives with the Conservative party; in particular, the programme to regenerate Spain through local reform. Antonio Maura had been an advocate of local reform since the military disaster of 1898.[102] When he was asked to form the government in Madrid in 1907, he seized the opportunity to introduce a wave of legislative initiatives including a bill each for local administration and electoral reform that were designed to make popular political participation more democratic and to eliminate the effectiveness of the *caciques*. The most significant aspects of the bill, which Maura introduced as a "bill to uproot caciquismo,"[103] included a provision for creating a confederation of municipalities for administrative purpose and a corporate suffrage.[104]

The Lliga Regionalista's leadership supported Maura's effort to control political representation through the corporatist vote for several reasons. First, corporatist representation corresponded perfectly with the vision of a traditionally-ordered Catalan society that was promoted by the party's intellectual directors, Prat de la Riba and Duran i Ventosa. Second, the Lliga's support was, for the most part, already organized into corporate structures such as the interest organizations representing industrialists, businessmen and landowners; intellectual movements that

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[101] Don Antonia Mauro, "Los partidos locales no remedian el daño" [Local parties will not repair the damage], in *Ideario Político: Extractos de sus Discursos*, D. Joan Bautista Catalá y Gavilá (ed.) (Madrid, 1918), p. 128.

[102] See Antonio Maura, "La Reforma de la Administración Local," *La Lectura*, Año II, Tomo I (1902), pp. 561-86.

[103] Quoted in Ullman, *The Tragic Week*, p. 50. The bill was officially titled: "Bill Establishing the Bases for the Reform of Local Administration."

were at the centre of the party; and cultural organizations such as the Ateneu Barcelonès. The LR reasoned that although it did not control interest organizations among the working classes, it already controlled or could conceivably gain control of organizations among industrialists, property owners, intellectuals, and the middle sectors. Finally, a corporatist system of interest representation would mean that the LR would not need to recruit, even indirectly, the working classes. In other words, corporatism made the alliance with republicans completely unnecessary. The alliance was pursued because of the electoral constraint minority parties faced in majoritarian systems. Corporatism would remove the constraint and, therefore, the need for electoral alliances.

The Lliga was able to exchange its support for corporatism for certain amendments to the bill, such as the direct elections of deputies to the provincial assemblies (although the number of deputies would be reduced) and the confederation of provincial assemblies. The former would open up the possibility of gaining control of these assemblies while the latter would allow for direct control of all of the governing institutions of Catalonia and, by extension, the consolidation of the Lliga's hegemony through these reformed state institutions.

The republican partners of the Solidaritat Catalana rejected the corporatist vote, which they considered to be a travesty of universal suffrage: "Let's not play games. Universal suffrage…means recognizing that every citizen of a certain age has a right to vote, and gives equal weight to each of their votes."[105] The republicans recognized that the collusion between Maura and the Lliga was intended to limit the

[104] Javier Tussell, *Antonio Maura: Una biografía política* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial 1994), p. 95.

place of workers in municipal and regional government. The most well-organized labour movement in Catalonia at that time was anarchist, but the anarchists would never consent to participate in a corporatist regime. Moreover, it was doubtful that the regime would allow anarchist participation; it would doubtless create its own system for the representation of labour interests. Second, corporatist representation was antithetical to republicans, who recruited members through the promotion of individual liberties. For the most part, republican organizations existed at the community level and served as cultural centres and meeting places. These 'circles' or 'casinos' were not class or trade-based. Although artisans and trades groups had traditionally been republican, the organizational centre of their republicanism was the community level circle or casino, not the guild or the cooperative society of tradesmen.[106] In order for republicans to compete with nationalists in a corporatist system, they would be forced to reorganize completely their support bases. Not only was this unlikely, but it went against the democratic thrust of the republican project.

As republicans soon realized, the Lliga Regionalista, and especially its ambitious leader Cambó, had deceived them by breaking the alliance and negotiating directly with the regime. Republicans got their first taste of the LR's conception of political reform, which had far more in common with the conservatism of the regime than it did with the democratic reforms pursued by republicans. The Lliga had taken advantage of the political clout that its membership in an alliance of reformist forces had provided it to deal directly with Maura's Conservatives, with

[105] Jaume Carner, "La Campanya pel Sufragi Universal" [The Campaign for Universal Suffrage], El Poble Català, 12 January 1908, in Carner, La Democràcia Nacionlista de Catalunya, p. 74.

whom it had more in common, ideologically and politically, than with its republican partners in Solidaritat Catalana. For example, the LR had presented its own position on local reform to Maura without consulting their republican partners.[107] Second, the LR took advantage of its access to Maura to undermine republican hegemony at Barcelona city hall by adding a fourth corporatist group to the three that already existed (intellectuals, industrial élites and workers): property owners.[108] The "Maura-Cambó duet, which is now the only duet being sung" in Madrid was an attempt to marginalize the influence of republicans in Catalonia, according to the Catalan republican Ildefons Sunyol.[109] Enraged, the republicans insisted that the member parties of Solidaritat Catalana be allowed a free vote on Maura's reform bill so that they could oppose it in its entirety; the Lliga's deception would provoke the end of the alliance.

While the local administration bill was debated in the Cortes, the Lliga Regionalista tried to revive Solidaritat Catalan for electoral purposes, but this failed after the LR betrayed the republicans on two further occasions. The first was in 1908 when the alliance of republicans and nationalists at Barcelona city hall passed a special budget for culture to construct secular schools that would have fallen under municipal jurisdiction. The initiative was an attempt to confront the problem of

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[106] See the list of such organizations for all of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Catalonia in the appendix ton Ángel Duarte, *El Republicanisme català a la fi del segle XIX* [Catalan republicanism at the end of the 19th century] (Vic: EUMO, 1987), pp. 161-188.
[107] See, Lliga Regionalista de Barcelona, *A Les Corts Espanyoles: Informe sobre el Projecte de Lley sobre'l Regim d'Administració Local* [To the Spanish Cortes: Statement on the Bill on the Local Administration Regime] (Barcelona: September 1907).
[108] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[109] Jesús Pabón, *Cambó*, Volume 2 (Barcelona: 1952), p. 310.

inadequate education facilities and Barcelona's high illiteracy rate.[110] The Church opposed the fact that teachers would be selected by the municipal government and that the schools would be non-denominational. The Church brought pressure to bear on the Crown-appointed mayor, who vetoed the project. But it was the regionalists who, having succumbed to the pressure of the Church, ensured that the cultural budget was not passed by the provincial council. The second betrayal by the LR occurred in 1909, when the vice-presidency of the provincial council was vacated by a republican. According to a previous agreement, the position should have been filled by another republican. However, the LR joined forces with the dynastic parties and supported a dynastic candidate in order to consolidate the position of regionalist and dynastic forces on the Council. After this action, the alliance of nationalist and republican forces was irreparably broken.

Becoming the new hegemon

Having marginalized the political influence of the reformist republicans in Catalonia's governing institutions, the Lliga Regionalista was confident that it would be able to consolidate its position as the new hegemonic force in Catalonia after the local administration bill was passed into law. Although there had been several modifications to those articles related to the confederation of provinces in Maura's local administration bill, the LR had no reason to suspect that the project would not go through. However, a week of anticlerical violence in the summer of 1909 brought down the government.[111] The 'Tragic Week' changed the course of Spanish politics

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[110] Ullman reports that the illiteracy rate for inhabitants of the city over the age of seven was 48 per cent. See, *The Tragic Week*, p. 62.
[111] Street protesters against the conscription of soldiers to fight a war in Spanish Morocco targeted church buildings. Conscripts were able to buy their way out of military service for a fee. Workers and petite bourgeoisie had mutual insurance plans to assist them in meeting the

in that "the politicians [in the Cortes] maintained the façade of a constitutional monarchy but they no longer claimed to use the legislature as a means of enacting profound reforms as they had done during the first decade of the twentieth century."[112] This would have extensive repercussions for the Catalan autonomy movement and would force both the LR and the republican forces to change their strategy. While the latter would become more radical the former would turn collusion with Madrid into their principal tactic for pursuing reform. The behaviour of the LR in this period, then, was truly indicative of its preference for controlled and conservative reform at the state level.

Conclusion

The analytical narrative developed in this chapter provides support for the hypothesized relationship between cooperation and ideological compromise that was examined here. Corporatism represented an ideological compromise for republicans and they preferred to abandon the cooperative alliance with nationalists than vote for a corporatist system of representation in the local administration bill. The republicans abandoned Solidaritat Catalana because the corporatist vote threatened their position on individual liberty and their pursuit of democratic reform. There would be no hope for a transition to a republic through corporatism.

The narrative also brought to light the different conceptions of autonomy and the social order held by nationalists and republicans. When the conceptual

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buy-out fee. The protest in Barcelona was made by those who could not afford the fee and had no insurance plan as well as those who opposed what appeared to be another colonial war. On conscription in Spain see, Ullman, *The Tragic Week*, pp. 24-26. Antonio Maura abolished 'buying-out' by decree in August 1909, after the events of the Tragic Week. For a discussion of 'buying-out' in a comparative context see, Margaret Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), ch. 4.

[112] Ullman, *The Tragic Week*, p. 307.

vocabulary developed by nationalists and republicans at the turn of the century was translated into political action, it became clear that nationalists were more supportive of the traditional social order that was held in place by the Restoration monarchy than were republicans. The republican project was directed at the system itself, its corruption and, especially, its monarchism, which was perceived as an impediment to liberty. For nationalists, by contrast, the monarchy itself was not an impediment to reform. In fact, their experience with Antonio Maura convinced the nationalists of the Lliga that institutional reform could be pursued through negotiations with the regime. In return for some political reforms which would allow the Lliga to consolidate its hegemony in Catalonia, the conservative nationalists would agree to support the Restoration system. In chapter 6, I examine how the different strategies of nationalists and republicans evolved during the second moment of counterhegemony, the campaign for autonomy of 1917-1919.

The Winds of Change: The First World War, Self-determination and Catalan Autonomy, 1914-1919

Introduction

The end of the First World War ushered in a new international order that was structured around the principle of self-determination.[1] Woodrow Wilson's wartime speeches were the building blocks of a new political vocabulary that took domestic populism to the level of international politics. The winds of change that were blowing through Europe were interpreted as a challenge to the basis of legitimacy of the Spanish monarchy. As dynastic empires collapsed in East-Central Europe, the Restoration monarchy was seen as something of an anachronism: the remnants of a former order when dynastic principles determined membership. Even though Spain had been neutral during the war, the crown could not escape the effects of the emerging consensus agenda around national self-determination that was restructuring the international order.[2]

The emergence of the principle of national self-determination, when considered against the patterns of political mobilization in interwar Catalonia, presents something of a puzzle, since it did not produce either a unified nationalist or republican movement for autonomy. During the period 1914-1919, Catalan political opposition to the Restoration monarchy did not organize as a mass *nationalist* movement despite the hegemony of the Lliga Regionalista after 1914. Republicanism remained a political option and, further, would only gain momentum in the 1920s and 1930s.

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[1] James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

This chapter addresses this puzzle through an analysis of the strategic dilemmas faced by the Lliga as it attempted to maintain its control over the public agenda while mobilizing an alliance of ideologically distinct forces in a campaign for political autonomy. The electoral and ideological dilemmas were particularly acute when considered against the background of the First World War, the events of which radicalized certain groups in Catalan political circles and raised expectations about autonomy amongst Catalans.

In the first section of this chapter, I show how the Lliga Regionalista was able to use its electoral hegemony at the regional level to build institutions for the creation and reproduction of its version of Catalan culture. In section two, I examine the way in which the events of the war reshaped political discourse around autonomy in Catalonia. In the last section, I examine the effects of this process during the campaign for autonomy in 1917-1919 through an analysis of the strategic dilemmas faced by the nationalists of the Lliga.

1. Institutions and Nation-building

After the failure of the autonomy movement of 1906-1908, Catalan reformers, spearheaded by the Lliga Regionalista, proposed another solution: appropriate the institutions of the state for their own purposes. In this section, I show how, as the LR's support base grew after 1910, it was able to use its electoral hegemony to forge a cooperative movement in support of a Mancomunitat or, confederation of Catalan provinces; to control the institution's new positions of power; and, to use these to design cultural institutions and create policies that were used to 'catalanize' the public sphere with its own brand of Catalan nationalism. The

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[2] Andreas Ossiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of*

inability of the government in Madrid to enforce the dynastic party system across the Catalan provinces meant that the very institutions that were created to represent the crown in the provinces were transformed into institutions for building the Catalan nation.

The Transition to the Mancomunitat

The institutionalization and reproduction of the Catalan culture in the public sphere proceeded in two stages. The first of these was limited to Barcelona province, where Enric Prat de la Riba was elected president of the provincial council in 1907, 1909, 1911 and 1913. During his presidency, institution-building was the central focus of the Barcelona provincial council:[3] the Institut d'Estudis Catalans [Institute of Catalan Studies] in 1907; the Junta de Museus de Barcelona [Council of Museums of Barcelona] in 1909; the Escola Industrial [Industrial School] and the Escola d'Administració Local [School of Local Administration] in 1910; the Escola Superior Agricultural [Higher Institute of Agriculture] and the Borsa de Treball [Labour Commission] in 1912; and, in the following year, the Escola Elemental de Treball [Lower School of Labour], the Escola d'Art Dramàtic [School of Dramatic Arts] and the Consell Padagògica [Education Council].[4]

The sphere of activity of these new institutions was limited to the city of Barcelona and its surroundings. There had been some institutional development in the three other provinces but, for the most part, the LR's failure to win a plurality of seats in, or the presidency of, the provincial assemblies of Girona, Lleida and

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International Stability (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994).
[3] Upon first being elected in 1907, Prat de la Riba is reported to have proclaimed, "What luck! Everything is waiting to be made!" Reproduced in Albert Balcells (with Enric Pujol and Jordi Sabater), *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia* (Barcelona: Proa, 1997), p. 46.

Tarragona[5] meant that these either remained in the hands of the dynastic parties or were fragmented politically. For the purposes of *Catalan* nation-building, the mandate of all cultural and educational institutions needed to be extended across the four Catalan provinces: Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona. This was the purpose behind the proposal for a Mancomunitat, or confederation of the four Catalan provinces. Again, the intent was not to replace the existing state institutions but, in this case, to introduce a superstructure that would coordinate the activities of all four provinces in order to build uniform institutions across Catalonia.

The proposal for the Mancomunitat that was introduced to the provincial assemblies in 1911 by Prat de la Riba was an all-party agreement that did not depend on a formal alliance like Solidaritat Catalana had, but this did not necessarily make the business of gathering cross-party support parties for the proposal any easier.[6] While the proposal did not entail any compromise on ideology or strategy for the Lliga, the same could not be said for the dynastic parties and the republicans. The

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[4] See Joaquim de Camps i Arboix, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya*, Quaderns de Cultural, 44 (Barcelona: Editorial Bruguera, 1968), pp. 7-10.

[5] According to Molas, after the provincial elections of 1911, the Lliga had 11 of 36 seats in Barcelona province; 5 of 20 in Girona; and, 0 out of 20 in Tarragona. He does not report data for Lleida. See Isidre Molas, *Lliga Catalana: Un Estudi d'Estasiologia*, Vol. 1: *Lliga Regionalista*, Col·lecció estudis i documents, 18 (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1972), p. 90. Balcells makes clear when reporting electoral data in *La Mancomunitat i l'autonomia de Catalunya*, that most sources contradict each other. Balcells and other scholars are currently researching data from the provincial elections of the first part of the century; the data in *La Mancomunitat* is part of this project. A similar project for the general elections has already been published. See, Albert Balcells, Joan B. Culla and Conxita Mir, *Les Eleccions generals a Catalunya de 1901-1923*, Estudis Electorals, 4 (Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill, 1982).

Conservative and Liberal parties had regained some of their electoral losses from the period of Solidaritat Catalana, but they appreciated that they would not return to dominate Catalan politics in the way they had before 1901. The dynastic parties realized, further, that if the LR's success in the institution-building sphere radiated out from Barcelona to the other provinces, the party would be in a good position to take votes away from them and consolidate its hegemony in the Mancomunitat. This seemed to be a sufficient reason to oppose the project. On the other hand, if they opposed the Mancomunitat, they would doubtless provoke a return to a formal nationalist-republican alliance, like Solidaritat Catalana, which would ultimately eclipse the dynastic parties at the polls. Since the reversal of the project for a Mancomunitat did not seem possible, the dynastic parties would be better off trying to adapt themselves to the new political landscape. Accordingly, they supported the new project and pursued a strategy of allying themselves with the LR, when they could, in order to have access to political power. In order to maintain some control over its political power and influence, then, the least costly of the two options—reject or support the Mancomunitat—was for the dynastic parties to support it and attempt to build bridges to the more conservative elements within the LR. Moreover, the dynastic parties could rationalize their choice to their followers in

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[6] The proposal was drawn up by a cross-party committee of 18 deputies from the four provinces, approved by each of the provincial assemblies between October and November 1911 and delivered to the government in Madrid on 8 December 1911. See, Camps i Arboix, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya*, p. 16-30; and Balcells, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia*, p. 57. The membership of the committee was as follows: Lliga Regionalista: 3; Unió Catalanista: 1; Liberals: 4; Conservatives: 1; Jaumists: 3; Republicans: 6. For the proposal itself, see "Les Bases de la Mancomunitat Catalana" [Bases of the Catalan Confederation], in J.A. González Casanova, *Federalisme i autonomia a Catalunya (1868-1938)*, Col·lecció Documents de Cultura (Barcelona: Curial, 1974), pp. 552-56.

Catalonia and counterparts in Madrid by claiming that they could use their seats within the assembly of the Mancomunitat to keep the LR in check.[7]

It was somewhat more difficult for the republicans to explain to their supporters why they would back the proposal for the Mancomunitat. As we saw in chapter 5, the republican political project consisted in institutional change, autonomy and democracy; the Mancomunitat—as the extension of an existing institution—provided none of these. In fact, one year before the proposal was drafted, in April 1910, the republicans had reemphasized these political objectives by founding a new party, the Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana (UFNR) [Federal Nationalist Republican Union],[8] the political objectives of which included a Spanish federation; full municipal and regional autonomy; and, a republican and democratic form of government.[9] Perhaps as a result of the experience of Solidaritat Catalana, the UFNR would only "permit [inter-party] cooperation when the object is to work to obtain laws and reforms that will lead us to our autonomist, federalist, nationalist, democratic and republican ideals." Although the party was committed to any "project that is beneficial for the interests and rights of Catalonia," this strategy did not mean that the UFNR would get "mixed up in a permanent way or even

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[7] Balcells suggests that the dynastic parties in Catalonia sought some independence from their party leaders in Madrid and believed that the Mancomunitat would provide them with this. See Balcells, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia,* p. 58.

[8] The three major groupings were federal republicans, the Unió Republicana and the Centre Nacionalista Republicà.

[9] See, *Bases constitutives de l'Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana* [Constitutive bases of the Federal Nationalist Republican Union], approved at the assembly of the three parties held in Barcelona, 24 April 1910, in Alfred Pérez-Bastardas, *Els Republicans nacionalistes i el catalanisme polític: Albert Bastardas i Sampere (1871-1944)* [Nationalist republicans and political catalanism: Albert Bastardas i Sampere (1871-1944)], Collecció estudis i documents, 44, Vol. 2 (Barcelona: Edicions 62: 1987), p. 485.

periodically with political elements that do not share the principles of our programme."[10]

In light of these stipulated party regulations, the decision to support the proposal for a Mancomunitat required some justification on the part of the leaders of the UFNR, particularly since influential members of the republican movement publicly stated that the Mancomunitat was a poor substitute for the autonomous institutions republicans demanded.[11] In the short-term, however, the UFNR calculated that it would never be able to achieve its political objective; a transition to a republic was not imminent and the party's supporters understood this clearly. Although republicans believed that Catalan autonomy was not possible under the monarchy, the Mancomunitat could be viewed as a very small first step towards attaining that goal. The best that the republicans could hope for was to be able to increase their percentage of the popular vote across the four provinces and to gain seats on the new permanent council. In this way, republicans would be able to have some input into both the design of public institutions and the policies managed by these. In addition to leaving a republican mark on the Catalan public sphere, republicans hoped that they could use their positions within the Mancomunitat to influence the course of its evolution into an institution for self-government by convincing nationalists that increased autonomy would only be possible under a republic. If it opposed the project, the UFNR knew that it would risk driving the Lliga Regionalista into the arms of the dynastic parties, which would create a

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[10] Jaume Carner, "Tàctica política que ha de seguir l'UFNR en relació an [sic] els altres partits afins" [The political strategy that the UFNR must follow in its relations with other similar parties], points 2 and 3, in Pérez-Bastardas, *El Republicans nacionalistes*, p. 493.

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coalition of conservative forces in the Mancomunitat that would have almost no incentive to open up the system to democratic reforms. Although their political calculations were very different, in the end, Conservatives, Liberals and republicans were all forced to accept the proposal or risk being shut out of political power.

The Mancomunitat and the hegemony of the Lliga Regionalista

After much filibustering and extensive lobbying on the part of the Lliga Regionalista,[12] the bill for the Mancomunitat was finally decreed into law in December 1913 by the Conservative prime minister, Eduardo Dato. The Mancomunitat was the second stage in the LR's nation-building project. Technically, the law on provincial confederations limited the purpose of confederation to the joint administration of services that were previously the responsibility of the provinces. The confederal structure would undertake projects that were beneficial to a group of contiguous provinces "without prejudice—on the contrary—with indubitable advantage for the general interests of the Nation."[13] In Catalonia, however, the establishment of the Mancomunitat was viewed as the first opportunity to represent Catalan interest and culture in the public sphere—"a fundamental turn, decisive, in Catalan life."[14] In his victory speech upon being elected the first president of the Mancomunitat in 1914, Prat de la Riba made it clear that "from this point forward...Catalonia will have an institution that will, in all

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[11] Antoni Rovira i Virgili, "La primera realització" [The first achievement], in *Debats sobre'l catalanisme* [Debates on catalanism], (Barcelona: Societat Catalana d'Edicions, 1915), pp. 163-64.

[12] See Francesc Cambó, *Memòries (1876-1936)*, Vol. 1 (Barcelona: Editorial Alpha, 1981), pp. 211-12.

[13] See the preamble to the "Decreto Real sobre mancomunidades provinciales" [Royal decree on provincial confederations] in González Casanova, *Federalisme i autonomia a Catalunya*, p. 564. The decree was promulgated on 24 March 1914.

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sincerity, represent it, that will give corporeal form to its spiritual unity, that will give a juridical organization to our personality."[15] Prat de la Riba was well aware, however, that without the devolution of legislative and executive powers from Madrid, the transformation of the Mancomunitat into an institution for self-government would not be possible: "Our principal task, in this first period, will be to study, prepare and obtain the devolution of powers" so that "our race can have all the collective means, institutions and instruments for education, revitalization, hygiene, intellectual, moral, professional and physical development, which are indispensable for us to rise up to a noble dignity in our thinking, talking and being."[16]

The LR's electoral hegemony during the period of the Mancomunitat meant that its nation-building endeavour was a guaranteed success.[17] Table 1 shows the electoral results for the provincial elections for the period 1911-1923. Elections took place every two years and each deputy was elected for a four-year period. The LR steadily increased its share of provincial seats over the course of the period under consideration but never attained a majority. Nevertheless, when it came to gaining control of the administration of the Mancomunitat, it was able to form an alliance with the dynastic Conservatives and Liberals, a strategy it preferred over forming an

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[14] Inaugural speech made by Enric Prat de la Riba on the occasion of his election to the presidency of the Mancomunitat, 6 April 1914, in Balcells, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia*, p. 535.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 535-36.
[17] See Les Mancomunitats, *L'obra realitzada, Anys 1914-1919* [Projects realized, Years 1914-1919], (Barcelona: June 1919); *idem, L'obra realitzada, Anys 1914-1923* [Projects realized, Years 1914-1923], 3 volumes (Barcelona: August 1923); and, Balcells, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia*, part IV, pp. 319-488.

alliance with republicans, since the dynastic parties provided a valuable link to the regime in Madrid.[18]

Table 1
Combined results for the provincial elections in the four Catalan provinces, 1911-1923
Number of councillors elected

Party	1911	1913	1915	1917	1919	1921	1923	Total
Lliga Regionalista	8	13	10	19	16	24	9	99
Radicals (Lerroux)	4	——	2	3	3	2	3	17
Republicans[1]	14	16	10	11	6	10	9	76
Liberals	9	13	3	16	4	5	6	56
Conservatives	4	8	3	4	1	3	1	24
Jaumins[2]	6	4	5	2	——	1	2	20
FMA[3]	——	——	——	——	1	3	2	6
UMN[4]	——	——	——	——	——	5	1	6
Acció Catalana	——	——	——	——	——	——	6	6
Other[5]	2	3	8	3	9	3	3	31
Total	47	57	41	58	40	56	42	341

[1]Includes: Unió Federal Nacional Republicà (UFNR); Bloc Republicà Autonomista; Partit Republicà Català; Possibilist Republicans; and Agrarian Republicans.

[2]Supporters of the pretender Don Jaime de Borbón Palma (Jaume in Catalan), heir to the Carlist line.

[3]Federació Monàrquica Autonomista: a group of pro-dynastic Catalans who supported autonomy and who were allies of the Lliga Regionalista.

[4]Unión Monàrquica Nacional: a group of pro-dynastic Catalans who opposed autonomy.

[5]Includes: Democratic monarchists; reformists; Unió Agricola; Joventut Conservadora; Maurists; democratic Liberals; independent Liberals; autonomist Liberals; independent monarchists; and traditionalists.

Source: Albert Balcells (with Enric Pujol and Jordi Sabater), *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia* (Barcelona: Proa, 1997).

Table 2 details the composition of the Assembly of the Mancomunitat between 1914 and 1923. The figures make clear that an alliance between the dynastic parties and the LR would give the conservative forces a majority in the Assembly.

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[18] Balcells, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia*, p. 300.

This majority, further, gave the LR and its dynastic allies an advantage in the elections for the presiding committee of the Assembly and the members of the Mancomunitat's permanent council, the administrative organ responsible for designing programs and institutions.

Table 2
Electoral representation in the Assembly of the Mancomunitat, 1914-1923, Number of councillors

Parties	1914	1915	1917	1919	1921	1923	Total
Lliga Regionalista	20	22	27	34	39	28	170
FMA[1]	——	——	——	1	4	4	9
Liberal monarchists	21	17	21	——	——	——	59
Conservative monarchists	13	14	9	——	——	——	36
Liberals and Conservatives[2]	——	——	——	18	14	15	47
UMN[3]	——	——	——	6	5	6	17
Traditionalists	9	9	7	7	7	4	43
Acció Catalana	——	——	——	——	——	11	11
Catalanist Republicans	26	25	21	17	16	18	123
Radical Republicans	4	2	5	6	5	4	26
Reformists	2	4	3	3	3	2	17
Others	1	3	3	4	3	4	18
Total	96	96	96	96	96	96	576

[1]Federació Monàrquica Autonomista: a group of pro-dynastic Catalans who supported autonomy and who were allies of the Lliga Regionalista.
[2]Balcells claims that after 1917 it was increasingly difficult to distinguish between dynastic liberals and conservatives. For this reason he counts them together.
[3]Unión Monàrquica Nacional: a group of pro-dynastic Catalans who opposed autonomy.
Source: Albert Balcells (with Enric Pujol and Jordi Sabater), *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia* (Barcelona: Proa, 1997), p. 296.

The presiding committee was made up of four vice-presidents and four secretaries and was elected by the Assembly every two years, following the provincial elections. The Assembly itself met twice a year for a period of approximately 5 days

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each time to debate and vote a series of proposals that had been drafted by the permanent council. Although the permanent council was made up of representatives of all the parties, the Assembly had a final decision on the budget and major projects. Therefore, two conditions applied in order for the Lliga's nation-building projects to be passed in the Assembly: first, a majority of support in the Assembly and, second, the ability to control the proceedings of the Assembly. As Table 2 makes clear, the first of these conditions was easily secured through alliances with either the dynastic parties or republicans, depending on the nature of the project. Table 3 shows that the second condition was also easily fulfilled: the Lliga Regionalista, by teaming up with the two dynastic parties to present and vote for candidates that were agreeable to all three parties, was able to ensure that the conservative forces would control the debates in the Mancomunitat's Assembly. From the figures in Table 3, it would even appear that the dynastic Liberals and Conservatives were able to exchange their support for the Lliga's policies and programmes for representation on the presiding committee, since their representation on the committee was disproportionately large when compared to their representation in the Assembly. However, what was most important for determining power was which party held the post of first vice-president and first secretary, since these controlled proceedings (these are denoted by an asterisk in the table). The other vice-presidents and secretaries controlled proceedings only in the absence of the person positioned before them in rank. Except for 1915, these positions were always in the hands of the LR or the dynastic parties. After 1919, the LR would control both of these positions.

Table 3
Party composition of the presiding committees
of the Mancomunitat, 1914-1923

Year/Party	Lliga Regionalista	Monarchist Parties[1]	Republicans	Total
1914				
--vice-presidents	1*	1	2	4
--secretaries	0	3*	1	4
1915				
--vice-presidents	1	2	1*	4
--secretaries	0	3*	1	4
1917				
--vice-presidents	1	3*	0	4
--secretaries	1*	3	0	4
1919				
--vice-presidents	2*	2	0	4
--secretaries	1*	3	0	4
1921				
--vice-presidents	2*	1	1	4
--secretaries	2*	1	1	4
1923				
--vice-presidents	2*	1	1	4
--secretaries	2*	1	1	4
Total				
--vice-presidents	9	10	5	24
--secretaries	6	14	4	24

[1] I have included in this category: Liberals, Conservatives, Jaumistes, Traditionalists and Maurists.

*: Denotes the first vice-president or secretary, which were the most influential positions politically.

Source: Albert Balcells (with Enric Pujol and Jordi Sabater), *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia* (Barcelona: Proa, 1997).

The election of councillors to the permanent council could similarly be manipulated through inter-party alliances for the selection and voting of

candidates.[19] The LR and the dynastic parties typically formed an alliance to select candidates from their respective parties, which were presented on a joint ticket. Assembly deputies did not have to vote for the entire ticket: they were free to select candidates from several tickets. In practice, however, party discipline appears to have been strictly enforced since candidates on the same ticket often received exactly, or very nearly, the same number of votes. Although the different republican parties did the same thing, they could not get the numbers they needed in the Assembly to elect a majority of candidates to the permanent council.

Table 4
Party representation on the permanent council
of the Assembly of the Mancomunitat, 1914-1923

Year/Party	Lliga Regionalista	Monarchists	Republicans	Other	Total
1914	1	5	5	0	11
1917	2	3	6	0	11
1919	4	4	4	1	13
1921	5	2	4	2	13
1923	4	3	4	2	13
Total	16	17	23	5	61

Source: Albert Balcells (with Enric Pujol and Jordi Sabater), *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia* (Barcelona: Proa, 1997).

Except for the years 1914 and 1917, the proportion of LR members on the permanent council closely corresponded to the proportion of LR deputies in the

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[19] However, two rules were in force to ensure minority and territorial representation. There were eight seats on the permanent council: three of these were reserved for minority parties and these councillors were appointed. The remaining five seats were reserved for the majority parties. To ensure provincial representation, the deputy from each province who received the most votes among all deputies of that province was elected, regardless of where he appeared in the overall count. The remaining four seats were filled by those candidates who received the most votes, regardless of their province. See, "Estatut de la Mancomunitat Catalana" [Statute of the Catalan Confederation], in González Casanova, *Federalisme i autonomia a Catalunya.* pp. 572-78.

Assembly of the Mancomunitat.[20] However, the key indicator of any party's influence on the council was the distribution of positions among the councillors. This function was carried out by the president of the Mancomunitat, who also sat on the permanent council. Significantly, for the entire duration of the Mancomunitat, the presidency was in the hands of the LR: from 1914-1917, Prat de la Riba was president and, after his death in 1917, Josep Puig i Cadafalch was elected president, a post he held until the Mancomunitat was abolished in 1924 by the dictatorship. Unfortunately, for the period between 1914 and 1920, when all of the provincial services were finally delegated to the Mancomunitat, we have no reliable data telling us which portfolios were assigned to which councillors. For 1921, however, we know that the Lliga's representatives on the permanent council were assigned the most important portfolios: culture (which included education), social policy, finance and, of a lesser importance, highways and roads. In 1923, the assignments were similar: the LR was responsible for culture, health and welfare, finance and highways and roads.[21]

The Mancomunitat and nation-building

The Lliga Regionalista was able to use its dominant position within the Mancomunitat to set two broad nation-building objectives. The first of these was to define and reproduce a comprehensive Catalan culture. This meant, in essence, developing institutions that would establish the norms of reference for Catalan history and archeology, normalize the Catalan language and specify Catalonia's

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[20] 4:13 (permanent council) and 34:96 (Assembly) in 1919; 5:13 (permanent council) and 39:96 (Assembly) in 1921; 4:13 (permanent council) and 28:96 (Assembly) in 1923.

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contribution to scientific development. In order to fulfill this objective, the function

and scope of existing institutions were expanded while new ones were created. For

example, the Institut d'Estudis Catalans was expanded into three sections—history

and archeology,[22] philology[23] and sciences[24]—and was responsible for organizing

Catalan culture into areas of knowledge, and cataloguing these and, finally, for

promoting conferences, publications and academic exchanges. A series of popular

libraries, local history museums and specialized archives were created across

Catalonia for the purpose of introducing these new spheres of knowledge to the

provinces and to break with the image of Barcelona as the cultural capital of the

region.

The development and management of the Institut d'Estudis Catalans, as well

as other institutions of culture, history and art, were the product of a new intellectual

current in Catalonia which had come to dominate the Mancomunitat after its

creation: *noucentisme* ['new-century-ism']. A rejection of the flamboyance of

modernism, *noucentisme* promoted neo-classicism through a return to the order and

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[21] For 1921, republican councillors were responsible for railroads and waterworks, and health and welfare; in 1923, they were responsible for railroads and waterworks, agriculture, and social policy. Liberal and conservative councillors were responsible for telephones (1921 and 1923).

[22] This section set up the Biblioteca de Catalunya and services for the conservation and cataloguing of monuments, excavations, the cataloguing and development of local museums, and the conservation and cataloguing of archives and libraries.

[23] This section was responsible for lexicography, orthographic norms, dictionaries, phonetics, and toponymy.

[24] This section managed the Institució Catalana d'Història Natural [Catalan Institute of Natural History] (1901), the Societat de Biologia [Biology Society] (1912), and created the Servei Tècnic de Paludisme i d'Estudis Sanitaris [Technical Service for Malaria and Sanitary Studies] (1915), and the Societat Catalana de Filosofia [Catalan Society of Philosophy] (1923).

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simplicity of Catalonia's Mediterranean roots.[25] Intellectuals such as Eugeni d'Ors and Jaume Bofill i Mates[26] promoted the principles of *noucentisme* from within the Mancomunitat: order, discipline, practicality, objectivity and professionalism—the qualities that were needed for building the institutions of a new Catalan culture.[27] The appointment of several *noucentistas* to positions in the Institute d'Estudis Catalans under Prat de la Riba's presidency is one important reason for which the study of Mediterranean archeology and history was enthusiastically promoted during this period as evidence of Catalonia's distinct historical development path.[28]

The *noucentistas'* predilection for order was revealed in the their political orientation: they defended a corporatist conception of the state, a form of conservative politics and were supporters of monarchism. *Noucentisme* was promoted as an intellectual trend or a conduit through which the LR could "translate its political anxieties into a cultural norm that, if [the party] was hegemonic, could be extended as a model to all of Catalonia."[29] *Noucentisme*, then, was the cultural form of

[25] For a discussion of *noucentisme* see, Norbert Bilbeny, "Nacionalisme i cosmopolitisme en la teoria noucentista" [Nationalism and cosmopolitanism in noucentisme theory], *Recerques* 14 (1983); Daniele Conversi, *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997), pp. 33-36; Robert Hughes, *Barcelona* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), pp. 553-55; Pérez-Bastardas, *Els Republicans nacionalistes*, Vol. 1, pp. 333-39.
[26] Jaume Bofill i Mates (1878-1933), literary figure and politician. He emanated from a conservative family background and, after university, travelled in the same intellectual and political circles as Enric Prat de la Riba and Jaume Carner. He was editor-in-chief of *La Veu de Catalunya* from 1909 to 1913, when he was elected alderman to the Barcelona city hall. In 1919, he became vice-president of the Mancomunitat and was in charge of social policy. He would militate as a republican from 1922 and wrote the famous reply to Francesc Cambó's *Per la Concòrdia. L'Altra Concòrdia* [The Other Agreement] (1930). He disagreed with the direction the republic was taking after 1932 and returned to the Lliga Regionalista, an about-turn which he explained in *Una política catalanista* [A Catalanist Politics] (1933).
[27] Balcells, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia*, p. 185.
[28] Catalonia's links with the Mediterranean continue to be promoted by the Generalitat through the Institut Català de la Mediterrània d'Estudis i Cooperació.
[29] Pérez-Bastardas, *Els Republicans nacionalistes*, Vol. 1, p. 335.

the Lliga's nationalism, which it would reproduce through the institutions created by the Mancomunitat.

The second nation-building objective of the Mancomunitat was to disseminate this newly-institutionalized Catalan culture through a range of educational institutions. Educational initiatives were amongst the most important achievements of the Mancomunitat and corresponded to several goals: the development of the Catalan language; the promotion of a Catalan culture and history, the content of which would be determined by Catalans; and, the creation of specialized schools that would respond to the needs of the Catalan economy, particularly its industrial and agricultural sectors. Educational initiatives were undertaken at three levels: pre-university, higher education and professional and technical education. The most important institution, which directed developments across all three sectors, was the Consell d'Investigació Pedagògica [Council for Pedagogical Research], first created in 1913 and transferred to the Mancomunitat in 1920. The Consell was responsible for overseeing the development, implementation and adoption of new pedagogical initiatives, as well as the assessment and regulation of these in all of the centres for learning that received funding from the Mancomunitat. The political significance of the Catalan Consell for forging a *national* consensus in Catalonia was incisively appreciated by the Lliga. The work of the Consell was deemed so important for the overall objectives of the regional administration that it was directed by the principal architects of cultural policy in the

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Mancomunitat: Eugeni d'Ors, Josep Puig i Cadafalch and Jaume Bofill i Mates, all three of whom were leaders of the Lliga Regionalista.[30]

The achievements of the Mancomunitat in the area of education served not only to institutionalize a Catalan national culture but also to promote the Catalan language. Indeed, it was crucial for the promotion of the language that the Mancomunitat was able to avail of the school system in this way, since Catalan deputies in the Cortes met with repeated failure in their attempts to introduce legislation to secure a co-official status for the Catalan language in Catalonia. Although Catalan was used in all of the institutions of the Mancomunitat, it was not legally possible to enforce the use of Catalan or to promote bilingualism.[31] As such, the designation of the Institut d'Estudis Catalans as *the* institution responsible for standardizing and promoting the Catalan language was an important symbolic measure designed to stake out some institutional territory in the language debate and

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[30] For a discussion of the complete ineffectiveness of the Spanish Council of Public Instruction to build a Spanish national culture through the public education system in the rest of Spain, see Carolyn P. Boyd, *Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity, 1875-1975* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), ch. 2.

[31] An identical debate over the right of the Catalan Generalitat to enforce the use of Catalan is presently taking place in Catalonia although, unlike the Mancomunitat, the Generalitat has the right to pass language legislation. See, "El Defensor del Pueblo no recurre la 'ley de catalán', pero sugiere a Pujol que la modifique" [The Ombudsman will not appeal the Catalan language law, but suggests that Pujol modify it], *El País*, 9 April, 1998; "Cataluña y el tabú de la lengua" [Catalonia and the language taboo], *El País*, 5 July 1998; "Pujol denuncia 'maniobras' para crear conflictos y dividir Cataluña [Pujol denounces manipulations to create conflict and divide Catalonia], *El País*, 6 July 1998; "Peces-Barba reitera que la llei del català és inconstitutcional" [Peces-Barba reiterates that the Catalan language law is unconstitutional], *Avui*, 7 July 1998.

prevent Castilian institutions, such as the Royal Academy, from interfering in the language question.[32]

Summary

In this section I have provided empirical evidence for a hypothesized relationship between state power and institutions that was introduced in chapter 2: Where the institutions of the state are weak such that they cannot fully penetrate society, achieve depth and contribute to the construction of actors' self-identity and social reality, actors will construct alternative identities. In some cases, I further hypothesized, actors will be able to appropriate the institutions of the state to construct their alternative identity. In the Catalan case, the institutions of the Restoration regime had come to be seen as illegitimate by large sectors of the Catalan population. However, Catalan counterhegemonic movements—nationalists and republicans—did not have the resources to replace these institutions. Instead, they were able to gain control of important state institutions by removing the dynastic parties' hold on power and, in some cases, by cooperating with these for new political purposes. Nationalists and republicans transformed the provincial councils by making them more representative of Catalan political interests. In this way, they were able to increase the vertical depth of the councils. At the same time, nationalists and republicans were able to gather political momentum within the provincial councils for a project that would extend the range of public institutions in Catalonia. Over the period 1914-1923, the Lliga Regionalista was able to use the

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[32] The Institut d'Estudis Catalans continues to be the guardian of the Catalan language although the Generalitat is responsible for implementing Catalan language laws. The continued influence of the Institut was recently felt in the ongoing debate over whether the Catalan spoken in Valencia is distinct or not. The Institut maintains that it is not; the

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Mancomunitat to create new cultural institutions and to use these to introduce and reproduce its version of Catalan nationalism.

Given the LR's electoral hegemony and the consolidation of this hegemony in new cultural institutions, it is interesting to consider why nationalists were not able to translate this position of power into real gains in the area of political autonomy from Madrid. The question is of particular significance when we consider the influence of contemporaneous events in the international arena on the political mobilization of counterhegemonic groups in Catalonia. The First World War was a turning point for a new political discourse that focused on the *right* of Catalans to self-government. In the next section, I review the influence of this discourse on Catalan political vocabulary and political strategy in order to pave the way for an examination of the relationship between the LR's hegemony in Catalonia and the battle for political autonomy in the period 1917-1919.

2. Manipulating Convention

Conventional nationalist and republican usage of the terms 'nation', 'autonomy' and 'self-government' had been established during the first decade of the twentieth century in Catalonia. The usage of these terms implied certain political objectives and forms of political action and, as the discussion in chapter 5 made clear, nationalists and republicans had distinct goals and strategies as a result of their different understanding of key concepts in Catalonia's political vocabulary. Until the outbreak of the war, arguments for Catalan self-government were made in two stages: first, the cultural and historical existence of a nation was established through example so that, second, the nationality principle, could be invoked using juridical

Acadèmia de Cultura Valenciana [Academy of Valencian Culture] maintains that it is. See

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reasoning: "For every nation a state...this is juridical fact that must correspond to the social fact of a nationality."[33] Republican arguments for Catalan autonomy, we saw in chapter 5, were made with reference to liberty and equality, and these did not necessarily *require* an argument about nations. Republican institutions for self-government could be argued independently of nationalist claims for self-government, but they still needed to specify over whom liberty and equality would hold.

During and immediately after the war, arguments for Catalan autonomy were modified in two subtle but significant ways. First, it was argued that the Catalan problem was part of a general challenge by popular forces in Europe to the existing dynastic basis of political rule. Second and related, it was argued that the Catalan problem was an international one: all nationality claims needed to be adjudicated by criteria established by the interstate society. The purpose of shifting the Catalan problem from the national to the international sphere was more political and strategic than ideological: if the Catalan problem could be recast in terms that invoked international law and the rights of nations to self-determination, then the political action that was needed to solve the Catalan problem should not be carried out in Madrid, but in international fora where, it was anticipated, public reaction would be more sympathetic. Second, if the Catalan problem could be recast as an international problem, then its resolution would require international intervention. Important efforts were made during the First World War to modify established arguments for Catalan autonomy in order to pursue a new course of political action.

"Un pacte amb dolor" [A distressful pact], *Avui*, 6 July 1998.

The first modification to conventional discourse was to argue that the Catalan problem was part of a larger European problem; that is, the problem of determining what rights, if any, were to be enjoyed by politically organized national minorities. In order to recast the debate on Catalan autonomy in this way, the arguments made by Enric Prat de la Riba and Lluís Duran i Ventosa about the timeless and natural character of the nation would have to be modified. It would not be an exaggeration to say that it was Antoni Rovira i Virgili who accomplished this almost single-handedly, since the range and extent of his writings made him one of early twentieth-century Catalonia's best-known and most widely-read political commentators.[34] Baras i Gómez maintains that his "familiarity with the foreign press, his curiosity for history and political events in Europe, especially the actions of stateless nations, made him the best commentator of international affairs in Barcelona."[35] Rovira i Virgili's first challenge to Prat de la Riba's position appeared in 1916 in his book *El Nacionalisme*.[36] While he accepted Prat de la Riba's argument that the nation consisted in certain historical, cultural and legal traditions, he rejected these as a sufficient basis "for a nation to become the active subject of liberties...[A

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[33] Enric Prat de la Riba, *La Nacionalitat Catalana*, 2nd ed. (Barcelona: "La Cataluña," 1910; reprint, Les millors obres de la literatura catalana, 5, Barcelona: Edicions 62 and "la Caixa", 1978.), p. 97.

[34] Molas writes that the amount of political commentary on nationalist and republican causes that Rovira i Virgili published in books, newspapers and magazines ensured that his ideas were more widely dispersed than those of his contemporaries. See Isidre Molas, Prologue, in Antoni Rovira i Virgili, *Nacionalisme i Federalisme* (Barcelona: Societat Catalana d'Edicions, 1917; reprint, Les Millors Obres de la Literatura Catalana, 80, Barcelona: Edicions 62 and "la Caixa," 1982), p. 11.

[35] Montserrat Baras i Gómez, *Acció Catalana, 1922-1936*, Biblioteca de cultural catalana, 53 (Barcelona: Curial, 1984), p. 78.

nation] must, essentially, have a consciousness of its own personality...Without a

national consciousness, the territory is a landscape, the history is a ghost, the law is a

routine, the language is phonetics."[37] Instead, Rovira i Virgili argued that nations had

to be *made* by political acts and popular will, which implied that they were formed by

concrete ideas about the character of a nation and, further, that these ideas were

those of an intellectual and cultural élite, not the spontaneous expression of a

nation's culture and history.[38]

Rovira i Virgili's conceived the nation as a political project, something that

needed to be made. This was the principal difference separating him from political

thinkers such as Prat de la Riba and Duran i Ventosa and, by extension, from the

Lliga Regionalista. A second, equally important, difference was that the institutional

expression of the political project proposed by Rovira i Virgili was republican: "As

far as the form of government is concerned, almost all of the new national states

have adopted the republican solution," because monarchism in the former empires

of East-Central Europe, as well as monarchism in Spain, was illiberal.[39] For this

reason he was a critic of the LR's strategy of sending deputies to the Cortes in

Madrid, since he rejected the possibility that Catalan autonomy was possible under

[36] Antoni Rovira i Virgili, *El Nacionalisme* (Barcelona: La Revista, 1916). According to Rovira i Virgili, the book sold out in a matter of weeks. A second and revised edition was published as *El Principi de les Nacionalitats: Elements de Dret Polítics* [The Nationality principle: Elements of political rights], Collecció Popular Barcino (Barcelona: Barcino, 1932). *El Principi de les Nacionalitats* can also be found in *Nacionalisme i Federalisme*. References are to the 1916 edition.

[37] Rovira i Virgili, *El Nacionalisme*, ch. 4, "Els Elements de la Nació" [The elements of the nation], p. 69.

[38] *Ibid.* See also ch. 8, "Els elements naturals i la voluntat" [Natural elements and will].

[39] Antoni Rovira i Virgili, "Nacionalismo y Liberalismo" [Nationalism and Liberalism], *La Publicidad* 1 May 1919, in Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira (ed.), *Antoni Rovira i Virgili i la Qüestió Nacional: Textos Polítics (1913-1947)*, Catalans illustres, 9 (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de la Presidència, Entitat Autònoma del Diari Oficial i de Publicacions, 1994), p. 69.

the monarchy.[40] Indeed, a large part of his political commentary during the war

consisted in exposing the unwillingness of the Restoration government to even

understand the significance of Catalan autonomy. Half-way through the war, Rovira i

Virgili would complain that politicians in Madrid were ignorant of the fact that

Catalan demands for self-government and language rights were consonant with

demands made by national minorities elsewhere in Europe, and even in Canada:

"Unitary Spain is a country out of this world and Catalans, when looked at from

Madrid, appear to be some odd inhabitants from the planet Mars."[41] At the end of

the war, Rovira i Virgili could conclude that the European winds of change had

never reached Spain: "Spain has not seen the great war, it has not noticed it; it has

not understood its significance, nor its implications."[42]

Many Catalan nationalists and republicans argued that the outcome of the

Peace Conference in Paris placed certain obligations on the Spanish government to

reform the state. The Conference had defined 'national minorities' as all those

subject groups in a state whose race and language are distinct from that of the

majority. Second, the outcome of the Conference, and the creation of the League of

Nations, appeared to indicate that states no longer enjoyed absolute sovereignty

over their territory where national minorities were concerned: the rights of these

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[40] Antoni Rovira i Virgili, "De política catalana" [Of Catalan politics], in *Debats sobre'l catalanisme* [Debates on catalanism] (Barcelona: Societat Catalana d'Edicions, 1915), p. 184.

[41] Antoni Rovira i Virgili, "Espanya, Fora del món" [Spain, out of this world], *La Campana de Gràcia* 10 June 1916, in Carod-Rovira (ed.), *Antoni Rovira i Virgili i la Qüestió Nacional*, p. 278.

[42] Antoni Rovira i Virgili, "L'Espanya Petita" [Small Spain], *La Campana de Gràcia*, 19 October 1918, in Antoni Rovira i Virgili, *Catalunya i Espanya*, Jaume Sobrequés i Callicó (ed.), Biblioteca dels Clàssics del Nacionalisme Català, 20 (Barcelona: Edicions de la Magrana and Diputació de Barcelona, 1988), pp. 51-52.

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minorities would now be protected under international law.[43] Indeed, the language used to argue Catalan autonomy emphasized that, like other national minorities in Europe, Catalonia now enjoyed a *right* to self-government: "When a people, such as in Catalonia, Aragón or Navarra…have an obvious and demonstrated collective will to govern themselves, they cannot be prevented from exercising this right, neither by force nor under any pretext." This right was not the equivalent to a demand for independence, since "autonomy refers only to the internal life of a country." As a result, there was no contradiction in demanding Catalan autonomy within Spain and, further, Catalonia would "necessarily obtain [autonomy] because this is a juridical right that is proclaimed in the new world that is being formed."[44]

This was the first time that Catalan intellectuals had raised the problem of international opinion and sanctions in relationship to the autonomy question and marked a second important modification to arguments for Catalan self-government. Rovira i Virgili and other Catalan political commentators promoted the importance of international opinion in newspapers, reviews and speeches in order to make the argument first, that Spain was not meeting its international obligations and, second, that Spain's failure to do so would have international repercussions. Madrid's refusal to accept the legitimacy of claims for self-government, or to consider the federal option, were interpreted as evidence of the Restoration regime's backwardness compared to other European states. In fact, the Spanish crown fully appreciated that

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[43] A[ntoni] Rovira i Virgili, "El problema de les minories nacionals" [The problem of national minorities], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 7 July 1919.
[44] José María España, Councillor of the Mancomunitat of Catalonia, *Las Corrientes autonomistas en el mundo y el pleito de Cataluña* [Autonomist trends in the world and the Catalan argument], Speech given at the regionalist group of Graus, 16 February 1919, by the Councillor of the Mancomunitat, D. José Ma. España Sirat (Lérida: Sol y Benet, May 1919), p. 77.

it did not conform to the new order emerging in Europe and was especially concerned that the Catalan cause would be taken up by the peacemakers in Paris. King Alfonso sent Prime Minister Romanones to Paris in December 1918 to speak directly with the French and American presidents, Georges Clemenceau and Woodrow Wilson, to seek assurances that the Spanish monarchy would be accepted within the new international order, including the League of Nations, and that the Catalan question would not become an international matter.[45] As it happened, Romanones was assured that Europe's new international order would leave old established nation-states, like Spain, untouched.

The war appeared to be a vindication of the nationality principle but most Catalan intellectuals recognized that "there is not one case where the nationality principle is sufficient to politically determine the Nation."[46] There were two solutions to any nationality claim, in Rovira i Virgili's estimation: separation or federalism. Surveying European events, he maintained that the separatist option was caused by "a policy of [territorial and cultural] unity and persecution by the central government."[47] While all of the new European states were adopting the republican solution to the nationality question,[48] Spain resisted reforms: "At the same time as all the problems of nationality and autonomy in Europe are receiving a broad and liberal solution, at the same time as the peoples [of Europe] are saluting with an

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[45] Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, "Nacionalismo y política exterior: España y la política de minorías nacionales de la Sociedad de las Naciones (1919-1936)" [Nationalism and foreign policy: Spain and the politics of national minorities in the League of Nations (1919-1936)], *Hispania* 55 (1995), p. 235.

[46] Antoni Rovira i Virgili, *El Principi de les nacionalitats*, in *Nacionalisme i Federalisme*, p. 102.

[47] A[ntoni] Rovira i Virgili, "Les nacionalitats i la guerra: Les causes del separatisme" [The nationalities and the war: Causes of separatism], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 13 January 1918, p. 6.

immense joy their new-found liberty; they [the regime in Madrid] want to force us to continue living under the yoke of a sterile, corrupt and barbaric centralism."[49] Even Prat de la Riba was convinced that in continuing along its established path, the regime "was working, every day, for a weaker, more divided, more deficient Spain."[50] Prat de la Riba and the LR concurred with Rovira i Virgili that the federal solution was the only one possible: "The triumph of the federal form during the war has been incredible...After the war, the unitary form [of the state] will disappear, will become rarer every day."[51]

Conservative nationalists sympathetic with the LR agreed with Rovira i Virgili's observations and recognized that Madrid's refusal to consider Catalonia's demands for self-government might push the autonomy movement toward separatism: "We don't want separation, but separation will become inevitable if those who resist our idea of autonomy do not stop their obstinacy."[52] Although members of the LR continued to reject the republican option, they were not averse to using provocative language when it suited their purposes. Cambó, despite his

[48] Rovira i Virgili, "Nacionalisme y Liberalismo," p. 69. See also, A[ntoni] Rovira i Virgili, "Un nou estat La Finlàndia lliure" [A new state: Free Finland], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 9 January 1918, p. 7.; *idem.*, "Un altre nou estat La Ucrania lliure" [Another new state: Free Ukraine], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 14 January 1918, p. 4.
[49] Antoni Rovira i Virgili, "Els Camins" [The Paths], *La Campana de Gràcia*, 14 December 1918, in Antoni Rovira i Virgili, *Catalunya i Espanya*, p. 57.
[50] Enric Prat de la Riba, "Per Catalunya i l'Espanya Gran" [For Catalonia and Greater Spain], March 1916, in Lliga Catalana, *Història d'una Política: Actuacions i Documents de la Lliga Regionalista, 1901-1933* [History of a Politics: Performance and Documents of the Lliga Regionalista, 1901-1933] (Barcelona: Biblioteca de Lliga Catalana, 1933), p. 185. This was a manifesto signed by, among others: Ramón d'Abadal, Francesc Cambó, Marquès de Camp, Joan Garriga i Massó, Albert Rusiñol, Joan Ventosa i Calvell, and Narcís Verdaguer i Callís, all of whom were Lliga deputies or senators in the Spanish Cortes.
[51] Enric Prat de la Riba, "Els parlamentaris regionals al país" [Regional parliamentarians address the country], Manifesto, 14 June 1917, in Lliga Catalana, *Història d'una Política*, p. 205-11. This was a second manifesto signed by the same people as in n.50.

commitment to the strategy of raising Catalonia's demands for autonomy by participating in the Cortes, used such language to raise awareness of the Catalan cause in the international sphere: "I believe that Catalonia and Spain have arrived at a decisive moment in their history. Catalonia's fate has always been determined by international conflicts...We are very prepared to do all that is necessary to ensure that *the national personality of Catalonia will be sanctioned in the new constitution of Europe.*"[53]

3. The Campaign for Political Autonomy, 1917-1919

The events of the war and the changes in the international order occasioned by the war were an important catalyst for mobilization in Catalonia around political autonomy. National self-determination became a rallying point for autonomy movements both in Spain and on the continent, and Catalan political opinion was increasingly oriented towards the rights of nations to self-determination, as we saw in the previous section. Given the institutional prominence of nationalism in Catalonia during the war, and the electoral hegemony of the Lliga Regionalista, a movement for autonomy led by the LR would, presumably, not face any, or very few, electoral and ideological constraints. However, the second moment of counterhegemonic mobilization being considered here took place in response to a parliamentary crisis in Spain and brought to the fore the problem of electoral constraints and ideological compromise for the LR.

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[52] "El problema de Catalunya: Juí d'un pensador sud-americà" [The Catalan problem: The judgment of a South American Thinker (J.E. Rodé)], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 7 September 1918. Rodé was a Catalan nationalist living in South America but who sojourned in Barcelona.
[53] Interview with Frances Cambó in Yvonne Pouvreau, "La nation catalane: Son passé, son présent et son avenir" [The Catalan nation: Its past, its present and its future], *Extraits des Annales des Nationalités*, Bibiothèque des Nationalités, 12 (Lausanne: Union des Nationalités, n.d. [1918?]), p. 148 (emphasis in original).

The Spanish Cortes had been suspended periodically during 1916 and 1917 by the dynastic parties when these were thrown on the defensive by labour agitation and political confrontations with opposition parties over Spain's neutrality during the war. The suspension of the parliament had galvanized opposition forces—republicans, socialists, regionalists, and anarchists—and fomented public protests and demonstrations across Spain. The campaign for Catalan autonomy was launched as part of a general reform movement, the Assembly of Parliamentarians, that operated *outside* of parliamentary channels. The short-term objective of the Assembly was to put pressure on the monarch to convene a constituent Cortes that would debate extensive constitutional reforms to the Spanish state, including the problem of Spain's regional nationalities.

The idea for an Assembly movement came from the Lliga Regionalista, who saw it as a means of overcoming the fact that as a regional party it would not be able, on its own, to lead a movement to reopen parliament.[54] However, an alliance with other reformist forces in the rest of Spain did raise the potential of ideological compromise for the LR, since the party could easily be overtaken by the anti-dynastic and comparatively larger republican and socialist parties, whose long-term objective was the overthrow of the monarchy. In forming an alliance with these groups in the Assembly, the LR would almost certainly be pressured into adopting a republican solution to the problem of government in Spain, which went against the

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[54] See, "L'Assemblea dels Parlamentaris Catalans: Pel règim autonómic i les Corts constituents" [The Assembly of Catalan parliamentarians: For an autonomy regime and a constituent Cortes], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 5 July 1917; and "Per Catalunya i la Democracia: L'Assemblea d'ahir" [For Catalonia and Democracy: Yesterday's assembly], *El Poble Català*, 6 July 1917, p. 1 The details of the meeting of 5 July 1917 announcing the Assembly are reproduced in Assemblea de Parlamentaris, "A la opinión pública," Document no. 1, 12 July 1917, Handbill Archive, Institut Municipal d'Història de Barcelona.

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party's long-term objective of finding a solution to Catalonia's nationalist demands through the monarchical regime. Given the potential for ideological compromise, why did the Lliga Regionalista participate in the Assembly? I hypothesize that the LR would join an alliance to meet its short-term objective but would defect as soon as its alliance with anti-dynastic forces would result in ideological compromise and the loss of its core support base.

The Assembly of Parliamentarians

The threat of a military revolt,[55] extensive general strikes by the labour forces[56] and the general social disorder in Catalonia during 1917, were viewed with a certain amount of apprehension by the LR. As Cambó later recounted, "The [threatened] military coup would lead Spain into anarchy if someone did not put the reform movement back on the right track. Only we [the LR] were capable of bringing to fruition a reform project...We had to choose between resigning ourselves to impotency or taking the revolutionary road, which would disgust the immense majority"[57] of the party's supporters. But in opting for the second, revolutionary, path, the LR would be forced into an alliance with the anti-dynastic republicans and socialists whose idea of revolution would not stop short of overthrowing the monarch. When Cambó and Prat de la Riba, the party leader and ideologue of the LR, respectively, weighed this risk against the benefits that would

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[55] For the historical details, see Carolyn P. Boyd, *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 52-58.

[56] The amount of days lost to strikes was 382,888 in 1915 but shot up to 2.4 million in 1916. Although this would taper off somewhat in 1917 and 1918, in 1919, 4 million working days were lost to strike action and 7.3 million in 1920. The data is reported in Juan Antonio Lacomba Avellán, *La Crisis Española de 1917* (Madrid: Editorial Ciencia Nuueva, 1970), p. 374.

[57] Cambó, *Memòries*, p. 260. For Cambó, destroying the Restoration system did not mean overthrowing the monarchy.

accrue to the LR by participating in a larger movement, they calculated that they could not sit on the sidelines: "Convert an essentially anarchic movement into one that is regulated and controlled; 'castilianize' our movement by linking it with a general Spanish effort that we would initiate and direct; make ourselves the essential element in a new regime that would come to power if we managed to destroy the worn out [Restoration] system"[58]—these were the benefits that they anticipated from an alliance with Spanish reformers.

The Lliga Regionalista had two immediate objectives in joining the Assembly of Parliamentarians. First, it was confident that by participating in the Assembly, it could convince the dynastic members of parliament to attend the organization's first meeting, which was scheduled to take place in Barcelona on 19 July 1917. The participation of the dynastic Conservatives and Liberals would ensure the predominance of conservative forces in the movement. Second, the LR viewed the Assembly as a vehicle for it to become the leader of a Spain-wide movement for reform. This had always been one of the LR's political objectives, beginning with Prat de la Riba's 'imperialist' vision of Catalan-Spanish relations.[59]

The LR's partner in the assembly movement was a coalition of anti-dynastic parties: Lerroux' Partit Republicà Radical (PRR) [Radical Republican Party], the Partido Reformista (PR) [Reformist Party] under the leadership of Melquíades Álvarez,[60] the Partit Republicà Català (PRC) [Catalan Republican Party] under the

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[58] *Ibid.*
[59] Prat de la Riba, *La Nacionalitat Catalana*, ch. IX.
[60] The Partido Reformista was an Asturian reform party.

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leadership of Marcellí Domingo,[61] the Partido Socialista Obrero Española (PSOE) [Spanish Socialist Workers' party] under the leadership of Pablo Iglesias and PSOE's union, the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT). The movement's stated long-term objective was "the triumph of popular sovereignty," which they considered impossible under the monarchy.[62] Although not convinced that the LR would support its political project nor its political strategy, which included the general strike, the anti-dynastic coalition realized that it needed an alliance with the LR, since the latter's "social and political weight was indispensable for any serious attempts to change the regime."[63] The LR was better placed politically to negotiate the re-opening of parliament with the king than the republicans or socialists. Therefore, in the short-term, the anti-dynastic reformers needed an alliance with the LR. Once this objective was achieved, however, the anti-dynastic forces calculated that they would be able to wrestle the leadership of a broader reform movement from the Catalan nationalists once this gained momentum. Through its contacts with socialist and anarchist unions, the coalition had organized certain revolutionary tactics in

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[61] Marcellí Domingo Sanjuan (1884-1939), teacher and politician. Domingo was a member of the Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana and was elected a deputy to the Cortes in 1914, 1923, 1931 and 1936. He wrote for *El Poble Català*, *La Publicidad* and *La Lucha*. He actively participated in the autonomy movement of 1917-1919 and spent part of the military dictatorship after 1923 in exile in France. By 1930, he had become a socialist and founded the Partit Radical Socialista [Radical Socialist Party]. He participated in the Pact of San Sebastián (1930, see ch. 7), was minister for public education and then agriculture during the Second Republic and was responsible for the Republic's first agrarian reform programme. In 1933 he founded the Partit Català d'Esquerres [Catalan Party of the Left]. He spent the civil war in exile and died in Toulouse in 1939. His publications include: *On va Catalunya?* [Whither Catalonia?] (1927); *¿Que espera el rey?* [What is the King awaiting?] (1930); *¿A dónde va España?* [Whither Spain?]; and *La Revolución d'octubre* [The October revolution] (1935). The Partit Republicà Català was founded 21-22 April 1917 in Barcelona.

[62] See "Nota de la Reunión del 16 de junio de las minorías antidinásticas" [Brief of the Meeting of Anti-dynastic minorities, 16 June (1917)], in Lacomba Avellán, *La Crisis Española de 1917*, p. 433.

[63] Joan B. Culla i Clarà, *El Republicanisme Lerrouxista a Catalunya (1901-1923)* [Lerrouxista republicanism in Catalonia (1901-1923)] (Barcelona; Curial, 1986), p. 316.

order to bring down the monarch.[64] If these did not work, and it would be forced to pursue reform through the Cortes, the coalition ventured that it could bide its time until the inflexibility of the Restoration system would push Cambó and the LR into the republican camp.[65] Either way, the anti-dynastic forces were confident that the monarch would not be able to withstand public pressure for political change and that after his expected abdication, the reform movement would naturally come under the leadership of the anti-dynastic coalition.

Cambó appeared to have been fully aware of the coalition's calculations: "What really happened is that [Lerroux'] republicans went to the Assembly with the belief that they would help to create a revolution which they would then redirect to suit themselves. Lerroux [was] convinced that he would be director [of a movement] to install a bourgeois republic."[66] Catalan republicans of the PRC believed that the imminent end of the monarchy would make the republican option inevitable. Therefore, in the short-term, an alliance with nationalists for the purposes of re-opening the Cortes could help them realize their long-term objectives more quickly. The coalition of anti-dynastic parties, then, viewed their participation in the Assembly as a means of positioning themselves at the helm of the parliamentarians' reform movement so that when the regime fell, they would be strategically placed to put a republic in place.

Given the objectives of the anti-dynastic forces in the Assembly movement, the LR had clear misgivings about cooperating with the coalition but, in the short term, "decided that it was better to exchange a compromise with the republican and

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[64] These included several planned general strikes and negotiations with the military.
[65] Culla i Clarà, *El Republicanisme Lerrouxista a Catalunya*, p. 316.
[66] Cambó, *Memòries*, p. 262.

labour forces for an agreement on the need to establish [social] order" in Catalonia and Spain by seeking a solution to the parliamentary crisis.[67] The compromise the LR was faced with was that in forming an alliance with republicans and socialists, it ran the risk of alienating its sympathizers in the dynastic parties and even the king. The Lliga Regionalista could rationalize the alliance to its sympathizers by claiming that it was doing its part to restore social order in Catalonia. However, if the anti-dynastic forces got the upper hand in the coalition, the LR would find it difficult to disassociate itself from the republican project of the group. Therefore, the LR needed to be able to monitor the anti-dynastic parties' activities lest "the conservatives classes which, until that moment, had been on our side, abandon us, [and] renounce us, our leaders and our ideas"; the LR's situation, according to Cambó, was "very difficult and the role that we played very dangerous."[68]

In order to guard against this danger, the LR opted to hedge its bets by seeking the participation of Antonio Maura and the Conservative party in the Assembly of Parliamentarians. Maura was not willing to participate, however, since he considered the movement to be subversive and non-constitutional.[69] The government of Eduardo Dato had already warned the parliamentarians that their meeting was considered seditious[70] and, the days leading up to the planned meeting "were filled with clandestine meetings and manifestoes, with rumors and exhortations, and, from the government side, with threats, remonstrances, and the

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[67] Molas, *Lliga Catalana*, p. 113.
[68] Cambó, *Memòries*, pp. 262-63.
[69] For Maura's views on the Assembly movement see, Javier Tussell, *Antonio Maura: Una biografía política* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1994), p. 174.
[70] See Eduardo Dato's telegram to the parliamentarians, 12 July 1917, in Lacomba Avellán, *La Crisis Española de 1917*, p. 455.

wholesale confiscation of newspapers."[71] The Catalan parliamentarians were forced on the defensive and attempted to calm public opinion with several published announcements to defuse rumours about Catalan independence: "In order to discredit the Assembly before the rest of Spain, [the regime] has promoted the idea that it is a separatist movement. The accusation is not only false, but absurd: no one with any common sense would suppose that in order to stir up support for separatism, Catalan parliamentarians would invite all Spanish senators and deputies [to the Assembly]."[72]

The Assembly met as planned but its composition alarmed the Lliga Regionalista: Of the 71 deputies and senators who attended, there were absolutely no representatives of the dynastic parties from outside Catalonia. The regime's strategy of linking the Assembly movement to Catalan separatism had convinced the dynastic parties not to attend. Moreover, 44 of the 71 deputies were Catalan, which compromised the LR's desire to lead an all-Spain movement. Both of the LR's motivations for joining the movement, then, failed to materialize: its participation in the Assembly movement did not attract the conservative dynastic forces nor were Spanish parliamentary deputies prepared to entrust the leadership of a reform movement to the LR. The Assembly of Parliamentarians managed to pass several

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[71] Gerald H. Meaker, *The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 72. For a selection of government propaganda see, Assemblea de Parlamentaris, "Una carta amb comentari" [A letter with commentary], Document no. 3, 14 July 1917, Handbill Archive, Institut Municipal d'Història de Barcelona.

[72] See Assemblea de Parlamentaris, "Els procediments del Govern i la nostra actitut" [Our position on the government's actions] Document no. 7, 18 July 1917, which also includes a warning ("Al Poble de Barcelona") for public order for 19 July, the day of the Assembly. See also, "A la opinió" [To popular opinion], Document no. 6, 16 July 1917, which outlines the purpose and agenda of the assembly for the public. Handbill Archive, Institut Municipal d'Història de Barcelona.

resolutions, strike up three committees and agree to a second meeting on 16 August in Oviedo, before its members were arrested by the civil governor.[73]

Crisis and Defection

Several general strikes led by the socialists and Alejandro Lerroux postponed the second meeting of the Assembly of Parliamentarians and made it almost impossible to deny a link between the Assembly movement and the strikers. This is exactly what the regime had hoped for in its attempt to discredit the reform movement. However, the tables quickly turned on the government when public opinion came out against the way in which the regime and the military handled the aftermath of the strike: martial law, censorship and the proposed execution of the Socialist strike committee. Internal divisions within the dynastic parties over how to handle the post-strike situation provoked the fall of Eduardo Dato's Conservative government on 26 October 1917. This time, however, the king did not immediately call upon the Liberals to form a new government, thereby breaking the *turno pacífico*—the alternation in power of Conservatives and Liberals—for the first time.

The Assembly of Parliamentarians finally reconvened on 30 October 1917 at the Ateneo de Madrid during this climate of political crisis and public outcry. Events quickly turned in the LR's favour: Cambó was summoned from the Assembly's meeting by the king who offered the Catalan sector of the Assembly movement

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[73] The resolutions included condemnations of the restoration government; a reiteration of the previous demand for a constituent Cortes; and the renovation of the Spanish state. The committees were: constitutional reform and municipal autonomy; national defence and justice; social and economic problems. See, Assemblea de Parlamentaris, Document no. 9 [no title], 26 July 1917, Handbill Archive, Institut Municipal d'Història de Barcelona; and "Catalunya salva a Espanya: L'Assemblea es cellebrada: Ridicol fracás del Govem" [Catalonia saves Spain: The Assembly meets: Ridiculous fiasco of the Government], *El Poble Català*, 20 July 1917, p. 3. See also a handbill detailing the events of the Assembly by the parliamentarians themselves in Lacomba Avellán, *La Crisis Española de 1917*, pp. 477-87.

several positions in a *concertación* (national unity) government. Two Catalan politicians would be given ministerial portfolios in exchange for which Cambó would drop the Assembly movement's demand for a constituent Cortes.[74]

The king's invitation was the LR's way out of an impasse. Although it now clearly controlled the Assembly movement after the events of the general strike, the anti-dynastic coalition was almost too weak to be an effective alliance partner; there was no future in the Assembly movement. By contrast, a national unity government presented the LR with a way to realize both its short and long-term objectives. The LR was, in fact, faced with Hobson's choice: either participate in the national unity government or, get nothing at all. In the short-term, the national unity government would not only restart the parliamentary process but it would also give the LR the opportunity to participate directly in the executive in Madrid—an objective the LR had pursued since its inception. Participation in government, further, would give the LR the strategic opportunity it needed to persuade the prime minister and the king to grant autonomy to Catalonia. Cambó was convinced that by participating in government, the LR would solve, at the same time, the electoral constraint associated with being a minority party and the problem of ideological compromise that came with an alliance with anti-dynastic forces. For the former, the participation of two pro-autonomy Catalan politicians in the executive meant that it would conceivably be easier to persuade the government to introduce legislation on autonomy. For the latter, the LR could pursue autonomy from within the monarchical regime.

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[74] The two ministers were Joan Ventosa i Calvell of the Lliga (Finance) and Felip Rodés, a republican (Education).

In the aftermath of the general strike, with their organizational basis severely weakened, the anti-dynastic groups did not have sufficient resources to prevent the LR from defecting from the Assembly movement.[75] As a result, even the republican leaders Lerroux and Álvarez were prepared to back Cambó if he accepted the king's offer, although they sought some assurances that the two ministers would use their positions of power in order to promote the Assembly of Parliamentarians' demands.[76] These demands had been made public in the press on 18 October 1917 and included a constituent Cortes charged with drafting a new constitution that would recognize regional autonomy.[77] But the republicans and socialists were not deceived: they recognized that the LR would work to keep the monarchy in place. The anti-dynastic forces had not bargained on the monarch providing the LR with a way out of the problem of ideological compromise that it faced in the Assembly movement. It was the first time that the regime had used an institutional innovation—a national unity government—as a way out of a political crisis. Indeed, as a result of this innovation, the LR had emerged from the Assembly movement unscathed, ideologically. In the LR, the "the enthusiasm [over the outcome] was

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[75] The failure of the general strike prompted a whole scale reorganization of anarchist unions in Catalonia. See the debate in Confederación Regional de Trabajo de Cataluña, *Memoria del Congreso celebrado en Barcelona los días 28, 29, 30 de junio y 1 de julio del año 1918* (Barcelona: 1918); and Confederación Nacional de Trabajo, *Memoria del Congreso celebrado en el Teatro de la Comedia de Madrid, los días 10 al 18 de diciembre de 1918* (Barcelona: Tipografía Cosmos, 1919).
[76] Culla i Clarà, *El Republicanisme Lerrouxista*, p. 320. See also, Ignacio de Alós Martin, "El regionalismo en el proyecto de reforma constitucional elaborado por el Asamblea de Parlamentarios de 1917" [Regionalism in the constitutional reform project drafted by Assembly of Parliamentarians of 1917], *Estudios de Historia Social* 28-29 (1984), pp. 347-52.

delirious. Everyone, young and old, felt the indescribable joy of triumph" and many were relieved to be rid of the Assembly, which they considered to be a "revolutionary venture."[78]

The evidence examined here, then, suggests that the Lliga Regionalista abandoned the alliance with anti-dynastic forces when it was offered an alternative. This turn of events does not fully support the hypothesis, since the LR did not abandon the alliance with anti-dynastic forces because it was in danger of losing its core support base. Despite Cambó's claims, there is no evidence available in party documents or newspapers to show that this was the case. In fact, at the time that it left the Assembly movement, the LR had not been forced by its alliance partners to abandon its support of the monarchy. On the contrary, because of the failure of the general strike movement, the LR had gained the upper hand in the Assembly.

The LR left the Assembly of Parliamentarians because the movement could not fulfill either its short or long-term objectives. By October 1917, the Assembly was a spent force. The LR had nothing to gain by staying in an alliance with anti-dynastic forces whose support base had been weakened in the aftermath of the general strike. When the idea of a national unity government was raised by the king, Cambó, acting for the LR, realized that the party had another available option. There were no guarantees that participation in a national unity government would be

[77] "El nou esperit triomphant: Assemblea de Parlamentaris: Les Conclusions de la Comissió Primera: La reforma de la Constitució: Document historic" [The new triumphant spirit: Assembly of parliamentarians: The Conclusions of the First Committee: The reform of the constitution: Historic document], *La Veu de Catalunya,* 18 October 1917, pp. 6-7. The details of the Assembly's decision regarding Catalan autonomy can be found in "Conclusions de l'Assemblea de Parlamentaris en relació amb el règim autonòmic de Catalunya" [Conclusions of the Assembly of Parliamentarians regarding the autonomy regime of Catalonia], in González Casanova, *Federalisme i autonomia a Catalunya,* pp. 579-80.
[78] Cambó, *Memòries,* p. 270.

the LR's opportunity to realize its short-term objective—political autonomy. However, the LR reasoned that it was worth taking the risk, since the party was essentially presented with Hobson's choice: either take up the offer to join the national unity government or, by electing to stay in the Assembly movement, get nothing at all. Only the former provided the possibility of obtaining political autonomy for Catalonia.

The Lliga Regionalista exited from the Assembly of Parliamentarians to enter a governing alliance with the regime. The party could make this move because the national unity government, as a form of political innovation, broadened its political options. Nevertheless, the LR's decision to pursue its autonomy campaign from within the regime did not remove the problem of ideological compromise. In the rest of this section, I examine how the LR attempted to manage this problem.

The Autonomy Statute

The Lliga Regionalista had clearly emerged the winner from the alliance with anti-dynastic forces because the Assembly had opened up the path to power for the party.[79] However, the LR's decision to participate in the national unity government of the Liberal Manuel García Prieto could be viewed as a real gamble, if the party was not able to deliver an autonomy statute to Catalonia. The party's platform in the general elections of February 1918 promised its supporters that the reform of the Spanish state was inevitable and that the LR, if reelected, would play a hand in bringing this about: "There is no state in this world whose constitution can remain undamaged from the profound transformations that are operating in the world...and there is no danger in making a mistake in affirming that only states that

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[79] *Ibid.*

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succumb either to revolutionary convulsions or whose life is regulated by the sword of a conqueror, can escape modifying their constitutions."[80] The electoral results were a show of support for the LR's strategy: the party won 20 seats out of a possible 44 in the four Catalan provinces, which was its best electoral performance to date.

For most of 1918, the LR's support base in Catalonia continued to believe that it would be possible to achieve Catalan autonomy by participating in the government in Madrid. But it soon transpired that participation in the executive provided no guarantees for Catalan autonomy. The government's short-term mission was to restore social order to Spain and to deal with another military crisis;[81] a bill for Catalan autonomy was not compatible with either of these political objectives. Not even Cambó's political clout could influence the executive when he joined as Minister of Development in March 1918. The LR soon found itself trying to pursue its reform strategy by gathering parliamentary support and was once again, as a minority party, faced with the problem of electoral constraints. Even though the dynastic parties had now been thoroughly defeated in Catalonia, the same could not be said for the rest of Spain. Prior to the general elections of February 1918, Cambó had travelled extensively around Spain in an attempt to gather support for the reform programme of the Assembly of Parliamentarians.[82] Although the election

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[80] "Al País" [To the country], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 14 January 1918, p. 11. The manifesto was signed by Ramón d'Abadal, Francesc Cambó, Josep Bertran i Musitu and Lluís Duran i Ventosa, all members of the Comissió d'Acció Política.

[81] See Boyd, *Praetorian Politics*, ch. 5 for the details of the government's attempt to introduce various army reform bills.

[82] For the announcement of this strategy by the Comissió d'Acció Política of the Lliga, see "Per l'Espanya gran: Preparant la Propaganda" [For Greater Spain: Preparing the propaganda], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 24 November 1917, p. 6. See also, Cambó, *Memòries*, p. 273; and Molas, *Lliga Catalana*, p. 121.

produced the first breakthrough for Basque nationalists—15 seats in the Basque Country and Navarra—the results elsewhere were not sufficient to bring to an end the hegemony of the dynastic parties in the Cortes. Even if the *turno pacífico* had come to an end, the dynastic parties themselves were not yet eclipsed by a Spain-wide reform movement and were even able to join forces to prevent the reform movement from gaining momentum. In addition to the Catalan and Basque nationalists, there were eight other congressional deputies that the LR could count as allies, for a congressional bloc of 35. This was much less than the share of parliamentary seats for the dynastic Conservatives (93) and the Liberals (95).

By September 1918, the nationalist and republican youth movement in Catalonia was becoming increasingly impatient with the LR's strategy in government. At a public meeting in Barcelona on 29 September, Cambó and Joan Ventosa i Calvell—the Minister of Finance—reaffirmed the party's strategy of working 'for Catalonia and Greater Spain' and conveyed their impression that Spanish public opinion was beginning to move in their favour. But there had been absolutely no progress on the autonomy question since the LR had joined the government. Meanwhile, in Catalonia, the LR leadership in the Mancomunitat had ceased making demands for autonomy while Cambó and Ventosa i Calvell were government ministers in Madrid. It was increasingly difficult to maintain this policy and to satisfy nationalist ambitions in Catalonia. With the end of the war approaching and the democratic and populist tide in Europe, Catalans were increasingly aggravated by the regime's inability to solve Spain's political problems. The reaction was a series of demonstrations that, over the next several months, would escalate into violence.

The popular demand for autonomy could not be ignored by the LR's leadership. The party's participation in the government had now become a political liability among its supporters in Catalonia and it was forced to choose between appeasing its electorate and attempting to push for reform in Madrid. The violence perpetrated against Catalan nationalists and republicans in Barcelona by pro-Spain forces and the emergence of a radical movement for Catalan independence convinced the LR that it had to change tactics in order, first, to convince its supporters that it was still the leader of the autonomy movement in Catalonia and, second, to regain control of this movement. On 14 October 1918 the LR gave the official signal that it was changing its strategy: "Now or never we must lift ourselves up to reclaim sovereignty for our language, for the codification of our law, for the administration of Justice, for the care of Education, for the autonomy of Catalan public life, all these things which in these moments are beating in the hearts of Catalans."[83] Cambó resigned his ministerial post on 6 November and returned to Catalonia to begin the campaign for autonomy.[84]

The evidence presented here suggests that the decision to pursue autonomy through participation in government threatened the defection of a substantial part of the LR's supporters. The LR's participation in government can be seen as a type of tacit alliance with the dynastic parties. In the end, this alliance, like the Assembly

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[83] Josep Bertran i Musitu, "Ara o Mai" [Now or Never], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 14 October 1917. See also, "La urgència nacionalista" [The national urgency], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 17 October 1918, p. 8.

[84] See "Després de la crisi: L'autonomia de Catalunya" [After the crisis: Catalan autonomy], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 11 November 1918; "Catalunya tota demanant l'autonomia" [All of Catalonia demands autonomy], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 12 November 1918; "Per l'autonomia immediata de Catalunya" [For the immediate autonomy of Catalonia], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 13 November 1918; and other similar articles appearing on 14, 15, 16 and 17 November 1918.

of Parliamentarians, did not fulfill the LR's short-term objective—Catalan autonomy. There was no indication that the national unity government was even prepared to debate the issue. However, the decision to participate in the national unity government did not entail an ideological compromise for the LR—at least not for its leadership. In Catalonia, however, the party's support base was becoming increasingly disillusioned with the leadership's strategy and was, in fact, determining the course of this strategy. Because of the violence and political agitation in Barcelona, the LR's leadership felt pressured to leave the government. The gap between the leadership and the support base, however, would continue to grow.[85]

The Extra-parliamentary commission

After the experience of the Assembly movement, the LR's strategy for the next round in the autonomy campaign was to move forward on two fronts: it would pursue an *informal* alliance in Catalonia with the republicans at the same time as it would keep its lines of communication open with the regime. The alliance would be formed in anticipation of an extra-parliamentary commission charged with drafting a bill on regional autonomy.[86] The LR needed the support of republicans in Catalonia in order to present a united front against Madrid on the commission; if the government was faced with a divided Catalan movement, it would not feel pressured to discuss autonomy. However, as in 1917, the LR viewed an alliance with republicans, even if informal, as risky for two reasons. First, as noted above, politics

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[85] In 1923, Cambó claimed in a speech that in 1918-1919 the party was being taken over by 'extremists.' See, Speech by Francesc Cambó, 7 January, 1923, at the Casal Nacionalista de la Barceloneta, in Lliga Catalana, *Història d' una Política*, pp. 329-50.

[86] Cambó claims that he had persuaded the prime minister, the Count Romanones, to strike the commission as a way out of the parliamentary impasse after Catalan deputies left the Cortes in November 1918 to protest against the government's unwillingness to debate autonomy. See Cambó, *Memòries*, pp. 305-308.

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in Barcelona was becoming increasingly radical; once the war had ended, the anticipation that Catalonia would receive autonomy, if not independence, had mobilized public opinion for a radical solution to the problem of political reform in Spain. The LR was concerned that in allying itself with republicans it would once again become overtaken by revolutionary groups and be faced with the problem of ideological compromise. Second, Lerroux' Partit Republicà Radical was once again in an alliance with PSOE, Spanish and Catalan republicans and, after 17 December, Catalan socialists. This preoccupied the LR since, as in 1917, the anti-dynastic coalition maintained that autonomy was not possible without a regime change. The LR feared that an association with these forces would jeopardize its capacity to negotiate a moderate form of autonomy with the monarchical regime. The anti-dynastic coalition, as well as a growing sector of the party's own support base, were unlikely to accept a solution to autonomy that did not include a transition to a republic.

The LR was, in fact, stuck between a rock and a hard place: it needed the support of the republican and socialist forces,[87] but it also needed to be able to retain the goodwill of the dynastic parties and the monarch in order to influence the course of the commission. But if the LR attempted to balance these forces, it would end up treading water, politically. On the one hand, if the party leaned toward the regime and negotiated an autonomy statute without the input and support of the

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[86] Cambó claims that he had persuaded the prime minister, the Count Romanones, to strike the commission as a way out of the parliamentary impasse after Catalan deputies left the Cortes in November 1918 to protest against the government's unwillingness to debate autonomy. See Cambó, *Memòries*, pp. 305-308.

anti-dynastic forces, it might not be able to deliver the document to the Catalan public; the statute would doubtless be considered far too moderate. If it leaned too far toward the coalition of anti-dynastic forces, on the other hand, the regime would suspect the LR of being anti-monarchical and the party would not be able to negotiate anything.

The LR initially opted to tread water. Cambó made a famous speech in Barcelona on 16 December 1918 that the LR fashioned as a type of manifesto for the Catalan people.[88] While recognizing that the Restoration regime was not disposed toward Catalan autonomy, Cambó stated that he was not convinced that a republican party was the solution since "on many occasions, the errors and sins of the republicans attenuate the faults of monarchs." Instead, he warned that the LR "would not mortgage autonomy to the republic; we are not going to postpone the petition for autonomy until the arrival of the republic; but neither will we retreat from our path toward autonomy because the monarchy might fall."[89]

The absence of any firm position on the regime question—at least not a public one—on the part of the LR only disappointed the anti-dynastic forces. These were willing to support the autonomy movement and the extra-parliamentary commission only as a means to attain a republic. As in 1917, the anti-dynastic coalition believed that the LR would eventually be forced into the republican camp

[87] The Lliga publicly acknowledged the support of the socialist party, "Despite the fundamental differences which separate us...[we] are very grateful for its aid and that of the proletarian masses which it represents." See, "L'actitud socialista" [The Socialist position], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 24 December 1918, p. 8.
[88] See "Monarquia? Republica? Catalunya!" [Monarchy? Republic? Catalonia!], in Lliga Catalana, *Historia d'una Política*, pp. 278-80. The speech was also reported as "L'hora suprem de Catalunya: El grandiós acta nacionalista" [Catalonia's supreme hour: The grandiose nationalist act], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 17 December 1918.
[89] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

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by the regime's intransigence. On this occasion, after the failure of the Assembly of Parliamentarians and the disappointing experience of the national unity government, republicans and socialists might well have presumed that the LR was running out of options. The coalition of anti-dynastic forces was able to force the hand of the LR when the membership of the extra-parliamentary commission was announced by the government on 17 December 1918. Since the regime had not appointed the anti-dynastic forces to the commission—the republican Melquíades Álvarez was the exception—they felt powerless to influence its outcome. Even if they publicly extended their support to the LR's participation on the commission, they were convinced that the LR would never risk a confrontation with the monarchical regime. Moreover, their worst fear was that the LR would be able to negotiate an autonomy statute *with* the monarchy. Consequently, the leadership of the anti-dynastic coalition—Pablo Iglesias (PSOE), Francisco Largo Caballero (PSOE) and Melquíades Álvarez (PR)—withdrew their support and convinced the most radical sector of Catalan republicanism—Marcellí Domingo, Francesc Layret[90] and Lluís Companys[91]—to withdraw theirs as well. The anti-dynastic coalition determined that it would be better to try to prevent the LR from attending the commission—in an

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[90] Francesc Layret i Foix (1880-1920), lawyer and politician. He worked amongst the labouring classes as a republican, having founded the Associació Escolar Republicana (1900) and the Ateneu Enciclopèdic Popular (1905). He was a member of Unión Republicana and an alderman for Barcelona city hall (1905). He was also a founding member of the Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicà and joined the Partit Republicà Català in 1917.

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attempt to break its relationship with the dynastic forces and the monarchy—than to risk a bill on autonomy that would make no provisions for a regime change.[92] The anti-dynastic forces had made a decision: they would only support autonomy with a republic. As in 1917, they anticipated that they could mobilize public support against the regime and use the outcome of the extra-parliamentary commission—which was sure to be a moderate piece of legislation—as a catalyst for popular mobilization. Therefore, the price that the anti-dynastic forces demanded for their support of the LR and a united Catalan front was the LR's withdrawal from the extra-parliamentary commission.

Despite this price, the LR persisted with its intention to participate. The party was initially confident that the composition of the commission would work in its favour and had every intention of participating despite the defection of the anti-dynastic forces: of the 33 members, the party figured that 18 would support Catalan claims for autonomy. But when the dynastic Conservative party also decided not to participate, the LR was forced to change its mind. The risk, Cambó calculated, was that "without the participation of the conservatives, it was a well-known fact that the results would be opposed by them [Conservatives] and the left [republicans and socialists] in the parliament; and, should we emerge triumphant, we would be forced

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[91] Lluís Companys i Jover (1882-1940), lawyer and politician. In 1917 he founded and directed the Partit Republicà Català and was elected an alderman for Barcelona city hall in the same year. In 1920 and 1923 he was elected a deputy for Sabadell, as a member of the Unió de Rabassaires [tenant farmers]. He wrote for *La Publicidad* and *La Lucha*. He was a founding member of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (1931) and was elected a congressional deputy in 1931, 1933 and 1936 as well as a deputy to the Catalan parliament in 1932, of which he was the first president. In 1934, he was elected president of the Generalitat and proclaimed Catalonia's independence that same year, for which he was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, but was released by republican forces in 1936. He was executed by the Francoist regime in 1940.

[92] Balcells, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia*, p. 149.

to implement the reform amidst an inflamed battle between left and right" in Catalonia.[93]

The events around the extra-parliamentary commission provide support for the hypothesized relationship about inter-group alliances and the problem of ideological compromise. The anti-dynastic forces defected from their informal alliance with nationalists when it became clear that if nationalists participated on the commission with the dynastic forces, the autonomy project they would draft would compromise the anti-dynastic forces long-term objectives. They would prefer nothing to a bill on autonomy that made no provisions for a republican regime. The LR was prepared to attend the commission in anticipation of the participation of the Conservative party with which it could make a tacit alliance against the Liberals. But when the Conservatives withdrew their support, the LR was similarly faced with the problem of ideological compromise. The autonomy it would be forced to negotiate with the Liberals would not be supported even by its most conservative members and it would certainly be rejected by the party's youth wing.

The extra-parliamentary commission's proposal was made public on 15 January 1919 and presented in the form of a parliamentary bill to the Cortes shortly thereafter. The proposal was a disappointment for Catalonia since, of its 22 articles, only one referred to Catalan autonomy; the rest referred to municipal autonomy.[94] Moreover, there were no provisions to grant Catalonia executive or legislative powers; the proposal was not much more than that which originally established the Mancomunitat in 1914. Violence in Madrid and another general strike would result

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[93] Cambó, *Memòries*, pp. 308-309.

in the suspension of the Cortes on 27 February 1919. On 13 March, a state of war was declared in Catalonia and although it was lifted in September, constitutional guarantees would not be restored until March 1922. The autonomy bill was never debated.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined the reasons for which the Lliga Regionalista was not able to catch the winds of change in Europe and obtain political autonomy for Catalonia. Whether the party pursued its autonomy project through parliamentary or extra-parliamentary channels, the LR was faced with the problem of ideological compromise. The types of strategic dilemmas with which the LR was faced arose from the combination of political crisis and the party's own ambivalence as regards the need for democratic reforms: Hobson's choice (the Assembly or Parliamentarians or the national unity government) and a rock and a hard place (the anti-dynastic forces or the monarchy). These dilemmas point to a tension within the LR that was related to the party's political orientation. International events raised the public's expectations about democratic reforms and created a political context which made it increasingly difficult for the LR to continue to hold together a party programme that was at the same time nationalist and monarchist. As the campaign for autonomy progressed, it became clear to both republicans and the LR's support base that the party leadership was committed to preserving the monarchical order. The fact that the LR was not so obviously committed to democratic reform was one important reason for which republicanism remained a viable political alternative in

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[94] See, "Projecte d'Autonomia presentat pel Govern espanyol al Congrés" [Autonomy project presented by the Spanish government to the Congress], in González Casanova, *Federalisme i autonomia a Catalunya*, pp. 589-628.

an age of nationalism and, as chapter 7 will demonstrate, republican parties attracted

increased numbers of supporters to its ranks in the 1920s and 1930s.

Republic and Liberty, 1930-1932

Introduction

The republican political project gathered momentum and supporters in Catalonia during the 1920s and early 1930s because it was the only viable democratic alternative to the monarchy and the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Gregory Luebbert and Juan Linz have both maintained that support for republicanism prior to the Second Republic was diffuse and poorly organized.[1] Against these accounts, I argue that for Catalonia, the historical evidence suggests otherwise. In fact, it was precisely because of the organizational and ideological potential of republicanism at the end of the dictatorship in 1930 that Catalan and Spanish republicans were able to form an alliance, the Pact of San Sebastian, to bring down the monarchy. Moreover, because of the terms of the Pact, which linked Catalan autonomy to a transition to a republic, an autonomy statute was virtually guaranteed after the republican electoral victory of April 1931. For the first time since 1901, Catalan republicans did not have to enter into an alliance with nationalists of the Lliga Regionalista in order to lobby Madrid for autonomy.

After April 1931, when republicanism had triumphed electorally in Spain, the political context seemed propitious for the autonomy project of Catalan republicans. After extensive parliamentary debates in the Constituent Cortes on the Autonomy Statute, however, what Catalan republicans obtained in exchange for their support

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[1] Gregory Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 151; and Juan J. Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978), p. 143.

of their Spanish counterparts was less than that for which they had bargained. This outcome is a puzzle: Why, despite their hegemony in Catalonia and the republican hegemony in the Cortes, did Catalan republicans not obtain the degree and type of autonomy for which they had bargained? Parliamentary rules and agenda-setting powers set limits on the range of autonomous powers that Catalonia could expect to obtain. The rules of procedure in the Cortes ensured that the Spanish republican version of the territorial organization of the state—'integral'[2] and not multinational—was debated prior to, and not simultaneously with, the Autonomy Statute—as Catalan deputies had requested.

This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first section, I show how the growth of organized republicanism after 1919 further sharpened the ideological cleavage between nationalists and republicans. In the second section, I show how this cleavage reshaped the possibilities for inter-party alliances. In section three, I examine the juridical arguments used to advance Catalan constitutional claims and, in section four, I consider how these claims were debated constitutionally.

1. The Republican Alternative

After 1919, republicanism came to be seen as a more likely avenue for political reform than the LR's strategy of collaborating with the Restoration regime because of its emphasis on democratic reforms and regime change. The Restoration monarchy's immobilism was confirmed time and again: by seeking out allies in the military, the dynastic parties and even regionalist parties such as the LR, the monarchy had been able to shelter itself from most opposition movements. Since all attempts to obtain Catalan autonomy through Madrid had failed, the republican

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[2] Article 1 of the Constitution stated that "The Republic constitutes an integral state,

claim that autonomy and republic were linked was gaining public support, while the type of political action that was associated with this claim was becoming increasingly radical. As a result of these changes, the ideological cleavage between nationalists and republicans became more pronounced. During the 1920s, Catalan republican parties rejected the parliamentary route to reform through Madrid and, by the end of the military dictatorship in 1930, were organizing around revolutionary projects for change. Compared to republican parties that existed before 1919, those that were created after had two new purposes. First, they were organized in reaction to the strategy pursued by the Lliga Regionalista: "One would not find in any State in the world a group of nationalist leaders who, engaged in a fight for the liberty of the *patria*, would collaborate with the government of an oppressive central state power."[3] Second, new republican parties publicly stated their intent to mobilize supporters for a transition from a monarchy to a republic and, to use revolutionary means, if necessary, to bring this transition about.

The most important of these new republican parties was Acció Catalana, which emerged from the Conferència Nacional Catalana, organized by Antoni Rovira i Virgili in May-June 1922.[4] The creation of Acció Catalana (AC) raised the stakes in the debate between nationalists and republicans, since it placed questions of state and regime at the top of the political agenda. Moreover, the creation of the party caused an important split in the LR along generational lines. Disillusioned with

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compatible with municipal and regional autonomy."
[3] Antoni Rovira i Virgili, *Els Camins de la Llibertat de Catalunya* [Paths to Catalan Liberty], speech given at l'Ateneu Barcelonès, 14 September 1922 (Barcelona: La Publicitat, 1922), p. 13. The speech was also reproduced in the newspaper *La Publicidad*, 15 September 1922, p. 7.
[4] "Conferència Nacional Catalana," Announcement and Registration, April 1922, Handbill Archive, Institut Municipal d'Història de Barcelona.

the strategy pursued by Francesc Cambó, prominent members of the Lliga

Regionalista—Jaume Bofill i Mates, Ramón d'Abadal i de Vinyals[5] and Martí Esteve i

Guau[6]—and of its youth wing—Bonaventura Gassol i Rovira[7] and Lluís Nicolau

d'Olwer[8]—joined with republicans to sign the public announcement for a

conference to consider forming a new 'patriotic assembly'. Convinced that the

conference might produce a split in the party, the LR's Comissió d'Acció Política

(CAP) warned members that if the conference was used as a forum to take political

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[5] Ramón d'Abadal i de Vinyals (1888-1970), historian and nephew of Ramon d'Abadal i Calderó, member of the Lliga Regionalista's Comissió d'Acció Política.

[6] Martí Esteve i Guau (1897-1977), lawyer and politician. Between 1921 and 1923 he was an alderman in Barcelona city hall for the Lliga Regionalista. In 1922, he was part of the executive committee of Acció Catalana and was politically active as a republican after that date. From 1922 to 1926, he was editor of La Publicitat, the mouthpiece of Acció Catalana. In 1930 he eas elected an alderman to Barcelona city hall for Acció Catalana. In 1931 he was appointed to the committee of the provisional assembly of the Catalan Generalitat that was charged with drafting the Autonomy Statute and elected the same year as a deputy to the Constituent Cortes of the Second Republic for Barcelona for the republican alliance Partit Catalanista Republicà. He was a member of the Generalitat and occupied various executive position until it fell in the civil war. He died in exile in Mexico City.

[7] Bonaventura Gassol i Rovira (1893-1980), poet and politician. He was a member of the Joventut Nacionalista of the Lliga Regionalista until 1922, when he joined Acció Catalana. In 1924, he went into exile in France and became a member of the radical Estat Català led by Francesc Macià. He was elected to the Constituent Cortes of the Second Republic as a republican deputy for Barcelona (1931-1933) and later, Tarragona (1936). He was also a deputy in the Catalan Generalitat representing Tarragona. He was Minister of the Interior of the República Catalana (1931) before it became the Generalitat, and Minister of Culture of the Generalitat (1931-34, 1936). He went into exile during the Franco period but returned to Barcelona after the transition to democracy.

[8] Lluís Nicolau d'Olwer (1888-1961), historian, journalist and politician. He was a member of the Joventut Nacionalista of the Lliga Regionalista, was elected alderman to Barcelona city hall in 1918, and occupied the positions of vice-mayor and president of the Mancomunitat's Culture Commission. After 1922 he was politically active as a republican and was editor of Acció Catalana's mouthpiece, La Publicitat. In 1923 he was elected a republican deputy to the Mancomunitat for Barcelona but went into exile after Primo de Rivera's coup d'état of the same year. Under the Second Republic, he was a deputy for Barcelona to the Constitutent Cortes of the Second Republic for the republican alliance, Partit Catalanista Republicà [Catalanist Republican Party]. In 1933, he was elected president of Acció Catalana Republicana and, in 1934, was appointed to head the parliamentary commission responsible for transferring services from the Spanish state to the Catalan Generalitat. His last position before the civil war was president of the Bank of Spain. After the civil war, he was part of the republican government in exile and served as its ambassador to Mexico, where he eventually settled and died.

decisions and to form a new movement, then members of the LR should abstain or face the risk of expulsion.[9] In case any members had forgotten why the LR was created in 1901, it was "precisely...to bring to bear a strategy of intervention in Spanish politics that would permit the fulfillment of Catalonia's nationalist ideals via evolutionary and legal methods." Some dissension was permitted, but dissenters should not expect to change the strategic direction of the Lliga Regionalista.[10]

The rift that erupted within the Lliga Regionalista was generational. The youth wing, Joventut Nacionalista, had come of political age during the First World War and was schooled in the methods and tactics of their nationalist counterparts in East-Central Europe and Ireland. While the older generation in the party continued to view the Restoration monarchy as a means to guarantee the preservation of the old social older, the younger generation viewed social change as a necessary corollary of democratic change. Since there was no way for the younger generation to take control of the party's strategic centre, the CAP, the only way it could pursue its own agenda was by starting a new party. The nationalist youth of the LR brought to AC a commitment to work for Catalan autonomy. What they were forced to accept in exchange for joining with republicans led by Rovira i Virgili was a rejection of the reformist path through Madrid and a commitment to a republican political project. The result was an alliance between political actors who were determined to create an alternative to the LR and to break the party's control over the autonomy campaign.

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[9] See "Als nostres amics" [To our friends], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 23 May 1922, p. 8; and "Declaració de la Comissió d'Acció Política de la Lliga Regionalista" [Declaration of the Political Action Committee of the Lliga Regionalista], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 25 May 1922. See also, Lluís Duran i Ventosa, "Reflexió" [Reflection], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 22 May 1922, p. 5.
[10] "La tàctica del catalanisme" [Catalanism's tactic], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 26 May 1922.

Acció Catalana was conceived as an organization that would work for the liberty of Catalonia through self-determination, the 'catalanization' of the population and the development of a self-sufficient economy.[11] In the place of the strategy perfected by the LR, AC stipulated that any parliamentary action on the part of Catalans could not contribute to the smooth functioning of the Cortes; rather, this action must be "independent, separate, capable of upsetting the business of government and the games of centralist politics."[12] Acció Catalana differed from the LR in another important respect: its political project was republican: "Given the situation of our land, the regime which best suits it is a republican one, free and sovereign."[13]

As the party leader and ideologue, Rovira i Virgili used his public profile to debate publicly what he termed 'the paths to Catalan liberty.'[14] He rejected the possibility that federalism could be a solution to the problem of Catalan autonomy since no other region in Spain besides Catalonia and Castile had sufficient national character to organize as part of a federation: "Catalonia, with its full personality, would have to unite itself federally not with nations, but with ghosts of nations."[15] Rovira i Virgili imagined that Catalonia could be a 'free state' like Ireland or that it

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[11] See "Ponència quarta" [Fourth Report], *Crónica de la Conferència Nacional Catalana*, no. 3, point I, Barcelona, 4 and 5 June 1922. The newspaper *La Publicidad* became the mouthpiece of the new organization but after 1922, it was published in Catalan and known as *La Publicitat*.

[12] Antoni Rovira I Virgili, "Actuació del Nacionalisme envers i dins l'Estat espanyol" [Position of Nationalism towards and within the Spanish state], in *Crónica de la Conferència Nacional Catalana*, no. 3, Barcelona, 4 and 5 June, 1922.

[13] *Ibid.* Also summarized in *Crónica de la Conferència Nacional Catalana*, no. 5, p. 5. Acció Catalana's programme can also be found in its weekly publication, *Acció Catalana*, Year 1, no. 5 (17 August 1922), pp. 37-38.

[14] "Conferencia d'En Rovira i Virgili" [Lecture by Rovira i Virgili], *La Publicidad*, 15 September 1922. These paths were: (1) intervention; (2) working exclusively within Catalonia; (3) an Iberian federal union; (4) international action; and (5) force and violence.

[15] *Ibid.*

could form a type of economic association with other Spanish regions similar to that which existed among the Baltic states.[16] He rejected the allegation that AC was pursuing a separatist plan: "We must not confuse two words that are often confused: independence and separatism. I believe Catalonia can be independent. If you ask me if it can be separatist, I would tell you that that is more doubtful...[Independence] is the opposite of dependence...And what is the opposite of separation? Union or association."[17]

This new discourse was difficult for the Lliga Regionalista to dismiss out of hand since it was promoted by Catalonia's most prominent political intellectuals and some former members of the party. Cambó, whose own strategy was targeted by the new republican discourse, was thrown on the defensive: "Today, a nucleus [of politicians] that we might well call select, is defending with great brilliance and great honesty radical—the most radical—solutions for the Catalan cause, defending—why not speak plainly?—a separatist solution."[18] Contrary to what Rovira i Virgili had claimed, Cambó countered, there were only two paths to Catalonia's liberty: either with Spain or against Spain.[19] The LR refused to relinquish the former: "All the

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[16] Antoni Rovira i Virgili, "El problema de les nacions iberiques" [The problem of Iberian nations], Speech given in Reus, 16 November 1922, in *Acció Catalana*, year 1, no. 17 (1 December 1922), pp. 135-38.

[17] "Conferencia d'En Rovira i Virgili: Més Enllà del Federalisme" [Speech given by Rovira i Virgili: Beyond Federalism], speech given at the Teatre del Retir de Terrassa, 18 April 1923, *La Publicitat*, 22 April 1923.

[18] "En Cambó defineix les modalitats caracteristiques de la Lliga" [Cambó defines the characteristic modalities of the Lliga], speech given at La Barceloneta, 7 January 1923, *La Veu de Catalunya*, 9 January 1923, pp. 11. For Rovira i Virgili's response, see "El Discurs d'En Cambó" [Cambó's Speech] *La Publicitat*, 9 January 1923.

[19] *Ibid.* See the references to separatism and armed revolution in "Els camins de la llibertat de Catalunya" [The paths to Catalonia's liberty], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 7 May 1923, p. 9

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radical campaigns of Acció Catalana or Estat Català will never achieve what one interpellation in the Congress or Senate can."[20]

Voters thought otherwise. In the elections to the provincial councils on 10 June 1923, Acció Catalana took 11 seats away from the LR, mostly in Barcelona.[21] Although the LR still had the largest share of seats in the Assembly of the Mancomunitat, it was clear that its dominant status was threatened by the new party. The LR viewed the elections of 1923 as a great defeat and Cambó took personal responsibility by giving up his parliamentary seat and resigning from the Comissió d'Acció Política.[22] Although the LR's Puig i Cadafalch was reelected president of the Mancomunitat, he sensed that it would be his last time; his victory speech appeared to be a condemnation of the strategy used by the LR and a show of support for the tactics advocated by AC: "All the energy used to conquer the old politics of Spain, renovating and regenerating it, has failed us."[23]

A second republican alternative to the Lliga Regionalista emerged in 1922 around Francesc Macià,[24] the future president of the Generalitat, and Estat Català

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[20] "L'estat actual del plet català" [The current state of the Catalan cause], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 17 May 1923, p. 8.

[21] For Acció Catalana's electoral strategy see, "Les eleccions i la causa de Catalunya" [Elections and the Catalan cause], *La Publicitat*, 25 May 1923, p. 1; and "El Consell d'Acció Catalana a l'opinió nacional" [The Council of Acció Catalana to the national opinion], Barcelona, 1 June 1923, Handbill Archive, Institut Municipal d'Història de Barcelona.

[22] Francesc Cambó, *Memòries (1876-1936)*, Vol. 1 (Barcelona: Editorial Alpha, 1981), p. 368.

[23] Speech by Josep Puig i Cadafalch on his reelection to the presidency of the Mancomunitat, 29 August, 1923, in Albert Balcells (with Enric Pujol and Jordi Sabater), *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia* (Barcelona: Proa, 1997), p. 553. There was some controversy within the Lliga over Puig i Cadalfach's role in facilitating the participation of the Lliga's youth section in the conferences that produced Acció Catalana. Cambó claims that Puig i Cadalfach was in constant contact with the youth wing during May and June 1922 but assured the Comissió d'Acció Política that nothing would become of the dissension. See Cambó, *Memòries*, pp. 361-62.

[24] Francesc Macià Llussà (1859-1933), military engineer and politician. He was a prominent politician in Lleida between 1907-1923, initially as a member of the Lliga Regionalista and, after 1912, as a republican. He founded Estat Català in 1922. After 1923, he was in exile in

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(EC), an "organized association of all revolutionary and separatist Catalans (men and women) who wish to obtain the independence of Catalonia by means of violence."[25] A former army officer who brought his military skills to the republican cause, Macià introduced a radical form of armed republicanism to Catalonia, which took its cue from the revolutionary movement for independence in Ireland.[26] Estat Català rejected the parliamentary road to revolution since political cooperation and electoral politics would temper EC's revolutionary determination: "It is obvious that coexistence with people who have different ways of thinking teaches one the noble virtue of tolerance" but "to participate in electoral politics, even if it is sincere and noble...will never free a people."[27] His military campaign to liberate Catalonia in 1926, during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, made him something of a hero in Catalonia.[28] As a result, Macià was effective at promoting the meaning and politics of republicanism among Catalonia's popular sectors: "As free citizens, the people who

France, Belgium and Latin America where he made links with radical Catalan separatists. He was president of the Generalitat from April 1931 until his death in December 1933.

[25] See Estat Català, "Progam mínim" [Minimum programme], Francesc Macià Archive, section 03.01.01.02, Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya, Sant Cugat del Vallès. See also the manifesto signed by Francesc Macià, "Per Catalunya Independent" [For an Independent Catalonia], n.d. [1924?], Handbill Archive, Institut Municipal d'Història de Barcelona.

[26] See "La bella lliço de l'Irlanda" [The beautiful lesson from Ireland], L'Estat Català, Year II, no. 2 (15 April 1923), p. 5; "Elogi a la Guerra" [In praise of war], Butlletí de l'Estat Català, Year II, no. 1, Paris (15 March 1925), p. 2; and "Irlanda i Catalunya" [Ireland and Catalonia], Butlletí de l'Estat Català, Year II, no. 2, Paris (30 March 1925), p. 3.

[27] "Els èxits de partit" [A party's successes], and "La pruija electoral" [The electoral itch], L' Estat Català, year II, no. 2 (15 April 1923), pp. 1-4.

[28] With the assistance of Italian revolutionaries, the Catalan Army created by Macià attempted to cross the border at Prats de Mollo in Perpignan on 4 November 1926. Most of the participants were arrested and sentenced to one or two months imprisonment before being deported from France. For the organization of Exèrcit Català and its plan to invade Catalonia, see Section 04 of the Francesc Macià Archive, Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya, Sant Cugat del Vallès. The official account of the invasion can be found in Estat Català, La Catalogne Rebelle [Rebellious Catalonia] (Paris: Corbeil Imprimerie, 1927). For Macià's explanation of events to his supporters in Catalonia see, Francesc Macià (For the Catalan Volunteers) "Catalans!" 1927, Handbill Archive, Institut Municipal d'Història de Barcelona.

make up Estat Català protest and promise to fight the Bourbon monarchy and any monarchy."[29]

2. Republican Alliances

As a growing sector of political activists in Catalonia became committed to a republican solution to the problem of autonomy and democracy, the possibilities for inter-party alliances were reshaped in two ways. First, it became more difficult for new republican parties to enter into an alliance with the nationalists of the Lliga Regionalista, particularly since these parties were created in reaction to the political strategy pursued by the LR. The long-term objectives of nationalists and republicans were, as always, rooted in distinct political projects and institutional configurations. However, their short-term objectives were now also completely distinct: the LR persisted with its strategy of seeking representation in the Cortes to lobby the Restoration monarchy for autonomy. The new republican parties, by contrast, rejected this path and were ambivalent about the effectiveness of contesting the general elections.

The short-term strategy of the new republican parties was, in fact, not very well-articulated. It was difficult to argue convincingly that Catalan autonomy could be obtained by mobilizing exclusively within Catalonia—a strategy known as Catalonia *endins*. Moreover, the opportunities for alliance-formation within Catalonia had been restricted to 'catalanist' forces that were liberal, democratic and republican by Acció Catalana and Acció Republicana de Catalunya (ARC)

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[29] See Estat Català, "Al Poble de Catalunya" [To the Catalan people], 1 February 1930, Handbill Archive, Institut Municipal d'Història de Barcelona.

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[Republican Action of Catalonia],[30] Rovira i Virgili's new party. This automatically

excluded the LR, which continued to avoid linking Catalan autonomy to the regime

question: "We don't have to believe, nor will we believe, that the arrival of a republic

automatically implies the solution of the Catalan problem."[31] Unless they were

confident that they could single-handedly bring the republic to Catalonia—and not

even Macià believed this in 1930—Catalan republicans would be forced to seek an

alliance with like-minded forces in the rest of Spain. Although Catalan republicans

did not expressly mobilize around the problem of Spanish liberty, they did

appreciate that Catalan liberty could really only be attained if the conditions of

liberty were achieved for all of Spain. For this reason, Acció Catalana was "disposed

to working with all those political sectors and opinion groups who, both within and

without Catalonia, are working for the ideals of liberty, democracy and the

Republic."[32]

After the dictatorship, when Catalan republicans became increasingly

committed to the need for a revolutionary solution to the problem of autonomy,

they were forced to seek resources and allies outside of Catalonia, amongst Spanish

republicans. An alliance between Catalan and Spanish republican parties could get

around the problem of ideological compromise with which Catalan republicans were

faced every time they entered into an alliance with the Lliga Regionalista. Moreover,

[30] Acció Republicana de Catalunya was founded on 2 May 1930 by Rovira i Virgili (president), Macià Mallol i Bosch (vice-president), Leandre Cervera (vice-president), Eusebi Isern i Dalmau (secretary) and Ambrosi Carrion (secretary). The party's mouthpiece was *La Nau.*
[31] Alfred Gallard, "La Nostra Joventut: Els republicans, les esquerres catalanes, i la Lliga" [Our Youth: Republicans, the Catalan left and the Lliga], *La Veu de Catalunya,* 5 August 1930.
[32] "'Acció Catalana' a l'opinió" [Acció Catalana to the public opinion], *La Publicitat,* 3 March 1930, p. 1. This was a manifesto signed by 92 people, including Jaume Bofill i Mates, Lluís

whether the short-term strategy was to bring about a republic through revolution or the ballot box, a Catalan-Spanish republican alliance would also remove the constraint Catalan republicans faced as a minority party. An alliance with Spanish republicans was not without some potential problems, however, since it was not clear that this partner would commit to a territorial solution to the problem of Catalan autonomy. Nevertheless, as long as they could receive assurances on the autonomy question, I hypothesize that Catalan republicans would enter into an alliance with Spanish republicans because the ideological content of their alternative state projects was the same.

Pact of San Sebastian

Spanish republicans, for their part, were equally dependent on a bargain with their Catalan counterparts. Historically, the comparative strength of republicanism in Catalonia meant that it was not possible to effect a transition to a republic in Spain without Catalan support. The Catalan Marcellí Domingo "propagated the idea that only a co-ordinated effort of the whole left under a minimum programme of 'Republic and parliament' could bring about the Republic."[33] The first stage in this programme was a coordinated effort of republican forces: a newly energized Alianza Republicana (AR) [Republican Alliance], Domingo's Partido Radical República Socialista (PRRS) [Radical Republican Socialist Party], and the Organización Republicana Gallega Autonomista (ORGA) [Galician Autonomist Republican Organization]. Alianza Republicana had built a loyal following in Catalonia through the work of Lluís Companys, who had convinced the Unió de Rabassaires (UdR)

Nicolau d'Olwer, Ramón d'Abadal i Vinyals, Martí Esteve and Maneul Carrasco i Formiguera.

(Union of Tenant Farmers) to join, bringing approximately 14,000 members to AR.[34]

Although 32,000 people in all are believed to have become members of AR in Catalonia alone, this was not sufficient to deliver the republic in Catalonia; only an alliance with Catalan republicans could bring about a regime transition.[35] This was the purpose of the meeting at San Sebastian on 17 August 1930. Spanish republican forces—AR,[36] the PRRS[37] and the Dreta Liberal Republicana (DLR)[38]— wanted to strike a bargain with their Catalan counterparts as part of a revolutionary project to bring down the monarchy.

Catalan republicans, particularly AC and ARC, were initially reluctant to join an alliance with Spanish republicans, whom they suspected were state centralists. However, they were provided assurances by Marcellí Domingo, who acted as a

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[33] Shlomo Ben-Ami, *The Origins of the Second Republic in Spain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 75.

[34] The figures are provided by Ben-Ami (p. 69). On the Unió de Rabassaires see, Albert Balcells, *El Problema agrari a Catalunya: La Qüestió rabassaire (1890-1936)* [The Agrarian problem in Catalonia: The 'rabassaire' question (1890-1936)], with an Introduction by Emili Giralt, Col·lecció Punt de Vista, 1 (Barcelona: La Llar del Llibre, 1983); Emilio Giralt y Raventós, "El Conflicto 'rabaissaire' y la cuestión agraria en Cataluña hasta 1936" [The 'rabassaire' conflict and the agrarian question in Catalonia until 1936], *Revista de Trabajo* 7 (1964), pp. 3-24.

[35] The figures are from Molas, *Lliga Catalana*, p. 149. This was considerably larger than membership in Castille and León (13,137) or Andalusía (10,131), probably due to the ability of Lerroux and Domingo to mobilize their republican base in support of the new alliance, as well as the efforts of Companys. See also, Montserrat Baras i Gómez, *Acció Catalana, 1922-1936*, Biblioteca de Cultura Catalana, 53 (Barcelona: Curial, 1984), p. 87. Marcellí Domingo founded a Spanish party, the Partit República Radical Socialista [Radical Socialist Republican Party] in 1929, which in Catalonia operated almost exclusively in Tortosa and Tarragona. The Dreta Liberal Republicana [Liberal Republican Right], a new Spanish party founded by Miguel Maura (Antonio Maura's son) and Niceto Álcala Zamora tried to establish itself in Catalonia but would eventually be forced to form an alliance with the Lliga Regionalista in order to survive the first stage of the Second Republic, which was characterized by the rise to power of leftist forces.

[36] Alianza Republicana was represented by Alejandro Lerroux and the future prime minister of the Second Republic, Manuel Azaña.

[37] The Partido Republicano Radical-Socialista was represented by Marcellí Domingo and Álvaro de Albornoz i Galarza.

[38] The Dreta Liberal Republicana was represented by Niceto Álcala Zamora, the future president of the provisional government of the Second Republic, and Miguel Maura.

negotiator between Catalan and Spanish republicans, that Catalan autonomy would figure prominently in any republican pact. When other more republican groups, such as Estat Català and the Partit Republicà Català joined, the more moderate form of republicanism represented by AC and ARC ran the risk of being excluded from any future republican settlement. Finally, this possibility, as well as the likelihood that any failure to obtain autonomy through a republican pact would be blamed on the AC and ARC, convinced the parties' directors to attend the meetings scheduled at San Sebastian. These were less preoccupied with potential ideological dilemmas than the parties' ideologues, Rovira i Virgili (ARC) and Bofill i Mates (AC).

With the assurances that the outcome of a transition to a republic would include a solution to the Catalan problem, three Catalan delegates attended the meetings at San Sebastian on behalf of Acció Catalana, Acció Republicana de Catalunya and Estat Català. Any cooperation between Catalan and Spanish republicans to bring down the monarchy would have to be based on an exchange: the Catalan part of the bargain would entail delivering a republican victory in Catalonia in exchange for a commitment on the part of the Spanish republicans to set up a self-governing regime in Catalonia. According to Manuel Carrasco i Formiguera,[39] the delegate for AC, "it would not be possible to lay the groundwork for the foundation of the regime which will substitute the one we will overthrow

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[39] Manuel Carrasco i Formiguera (1890-1938), lawyer and politician. He was a professor of law at the Escola d'Alts Estudis Comericals of the Mancomunitat and a member of Barcelona's most prestigious cultural institutions. He was a Lliga Regionalista alderman for Barcelona in 1920 until he left the party to join Acció Catalana in 1922. After the transition to a republic, he was appointed Councillor for Health and Welfare. In 1931 he was elected a deputy for Girona to the Constituent Cortes of the Second Republic, where he was one of the principal defenders of the Catalan Autonomy Statute. He was named a commercial delegate for Catalonia to the new Autonomous Basque government at the outbreak of the civil war. He was detained by Francoist forces and executed in Burgos in 1938.

unless…[Spanish republicans] understand clearly where we sit [on the issue] and unless they have a clear understanding of the nature of the Catalan problem and what possibilities exist to resolve it."[40] Jaume Aiguader i Miró,[41] the delegate for EC was even more straightforward: "I explained to them [Spanish republicans] the conditions imposed by Estat Català and our commitment to proclaiming the national liberty of Catalunya, even if federated with the Spanish state, without awaiting the decision of the Constituent [Cortes]. This demand, in our estimation, was consonant with the Revolution."[42]

The Catalan delegates considered that any successful republican revolution would mark the creation of a new Spanish state and, further, they viewed Catalonia's relationship with this new state as one of 'association.' The revolution would bring about the liberation of Catalonia at the same time as that of Spain, but the results of these two events would be quite different institutionally since, in Catalonia, the republican revolution would result in institutions of self-government. The reaction of Spanish republicans was to attempt to work out a compromise position; if they alienated their Catalan counterparts at this stage they would surely arrest the course

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[40] M[anuel] Carrasco i Formiguera, *El Pacte the San Sebastián* [The Pact of San Sebastian], Estudis Socials i Politics, V (Barcelona: Les Edicions de l'Arc de Bara, 1931), p. 39.

[41] Jaume Aiguader i Miró (1882-1943), doctor and politician. As a doctor, his interest in social and sanitary issues led him to work with the labour movement in Catalonia. He was president of the workers' Ateneu Enciclopèdic Popular (1919-1923) and was, for a brief period, a member of the Unió Socialista de Catalunya until he joined Estat Català, for which he coordinated the party's activities in Catalonia during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. His republican activities led to his imprisonment in 1926, 1929 and 1934. He was elected to Barcelona city hall in April 1931 and, after the republic was declared, was appointed mayor. At the same time, he was elected a deputy to the Cortes in 1931, 1933 and 1936 as a member of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. He was a minister without portfolio in the government of 1936 and Minister of Labour and Social Assistance in the government of 1937-38, during the civil war. After the republican defeat in 1939, he went into exile, first to France and then to Mexico, where he died.

[42] Jaume Aiguader i Miró, *Catalunya i la Revolució* [Catalonia and the Revolution], Collecció "La Sageta" (Barcelona: Publicacions "Arnau de Vilanova", n.d. [1931?]), p. 77.

of the revolution. Without explicitly rejecting the right of Catalans to draft an autonomy statute they argued that this would have to be submitted to the Constituent Cortes for final approval. Catalan republicans did not reject this condition but they emphasized that the will of the Catalan people in drafting the autonomy statute should not be altered in any way by the Spanish Cortes. Spanish republicans were noncommittal. In the end, all sides could accept this step in the bargain without having to agree on the exact role to be played by the Cortes after the transition to a republic. In agreeing to disagree, Catalan and Spanish republicans were able to conclude the pact; later, however, the pact would fall apart precisely over the role to be played by the Cortes.

The results of the meeting appeared in two semi-official memoranda, the second of which outlined the terms of the cooperation of Catalan republicans in the plot. According to the Catalan delegates—Carrasco i Formiguera (AC), Macià Mallol i Bosch[43] (ARC) and Jaume Aiguader i Miró (EC)—all parties to the pact accepted three points which they drafted.[44] First, all participants at the meeting accepted that the revolutionary settlement would include a recognition of Catalonia's 'personality'

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[43] Macià Mallol i Bosch (1876-1960), shipping magnate and politician. He was a member of the Unió Democràtica Nacionalista and the Unió Catalanista before he was elected a republican deputy to the Cortes in 1918. After a brief period as a senator for Tarragona (1920-1922), he joined Acció Catalana in 1922 and, in 1930, Acció Republicana de Catalunya, of which he was a vice-president. During the republic, he was civil governor of Tarragona province and, in 1936, a deputy for Tarragona in the new party, Front d'Esquerres [Leftist Front]. He was exiled during the civil war and returned to Catalonia in 1947.

[44] There was no written agreement at San Sebastian, and Spanish and Catalan versions of events tend to contradict one other. However the three Catalan delegates all claimed that there were two notes of agreement. In addition to the account of Carrasco i Formiguera, there is that of the delegate of Estat Català, Jaime Aiguader i Miró, *Catalunya i la Revolució.* The plan for a revolution can be found in F. Solà Cañizares, *El Moviment Revolucionari a Catalunya: Contribució a la Història de l'Adveniment de la República* [The revolutionary moment in Catalonia: A contribution to the history of the coming of the Republic] (Barcelona: Llibreria Catalònia, 1932).

and the commitment on the part of the revolutionary government to find a juridical solution to the Catalan problem. Second, the basis of the solution of the Catalan problem would be an autonomy statute or constitution "proposed freely by the Catalan people and accepted by the free will of the majority of Catalans in a referendum." Finally, only those parts of the statute which defined the division of powers between Spain and Catalonia would be submitted to the Constituent Cortes.[45]

In Catalonia, the Lliga Regionalista rejected the term of the Pact of San Sebastian for several reasons. There was, first, the ever-present difference between nationalist and republican forces over the regime question. In a series of commentaries on the Pact, *La Veu de Catalunya* wrote that "here, from our point of view, is the error: to tie our [Catalan] question to a simple consequence of the regime question...we will not accept, for Catalonia, that our permanent essence should be linked to the eventuality of a regime change."[46] Second, although the LR and republicans agreed on the need to determine the nature of relations between Catalonia and the Spanish state, for nationalists, this was the "central problem" while for republicans the prior problem was the form of government.[47] For the LR, the terms of the Pact created the impression that the only solution for Catalonia was "the Republic, the Constituent Cortes and the Statute." In the LR's estimation, Spain's political problems could be solved simply, through the elevation of civic life,

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[45] Carrasco i Formiguera, *El Pacte de San Sebastián*, p. 54. The terms of the second memorandum were published in *La Publicitat* on 19 August 1930.

[46] "Pactes V: Invitació al retrocés" [Pacts V: Invitation to backwardness], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 29 August 1930, p. 5.

[47] "Epíleg als Pactes I: Persistència de l'equivoc" [Epilogue to the Pacts I: The persistence of a mistake], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 25 September 1930, p. 5.

which had been destroyed during the dictatorship.[48] Finally, by playing the revolutionary card, republicans were dividing Catalans into separate monarchical and republican camps which, the LR argued, would impede any attempt at cooperation among catalanist forces: "You can, if you want," the LR warned Catalan republicans, "declare war in Spain; that will be the consequence, if you separate yourselves [from us]."[49]

Republican alliances in Catalonia

Despite the Lliga Regionalista's threat, this is indeed what occurred. The Pact of San Sebastian changed patterns of political mobilization in Catalonia by allying Catalan republicans exclusively with Spanish republicans. In Catalonia, two new alliances of Catalan republican forces were formed immediately prior to the municipal elections of April 1931 for the same reason that a Catalan-Spanish alliance had formed: it was now possible for minority republican parties to find a solution to the problem of electoral constraint that did not include the threat of ideological compromise. The first of two alliances was Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya[50] (ERC) [Republican Left of Catalonia], which emerged from the Conferència d'Esquerres Catalana [Conferences of Catalan Leftist Forces] of 17-19 March 1931 under the leadership of Francesc Macià.[51] According to El Diluvio, 61 republican, federal, socialist and youth associations attended the conference meetings, 12 of

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[48] "Pactes III: Exit sense compromis?" [Pacts III: Success without compromise?], La Veu de Catalunya, 27 August 1930, p. 5.

[49] "Epileg als Pactes I: Persistència de l'equivoc," p. 5.

[50] The Central Executive Committee of the party was: Francesc Macià (president); Marcellí Domingo, Jaume Aiguader, Lluís Companys, Joan Lluhí i Vallescà, Pere Comes i Calvet; Joan Casanovas; Ricard Palacín, Miquel Santaló and Ignasi Iglésies (all councillors). The first party congress of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya did not take place until 19-21 May 1931, after the April elections which brought it to power.

[51] Francesc Macià had finally been allowed back into Spain in at the end of February 1931.

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which were from Barcelona and the rest from the provinces, representing 16,000 members altogether.[52] Many of these were already affiliated to one of the three parties or movements which would form the nucleus of the ERC: Estat Català; the Partit Republicà Català; and the Grup de l'Opinó.[53] All three parties, which represented different constituencies in Catalonia, were democratic and liberal, although the first two were more committed to republicanism than the latter. The second alliance, the Partit Catalanista Republicà[54] (PCR) [Republican Catalanist Party], was formed by AC and ARC on 22 March 1931. According to reports in *La Publicitat*, the new party's official mouthpiece, over 5000 people as well as 600 delegates from the 85 associations which were officially affiliated with the new party, attended the conference.[55]

Given the support for the two republican alliances as demonstrated by the attendance at the conferences which led to their creation, the claim made by scholars such as Linz and Luebbert that republican parties were poorly organized before 1931 requires some discussion. The claim actually has two parts: that the

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[52] See "La Conferencia de Izquierdas catalanes" [The Conference of Catalan Leftist Forces], *El Diluvio*, 19 March 1931, p. 15. See also M. Dolors Ivern i Salvà, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, Vol. 1. (Badalona: Abadia de Montserrat, 1988-1989), p. 53; and Isidre Molas, *El Sistema de partits polítics a Catalunya (1931-1936)*, Llibres a l'abast, 103 (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1972), p. 82.

[53] The Grup de l'Opinió was a group of young democrats organized around the weekly magazine *L'Opinió*. Their magazine, which started in 1928, was an open forum for leftist forces. Among its members were: Joan Lluhí i Vallesca, Joan Casanova, Joan Casanelles, Domenec Pallerola and Pere Comas. See, Joan B. Culla i Clarà, *El catalanisme d'esquerra: D'el Grup de l'Opinió al Partit Nacionalista Republicà d'Esquerra (1928-1934)* [Catalanism of the left: From the Grup de l'Opinió to the Nationalist Republican Left Party (1928-1934)], Biblioteca de Cultura Catalana, 25 (Barcelona: Curial, 1977), pp. 14-31.

[54] The first step toward a union of the two parties was taken on 7 February 1931 with the creation of the Directori Catalanista Republicà [Catalanist Republican Directorate]. The party's directors included: Albert Bastardes i Sampere, Jaume Bcfill i Mates, Lluís Nicolau d'Olwer Antoni Rovira i Virgili and Martí Esteve i Guau.

[55] See, "Constitució del Partit Catalanista Republicà" [Constitution of the Catalanist Republican Party], *La Publicitat*, 24 March 1931, p. 3.

number of republican parties was evidence of a lack of ideological cohesion in the movement and that these parties were poorly organized. Against the first part of the claim, I would argue that the number of republican parties can more convincingly be explained by the fact that many of these were created just prior to or during the dictatorship. Given the fact that civil and political associations were banned between 1923-1930, only small organizations could hope to exist in clandestine conditions. Even those parties that had been created before 1923, like the Lliga Regionalista, Acció Catalana and the Unió Socialista de Catalunya,[56] (USC) [Socialist Union of Catalonia] were forced to find ways to retain their membership while avoiding arrest. A more plausible hypothesis, it seems, would be that the number of republican parties in 1930 is related to the impediments to the creation of broad based parties under the dictatorship.

As for the organizational dimension of parties, Baras i Gómez claims that republican parties such as AC and ARC were organizationally weak because members were not affiliated directly but rather indirectly, through local civic associations. Indeed, these associations voluntarily joined a party and it was the responsibility of the leadership of these to mediate between members and the party. Clearly, as Baras i Gómez notes, this meant that, in practice, patterns of party mobilization could differ between neighbourhoods, cities and provinces.[57] Moreover, party leaders had only limited resources with which to monitor the

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[56] The Unió Socialista de Catalunya was founded in July 1923 by Manuel Serra i Moret and Rafael Campalans, who had been members of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). See, En Manuel Serra i Moret, *La Unió Socialista de Catalunya*, Speech approved unanimously by the constitutive assembly of the USC on 8 July 1923 (Barcelona: Publicacions de la 'Unió Socialista de Catalunya', n.d.); Ricard Alcaraz i Gonzàlez, *La Unió Socialista de Catalunya (1932-1936)*, prologue by Josep Termes, Curs d'Història de Catalunya, 13 (Barcelona: Edicions de la Magrana and Institute Municipal d'Història, 1987).

activities of civic associations and, given the independence of these, there might not always be a well-defined articulation of party principles. Finally, members of civic associations did not necessarily consider themselves to be members of political parties, even when the association to which they belonged was affiliated with a particular political party.

It is certainly true that some individuals would join a republican civic association primarily for cultural and social reasons. Members could partake in the activities of a republican civic association without necessarily being involved in its political activities. However, when an individual joined a republican civic association, they were necessarily committed to the republican political project. Some members might prefer to fulfill some of the goals of this project by working exclusively towards the development of a republican political culture through educational and social initiatives. But even if they only partake in social and cultural activities, these individuals will still be committed to the goals of republican politics.

Some of the organizational disadvantages associated with patterns of affiliation in republican parties noted by Baras i Gómez could easily be overcome by party leaders. For example, the creation of direct relations between party leaders and leaders of civic associations would facilitate communication between party and association and create a mechanism for monitoring the way in which party directives were carried out. Second, parties could also organize local meetings, where party leaders would speak on the party's political objectives to members of local civic associations. Since these speeches and meetings were reported in party newspapers, we know that they occurred frequently; what we do not know, however, is what

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[57] Baras i Gómez, *Acció Catalana*, p. 264.

impact they had on political mobilization. Finally, parties could organize large meetings at the municipal, provincial and regional level in order to promote a sense of party activism among members. We also know that these types of meetings took place although, again, we are limited in our ability to judge their impact.

It is difficult to argue that republicanism was organizationally and ideologically weaker than nationalism at the end of the dictatorship without some consideration of patterns of organization in the Lliga Regionalista. The organizational challenges faced by republican parties were no different than those faced by the Lliga Regionalista in the period 1930-1932. According to Molas, all of the LR's centres were closed by the dictatorship in the period 1923-1930 and "the party was left disorganized. The only link that remained between its members, besides personal contacts, was *La Veu de Catalunya*, which was censored."[58] Although the LR's organizational base had regained some ground after the experience of the dictatorship by 1932, the party still remained, according to Molas, very weak, particularly outside of Barcelona where, according to one party member, the dictatorship had destroyed everything.[59] Civic associations affiliated themselves directly to the LR in much the same way as republican ones did: either through the party's headquarters in Barcelona or through one of its delegations at the municipal level. An important difference, however, was that the associations affiliated with the LR were purely political and did not serve the same educational, cultural and social functions that republican civic associations did. In practice, this meant that the articulation of party principles and party discipline was more tightly controlled in

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[58] Reported in *La Veu de Catalunya*, 11 January 1932, in Molas, *Lliga Catalana*, pp. 149 and 301.
[59] Molas, *Lliga Catalana*, p. 302.

nationalist than in republican parties. However, this is not the same thing as saying that nationalism was more ideologically cohesive than republicanism. Republicans learned both a political culture and a form of politics through republican civic associations and some of these continued to operate during the dictatorship. After 1923, nationalists did not have associations that could socialize members to the same extent. The municipal-level political associations of the party had been destroyed by the dictatorship. The nationalists' cultural institutions, meanwhile, were public ones created by the Mancomunitat. All of these were closed down by the dictator. After the dictatorship, finally, the number of associations affiliated to the LR was far fewer than that affiliated to the main republican parties (see Table 1).

Table 1
Number of affiliated associations per party, City of Barcelona (1932)

Lliga Regionalista (January 1932)	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (August 1932)	Partit Republicà Radical (January 1932)
17	39	41

Source: Isidre Molas, *Lliga Catalana: Un estudi d'Estasiologia*, Vol. 1, Collecció estudis i documents, 18 (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1972), pp. 302, 304.

A consideration of the number of associations affiliated with nationalist and republican parties suggests that the latter were at least as well organized, if not better organized, than the former after 1930. In order for the claim about the organization of republicanism to be substantiated, we require an accurate count of overall membership, both in terms of the affiliated associations and the membership within these associations. Further, we require accounts of how nationalist and republican associations mobilized at the local level, particularly outside of Barcelona, so that we might assess whether the different forms of affiliation point to weaker organization

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among republican parties. As both Molas and Baras i Gómez note, this empirical evidence is not readily available. Until it is, the claim about the weak organizational basis of republicanism in Catalonia is unsubstantiated.

3. Reconceptualizing Sovereignty: The Catalan Autonomy Statute

The announcement of municipal elections · for 12 April 1931 quickly transformed Catalan politics into a public debate on the form of government and the nature of interest representation in Spain. For republicans, the vote came down to a choice between the preservation of the old order or a transition to a republic. For the labour movement, the elections similarly represented an opportunity to do away with the old order. *L'Hora*, the newspaper of the communist Bloc Obrer i Camperol (BOC) [Labour and Agricultural Workers' Bloc], appealed to its readers "to confront the bourgeoisie in the political arena in order to wrestle from its hands the direction of the public affairs in all areas...the working class must participate in the upcoming election."[60] Even the anarchists could not stay away from the elections: Since it seemed that the "Monarchy will be supplanted by the Republic, we anarchists must join the strong movement against the regime and propel the revolution."[61] The LR, meanwhile, warned the public that "those who vote for republican candidates must understand that they are voting for a revolution."[62]

The municipal elections had all the potential of a revolution if the monarchists failed to win. Indeed, the republican victory, although largely concentrated in the urban regions, was resounding: all of the provincial capitals went

[60] "El bloc obrer i camperol davant les eleccions municipals" [The labour and agricultural workers' bloc and the municipal elections], *L'Hora*, March 1931.
[61] "¿Monarquía? ¿República? ¡Revolución!" [Monarchy? Republic? Revolution!], *Solidaridad Obrera*, 31 March 1931.
[62] "Davant les eleccions" [Before the elections], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 18 March 1931, p. 5.

republican; the revolution was over before it started (see Table 2). In Barcelona, the

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya won 25 seats on the city council against 12 for

the Lliga Regionalista; it was an upset victory that not even the ERC had dared to

predict. Aside from the LR, other losers included Lerroux' Partit Republicà Radical,

which won only 8 seats in a coalition with socialists. The moderate republicanism of

the Partit Catalanista Republicà, meanwhile, did not win one seat. Not only had

republicanism triumphed, but it was the most radical of the two republican alliances

that had emerged victorious. Although the LR claimed it was the coincidence of

revolutionary and sentimental myths that could explain the victory of the coalition

of parties led by Francesc Macià, it was doubtless the large turnout of workers,

artisans and first-time voters that contributed to the ERC's success.[63]

Table 2
Results of the municipal elections of 12 April 1931 in Catalonia,
number of aldermen elected

	Barcelona	Girona	Lleida	Tarragona	Total
Monarchists	106	27	24	128	285
Republicans	1189	722	858	541	3310
Socialists	33	59	6	25	123
Communists	2	1	5	———	8
Other	441	181	216	202	1040
Unknown	197	———	———	57	254
Total	1968	990	1109	953	5020

Source: Isidre Molas, *Lliga Catalana: Un estudi d'Estasiologia*, Vol. 1, Collecció estudis i documents,
18 (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1972), pp. 173-174.

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[63] For the Lliga Regionalista's interpretation see, "Les eleccions municipals: Desprès de l'escrutini" [The municipal elections: After the vote], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 14 April 1931, p. 1.

When, on 14 April 1931, the scope of the republican victory across Spain was clear,[64] Macià marked the occasion by declaring the "Catalan Republic a state within the Iberian Federation," in accordance with the terms of the Pact of San Sebastian.[65] Macià's move helped to bring the monarchy to end—King Alfonso went into exile that very night—but the turn of events in Barcelona alarmed even the provisional republican government in Madrid. An agreement was reached between Macià and three ministers from the provisional Spanish government—Marcellí Domingo, Lluís Nicolau d'Olwer and Fernando de los Ríos—to change the name of the Catalan Republic to that of the Catalan Generalitat. According to the Catalan government's account of the meeting, the provisional government of the Republic was still committed to completing the terms of the Pact of San Sebastian; the meeting specified how this would occur. The provisional government of the Generalitat would draft a statute which would be voted by an assembly of municipal governments and then presented by the Spanish provisional government to the Constituent Cortes, which would pass it more or less without any debate or amendment.[66] Later, after a second request by the Spanish provisional government, the statute would have to be approved in a popular referendum before being sent to

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[64] Ben-Ami has attempted to reconstruct the electoral results for all of Spain, but he notes that they are only partial because governors did not always report the results to the Ministry of the Interior. He claims that of the 50,000 councillors elected on 12 April, the Ministry only had results for some 20,000 seats. See Ben-Ami, *The Origins of the Second Republic in Spain*, Apendix I, for a detailed discussion.

[65] See, Proclamation by Macià, "República Catalana," 14 April 1931, Handbill Archive, Institut Municipal d'Història de Barcelona.

[66] The Generalitat published its account of the meeting as a semi-official memorandum. See, "La reunió dels ministres del Govern central i els governants de Catalunya (la nota oficiosa)" [The meeting of the ministers of the central government and the governors of Catalunya (the officious note)], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 18 April 1931, p. 1.

the Cortes.[67] Marcellí Domingo reassured Catalan public opinion in an interview with *El Diluvio* that "The entire provisional government of the Republic…is prepared to concede to the aspirations of even the most demanding Catalans…In Madrid, the atmosphere is one of maximum respect for Catalan aspirations and all republicans are disposed to comply with the Pact of San Sebastián."[68]

Much has been made of the change of name from the Catalan Republic to the Catalan Generalitat. The three-day old republic is interpreted as Catalonia's failed attempt at independence while the change to the Generalitat is indicative of Catalans' realization that they would have to settle for something less than independence. As I will argue below, the significance of Macià's proclamation lies elsewhere. The electoral results confirmed that republicanism was on its way to becoming the new hegemonic force in Spain, but there was as yet no blueprint for the new republican order. Macià's declaration was a statement about the freedom of Catalans to determine for themselves how republicanism would be organized institutionally within their territory, independently of how the Spanish Second Republic might be organized. The change of name to the Generalitat did not alter the intent of Macià's initial statement in any way. Even the nationalists of the LR accepted that once autonomy was obtained, it was the right of Catalans to determine

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[67] The details can. be found in the following decrees: "Decret de la Presidència de la Generalitat sobre el Govern i la Diputació provisional de la Generalitat de Catalunya" [Decree of the President of the Generalitat on the Government and the provisional Council of the Generalitat of Catalonia], Barcelona, 28 April 1931; "Decret del Govern provisional de la República sobre les relacions amb el Govern de la Generalitat de Catalunya" [Decree of the provisional Government of the Republic on relations with the Government of the Generalitat of Catalonia], Madrid, 9 May 1931; and "Decret definitiu d'estructuració de la Generalitat de Catalunya" [Definitive decree of the structure of the Generalitat of Catalonia], Barcelona, 15 May 1931, in J.A. González Casanova, *Federalisme i autonomia a Catalunya (1868-1938)*, Col·lecció Documents de Cultura (Barcelona: Curial, 1974), pp. 686-702.
[68] "Tres ministros en Barcelona" [Three ministers in Barcelona], *El Diluvio*, 18 April 1931, p. 14.

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their form of government.[69] In the remainder of this section, I argue that republicans used their electoral hegemony in Catalonia to define a constitutional order that would allow Catalonia to structure its relations with Madrid as though it were a separate state.

State Sovereignty

The Second Republic could deliver the first of Catalan republicans' two political objectives: institutions of political liberty and freedom. However, their second objective—autonomy—required an argument about the sovereignty of the Catalan territory. Without such an argument, Spanish republicans could easily maintain that the institutions of the Second Republic would guarantee the freedom of Catalans to the same extent as they would the freedom of all Spaniards. Republican liberties could be applied indiscriminately across Spain and the result, from the perspective of Spanish republicans, would be the same everywhere. Republican institutions would not discriminate against Catalans or any other minority nationality.

Catalan republicans, by contrast, argued that the institutions of the Second Republic would discriminate against Catalans because they could not provide guarantees for Catalan liberty, which was rooted in a distinct historical context. Catalan republicans wanted institutions that would guarantee liberty exclusively amongst Catalans. In order to obtain these institutions, they had to be able to argue that Catalonia was sovereign and that this sovereignty gave Catalans the right to

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[69] The only part of the Pact of San Sebastian with which the Lliga was in agreement was that which stipulated that the Cortes of Madrid could only debate a treaty governing external relations between Madrid and Barcelona: "This doctrine, from our way of thinking, is impeccable, perfect." See, "Pactes II. Nous Equivocs" [Pacts II. New mistakes], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 26 August 1930.

constitutional powers. The argument about Catalan sovereignty was made up of two parts. First, republicans argued that the transition from a monarchy to a republic was a moment in state-*making*. Second, they argued that the break-up of the monarchical order occurred in such a way as to grant Catalans a right to sovereign rule. In fact, what they argued was that the breakup of the monarchical order *returned* sovereignty to Catalonia in the form of the Generalitat, which had been taken away from Catalans by the Bourbon monarchy in the eighteenth century. This was how Manuel Carrasco i Formiguera rationalized events: "The Catalan Republic was more artificial than real; what succeeds it is the Government of the Generalitat, which was more typical in Catalonia before the Bourbons."[70]

The task of constructing these two juridical arguments was conferred on Francesc Maspons i Anglasell,[71] the former president of the Acadèmia de Jurisprudència i Legislació de Barcelona [The Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation of Barcelona] by "a group of Catalans anxious to clarify the legal foundation of the Catalan situation after the proclamation of the Republic."[72]

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[70] Manuel Carrasco i Formiguera, in the Madrid newspaper *El Imparcial*, 17 April 1931, in Enric Jardí, *Francesc Macià: President de Catalunya* (Badalona: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, 1981), p. 89.

[71] Francesc de Paula Maspons i Anglasell (1872-1966), renowned jurist. As Professor of Public Law at the Universitat d'Oñate, he compiled and published the works of classical Catalan jurists and studied and defended the use the Catalan civil law. Besides being president of the Acadèmia de Jurisprudència i Legislació de Barcelona (1918-1920), he was director of the Mancomunitat's Oficina d'Estudis Jurídics, which was founded in 1918 for the purposes of codifying Catalan civil law and preparing legislation to be submitted to the Spanish Cortes. At the Mancomunitat, he edited the publication *Costumari Català*, which was a compilation of the juridical customs of Catalonia. In 1931, he led the Catalan delegation to the Congress of National Minorities of Europe and became vice-president of the Congress' executive committee. He was also a member of the International Association for the Study of Minority Law at the Hague. For an assessment of his contribution to Catalan civil law see, Antoni Borrell Macià, "Maspons i Anglasell i el Dret Civil Català" [Maspons i Anglasell and Catalan Civil Law], *Revista Jurídica de Catalunya* 64 (1965), pp. 753-776.

[72] F[rancesc] Maspons i Anglasell, *La Generalitat de Catalunya i la República Espanyola* (Barcelona: Occitània, 1932), p. 1.

Maspons i Anglasell had distinguished himself during the autonomy campaign of 1919 when, as president of the Acadèmia and director of the Mancomunitat's Oficina d'Estudis Jurídics [Office of Juridical Studies], he organized a public campaign to promote the idea that Catalans had a right to legislative powers.[73] But his reputation extended beyond Catalonia: he was known in Europe for his work through the Congress of National Minorities and as president of the International Society for the Study of Minority Law at the Hague.[74] Moreover, as an honorary member of the National Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation in Madrid, it was assumed that his opinion would carry weight in the capital.

Maspons i Anglasell was asked to provide a legal opinion on the juridical character of the Generalitat; the range of its faculties; and the rights of the Spanish state in Catalonia. He argued that the Generalitat was the government of a sovereign Catalonia which, with the proclamation of the republic, had been "emancipated from the regime of absorption beneath which the monarchy had maintained it."[75] Historically, the juridical bond between Catalonia and Spain was a type of personal union marked by the association of the crowns of Castile and Aragón in the fifteenth century; with the fall of the monarchy, the union had been dissolved and "juridically, Catalonia is left free."[76] The fall of the monarchy, in Maspons i

[73] Balcells, *La Mancomunitat de Catalunya i l'autonomia*, p. 189. See Maspons i Anglasell's published speech, which prompted the creation of the Oficina: *La reivindicació jurídica de Catalunya* (Barcelona: Acadèmia de Jurisprudència i Legislació de Barcelona, 1918). Other members of the Oficina d'Estudis Jurídics include: Martí Esteve i Guau (a member of the Lliga Regionalista who left to join Acció Catalana in 1922); Ferran Valls i Taberner (a member of the Lliga Regionalista); Ramón d'Abadal i Vinyals (a member of the Lliga Regionalista who left to join Acció Catalana in 1922); and Jaume Bofill i Mates (a member of the Lliga Regionalista who left to join Acció Catalana in 1922).
[74] *La Generalitat de Catalunya i la República Espanyola* was also published in French and distributed in Europe.
[75] Maspons i Anglasell, *La Generalitat de Catalunya i la República Espanyola*, p. 13.
[76] *Ibid.*

Anglasell's estimation, marked the breakup of the composite order that had been held in place by successive monarchies. He rejected entirely the legality of the Decret de Nova Planta of 1716 (New Foundation Decree) which, in Catalan historiography, is understood as the conquest of Catalonia by Bourbon Spain for the purposes of assimilating the region into the newly-emerging Spanish state.[77] The *restoration* of the Generalitat, which was Catalonia's institution for self-government before the initiation of the period of Bourbon rule in 1714, was significant, in Maspons i Anglasell's estimation: "This is a name that the Government of the Catalan Republic adopted in the presence of the Spanish representatives and neither then nor since then has [the Catalan government] or the Spanish state said anything from which it could be inferred that [they] draw a distinction between the powers of the Generalitat before 1714 and the current" powers.[78] None of this was incompatible with the concept of state sovereignty in international law since the old notion of the absolute and indivisible sovereignty of the state that had existed before the First World War had been overthrown by one which could be qualified as "the interdependence of states," a corollary of which was equality among states.[79] Indeed, after 1930, the new republican parties had built this argument into their political platform: "The Spanish monarchy is not the only obstacle [to liberty] that we must

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[77] For a revisionist interpretation of the Decret de Nova Planta see, Henry Kamen, "L'Espanya i la Guerra de Successió: L'abolició dels furs: Una mesura absolutista?" [Spain and the War of Spanish Succession: The abolition of the foral rights: An absolutist measure?] *L'Avenç* 200 (1996), pp. 48-50, 67. For a detailed analysis of Catalan civil law prior to the Decret de Nova Planta see, Victor Ferro, *El Dret Públic Català: Les Institucions a Catalunya fins al Decret de Nova Planata* [Catalan Public Law: Institutions in Catalonia until the New Foundation Decree] (Vic: Eumo Editorial, 1987).

[78] Maspons i Anglasell, *La Generalitat de Caltaunya i l'autonomia*, p. 14.

[79] F[rancesc] Maspons i Anglasell, "Tendencies i regulacions internacionals" [International tendencies and regulations], *Revista Jurídica de Catalunta* 33 (1927), pp. 221-22.

overthrow. We must also overthrow that myth about the absolute sovereignty of the state."[80]

Maspons i Anglasell's argument was essentially that in accepting the restoration of the Generalitat, the provisional government of the Spanish Republic had implicitly recognized the sovereignty of the Catalan territory and the right of Catalans to self-government. But the recognition of the Generalitat was significant for a second reason: the provisional republican government's interactions with the Generalitat, whether through the decrees of April and May 1931 or through the agreement between the three Spanish ministers and Francesc Macià, were a formal recognition of Catalonia's status as a state.[81] If Catalonia was not a state, Maspons i Anglasell reasoned, the Spanish state would not have 'pacted' with Catalonia with regards to the internal structure of the territory: "A State either orders or it imposes, it does not have to negotiate" with a part of its territory. Moreover, "this is what the Spanish state would have done [order or impose itself] if it did not have full consciousness of and a resolute will to recognize that Catalonia was not a part of the Spanish state, subjected to it like its other territories."[82] Nor could it be said that, in spite of recognizing Catalonia as a state, the provisional republican government somehow considered Catalonia to be a lesser state than the Spanish one. Drawing on recent developments in international law, Maspons i Anglasell argued that there were only two types of states: dependent states—protectorates and vassal states— and independent states. Since no legal document existed which declared that the

[80] "Acció Catalana' a l'opinió," *La Publicitat*, 3 March 1930.
[81] Maspons i Anglasell, *La Generalitat de Caltaunya i l'autonomia*, pp. 6, 8-12, 17.
[82] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Catalan state was subjected to the Spanish state, Catalonia and Spain were both independent states.[83]

The abdication of the monarch, then, had marked a new period of state-making in Spain; the Catalan people had used that moment to restore their sovereignty through the Generalitat. The relationship between the Catalan Generalitat and the Spanish Republic would be formalized through a statute—an external treaty—which would outline the division of powers between the two states. Until the statute was passed into law, Catalan republicans, as Macià had stated, were "inclined, by our spirit of republican solidarity and by our own interests, to deprive ourselves, for a brief period of time, of a part of that sovereignty to which we have a right."[84] But as soon as the Constituent Cortes was convened, Catalonia would submit to it "not the interior constitution of Catalonia, but the statute of relations between Catalonia and the central power. They are two different things, and to confuse them would be a grave error of constitutional procedure and an initial abdication of the rights of our people."[85] Even the Lliga Regionalista was in agreement on the nature of the pact—although it was silent on the question of sovereignty—since it was up to the Catalan people to determine how Catalan governing institutions should be organized: "The Catalan Autonomy Statute must only be a pact between Catalonia and the central or federal state...recognizing Catalan autonomy."[86]

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[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

[84] Francesc Macià, "La nota presidencial" [The presidential note], *La Publicitat*, 19 April 1931, p. 1.

[85] Antoni Rovira i Virgili, *Catalunya i La República* (Barcelona: NAGSA, 1931), p. 49.

[86] "El que ha d'esser l'Estatut de Catalunya" [That which the Statute of Catalonia must be], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 12 June 1931, p. 1

Federalism

Maspons i Anglasell's legal opinions were influential among Catalan republicans in the provisional Generalitat and provided strong justification for continuing to refer to Catalonia as a 'state' until changes to the Autonomy Statute in 1932 no longer made this possible. But Maspons i Anglasell's arguments were dependent on a federal Spain; without this, separation would be the only path to statehood and, after the peaceful transition to a republic, only the most extreme of republicans were willing to consider this option. The federal option had been discussed and debated in Catalan political circles since the terms of the Pact of San Sebastian had been made public in August 1930 and it was generally assumed that the constitution of the Second Republic would introduce a federal principle. For example, the popular republican daily *El Diluvio* explained the principles of federalism to its republican readers in anticipation of the Iberian Federation: "The federal system...consists in the union of various States...Each State of the Federation must establish the particular laws of its political Constitution, not as a result of a privilege or favour conceded by a higher authority, but rather as an absolute right and in virtue of its own power as an independent State."[87] After the elections of April 1931, *El Diluvio* took the position that the Spanish Republic was obliged to organize itself federally or Catalonia's demands for autonomy would be interpreted as a form of separatism.[88]

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[87] Un viejo federal [an old federalist], "Unitarismo y federalism" ['Unitarism' and federalism], *El Diluvio*, 9 September, 1930, p. 35.

[88] "Como debe ser la República" [How the Republic must be], *El Diluvio*, 22 April 1931, p. 9. For a similar view on the part of the youth sector represented by the Grup de l'Opinió see, "Per la Federació" [For the federation], *L'Opinió*, 9 June 1931.

Antoni Rovira i Virgili, with his characteristic energy, published articles and books on what he considered should be the political and juridical nature of Catalan-Spanish relations in a republic. He was less convinced than other republican élites that federalism would solve the autonomy question. He had revised considerably his views on federalism since he had published *Nacionalisme i Federalisme* in 1917. The problem that now preoccupied him was how to guarantee a people's need to protect its own freedom and liberty given the fact that war-making powers were generally ceded to the federal authority: "The nation needs liberty within and without. When a nation federates and cedes [powers] of peace and war to the central state, it gives up that which is most important for the material well-being of the nation."[89] Some Catalan republicans argued that since not all regions of Spain would be seeking autonomy, a federal structure that was imposed by a central government might not be practical. Instead, "it would be preferable [to have] a constitution with rules that allow for various peoples of the peninsula with a truly 'real' personality to become autonomous states." Later, these could form a union through the promulgation of a statute.[90] Still, Rovira i Virgili recognized that if Catalans asked for more than federal autonomy, they were likely to lose the support of democratic forces in Spain, so the federal solution would give Catalonia, "with the minimum resistance by the other side, the maximum of liberties that can presently be obtained."[91]

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[89] Rovira i Virgili, "Més Enllà del Federalisme."

[90] Rovira i Virgili, *Catalunya i la República*, p. 38. See also his article "El camí de l'autonomia" [The path to autonomy], *La Publicitat*, 26 February 1931, in Rovira i Virgili, *Catalunya i Espanya*, pp. 458-60.

[91] Rovira i Virgili, "El camí de la llibertat," p. 458.

The Autonomy Statute

These perspectives on the territorial sovereignty of Catalonia and the right to self-determination of the Catalan people provided the legal framework for the autonomy statute which fixed the limits of relations between Catalonia and Spain under the Second Republic. In republican circles, the statute was viewed as a necessary guarantee of the political liberty of Catalans since, without some established limits on the ability of the Spanish state to exercise its authority in Catalonia, it would not be possible to build republican *and* Catalan public institutions.

Republican freedom was not a principle that was readily accepted by every group in Catalan society, however. Joan Estelrich,[92] a member of the LR's Comissió d'Acció Política, echoed the sentiments of many members of the LR when he wrote publicly in 1931 that "we have always maintained that the advent of the Republic would be disastrous...For all the facility that the advent of the Republic provides [the autonomy cause] we do not want to deceive ourselves—or deceive others—by

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[92] Joan Estelrich i Artigues (1896-1958), writer and politician. He was a member of the Lliga' youth wing and was elected deputy to the Cortes for Girona in 1931, 1933 and 1936. He was Cambó's right-hand man and confidant, having been placed in charge of the Fundació Bernat Metge, Cambó plan to put in place a humanistic culture in Catalonia. He disseminated information on Catalan politics and the campaign for autonomy throughout Europe by founding the French-language *Courier Catalan* and Expansió Catalana, an institution for propaganda. When the civil war broke out, he was in Paris id from there he collaborated with the Francoists by publishing two bimonthly magazines, *Occident* and *Destin*. After the war he was the Spanish representative to UNESCO (1952-1958). Estelrich was a vociferous opponent of the Second Republic and advocated a return to the monarchy. He died in Paris in 1958. Some of his writings include *La Qüestió de les minories nacionals* [The national minority question] (1928); *Catalunya endins* [Within Catalonia] (1930); *L'autonomia en perill* [Autonomy in peril] (1932); and *Catalanismo y reforma hispánica* [Catalanism and Spanish reform] (1938). For his propaganda activities abroad see, Joan Estelrich, *Per la Valoració Internacional de Catalunya* [For the International Assessment of Catalonia], Speech given at the Associació Catalanista de Valls (Barcelona: Editorial Catalana, 1920); And Joan Estelrich, "El problema de la propaganda a l'estranger [The problem of propaganda abroad], *La Publicitat*, 14 July 1923.

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claiming that the monarchy was the only obstacle to the solution of the Catalan problem; that, once the obstacle was removed...one could only be a good catalanist by being a republican."[93] Republican hegemony imposed a certain political project on Catalonia that the LR was forced to accept publicly, even if it did not fully support its orientation. The transition to a republic had the effect of shutting out the LR, as well as monarchists generally, from politics in Catalonia. Indeed, the LR realized that the wave of popular support for republican parties made it unlikely that its candidates would be returned in the indirect elections, set for 24 May 1931, for the assembly charged with drafting the autonomy statue.[94] The party withdrew its candidates, "not wanting at this time to foment dissension among Catalans."[95]

With the LR out of the election, republican forces were able to consolidate their hegemony in the Generalitat's first institutions and thereby direct the autonomy project. Of the 44 assembly seats, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, won 25—a clear majority.[96] The ERC was able to use its majority position in the assembly both to set the rules by which a committee would be struck to draft the autonomy statute and to name its members. For example, four of the five members of the presiding committee of the assembly were deputies for the ERC: Jaume

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[93] Joan Estelrich, *De La Dictadura a la República* (Barcelona: Llibreria Catalònia, 1931), p. 13.

[94] Delegates to the assembly were to be elected by city halls around Catalonia. The Lliga maintained that there was an agreement between it and other parties, which it never named, that some seats in the assembly would be reserved for its candidates. However, it withdrew its candidates when it received word that the agreement would not be enforced. See, Lliga Catalana, *Historia d'una Política*, pp. 391-92.

[95] "L'Assemblea de la Generalitat: Declaració de la Lliga Regionalista" [The Assembly of the Generalitat: Declaration of the Lliga Regionalista], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 21 May 1931, p.1. See also, "El millor camí" [The best path], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 22 May 1931

[96] Ten other republican deputies were divided among Acció Catalana (7), Entesa Republicana (2) and the Partit Radical Republicà (3); the remainder of the seats were divided among the Unió Socialista de Catalunya (4) and independent candidates (5).

Carner[97] (president); Lluís Companys and Josep Irla (vice-presidents) and Josep Dencàs (secretary); the second secretary, Martí Esteve, was a member of Acció Catalana. As president of the Assembly, Carner named the committee charged with drafting the statute, which included Francesc Macià, the 6 councillors of the Generalitat previously appointed by Macià[98] and 11 other deputies that Carner would name.[99] Carner then named a sub-committee that would actually write the statute in the city of Núria: Carner, Coromines, Dencàs, Esteve, Xirau i Palau and Campalans—5 republicans and one socialist.

The sub-committee was charged, in Macià's words, with producing a statute which would return to the Catalan people the sovereignty of which they had been dispossessed. In his speech to the provisional assembly of the Generalitat, Macià ensured its members that the first constitutional legislation of the Spanish Republic had to be "and we have to believe that it will be, to restore the traditional rights to that people [Catalans] who, in the history of Hispanic countries, has been the leader in liberty and democracy."[100] When the provisional Generalitat approved the Autonomy Statute in July 1931 then, it assumed that it would be passed almost immediately by the new republican government that had been elected in the general elections of 28 June 1931. The Generalitat also assumed that either the Autonomy

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[97] Carner appears to have run as an independent candidate, but at Macià's invitation. However, Pitarch lists him as a member of ERC. See *L'Estructura del Parlament de Catalunya*, p. 28.

[98] These were: Ventura Gassol (ERC); Joan Casanovas (ERC); Manuel Serra i Moret (USC); Casimir Giralt (PRR); Salvador Vidall Rosell (UGT); and; Manuel Carrasco i Formiguera (PCR).

[99] Josep Puig Pujades (ERC); Antoni Xirau i Palau (ERC); Pere Mias (?); Domènec Pinyana (?); Lluís Companys (ERC); Josep Dencàs (ERC); Jaume Bofill i Mates (AC); Martí Esteve (AC); Rafael Campalans (USC); Pere Coromines (ERC); Josep M. Serraclara (PRR). I cannot determine the party affiliation of Mias and Pinyana.

Statute would be debated alongside the constitution of the Second Republic—which would be federal—or, that the Autonomy Statute would be passed into law without any debate. It was for this reason that the Generalitat viewed as unproblematic the references to Catalonia as an autonomous state in the Spanish republic and to the fact that Catalan sovereignty was constituted in the Catalan people and represented through the Generalitat.[101] The statute met with almost no opposition in Catalonia. Even the LR gave the statute its stamp of approval and instructed its supporters to cast a 'yes' vote in the referendum: "For us and our friends, the Statute approved by the Provisional Council of the Generalitat is the Statute of all Catalans."[102] On 13 July 1931, the statute was approved by the provisional assembly of the Generalitat; by 26 July 1931, 98 per cent of Catalan city halls had approved it; and, on 2 August, 99 per cent of the votes cast in the referendum were in support of the statute.[103]

4. The Constitution of the Second Republic and the Autonomy Statute

The purpose of the Autonomy Statute was to fix the territorial boundaries between Spain and Catalonia in order to consolidate the territorial sovereignty of the latter. Until the Autonomy Statute was passed, however, there was no possibility of fully consolidating republican rule in Catalonia; the Generalitat would remain provisional. Electorally, republicans had been able to establish their hegemony in Catalonia—this would be confirmed in the general elections of 28 June 1931—but

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[100] The speech is reproduced in Fernando Diaz-Plaja (ed.), *La Historia de España en sus documentos: El Siglo XX (1923-1936)* [The history of Spain through its documents: The twentieth century (1923-1936)] (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1964), pp. 240-46.
[101] Articles 1 and 2 of the Statute of Núria.
[102] "L'Estatut de Catalunya" [The Statute of Catalonia], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 17 July 1931, p. 1, See also, "La Lliga Regionalista i l'Estatut de Catalunya" [The Lliga Regionalista and the Statute of Catalonia], *La Veu de Catalunya*, 15 July 1931, p. 1. Only the anarcho-syndicalists rejected it, but they abstained from the referendum instead of casting a 'no' vote. See, Luzbel Ruíz "No nos satisfece" [We are not satisfied], *Solidaridad Obrera*, 30 July 1931.

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this hegemony could easily be reversed unless it was given an institutional structure through which it could reproduce a republican culture. It was for this reason that when he personally delivered the Autonomy Statute to the government in Madrid, Macià asked that it be presented to the Constituent Cortes without any alterations and that it be dealt with urgently.[104]

Parliamentary procedure

Two developments in parliament made Macià's request impossible to fulfill. First, when the coalition government of the republic—Derecha Republicana, PSOE and PRRS (See Table 3)—did not introduce a federal solution to the minority nationalities question in the constitution, it became clear that the Spanish participants at the meeting in San Sebastian had rejected the idea that the pact committed them to creating a federal Spain. The draft of the constitution of the Second Republic that was presented to the Constituent Cortes on 18 August 1931, made no reference to federalism even though the constituent committee had full knowledge of the contents of the Catalan Autonomy Statute when it drafted the constitution.[105] Instead, the draft constitution provided for an 'integral' state, which Gerpe Landin has defined as "a unitary State characterized by regional autonomy."[106]

Juan Botella Asensi, a deputy of the PRRS and member of the committee which

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[103] The voter turnout was 76 per cent; 75 per cent of those eligible to vote supported the statute. See González Casanova, *Federalisme i autonomia a Catalunya*, p. 317.

[104] Petarch, *L'Estructura del Parlament de Catalunya*, p. 31.

[105] The constitution was drafted by a committee which included 5 members of PSOE; 4 from PRR; 3 from PRRS; 1 from AR; 1 Galician republican; 1 Basque-Navarrese deputy; 1 from the ASR; and, from Catalonia, Gabriel Alomar (USC) and Antoni Xirau i Palau (ERC). The committee had been struck on 18 July; the Autonomy Statute was published around this time and was the subject of extensive propaganda. It would be highly unlikely that the committee members would be unaware of the content of the Statute, particularly since two Catalans were among them. Another draft constitution had been prepared by a committee of jurists, but was rejected by the Cortes.

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drafted the constitution, argued that "We could not adopt a frankly federal criteria because...there are many regions [of Spain] that, certainly until now, have never manifested" a desire for autonomy. The integral state, he reasoned, was a more appropriate solution to the problem of regional identity, since the few regions which had a national character could approach the Spanish government and ask for autonomy.[107] The door was now left open to a full-scale parliamentary debate on the territorial organization of the Spanish state.

Table 3
Party representation in the Constituent Cortes, 1931-1933
Number of seats per party

Party	Seats
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	115
Partido República Radical(PRR)	90
Partido Republicano Radical Socialista (PRRS)	54
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)	38
Grupo Agrario	26
Acción Republicana (AR)	26
Derecha Liberal Republicana (DLR)	21
Galician autonomy parties	17
Federal Republicans	16
Basque and Navarrese parties	14
Independent	14
Agrupación al Servicio de la República (ASR)	13
Lliga Regionalista (LR)	3
Independent republicans	3
Independent liberal democrats	2
Monarchists	2
Total	**454**

Source: Josep M. Roig i Rosich, *L'Estatut de Catalunya a Les Corts Constituents (1932)* Barcelona: Curial, 1978).

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[106] Manuel Gerpe Landin, *L'Estat d'Autonomia de Catalunya i l'Estat Integral*, Collecció estudis i documents, 29 (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1977), p. 257.
[107] Juan Botella Asensi, Speech to the Cortes, 9 September 1931, Jardí, *Francesc Macià*, p. 165.

This was a favourable development for those parties or groups which, not having signed the Pact of San Sebastian, rejected the idea that it could bind the government to resolving the Catalan question. Antonio Royo Villanova, a monarchist deputy and fierce opponent of Catalan autonomy, represented the views of this contingent of parties when he warned his Catalan counterparts in the Cortes that "Certainly you have a right to present the problem of your [nationalist] claims, but not through the Pact of San Sebastian nor through a plebiscite."[108] For Catalan deputies, however, the draft constitution was a betrayal of the terms of the Pact of San Sebastian: "When Alianza Republicana was formed," Lluís Companys (ERC) told the Cortes, "certain bases were drawn up, in which the entrenchment of a federal republic was pacted."[109] Catalan deputies also protested that the constitutional project did not acknowledge in any way the Autonomy Statute, which had been made public in mid-July, at the same time that the parliamentary committee had started drafting the constitution. The Catalan Statute, Josep Xirau told the Cortes "is a Spanish constitutional project...Our Statute is a project of collaboration; Catalonia wishes to say that it will collaborate in the work of Spain; that Catalonia is integrally a part of Spain; but that it wishes to be in Spain with its own accent."[110] In *Claris*, the weekly magazine he published to report on the parliamentary debates, Maspons i Anglasell complained that "the Cortes is [mistakenly] starting from the assumption the Catalonia is a territory [which is]

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[108] Royo Villanova, Speech to Cortes, 23 September 1931, in Jardí, *Francesc Macià*, p. 176.

[109] Lluís Companys, Speech to the Cortes, 4 September 1931, in Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de governació, *La Intervenció dels Representants de Catalunya en la Constitució de la República* [The Participation of Catalan representatives in the Constitution of the Republic], Sessions of 18 August 1931 to 13 October 1931, First Volume of the Series, Oficina de Madrid, Part no. 6. May, 1932, p. 8.

[110] Josep Xirau, Speech to the Cortes, 22 September 1931 in, *Ibid.*, p. 63.

legally equivalent to any other Spanish territory, subjected to the same laws and the same duties."[111]

Catalan republicans had attended the constituent Cortes on the assumption that their Autonomy Statute would not be subjected to a parliamentary debate. The Statute was intended to regulate relations between Spain and Catalonia; therefore, it could be introduced in the Cortes either prior to or simultaneously with the Constitution of the Second Republic. Since the Catalan people had already demonstrated their collective will for self-government through the referendum of 2 August 1931, the Cortes had no right to debate the contents of the Statute. The results of the referendum, however, carried almost no weight in the Cortes, even though a referendum had been implicitly agreed upon at San Sebastian and, later, made a requirement in the Decrees of the provisional government of the Second Republic.[112] However, as we saw in section two, above, there had been no final decision taken at San Sebastian over the role to be played by the Cortes and whether the will of the Spanish people—represented in the Cortes—or the will of the Catalan people would prevail in the event of a conflict over the content of the Autonomy Statute. Parliamentary procedure was now imposing a decision: the constitution would be debated and modified first and, if the Autonomy Statute did not conform to the letter of the constitution, it would be debated at a later date. The will of the Catalan people would be superseded by the sovereign authority of the Cortes. Royo Villanova even suggested that "if we are going to transfer sovereignty to you [Catalans], let's consult non-Catalans in another plebiscite, because [if we give

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[111] *Claris*, Weekly Newsmagazine, no. 2 (24 May 1932), p. 1.
[112] See the discussion on this point in *Claris*, Weekly Newsmagazine, no. 5 (14 June 1932).

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you] sovereignty, the rest of the Nation will lose some. We do not have the right to transfer national sovereignty through a partial plebiscite."[113]

At issue in this debate was whether state sovereignty was divisible although, as we saw in the previous section, Catalans understood the question in another way namely, that Catalonia had regained sovereignty over its territory as a result of the end of the monarchical order. The territorial sovereignty of the Catalan state, it was argued further, in no way infringed on the sovereignty of the Spanish state; the two territories were now separate and the Autonomy Statute would institutionalize relations between the two.[114] The conceptual gap between the constitutional project of the Second Republic and the conception of territorial sovereignty defended by Catalan parliamentarians was too wide to overcome without the firm commitment of the Spanish republican and leftist parties to federalism, but this was not forthcoming. Catalan republicans had been enticed into a pact with Spanish republicans with the promise of a federal constitution but all of these Spanish parties, "in spite of confessions of federalism, were essentially *españolista*"[115]—that is, proponents of a centralized Spanish state. Spanish republicans had calculated that, with the integral state, they could comply with the terms of the Pact without necessarily adopting federalism for Spain. The integral state was certainly a compromise. Because it was not federal, it could not be opposed by PSOE or Spanish republicans, both of whom were state centralists. But the fact that Spain was constituted by autonomous municipalities and regions at least held out the

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[113] Royo Villanova, Speech to the Cortes, 23 September 1931, in Jardí, *Francesc Macià*, n.81, pp. 176-77.
[114] Maspons i Anglasell, writing in *Claris*, maintained that Catalonia enjoyed the same rights to statehood as those newly-created states of East-Central Europe which had emerged from the end of empires. See *Claris*, Weekly Newsmagazine, no. 5 (14 June 1932), pp. 1-2.

promise of self-government to the peripheral nationalities, all of whom now had deputies in the Cortes. The type of autonomy provided by the constitution had to be negotiated with the central state authority through parliamentary channels and could be revoked at any time. This type of autonomy satisfied proponents of a unitary Spain, who compared the self-determination of peripheral nationalities with separation. This form of autonomy hardly satisfied Catalan republicans, by contrast, but they accepted the constitution and hoped they could bargain further concessions when the Autonomy Statute was debated in the Cortes.

Agenda-setting

A second development in the Constituent Cortes compromised this strategy. Once the constitution was passed on 9 December 1931, a new coalition government was formed by Acción Republicana, PRRS, PSOE, ERC and the Galician and Basque nationalists. The participation of the socialists gave the coalition a decidedly leftist orientation and, more importantly, determined the legislative agenda until the coalition came apart in September 1933. The new government "was an effort to combine a bourgeois revolution with social reforms that would incorporate the Socialists into a democratic regime [but] at the risk of losing conservative Republican support."[116] The ability of PSOE to place its reform programme at the top of the parliamentary agenda with the support of the government leader, Manuel Azaña, delayed the discussion of the Catalan Autonomy Statute until May 1932, when it was finally introduced—although much amended—alongside the government's agrarian reform bill.

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[115] Ben-Ami, *The Origins of the Second Republic in Spain*, p. 290.
[116] Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War," p. 165.

The delay worked against Catalan republicans. The Autonomy Statute had been redrafted by a parliamentary committee which had curtailed the range and type of autonomous powers contained in the original statute.[117] Catalonia was no longer an 'autonomous State' but rather an 'autonomous region in the Spanish state.' Catalan deputies counted on being able to introduce amendments to regain some of the privileges which the committee had removed. In the six months since the constitution of the Second Republic had been passed, however, public opinion had been able to form around the new integral state and against the claims to territorial sovereignty on the part of Catalan republicans.[118] Inside and outside of parliament, the matter was debated extensively by parliamentarians, jurists and political commentators. Despite the influence of Maspons i Anglasell and the weight of historical evidence, there were many more jurists outside of Catalonia who were willing to proffer counter arguments and who had a different understanding of Spanish history. The jurist Eduardo Llorens published an influential book on the subject during the period of the Constituent Cortes that maintained that "if one examines historically the characteristics that are usually attributed to those collectivities knows as *nations*, one notices that none one these, nor all of them together, have been sufficient to constitute a State." In contemporary Europe, he continued, "important collectivities with conscious and distinct interests integrate themselves through autonomous regions." Even in federal or confederal states, it was not possible to speak of a "division of sovereignty—absurd concept—because

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[117] The parliamentary committee was made up of 5 members of the PRR; 3 members of the PRRS; 2 members of ERC; 1 member each from the nationalist Basque-Navarrese and Galician parties; 1 member of the ASR; and 1 member from PSOE.

[118] See the examples of organized opposition against the Catalan Autonomy Statute in Jardí, *Francesc Macià*, p. 214-15, n.19

sovereignty has the quality of a superlative that either exists or does not exist; but it cannot be divided."[119]

The Ateneo in Madrid contributed to the ongoing discussion by organizing a series of lectures on the Autonomy Statute beginning 29 April, just days before the parliamentary debates were set to begin. Parliamentarians such as Miguel de Unanumo, rector of the University of Salamanca, the socialist Emilio Iglesias, and the increasingly conservative republican Alejandro Lerroux, used their speeches to mobilize support against Catalan autonomy and in support of a united Spain. The atmosphere had become so poisoned in Madrid cultural circles that the Catalan socialist Josep Xirau decided to cancel his scheduled lecture at the Ateneo. Pere Coromines, who had participated in the drafting of the Autonomy Statute, took up the challenge of winning support for the Catalan project, but his speech at the Ateneo was so frequently interrupted that he gave up.[120] Joan Estelrich, one of the three deputies of the Lliga Regionalista in the Constituent Cortes, spoke extensively in cultural centres in Madrid in an attempt to quell suspicions that the Autonomy Statute was a separatist programme: "We link this problem of Catalan autonomy...to the set of Hispanic problems; and in our search for a solution to our Catalan problem, we also hope, naturally, that this solution is totally compatible with the other solutions, the other problems of Spain."[121]

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[119] Eduardo L. Llorens, *La Autonomía en la Integración Política: La Autonomía en el Estado Moderno: El Estatuto de Cataluña: Textos Parlamentarios y legales* [Autonomy in political integration: Autonomy in the modern state: The Statute of Catalonia: Parliamentary and legal texts] (Madrid: Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado, 1932), pp. 146, 149-150.

[120] Jardí, *Francesc Macià*, pp. 214-15, n. 19.

[121] Joan Estelrich, "El Estatuto catalan, la Constitución española y los problemas de cultura" [The Catalan statute, the Spanish Constitution and the Problems of Culture], Speech given at the Casa de Catalunya in Madrid, 30 October 1931, in J[oan] Estelrich, *Catalanismo y Reforma*

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Most Spanish parliamentarians did not agree with Estelrich's position and were increasingly convinced that there was in fact no solution to the Catalan problem. José Ortega y Gasset, one of Spain's leading intellectuals and a deputy of the Agrupación al Servicio de la República, claimed that "the Catalan problem like all similar problems...is a problem which cannot be resolved, which can only be endured."[122] The revised Statute failed to remedy the situation. According to one deputy, it "breaks with the unity of Spain in various areas; it breaks with all that which relates to the State's exclusive legislative faculties and executive powers."[123] Spain, according to another deputy, disappears altogether in both the original Autonomy Statute and that produced by the parliamentary committee.[124] Catalan republicans could not convince the Cortes that the Autonomy Statute was a pact between a self-constituting Catalonia and Spain. Sánchez Román argued that "Catalonia has the intolerable pretension—which, constitutionally, is impossible—to be a State...We must destroy the idea that the Statute is a pact."[125] Royo Villanova further discounted this possibility, arguing that "in the Spanish state, according to the constitution that we have approved, there are no pacts because Catalonia is a piece of Spain, it contributes to the integration of Spain. The regional autonomy of Catalonia is compatible with Spanish political unity [but] not because there is a

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hispánica [Catalanism and Spanish reformis], with an introduction by D. Angel Ossorio y Gallardo (Barcelona: Montaner y Simón, 1932), p. 123.

[122] José Ortega y Gasset, Speech to the Cortes, 13 May 1932, in Jardí, *Francesc Macià*, p. 222.

[123] Garcia Gallego, Speech to the Cortes, 19 May 1932, in Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de Governació, *L'Estatut de Catalunya a les Constituents de la República*, First Volume of the Series, Oficina de Madrid, Part no. 10, August 1932, p. 90.

[124] Ossorio y Gallardo, Speech to the Cortes, 26 May 1932, in *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[125] Reported in *Claris*, Weekly Newsmagazine, no. 2 (24 May 1932).

pact."[126] Regional autonomy was compatible with the unity of the Spanish state precisely because "the organization of these regional autonomies is the result of the will of the state," which must decide which powers to delegate to the regional authority.[127] This was, in fact, the way in which Catalonia would finally receive its autonomy on 9 September 1932—as a type of concession from the Spanish state and not as a demonstration of the popular will of the Catalan people. It was now clear, concluded Rovira i Virgili, "that for many Spanish republicans there is something more strong than principles, than programmes, than pacts: the unitarist tendency that is apparent in their dominating spirit and penchant for assimilation."[128]

Ideological Compromise

Catalan and Spanish republicans shared similar state projects that centred around the republic and liberty. However, they could not agree over whom the republican values of liberty and equality would range. The republican project of Spanish republicans *included* the liberty of Catalans while that of Catalan republicans was focused *exclusively* on the liberty of Catalans. For the former, the participation of Catalan republicans in the Pact of San Sebastian was a means of bringing the republic to all of Spain. For the latter, by contrast, the alliance was a means to a *Catalan* republic, to Catalan autonomy. There was, then, the potential for ideological conflict in the alliance of Catalan and Spanish republicans, but this did not become

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[126] Royo Villanova, Speech ot the Cortes, 10 June 1932, in Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de Governació, *L'Estatut de Catalunya a les Constituents de la República*, Third Volume of the Series, Oficina de Madrid, Part no. 12, September 1932, p. 36.
[127] Sánchez Román, speech to the Cortes, 12 May 1932, in Jardí, *Francesc Macià*, p. 218.
[128] "Catalunya i Espanya: La deslleialtat d'uns republicans" [Catalonia and Spain: The disloyalty of some republicans], *La Publicitat*, 16 July 1932, p. 1.

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immediately apparent to Catalan republicans until the parliamentary debates on the Constitution of the Second Republic and the Autonomy Statute.[129]

It was not the debates themselves but the institutional constraints which structured these debates—parliamentary procedure and agenda-setting powers—that brought Catalan republicans face to face with the indeterminacy of republican political thought with regard to political boundaries. These rules of procedure intervened to compromise the Catalan autonomy project by giving Spanish republicans the opportunity to consolidate the hegemony of their project first. Catalan republicans had submitted the Autonomy Statute to the Cortes and participated in the Constituent Cortes as a mere formality.[130] They assumed that they had a bargain with Spanish republicans that existed over and above parliamentary procedure. Catalan republicans would never have agreed to the Pact of San Sebastian if it had specified that the Cortes would have the privilege of treating the Autonomy Statute like a piece of legislation that could be debated and amended. In the end, as Maspons i Anglasell argued, the Statute could not be viewed as a bargain between Catalan and Spanish republicans, since "the concept of a bargain cannot be divorced from the necessity of accepting the agreed-upon formula" for reaching it.[131]

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[129] See C. Massó i Escofet and R. Gay de Montellà, *L'Estatut de Catalunya: Text oficial comentat and Referencies legals i notes de la Discussió Parlamèntaria* [The Catalan Statute: Official text with commentary, legal references and notes of the parliamentary debate] Biblioteca de la cultura catalana, Vol. 1 (Barcelona: Llibreria Bosch, 1933).

[130] Many Catalan republicans who had been elected to the Constituent Cortes, including Francesc Macià, never attended parliament when it was in session. Other deputies only attended when Catalan issues were on the agenda. It was possible for an individual to be elected to both the Cortes and the provincial council.

[131] *Claris*, Weekly Newsmagazine, no. 16 (30 August 1932), p. 1.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analyzed the reasons for which neither the growth of organized republicanism after 1919 nor republican hegemony after 1931 were sufficient conditions for the constitution of a separate Catalan republic after the fall of the monarchy. Catalan republicans entered into an alliance with their Spanish counterparts with the expectation that the transition to a republic would provide them with self-government. While Catalonia did receive self-government, certain rules of procedure worked against it obtaining a constitutionally-recognized separate state. In its final form, the Autonomy Statute set some limits on Catalan self-government in the areas of language, education and tax-raising powers and this impacted on the ability of the Catalan Generalitat to institutionalize fully a *Catalan* republican culture. Nevertheless, the amount of autonomous powers for self-government received by Catalans under the Autonomy Statute and Catalonia's Interior Statute (1933),[132] set them apart from other national minorities in Western Europe. Moreover, Catalan republicans would, over the course of the Second Republic, use the Generalitat to lobby Madrid for more extensive powers. When they met with resistance, Lluís Companys, the president of the Generalitat, unilaterally declared the independence of the Catalan state in October 1934.[133] Madrid reacted by suspending the Autonomy Statute in 1935. By the outbreak of the

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[132] The Generalitat had intended to call this document the Constitution of Catalonia. However Maspons i Anglasell, a member of the committee charged with drafting the Constitution, argued that according to the Autonomy Statute that was voted by the Cortes, Catalonia was part of the Spanish state and did not have the right to constitute itself. See "Avantprojecte de Constitutió de Catalunya, 1932" [Bill of the Catalan Constitution]; "Vot particular de Maspons i Anglasell a l'avantprojecte de Constitució de Catalunya. 1932" [Maspons i Anglasell's personal vote on the Bill of the Constitution of Catalonia]; and "Estatut Interior de Catalunya, 1933" [Interior Statute of Catalonia], in González Casanova, *Federalisme i autonomia a Catalunya*, pp. 745-99.

civil war in July 1936, however, the Generalitat was back in full force and would even raise its own army, issue its own currency and conduct its own foreign relations with other governments. Catalan republicans used the context of the war to exceed the limits of the Autonomy Statute; by the end of 1937, Catalonia *was* the republic: the Madrid government had been forced to move its operations to Barcelona. Cut off from the rest of Spain by Francoist forces in early 1938, republican Catalonia would finally fall in February 1939. The republican defeat was made final shortly after, in April 1939.

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[133] See, Generalitat de Catalunya, Text of the Proclamation of the Catalan State in the Federal Spanish Republic, by Lluís Companys, 6 October 1934.

Fundamental disagreements over the essential nature of autonomy and centre-periphery relations caused deep divisions in Catalonia that could not be contained through democratic government during the Second Republic. There were many ways to dispute the legitimacy of the state and contest the meaning of the nation in Catalonia. Anarchists, nationalists, monarchists and republicans were only some of the many political actors who competed for supporters in the Catalan political arena. This combination of counterhegemonic groups made Catalan politics intensely competitive. It also made it inherently unstable.

Three moments of counterhegemonic mobilization

The analysis of the three moments of counterhegemonic mobilization in chapters 5 through 7 brought the nature and extent of these divisions to light. Each of these moments represented a campaign for political autonomy in Catalonia and, more generally, political reform in Spain. Each of these campaigns was conducted by a cooperative alliance of counterhegemonic forces. The purpose of Solidaritat Catalana (1906-1908) was to displace the dynastic forces in Catalonia in order to gain access to representative institutions and put pressure on the Restoration regime to introduce democratic reforms at the local level. In a period of political crisis at the end of the First World War, the Assembly of Parliamentarians (1917-1919) used extra-parliamentary channels to pressure the Restoration regime to call a constituent Cortes to discuss far-reaching reforms to the Spanish state, including regional autonomy. Finally, the Pact of San Sebastian was an agreement amongst anti-dynastic forces to bring down the Restoration regime, using revolutionary means if necessary.

The three moments of counterhegemonic mobilization were marked by patterns of political competition between nationalists and republicans that made cooperation exceedingly difficult. Inter-group competition generated strategic dilemmas for nationalists and republicans as they attempted to manage the electoral constraints inherent in their status as minority parties and the problem of ideological compromise engendered by this constraint. Cooperative alliances were a means of managing this constraint and containing one's political rivals. A group could undermine its rival by recruiting its support base, as both the Lliga Regionalista and the Unión Republicana attempted to do in Solidaritat Catalana. Ideological compromise was a second strategy for containing political competition. The anti-dynastic forces of the Assembly of Parliamentarians attempted to force the Lliga Regionalista to abandon its support of the monarchy so that it could recruit the party's supporters to the republican cause. Finally, it was possible for a counterhegemonic group to neutralize a political rival by excluding it from a cooperative alliance, a strategy used by Catalan republicans in the Pact of San Sebastian with Spanish republicans. By shutting out the Lliga Regionalista from the alliance, Catalan republicans ensured that nationalists would not be able to win the elections of April 1931. This was a strategy that republicans had learned from their experience in Solidaritat Catalana, which had served as an effective counterbalance against the dynastic Liberals and Conservatives.

The temporal sequence of group interaction in each of these cooperative alliances shaped actors' motivations and strategies over time. There was a diffusion of innovation across the three moments of counterhegemonic mobilization that was evident in the way in which actors adjusted their strategies for obtaining Catalan

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political autonomy. The temporal order of cooperative alliances forced nationalists and republicans to learn from past mistakes and to draw on these lessons during the next round of strategic interactions. For example, after republicans learned that their support of the Lliga Regionalista's participation in the national unity government of 1917-1918 yielded absolutely no political benefit, they refused to endorse the LR's participation on the regime's extra-parliamentary commission to draft a bill for local reform. Similarly, after the LR's partnership with revolutionary anti-dynastic forces in the Assembly of Parliamentarians of 1917, it refused to support the Pact of San Sebastian, which it viewed as a revolutionary alliance to bring down the monarchy.

International events in the interwar period were another important source of innovation for political actors in Catalonia. The emerging discourse on national self-determination fueled the Catalan autonomy movement with new ideas and political objectives. The war showed how it was possible for political actors to innovate at the strategic level in order to bring their projects to fruition. Political actors manipulated existing conventions about political autonomy in order to convince supporters that Catalonia was a sovereign territory and that Catalans enjoyed a *right* to self-government. The creation of new states after 1918 reinforced these new arguments and influenced patterns of mobilization, as the Assembly movement of 1917-1919 and republican mobilization in Catalonia after 1930, made clear.

As the decades progressed, political actors became adept at drawing on past experiences as a source of strategic innovation. However well the lessons of the past were learned, they were not always a guarantee of future success. There were latent tensions within the republican and nationalist political projects that the analysis of the three moments of counterhegemony brought into focus. By the 1930s, Catalan

republicans were convinced that only the end of the monarchy would bring autonomy to the region. The force of their conviction presented them with few political alternatives: either a parliamentary majority or a revolution. Under the monarchy, the parliamentary route always entailed ideological compromise for Catalan republicans. When Catalan republicans chose to cooperate with the LR, it was invariably to deal with the problem of electoral constraints. If they cooperated with Catalan nationalists in order to increase their electoral profile in the Cortes, they faced the likelihood that the regime would attempt to divide and conquer a nationalists-republican alliance by attempting to collaborate with the conservative forces of the LR. The ideological competition between nationalists and republicans, in combination with the political dominance of nationalists, worked against the possibility that a cooperative alliance with the LR would result in the implementation of a republican political project.

A cooperative alliance with Spanish republicans, by contrast, presented Catalan republicans with some advantages. First, such an alliance could overcome the problem of electoral constraints and, like an alliance with nationalists, increase the electoral representation of Catalan republicans. An alliance with Spanish republicans could also eliminate the problem of ideological compromise that always existed in an alliance with nationalists; both Spanish and Catalan republicans were working for the creation of political institutions that would guarantee liberty and equality. However, in practice, an alliance between Catalan and Spanish republicans raised the problem of ideological conflict, since Spanish republicans were not explicitly committed to the creation of separate political institutions for the exercise of Catalan liberty.

When forced to choose between Catalan nationalists and Spanish republicans, Catalan republicans preferred the former because they assumed that the Lliga Regionalista was at least committed to Catalan autonomy. This assumption was the motivating factor behind Solidaritat Catalana and the Assembly of Parliamentarians. Catalan republicans reasoned that if they could obtain institutions for self-government by cooperating with the LR, it would at least be *possible* to use these institutions to attempt to consolidate a Catalan republican political project at some point in the future. This possibility would not necessarily exist in an alliance with Spanish republicans, since these might impose a set of institutions on Catalonia for the purposes of reproducing a Spanish national culture. Still, the participation of Spanish republicans in both Solidaritat Catalana and the Assembly of Parliamentarians was a useful counterbalance against the dominance of the Lliga Regionalista and strengthened the position of Catalan republicans.

The choice between Spanish republicans and Catalan nationalists was fairly stark for Catalan republicans since, in the end, there were no clear guarantees either way. Two factors intervened to make them choose an alliance with Spanish republicans in 1930: First, it was not clear that Catalan nationalists were committed to democratic institutions for self-government in Catalonia and second, Spanish republicans provided their Catalan counterparts with a guarantee that they would support the creation of separate institutions for self-government in the region after a transition to a republic. Even if, in 1932, Catalan republicans received less extensive autonomous powers than they had anticipated, they certainly managed to negotiate more than the Lliga Regionalista had under the monarchy. On balance, then, the

strategy used by Catalan republicans in the period 1930-1932 was more effective than their earlier strategies of cooperating with the LR.

Ideological compromise was not the same problem for the Lliga Regionalista under the monarchy as it was for republicans. The LR's conservatism meant that it was possible for it to cooperate politically with the dynastic parties, particularly the Conservative party, which was more interested in political reform than the Liberal party. Socially and politically, the LR had more in common with the dynastic parties than with republicans, which is one reason for which it was not a reliable alliance partner in either Solidaritat Catalana or the Assembly of Parliamentarians. Whenever the possibility arose of collaborating with the dynastic forces in government, the LR always opted to pursue its political objectives through the regime. So long as the Restoration monarchy was in place, it was possible for the LR to cooperate directly with the regime for its own purposes. However, the LR's monarchism was no guarantee that the dynastic parties would support a bill for Catalan autonomy. By 1918, with high expectations among Catalans about their right to national self-determination, the LR was no longer able to balance the tension between its support for the monarchy and its nationalist orientation. The party's monarchism and nationalism came to be seen as an internal contradiction in the LR's programme, which eventually alienated many supporters.

With the transition to a republic, the Lliga Regionalista was not faced with the problem of ideological compromise so much as it was effectively shut out of politics. The republican victory underscored how, for a majority of Catalans, monarchism was incongruous with a nationalist project. The LR learned this the hard way and adjusted quickly by reorganizing as the Lliga Catalana. The new party

narrowly beat out Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya in the Catalan legislative elections of 1933. The LR was prepared to accept the republic and to cooperate with other forces in the Generalitat until another political alternative came along. When the civil war broke out, the Lliga Catalana abandoned the republic and the Generalitat and supported the return to a conservative political order in Spain.

Republicanism, Nationalism and Liberalism

Republicans brought about a transition to democratic politics in Catalonia in 1931 and created a political order that was only marginally supported by nationalists. The literature on nationalism ignores the role played by republicanism for mobilizing national minorities in modern Europe and structuring transitions to democracy. This literature assumes that during the nineteenth century, nationalism became *the* organizing principle of domestic European societies. The republican legacy of an earlier age is not considered to be of any political consequence.

I challenged these assumptions by demonstrating that republicanism continued as a distinct political force into the twentieth century. As the preceding chapters made clear, republicanism and nationalism were political alternatives in Catalonia. The political projects of republicans and nationalists were very different; the level of political competition between them makes this evident. In early twentieth-century Spain, republicanism was still an important political alternative to the dynastic Liberal and Conservative parties because of the persistence of weak and corrupt monarchical rule. I have also shown that in Catalonia, republicanism continued as a political force even after the emergence of nationalism at the beginning of this century. The principal reason for this was that early twentieth-century Catalan nationalism was, in many respects, illiberal: it emphasized the

priority of the nation over the rights of individuals and favoured a conception of the social order that did not promote a liberal view of social and economic mobility. By contrast, republicanism was consonant with democratization and its political project continued to attract supporters in early twentieth-century Catalonia, where a transition to democracy had yet to take place.

Republicanism was part of a range of counterhegemonic ideologies that could be used to mobilize against the state. It is not possible to understand patterns of political organization and mobilization in Catalonia without an analysis of the role of republicanism. However, the implications of this finding extend beyond the Catalan case. There will continue to be gaps in the literature on European nationalism until scholars specify more clearly the differences between republicanism and nationalism and analyze republican and nationalist movements as distinct forms of political mobilization. It is only by distinguishing between republicanism and nationalism at the micro-level of political mobilization that we can properly understand larger structural processes.

By bringing republicanism into the foreground, we can also clarify its relationship to liberalism and the relationship of each of these to transitions to modernity in Western Europe. The assumptions in the literature on nationalism about the central role played by liberalism in democratic transitions has obscured the role republicanism played in shaping transitions to modern democratic politics. Republicanism was an alternative to liberalism in Catalonia and Southern Europe. Republicanism emerged after the failure of non-oligarchic liberalism to stabilize politics in the region in the aftermath of the Napoleonic invasions, as we saw in chapter 3. The turn to an oligarchic form of liberalism in the second half of the

nineteenth century precluded liberalism's potential as a democratizing force. In its place, republicanism became the democratic force in Southern European politics and challenged both the monarchical order and the role of liberals in upholding this.

Most studies of Spanish political development focus on the consequences of the absence of liberalism and fail to consider the effects of the presence of republicanism. These analyses fail to discuss what political forces actually contested power in Catalonia and Spain and, as result, are inconclusive. I have analyzed the republican option in Catalonia; future research should extend this analysis to other parts of Europe and specify *how* republicanism shaped democratic transitions and political development paths in Western Europe.

Republican mobilization

The micro-level analysis of political mobilization in chapters 5 through 7 not only underscored the importance of republicanism in Catalan politics; it also revealed some of the enduring problems faced by modern republicans. There was, first, the problem of the type of political action: revolution or reform. In nineteenth-century Southern Europe, the way in which oligarchic liberals and conservatives controlled the system of interest representation made it difficult for republicans to pursue reform through parliamentary channels. As a result, republicanism and revolution often went hand in hand.

Most Southern European republicans eventually chose the more moderate and less costly parliamentary route to political reform. This form of political action was not without its own dangers. The decision to contest elections brought republicans face to face with constraints related to their status as minority parties. It was not possible for republicans to win elections in majoritarian parliamentary

systems. The only way to get around this constraint was for a party to expand its support base, but this usually demanded that republicans temper aspects of their political project. Managing electoral constraints in this way inevitably raised the problem of ideological compromise and the risk that by expanding its membership, republican parties would lose their core group of supporters.

In Catalonia, the problem of ideological compromise was inherent in every electoral alliance between republicans and nationalists. Given the level of ideological commitment among republicans, this problem prevented them from making much headway since they always chose defection over compromise. Republicans preferred to defect from Solidaritat Catalana in 1908 rather than compromise on universal suffrage, which was a central feature of the republican programme. Similarly, republicans defected from a tacit alliance with the Lliga Regionalista at the time of the extra-parliamentary commission in 1918 because they could not accept a form of autonomy negotiated jointly by the LR and the dynastic forces without abandoning their republican principles.

An alliance with Spanish republicans did not entail ideological compromise for Catalan republicans, but it did raise the problem of ideological conflict, as the constitutional negotiations of 1931-1932 made evident. The constitutional debates revealed that there were two different republican projects in Spain: a Spanish and a Catalan one. Intergovernmental relations between Madrid and Barcelona during the Second Republic brought the political tension inherent in this ideological conflict to the fore and contributed to the destabilization of republican politics.

Institutions and strategic interactions

The political issues which structured strategic interaction at the micro-level in Catalonia shaped patterns of mobilization against the Spanish state. Only an institutional analysis can specify the nature of this political interaction and the range of groups which emerged to challenge the state. Structuralist explanations of the conditions for sub-state nationalism fail to explain why the state cannot adopt a long-term strategy to correct the effects of uneven development. In chapter 2, I argued that the capacity of states to do so is related to levels of infrastructural power and institutional incorporation since state actors require high levels of institutional incorporation in order to reproduce a national culture and build consensus around the legitimacy of their rule. In chapter 3, I argued that levels of institutional incorporation can also determine the range and type of alternative state projects or patterns of social relations that can be used to challenge state nationalism. The examination made clear that cultural and national groups in Southern Europe will use ideologies other than nationalism to mobilize against the state: anarchism, communism and republicanism are only some of these. Structural approaches that focus exclusively on patterns of economic development cannot explain the emergence of the range of counterhegemonic movements that I have identified here.

By specifying the range of counterhegemonic groups that existed in Catalonia through an institutional analysis, I was also able to specify the types of political issues around which these groups mobilized. When these issues were examined in relationship to patterns of strategic interaction among political actors in Catalonia, it became clear that questions related to state and regime were more

important than class conflict and economic grievances for explaining political competition between nationalists and republicans. A consideration of patterns of economic development can contribute to our understanding of Catalonia's distinctiveness within Spain. Class conflict, further, was certainly an important aspect of interwar Catalan politics. I have not eliminated economic variables from my analysis, but I have recast their importance through an analysis of political institutions and strategic interactions among political actors. Only an institutional analysis can explain why *both* nationalism and republicanism emerged in Catalonia *and* why the Spanish state was not able to thwart these counterhegemonic movements.

Implications for further research

The principal findings of this dissertation have implications which extend beyond interwar Catalonia and I have set up the case-study in such a way as to allow for further comparative investigation. Three implications of the research point to further avenues of scholarly inquiry. First, the neglect of republicanism in the literature on political development needs to be corrected. Despite the important advances in our understanding of republicanism in the sub-field of political theory, the role of republicanism in comparative politics remains under-researched. Systematic comparative research on republicanism in the European context will allow us to specify more precisely the political development path of Southern Europe, including France. Such research will also correct the assumptions about patterns of sub-state mobilization in the literature on nationalism.

Second, the institutional level of analysis that I developed here can be applied across cases and in a comparative context in order to advance our

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understanding of sub-state mobilization. By measuring levels of institutional incorporation across states, we can compare patterns of nation-building and specify the conditions under which different counterhegemonic groups emerged. An institutional analysis, further, can identify the particular constraints faced by sub-state actors across cases and allow us to compare how these constraints affected their ability to mobilize. In this way, the institutional analysis I used here fits well with other emerging work on political development generally and in the European context, in particular.

Finally, the micro-level analysis that I have used here draws on a general logic of electoral competition that can be applied to other cases of sub-state nationalism regardless of their particularities. Any minority nationalist movement that takes the parliamentary route to reform will face the same electoral constraint that Catalan nationalists and republicans did. Even if the political issues around which groups mobilize vary from case to case, the logic of electoral competition allows us to compare how groups manage electoral constraints and the problem of electoral compromise. Such an approach allows us to move beyond purely structural analyses to a comparison of the *politics* of nationalism across cases.

Catalonia today

Political competition between Catalan nationalists and republicans is not as intense at the end of this century as it was at the beginning. Nevertheless, nationalism and republicanism are once again political alternatives in post-Franco Catalonia, although the ideological force of republicanism is today much distilled. The hard-learned historical lessons of republican experience of 1931-1936 were very much in evidence during the transition from the Franco regime to a constitutional

democracy in the late 1970s. The constitutional negotiations of the period 1977-1978 raised many of the issues which the Second Republic and the Franco dictatorship failed to resolve, including the problem of regional nationalism.

Two questions dominated the constitutional negotiations: the structure of the state and the nature of the regime. As in 1931, a debate took place between state centralists and regional nationalists over the relationship between state structure and Spanish nationalism. Compared to 1931, however, there was a stronger inter-party consensus that some form of decentralization was necessary since the highly centralized Franco state existed to maintain a corporatist social and political system. A democratic system needed to open up paths to citizen participation; decentralization could fulfill this need. The constitutional outcome was a compromise between state centralists and federalists: on the one hand, a recognition of the indivisible nature of the Spanish nation-state and, on the other, a formal recognition and guarantee of the right to autonomy on the part of the historic nationalities and regions.

The regime question was similarly settled through a compromise. A parliamentary monarchy with the king acting as an arbiter in government was the preference of the centre-right parties, Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD) and Alianza Popular (AP), the military and the state actors from the Franco period. The republican option was supported by socialists, communists and regional nationalities. The political weight of the pro-monarchy groups ensured the restoration of the Bourbon crown but as a concession to the pro-republicans, the monarchy was made purely representative.

The constitutional monarchy was approved by nearly 90 per cent of voters in a referendum in 1978; after the experience of the Second Republic and the civil war, republicanism was not a viable option for many Spaniards. In Catalonia, however, the main republican party of the 1930s, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya continues, and a second republican party, Partit per la Independència (PI) recently split off from the ERC. Compared to the 1930s, these parties have no allies in the rest of Spain. This fact has reshaped patterns of republican mobilization in Catalonia in a dramatic way: Instead of working for the overthrow of the monarchy, Catalan republicans now mobilize supporters for political independence. Since the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy is largely uncontested among Spaniards, independence is now the only way to realize the republican project in Catalonia.

Support for independent statehood is not strong in contemporary Catalonia; republicans capture less than 10 per cent of the popular vote in Catalan elections. By contrast, Catalan nationalism is once again dominant, although today's nationalist parties have no links with those that existed at the beginning of the century. Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC) joined forces as the nationalist Convergència i Unió (CiU) for the first Catalan elections in 1980 and have been in government ever since. Since 1980, CiU has steadily increased its share of the popular vote from 28 per cent to 46 per cent in 1992.

CiU's success in implementing its nationalist project in the new democratic institutions of Catalonia has forced opposition parties to consider an electoral alliance to break nationalist hegemony. Political cleavages in contemporary Catalonia are more complicated than in the 1910s or 1920s. In addition to the two republican

parties, there is the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), the left-wing nationalist coalition, Iniciativa per Catalunya (IC), other Catalan minority parties as well as the ruling Partido Popular (PP), a state-level conservative party which has a Catalan wing. Two main political cleavages structure political mobilization: the first is related to political differences over the nature of Catalan nationalism while the second is related to class. The only way for these opposition forces to introduce a new social and political project for Catalonia is to join forces in the regional elections of 1999 in a bid to unseat CiU. As in the early decades of the twentieth century, this strategy for managing electoral constraints brings with it the problem of ideological compromise. Given the range of different political parties which today contest power in Catalonia, this problem is both inevitable and unlikely to be resolved to every party's satisfaction.

Nationalist politics continues to structure relations between Catalonia and Madrid. The constitutional outcome of the transition to democracy did not entirely settle nationalist claims from the periphery. Catalan and Basque nationalists have been able to bargain increased regional powers in return for supporting the ruling parties in the Cortes in Madrid. The recent 'Barcelona Declaration' (July 1998) by the three ruling nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, is an attempt to put pressure on Madrid to recognize the 'plurinational' nature of the Spanish state which, they claim, is implicit in the constitution. The Declaration draws on similar tripartite initiatives from the 1920s and 1930s to challenge Spanish state nationalism. There continues to be an important diffusion of innovation from the early part of this century which is evident in the strategic actions of counterhegemonic groups in Catalonia and Spain.

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