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TRANSMIGRATION AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION:

THE CASE OF IRANIANS IN CANADA, 1946-1998

by

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Abstract

In this thesis, transmigration of Iranians to Canada and perpetuation of multi-hyphenated Iranian identity are analyzed in the context of global, national and local factors. Their movement to Canada and identity constructions are affected and determined by dialectically interrelated factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, ideology, nationalism and economic considerations in both the East and the West. Identity construction and transmigration of Iranians to Canada are explored with references to historical data, personal letters, newspaper articles, secondary research, life history of informants and Census and Immigration data. The aim is to highlight Iranian transmigrants' "situational" and "relative" social positions within the context of socio-economic relations at both macro- and micro-levels. Iranian transmigration is viewed with references to ideological changes and conflicts (for example, from pro-Western to an anti-imperialist Islamic ideology), and how Iranian transmigrants were affected by socio-economic factors such as Western- and Persian-centric modernization programs, the revolution and the Canadian immigration policy.

Iranian transmigration to Canada and their establishment of communities in this country is explored in the context of: a) how territorial communities change into networks of communities acrcss national borders, and b) how such communities are fragmented based on factors such as ideology, gender, ethnicity and political beliefs. Here it is argued that although Iranian community in Canada is a fragmented society, it is nevertheless connected to other pockets of fragmented Iranian communities in other parts of the world. Despite the fact that this population is overwhelmingly Persian, Moslem, highly educated and middle class, gender, income, education, religion, political beliefs, and ethnicity cut across it. Such inequalities (income) and differences (ethnicity or religion) are the end result of the cumulative effects of socio-economic systems and relations in both Canada and Iran.

The process of transmigration has also resulted in the formation of multi-hyphenated Iranian ethno-national-religious identities in Canada and other parts of the world. These multi-faceted identities (for instance, Persian-Iranian, Iranian-American, Iranian Baha'i, Iranian-Canadian) have their roots in ethno-national conflicts in a transnational context (in Iran and other parts of the world). The perpetuation of Iranian national identity as an ethnic identity (a non-White minority group) in Canada, for example, hides the extent to which Persians have historically dominated other ethno-national groups politically, economically and socially within Iran and Iranian communities abroad.

For My Wife

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I would also like to thank my parents, whose love and support made it possible for me to eventually transmigrate to Canada. I would like to thank my wife, Sabrina, as well. Her support and love over the past four years has made it possible for me to complete this research. Last but not least, I would like to thank the informants who participated in this research.

"I know why you love Iran? Because your dad lives there."
Gianni, a *five year old second generation Italian-Canadian*

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Chapter One: Methods And Data

The Problem Statement

The main questions that are explored in this thesis is how "push" and "pull" factors such as the modernization of Iran, the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, the Islamic Republic's socio-economic-cultural policies and the Canadian immigration and refugee laws influenced: a) their departure from Iran and b) their eventual transmigration to Canada through other nation-states. Is this a homogenous or diverse population? How is diversity or homogeneity within the Iranian transmigrant population a reflection of the effects of the socio-economic policies in both Iran and Canada? And, how is this diversity and/or homogeneity depicted in different texts? The aim is to demonstrate: a) how a specific ethnic group (Persians) has historically dominated other ethnic and religious groups within Iran and b) how such a division is finding new life in Canada.

As Glick Schiller (1992:15) points out, transnational migrants, such as Iranians, are not confined within the boundaries of any one single polity. Transmigration is not only a "local [and individual] initiative but one of global positioning" of individuals who are categorized and conceptualized by themselves or *others* as barriers of specific nationalities, ethnicities, religions and ideological suppositions. Transmigration of non-Westerners to Canada and other parts of the West is a reflection of how the globalization of technology, information and the economy has undermined "the primacy of the nation-state in its present form" (McGrews, 1992:62). At the same time, their transmigration to Canada and other parts of the world has resulted in the creation of a well connected web of ethno-national diaspora throughout the world. In a sense, this is a reflection of the "nature" of that fragmented world which seems to undermine the primacy of the nation-state but has not done away with the idea of ethno-nationalism as a criteria of difference.

A related question that becomes central is "do Iranian transnationals in Canada and other parts of the world continue to construct social reality according to nationalistic sentiments and ideas, thus, reproducing 'hegemony of dominant classes in each nation state as they live lives that span national borders'" (ibid.)? How are *other* minority groups constructed and ranked by members of a minority group like transnational Iranians in Canada? In order to answer this question, it is important to analyze how Iranians construct images of dominant elite groups and *other* transnational ethnic minorities, and how, in turn, they are perceived by *other* ethno-religious groups politically, socially, and culturally in both the West and the East.

Here, it is argued that Iranians not only defy but also reproduce national hegemony. For example, like many other minority communities, the Iranian community differentiates itself from *other* communities, based on categories such as nationality, ethnicity, language, color of skin, gender, religion and other forms of "us" versus "them" distinctions, without accounting for their biases and ethnocentric views. For Iranians (as manifestations of "Orientals" in the West) in Canada, their Aryan heritage, ethnicity (i.e.: Persian, Turk and Baluch), language (i.e.: Farsi, Turkish, Baluch, etc.) and class divide between them and between Iranians and members of other ethnic minorities within the context of the British/French dominated Canadian society. Despite such divisions, the perpetuation of Iranian identity as an ethnic identity in Canada is a reflection of the dominant position of Persian/Shiites in Iran and within the Iranian transmigrant communities in Canada. By transmigrating to Canada, Iranians also perpetuate the West (not as a political entity, but rather as a symbol of technological progress, higher standard of living, individualism and freedom) as an "advanced" and free space within the globe despite inequalities and social disparity prevalent in the West among Iranians. However, as activists (i.e.: member of political organizations or intellectual community) in the West, they may defy and resist the policies of the Iranian government through public demonstrations or publication of articles in popular magazines or scientific journals. As refugee claimants in Canada, they may

redefine Canadian Refugee laws and the definition of what is a refugee. But, such perpetuation resistance and defiance of national hegemony may not be a reflection of the attitudes of the entire community due to differences in terms of class, ethnicity, gender, ideological beliefs (i.e.: religious and political) and personal experiences.

The main argument of this thesis is three fold. *First*, the Iranian community is a segmented population based on factors such as age, period of socialization, political beliefs, class and religion. These differences and inequalities among Iranians not only divide Iranians but also divide them from other ethno-national groups into a segmented population. The transmigration of Iranians to Canada and other parts of the world has also resulted in the formation of formal and informal Iranian groups and organizations in different parts of the world. They connect the segmented Iranian communities abroad, "thus linking together" Iran and their host countries to other parts of the world through various political, class, religious and ethnic institutions and groups (Schiller, Basch and Blonc-Szanton, 1992:1). In other words, the Iranian community in Canada connects Canada, Iran and "pockets" of Iranians around the world through a network of formal and informal relationships between individuals and groups based on factors such as ideology, class, religion, ethnicity and gender.

Second, identity construction for Iranians is expressed with references to essentialized categories of difference which have different meanings and manifestations during different periods. As Marcus Banks (1996:178) maintains, although "minority group ethnicity or identity is constructed in relation to the dominant group and to the state, there is also a sociologically relevant discourse of race among minority groups." As such, in this thesis, close attention is paid to: a) how concepts such as race and ethnicity are represented and conceptualized, and b) how such racially or ethnically biased views affect and at times constitute Iranian transmigrants' experiences and interpretations of socio-economic events. In Iran, for example, knowledge and discourse about "otherness" and ethnic-relations is taught as part of the school

curriculum in the education system[1]. As it is argued in chapter four, at schools, students are socialized according to a "world-view" which considers their race (Aryan), ethnicity (Persian), nationality (Iranian), and religion (Islam) as legitimate criteria of differentiation. This image, however, does not reflect upon other ethnicities, languages and religions as defining elements of Iranian national identity.

The formation of hyphenated Iranian-Canadian identity as an ethnic identity hide the extent to which the Iranian community in Canada is ethnically, religiously and politically diverse. As mentioned, the perpetuation of Iranian national identity in Canada as a homogenous minority ethnic group has also accompanied the perpetuation of dominant Persian identity and culture as the defining elements of the Iranian community, despite religious, ethnic and linguistic differences. This characteristic of Iranian transmigrants is the direct result of Persian-centric policies of both the past and present Iranian regimes. It is a reflection of how reforms in economic and social spheres benefited the Persian ethnics more than any other ethnicity in the past six decades.

In this research, constructions of Iranian identities- (as reflected in life narratives, newspaper articles, government documents and scientific papers) are treated as local/global discourse of positioning individuals within the broader context of the West-East dichotomy by references to factors such as ethnicity, race, civilization, class and nationality. This discourse is multi-facetted and consists of ideas and views that reflect Persian, Shiite and Western characteristics, and through which individual Iranians are: a) "represented" and "ranked" and b) "represent" and "rank" *other* ethno-nationalities, political and religious groups. Identity construction is a process

---

[1] The education system is conceptualized as a universal institution of modernity and as an "Ideological Apparatus" (IAs) which socializes students according to certain "official" types of knowledge, and differentiates between students based not only on school achievements but also on factors such as class, ethnicity and gender. Following Althusser's conceptualization of the "Ideological State Apparatus," "ISAs" are defined as those institutions of modernity which function by ideology as both unifying and divisive agents. In this sense, schools not only promote bring about consensus but also fragmentation at individual, local and global levels.

through which they ***criticize***, ***incorporate***, ***reverse***, or *ignore* ethnocentric views prevalent in the West, in Iran and in other part of the world.

Third, Iranian transmigrants' representations as "Iranians," "refugees," "women," "immigrants," "citizens" and "students" are constructed differently depending on factors such as class differences, ideological suppositions and religious beliefs at the individual, local, national and global levels. Here, it is argued, that their constructions of identities are reflective of how distant events and day to day interactions are dialectically related. That is, identity construction for Iranians in Canada, in Iran and in the other parts of the world is affected by the events of the past and the present in both the East and the West.

More specific, in chapter two, the transmigration of Iranians is analyzed in terms of "push" and "pull" factors, with references to the modernization of Iran, the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, political and cultural policies of the revolutionary government, the West as a cultural and social consumption item, and immigration/refugee policies of the Canadian government (as the most influential pull factors). These factors are analyzed with references to current research, newspaper articles, life-narratives of informants and statistical information on Iranian transmigrants. Their immigration to Canada is viewed as how their "shifting collectivities" change over time and are situated in a web of uneven power relationships in Canada.

In chapter three, it is argued that Iranians in Canada are not only a divided population politically, culturally and socially but their economic position, occupation, education and income further divide them into a segmented community both before and after their arrival in Canada. In this sense, economic diversity is not a local issue but a global matter which finds different manifestations in various parts of the world as Iranians move around the globe before settling down in Canada.

In chapter four, the perpetuation of Iranian national identity as an ethnic identity in Canada is explored. In this section, it is argued that hyphenation of Iranian identity in Canada was

preceded by ethnic differentiation in Iran. The role of modernization policies, education and media in (re)production of hyphenated identities based on discriminatory and ethnocentric interpretation of history (knowledge) is analyzed by reference to secondary sources, newspaper articles, Census data and school texts curriculum.

In short, the emphasis here is: a) how the East is affecting the West through "settlement" of distant communities of transnational migrants such as Iranians; and b) how diverse this community is due to the effects of Western influences (i.e.: in education), ethno-centric policies in Iran and immigration policies in Canada. In the rest of this chapter a brief discussion of methods and data is presented.

1.1 Methods and Data

Primary (life history, quantifiable data) and secondary (other research on Iranian ethnic issues and history) sources are used in this thesis. A statistical/historical "biography" of the Iranian population is discussed in detail. Such information sheds light on the diversity of the Iranian population based on factors such as education level, income, labor participation, ethnicity, religion, immigrant class category, intended occupation, and place of residence. In this thesis, two sets of data are used: i) immigration data (1980 to July, 1998) based on the variable *last permanent residence* (Iran) and ii) Target Group Profile, 1991 Census, based on the variable *ethnic origin* (Iranian).

Rather than conceptualizing Iranians as immigrants or refugees alone, their movement as workers, asylum seekers and landed immigrants with specific histories, ethnicities, nationalities and religions is viewed within the context of transnationalism. These Iranian transmigrants "migrate" to Canada from Iran via other Western and Eastern countries. Transnationalism refers to the globalization of economy and information. Transmigration is defined as the movement of individuals between nation-states for political, social, cultural, and economic reasons. By conceptualizing their movement into Canada within the context of the globalization

of economy and information, the aim is to account for their translocalities. Their translocal characteristics have significant importance in terms of how *Otherness* (i.e.: elite and non-elite minority groups in different parts of the world) is constructed. The importance of their translocal experiences is that information and knowledge about *Otherness* is no longer based on second hand observations of non-Persian (Iranians) but rather it is based on first hand experiences or second hand observations of Iranians who have lived in different parts of the world and have come into contact with various ethnic and racial groups.

Related to the concept of transmigration is the idea of "shifting collectivities," which refers to how individuals' and groups' relations and constructions of reality are affected by the day-to-day interactions as well as socio-political events in distant territories. The movement of Iranians to Canada is viewed within the context of how individuals' "shifting collectivities" were affected by events in Iran and in the host countries in which they resided before entering Canada. That is, the aim is to point to the extent to which individual Iranians' personal choices, class positions and attitudes, ideological beliefs, gender, age and religion have been influential in the "temporary" or "permanent" out-migration from Iran. That is, "migration" is analyzed within the context of class and power conflicts at both local and global levels.

Transnationalism and "shifting collectivities allow the researcher to bridge the gap between local and global and view the individual within and beyond the boundaries of national socio-economic structures and relations. In other words, such terms allow the researcher to view the movement of individuals and groups from a global perspective without losing sight of how national policies of governments in both the East and the West function as "push" or "pull" factors.

Through application of such terms, the idea of "insider" and "outsider" is problematized as such divisions find different interpretations and "realities" during different periods and in different parts of the world. That is, within the context of transnationalism, "us" and "them" categories are

dialectical and reflective of class, ethnic and religious differences not locally but also globally. In other words, the divisions between the “insiders” and “outsiders” are no longer local and “specific” to any nation-state but global and go beyond regional differences. Transmigration of Iranians, then, is viewed from a historical perspective within the context of the East-West dichotomy with references to how factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, income, education level, occupation, language and nationality divide between education level, occupation, language and nationality divide between Iranians and between them and other ethno-national groups not only in Iran or Canada but also in other parts of the world.

In the case of Iranians, the Shiite Persians, as the most powerful ethnic group, are conceptualized in relation to other marginalized ethnic groups such as Kurds, Turks and Baluch. As transmigrants in Canada, the roles of Persian and other minority Iranians may be reversed or perpetuated depending on a host of factors such as ideological differences, economic inequality, period of transmigration and one's socio-economic position in the “home” country. Within the Iranian-Canadian communities, however, the middle class Persians with their Farsi culture and language are dominate. Such a hegemonic position of Persians is reflective of the role they played in the nation building process in Iran. The role of Persians in the modernization of Iran can be equated to the role of British and French Canadians in the nation-building process in Canada. Yet, as a minority group within Canada, its hegemonic role in relation to the Turk, Baluch and other groups within the Iranian communities is disguised by its construction as a marginalized group, whether or not that is the case for individual Iranians.

In the case of the informants, Ali, Saman, Piroz and Farzad are of Persians background and Kayvan is of Turkish-Kurdish descent. They are all Shiite Moslems and members of the middle class. One of their shared characteristics is their multi-national experiences as students, tourists, and “immigrants” in more than two nation-states in both the East and the West. As a result, for these individuals, their identities are not only portrayed as Persian/Iranians but also

account for their translocal experiences in different parts of the world. For example, Piroz and Keyvan see themselves as partly German and British respectively.

To account for the fact that life narratives in this research are not reflective of women's experiences, specific attention is paid to how Iranian women have been portrayed in both Iran and Canada by references to research, newspaper articles and second hand interviews. Also, specific attention is paid to gender differences in terms of age, martial status and the numbers of Iranian transmigrants in Canada. Gender inequality in terms of income, occupation and education level, both before and after arrival in Canada, are also analyzed in chapter three with references to Immigration and Census Data.

1.2 Life History

Lawrence Watson (1985) points out that life history as a form of personal account is a "discourse translated inter-subjectively into text." Life history is defined as personal reflections on one's identity, dreams, choices in life, and world-view (Watson, 1985; Langness, 1981). In life history, individuals "are not reduced to an insignificant role in human affairs" (Watson, 1985:IX). In this research, life history is treated as a method through which the views of informants on construction of "otherness," nationalism (people-hood), and other forms of "us" versus "them" categories are explored.

Through the application of life history, the purpose is to illustrate the informants' diverse experiences despite their categorization under all encompassing terms such as "Moslem," "Iranian," "middle class," "immigrant," and/or "refugee." Their narratives are analyzed with references to national and global events in both the East and the West. Life histories of the informants are treated as tools pointing to shared continuities and discontinuities of their experiences in terms of ethnicity, class, and identity formation across imagined national boundaries (Anderson, 1992). For example, due to the fact that the informants lived in different parts of the world at the time of the revolution, their life histories can be used to demonstrate

how events in Iran (distant territory) have affected their lives in different parts of the world (i.e.: Germany, Canada, England).

The emphasis in analyzing life history, Watson argues, should be on the insider (emic) view (Ibid.). The so called "insider" view, however, has been marked by significant changes within the context of colonialist and capitalist expansion around the world. Informant's emic views, for example, are reflective of how, as students and transmigrants in different parts of the world, they reject, incorporate and re-define modernity and its "forces." As educated individuals, for example, their emic view may not question the "universality" of Western scientific methods, structures and tendency toward extreme quantification of human lives, despite their Western-centric biases. In other words, emic view of non-Western ethnics such as Iranians may not be too different than one found in any Western or non-Western country. Their emic views are reflective of the extent to which they are affected by the socio-economic events in different parts of the world.

1.3 Fieldwork and Informants

The life histories of five Iranians, Piroz, Kayvan, Saman, Ali, and Farzad, are employed in this research. They were born before the revolution and were socialized during the Shah's period. Although not all of the informants were living in Iran at the time of the revolution, the revolution and events after it are defining periods in their constructions of their identities. They were born between 1960 and the late 1970s in different parts of Iran and Europe. They are of Persian background except one who is of Azari-Kurd background. They all claim to be members of the middle class in Iran and Canada. All of the informants entered Canada as single individuals under the family reunion or investment categories with their families. Only one of them came as a single refugee without his family.

The informants in this research arrived in Canada between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. However, their immigration experiences do not begin in Canada, but in a second country

where they first resided, attended school and worked before applying for Canadian refugee or immigrant status. Piroz was born in Germany and moved between Germany and Iran until the revolution. Piroz left Iran with his family after the Revolution. Kayvan left Iran as a student in his youths well before the revolution and remained in England when political conflicts and the war drastically altered and molded the Iranian political economy. Saman first moved to Germany and then to Canada. Farzad left Iran towards Germany after the war before entering Canada. Ali also left during the war. He first resided in Belgium and eventually moved to the United States. After several years of living in the States as a student he immigrated to Canada.

1.4 Interviews

Interviews were conducted in their residences, my residence and Simon Fraser University (SFU) campuses in Vancouver and Burnaby. Interviews at SFU were obtained in classrooms. All interviews were taped and later transcribed.

The informants were asked and encouraged to expand or explore any issues they deemed necessary. Questions were mainly concerned with how, as transmigrants or students interacting within systems and institutions with specified rules and boundaries, they constructed their identities. At the individual level, their construction of themselves differs widely during different episodes of their lives. Individual reactions in similar circumstances and time periods varied due to class differences, period of immigration and socialization.

In the first interview, informants were asked to comment on their schooling experiences. This led to a mapping of education experiences which covered four nation-states with similar yet different education systems. The main question was open ended, that asked the informants to talk about their education experiences in any chronological order.

The second interview concentrated on the transmigration experiences of the informants and how they saw themselves during different periods. Some of the questions used were based on information provided by informants in their first interviews. Yet, the interview was based on

mainly open ended questions such as why and when did you leave Iran? Why did you come to Canada? How did you come to Canada? How do you classify yourself, (i.e.: Iranian, Turk or Canadian)? Informants, for example, were asked to expand on issues or episodes which they had already made reference to in their first interview. The informants were asked to explain why they chose Canada, what difficulties they faced, and how they, as members of a minority ethnic/national group, rationalize their daily lives and relationships with "others." The purpose of the third interview was to expand on the life histories of informants by asking them to recount their experiences with references to politics, history and culture in regional and/or global contexts.

In this research, with references to concepts such as modernization, revolution, religion and ethnicity, the objective is to demonstrate how Iran and Iranians are depicted socially, economically and culturally within different texts (statistical data, life narratives of informants, newspaper articles, scientific books and journal articles), in different places (i.e.: in North Shore, a suburb of Vancouver; Vancouver, British Columbia; Germany; England; and Iran) and during different periods (i.e.: before and after the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79).

Chapter Two:

the transmigration of Iranians to Canada, a global linkage of a segmented population

Introduction: "push" and "pull" factors and their consequences, a Canadian perspective

In this chapter, the formation of Iranian communities and ethnic identities in Canada are analyzed by references to "push" and "pull" factors in parts A and B respectively. In part A, the out-migration of Iranians as "temporary" or "permanent" immigrants, exiles and refugees is analyzed in terms of the effects of the modernization programs, the Revolution of 1978-79, the Iran-Iraq War and the Islamic government's political-cultural policies on the movement of Iranians into Canada through other parts of world. In other words, it is argued that ideological, religious, political and class differences play defining roles in the out-migration of transnational Iranians from Iran. Under each section, life histories of the informants, letters, newspaper articles and immigration/Census data are incorporated in order to analyze how the socio-economic events have affected the construction of their identities or the process of *othering.*

Iranian transmigration to Canada in the twentieth century is also reflective of the introduction and implementation of the Immigration Law of 1967, which opened the door to non-Western immigrants. Canadian immigration law is a policy through which officials determine who (and from what parts of the world) can immigrate to this country. It constructs a system of decision making with a specific agenda and a set of objectives through which officials "choose" among a pool of applicants. The number of Canadian overseas offices and their locations become major factors in the immigration of ethno-religious-nationalities. It is through Canadian offices in Western countries, Syria, Turkey and Pakistan that the majority of Iranians arrive here.

In particular, refugee policy of Canada towards the Iranian Baha'is (in the context of the Islamic Republic's policies) is the main factor influencing their transmigration to this country. Iranian transmigration to Canada is also determined by the immigrants' knowledge of one of the official languages, their level of education, the applicants' financial records and the

economic/labor needs of Canada. As such, although not exclusively, the point system and Canadian refugee policy have played a major role in facilitating the transmigration of middle and upper-middle class Iranian families and young male adults of military age from diverse political, religious and economic backgrounds.

The transmigration of Iranians to Canada through other countries is also partly affected by the global image Canada has constructed of itself, as a country which is "open" to asylum seekers. In conjunction with this image, Iranian communities as a collection of social networks (not implying cohesion) also become an important factor in further immigration of Iranians through the family reunification option under the Immigration Act. More specific, since the Revolution of 1978-79, the formation of Iranian communities and identities in Canada is influenced by the extent to which Canada has become a desirable place and an avenue through which life-style expectations of individuals are satisfied and/or contested.

2.1 A Short Statistical Review of Iranians in Canada

As both immigration and Census data suggest[2], prior to the introduction of the Canadian immigration law of 1967 and the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, "Persians" constituted a small portion of non-European minorities in Canada (See Tables 1 and 2.). Since the early 1980s, however, more Iranians have immigrated to this country. Between 1980 to 1998, for example, 64,159 Iranians came (See Table 1). In fact, Iran has been one of the top immigrant source countries in the last decade. In 1995, 1996, 1997, for example, Iran ranked 15th, 9th and 9th respectively (Citizenship and Immigration Canada: Facts and Figures, 1997:5).

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[2] As the data in Tables 1 and 2 show, prior to 1979, Iranian immigration to Canada can be divided into two distinct periods of 1946-1967 and 1967-1979. During the period of 1946-1979, a total of 4,593 Iranians entered Canada (Quartely Statistics Immigration, 1970-1977). From 1946-1967, only 550 Iranians were granted Canadian immigrant status (Quartely Statistics Immigration,1970). Between 1968 and 1979, 4,043 more Iranians were accepted. Between 1976 to 1979, 2,575 individuals were admitted, which is more than half of the number of Iranians accepted between 1968-79. Moreover, according to Census 1991 Target Group, 75 Iranian immigrants entered Canada prior to 1961. Between 1961 to 1970, 790 Iranian ethnics immigrated (Census 1991, Target Group). During the 1970s, 3,085 more Iranians moved here. In total, 4,908 of Iranians arrived in Canada between pre-1961 and 1980, which is 11.4% of the total Iranian population in 1991 (See Table 12 and 13).

The uneven movement of Iranians to Canada in this century is a function of two general factors. First, Canada was not a well known destination for Iranians during the period between 1850 to the late 1970s. Second, due to the effects of the pre-1967 immigration law of Canada, Iranians were not considered as favorite immigrants who could assimilate into the dominant British and French cultures of Canada. Since the implementation of the point system, however, more Iranians have arrived in Canada. Yet, it was not until 1983 that their numbers increased sharply.

When available data are read in conjunction with historical events in Iran, and changes to the Canadian immigration policy, Iranian transmigration to Canada can be roughly classified into two distinct periods. First, the pre-revolutionary period of 1946-1979, itself divided into two distinct periods of 1946-1967 and 1967-1979. During these two periods, major modernization programs were initiated (Nima, 1983); Iran's socio-economic ills were blamed on the Westernization policies of the Shah's government (Al-e Ahmad, 1983); and finally, opposition to the Shah's government and its hegemonic and pro-Western policies took the form of the Islamic Revolution (Keddie, 1983). Major changes were also made to Canadian immigration policy with the introduction of the point system in 1967.

More specifically, this period corresponds to the introduction and implementation of the Shah's "White Revolution" modernization program, which resulted in a sudden increase of the middle class population in Iran (Keddie, 1983). Contact between Iran and the West had intensified and Western consumption items had become popular in Iran (Amuzegar, 1991). More Iranian students were studying abroad, more tourists were traveling to the West and Western cultural forms were becoming widely popular (Menashri, 1992). On the other hand, economic disparity between rural and urban populations and working and middle classes had resulted in discontent for the regime (Nima, 1983).

The second period, the post-revolutionary period (1980-1998) is characterized by major ideological changes, political upheaval, wars and economic recession. This period is divided into two sub-periods characterized by the Iran-Iraq War and the economic recession (1980-88) during which contact between Iran and the West was minimized although not completely ignored. More individuals and families left Iran during this period. At the same time, Canada began to accept Baha'i Iranians on a humanitarian basis beginning in 1982. The post war period (1989 to the present) is characterized by the attempt of the government: to rebuild Iran's economy and to control its peripheries (The Globe and Mail, Saturday, November 19, 1994:D4; The Vancouver Sun, Wednesday, January 31, 1996:A7c). At the same time, pressure on political dissidents has been on the rise since the end of the Iran-Iraq War (The Globe and Mail, Wednesday, November 2, 1994:A7; Shahrvand-e Vancouver, Friday, Sept. 25, 1998:1). In recent years, with the election of moderate Mr. Khatami, the President of Iran, open dialogue between Iran and Western European countries and cultural contact with the United States characterize the political economy of Iran (The Vancouver Sun, Tuesday, August 5, 1997:A7). This is despite the fact the two sides still consider one another as "enemies". The United States, for example, considers Iran as a supporter of global terrorism (The New York Times, Monday, May 1, 1995:A1). Consequently, the American economic embargo still affects Iran's economic relations with the West.

Part A:

Push Factors and Their Consequences

2.2 The Effects of Modernization on Iranian Out-Migration: the case of "temporary immigrants"

The West has become a favorite destination for many Iranians since the early decades of this century. As Mehdi Bozorgmehr (1991:380) maintains, before the events of 1978-79 most Iranians living outside Iran were students in the West or what he calls "temporary immigrants." Historically, the movement of Iranians to Western countries, especially to Europe and the United States, intensified as early as the 1850s when the first major reforms were introduced during the late *Qajar* period 1796-1925 (See Lapidus, 1988:577; for an account of similar policies during the Ottoman Empire see Cleveland, 1994:70-80). And, it accelerated during the 1970s, a period of intense modernization during the Pahlavi era (Bahman, 1357). The need for educated individuals, trained in modern technology, as a necessary pre-requisite to develop Iran's economy and administrative system has been responsible for the movement of Iranians as students, government officials and tourists to the West. In fact, Ali's, Saman's and Piroz's fathers finished their higher education in various countries in the West during the 1950s and the 1960s.

As Amin Banani (1961:101-103) points out, from 1922 to 1938, over 1500 students were studying abroad, 396 of whom had already returned to Iran. James Alban Bill (1972:58) asserts that between 1922 and 1970, one out of four students enrolled in higher learning institutions was attending school abroad. Between 1955 and 1965 an estimated 5,000 students had already returned to Iran, adding to the growing number of middle class or what Bill calls "Professional-Bureaucratic-intelligence." Between 1955-1961, in comparison to other Asian countries, a higher percentage of Iranians attended universities abroad. Iran with a smaller population than Turkey and Egypt, writes Mohamad Borhanmanesh (In Bill, 1972:58), "ha[d]

about three times as many students in the United States as either these two countries." By 1978, there were about 300,000 students abroad and many more had already returned to Iran. Even in 1978 as the revolution was unfolding, many waited for days and nights lined up in front of the US Embassy in Tehran in order to obtain their student visas.

What is important is that in the early stages of the reforms, a majority of students abroad were from the elitist families (Banani, 1961). During the seventies, a majority of those who were able to travel outside Iran were of middle class background and of elite families (Halliday, 1978)[3]. In fact, an important characteristic of the so-called "modern" middle and elite classes is their Western educational qualifications. Education, especially Western education, characterized the elite, government officials and the members of Iranian Majlis (Parliament) {even after the revolution, the number of educated members of Iranian cabinets and Majlis has been on the rise, (see Ehteshami, 1991:150)}. The implementation of major reforms in the education system meant a relatively high number of individuals established middle class life styles for themselves and their families (Menasheri, 1992:278). The middle class families, as a result, valued formal higher education in the medical fields and in engineering sciences more than in the trade subjects. The existing data also points out that "to a marked degree, education had become the 'hallmark' of the elite membership and that educational qualifications were well on the way toward replacing lineage as a key to position of power" (ibid.:280). With higher education levels, the incomes of government officials also increased. For example, during the mid 1970s, someone with six or less years of education received 8,629 Rials, with a B.A. 11,787 R, with an M.D. or a Ph.D. 40,107 R (ibid.:279).

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[3] Many scholars and social scientists attribute the rise of the modern middle class to the effects of the modernization policies of the Pahlavi period. James A. Bill (In Richard Nyrup, 1978:157) refers to the modern middle class as "The Professional-Bureaucratic-Intelligentsia." Many of them were employed in high ranking or lower ranking civil service in the Pahlavi regime's bureaucracy, military and education systems. During the revolution, Keddie (1981:268) states that the middle class identified with the National Front party. According to Abrahimain (1982:508), the main economic reason for the middle class uneasyness during the late 1970s was due to "spiraling cost of living."

Although a Western education may be desired by many Iranians as a means toward social mobility, such an education is nevertheless perceived in the context of a hierarchy of diplomas, grades and ranking order of universities. An influential bureaucrat in the Shah's regime, for example, once told me that when he hired new government employees, he preferred to employ applicants with degrees from prestigious schools in America or Europe rather than those with degrees from unknown "state" universities in the West.

As the above suggests, class position of would-be-students played an important role in their temporary out-migration. What should also be mentioned is that a few of the students who left before the revolution or even after the revolution did so with hopes of staying in the West (Bozorgmehr, 1991:380). In fact, for many, as mentioned, they traveled to the West to finish their higher education and return home upon graduation. After their arrival in Iran, through their participation in the labor market they were expected to contribute to the development of Iran.

The movement of Iranian students overseas is still an important source of "temporary" migration from Iran. Even before the ban on foreign studies, which was originally designed to "prevent innocent Moslem youth from being corrupted by a rotten world," was dropped in 1983, many of my high school and neighborhood friends talked about leaving Iran and attending schools in the West (The Vancouver Sun, "Iran's Ban on Studies Abroad Dropped," October 12, 1983). In 1994, approximately 760 Iranian foreign students were financially supported by the Islamic Republic's government (Embassy of the Islamic of Iran in Ottawa, July, 1994). Out of this number, 450 studied engineering, close to 100 were registered in medicine, about 60 enrolled in the natural sciences and close to 230 majored in various other fields.

The desire of the Islamic Republic to modernize its industries and military after a decade of war with Iraq has meant a need for educated and knowledgeable professionals in new technological innovations. As President Rafsanjani (In Menashri, 1992:315) maintains,

> Iran may need experts from abroad. For reconstruction, one cannot work with slogans, commotion, and sentiments.... Iran cannot operate in today's world without the material capabilities and the advancement of science and technology.

The reliance on "imported" Western experts is partly due to the limited capacities of Iranian universities. It is also due to the negative effects of the "brain drain" on the Iranian economy and institutions since the revolution (Ehteshami, 1991:154).

Despite a serious need for qualified individuals, the desire of many Iranians to study abroad is also due to the fact that, even if applicants are able to pass the university entrance examination (*Konkor*), applicants still have to pass what has come to be referred to as the "morality" exam. As a result, "Less than one-tenth of the million or more students who take the highly competitive entrance examination are able to enter universities" (Banuazizi, 1994:6). Moreover, Seyyed Kamaleddin Nikravesh, a deputy of the *Majlis* from Tehran, pointed out that in 1985 only seven percent of those who passed the *Konkor* were qualified by the loyalty and morality standards (International Iran Times, 26 December, 1986). In fact, university applicants' political and ideological associations are investigated before they are permitted to register.

What emerges is the attempt of the government to deny access to higher education to those who are considered as undermining the interest of the Islamic state (Mojab, 1991:xv). As a result of such rules and regulations, the number of eligible university applicants is limited to those who can pass the morality standards. In addition, more youth attend public schools in today's Iran than ever. As a result, more young single adults may find themselves as students in different parts of the world, thus becoming "temporary" migrants (Banuazizi, 1994:6). This is especially the case for the middle class families for whom education is an important sign of status. Finally, students interested in finishing their post-doctoral degrees often have to travel outside Iran due to limited facilities.

Regardless of one's year of out-migration and one's ideological beliefs, for some Iranian students abroad, their short term residence may turn into "permanent" residency during or after completing their education. I, for example, know a large number of Iranian middle class individuals who lived in the United States, India, Europe, and the Philippines as foreign students both before and after the revolution and eventually moved to Canada as landed immigrants. For me and many other individuals, our transmigration experiences were supposed to be short and "temporary," yet it took us to different countries before settling in Canada. In fact, my interest in issues of "immigration" and identity construction is partly reflective of my own experiences as a student, tourist, immigrant and citizen in Iran, France, the United States and Canada.

In the next section, life experiences of informants are analyzed from the perspective of the modernization of Iran. For all informants, their parents were indirectly or directly affected by the education programs introduced during the Pahlavi regime. For all informants, their parents emphasized the importance of education as the key to success. In the following part, informants' identity constructions are explored in the context of their education experiences.

2.3 Identity Construction of Students in Iran and Abroad: modernization, education, national identities, ethnicities, race and the West

An important factor that emerged out of the life-histories of the informants was that national identity, ethnicity and race are important factors in their identity constructions both prior to and during their transmigration. For Piroz, his transmigration begins in Germany and takes him to Iran, back to Germany, to the United States and finally to Canada. For Saman, his transmigration begins in Germany. For Kayvan, his transmigration takes him from a middle-class environment in Tehran to the world of elitist institutions in England. For Ali, on the other hand, transmigration is an idea which he "dreams" about as a child. He wanted to travel to the West as a student in the mid-1970s but did not until after the revolution. Their transmigration

into Canada are travel accounts of socio-economic and cultural conflicts, expressed through national identities, ethnicities and race. Their movements around the world have been marked by racial and ethnic conflicts prevalent in their host societies.

For Piroz, race is an important criteria for defining himself, due to his personal experiences as a six year old in Germany in the early 1970s. He mentions,

> I was in Germany and I was in the first grade for about a semester and people paid me a lot of attention because I was the only dark featured person in the class in the entire city probably. .... All the adults were really interested in me. Sure, I had a little bit going for myself too probably, it wasn't just that I was dark, I probably had some qualities that people like at that time. So, having gotten a lot of attention, it was very enjoyable for me, naturally every child likes the attention.... in 1971.... After about four or five months attending the first grade, my parents decided to move to Iran,... Once we arrived there, I was too young to join the German school in Iran which only allowed students to join the first grade at the age of seven. And at the same time they required that you speak and write or have some knowledge of Farsi, fluent enough to join the first grade. At that time I didn't and I wasn't fluent so my parents put me in an Iranian school for first grade... . After ... my Farsi was good enough to join the German school at age seven. (sic)

Color of skin, class, gender, nation-building process and language are interwoven factors for Piroz beginning in grade one. He perceives himself as a dark person as opposed to white Germans. He liked the feeling he experienced as a result of being the center of attention, although he knew the attention he was receiving resulted from the fact that he was seen as "different." Yet, being perceived as different does not translate into rejecting his German identity. He explains,

> I saw myself as a German. It was sort of a mixed feeling actually. Until a certain age I saw myself as a German because, I mean, everyone else around me was a German and I spoke German and people around me always kept on telling me you're a German, you speak German better than some German people. So in that sense, it was justified for me to be a German. On the other hand there was this confusion that if I'm German, why do I have such a strong longing for another part of the world as well. I felt drawn to Iran as well. Maybe not as much as to Germany at that time. But it was not a clear cut thing that I am German and that's it. I knew there was more to it. (sic)

In a way, he identifies himself as partly German because his childhood experiences were constructed within the context of the German national identity. Yet, at an early age, he begins

to see himself as belonging to two cultures, one in the East and the other in the West. He has been brought up in Germany thinking of himself as a German. Yet, he knows he is different, because his parents' national origins and cultural backgrounds are seen as different in Germany. In this sense, he defines himself as a transnational, not based on his own birth place or his self-perception, but by how his nationality is determined by the *others*. In a way, for him, transnationalism is a constant negotiation of identity with references to more than two national and racial identities. Yet, what emerges is that one's identity construction is not only dependant on one's definition of *self*, but it is also related to how one reacts to his/her representations by the people around him/her. Saman, maintains that

> ...It's is true that Iranians have, they are Aryans in a sense, but none of the Germans know that; and they don't give a shit. I mean if a German is racist, he doesn't care what your origin is as long as "you" look different or you are a foreigner they give you a bad time (sic)

He sees himself as different from Germans. He identifies these differences in terms of physical appearance and nationality. Race or physical characteristics are factors which mold his identity politics as an Iranian. To him, his Aryan past is not important. The important factor is how the German majority see him as a member of a certain nationality, ethnicity and linguistic background.

In this sense, Piroz and Saman are two different representations of the oriental *other* in the West. What they both share is that their families are of middle to upper-middle classes who had contacts in Germany since the 1960s and 1970s respectively. Their presence in Germany is a function of how, during the intense modernization of Iran, their parents travel abroad as students and businesspeople respectively. One, however, identifies as both German and Iranian while Saman sees himself as an Iranian rather than a German. Yet, their negative experiences in Germany construct the Germans as the *other*. They see themselves as "outsiders" because "insiders" see them as representatives of "dark" individuals. Their identities nevertheless are

constructed by reflecting on their experiences in more than two nation-states, in both the Orient and the Occident. How they differ in their constructions of their identities is due to the fact that Piroz lived in Germany during the 1970s, a period relatively "free" of overt racism; where as Saman moved to Germany during the 1980s, when racial tension in Europe against non-Western minorities was on the rise.

In the case of Piroz, for example, his self-perceptions are affected by the nation-building projects in Iran, Germany, and the United States. Thus, his identity construction needs to be analyzed in terms of how, in different socio-economic organizations, his experiences diverge and/or converge. His color, for example, becomes an important factor in his conceptualization only in Germany and not in the United States and Canada, where there are significant numbers of colored peoples. This is not a reflection of the extent of racist views or lack of ethnic biases, but rather how, due to his class position and ethnic composition of his immediate environment, his racial categorization affects him in a negative or positive manner in different social settings.

Kayvan begins his narrative by talking about his first day of school in England,

> When I was seven I went to England to attend boarding school which was in 1975, and this was one of those boarding schools that was an old boys, rather elitist and old boys I mean, very patriarchal, so I began attending that school from the age of seven.... And what I saw in that school was the lives of, for instance, princes who come from Africa or from the Arab countries and their life obviously wasn't one that was hard and harsh, so we never gained any real understanding, as I recall. What we did gain, I suppose, was how to fit in, really well, into a certain structure that seemed to be the right structure for such children as us. We would be going on and probably becoming the elite of our country or wherever.... (sic)

His desire to attend foreign schools in the West stemmed from the fact that his brother was already attending school in Europe. In a sense, his transmigration begins not with him but with his brother. In his new school, nationality, race, ethnicity, athletic ability and class were factors which divided students into groups and dormitory units. The aim is to "transform" them into the elite of their respective nation-states. After living in England without his family, he begins to

identify himself with the British culture and national identity. His identity takes a transnational characteristic and is reflective of how he was socialized as both Iranian and British. He does not provide space for his Iranian identity because, as he was taught about British manners and rules, the Iranian life-style seemed traditional to him. In a sense, he was an oriental among *other* Orientals who were being taught to be Orientalists in an elitist British school.

Kayvan explains why and how his parents decided to send him to a private school in England by stating that:

> When I talk to my Dad,...they thought that the best education they can give to their children, is if they send them to England.... My Dad always said that he never [had] the same opportunities that we had to go to school, or my mom either. They both, for instance, they came from, not really well-off families, but they were okay, they worked hard for what they had, their families, but they never had the opportunity to get the education that they wanted to give to us. (sic)

For Kayvan's parents, his education is supposed to inculcate a certain set of values, belief systems and cultural elements which are considered to be essential for the future of Kayvan not in any specific nation-state but in modernity (although he does mention that he was supposed to return to Iran after his education was finished). For them, a Western education is a necessary tool preparing their children for better economic and social positions in modernity. The West and the Western conceptualization of education are appropriated as tools which provide them with specific instructions and diplomas in order to situate themselves as the elite class within the socio-economic relations in Iran.

Ali also refers to a conversation between his mother and one of her friends, who had sent her children to private boarding schools in Switzerland in the mid 1970s:

> She was telling my mother why don't you send your son to a boarding school. I was so excited. I was willing to go because I thought it is fun. I had seen movies about the lives of students in boarding schools and it seemed [an] exciting thing to do. My mother did not listen to her though. As I remember she explained by saying that she could not send a ten year old to Europe. (sic)

He never left Iran until after the revolution and when he arrived in the United States, he attended public schooling in his late teens. He never saw himself as an American. Piroz does not conceptualize himself as an American either. In fact, in one interview he mentions that he has lived in two and a half cultures: Iran, Germany and the United States.

Although Ali never attended boarding schools or private (international) schools in Iran or the West, he mentions that

> My mother and father wanted me to get into these prestigious schools in Iran. One of those schools was the Andishe. I think it was run by catholic fathers and it was closed soon after the Revolution. In Andishe, the emphasis was on English and I guess they had better teachers. But, I did not get in. My mom was disappointed, when I could not get into Alborz High School, it was a big blow to me. In a way, I felt stupid. Especially since most of my cousins were enrolled in such schools. I felt I had let down my parents. I always tried hard. I was a mediocre student. I was good in certain subjects and terrible in others. (sic)

On the one hand, Ali was influenced by the Hollywood films. For him living in Iran, the West becomes an important criteria of defining what he wants and how he wants to live his life. As a middle-class boy living in Tehran, his view of the West and the Western education system was partly constituted by the Western media, which portrayed life in Western schools as “exciting” and “fun.” His own experiences as an ESL student in an American high school, however, contradict his earlier view of school life in the West. At the same time, traveling to the West and continuing his education was a social reality for him. In fact, many members of his family were either enrolled in institutions of higher education or had already obtained their degrees from Western universities. On the other hand, schooling for him has been an arena through which he attempts to situate his relations with others around him. He has been socialized to consider education as a sign of prestige and status. Ali is in competition with other pupils not because he desires the competition, but because the system differentiates between pupils based on competitive measures, such as exams and tests. His identity as an Iranian is formed within a

Persian dominated society and a school system oriented toward Persianization of Iran by relegating tribal and religious minorities to the peripheral position.

The school experiences of the narrators point to the importance of Western education as a popular item of consumption for the middle and elite classes in Iran. The Western education systems are used as blueprints for school structures in Iran since the early decades of this century. In the context of foreign schools and/or private schools, with emphasis on foreign languages, the West has occupied real tangible space within the East to represent itself as something special which should be desired.

For Iranian students in both Iran and outside the country, the socio-cultural space is no longer confined to the East but it is as well constituted by the West and its socio-cultural elements. Education is conceptualized as a social mobility tool. Such a view is based on a liberal conceptualization of the education system as an emancipatory institution through which individuals flourish and develop (Menashri, 1992). Yet, schools for Iranian students are also differentiating structures, giving rise to class, racial and ethnic conflicts. As Apple (1979:64) suggests in reference to schools in the United States, they "contribute to cultural reproduction of class relations in [modern] society."

Space, then, is not confined to a specific geographical location. It is a reflection of the interconnectedness of the East and the West and their differences. Space is a tale of "travel" for individuals who move from the Middle East to Europe and then to North America. Their tales of travels are shaped by the global relations of domination and resistance. As Edward Said (1993:7) notes: in this post-modern world, "just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography [brought about by other individuals and groups]." However, here the West is no longer a geographical location but also refers to ideas, products and individuals from the East, who are now living in the West.

In the West, both before and after the revolution, Piroz, Ali and Kayvan were not simply students but members of a specific gender, class, ethnicity, religion and nationality. As non-European students living in the West, they are representations of the Easterners and the Orientals in the West, inspite of how they define themselves. They play cultural roles and are perceived from the perspectives "of [the] Western [and the Eastern] conceptions and treatments of the *Other*." As Iranians, after the Revolution of 1978-79, they are reflections of "how [the] East [i.e.: Iran] has always signified danger and threat [since the 1950s]" (Said, 1979:26). Yet, their class positions as middle and upper middle-classes further distinguish them from the working class German or British students who attend public schools. As Iranians, furthermore, they are distinguished from *other* minority students of non-European backgrounds. In short, within the context of Western and Eastern constructions of *otherness,* in both Iran and the West, they are distinguished from other students based on factors such as ethnicity, nationality and mother tongue, factors which find expressions and space within their school curriculum and school experiences.

The fact that Kayvan and Piroz attended foreign schools or left Iran in order to attend private boarding schools in Europe is a sign of not their parents' class position and attitudes towards Western education but also the extent to which Western education had become a consumer item for the middle and upper middle classes. Such schools were seen as prestigious and academically advanced. That is not to say that foreign private schools were necessarily viewed as superior to schools such as *Alborz* (which was established by American missionaries), *Kharazzmi*, or *Hadaf* educational institutions.

Yet, the fact that they were Western-based and instructions were given in Western languages such as German, French and English made them popular items of consumption for the newly emerged middle and upper classes in Iran. Consuming the West in the form of education stems partly from its conceptualization as something "better," "exotic" and "erotic,"

which should be desired and emulated. The West is considered as a place where one finds freedom, opportunities and high standards of living (i.e.: entertainment). Western knowledge and structure in the form of universities or private secondary schools take the role of consumption items, symbolically representing one's high status and class position within the society. The West and its reflections are incorporated in order to differentiate between oneself and *others* (Baudrillad cf. Bocock, 1993:50). The West is seen as an "entity" which is endowed with power and authority; and it is articulated as the representation of technological advancement and progress in sciences.

For Kayvan, his education is viewed as a consumer item enabling him to move up the social ladder. Kayvan received part of his education in an elitist institution. An education which enculturates students according to British standards with its orientalist, colonialist and racial biases. He is not receiving a Persian education, emphasizing Iranian history, geography and other achievements. Rather, Kayvan is being socialized in a system of hierarchy similar to that of Iran in which with age and qualification, students move up the social hierarchy within the school. Kayvan is conscious of how schools as institutions mold students to fit into a certain structure. As he mentions, his elitist education was supposed to provide him with a high paying job, comfort and high class status.

The fact that Kayvan and Piroz attended private schools in both Iran and Europe differentiates them from Iranians who attended crowded public schools. But, Ali's school experiences in a middle class public school was also in contrast to school experiences of students in the rural areas and low-income neighborhoods. Ahmad Birsask (1991:205) maintains that the middle and upper classes prefer private schools to the public schools which are seen as inadequate. This has resulted in division of the secondary school system into schools for the masses and schools for the elite. Public schools are characterized by lack of qualified teachers and educational materials (ibid.). Yet, what these schools share is that they

are tools in socialization of students based on Western systems of education. It represents a national identity which is characterized by hegemonic tendencies of culture, social norms, economic interest, and morals of the elite in the society (i.e.: Pahlavi upper classes, and post-revolutionary conservatives, radicals and the Bazaar) Schools are not only involved in the reproduction of the labor force, but they also reproduce and formulate knowledge deemed necessary for the survival of society and capitalist relations in all corners of the world. School systems do differ from one another. There are structural, cultural and political differences between schools of different regions, countries and continents. Yet, it is precisely their historical roots that bring all schools as institutions of modernity into one united force, enabling the creation and reproduction of *difference* not only regionally but also globally.

One of the similarities between the schools the informants attended was the hierarchy and division into sciences and vocational studies. I remember that after finding out my final examination marks for grade nine were good enough to make me eligible for any type of school: technical, hard sciences, or social sciences, I was very relieved since I knew that only *Tahbiei* (natural) or *Riazi* (Mathematical) subjects would be acceptable to my parents and myself. I feel that we considered students in technical schools as "lazy" pupils who did not have the grades to make it into the hard sciences. Also, my chances of passing the *Konkor* would have been greater if I was enrolled in hard sciences which emphasizes biology, mathematics and chemistry. After all, I was called "Mr. Doctor" by my "*Mamani*" (nickname for my mother's mother) for as along as I remember. Piroz, Saman, and Kayvan also point to pressures they experienced as they tried to qualify for *Gymnasium* (Hard Sciences) rather than *Real Schule* (technical) schools and O level examinations respectively. As Gramsci (1971:26) concludes, "the fundamental division into classical and vocational (professional) schools was a rational formula: the vocational school for the instrument classes, the classic school for the dominant classes and the intellectuals."

2.4 Modernization, Discrimination, Religion and Transmigration: Iranians in Israel, the Arab Gulf States, and North America

The movement of Iranians was not characterized by the migration of students alone. Due to factors such as ideological differences, religious discrimination and the negative effects of modernization policies, Iranians also moved to non-Western countries during the first six decades of this century. For example, by 1991, 121,300 had moved to Israel, out of which 41 percent immigrated before 1948 (Pliskin,1987:34-40). Movement of Jewish Iranians to Israel is a good example of how political events in Palestine during the 1940s and the formation of the state of Israel affected the out-migration of Iranians. Their movement was due partly to the prevalence of discrimination as well as the prevalence of Zionist ideology amongst Iranian Jews. To what extent such factors were significant in the transnational migration of Iranian Jews requires closer attention. Yet as Pliskin (1987) points out, in Israel, there are also conflicts and cultural differences, which differentiate Iranians, for example, from Iraqi Jews. That is their movement to Israel is not a return of Jews to their "homeland," but a transmigration of a minority group from a country dominated by Persian/Shiite culture to the multi-racial and ethno-national state of Israel.

Since 1978-79, many Jewish Iranians have also moved to the United States and Canada from Israel and Iran (Bozorgmehr, 1997). Dalarfar (1997:94) in reference to Iranian Jewish women in Los Angeles points out that they mostly immigrate as extended families. In contrast to Moslem families, they consider themselves as permanent immigrants. The presence of Iranian Jewish communities in Israel, Iran and throughout North America has resulted in the formation of hyphenated religious ethno-national groups (i.e.: American-Iranian-Jew). It distinguishes itself from *other* ethno-religious groups (i.e.: Moslems, Christians, Baha'is) yet at the same time crosses borders and political divisions in both the East and the West. In Canada, between 1980-1998, nine Iranians were Israeli citizens. A total of 295 immigration applications

were filed in Tel Aviv during the same period. In 1991, 70 Iranians had knowledge of Hebrew, and 415 individuals were of the Jewish faith.

Although they constitute only one percent of Iranians in 1991, as Arlene Dalarfar (1997:93) points out, in Los Angeles,

> Contact in synagogues and in Jewish organizations, as well as monetary support for Jewish refugees and poor immigrants through the Jewish Federation, has increased interaction and communication between Iranian Jews and American Jews, despite cultural differences between Sephardic and Ashkenazi origins.

As such, these organizations connect Jewish "minorities" of both "peripheries" (i.e.: Iran) and "centers" (i.e.: the United States) in a global manner. This is an important characteristic of transnational migrants. It is as a direct result of the globalization effects of modernity. It is reflective of how absent *others* or events affect social relations and ethnic compositions in different parts of the world. In this case, the absent *other* is no longer only a White Christian "man" but it may be an Iranian Jewish transmigrant. At the same time, their Jewish identity divides them from other Iranians especially in the light of the discriminatory views towards Jews among some Iranians.

Piroz in reference to the question "do Iranians have discriminatory views?" replies that,

> Jewish, Generally Arab and Jews, and I think that these are the two ethnic groups that Iranians will always discriminate against and they always naturally make fun of the [East] Indian people. And I think Iranians are a very special case in terms of the socio-economic status of the people and how they are discriminating against others. I think its very broad in Iran and it comes from all shifts in that hierarchy and a lot of it has to do with the governments we've had I think. People have always had hatred for Israel for example, right, and it has to do with religion a lot. We always say, Arab, the dirty Arab, and everyone says that, I think outside its a little bit different, in the Western world. I think the higher you go in the socio-economic status, the more discriminating person or racist you become. (sic)

Views such as "Jewish people are *khasis* (scrooge)" or "they control the world's banks" are common among Iranians. On one occasion, an older Iranian male in the presence of a Jewish person referred to their traditional religious hat as the "pimp" hat. At the time, everyone present

looked at each other in disbelief. One person later commented that he must have been drunk and forgotten that Davood is Jewish. Dalarfar (ibid.) argues that Jewish women identify themselves as Jews rather than Iranians due to discriminatory views toward Iranians in Los Angeles. Moreover, in Los Angeles, Iranian Jews prefer to marry within their religion but no preference is given to nationality (Hanassab, 1997:85-86). One's identification as a Jew may be a solution to hiding Iranian nationality but it is also a reflection of how they may view themselves first as Jews then as Iranians. It as well reflective of how religion divides Iranians yet, how at the same time, religion brings together different nationalities together.

As one of the Dalalfar's informants points out,

> We are different than Moslems.... Our homeland is gone forever.... Our history in Iran goes back thousand of years, but now this marks the end of this history, and we have to make a new identity for ourselves for the sake of our children. (sic)

Yet, what is often not discussed is that Jews living in the United States and Canada also face discrimination due to their religious beliefs. However, it is important to note that despite religious, ethnic and linguistic differences and ethnocentric views prevalent among Iranians, Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles communicate "surprisingly well with one another about their identity construction[s]" (Safizadeh, 1997:124).

Arab Gulf States are also home to a large number of Iranians. In 1970, in Kuwait there were 39,129 Iranians. In 1972, 5,000 Iranians lived in Bahrain,. And, in 1973, 40,000 Iranian resided in Dubai. Those who left Iran for the Arab Gulf states prior to the 1970s (before the "Iranian economy started to prosper") did so because of economic factors or as a result of their opposition to Western-oriented policies of the Pahlavi Shahs (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1991:380). These policies were interpreted as undermining their socio-cultural and religious beliefs and economic status. After the introduction of Reza Shah's reforms, especially after the ban of the *Chadoor*, a number of well known Bazaar families from the South, for example, moved to Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar or Bahrain (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1991:380). Iranians in many Sunni populated Gulf

States experienced ethnic and religious discrimination (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994:173). In addition, many of those Iranians who resided in Kuwait before its invasion by Iraq have not been able to return to Kuwait due to its government's social policies which limited the population to only one million individuals (Ibid.:75).

In Canada, I have also come into contact with a few Iranian families from the south of Iran who had emigrated from the Arab Gulf States. In fact, from 1980 to 1998, almost 23% of all Iranian immigration applications to Canada were filed in the Arab Middle East. What is important is that since 1980, 240 Iranians with various Arab citizenship arrived in Canada. In 1991, 515 Iranians claimed Arabic as their mother tongue, 285 spoke Arabic at home, and 1175 had knowledge of Arabic (Statistics Canada, Target Group Profile, 1991 Census). Their transmigration to Canada is due to fear of discrimination and/or limited citizenship/permanent residency rights in the Arab Gulf States. Their transmigration to Canada is a reflection of the harsh treatment of Iranians in Iraq, Kuwait, and other Sunni populated Gulf States since the Iran-Iraq War. For such families, settlement in Canada is preferred to moving back to Iran. In a sense, as they settle in Canada, they consider this country, rather than Iran or other countries, as a "desirable" place. At the same time, their movement to Canada has added to the diversity of Iranians in terms of ethnicity and language. Yet, their links to the Middle East has connected pockets of Persian-Iranians, Arab-Iranians and Arabs in various parts of the Middle East to Canada.

2.5 The Revolution, Post-Revolutionary Events and their Consequences

Mohammad A. Chaichian (1997:616) maintains that one of the major contributing factors to the transmigration of Iranians to different parts of the world is the revolution and events which followed it. After the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the central government has been in a state of war with the ethnic minorities of Iran. Ideological changes, anti-American and Western positions of religious leadership, the lack of freedom of speech and association, the

Iran-Iraq War and economic stagnation have had devastating consequences for Iranians. For some, due to economic motivation, political reasons, class position and individual/family reactions to Islamicization policies, out-migration has become a solution to life in the post-revolutionary period. It is during this time that more Iranians than in any other period left Iran and immigrated to Canada. After the revolution, for example, more than 2 million Iranians migrated from Iran and went into "exile" in various countries around the world (Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, August 1993:12).

Their movement to the West and then to Canada is not an isolated matter. By 1991, according to the U.S. Bureau of Census, 220,714 Iranians lived in the United States, out of which 77 percent were foreign-born (In Bozorgmehr & Feldman, 1997:14). Moreover, from 1980 to 1990, 82,180 Iranians immigrated to the United States. Prior to the Revolution of 1978, between 1953 and 1975, 19,049 Iranians were admitted as immigrants and 10,731 were admitted first as students and tourists and then as permanent residences. In total, during this period, only 29,817 had obtained their Green Cards (In Ansari, 1992:30). By 1991, 32,300 Iranians were living in the United Kingdom, an increase of 24,100 immigrants since 1971 (Bozorgmehr, 1991:381). By 1990, in Germany, Sweden, France and Norway, the population of Iranians reached the 141,600 mark. Although the revolution happened almost twenty years ago, Iranian out-migration to Western countries continues and has been on the rise. As is discussed later, many Iranians entering Canada reach this country after residence in many Western countries. In this sense, transmigration to Canada is not immigration from Iran; rather it is a movement of Iranians through the West towards Canada.

Despite the mass immigration of Iranians to Western countries, it is important to note that a large number have immigrated to other Asian and Middle Eastern countries. By 1992, for example, 4,500 Iranians "immigrated" to Japan, many of whom are subjected to low paying and

labor intensive jobs (ibid.:381). India is also home to a growing number of Iranian students and "immigrant" communities.

Out-migration of the Pahlavi elite after the revolution can be singled out as the beginning of the out-migration from Iran towards the West due to the Islamicization of the Iranian society and ideological changes (Immigration and Refugee Board Documentation Center, January 1993:12). Many influential industrialists, small owners of factories and high-ranking members of the government left Iran. Fear of punishment and the fact that very few members of the "old regime were allowed to stay in government" played significant roles in their decision to leave (Keddie, 1986:7). Ali, for example, mentioned that some of his close relatives and their families who had high-level government positions left Iran before Ayatollah Khomeini arrived in Tehran.

Revolutionary goals and aims were detrimental to the economic and political positions of the governing elite of the Shah's government, or those who interpreted the Islamic tones of the leaders as "problematic." Toppling tyranny meant the movement of influential "Westernized" elite and middle classes to other parts of the world and the implementation of communities in London and Los Angeles. Many Iranians never saw themselves as permanent immigrants. Since the revolution, implementation of Islamicization programs has also been influential in the out-migration of many middle and working class Iranians who initially supported the revolution. Their eventual dissatisfaction with the state's policies was influential in their departure as tourists, students and refugees to other parts of the world.

On the other hand, when I asked a working class Iranian why he came here, he answered by stating that he just wanted to see what it is like to live in the West. He claims that as soon as his refugee hearing is concluded he is going to go back because he was better off in Iran. In fact, status and class differences between one's position in Iran and in Canada have caused emotional "distress" as individuals attempt to improve their class positions in this country.

Since 1980, a large number of Iranians have lived in neighboring countries of Iran and in Europe as refugees. By December 31, 1991, approximately 100,000 Iranians who "fear[ed] prosecution or harm" but were not recognized as refugees by any government resided in Turkey (Middle East Report, 1993:9). In Iraq, as of December 31, 1992, there were 48,000 Iranian asylum seekers and in Turkey about 2,000 asylum applications were filed (ibid.). According to the US Committee for Refugees, in 1984, 1991 and 1992, 27,000, 50,000 and 50,000 Iranian asylum seekers were residing in various Western and Eastern countries (ibid.). Moreover, in 1987 there were 4,000 Iranian refugees living in Pakistan, 1,100 in India, and 75,000 in Iraq, some of whom came to Canada as convention refugees (Adelman, 1991:180-181).

In the United States, 13,061 refugee cases were heard and accepted between June 1983 to September 1989. 8,173 Iranians were, however, denied status. The approval rate for that year was 61.5%. In 1989, 602 cases were granted political asylum, 446 were denied and 987 applicants were pending decision (Zucker, 1991:241). From abroad, in 1989, 5,132 cases were approved, 1,174 denied and 2,321 were pending (Ibid.). In Canada, there are also a large number of Iranian refugees. In the next section the transnational characteristics of Iranian Revolution is explored by references to its effects on their movement and identity politics.

2.6 The Revolution, Class, Geography and Transmigration: the cases of Saman and Kayvan

Saman was Seven years old when the revolution occurred. To him, the revolution was a sign of negative changes, chaos and social disorder. Saman, in reference to how he perceived the revolution as a young child replied

> I was very young so I didn't probably think very political about it, ... I remember even my parents, they were excited and they thought it's a good thing, it's a good change. All my family and relatives they thought it's good the Shah is going and Khomeini is coming although they had, we had a very good life there, I would say. We had everything we could wish but still I remember my parents were happy about it so I was also kind of happy about it. ... We lived in an apartment complex. And it used to be a very nice place, clean .... After the revolution all kinds of people came there... because some of the people who lived there

> escaped from Iran and probably these revolutionaries came and lived in their apartments. ... And I remember them spraying on the walls all these writings and pictures of Khomeini and ... the place got really dirty. That left a really bad impression of the revolution for me. Another thing ... I remember the TV. programming changed. All of a sudden there was less much less entertainment. You just saw these Ayatollahs on the TV. So all in all I would say I felt that life is not as good anymore after the revolution as it was before, and I think my parents realized very soon... that was when we left Iran. Actually we did not leave to go forever we just left for summer to Germany ...[like any other] summer, and after we stayed there as things got worse and soon after that war with Iraq started and I think that was when we decided to stay in Germany. (sic)

For him, the revolution did not bring about social equality since, as he explains, "they had everything." In contrast, revolution made Saman aware of his class position and the differences between him and other groups within Iran. Social and class differences became evident to him as "revolutionaries moved into" apartments left behind by those who fled Iran. For Saman, differences between him and the newly arrived occupants in this middle class environment was not a simple fact of economic disparity. It was also a reflection of life-style differences and conflicting conceptions about tidiness and social order.

His construction of social actors into revolutionary and non-revolutionary is based on his perceptions of his middle class up bringing and his secular life-style. His perception of the revolution is shaped by the distinction he made between himself as a middle-class child and others in the context of class and ethnic diversity in Iran. His parents, on the other hand, supported the revolution and its main aims. They initially "supported" Mr. Madani with liberal-secular views. But Madani's involvement in the revolutionary government was short lived. He was put aside but not before assisting in controlling the Arab uprising after the revolution.

The revolution is viewed as anti-modern, moreover, due to the limited access to an important characteristic of modernity: leisure. His emphasis on the lack of entertainment on TV and his indirect references to how TV programming was altered is reflective of ideological changes. Before the revolution, more than 33% of First Program content and 60% of Second Program content of the Iranian TV programming were imported from the West (Mohammadi,

1994:69). Shows like Tarzan, Zorro, Days of Our Lives, World Title Fights in Boxing and World Cup Soccer games were major components of Iranian TV programming.

The revolution's anti-Western stance, which was reflected by the changes in TV programs, was identified by him as undesirable and problematic. Saman's views regarding the revolution are constructed through indirect references to the West and its cultural products as popular consumption items amongst different classes within Iran. It is not that he perceives of the West as superior. In fact he is very critical of German and American policies of the past and present. But, modernity to him is understood in terms of Western cultural influences. These influences were considered as detrimental to the Iranian-Shiite cultural establishment by the revolutionary leaders.

Saman and his family did not migrate soon after the revolution due to such changes, however. They stayed in Iran since his parents did not consider its consequences as undermining their class position or ideological beliefs. In fact, the events after the revolution and power conflicts between political groups, Islamic moderates and hard-liners, rather than the toppling of the Shah's government, were determinant factors in their departure from Iran. They moved to Germany where they had frequently visited in the past.

Ali who left Iran in his late teens and four years after the revolution mentions:

> I participated in the revolution. My whole family supported the revolution. We listened to reports from BBC and read Khomeini's sermons regularly. In fact, another incident that I remember really good, is when Khomeini came to Iran. ... We all came to see him. I had a feeling like wow I am where Khomeini is going to pass by and I am going to see Imam. After the revolution, things changed and there was no real political freedom. Some of my [school] friends were killed because they were *Mojahed* [members of an Islamic Militant group established during the Shah's period]. One day at school, our principal announced that a student of our school who was a *Mojahed* was killed in an armed struggle and I remember him saying that's what's coming for those who support the *monafegin* [a derogatory term used by the Islamic officials to refer to Mojahedin members] . But since I was not political it really did not affect me. I was worried about getting into university. Especially after the war since based on the law I had to report for military duty before being able to apply for university. Still, I had to pass *Konkor* [nationwide university entrance examination], which is really hard as you know. I left, not because of the revolutionary changes, but because of military service and to get education. I was supposed to go back to Iran after the revolution. I

> never intended to come to Canada. My dad did inquire if I could come to Canada, but his friend who lived in Canada told him it is very difficult to obtain necessary papers from a high school for student visa for a young teenager. (sic)

First, he supported the revolution as a young boy. His views about the revolution and the regime did change as the Islamic Republic's control over the power structure turned violent (i.e.: as the crack down on the Mojaheedin took the form of an open attack on their followers as enemies of Islam within his school environment). Yet, Ali leaves Iran not because of the events of the revolution and/or its negative effects on his family's income. His main reason to leave is due to his parents' and his lack of desire to "participate" in the war. In order to finish his education and escape the War, he was sent to Europe in the early 1980s. He leaves Iran in the hope of coming back as an educated person. In other words, at the time his intentions classified him as a "temporary migrant." Ali left Iran, as he mentions, due to his parent's class position. That is, they were able to meet the cost of traveling, despite the inflated price of American dollar in the black market. In other words, his departure is affected by: a) his parent's political positioning with respect to the war, and b) the importance of education as a sign of status for him and his family. His destination was not Europe. There he applied for visa to the United States and arrived in California in 1983.

For Kayvan, the revolution is constructed from what he reads, hears and considers as legitimate knowledge about it. It was a far removed experience, which affected his school experiences in England by forcing him to quit his private school due to financial difficulties. He explains

> one of the major points in my life was the revolution and the war. Because, I think I mentioned it, it totally changed who I was, from a boarding school character to somebody who had to go and work, who had to go and work for his rent and his own food. I got some help. And also, I had gotten some help from the British government too because I had been there for so long. But it totally changed my whole view toward certain things.

It is during the Hostage Crisis that he was confronted in the dorms by an American boy, who told Kayvan that Iranians are terrorists and have taken innocent Americans against their will.

He was told by one of his friends that he is an Iranian. At the time, Kayvan felt British and his Iranian identity was denied any space. It is after the events of the revolution and the arrival of his sister that he begins the process of re-Persianization. What is interesting is that while he thought of himself as British and joined friends in making fun of ethnic Pakistani kids, he was perceived by his British friends as an Iranian. His national identity was problematized by his friends only because of Iran's anti-Western stance. As he moves away from his private boarding school and lives with his sister, he is surrounded by Iranians who "educate" him about who he is. But what he hears is not about the history of his parent's minority ethnicities (Kurdish-Turkish). The oral history through which he learnt about history and people is concerned with the Persian culture, music and literature. Only after his arrival in Canada and living with his parents, he begins to understand his multi-faceted identity.

2.7 Political Turmoil, Cultural Changes and the Transmigration of Iranians

Lack of religious, political and intellectual freedom forced many to leave Iran and apply for refugee status around the world. The flight of political activists, intellectuals and Baha'i followers from Iran is due to the harsh treatment of the opposition within Iran. In 1991, in fact, 12.4% of the population had no religious affiliation which may be due to their political views, secular attitudes or a sign of overall dissatisfaction with socio-political events in Iran (Statistics Canada, Target Group Profile, 1991 Census).

Hooglund (1986:21) in reference to political pressures experienced by one opposition group points out that

> the government responded to the Mojahedin challenge with mass arrest and summary executions. An estimated seven thousand seven hundred persons, mostly young people, are believed to have been killed in 1981-82.

The fear of being arrested or killed prompted many to flee Iran towards European or other Asian countries in the hope of finding refuge.

As one of the informants pointed out, one did not have to be politically active in anti-government activities to be arrested. Ali claims that one of his friends, whom he met while in Europe, was accused of being a communist and a member of the Fedayin group (a leftist group) and was arrested in his home in front of his family. Ali maintains that

> he told me his mom and dad had no idea what had happened to him for a long time. He was beaten up with cables, put in a very small prison cell with ten other prisoners. He used to tell me that at night times he could only hear screams and pain from other cells. He was released after eight months but he had to sign a document which stated that he was a communist and that he would no longer participate in any activity against the government. He escaped Iran within months after being released. His cousin [left the country] three years before. And he came and lived with his cousin. (sic)

A negative image of Iran as a repressive country where individuals and collective rights are often ignored have become incorporated into the oral history of Iran and Iranian transmigrants. Such images have played a major role in the decision of many Iranians students and sympathizers of political groups to stay abroad. Such images do reflect the experiences of many political prisoners in Iran.

Political activists are not the only people who were targeted. Intellectuals, poets, singers and other activists are also "harassed" by the officials. Iranian intellectuals and writers "say they are facing a concerted campaign by the security services aimed at further curbing press and literary freedom" (Guardian Weekly, Evans, Sept, 9, 1996:4). Through programs such as "Our Cultural Identity," prominent poets, novelists and newspaper journalists residing in Iran are linked to Iranian dissidents and monarchists outside Iran. The government employees are threatened if they give "damaging" information to journalists. And, journalists face special press courts if they write damaging articles about the revolutionary movement ("Walk in fear," Economist July 23rd, 1994). In addition, artists whose works do not follow official guidelines are imprisoned. One cartoonist, for example, who completed his sentence for publishing a cartoon

of Ayatollah Khomeini playing soccer was sentenced again on October 1993 and given ten more years.

The constant pressure and crack down on activists and other intellectuals is an important factor for mass migration from Iran. But, their migration is more than a reflection of their fears of arrest or personal experiences in the prison. Their migration out of Iran is a reflection of their ideological suppositions. For political activists and intellectuals, human rights, freedom and democracy are fundamental characteristics and qualities. What they seek in different manners and as members of different political-religious-ethnic groups are the same characteristics, which are the basic building blocks of Western liberal and socialists ideologies. They travel to the West in order to escape inequality and lack of freedom.

2.8 The West as the Site of Discontent and Freedom

Political refugees travel toward Canada (the West) in search of freedom and democracy. More important, the West for them provides an avenue through which they continue their opposition to the Islamic government. The same role was also played by students abroad during the Shah's regime. In this sense, the West continues to function as a center for resisting Iranian governments and a space within which policies and practices of the regime are criticized.

Regardless of the extent of their alleged political activities, followers and ex-members of political groups constitute a significant but small proportion of the Iranian immigrant population in Canada. Iranian communities outside Iran are constituted of dissidents whose political and ideological views not only create divisions among themselves but also between them and pro-monarchy, religious and nationalist Iranians. The presence of Iranians in Canada has led to the formation of well connected (yet at times separate and divided) Iranian associations[4] locally and

[4] For example: Hambastegi: The International Federation of Iranian Refugees and Immigrant Councils (world wide); Aeen-e Iran Society (USA); iranian Christians International; Iranian

around the world. Research in the United States suggests that Iranian associations play an important role in the "preservation of Iranian cultural heritage, followed in turn by structural, cultural, and marital assimilation. Other roles played by associations serve political interests and attempts for unity amongst Iranians.... Most members of the associations are male, educated and middle class." To many of them, cultural preservation and liberation of Iran seem to be central rather than the "future development of Iranian organizational life in the U.S. (Iparva, 1988:Abstract).

Although the West for them is a solution to escape injustice, coming to the West does not translate into finding freedom in its pure liberal sense. Asylum seekers in Canada, for example, can not travel abroad. They can not sponsor their families. And, if they wish to attend college, they are obliged to pay foreign student rates (Tanner, 1998:A4). If they are considered as a "danger to [the] security of Canada, they can face deportation. For some Iranians, because of their political membership and activities in Iran, they find themselves not as "free" as they hoped to be in Canada.

To live in the West, moreover, does not imply that one is free of the pressures and scrutiny of the Iranian government. Alleged political assassinations of Kurdish and nationalist leaders in France and Germany by the Islamic Republic agents diminish the safety of the West as a site of refuge and turn it into a site of struggle with the agents of the Iranian government (Time "Terrorism: the Tehran connection" March 21, 1994 Volume 143, No.12). In London, England, even "insignificant people" are harassed and confronted by the agents of the Islamic regime (Montreal Gazette, November, 3, 1987). Moreover, allegedly, Iranian terrorist cells have setup their operations in Canada (The Vancouver Sun, Friday, March 19, 1993:A19). In 1994, during the Month of *Ramadan* in Vancouver, pro and anti-government groups clashed violently at the

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Immigrant Council INC (USA); Academy of Persian Physicians (USA); Society of Iranian Professionals (in Vancouver and other parts of the world).

Pacific National Exhibition in Vancouver, British Columbia (The Vancouver Sun, "Long Shadow of Mullahs" by Ian Mulgrew). Ian Mulgrew writes, "Iranian immigrants in BC have established a vibrant community, but now many fear the evil they had left behind—Islamic fundamentalism." On the other hand, during the early 1990s, [the] Islamic Republic Embassy in Canada was occupied briefly and embassy employees were "assaulted" by members of the opposition groups. In short, the West has been the "home" away from home for opposition groups.

2.9 Islamicization, Out-migration, Letters and Formation of Short and Long Term Global Social Networks: the case of Ali and his friends

The Islamicization of Iran after the revolution is an important factor affecting the out-migration of the youth and families from Iran, especially after the end of the war. Colin Barraclough (The Globe and Mail, 199?) in his article "Iran Keeps eye on restless youth" writes

> For many Iranian youths, sport is the only means [of] expressing themselves. By pushing for the gradual reintegration of Iran with the rest of the world, they are slowly widening the bounds of what is permitted by Iran's Islamic authorities

There are limited opportunities for the opposite sexes to freely associate and date; and few men can afford to marry due to economic stagnation (The Middle East, November, 1989:28). "Westernized" youth are harassed and their actions and behaviors detested, as one soldier who participated in the war writes to the editor of *Joumhuri Islami*: "upon return[ing] from the warfront [I] got upset at the sight of youths freely promoting the filthy Western culture." The departure of young adults between 1980 to 1988 needs to be analyzed in the context of the Islamic Republic's cultural and ideological control over the Islamic institutions such as the *Basij and* the *Komittee*. The dress code and moral laws were enforced through such institutions and volunteers were recruited for the war efforts from schools and mosques. In my own high school in Tehran, many classmates and some of my school teachers participated in the war by

becoming members of the *Basij*[5]. Many streets also bear the names of those who lost their lives for Islam and Iran. In contrast, travelling to the West is considered as a solution to the lack of social activities, especially for middle class individuals. One of the by-products of such a movement of youth has been the formation of short and long term social networks.

Ali, for example, left many of his friends back in Iran, some of whom also left Iran either legally or as refugees. In a letter written in 1985, a friend of Ali, Samad (who lives in Iran) wrote

> Ali you wrote that you are working now. And more important than that you received your high school diploma. I must tell you that amongst all of the family members and friends who left Iran and came to *Kharej* [abroad, usually implying the West] you are ahead of all of them, although as you mentioned you had to stay in Belgium for seven months. But you have excelled. Dear Ali let me give you a sound advice. If you want to go to university take your time and choose a good repudiated university and major in a field that is worth it, like medicine, engineering (mining, electronics and such), which are excellent choices. ... Since you guys have left [most of his closest friends left Iran and settled in the West] I have only suffered in the last two years. But you have experienced hardship but not to the extent that I have been subjected to [pain] since you are now in an environment which is new to you, and it is like this for others who have also left. I was just lonely in our street and I am writing this to you because I love you like a brother. ... Hoshang [who lived in Europe at the time] wants to go to Turkey to join Darius. If you have access to him write to him and advice him that in Turkey it is difficult to obtain a visa for the United States and he should not play with his future over having fun with a friend. And of course his parents will not allow him to do such a thing (especially Hoshang's mom). Because I am well aware of the situation and I am telling you that you are in a better situation than them. (sic)

In the rest of the letter he writes about the whereabouts of high school and neighborhood friends and what they were doing. Some had gone to the West. Others were attending university. Several of them were serving their military duty (like Asgar). The important aspect of this letter is how geography is compartmentalized. It seems that North American rather than European countries (i.e.: Turkey) are viewed as "desirable" places. Another important aspect of this letter is how the "pain" of being left back home is compared to the "joy" of being in a new land with new possibilities. Difficulties associated with out-migration such as racism and discrimination

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[5] Nima (1983:134) asserts that the *Basij* volunteers "provided the main thrust of the offensive[s], with the teenage [boys] repeatedly throwing themselves at the Iraqi lines, and regular soldiers and Islamic Revolutionary Guards moving behind them." A western reporter who interviewed one 16 year-old prisoner of war in an Iraqi camp cited him as stating that "I was a student in school in Tehran and they [the clergy

are not considered. The West is desired more in this case, because his social network was no longer based on a face to face interaction but through absent relations with his friends in different parts of the world, a situation which is created by the war.

Asgar in a letter written in 1983 to Ali maintains

> I hope you do not feel lonely in the foreign land. I am studying very hard to get my high school diploma and if God wants, to take the *Konkor* [nationwide university entrance examination] and see what happens.... Dear Ali I hope that you'll be successful in your life and continue your education and enter university... and have a nice and enjoyable life. (sic)

As Ali pointed out, what is ironic is that Asgar was the first friend who two years prior to Ali's departure asked Hoshang and him to go to India as students. Ali mentions that they downplayed his idea by making fun of Indian universities, which is reflective of their negative image of India. Asgar now lives in Canada and is trying to begin his higher education while he is building his small business. Parsa, who is known amongst friends as a person who always talked about leaving Iran but never did, writes to Ali on 1362/9/23 (1983) that

> .... You wrote about a lot of stuff you have been doing in America. You said you went to disco, got drunk and you are less shy and want to get a girlfriend. Be careful, though, listen to me, about your school and studying because those are more important. Your parents have invested their hope in you to come back to Iran successfully, not as a defeated person and shamed, anyhow first education and then these things.... According to my mom, they have set up everything that I will leave Iran to London very soon by the end of *Esfand* with my father's friend. After ten days I will leave for America. (sic)

The main role of Ali is to become educated and go back to Iran to make his parents proud. He is not there to have fun. Even during the war he has a mission. For Parsa, going to the West is not a permanent solution although it was actively sought. Rather, it is a reflection of the socio-economic circumstances, harsh government's cultural and social policies towards the youth and

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controlled *Basij* Organization] forced me to come to fight. I was captured today. It was my first fight" (In ibid.:134).

the image of America as "free." In another letter dated 62/10/6 Jamshid, a mutual friend of Samad and Asgar writes to Ali,

> Hoshang also left for Europe, he is going to stay with his family members. I feel jealous towards you guys, but maybe this is our destiny that we should stay here. I am lonely. What else are you doing? Do you have a girlfriend? If so write to me about her.

What these letters point out to is how differently a group of high school friends from a middle class neighborhood in Tehran were differently affected by the events of the war and the revolution. They are also reflective of how such events resulted in the out-migration of some of them with various out-comes and consequences. As well, what these letters point to is the extent to which Iranians provided information about the West to each other in writing personal letters.

They have formed informal information webs, which cross borders and in a sense interact within different socio-economic and cultural formations and power structures. Ali only keeps contact with a few of his friends now. As he mentions "we [i.e.: Hoshang and Asgar] call each other during desperate emotional times for advice."

By forming a network of young transmigrants who lived in different parts of the world, they provide advice, gossip and information about themselves, school events, the West and Iran to each other. Ali looks forward to receiving letters from his friends. Through these letters, he is informed about familiar places and people in an unfamiliar Western culture. In a way, these letters help ease the pain of being away from Iran and from family.

2.10 Religious Discrimination and Out-Migration: the case of the Baha'is

Religious discrimination also plays an important role as a push factor in the out-migration of Iranian Jews, Baha'is and Christians. In 1991, in Canada, 1% of the Iranian population were of Jewish background; 6.5% were believers of various Christian faiths, while 15% identified their religion as other (i.e.: Baha'i) (Statistics Canada, Target Group Profile, 1991) (See Table 5). During the 1960s, Ayatollah Khomeini criticized the Shah's government for its involvement in

"imperialist-Jewish conspiracy," allowing women to vote, land reforms and "giving high offices to Baha'is (Abrahamian, 1993:21). In an Introduction to the Baha'i faith (published by the Baha'i Community of Canada under the sub-title "The Historical Background"), however, the Shah's army and clergy are blamed for the destruction of the Baha'i national center in Teheran in 1955. Furthermore, during the period between 1970-82, the Islamic leader of Iran characterized Baha'i and Jewish Iranians as the oppressors, "Zionist," and enemies of Islam. Ayatollah Khomeini argued that "Reagan supports the Baha'is in the same way the Soviets control the Tudeh [a communist party with "ties" to [the] Soviet Union, popular during the 1940s and 1950s]. The Baha'is are not a religious community but a secretive organization plotting to subvert the Islamic Republic" (Ibid.:124).

There are about 350,000 Baha'i followers in Iran who have faced institutionalized discrimination due to their religious beliefs (i.e.: "recognition that true religion is in harmony with reason and the pursuit of scientific knowledge"). Since 1979, according to Hedges (New York Times, August, 1, 1994), "201 Baha'is have been killed since the revolution." In June 1987, four Baha'i followers were reported as having been executed by the Islamic Republic and seventeen more were "at imminent risk of execution" (United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission On Human Rights, 44th Session, Agenda item 12, February 10, 1988).

Discrimination towards Baha'i followers has been institutionalized after the revolution. In January 1989, in a memorandum to all ministries and organizations in the country, the Prime Minister of Iran Mr. Mir Hussein Moussavi states:

> According to information received, there is no co-ordination within the organs of the executive, concerning the persons belonging to the Baha'i sect. With the agreement of the President, the following official directives have been drawn up and shall be applied to all ministries....
> Spies shall be treated firmly, as stipulated by laws and regulations. All other citizens shall be treated as normal citizens, no matter what their beliefs are, in conformity with the latter part of principle 23 of the Constitution....

It is well understood that "in conformity with principle 13 of the Constitution" refers only to Zoroastrian, Christian and Jewish followers who are recognized as religious minorities. The Baha'is are not legally protected under the constitution, which has imposed major legal, social and economic problems for them. Lisa Gilad (1990:25) asserts that "since the foundation of the Baha'i faith in Persia in 1863, they have been subjugated to various types of persecution by the religious and secular leaders of Iran." The Baha'i beliefs on formal education, equality between men and women and democracy "represent the Western threat to Islamic society" (ibid.).

The formulation of a policy to deal with the "Baha'i problem" is pursued within bureaucratic and legal avenues. In a letter dated February 25, 1991, the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council in conjunction with the approval of the Spiritual leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, recommends several directives against the Baha'i. They should be denied any position of power (i.e.: in the field of education). They must be expelled from universities. As well, they shall be denied employment if they identify themselves as such. However, they will not be arrested without reason. The letter goes on to say that a plan must "be devised to confront and destroy their cultural roots outside the country" (In Baha B.E. 150/March 21, 1993:2).

As a result of such harsh treatments many of the Baha'is left Iran beginning in 1980. Canada, for example, is home to a growing number of Baha'is refugees. In fact, Gilad (1990:26) argues that Iranian Baha'is grow up as refugees in Iran and become transnational refugees only after their departure. Rather than conceptualizing them as refugees in Iran, Baha'is are viewed as representation of the *other*, as agents of the West. It is as a result of *othering* the Baha'i through recent institutionalized discrimination that they become refugees. Their refugee status is due to: a) ideological changes (i.e.: establishment of the Islamic Republic with its distrust of the Baha'i), b) discriminatory views and c) the role the Baha'i elite played during the last regime. Nikki Keddie (1981:64) maintains that reform minded Baha'is were rather hostile to the *Ulama*, especially during the nineteen hundreds. During the Shah's regime,

the *Ulama* denounced his policies based on the fact that the modernization policies of the Pahlavi regime were seen as favoring religious minorities such as the Baha'i or foreigners. Although a small proportion of the Baha'i had well paying jobs and were industrialists, these accounts were often exaggerated, resulting in the resentment of minority religious groups (ibid.:242).

2.11 The War and Its Consequences on Out-Migration

The lack of political freedom and discrimination may explain the departure of some but not of all Iranians. The war with Iraq was also an important push factor. As one of the longest conventional wars of this century, the Iran-Iraq War had tremendous consequences in terms of the loss of human lives and capital in both countries[6]. The Iraq-Iran War, however, had a more direct effect on the out-migration of young Iranians. The unwillingness of many middle class families to send their sons to the war may have played a major role in their decisions to send their male children outside Iran. During the war, every young male adult had to report to the armed forces and serve a two year mandatory period before being able to attend university, apply for a passport and/or gain employment.

Ali, who was sixteen at the time of the war, recalls that

> I was just coming to the yard to talk to my best friend, when we heard that the Iraqi's bombed the airport. Didn't know anything about war, and really didn't know anything about the Iraqi's [other] than they were Arabs and we were Persians and supposedly more 'civilized.' My views really didn't change about the war over the years because the war was outside Tehran when I was living back home. In a sense, we used to make fun of the fact that in such a short time we had shot down so many Iraqi airplanes or destroyed thousands of tanks. I left in 1982 and even until then we really didn't see a lot of destruction in Tehran or at least in our part of the town which was in the north. There were a lot of sirens and at times anti-aircraft guns would light up the sky above Tehran. [At the time] it was beautiful. We used to go on the roof and watch the 'fireworks.' But then again I hear about the events after 1984, you hear a different version of Tehran and how people felt. In fact, one of my friends who didn't leave until the end of the War explains that he had internalized the fear [associated] with bombing. It had become part

[6] According to Farhang Rajaee (1993:1), both Iran and Iraq spent an estimated 350 billion dollars on the war effort. Kamran Motif (In Hiro, 1990:251) has estimated the cost of the War for Iran at about $627 billion and for Iraq at about $561 billion. The human loss has been estimated 200,000 soldiers and civilians, although the Iraqi government estimated the Iranian human loss at about 800,000 individuals. According to Hiro (Ibid.), "Western estimates put the total number of the dead [for Iran and Iraq] at 367,000."

> of the daily life, and you just went on doing what you had to do. I left Iran just before I was eligible to be drafted and I didn't push for leaving Iran, my parents decided that I should leave Iran. I guess for many people who did not want their sons to be involved in the War, sending them outside Iran was an option. (sic)

The Iraqi aggression for Ali was a sign of historical "us" versus "them" distinctions between the Persians and Arabs without accounting for the cores of many other ethnicities. To him, the destructive effects of the war were minimal despite the fact that many had already died. The war also caused the internal migration of *Jahng zahd-e-ha* (affected by the war) from the south to other parts of Iran. Their movement to other parts of Iran as non-Persians resulted in clashes in cities, such as Isfahan. What is important, moreover, is that his parents' refusal to send their son to fight in the war was partly a reflection of their opposition to the government after the revolution. It was a silent one and was reflected in their decision to send Ali to the West. But, ideological differences are not the real reason why he out-migrated. He became a temporary immigrant as a direct result of his age (eligible for military service) and gender (male) during the war. Events after his departure are "lived" through what he hears from his friends or reads in the newspaper. What he remembers is not reflective of the effects of the war. His departure, however, is.

Farzad, another informant, points out that

> .... In 1984 I left Iran. ... I was 14, I had to leave the country otherwise.... it was typically military service that every male was running away from, so in that two years really there was one thing in my mind. That was quite sure that I'm going to be rather lucky to join the lucky people who [were] going to get to leave. And after that it was coming over to Canada via Germany. ... I was more happy than anything because I knew it had happened. I was out and actually got out just before my time was due, before it was illegal for me to leave the country. (sic)

To Farzad, his departure from Iran is not due to his middle-class position. His movement is conceptualized in the context of luck. Farzad, like Ali who left Iran to avoid military service, but there were many who volunteered to defend Iran against enemy aggression. In a sense, not everyone was running away from the war, but mainly those whose class, cultural and ideological

suppositions opposed the war. However, as Farzad mentioned to me, many of the same parents may have done the same thing if the Shah was in power and their sons had to participate in the war.

What is also important is that they were able to travel to Europe as tourists via Mehrabad Air Port, while many people were escaping through Iranian borders and risking their lives (For life narratives of the account of Baha'i refugees escaping to Pakistan see Gilad, 1990:58-59). As such, their experiences as tourists in Europe distinguishes them from those who escaped without any legal papers.

Even for those Iranians who lived outside Iran, the Iran-Iraq War may have played an important role in their decision to stay in the West in order to avoid military service. Kayvan, for example, who lived in England at the time when the Iran-Iraq War began, stresses that

> The war scared me. The whole point that I might have to return [to Iran.] If I go to Iran and I would have to go to the army for two years and do my conscription. That was a very big fear for me. And in England at the time too, before I came to Canada, I met a lot of guys who had escaped from Iran and a lot of guys who told me about the time that they had spent at the front in Iran, in war. ... one of my friends told me that his friend, who had been out of the country for such a long time, he probably spoke as much *Farsi* at the time as I did, returned to Iran. From the airport, he was taken and put in a truck. ... I don't know how much truth there is to this but, he was taken to training grounds. He was trained for about two or three months. ... And I feared what if I go there. ... I can hardly speak *Farsi.* I could speak *Farsi.* But how was I going to be able to survive there? [I was afraid to go to Iran and] straight away go to the war.... Well the guys that escaped from Iran ... the ones that went through Pakistan and ended up in jail and went through hell in jail. ... they ended up as drug addicts, all of them on heroin.... Just kids, some of the middle class kids that have no future whatsoever, and they're stuck there for probably ever. These stories were eye openers... I really realized the fact that damn am I lucky that I am out already.

Although Kayvan did not live in Iran at the time of the war, he relies on accounts of those who escaped from Iran after the revolution. In this case, it is not the Western media which constructs the political and cultural environment of Iran as undesirable. His sources of information are other Iranians whose stories portray Iran as a "dangerous" place. Such images also portray Pakistan and Turkey as undesirable places where young middle class kids become

addicts or face discrimination. He does question the authenticity of the life histories he heard. Yet, through these stories of inhuman treatment, Kayvan views Iran as a law-less country where human rights are not protected. What he has heard about the ordeal of those who escaped to Pakistan created a fear in him.

The life stories of Iranians who left Iran after the revolution and the war paint a negative picture of the political and legal status of youths, women and people in Iran. To what extent did Iranians, who were living in the West or other parts of the world during the revolution, decide to stay in their host countries is a question that needs further analysis? Ansari maintains that: a) assimilation into American way of life, b) uncertainty and skepticism about events in Iran and c) "alienation from home" result in the decision of Iranians to stay in America. As one person states,

> We do not know what to do. It is almost three years that we are planning to return home. Each time we are going to pack up, we meet Iranians who tell us not to return because he himself returned home, but came back here as a failure...(Ibid.).

The emerging factor here is that the decision to stay abroad was based on what they had heard about events in Iran from their friends, family members and the media. Such news and information paint a negative picture of the socio-economic conditions in Iran.

The fact that many young males escaped or left Iran soon after the beginning of the war is reflected in the number of young males accepted in Canada as refugees and immigrants. In 1989, 1990, and 1991, for example, the male population of Iranian immigrants between the ages 20-34 was almost double the number of female transmigrants. It is not the contention of this thesis that all these young adults escaped the war. There are also soldiers who deserted and became refugees in Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey. In an informal and brief conversation with three Basij volunteers (two of whom had only finished grade eight at the time), they told me how after a few months of fighting in the war they deserted the "army" and sought political asylum in

Iraq. They were eventually accepted as refugees by the Canadian government in the late 1980s through the UN offices in the Middle East.

As well, some Iranian immigrants in Canada have already served in the Iranian army before, during or after the war. Connected to this issue is that the war also had drastic socio-economic consequences such as high unemployment, low economic growth and limited social services. As the war ended and soldiers returned from the war duty, many obtained their passports and left Iran due to the effects of, for example, high unemployment.

In addition, during the war, the government was able to justify its policies towards political and social critics and activists; especially, if their activities could be linked to the Iraqi government, Israel or the United States. In other words, the war during the early 1980s was a catalyst assisting the Islamic regime to consolidate its power. As Eric Hooglund (1986:17, 24) asserts, the Iraqi invasion functioned as a means to mobilize the people and their support for the central government in the name of Islam and nationalism. In fact, the harsh treatment of members of the Mujaheedin and other political groups with organized military camps in Iraq was justifiable due to their connection with that government. The war was used as a protective shield against popular discontent used to justify the execution of the Mujaheedin supporters (ibid.). In this sense, the war had an indirect effect on the number of politically active Iranians who left Iran and found "safe havens" in other parts of the world.

Conclusion: Part A

The transmigration of Iranians to Canada in the late twentieth century is a process that finds its roots in an era during which modernization policies were initiated. It is during this period, that the West represented itself as something "special" and "desirable. The factors responsible for the out-migration of Iranians after 1978 can be summarized as: a) the Islamicization of Iran, b) the enforcement of a strict Islamic code after years of Westernization, c) the lack of political freedom and expression, d) religious discrimination, e) the Iran-Iraq war and f) the declining

economy. Yet, the Westernization of Iran also resulted in the out-migration of "traditional" Iranian families to various parts of the Middle East. In addition, since the early 1940s, a large Iranian Jewish population has historically lived in Palestine. In other words, the movement of Iranians since the 1930s has been determined by: a) ideological differences, b) political changes and c) economic consequences of the modernization policies in Iran. Since 1978, their movement to other countries and especially to the West is mainly characterized as a refugee flight. For the informants and many other Iranians, their transmigration is also related to how race, ethnicity, class, and national identity are defined, negotiated and/or denied by the "outsiders." That is, transmigration seems to have problematized the notion of *nation-state* but it has not done away with the idea of *ethno-nationalism* and its manifestations in different parts of the world. Not all these factors play important and equal roles. Their shifting qualities and cumulative effects, however, situate individuals differently in different contexts. This aspect is further investigated in the following chapters.

Life history method as an analytical tool in exploring the construction and/or perpetuation of national and ethnic identities among Iranian transnationals needs to be incorporated in research to account for how differently individuals Iranian transmigrants were affected. A collection of such information from different parts of the world will be helpful in viewing how Iranian transmigrants construct their identities in contradictory ways, in different places and during different time periods by references to nationality, race, ethnicity and other "us" versus "them" categories.

Part B:

"Pull" Factors and Their Consequences, Canada's role in the transmigration of Iranians

Introduction: Canadian immigration policy and its affects on Iranian transmigration to Canada

In part A, "push" factors responsible for the out-migration of Iranian to other parts of the world and Canada were discussed. In this section, the focus is on the effects of the Canadian immigration law on the immigration of Iranians and their implications in terms of construction of gender, refugee, class, and ethnicity based on factors such as the category of immigrant class, citizenship status and country in which application for immigration were filled. In addition, how laws in Canada are contested by Iranian refugee claimants are discussed in detail. In this section, it is argued that: a) the point system with its emphasis on the education qualifications of immigrants, b) the economic compatibility of the applicant to labor and capital needs of Canada, c) the Canadian refugee policy towards Iranian Baha'is, d) the Iranian community, e) the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and f) to an extent "smugglers," play divergent yet important roles in the transmigration of Iranians from Western countries and the Middle East to Canada.

Prior to the 1970s, the small population of Iranians in Canada was partly the function of pre-1967 Canadian immigration policy. Immigrant selection was based on based on factors such as place of birth, ethnic background and nationality. In short, it was a policy based on a set of economically and racially biased views, geared towards Canada's economic growth. It differentiated between charter groups, Eastern Europeans, Jews and "Third World" people. Due to the restrictive "nature" of the immigration law, most immigrants originated from Western, Northern and Eastern Europe with limited numbers from non-Western parts of the world (Badets, 1994:3). Iranians, as non-Christian-Europeans, were not classified as favorite immigrants.

On August 16, 1967, a new system of selecting immigrants, known as the point system, came into effect. The aim was to eliminate factors such as ethnicity, nationality, color or creed of immigrants as influential criteria for immigrating to Canada. Since its implementation, more Iranians have been admitted. Between 1968 and 1970, for example, 369 Iranians arrived in Canada in comparison to 544 admitted between 1956 to 1967 (See Table 2). As shown in Table 3, from 1971 to 1975, 1,099 Iranians arrived, which is slightly more than the number of Iranians admitted during 1946 to 1970 (Quarterly Statistics Immigration, 1973, 1974, 1975). Furthermore, during the eight-year period between 1971 to 1979, 3,797 individuals were admitted, which is more than three times the number of Iranians admitted during the previous 29 years.

Between 1980 and 1982, 4,159 Iranians came to Canada. In other words, in three years almost the same number of immigrants entered Canada as during the period between 1946-1979. The beginning of the war with Iraq in 1980 also corresponds to a sudden and sharp increase in the number of Iranian immigrants in Canada. From 1980 to 1988, 16,848 Iranians were accepted as immigrants. Furthermore, from 1989 to 1992, 20,265 Iranians were accepted, out of which 12,957 Iranians were admitted during the period between 1991-1992. In 1993 and 1994, however, their numbers were drastically reduced to only 6,579 individuals. This is mainly due to the reforms introduced during the early decades of the 1990s, limiting the number of refugees accepted. Despite this sudden decrease, from 1995 to 1998, 19,974 Iranians were accepted, of which many were refugees. Ten years after the end of the Iran-Iraq War and its negative economic and social impacts and twenty years after the ideological changes brought about by the revolution, the transmigration of Iranians towards Canada is on the rise.

2.12 Principles, Categories and Transmigration

The 1967 Immigration Act established four main principles: universalism, family reunion, humanitarian and economic considerations. These are fundamental aspects of the immigration

policy today. Between 1980 to 1998, 64,159 Iranian transmigrants were accepted under five major categories of independent, family, assisted family, convention refugee, entrepreneur and designated classes. For example, 34% were accepted under the convention refugee class; under the independent class, 25.5% of Iranians were admitted; 14.6% came as family members; 5% arrived as entrepreneurs (with families); and 9% of the total of Iranian transmigrants were admitted as humanitarian refugees under the designated class category (See Table 4).

2.13 Independent Class: the role of education and language in the transmigration of Iranians

From 1980 to 1998, 16,308 Iranians were granted immigrant status under the independent category (See Table 1). Moreover, 45.7% of all Iranians in this category arrived between 1995 and 1998. As the data suggests, the movement of Iranians under this category is a recent phenomena. The emphasis here is on individual qualities rather than political, religious and ideological considerations. As independent immigrants, the ability to speak English or French, education levels, skills, age, arranged employment and personal qualities could earn up to 100 points. Close to 50 to 60 points are required for immigration to Canada (Driedger, 1989:76).

Education differences, occupational diversity and the ability to speak a foreign language, however, are partly the reflections of class and ethnic inequalities in Iran. Individual qualities are no longer individual; rather they are reflections of inequality in class and ethnic relations in Iran. As such, the Canadian immigration policy, with its emphasis on immigrants' education and occupational qualifications, is not an open process. It establishes a set of criteria, which are determined by how resources and information are distributed and how such a distribution is biased and unequal in Iran. In other words, the mere presence of Iranians as independent class immigrants in Canada is reflective of the socio-economic diversity in Iran and how such a diversity has been affected since the beginning of this century.

2.14 Family Reunion Category: the role of the Iranian community in transmigration

Family reunion is the second objective under the 1967 Immigration Act. A large number of Iranian transmigrants were accepted under either family or assisted relative classes. From 1980 to 1998, 14.6% of the total of Iranians were accepted under the family class category (See Table 1). Under the category of assisted relative, furthermore, 9.1% of Iranians were admitted. The two categories together compromise almost one fourth of all Iranian population.

The majority of Iranians accepted under the family reunion class have entered Canada since 1990. In 1991 and 1992, only 7.7% of Iranians were accepted under this category. In 1993, 58% of all Iranians came as sponsored family members. In 1994, 46% of all Iranian immigrants came as sponsored family members. This sudden increase in the number of Iranians is partly due to fluctuations in the number of Iranians admitted under other categories such as convention refugee. In 1991 and 1992, for example, more refugees were accepted than in 1993 and 1994 (See Table 1).

What is important is that Iranians sponsor their family members and relatives through these categories. In this sense, the Iranian community becomes a factor in further transmigration of Iranians as long as the policies of the Canadian government continue to favor family reunion as one of the fundamental characteristic of the immigration law. In recent years with the introduction of an application fee, many single low income Iranians, who may want to sponsor their relatives, can no longer do so due to financial reasons. That is, class position and economic ability in both Iran and Canada are factors which affect the immigration of Iranians, as only those who can afford the sponsorship fee can transmigrate to Canada.

2.15 Humanitarian Principles, Law and Transmigration: the role of the Baha'i

The third principle is based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds through which a set number of refugees and designated classes are admitted to Canada as landed immigrants. A large number of Iranian transmigrants are classified as refugees or members of designated

classes. Between 1983 and 1991, 13,783 of 26,978 Iranians were admitted under these categories. Out of the 13,783 "refugees," 82.3 percent were considered as convention refugee claimants. This is a relatively high number especially in comparison to the years 1946 to 1973, during which only eight Iranians were accepted as refugees, displaced or stateless persons in Canada (Employment and Immigration Canada, Quarterly Statistics Immigration, 1974). This refugee component of the Iranian population, moreover, constitutes almost 18 percent of the 78,296 refugees who arrived in Canada between 1983 and 1991. More specific, in 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1991, 4%, 7%, 5%, and 10.6%of all refugees in Canada were classified as Iranians respectively (Employment and Immigration Canada, Quarterly Statistics Immigration, 1991). In total, from 1980 to 1998, 21,791 Iranian refugee claimants were accepted as immigrants, accounting for 34% of the Iranian transmigrant population. As a result, in 1995, 1996 and 1997 Iran placed 3rd, 4th and 4th respectively as a refugee producing country to Canada (Citizenship and Immigration Canada: Facts and Figures, 1997:37).

Discrimination and human rights violations against the Baha'i of Iran play a pivotal role in the fate of non-Baha'i Iranians admitted as refugees in Canada. In 1980 and 1981, for example, only 32 Iranian refugees were accepted. In 1982, the Canadian government announced a plan to admit the Baha'is of Iran under the provision of the humanitarian refugee clause introduced in the 1967 law, allowing entry to individuals or groups, not as convention refugees, but as a designated class (Adelman1991:210-215). Many are sponsored by the 20,000-member Baha'i community in Canada (Ibid.). As a result of the implementation of this policy in 1982, the number of Iranian refugees increased to 293, and in the following year it almost doubled (See Table 4).

The "problem" with this policy is that it only refers to the discrimination experienced by the Baha'is. Beginning in 1980, the communists, intellectuals and ethnic minorities (such as the

Baluch) also face(d) injustice, death and discrimination. They, however, are not reflected in the formulation of this policy.

Nevertheless, a large number of Iranian "refugees" have been accepted in Canada. From 1980 to 1990, for example, 40% of Iranians were accepted as convention refugees, many of whom are non-Baha'i Iranians (See Table 4). In terms of their religious distribution, in 1991, 64% of Iranian ethnics identified their religion as Islam (See Table 5) (Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile, 1991 Census). Since the majority of Iranians were Moslems in 1991, it is safe to assume that between 1980 and 1990 a large number of refugees were also (born) Moslems. Thus, the reaction of the Canadian government to the position the Baha'i in Iran has been influential in the acceptance of a large number of Moslem Iranians as refugees. Their presence in Canada is due to the fact that Iran officially viewed by the government of Canada as a country in which human rights are abused.

2.16 Economic Factors: the transmigration of status, money and class differences

Economic considerations, in accordance with manpower requirements for the economic development of Canada, constitute the fourth principle (Anderson and William Marr, 1989:100). For example, under the point system, employment arrangements and adaptability can earn individuals points. From 1980 to 1998, 7.6% of Iranians entered Canada as investors, self-employed or entrepreneurs (See Table 1). In 1995, 322 Iranians arrived in Canada under the entrepreneur class, which placed Iran as the seventh entrepreneur country in Canada. In 1996 and 1997, Iran also placed fifth in the top ten business class source countries (Citizenship and Immigration Canada: Facts and Figures, 1997:47). Although the number of Iranians admitted under this category comprise a small portion of the Iranian community, the mere presence of Iranians in this category points to class and economic differences among Iranians prior to their arrival in Canada (See Table 1). It is also important to note that their movement is a recent movement which has accelerated only in the last seven years.

Iranian transmigrants bring with them assets and money. As investors, they must invest at least $700,000 into the Canadian economy before their arrival in Canada. One example is the Khossroshahi family. Michael McCullough (1994), in his article "War of Noses" writes:

> [A]n Iranian immigrant named Ali Khossroshahi opened a small office equipment store on West Broadway called Future Shop. Back in Iran, the Khossroshahi family had owned Minoo Industrial Corp., a conglomerate that manufactured and distributed everything from candies to cosmetics. Unfortunately, Islamic militants don't think much of either, and when the Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution came in 1979, the revolutionary guards seized the business. The Khossroshahi escaped with not much more than their lives and a few offshore holdings. ...[I]n 1983, he smuggled Mohammad Ziabakhsh, a trusted lieutenant with the Minoo Group, out of Iran to run [the Future Shop].

Here, the Iranian Revolution is constructed as an anti-capitalist movement. The departure of the Khossroshahi family is not explored in the light of its role as a capitalist class during the Pahlavi regime. Rather, their migration is considered as a consequence of the anti-modern policies of the Islamic government. The West, on the other hand, is portrayed as a space in which this Iranian entrepreneur with only a few offshore holdings (amount of which is not disclosed) makes it in Canada as a successful businessman. What is also important is how his business manager from Iran joins him in Canada with the help of smugglers.

Because of the success of the Future Shop and other development companies owned by Iranians in Edmonton and Vancouver, it can be argued that "Iranian" investment in Canada has fueled the Canadian economy. This "Iranian investment" has been beneficial to the economic growth (read exploitation) not only in Canada, but also in the United States. More important, such success stories point to the extent in which Iranian families may play the role of "Canadian elite," despite their ethnic "minority" status as *Iranian*. Saman mentioned, for example, that a few Iranian businessmen often participate in "liberal dinners" whenever Prime Minister Chretien travels to Vancouver. More studies are required to fully analyze the impact of their elite positions in Canada or in other parts of the world.

The Khossroshahi family is only one example of many wealthy families who took their assets and left Iran. Research on Iranians in California also points out that those "who fled Iran after the fall of the Shah...apparently were able to bring substantial amounts of capital with them, enabling them to establish business[es] in the United States" (Donald Trieman and Hye-kyung Lee, 1996:68). In fact, Kayvan, whose father worked at a bank, stated that according to his father, during and soon after the revolution, large amounts of money were being transferred by his clients through his branch to various bank accounts in Western countries. Yet, it is important to note that most Iranians in this category have entered Canada only in the last few years. Their movement is reflective of a continuous "out-migration" of assets from Iran since the late 1970s. It is not then surprising that in the last several years the Iranian government has been encouraging Iranians in the West to move back and invest in its economy.

Although, Iranian entrepreneurs have flourished in Canada, many of their services are geared towards the Iranian community, thus, forming what has been referred to in the literature as a differentiated ethnic job market. In contrast to those Iranians who have multi-million dollar assets and whose economic relationships go beyond the boundaries of Canada (i.e.: the Germezian family, owners of West-Edmonton Mall), other Iranians also work in minimum paying jobs (See chapter three).

2.16.1 The Bazaar (traditional merchants), Carpets and North America: a global linkage

The Germezian family made their first fortune by establishing a carpet business in Montreal after their arrival in the early 1950s (Dean Bennet, "Mall Owners Deny Paying Bribes for Loan," the Vancouver Sun, Thursday, August 27, 1998:A4). There are many other Iranian dealers in North America whose economic interactions take the traditional Bazaar out of its so-called traditionalism and contextualize it in a web of global market demand for Eastern products. In the West, Persian carpets symbolize status and wealth, and it has become a million-dollar "industry" in North America. In fact, many single male Iranians find employment in carpet shops

as salespeople. Many dealers move across the continent in search of carpets and business deals, taking their assets across transnational borders as these carpets are sold to dealers in different cities and countries. In Vancouver, carpet dealers, not all from Moslem or Bazaar background, for example, also have shops in the United States, especially in Seattle, Washington[7]. Some are only landed immigrants in Canada but others are also Green Card holders in the United States. In a sense, as a periphery group in the global market system and as the center in today's political economy of Iran, the Bazaar contribute to both global and local economic growth. This is despite the fact that as close associates of the *Ulama* and the post-revolutionary regime, they condemn imperialist hegemony and foreign exploitation.

2.17 The Image of Canada as a "Pull" Factor: the role of development, sports, culture and Iranian-Canadians

As mentioned, Canada has not been a popular destination for Iranians historically. The United States and Western European countries were frequented more often than Canada. By talking to recent Iranian visitors to Canada and Iranian-Canadians who have recently returned from Iran, the impression is that Canada is becoming a favorite destination for Iranians in the late twentieth century. This is due to several factors: a) the establishment of Iranian communities in Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal; b) Canada as an "intermediary space;" c) the Canadian immigration policy and d) closer ties between Iran and Canada since the revolution, when diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States were broken off.

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[7] When I worked in the United States as a salesperson at a carpet shop I met many influential carpet dealers with direct links to Iran and other Iranians in other parts of the world. On one occasion, two *Haji* ("this word precedes the name of a pilgrim to Mecca") from the Bazaar of Tehran were talking about political events in Iran after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. One, whose (Westernized) children had entered the same line of work in the States, expressed that when Khomeini died he was deeply saddened and considered it his duty to participate in the funeral. His reference to Khomeini was through the term Imam (leader). He said that Iran had been thriving since the revolution and that business was good for him. After he left, the second individual in reference to his friend's comments said: life has become harder for people. He continued by stating that these days people have to have two jobs in order to meet their ends. In private, he was able to voice his dislike for the policies of the regime rather than for Islam and/or the Clergy.

Canada's image as one of the best countries in the world and its image as open to refugees, reproduced globally and locally by both the media and Iranians through letters and oral communication, are influential factors in the immigration of Iranians to this country. As well, economic and cultural contacts between Iran and Canada have increased since the revolution. The new Iranian government is open to foreign investment by Canada and Canadian companies (Shahrvand-e Vancouver, Friday, Feb. 20, 1998:12). As a result, Iran sent a large delegation of high government personnel and industry leaders to Canada during the month of February 1998 in order to pursue more Canadian investment in Iran. Despite the fact that the economic relationship between Canada and Iran is estimated to be more than one billion dollars, there is little direct Canadian investment in Iran.

The most recent examples of cultural and social relationships between the two countries are exhibition wrestling tournaments and soccer games between Iranian sports and national clubs and their Canadian counterparts (i.e.: the Capilano College Wrestling Invitation; and friendly games between Iranian and Canadian national and club teams in Vancouver and Toronto). The soccer games between Iranians and Canadians can be attributed to the attempts of the Iranian-Canadian official in the Canadian Soccer Federation to promote such games (In Vancouver, in 1998, the local Iranian soccer team also played a friendly game with the North Shore RCMP team, promoting friendly relationships between the Iranian community and the police). In early 1999, Canada also sent a team of investors to Iran, many of whom are Iranian-Canadian. The role Iranians play in promoting economic and cultural transactions between the Islamic Republic and Canada is an important one, but is not given due consideration in research on Iran and Iranians living outside Iran.

2.18 Iranian Transmigration to Canada: where do they come from?

As mentioned, many Iranians first traveled to other countries before entering Canada. Not withstanding the flight of refugees from Iran, this may be due to the fact that since 1983, no

immigration applications for Canadian landed immigrant status have been processed in Tehran, Iran (Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998. Immigration and Citizenship, 1980-1998). The movement of Iranians to Canada through other countries is also a reflection of the presence of well-established Iranian "immigrant" communities in these intermediary countries (already discussed). To what extent do Western and Eastern countries play the role of short term "homes" for Iranians? In this section, the transmigration of Iranians is analyzed by references to two factors: a) where they filed their applications and b) their intended destinations in Canada.

In general, between 1980 to 1998, 38,842 Iranian applicants filled their request in Canada, the United States and Europe (See Table 6). That is, 61% of Iranians first traveled to European or North American countries before applying for Canadian immigrant status. In Germany, France, England, Italy and the United States, 17% of Iranians applied for Canadian landed immigrant status. The rest of Iranians had to travel to other Asian, African and south American countries. In the Middle East, 33% and in South and South East Asia, 6% of Iranians filed their applications. From Pakistan and Turkey, neighboring countries reached by land, 12.2% of Iranians were accepted. And in Syria, 21.2% of Iranians applied for landed immigrant status. As the data suggest, Western European countries, Pakistan, Turkey and Syria are the most "popular" intermediary countries for Iranian transmigrants.

Two issues emerge here which have already been discussed previously. First, Eastern countries populated by Iranian immigrants or refugee populations are not necessarily the actual destinations for these Iranians. Rather, they are only gateways to the West (especially to the United States and Canada). It is in the West that refugee claimants or immigrant applicants have a better chance of "becoming immigrants." Second, different countries within the West play the role of intermediary "space" for Iranians whose goal is to reside in Canada.

In Syria, for example, between 1980 and 1998, 60% of Iranian applicants were accepted under the family reunion or the assisted family categories (See Table 7). In Syria and Canada, 69% of all assisted family and family reunion applications were accepted (See Tables 7 and 8). During the same period, 51.2% of Iranian immigrant applications were accepted under the family class category, in Syria. Only 520 Iranians applied for refugee status in Damascus. That is, it is through the Canadian immigration offices in Syria and Canada, that Iranians in Canada sponsor their family members. Syria, as a "friendly" country, plays the role of an intermediary country due to its close political and economic ties with Iran.

Except for refugee claimants, the rest of the Iranian applicants, whose applications were processed outside Canada, did not require them to reside in a third country. I know a number of Iranians who traveled to other parts the world for their interviews with Canadian immigration officials. After the interview, they moved back to Iran until their applications were approved. The cost of travelling is high. In the light of high unemployment, high inflation, high black market rate for one US dollar, many peasants, tribal and lower middle class families are not in a position to leave Iran. Not because they do not wish to out-migrate from Iran, they cannot afford the cost involved in becoming an immigrant.

One solution, however, is for one member of the family to leave Iran and pave the road for the rest to enter Canada as landed immigrants. For example, one low-ranking government official, whose application for refugee status is currently being processed, mentioned to me that he is waiting for his result and as soon as he is accepted, the "plan" is to bring his wife and children. In the last year and a half, he has been working full time, not only to pay for their expenses here, but to save money for the expenses associated with sponsoring the rest of his family.

Many Iranians, in fact, apply for their immigrant status in Canada. For example, between 1980 and 1998, for example, 38% of Iranian immigrants' applications were processed (See

Table 8). For some Iranians, Canada plays two roles: first, as the destination, and second, as an "intermediary space" before such applicants are accepted or move to the United States. For some Iranians, Canada is the gateway to the United States. A roommate of mine arrived in Canada from Turkey as a refugee claimant and while his case was in the process of being adjudicated, he decided to cross the border to the United States. His whole family was already living there, and he wanted to join them. Another Iranian immigrant, who came from Turkey after escaping Iran, recently returned from the United States where he was living and working for the last two years. His reason for moving to the United States was due to his belief that in the United States, there are better business opportunities available to individuals. He also has friends in California whom he became acquainted with in Turkey, while he lived there as a refugee claimant. In this sense, the West is "graded" and "hierarchized" and certain countries like the United States and Canada are considered as more "desirable" than others. The aim is not to travel to the West alone, rather in many cases the aim is to transmigrate to a specific geographical location in the West through other Eastern and Western countries.

2.19 Iranian Refugee Claimants in Canada: defying the Canadian immigration policy, globalization of law, gender, representing "danger," and class perceptions

In Canada, most of the applicants were accepted under the refugee and designated classes (63.5%); and 25.4% of the applicants were accepted as independent class (See Table 8). More specific, in 1989, 1,029 Iranians applied for refugee status, 7.6% of the total number of all refugee claimants within Canada (Immigration and Refugee Board, 1989). However, from the above mentioned number, 950 were referred to the second refugee claimant hearing, out of which only 588 cases were heard. Out of the 588 cases, 422 applications were accepted. That is, after reaching the final stage of the refugee hearing, the probability of one's acceptance is at about 90%. In 1991, 54% (1,095) of all Iranian refugee cases were decided within Canada (For a discussion of the refugee determination system see Gilad, 1990:149-161).

The process is not, however, a smooth one. For instance, one nineteen-year old Iranian refugee claimant explained to me that, while his brothers' and mother's refugee applications were finalized, his case is still in the court system. After six years of living here, another Iranian immigrant who is not involved in any illegal activities was to be deported from Canada because his application was turned down by the refugee determination board. Since 1996, due to changes made to the Immigration Act, those refugee claimants who are considered as a danger to the public by the Canadian government can be removed from Canada. For instance, two Iranians involved in drug trafficking and other criminal activities were to be deported on a minister's order in 1996 (Murray Hogben, Whig-Standard, September 11, 1996, "Courts to Hear Appeals of Pair Facing Deportation").

By entering Canada and applying for asylum or refugee status, Iranian refugee claimants "ignore" and "challenge" the attempt of the Canadian government to choose among a pool of refugees in other parts of the world. In a sense, they bring the Refugee Determination Process and decision making into Canada (Adelman, 1991:202-206) and "involve" the Canadian legal system into the process as they challenge refugee boards' decisions of what is considered as the definition of convention refugees. That is, the definition becomes individualized within a global setting.

In the case of female Iranians, their status as women in Iran is considered as a basis for receiving refugee or humanitarian status. In a news release on May, 9 1994, Kranc Mamann, a Barrister and Solicitor, states that a female judge of the Federal Court of Canada had to "overturn a decision of the [Immigration and Refuge] Board denying a women's claim of fear of prosecution in Iran for violations of Iran's strict Islamic dress code. That is, laws within Canada regarding what is considered as human rights violations in other parts of the world are challenged by asylum seekers through the court system within Canada. The woman's lawyer

stated that Canada's high court has recognized "it is women who are the specific victim's of this harsh law [in Iran]."

Judge D. McGill of Toronto (April 13, 1994) in her final judgment regarding the case of a female Iranian involved in the distribution of "anti-government" pamphlets and who was detained for her defiance of the Islamic dress code writes

> The Islamic dress code is a law applicable only to women in Iran. It dictates the manner in which Iranian women must dress to comply with the religious beliefs of the theocratic governing regime and prescribes punishments for any violation of the law. The board erred in law in concluding that for the purpose of its analysis that the Islamic dress code was a law of general application... . ... I am further of the opinion that the Board erred in law in concluding that a violation of the Islamic dress code, as a law of general application, could not form the basis of a well founded fear of persecution.

In this representation of Iran and in the framework of bureaucratic and legal decision making processes, Iran is portrayed as a country in which human rights are denied. What is of more interest is that lawyers and judges in the West become the advocates of rights of victims of discriminatory laws in the East. They challenge Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board decisions in regards to what ought to be considered as justifiable fear of punishment. They rewrite Canadian law by references to how to interpret the laws of other countries in the light of the definition of the convention refugee. Moreover, the construction of identities for Iranian women, their roles and their social positions in life are no longer issues which are individual, local and an aspect of life in Iran. They are global constructions, which are contested at local, institutional and individual levels in both the West and the East in contradictory ways.

Consider the case of Zaria. In 1989, Zaria, a member of L'Association des femmes Iraniennes de Montreal, who initially participated in the revolution, " left because she was tired." "Tired of the whole situation; tired of walking down the street worrying that my *Chadoor* wasn't just right'" (In Marshall, SFU, 1995:7). What "the whole situation" refers to is the lack of legal and political rights for women after the revolution. According to Marshall, "women [were] betrayed by [the] Iranian revolution" (Ibid.). The restrictive nature of Islamic law as "it is used by

the government" is one of the main problems in Iran. Zaria came to Canada as a result of policies which she labels as undemocratic and sexist.

Many young female adults also "immigrated" to Canada as a result of policies which they label as undemocratic and sexist. Yet, the same policies are viewed as emancipatory and progressive by those women who support the Iranian government. A Zane-Ruz (Today's Women) journalist, for example, was quoted as stating that "I suppose you think we are subject to men here. Well I have got five men under my orders" (Simpson, Manchester Guardian, July 22, 1990).

In *Paik-e Ruz*, a publication of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic in Canada (Summer, 1995:21) a Russian journalist's account of his stay in Iran and his thoughts about Iranian women are explored in a lengthy article. Iranian women who did not wear the *Chadoor* [a veil or mantle worn by Persian women to cover their bodies and hair] preferred to accept the *Hijab* [veil] after the revolution. Iranian women behave freely in the streets and mosques. In every respect they have equal rights to that of men. Women can become university professors and constitute half of the teacher population. In fact, Iranian women's participation in the economy has increased by 75 percent. Ayatollah Khomeini, the article states, supports their interests and protects the rights of families and children.

In contrast to such constructions of social events in Iran, Fatemeh E. Moghadam (1994:96) concludes that gender inequality in the form of occupational segregation and discrimination against women has increased as a result of emphasis on Islamic philosophy since the revolution. However, she continues by stating that such inequality "is likely to have more impact on the position of poor women in the family than that of the more affluent." For Zaria, gender inequality within Iran seems to be an influential factor in her decision to "immigrate" to Canada. As the head of the Iranian women's association, her attempt to bring attention to women's suffrage and rights in Iran, finds a new format and a new audience in the West.

Zaria's reason for leaving Iran is not peculiar to her and is shared by other female and male Iranians. Gender inequality, however, may not explain out-migration and movement of all Iranian women to Canada. Rather, the cumulative effects of the socio-economic-religious and economic policies of the current regime explains the departure of females, a majority of whom are married with dependent children. That is, women's inequality can only partly explain their departure. For many women who (or whose husbands) were well connected to the Shah's government or were politically involved, their immigration is partly as a result of their class and political beliefs rather than gender biases prevalent in the society.

Gender inequality, one would suspect, would have forced many single adult females to leave Iran as individuals as well. However, it seems to be the other way around. Their limited out-migration is partly the result of gender discrimination prevalent in Iran (See chapter three). In Canada, for example, only a small percentage of Iranian "immigrants" were single adult females. A majority of single adult females came under immigration categories of refugee class, family reunion and independent class. They, however, comprised only 5.9% of refugees, 6.2% of family reunion class and 3.3% of the independent category. It is important for immigration officials to note the lack of representation by single adult females and to open the process to them, especially as refugees or independent classes. By providing support services within the Iranian community in association with government and non-government organizations, perhaps more women like their single adult male counterparts can immigrate to Canada.

Refugee claimants and their "high" numbers, nevertheless, are sometimes portrayed in the media as undermining the Canadian social system. West Vancouver Reform MP John Reynolds, in reference to the deportation hearing of an Iranian family whose son was arrested on the charges of murder, commented that, "We do not want criminals coming to this country, we have enough of our own. We don't need to import them" (Anne Marie D'Angelo, "WV MP rejects father's appeal," the North Shore News, [On line]. Available:

<http:www.nsnews.com/backissue.html.>, 1997). Here, Iranian refugee claimants are seen as representations of the *other* in the light of criminal activities. The "we" seems to refer only to White Canadians since the co-accused who has his Canadian citizenship is distinguished from the non-immigrant population by mentioning his place of birth: *Iran*. On the one hand, Canada is portrayed as a country, which is being abused because of its humanitarian stance. On the other hand, Iranian refugees are viewed as "dangerous" and their presence is seen as undermining the most basic elements of the Canadian society: law and order.

Iranian refugees are considered as a burden on taxpayers. Their arrival is seen as something unwanted which limit Canada's "right" to select from immigrant/refugees abroad. In one article, Iranian asylum seekers in Canada are depicted by references to: a) Islamic fundamentalism, b) an immigration consulting business, c) smuggling of refugees and assisting in filing false refugee claims, d) spousal abuse, e) criminal convictions, and f) the so-called "Persian Pride" gang (Anne Marie D'Angelo "Immigration Charges Considered," the North Shore News, [On line]. Available: <http:www.nsnews.com/backissue.html.>, 1997). These negative representations of Iranian transmigrants in the local media in British Columbia are reflective of ethnic tensions in Vancouver and especially in North Vancouver with its well-established Iranian community. As it is stated in another article entitled "A taste of Persia" (the North Shore News [On line]. Available: <http:www.nsnews.com/backissue.html.>, 1997),

> "Not exactly household name in old North Vancouver. But, hey, this is not old North Vancouver anymore.... Not your typical North Shore restaurant experience, for sure, but Persepolis offers an authentic slice of Persian dining that is well worth savoring."

As the above example implies, North Vancouver is no longer populated by white middle and working class "Canadians" but it is home to a growing number of Iranians. Their presence in North Vancouver is portrayed as something different which has altered the "normal" cultural characteristics of that city. Rather than considering Iranians in North Vancouver as part of the

fabric of social and economic relations in Vancouver, they are viewed as altering the "typical North Shore...experience."

Biased views towards (Iranian) refugees are also expressed among Iranians. Ali mentions that

> I know one person in the United States [who has] certain views with respect to Chinese people, that resembles the general view of the American people, what you hear in the media, about immigrants in the United States. And the same family has the same sort of ideas about Iranians who are abusing the welfare system of Europe and in a way, they paint the picture, as if one of the reasons why Europe and the United States is going through all these cuts and what not is because of immigrants of the Third World coming and abusing the system, like there is no abuse by the white people here. (sic)

A number of wealthy Iranians have also commented to me that some "low class" Iranians have become refugees (as a result immigrants) in Europe and North America. Asylum seekers in Canada, for example, are portrayed as "fake" claimants by some individuals in the Iranian community (See Gilad, 1990). Such views are also held by some Canadian organizations and political groups. As well, immigrants are seen as a financial drain on Canada, despite the fact that most studies point out that "there is no proof immigrants are a drain on the economy" (Diane Finehart. "opposition to newcomers on the rise, analyst say," the Vancouver Sun, January 14, 1994).

Their perceptions imply that non-European "refugees" abuse Western welfare systems. In such cases, the process of *othering* Iranian refugees by *other* Iranians is based on a set of class and status perceptions which find their roots in Iran rather than in Canada. Nevertheless, it perpetuates the dominant views regarding the "refugee problem" in Canada. In this sense, biased views are not *nation-state* specific but global. In Iran, Afghan refugees are also viewed as "dangerous" by the elite and the general public, due to the perceived "criminal" activities of Afghans in Iran. They are constructed much the same way as Iranian refugees are constructed in the West. The process of *othering* refugees cuts across nationalities, ethnicities and socio-

economic classes and serves to perpetuate the dominant elite views regarding "insider" and "outsider" divisions in Iran, Canada, Pakistan and other parts of the world.

More studies, however, need to be done to evaluate the extent to which such biased views cut across Iranian communities in different nation-states and affect relations between Iranians. For example, the death of more than nine Iranian refugee youths in a fire in a Disco in Sweden, which was set off by racist groups, has angered many Iranians around the world from different socio-economic classes, ideological and religious backgrounds, despite the prevalence of negative views towards refugees among some Iranians (Shahrvan-e Vancouver, Friday November 6 and 13, 1998:1).

What seems very important, nevertheless, is that refugee status is viewed as a transnational characteristic of Iranians and it is contextualized by references to class and status differences in different parts of the world. It is a discourse that is global yet it takes place in specific localities and in particular instances. In an Iranian concert in the Hyatt Hotel in Vancouver, for example, a young wealthy Iranian, pointing to a group of young adults of ethnic and working class backgrounds, told me in derogatory tone "What do these refugees want here?" His statement may not be a reflection of the views of many Iranians, since a large number of them have been admitted as *refugees*. But, it is a reflection of a divided community which dichotomizes itself with references to one's immigrant status within the context of class differences.

One important draw back of such biased views is that in cases where government policies limit immigration to those who are financially well off, such Iranians may not object and express their discontent. Their lack of concern may be due to the fact that, because of their economic position, they are not affected by such policies. In recent years, in fact, the legislative review of Canada's immigration policy, "endorses and expands existing government efforts to recruit upscale immigrants" (The Vancouver Sun, Peter Rekai "Immigrant dream team not a sure

winner," January 16,1998:A17). Investors, entrepreneurs and highly educated individuals have become the preferred "types" of immigrants.

2.20 Transmigrant Refugees: movement of Iranians to Canada through Pakistan and Turkey and conflicting global constructions of *otherness*

Most applicants in Pakistan (93.2%) and Turkey (77%) were refugee claimants (See Tables 9 and 10). Of all applications for Canadian refugee status 78% were filed in Pakistan and Turkey. In more recent years, however, fewer immigrant applications were filed in Pakistan and Turkey, which may be due to tighter border control by the Iranian armed forces. Despite such variations, Pakistan, Canada and Turkey become connected entities through the role of UNHCR in relocating Iranians. They are also connected through a web of asylum seekers who move from one country (Pakistan) to another (Canada) in hope of being accepted as immigrants.

In a memorandum concerning an Iranian refugee claimant in Canada and his treatment in Pakistan, for example, the Immigration and Refugee Board Documentation Center in Ottawa writes (Request Number: 3090, 1 December, 1989),

> There are very few Iranian refugees in Pakistan (relative to the millions of Afghan refugees). A total of 2,364 Iranian were registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at the end of 1988. In the World Refugee Survey, it is mentioned that 'the majority of the Iranian refugees are believed to be Baha'is or Christians'. Following clashes between pro- and anti-Khomeini Iranians in Quetta and Karachi, the Pakistani government announced (in September 1987) that all people who had entered Pakistan illegally would be deported to their country of origin. Iranians are permitted to remain in Pakistan if recognized by the UNHCR with a possibility of being resettled elsewhere.

As such, in 1988, the Canadian government accepted 400 Iranian refugees. In the previous year, 140 were accepted. In 1989, 394 were admitted (See Table 9). However, the number of Iranian refugees accepted by Canada in Pakistan (and Turkey) is a small proportion of Iranian refugees and asylum seekers in that country (and Turkey). The Canadian government's attempt to accept Iranian refugees abroad is a program which reaches a few individuals and does not really address why such individuals leave Iran in the first place (Adelman, 1991). With

a large number of Iranians living in Turkey as temporary migrants, Canada has accepted only a small number of them as refugees.

Many Iranians living in Turkey travel to Canada in order to apply for refugee or immigrant status within this country. About six years ago, for example, I met an Iranian family (wife, husband and a child) who had just arrived in Canada and applied for refugee status in the Vancouver International airport. They had come to Vancouver from Turkey and did not know anyone. Their only friends were in Toronto. But, the ticket, which their smuggler bought for them, was to Vancouver rather than Toronto. The man contacted me from his hotel room after two days and told me that they were moving to Toronto, where family and friends could help them settle down. As this example and other research show, smugglers play an important role in the transmigration of Iranian refugee claimants to Canada and other parts of the world (See Koser, 1997:599; Gilad, 1990).

In comparison to their large numbers in Pakistan and Turkey, the limited number of Iranians accepted as refugees in Pakistan and Turkey may explain why many travel to Canada and apply for the convention refugee status. As it is mentioned below, in Canada, they have a legal avenue to challenge the process. The movement of Iranians refugee seekers towards Canada or other countries is also directly related to: a) the human rights abuses against Iranians and b) ideological conflicts among Iranians in Pakistan and Turkey.

Despite variations in the number of refugees accepted in Pakistan, many of the Baha'i refugees are accepted by the Canadian government in Pakistan. For Baha'i Iranians, revolution marks their flight as a religious minority. How did they view the indigenous ethnic groups in the Baluchistan region of Iran and Pakistan? One Baha'i male (in Gilad, 1992:57), for example, refers to Baluchistan as

> "It was Baluchistan and it was a strange and different city. The people look different and the clothes and colors are different... . We were afraid of the Baluchi because they killed for money."

Another female Baha'i escaping Iran, refers to her guide and his occupation as "Many people are killed doing this. It is a lucrative job, though, because there is a lot of money in taking people out and they bring drugs or other things back." As these Baha'is are escaping the discriminatory views and policies of the Islamic government through Baluchistan to Pakistan, they view the Baluch through the same lenses the Islamic Republic views them: *prejudice*. In fact, when I originally wanted to do my fieldwork among the Baluch people, I was told by both Canadians and Iranians that, "be careful it is a dangerous place, they kill for nothing."

Their views do not account for the fact that Baluchistan is the least developed part of Iran (Baloch, 1987). During the Pahlavi era, as Beck (1990:185) explains, tribal groups were portrayed as "dangerous" and "lawless bandits" in many publications and film series. During and since the revolution, tribal conflicts in Kurdistan and religious clashes between Sunni and Shiite groups in Western Iran are portrayed as "dangerous" by the central government of Iran. The majority of development in the region has been for military reasons and the need for expedient land access to the ports of the Sea of Oman, rather than the improvement of life for the Baluch. Since the Reza Shah time, the military presence has been a major characteristic of this region. Forced relocation and the nationalization of "their" forest and "their" land have had devastating effects for the Baluch people, who have access only to a limited number of educational and job prospects.

Such representations of the Baluch also find space in the Canadian media. In an article titled "A new conflict, a new battlefront," by Bijan Torabi, Iran's economic, military and internal conflicts are discussed by references to Baluch tribes and their role as "counter-revolutionaries" and "drug traffickers." The sub-title reads: "After a terrible decade long war with Iraq, Iran is now concerned about the East, where religious dissidents are threatening the country's mullahs and drug runners are arriving from Pakistan and Afghanistan." Baluch and their identity as a

Sunni and non-Persian tribal group are viewed in the context of the desire of the Shiite government to control its peripheries. In a sense, the region is represented as a volatile geographical part of the world in which tribalism, religious fanaticism and national policies are undermining its security. The two pictures in this article are of an Iranian militant woman with a rocket launcher in a black *Chadoor* and of the Spiritual leader of Iran in a dark setting/background, in which only a small part of his face is shown. These pictures are not of Baluch people. They are more representations of Iran as a "different" place and "militant" in "nature." The message which is being communicated to the readers of the Globe and Mail by manipulating Baluch position is well captured in the sub-title of the article, "Ayatollah Khamenei reviewing troops and Iranian woman displaying her might with a rocket launcher: more treats" (Saturday, November 19, 1994:d4).

As Iranians move to Canada their memories and experiences in these countries take the form of oral histories. Consider the following letter, written to Ali (in Belgium) by his high school friend Farid who lived in Turkey at the time, his friend states

> I am writing to you to ask you some questions about medical schools in Belgium. God my witness, I have been in Turkey for almost four months and at least the truth is that in this period I have been "fucked." I have had it and that's why I want to leave this "shity" country. I want to go some where which is all right. Dear Ali people here are all "mother fuckers", only God knows, they are stupid, and you can find from a thief to a smuggler amongst these people.... Couple nights ago, my roommates wanted to steal my passport and money because I had a fight with them. Let me not talk about the police here, all of them are thieves and take bribes. ... God, save me from this "cemetery," I am fucked, I just hope for it to end. My father is coming from Italy and he'll be here soon. But can you send me an invitation or ask your friends see if any one could send me an invitation. I am sending this letter to you express so it gets to you as soon as possible. (sic)

An important issue, which emerges from this and other letters, is how Iranians perceive and imagine the West. In the first letter, United States is referred to as the "best" country in comparison to other nation-states. The West (Belgium or Italy) in Farid's letter is considered as the destination. Turkey, on the other hand, is conceptualized as a "cemetery." In reality,

however, it plays the role of an intermediary place before he can find his way into a Western country. What is interesting is that there is no mention of the possibility of going back to Iran. Rather, despite the difficulties faced in Turkey, Farid's aim is to enter any medical school in the West. But in order to get to the West, like many other youths during the war, Farid first had to escape to Turkey.

In his letter, Turkey is constructed by references to his personal experiences as an Iranian middle class refugee. He speaks of corruption and the lack of respect for human rights in Turkey. Such a view is often expressed by those Iranians who lived in that country during the 1980s and 1990s (See Bauer, 1993, for the effects of corruption in Pakistan on Iranian Asylum seekers). Farid's desperation in getting an invitation to leave Turkey for a Western European country is no longer based on his desire to travel to the West alone. The West becomes a "more" desirable place because of his negative experiences in Turkey. It is his lack of legal status and rights which personifies "the West as the best." .

Due to his personal experiences, he does not have a positive image of Turkey and its people. His direct or indirect references to corruption and human rights violations construct Turkey as a chaotic country. His experiences, on the other hand, are reflections of how Turkish society and government view Iranians. His negative experiences are partly due to ethnocentrism surrounding the dichotomy between Persians and Turks. The Turkish government's return of Iranian refugee claimants back to Iran, which undermines the safety of many of these individuals, is reflective of a lack of concern for human and minority rights(i.e.: towards Kurdish people). In an ironic twist, in Turkey, Iranians and Kurds play the role of minorities and are discriminated against, much in the same way the Turkish workers are discriminated in Germany or Kurds and Baha'is are in Iran: in the name of ethno-nationalism.

In Germany, as Piroz mentions,

> Most Iranians are sympathetic [towards Turkish people in Germany] because [Iranians] truly understand what it means to live in a foreign country such as Germany as [minorities]. (Sic)

Piroz lived most of his youth in Germany. As they moved to Germany after the revolution, he asked his parent to place him in a boarding school. In that school, he experienced discrimination not as an Iranian but as a "Turk." As previously mentioned, Piroz identified himself as German despite the fact that he experienced discrimination as a child. His identity politics as an Iranian is not a matter of being Persian in a Persian dominated society anymore. In contrast, his Iranian identity takes a peripheral position to that of the dominant German identity. He, nevertheless, distinguishes himself from a Turk because of the negative effects of overt racial discrimination towards Turks in Germany.

His Iranian identity distinguishes him from Germans and Turks. This division is not brought about by his own desire. Rather, he is put in situations in which he needs to react to biased views towards ethnic Turks by identifying himself as an Iranian. In other words, he distinguishes himself in respect to other ethnicities when his German identity is denied (i.e.: when he is referred to as a Turk). It is not that he saw Iranians as superior to Turks. He explains,

> Well, I never had a personal relationship [with Turks]. The reason was basically, I was a minority myself and I happened to be staying with a German couple that didn't have any relationships. ... And it was a small town in Germany, and then, it wasn't such a visible minority as it is in the late eighties and nineties and we are talking about the seventies now, starting with my school year in 1970 through 1982. ... the only thing I knew was that all these people were lighter than me, nobody had a suntan. I was the only one with a suntan and they all turned red when they went in the sun.... The fact was, I myself was sometimes discriminated against and people would call me you Turkish bastard and all that and I would tell them that I'm Iranian for two reasons: probably wanting to differentiate the fact that I'm from Iran not from Turkey or saying that I am Iranian because Iranians are better than the Turks. But I think my view would have been that I just wanted to say where I come from geographically....Germany is a very disciplined tidy country, its like clockwork, and the Turkish people, when you drove by "little Istanbul" you noticed. The reason you noticed was it wasn't as tidy, it was messy. The people were dressed in their local outfits. The men had rarely ever shaved. But I didn't look at it as bad because I knew that where I came from, it was the same. It was just them living their own life and they had every right. But I also understood why the Germans separate themselves from this particular community. And a lot of it has to do with appearance, I believe. ... That's what they were offered originally in the sixties, the

> German government hired a lot of Turkish people to come do their dirty work. The fact that this is the way it is does not justify by any means, for the Germans to treat the Turks the way they are. I mean sure there is cultural differences, but somewhere along the line you've got to stop, and with the history that Germany has, it's a sad event to see, to have to experience. ... And that in itself was a reason for more acceptance on my part, with the Germans, and I had become integrated, I had become them in a sense, that I did everything that they did. I ate their food, I did their play, I know their songs, I know their history and so I never personally had that many, I had a few run-ins with discrimination. But in terms of the view, I'm almost inclined to say that in a way I was indifferent. Not to say I didn't care, I was conscious, but I didn't have any relationship with them, and given at that age, you probably tend not to think about these things. (sic)

Piroz feels German not because he is not critical of ethnic and racial inequality in Germany. In fact, he explains that as he got older such incidents made him disappointed with Germany. Yet, he feels he did not really have to face discrimination because of his ability to speak fluent German. His middle class position in Germany may have also played an important role in downplaying the effects of racism on his experiences and everyday interactions. In Germany, as he points out, people are socialized to have a certain view of what it is to be German, living in a "structured" social-economic and cultural system. Turks and their presence in Germany undermined that social image of Germany.

It is the process of *othering* etrhno-national groups such as Turks, which perpetuates the "racialization" of ethno-national identities in Germany and in other parts of the world. As mentioned, for Piroz, identity is defined not necessarily by references to Iranian and German "civilizations" but by reference to the third *other*, the Turks. His identification as Iranian is an indirect reaction to being labeled Turkish in a racially divided Germany. On the other hand, for Farid, the Turkish national character is a racist dominant ethno-national group. Turkey is depicted in the same light as "Little Istanbul" is by racist Germans. In Turkey, it is the Iranian or Kurd who is discriminated against. In Germany, to a racist German, the difference between a Turk, a Kurd and an Iranian seem to be unimportant. To Turks, Iranians or Kurds, however, economic, cultural and ethnic divisions and differences in the East seem to be defining factors in dividing, rather than in uniting them as minorities in Germany.

The process of *othering* ethnic minorities by other minorities in the United States has also been a dividing factor. During the Hostage Crisis, for example, Arab shop owners in the United States placed signs on their windows stating that: "they are not Iranians," so their shops would not be targeted by arsonists (Bozorgmehr, 1997). A decade or so later, during the Persian Gulf War, Iranian shop owners set up signs claiming: "they are not Iraqi (Arab)." Although, their decisions seem to be functional and practical, they are also partly reflections of their attitudes towards *otherness*. By ignoring racism faced by other minorities, however, one is nevertheless involved in the perpetuation of elite ideology.

In these examples, "national characters" are imagined and constructed within the context of colonial relations in the post-colonial world. These ethno-national groups are no longer defined in terms of one specific *nation-state* but by references to ethnic enclaves such as "little Iran" in Los Angeles, in North Vancouver and other major metropolitan centers around the world.

The above argument suggests that one's ethnic position in relation to elite position affects how one is perceived, and how one views the *other*. On the one hand, the division between the Turks and Iranians is a political issue. It find expressions in ethno-historical documents such as the Shahnahme of Firdowsi (Keddie, 1981). In his account, the separation of people and land is expressed through the dichotomy of Turan and Iran. In Germany, on the other hand, Iranians (mainly middle class) view (working class) Turks as minorities like themselves. It is their shared minority position as Orientals with similar histories which groups them together. But, their national origins and class positions divide them in Germany. Such historical divisions seem to have different manifestations depending one one's ethnicity, geographical location, class and historical period.

2.21 **From the Globe to Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal: Iranians as Ethnic Canadians**

Between 1980 to 1998, 60% of Iranians intended to settle in Ontario; 18.2% were destined to British Columbia; 15.1% intended to live in Quebec; 4.5% intended to reside in Alberta. In

1991, 57.4% of Iranian ethnics resided in Ontario, 18.1% in British Columbia; 15.6% in Quebec; 4.8% in Alberta. In total, 14.5% of Iranian ethnics were living in Montreal. The majority of Iranian ethnics (44%) lived in Toronto; and Vancouver (16.4%). In 1996, 56.3% of the population lived in Ontario followed by British Columbia, which was home to 22.8% of the population; 14.5% resided in Quebec and 3.6% in Alberta. The majority of the Iranian population lived in Toronto (44.8%), Montreal (13.2%), Ottawa (10.3%), Hamilton (1.5%), Calgary (2%), and Vancouver (20.5%).

Since 1991, more Iranians have moved to Vancouver, and fewer people have chosen to live in Quebec. In fact, one of the top immigrant source countries for Vancouver in 1995, 1996 and 1997 was Iran. Moreover, in Vancouver, newly arrived immigrants from Iran placed in 8th, 6th and 6th positions respectively for the above mentioned years. In Toronto, Iranian immigrants arriving there ranked 11th, 7th, and 7th for the mentioned period (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1997:15,19). Despite the movement of Iranians between these geographical locations, Vancouver, Montreal and Toronto are the preferred locations for the majority of the Iranian population.

Although recent Iranian immigrants who immigrated between 1991 and the first four months of 1996 have mainly settled in Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal, only in Vancouver did they rank seventh among newly arrived immigrants from other parts of the world with 4,600 individuals (Statistics Canada, Catalogue No. 93F0023XDB96003: 1996 Census). In Ottawa, recent immigrants born in Iran placed ninth with slightly more than 1,000 Iranians arriving in that city (Ibid.). For this reason, in this chapter and chapter four, the focus is on how Iranians in Vancouver are constructed and represented in the local media.

2.22 Citizenship, Place of Birth and Iranian Transmigrants in Canada: the cases of Piroz and Kayvan

Although many Iranians come to this country after long-term residence in other countries, before entering Canada, the majority of Iranians were mainly Iranian citizens. From 1980 to 1989, for example, 91.2% were Iranian citizens; 1.8% were citizens of other countries, mainly of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Arab Gulf States (See Table 11 and 12). Beginning in 1980, however, there was a sudden rise in the number of stateless Iranians. From 1980 to 1998, 7% of the total of Iranian transmigrants were accepted as stateless individuals. However, by 1998, their numbers had declined to only two individuals. Their identification as stateless individuals may be interpreted as a symbolic sign of showing their disapproval with the Iranian government's policies.

According to the Target Group Profile data (Statistics Canada, 1991Census) the majority of Iranian ethnic immigrants were born in Iran (See Table 12). According to the same source, 17,470 Iranian ethnics had become Canadian citizens, slightly more than 40% of Iranian. This trend in obtaining their Canadian citizenship is a function of several interrelated factors. First, it is a reflection of the desire of Iranians to establish their roots in Canada as citizens of this country with full voting powers. Second, it is partly due to travel restrictions put on Iranian passport holders to other parts of the world: a Canadian passport seems to be an easy solution to this problem. Becoming a full citizen not only makes one an eligible voter, but also provides Iranians with a passport which as far as obtaining visas is concerned does not bias against them. As the above suggests, it seems that in the late twentieth century and in the context of the globalization of information and economy, one of the characteristics of Iranian transnationals is their multiple citizenship.

All the informants are Canadian citizens. Are they Iranians or Canadians? In response to this question, Piroz replies,

> It's really hard to say whether you feel Iranian or Canadian.... Surely, on some issues, you are Canadian because your taking advantage of the social system of Canada. You are a citizen of Canada. You [as an immigrant] are contributing to unemployment insurance, pension plans, you pay the taxes. .... Or when you say what is it being an Iranian? People immediately say well Iranian, its gormesabzi [food], and ghali [carpet], its pistachios, its poetry, the science, the landscape, all that you know. And you associate being an Iranian with all that. And being Canadian, you know, [I don't have many close relationships] .... But, yah, okay, if I really want to think about it, it boils down to what kind of people you have contact with in daily life, and right now, ... I'm not working right now full time, As a result, my contacts are 99% with Iranians... in a social way, in terms of your daily life, your experiences, I am an Iranian, but ... the fact that physically you're living in a part of the world that is called Canada, ... and you're existing by being part of the grinding wheel called society.

Although he defines himself by references to the boundaries of nation-states, his identity is not a matter of being culturally Iranian or Canadian. It is a matter of providing space for his multi-geographical experiences. He is Canadian legally. Culturally he is Iranian (and German). He is Canadian because as a social actor he participates in the labor market and he uses the services provided by established institutions in Canada. When he refers to his social networks and close friends in Canadian society, his identity is defined by references to Iran. In this sense, his identity politics is defined by references to different socio-political spaces and cultural practices, which are in conflict with one another. The conflict is resolved by viewing his relationships by references to legal and cultural factors, enabling him to express his "lived" experiences in both the West and the East.

Piroz expresses his views, however, by references to criteria which have become popular means of constructing people-hood: ethno-national characteristics. What is interesting is that his references to Iranian culture (i.e.: food, carpets, literature and science) construct Iran as a civilized and "tasteful" country. His conceptualization of Iranian poetry and literary writings are not necessarily in terms of Turkish and other minority works. It only refers to Persian civilization, despite ethnic diversity within Iran.

Such a Persian-centric image is the manifestation of years of nation-building project, which has been a major tool in the production, and reproduction of Iranian national identity. He defines "self" by references to the dominant Iranian-Persian culture within the context of legal and economic relations in Canada. In this manner, the East and the West are interwoven and also separated in a complementary manner. For him, citizenship is a tool which enables him to feel at "home" with "his" culture.

Kayvan is also a citizen of Canada. As mentioned, for him, after the revolution, he came to the realization that he had no legal status in England. For him, becoming a citizen is conceptualized as the next stage in his transmigratory experience. It is a movement from the immigrant stage to the final stage: a legal citizen of Canada. However, regardless of how he sees himself (i.e.: as a Canadian or Iranian), he is viewed as an Iranian by people around him. That is, in his everyday activities, his self-definition as a citizen of Canada are questioned. In one incident, he was waiting to turn into another street, when a car pulled over and the man gave him the finger for no apparent reason. Kayvan mentions that, "this is in North Van; straight away he comes out and he says, you fucking Iranian go back home.... Go back to where you come from." He attributes such incidents to the effects of views expressed in the NorthShore News, especially by Mr. Doug Collins. He says: "some of the things that he's been writing about Iranians got me thinking too because, although I'm a citizen, what he writes affects me, because whether I like it or not I am Iranian and secondly I'm still seen as Iranian through the words he puts to his readers." His citizenship is a legal document, a subjective way of belonging somewhere. At times, however, his Canadian status is ignored. Ironically, he is seen only as an Iranian, despite his Turkish ethnic identity.

Conclusion Part B

The above arguments point to three characteristics of Iranian transmigrants in Canada. First, they have lived in more than two nation-states. Second, they have multiple citizenship. And, third, Iranians are linked through informal and formal organizations and groups to other Iranians in different parts of the world.

Their movement around the world is characterized by: a) ideological, political differences and the cultural policies of the past and present Iranian governments, b) class hierarchy and the lack of economic growth since the end of the war, and c) the image of the West as a solution to their socio-economic conditions. Their movement to Canada is affected by: a) the classification of the Baha'is of Iran as humanitarian refugees; b) the emphasis on admitting immigrants under independent and investor classes; and c) the presence of family and friends in Canada (i.e.: through the family reunion category). It is a community that is concentrated in three major cities: Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. In Canada, in comparison to other ethnicities and recent immigrants, only in Vancouver and Ottawa do Iranian ethnics comprise a significant population of recent immigrants into Canada.

It is a community which is divided based on factors such as political beliefs, class, period of immigration and religious affiliations. Their immigration to Canada is reflective of how due to the reforms introduced since the mid-1850s they moved across the globe and how since 1978 they traveled to Canada not only from Iran but also as Iranian foreign students, businessmen, refugees and illegal aliens living in other countries.

The constructions of Iranian identities, then, are best understood by reflecting back on how their national identities are reproduced in both Western and non-Western parts of the world. Their experiences in these countries with their different cultural, social and economic relations

should be considered when discussing and analyzing their identity formations as Iranians in Canada.

The Iranian community is no longer predominantly an "immigrant" population. It is a well established population with a growing number of Canadian citizens among them. To conceptualize Iranians as solely immigrants or refugees is to deny any space for their transnational experiences. They move within categories such as refugees, immigrants, citizens, students and tourists in both the East and the West. As such, in order to define themselves, they (and others) travel beyond the boundaries of the West and include the history of the East as a constitutive defining element of their identity constructions. What seems to bring all these categories together is how race, nationality, geographical location and discriminatory views affect one's identity politics. Using Ian Angus' terminology, Iranians in Canada are reflections of the growing number of "borders within Canada." However, it is not a political border, but rather a cultural border defined by references to Iran's national borders, racial ideology and the West-East dichotomy.

Chapter Three:

a segmented Iranian population, demography, income, occupation and education and their implications in Canada

Introduction: diversity among Iranian transmigration before and after their arrival in Canada

In this chapter, the "idea" of the Iranian population as a segmented community is explored by references to their demographic characteristics (i.e.: age, gender, martial status), income, occupation, education level and categories of immigrant class both before and after their arrival in Canada. Gender differences in education, income and occupation are also investigated.

The aim is to point out that gender inequality, occupational and educational differences, and income disparity among Iranians are the end result of the cumulative effects of both the Canadian and Iranian socio-economic systems and relations. When transmigrant Iranians come here, they are not simply individuals with specific talents, but their "intended occupations" in Canada are reflections of class and economic disparities prevalent in Iran and other parts of the world, depending on where they have resided. Their occupational classifications are not only indicative of what they want to pursue in Canada. Their "intended occupation" is reflective of their class positions, education levels and incomes in Iran and/or other countries. Accounting only for the Iranian economic system, the "intended occupation" of Iranians is viewed as a reflection of how they were affected within the hierarchy of the education and economic systems during the modernization of Iran.

The argument here is not that Canada's class relations are being altered by Iranians, or that Iranians are bringing class and cultural differences to Canada. Rather, Canada is home to a population whose class and social positions in life were affected by the interaction between the West and the East in the form of global capitalism and the modernization of Iran. In an ironic

twist, Canada is witnessing the effects of the Cold War and Western policies in Iran. Class, income and education differences between Iranians point out the extent in which inequality in the East, brought about partly by the West, is now finding a new home in Canada where inequalities also persist (i.e.: gender and ethnic inequalities). In this chapter, the gender ratio difference between the number of females and males, education, occupation, income, age and generation differences among Iranian population are explored with references to immigration and Census data. Their socialization during different periods of Iranian history, and class perceptions among Iranians are also discussed to show the extent to which Iranian experiences diverge or converge. Special attention is given to the effects of age and gender gap in terms of choices of marriage partners, class perceptions, socialization and school experiences among Iranians. The gender gap, for example, is most evident in the category of single adults, ages 20 to 39. And, it has resulted in two practices. One the one hand, it has resulted in inter-ethno-national marriages. On the other hand, It has also resulted in the further transmigration of Iranian females as fiancés and wives into Canada. This brings into the foreground issues related to how "insider" and "outsider" divisions may affect one's choice of marriage partner and may or may not result in further transmigration of Iranians.

3.1 Short Demographic Overview: Iranian representation in Census and Immigration data

As the following data suggest, the Iranian community in Canada is a young population. In 1991, the Iranian ethnic population consisted of a greater number of males than females; 22.9 % and 14.4 % of the male and female populations were between the ages 25 to 39 respectively (See Table 13). And, 41% of Iranians were under the age of 19. In other words, 78.3% of Iranians were between the ages 0 to 39. A majority of the population was married with a small percentage of divorced individuals.

Since 1991, more Iranians have arrived in Canada. In 1996, 64,405 Iranian ethnics were living in Canada (Statistics Canada, Catalogue No. 93F0026XDB96001:1996 Census).

Moreover, 60,275 selected *Farsi* as their mother tongue (Statistics Canada, Catalogue No. 93F0024XDB96002:1996 Census). Out of this number, 28.5% were under the age of 19; 41.9% were between the ages 20-39 and 22.7% were between 40-59. And, the 60+ population compromised 6.6% of total Iranians. As the data shows, the majority of Iranian are under the age of 40. However, in comparison to the last Census, fewer percentage of the total population of Iranians are under the age of 40. In fact, the population of Iranians over the age of 40 has increased since the last census.

From 1980 to 1998, the majority of the Iranian population was single (See Table 14). The divorced, separated and widowed population comprised 3.8% of Iranians. More males than females arrived during this period. When age is considered, the majority of Iranians were single adult men (ages 20-39) followed by single youth males (ages 0-19), married females (ages 20-39), single youth females (ages 0-19), married males (ages 20-59), and single adult females (ages 20-39) (See Table 14). By dividing the population into youth and adult categories and reading the data against gender and marital status, married females comprised more than one fifth of the population, closely followed by married males. Single adult males comprised 18.3% of the population in comparison to 5.3% of single adult females (See Table 14).

Prior to 1981, the majority of Iranian landed immigrants consisted of married individuals and youth rather than adult single individuals. From 1976 to 1981 about 60% of Iranian immigrants came as families (Quarterly Statistics Immigration, 1976 to 1981). As the revolution took form and seemed inevitable, many of those who left Iran did so with their families. From 1980 to 1998, on the other hand, 25% of Iranian immigrants were dependent children and/or students under the age of 19. When married couples are added to this number, 45% of Iranians can be considered not as individual "immigrants" alone but also as transnational families (See Table 15). What is important is that 81% of the students and dependent children arrived only after 1988, with 31% arriving between 1995-1997; 78% of spouses as well arrived after 1988, with

32% entering Canada between 1995-1997. In other words, only in the last ten years have the majority of children and families arrived in Canada. That is, since the end of Iran-Iraq War more Iranians with their families have come to this country.

In terms of the informants, their movement around the world was very much determined by the movement of friends and family members around the world both before and after the revolution. For example, when Piroz moved to the States, he moved to different parts of the United States as his family moved around the country. All but one informant, received their immigrant status together as families.

Despite the fact that he left as a teenager without his family, Ali's movement in Europe and the United States, especially during the first five years of his departure from Iran, was due to the fact he had family members who were willing to help him in "*farang*" (foreign land). Research, however, shows that not all family members help each other due to, for example, family problems/conflicts or lack of previous contact (See Koser, 1997). For example, I know a number of male single individuals who have close relatives in Canada, yet some have no relationship or limited one with their relatives.

From 1980 to 1988, 282 more married males entered Canada than married females (See Table 16). Since 1989, the reverse has occurred. In the last ten years, 855 more married females than their male counterparts arrived in Canada. In total. from 1980 to 1998, 882 more married females than males entered this country. That is, between 1980 and 1998, 573 more married females arrived than married males. In fact since 1989, for each landing year, more married females than married males arrived under the family reunion category. In contrast, under other categories, almost the same number of married males and females arrived each year. During the same period, for example, under the refugee class thirty eight more married men arrived. Under the assisted family and independent classes, thirteen more married females than men; and 144 more married men than women arrived respectively.

A majority of the Iranian male population was single and only 2.1% were divorced, separated or widowed. Single adult males (ages 20-39) comprised most of the population, followed by single youth males (ages 0-19) and married males (See Table 14). Most females were, however, married (ages 20-39), followed by single youth women (0-19), married women (ages 40-59), and single adult females (ages 20-39). A larger percentage of females were divorced, separated or widowed in comparison to the male population.

Under the convention refugee class, most Iranians were single adult males and youth. Single adult females comprised 5.9% of this category (See Table 17). Under the family class, married females comprised most of the population (more than any other category) followed by married males. A small percentage of this population was single adult male/females. Widowed, separated and divorced individuals compromised 13.4% of this category, more than any other category. The youth population made up 11.8% of the family class. Single adult females made up a small percentage of the independent class, whereas adult single males, married females and males each comprised one fifth of this category; 27.8 % of this class consisted of male and female youths aged 0-19. Under the entrepreneur class, married and youth male/females consisted more than 87% of Iranians accepted in this category. Under the designated class, single adult males made up 29.1% of the population in comparison to only 3.3% of single adult females. Almost one fourth of Iranians in this category were single youths. Under the assisted family category, 35.4% were youths and 45.2% were married males and females. More single adult males than females arrived under this category. And, self-employed class was mainly comprised of youths and married people.

Furthermore, 49.1% of single adult males were accepted under the refugee class; 12.1% under the designated classes. And, 28.2%, or 16,405 Iranians, were accepted under the independent class (See Table 4). For single adult females, most of them were accepted under the refugee, independent and family rather than designated classes. For both married males

and females, more individuals were accepted under the family than the independent class. Most were, however, accepted under the refugee class. For the youth population, they were mainly accepted under the refugee and the independent classes with more than 10% of both genders arriving under the assisted relatives rather than the family reunion categories.

3.2 Occupational and Educational Differences Before Transmigrating to Canada

Between 1980 to 1998, 32,404 Iranians intended to participate in the labor market upon arrival in Canada (See Table 18). In other words, more than half of the Iranian immigrant population considered itself as employable before entering this country. The total of 27% of the Iranian population hoped to find employment in a specific field of the labor force. This population compromised 53% of all employable Iranians. Not accounting for those who did not identify their "intended occupation," the data suggests that there is a sharp contrast in terms of the types of jobs and associated incomes Iranians intend to find in Canada.

Out of those intending to work, 28.3% listed their intended occupation as: entrepreneur, investor, teacher, manager-administrator, natural scientist, social scientist, health specialist or artist. More specific, 16.3% of the employable population classified their intended occupations as: engineer, natural scientist or health professional. In other words, almost one third of "employable" Iranians intended to find work in a professional occupation with a corresponding high income and status. Such expectations are not always materialized. In the medical and engineering fields, for example, accreditation by professional community becomes an obstacle for many in continuing their profession in Canada. However, job retraining is an option.

In contrast, 22.4% of the employable population listed machining, fabrication, clerical, sales, services or construction as their "intended occupation." They tend to identify their "intended occupation" in what has been referred to as the "segmented job market" which is seasonal, part-time and low paying with little or no benefits. As the data suggest, these Iranians are not

predominantly of elite or middle class backgrounds. It can be deduced that they are also transmigrants from lower middle and working classes.

3.2.1 Education: years of schooling

In Canada, between 1980 to 1998, 38,955, or 60% of Iranian transmigrants had either high school diploma or higher education (See Table 19). This is a high percentage especially since, at the time of immigration, 26.9% of the population was single and under the age of 19. A majority, 24.6% of Iranian transmigrants were high school graduates; 14.2% of the population had 13 to 15 years of education. Also, comparably large number of Iranians, 22% of total population had 16 or more years of education. In contrast, there were 7,833 adult individuals (12.2% of the population) who had less than 12 years of education.

Educational differences amongst Iranians is most evident between male and females. A smaller percentage of men (14%) had 0-11 years of education than women (23.4%). More women than men had 12 years of schooling. For example, 32.5% of men had 13-16 years of education in comparison to 29.8% of females; 23% of adult males and 11% of adult women had 17-25 years of schooling. The difference between years of schooling completed by male and females is more evident in the two categories 0-11 and 17-25. More women than men have 12 years of schooling, which may be due to the fact that many females marry young and may not continue their studies due to family obligations (the majority of females between the ages 20 to 39 are married). For many males (the majority of whom are single), they enter university or trade schools after graduation from high school. It is important to note that, for example, on average, 22% of Iranian immigrants intended to pursue their studies upon their arrival in Canada, which partly explains the increase in the number of educated women and men in fields such as medicine and management after arrival in Canada.

As the data point out, prior to their arrival in Canada, Iranian transmigrants were not a homogenous population in terms of labor qualifications and education levels. Differences in

education and occupation among Iranians cut across the community even before they entered Canada. Also, those with more than seventeen years of education completed their higher degrees in the West. That is, it can be stipulated that more than 12% of Iranians in Canada finished their education outside of Iran. In other words, for a relatively a large number of Iranians, their residences in the West began as students rather than as permanent immigrants. In this matter, it can also be stipulated that a smaller percentage of women finished their higher education in the West.

3.3 Educational Diversity Among Iranians After Transmigrating to Canada

According to the Target Group Profile (Statistics Canada, 1991 Census), 14.5 percent of the Iranian ethnic population between the ages 15 to 24 were attending school, out of which almost 65% were registered in full time studies (See Table 20). Furthermore, out of the total population of 15 years and over, 29.2% had university degrees, and 8.5% received university certificates; 18% had attended universities without receiving a degree (See Table 21) (Target Group, 1991). Moreover, 18.6% had attended non-university trade programs; in contrast, 5,595 Iranian ethnics (12.5% of Iranian ethnics over the age of 15) did not have their high school diploma. Since only 1,570 of this population was actually between the ages of 15 to 19 (See Table 13), it is safe to assume that about 4,025 of adult Iranians over the age of 20 did not receive their high school diploma.

According to 1991Census, 16,110 Iranian ethnics had post-secondary qualifications; 16% of total population obtained their degrees in engineering, health, sciences and technologies (See Table 22). All the informants in this research upon their arrival continued their education by attending universities, colleges and/or trade schools. One already had one university degree before coming to Canada. Ali attended university in the United States but received his degree in Canada. Saman finished his BS and MS in Canada and is now working in his field of specialization. Kayvan received his BA in Canada and is working in the service sector. As he

mentioned, he is contemplating going back to school to finish a post-degree. The other two informants are working toward their degrees, both in the arts. At the same time, a number of Iranians, whom I have been in contact with over the years, did not continue their education after arriving in Canada. Many of them enrolled in training courses offered by employment Canada or "welfare" offices, but such programs did not help them to find satisfactory employment. Despite such differences, as the above data suggest, it is safe to conclude that the Iranian transmigrant community in Canada is a highly educated group; and, educational qualifications continue to be an important characteristic of Iranians within Canada.

Having said the above, it is important to account for gender differences in education levels among Iranians in Canada. According to Target Group Profile (Statistics Canada, 1991 Census), out of 43,215 Iranian ethnics, 37% (23.3% men and 14% women) had post-secondary qualifications. Out of 13,240 adult women over the age of 19, 45.6% had degrees and qualifications (See Tables 13 and 21).

For Iranian males, out of 18,960 adult males over the age of 19, 10,060 or 53% had some sort of educational degrees. Out of this population, 48.2% received their degrees in engineering, applied sciences and trades, 12.3% in commerce and business management, 9.1% in mathematics and physical sciences, 8.4% in health professions and sciences and 8.7% in social sciences and related fields (See Table 13 and 22).

For female transmigrants, out of 6,050 individuals, most were educated in commerce and business management (11.8%) or health professions and sciences (10.4%). Only 4.4% had engineering related degrees. The remainder received their degrees in educational, arts and social science fields (23.2%), and in mathematical and biological sciences (10.2%) (See Tables 13 and 22).

The major difference between Iranian men and women is in the "types" of education fields in which they specialize. The majority of men received their specialization in engineering, and

majority of women specialized in arts and related fields. This specialization trend is partly a reflection of gender biases in the education systems in both Canada and Iran (and for some Iranians in a third country). Gender biases towards women in mathematical and applied engineering fields seem to have global characteristics, which are often discussed only within the context of education systems in a specific *nation-state*. The education level of Iranian women as immigrants in Canada and citizens of Iran bring into the foreground women's global-local positions within the context of the production and the distribution of knowledge within the East and the West.

3.4 Labor Market Participation, Occupation, Income and Gender: the case of Iranian Transmigrants

In total, 47.6% of all Iranian ethnics participated in the labor market (See Table 23). This is significant since 25.5% of Iranians, 11,015 people, were under the age of 15 (See Table 13). In fact, according to 1991 Census (Statistics Canada, Target Group Profile) the participation rate for Iranian ethnics 15 and older was 63.9%. For Iranians 25 years or older, the labor participation rate was 66.9% (See Table 24).

Although this rate of participation in the labor market is high, it is important to note that retail industries comprised 16.6% of the total of employed Iranians; 14.8% of the employed Iranians, moreover, worked in the food industries (See Table 23). That is, 31.4% of the employed Iranians worked in seasonal, part-time and/or low-pay jobs. When reading this data against "intended occupation" of Iranians from 1980 to 1990 a sharp contrast arises. The data suggests that there has been a concentration of Iranians in the service sector, a growing sector in Canada. For example, from 1980 to 1990, 2,291 individuals maintained that they intend to be employed in services, sales and clerical industries, which is 9.3% of the total immigrant population or 17.8% of the total of Iranians intending to work (See Table 18). What this means

is that many of those who did not specify their intended occupations are working mainly in food and service industries, despite high educational qualifications.

Such a high concentration of ethnic Iranians in these jobs is partly a reflection of "segmented job market," in which, certain ethnic groups are concentrated in specific trades and sectors of the economy (Hiebert, 1996:2). For some Iranian males, driving a taxi cab is a "popular" job. Kayvan and many of his close friends, for example, worked in the industry for a long time. With a large number of Iranians living in areas such as North Vancouver, many of the taxi drivers in the municipality are of Iranian background. There are also those Iranians who own their own cabs. The majority, however, are hired as drivers. In Canada, 5.4% of the Iranian population was employed in transportation related jobs. In Vancouver, out of 1,970 employed males, 180 worked in the industry, which is 10% of the total employed male population.

When the data for male and female participation in the Canadian labor market is compared, they point to more inequalities. In 1991, 42% of the Iranian population was female and out of 18,225 female Iranian ethnics; 72.7% were older than 15 (See Table 13). This population constituted 30.7% of the total of Iranian ethnic population. Out of this population, 6,140 females were classified under the category of "All classes of Workers" (See Table 25). The total of 5,790 females were employed as paid workers (See Table 2); only 165 were self-employed (incorporated) and 5,625, were employees. In addition, 315 females were self-employed (unincorporated). Most females, 60.2% of all female workers, were employed in clerical, sales and service occupations (See Table 26). In contrast, only 25.5% were employed in managerial, natural sciences, social sciences and medicine and health occupations. In addition, from 1980 to 1990, only 835 Iranian immigrant women intended to participate in service, clerical and sales occupations; 539 females intended to participate in managerial, social and natural sciences and medical related occupations. Although more women are now employed in medical sciences

than the number of immigrants intending to find jobs in that field, more women also work in service industries than intended.

Moreover, 6,825 females over the age of 15 were considered to be in the labor force, out of which 5,150 females were employed and the rest unemployed (See Table 25); 2,110 females (4.9% of the Iranian ethnic population) worked full time and earned on average $24,576; where as, 3,960 (9.2% of ethnic Iranians) were employed in part-time work, and on average earned $9,887 (See Table 25). In other words, only 30.9% of total females over the age of 15 were employed in full-time occupations. 58% were employed in part-time jobs. The average income for females does not account for the discrepancy between the type of jobs and income earned from such employment, thus hides the extent of income disparity among females. Moreover, 50% of the female population over the age of 15 earned less than $9,999 in comparison to 33.9% of the male population. Only 5.1% of female population earned more than $40,000 in comparison to 13.3% of males. Although the same percentages of males and females earned between $10,000 to $19,999, more males than females earned between $20,000 to $39,999 (See Table 27).

For the male population, they constituted 43% of the Iranian population. Out of 24,990 Iranian males, 76.4% of them were over the age of 15; 13,040 of Iranian males, or 30.2% of the Iranian population, were employed as workers. Out of this number, 89.8% were paid workers, 27.1% of the Iranian population; 1,135 individuals were self-employed (incorporated); 1,310 males were self-employed (unincorporated). Moreover, 10,915 males, 25% of the Iranian population, were employed in the labor force. The average income for males in full time employment, 13% of the Iranian population, was $33,420, and for the 6,760 males in part-time employment, 15.6% of ethnic Iranians, it was $14,836 (See Tables 13 and 25).

As the data suggest, there is a gap between female and male labor participation and income earnings. More men own their own business than women, and women earn much less than

men. Such inequalities may be attributed to Canadian labor relations and the fact that females on average earn half the income of men. However, it is also important to note that such inequalities may also be attributed to the socio-economic and gender relations prevalent in Iran. This is, the extent of globality of inequalities, and how the effects of inequalities in one part of the world extenuate inequalities in another part of the world.

3.5 Gender, Age-Cohorts, Marriage, Socialization, "Class Perceptions," and School Experiences: further segmentation of Iranian transmigrants

As the data point out, it can be concluded that the Iranian immigrant community is a young population with more males than females and more singles than married individuals. More specific, close to 60% of the Iranian population transmigrated as single males (ages 20-39), married females (ages 20-39) and male/females under the age of 19. Also, the majority of Iranians (74%) arrived under one of the three categories of refugee, independent and family classes. Many married and single males as well arrived under designated and assisted relative classes.

Iranian community is characterized by three age-cohorts, two of which are aging toward the senior citizen status and one which is under the age of 19. Such changes are not only due to the aging of long term immigrants or ethnic Iranians born in Canada (i.e.: in 1991, for example, 6725 Iranian ethnics were born in other parts of the world other than Iran). They are also partly the result of older and more mature immigrants as well as youths entering this country. The important point is that within the next 20 years, a large portion of them will approach retirement. How will the community handle its aging population and ensuing needs is a question which must be addressed in relation to cultural differences, to ensure that proper facilities are available to Iranian senior citizens in at least Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver.

As the data suggest, a smaller number of single adult females between the ages of 20 to 39 have entered Canada than single adult males between 1980-1998. This is partly a reflection of

those gender biases prevalent in Iran, which may prevent the out-migration of single adult females, especially when there are no family members or friends to help them settle down in other counties. The fear that a single adult woman may become "corrupted" in the West may affect the chances of single females leaving Iran. Such views also find expressions in popular Iranian magazines in Los Angeles during the 1980s in articles or "stories" about the life experiences of young adult female Iranians who were "exotic dancers" in Japan.

Whatever the causes for this gender ratio difference, it can result into two interrelated issues. These issues highlight the "insider" and "outsider" divisions and bring into the foreground the importance of cultural boundaries, choices and compatibility in an analysis of transmigration. On the one hand, Iranian males marry women from different cultural backgrounds. Kayvan is seriously involved with his Eastern European girlfriend and plans to marry her in the future. He mentions that it was not an easy road for him.

> I was in a relationship with my girlfriend who I've been with ever since I've been in Canada. (My voice: Since 1987 you have had a relationship with your girlfriend.) And my girlfriend is also from [Europe] she's not Iranian, which ... wasn't too exciting for my parents. They really wanted me to be with an Iranian girl. They wanted me to marry into an Iranian family. ... Their point was cultures don't interact, they don't go together, different cultures. So in the future, even if you marry somebody from a different culture, you guys are going to get divorced, no matter whether you love each other ... (sic)

Such views regarding cultural differences at times explain why some single male Iranians, despite dating non-Iranian women, end up marrying Iranian women. Research in the United states suggests, for example, that Iranian parents in Los Angeles "grant more freedom to young males than to young females. Social interactions remained more restrictive for women than for men, making it easier for Iranian men to interact with members of the host society" (Hanassab, 1997:81). But the expectation is to marry other Iranians. The issue is not the compatibility of couples as individuals. It is their cultural backgrounds which characterize conflicts between couples, in this case between Iranians and non-Iranians. That is, differences and problems are thought to result from their roots in cultural diversity rather than marital conflicts and societal

pressures. In fact, Al-e Ahmad referred to foreign wives of Iranians as one of the elements of *Westoxication* (the plight of the West).

The low number of single adult females in Canada has made the situation problematic for many male Iranians who wish to marry female Iranians. In the last several years, a number of individual males whom I know have traveled to Iran and married. Their sources of eligible partners are not confined to Iran but also include other Iranian diasporic communities. Families or friends who know eligible females or males in other parts of the world introduce these young people to one another. Returning to Iran for the purpose of getting married is also a common "practice" for those who can afford the costs of traveling. Such practices are, in fact, so common that they have become the subjects of comedy shows, jokes and new terminology. For example, I have heard the term "*Zane Posti*" ("a women (wife) who can be mailed") to be used by a few individuals in a joking manner, referring to their friends whose parents arranged marriages for them in Iran.

It is also a common practice to place advertisement for marriage partners in Iranian newspapers around the world. In one (In *Payvand*, Friday Sept, 18th 1998:35), there are references to age preference, employment and citizenship status in Canada, and Iranian family values as a criteria for getting to know Iranian women. Western citizenship, nationality (culture) and family values become criteria for finding a wife. That is, in an ironic twist, the West becomes an advertisement tool for this individual to find an Iranian wife who is well versed in Iranian family values. Regardless of techniques used, if one desires another Iranian, an option is to look into other parts of the world.

3.5.1 Socialization

Not accounting for those who were not born in Iran and/or whose socialization took place in different parts of the world, it can be stipulated that in 1991, 18%, or 7, 779, of the population was mainly socialized under the new regime and its cultural policies; 14%, or 6,050, were

socialized during both periods and the rest (68%, or 29,386 individuals) were socialized during the Pahlavi era with a minority being socialized during the initial stages of the modernization programs. In 1996, it can be stipulated that approximately 35%, or 21,096 individuals, were born and socialized after the revolution, 23%, or 13,863 people, experienced life during both regimes and 42%, or 25,315 individuals, experienced the changes introduced during the Pahlavi regime first hand.

Due to recent immigration, the Iranian population partly consists of age-cohorts with no real historical experiences of the events before and after the revolution. In addition, the fact that the Iran-Iraq War was not experienced in the same way by Iranian transmigrants. In fact, although there are young single males who left Iran in order to avoid military service, there are also those Iranian transmigrants who fought in the war. Moreover, there are also those who initially were displaced by the events of the war (i.e.: the Persian-Iraqi population, the Persian and Arab populations in southeastern Iran) and are now living in Canada.

3.5.2 Class Perceptions

As the data suggest, a majority of Iranians were employed in accommodation, food and retail industries. I myself worked in both the food and retail industries for a longtime; I worked in the kitchen as cook, "dish-washer," sales person in retail and service industries such as clothing, Seven/Eleven and gas-stations. As well, many of my friends were employed in the service sector before eventually establishing their own businesses or finding better jobs after completing university or college. In terms of the informants, Piroz and Kayvan, for example, briefly worked in the food and the retail industries. Piroz has a BA but was unable to find a job in his related field. While he was going to school for retraining, he also worked part time in the service industry. He has now found a permanent full-time job, due to his retraining.

The life histories of the informants also suggest that personal and family relationships among Iranians is at times affected and constituted by their socio-economic positions in Iran. At

times, class and occupation inequalities prevalent in Iran affect social relations among Iranians, despite their middle class economic positions in Canada. As already discussed, both before and after their immigration to Canada, occupation, income and education are factors which divide among Iranians. The importance of higher education with its associated status and high income, for example, is often used as a tool in differentiating between individuals, despite the fact that many educated Iranians may be working in service sector jobs. Derogatory references such as *dahaty (villager)*, *lat (street kid)*, *bache-poldar* (rich kids) are also used in conversations to describe individuals by indirect references to their class and cultural backgrounds in Iran. It is "common" to hear remarks such as "he made his money here," "they were rich in Iran," "what do you expect from a person whose father was a salesperson," "*Taz-e be-doran reside*" (newly rich). In Vancouver, some of the individuals whom I have come into contact with, who are employed in service sector jobs and do not have outside financial help from parents or other sources, often distinguish themselves from "rich kids of the West-Van" (West-Vancouver, British Columbia). On the other hand, upper middle class Iranians distinguish themselves from those whose class position they consider as lower by references to the class attitudes and class relations prevalent in Iran. This is one of the main characteristics of transmigrants: immigrants' relations in the host country depend on a series of factors such as class and education experiences in other parts of the world.

3.5.3 School Experiences

As the data suggest, Iranian transmigrants are educated in different and diverse institutions all around the world. The Iranian population consists of diverse groups of families and individuals: from the highly educated and professional classes to those with limited education hoping to find employment in the service sector. In terms of education qualifications, one of the main characteristics of the Iranian population in Canada is their relative high level of educational achievements before entering Canada. As mentioned

before, education is viewed as a valuable "commodity" signifying wealth and status, especially among the elite and middle class Iranians.

Not accounting for those who completed their elementary and secondary schools in other countries than Iran, within Iran, students have been socialized in three different school environments and systems, and within different periods. Consider the population between the ages 25 to 34, for example. They were born between 1957 to 1966. At the time of the revolution, they were between the ages 13 to 23. For those born in 1957, they had already graduated from high school during the Pahlavi era and received their diplomas under the old school system known as the *Nezam-e Gahdim*. For those born in 1966, they were socialized during two distinct periods of the pro-monarchy and the Islamic Republic under the new system put into effect in 1972, known as the *Nezam-e Jadid*. However, for those born after 1971, they mainly experienced life during the Islamic regime without any real first hand recollections of the events of the revolution. They attended public school, which is a strong tool in the hands of the government used to enculturate the youth (See chapter four). As with other parts of the world, Iranian curriculum codifies knowledge of the world (history, literature, and sciences) according to scientific, objective and rational methods, and represents to the students a specific Persian/Shiite interpretation of "truth" about the world around them.

In this sense, the Iranian community is not a united front, but it is a fragmented whole consisted of age-cohorts whose experiences and views are formed during different political contexts and according to various ideological views and religious/cultural practices. Yet, they are loosely connected due to their shared views regarding nationalism, race, ethnicity, religion and cultural values and norms which "unite" them under all encompassing terms such as *Iranian* and *Moslem*. For example, as it is discussed in the next chapter, the importance of knowledge in Iranian society is viewed as a historical preoccupation of Iranians. Iranian civilization is viewed as a rich cultural and political institution which established the first world empire. Iranian

culture furthermore, is constructed as an institution which has historically defended its boundaries and social values despite foreign rule or pressure. Yet they differ in their interpretation of history and historical events and the construction of their roles within that framework. In terms of the informants and their reflections upon the revolution, and how the revolution affected them, different scenarios emerged.

Conclusion

As the above data show, as individuals and families, Iranians come here for different reasons and with different economic power and class attitudes. As such, the Iranian community is a collection of groups of families and individuals with diverse ideological beliefs, religious orientations, class positions and cultural-social attitudes. In Canada, class divisions within the Iranian community are conceptualized in a medium which provides space for both their experiences in the East and the West. It refers to occupation, income, and education within the context of how families' and individuals' political and economic powers were altered due to the events before and after the revolution. Such differentiation is also based on political and ethnic factors. In fact, on many occasions, the political association of individuals is mentioned as an important piece of information. This is not to say that they are bringing class differences to Canada. Rather, they are "Persianizing" class diversity within Canada by references to Eastern socio-economic-religious relations. As mentioned in the last chapter, class differences in Iran were partly the outcome of Western modernization programs. In other words, Canadian class relations is further segmented due to the indirect effects of Western influences in the East. In a sense the West is not being altered by Easterners. Rather, Canadians are witnessing how (a) the effects of Western exploitation in Iran, (b) the reactions to Western hegemony in the form of revolution and (c) the reactions to the revolutionary regime, have resulted in the movement of different socio-economic classes with different occupations and education levels from Iran towards Canada through various countries in both the East and the West.

The East and the West are no longer geographically separated, however. They do not refer to any specific well defined culture and value system. In Canada, with a growing number of recent immigrants from Iran and other countries, the West and the East are no longer sufficient dichotomies in referring to peoples and cultures of Canada. The East is the West and the West is the East. The two "worlds" interact not in the context of the socio-economic systems in the East but also within the West (i.e.: as immigrants and citizens).

So when one speaks of class differences in Canada, the reference is not only to the socio-economic relations in this country but it must also account for family and class relations in other parts of the world. This is especially true for ethnic minorities which mainly consist of recent immigrants. Yet, it is important to go beyond the dichotomy between the West and the East and account for how local relations are affected by conflicting ideologies. These ideologies are not geographically defined. They are also affected by the global movement of ideas, relations and peoples. These local relations (whether in the West or the East) find expressions in other parts of the world, not due to the movement of capital and ideas alone, but through the lived experiences of ethnics living in the West or the East.

Chapter Four:

Iranian transmigrants in Canada,(Re)Production of Multi-Hyphenated Ethnicities

Introduction

In this chapter, issues surrounding the construction of Iranian identity are analyzed by references to how geography, race, nationality, progress and civilization are employed as legitimate criteria of differentiating "insiders" from "outsiders" in both the East and the West. The main point is that Iranian ethnicity in Canada and in particular in North Vancouver plays the role of an oriental minority which is constructed as undermining the moral fabric of this country by the popular media. Yet, within the Iranian communities, Persians play the role of "dominators" and promote Persian culture as the culture of Iranians despite ethnic and religious diversity among them.

The dominant role of Persians in Iranian communities in Canada is due to the fact that despite educational and class differences among Persians, Persians are the main beneficiary of modernization reforms. As such, their movement into Canada or other parts of the world is not only due to ideological changes but it is also reflective of how Persian/Shiite identity dominates within Iran and how Persians benefit from the government policies.

Despite the dominance of Persian identity, Iranian identity finds different manifestations in its different representations, depending on factors such as ideological, political or religious beliefs. In many translocalities such as Vancouver and Toronto, for example, Iranian identity is both a national and an ethnic identity. It is, as well, represented in the Canadian Census, newspaper articles and Iranian school text books for different purposes and from the perspective of conflicting ideologies. In this sense, Iranian identity is a multi-faceted identity. The emergence of the multi-hyphenated Iranian identities can be traced to the era of modernization. Here, it is argued that Iranian immigrants construction of themselves as "Iranian" is not only due to the wording of the Census question and of "Iranian" as an option under the category of "ethnic

origin." It is also a reflection of years of the Persian-centric nation-building process in Iran. In other words, in both the East and the West, Iranian identity is considered as an important aspect of one's self definition for many Iranian transmigrants due to the emphasis put upon Persian, Islamic and Aryan past of Iran both before and after the revolution.

4.1 Iranians as ethnics in Census Canada: the Persian majority

Since the early 1980s as is the case with more recent immigrants, Iranians were more likely to report a single ethnicity (Sheridan, 1991). Only 15% of 15,850 Iranians, for example, reported multiple ethnicities in the 1986 Census. By 1991, almost 90 percent of 38,920 Iranians reported a single ethnicity (Statistics Canada, Target Group Profile, 1991Census). In 1996, out of 64,405 individuals, 53,545 people (83%) reported Iranian as their ethnic identity (Statistics Canada, Catalogue No. 93F0026XDB96001:1996 Census). As the data suggests, the Iranian community in Canada consists of a more or less ethnically homogenous group of Iranian-Persian individuals. However, since the 1991 Census, it appears that more Iranians with non-Persian ethnicities have arrived in Canada. In fact, research suggest that since the revolution of 1978-79, more Iranian ethno-religious minorities have arrived in the United States as well (Sabagh, Bozorgmehr, 1987:81).

Construction of Iranians as ethno-nationals living in Canada is reflective of how official categorization in the West reproduces categorization of peoples with references to boundaries of nation-states and national identities without accounting for diversity within these boundaries. The variable "Iranian" in the Census 96 and Census 91 questionnaires should only refer to ethnic and not national origin. It, however, functions as both ethnic and national identities.

In Canada, Iranian identity is both a dominant national identity in Iran and a minority ethnic identity in Canada. Within the context of multicultural policies and French-British dominant cultures, Persians are viewed much in the same light as other minorities such as Kurds, Baluch and Turks. Although in comparison to other ethno-nationals in Canada, Persian ethnicity is not

a dominant community, Persian culture and customs dominate within the Iranian transmigrant communities (i.e.: Farsi poetry nights, Farsi oriented TV shows in Vancouver and the United States).

The term Iranian as an option within the Census Canada data hides the extent to which citizens of Iran are ethnically diverse. This is true especially since many ethnic minorities of Iranian descent may identify themselves as Turks and Baluch despite their shared nationality: *Iranian*. In fact, research in the United States points out that "pre-migration ethnicity is an important and neglected determinant of post-migration ethnicity" (Bozorgmehr, 1992:Abstract). In a conversation with someone from the Northern Province of Iran, he mentioned that he does not consider himself Iranian because he identifies with his ethnicity as a non-Persian. Although his friends and associates are mostly Iranians, he does not wish to categorize himself as such. As the above example points out, Iranian identity is contested and resisted to foreground other identities.

On the other hand, there are also those individuals who are minorities within the community but identify with the dominant Iranian identity. In a conversation with a Turk immigrant, I asked him how he identified himself in the Census: *Turkish* or *Iranian*? He answered that he selected *Iranian* although both his parents and himself are of Turkish descent. In his case, Iranian national identity, which emerged after 1920s, has been a powerful tool in his socialization. It is not that he hides his Turkish origin but that his Turkish identity is an internal construct with boundaries which distinguishes him from Persians. But, his self-identification as an Iranian allows him to participate in a community whose jokes and ethnic humor often make ethno-centric and derogatory remarks about the Turks.

It is his socialization as an Iranian which takes the dominant form and his Turkish self-identification is only secondary in importance but important enough to be mentioned among other Iranians. What his identification with *Iranian* as an ethnic category in the Census Canada

points to, however, the effects years of the Persianization programs have had on downplaying the role of hyphenated ethnicities in the construction of Iranian national identity.

The presence of a large number of Iranian-Persians in Canada and the United States is as the result of the relative success of the nation-building project in Iran. The policies of the Shah were Persian-centric and denied any space for ethnic identities and socio-cultural structures. The socio-economic policies of the Pahlavi kings and the revolutionary regime towards ethnic and tribal groups such as Kurds and Baluch have been discriminatory (Beck, 1990). Military force and violence has been the main tool used against ethnic uprisings in Iran both in the past and present. In terms of occupation and industrial distribution among the ethnic population, they are represented in low paying agricultural sector more than Persians (Aghajanian, 1983:214). In terms of urbanization, Persian dominated provinces have a urbanization rate of about 80 percent compared to the national average of 46.8%. Such a low rate of urbanization affects non-Persian chances and access to higher paying jobs, better educational and health facilities, which are in abundance in the urban centers rather than the rural areas. During the period between 1967-72, for example, ethnic provinces received comparatively lower development funds per capita than their Persian counterparts (Amirahmadi, 1987:367). As such, Keddie (1983) points out that the size of the middle class population in non-Persian regions is significantly lower than that of Persian regions of Isphan, Tehran, and Shiraz.

In reference to Iranians residing in the state of Iowa, Mohammad Chaichian (1997:612) concludes that emphasis on Iranian ethnic identity result from middle class position and above average educational qualifications. He points out that their failure to assimilate into the American cultural setting is due to "prejudice and subtle discrimination against them." In Canada as well, Iranians are mainly of middle class background and are highly educated. Ali Modares (1990;Abstract) shows that Iranian ethnics in the United States belong mainly to three groups: "a) traditional low socio-economic groups; b) elite immigrants with high socio-economic

and educational achievements; and c) recent immigrants with high educational and medium to high socio-economic status. His typification also applies to Iranians in Canada. In other words, the term "Iranian" refers both to those who are mainly middle class and ethnically Persian or non-Persians who identify with Iranian national identity. Yet, Iranian national or ethnic identities only partly explain Iranian transmigrants' identity politics. For Kayvan and Piroz, for example, their identity constructions also account for *other* ethno-national identities, as they were socialized in different parts of the world.

Perpetuation of Iranian/Persian identity in Canada is also accompanied with the perpetuation of Farsi language not as a national language alone but as an ethnic language in Vancouver and in other major cities in North America. Farsi is the language of communication for Iranians especially in terms of both electronic and printed media. Iranian TV programs in Vancouver are only in Farsi and seldom make space for regional dialects, Armenian, Hebrew or Arabic. This is despite the fact that the Iranian population consists of both Persians and non-Persians who speak a multitude of languages other than Farsi.

4.2 Iranian Ethnicity: the perpetuation of contradictory representations of Persian ethnicity in Iranian school textbooks

Since the early 1920s, Persian ethnicity, culture and language has played a major role in the construction of Iranian national identity. The education system plays an important role in the inculcation of national identity with references to Persian/Shiite cultural practices in the minds of students. The exclusion of minority ethnic/religious identities as defining factors in constructing Iranian identity stems partly from prevalent Persian-centric views. The assumption is that it is their responsibility of the Persians to "modernize" and "civilize" the indigenous peoples of Iran. Ethnocentric views about tribal and rural peoples of Iran are evident in a speech by the former minister of education:

> It follows that an educational program must be built upon the following aims: (1) to create in the minds of the people a living consciousness of the past by showing the great achievements of the *race* ; ... (2) to train boys and girls to become good citizens of modern Persia; ... (4) to teach the rural people and the tribes to live, make a home, ... prepare food and clothing, ... prevent disease; ... (5) in secondary schools and ... the university the gifted youth must be trained for leadership and service in the state. They must be given a vision of Persia's place, past and present in the world, with the ideals of leading the country in culture, science, technology, business, statesmanship. And the government to such heights as befits a progressive state" (In Banani, 1961:109)

Such aims may satisfy the formation and crystallization of national identity against foreign powers and their encroaching cultural forms, but they also assume a need for cultural pacification despite cultural, political and social diversity within Iran (Annabella and Ali Mohammadi, 1994:17).

In school curriculum, for example, Iran is portrayed as a united "force" with one goal and one culture. It assumes homogeneity at the national level despite conflicts and social hierarchy at the local and provincial levels (i.e.: ethnicity). In the Social Studies text for Grade Four (1372:85-126), Iranian society, for example, is conceptualized as a nation with a rich civilization (*Tamadon*). Progress (*Pishraft*) is defined as civilization and is linked to the emergence of cities. It as well portrays Iran as the land of Aryans. Aryans are referred to as *Najib* (noble). Persians are conceptualized as Aryans; thus, their control over the economy and power structure is constructed as a historical fact. The history of tribal exploitation and inequality is ignored in favor of the Iranian national identity. It denies any space to the voices of the periphery such as the Kurd and Baluch people within Iran.

The only reference to tribes in the Social Studies text book for Grade Five (1372:10), for example, is made in lesson four of part one: *Life and Population in Mountainous area*. The lesson states that tribes {in Farsi *Ashayer*} are mostly pastoralist nomads who move in search of food for their animals. It also mentions that they live in portable housing such as tents. Three pictures are also provided to portray tribal life to students. Tribal people are referred to as "religious" and *Delavar* (brave). The authors state that "some of them have participated in Tribal

Basij Organization. Tribal Basij plays an important role in protecting the boundaries of our Islamic country." In this sense, the role of tribal people in the political economy of Iran is viewed through their contribution to Islam and Iran rather than their resistance to the policies of the government.

The message that is portrayed here is that tribal identity can only exist within the context of the national identity of Iranians. Yet, the pictures represent tribal life as simple and peaceful, despite the fact that their histories have been nothing but peaceful in the last seventy five years. It is not to say that the curriculum does not refer to diversity among Iranians. But, this diversity is portrayed as unproblematic and natural. History is contextualized in ethno-nationalistic and religious terms and according to ideological assumptions of the ruling party in Iran. In this sense, school structures and curriculum inculcate a certain world-view in students which, as its basic assumptions, race, geographical location, religion, ethnicity are considered as natural and scientific factors in conceptualizing the world around them.

4.3 Representations of Iranians in Canadian media

In Canada, on the other hand, Iranians are often viewed in the light of the anti-immigrant stance by various political groups such as the Reform Party. In the media, as well, their presence is seen with disdain. On the cover page of the British Columbia Report (Dec. 1, 1998), for example, flags of Iran, India, Hong Kong and Taiwan are placed over different geographical areas of a map of the lower mainland. The title of the article reads "Alien Nations: The immigration revolution has transformed the lower mainland--but who benefits." In this article, Iranians in Vancouver are represented by the flag of the Islamic Republic flying over the North Shore (North Vancouver, British Columbia). Although the Greater Vancouver is divided through municipal lines, it is represented by national flags of Asian countries. They are viewed as "foreigners" who have changed Vancouver into small ethnic nations. The mere fact that the Islamic Republic's flag is used to depict Iranians dismisses the extent to which political and

ideological differences within the Iranian community divide them. Ironically, such divisions often surface through various symbols on Iranian national flag. In contrasts, the "official" flag of Iran on the above mentioned cover page of the magazine is used as a symbol of Iranians' national identity, one which represents them as "agents" of the Islamic Republic, thus as "dangerous aliens."

Iran and Iranians are often represented in the NorthShore News articles ([On line]. Available: <http:www.nsnews.com/backissue.html.>, 1997) by references to the revolution, Islamic fundamentalism, opposition to the West, Aryan origin, refugee status, asylum claimants, Iranian New Year celebrations in West Vancouver (Robert Galster, "Iranian New Year Heats Up"); criminal activities (Ann Marie D'Angelo, "Witness Followed Cinema Killer"); gang membership (Anna Marie D'Angelo, "Feud Claim Life"); youth problems (Steve Braverman, "Grieving Father Speaks out: Search on Solutions to Violence;" and Ian Noble, "Newcomers Facing Challenge") and cultural and religious differences (Dean Lancaster "Moving out of the Shadows:... dreams of an Iranian cultural center").

The revolution has been portrayed by the Canadian and Western media as a reaction to modernism. According to one article (Globe and Mail Oct, 6 1979 "A black day in the history of Islam,"), Ayatollah Khomeini's attempt was to stir Shiite and Sunni dichotomy in the advantage of its revolutionary movement, resulting in regional sectarian and ethnic warfare in the name of national uprisings. "They have sent into these countries Shiite theologians who are Khomeini's personal representatives and who have nothing to do with the local Iranian embassy."

In another article (Nicholas Cage, New York Times on December 11, 1978), the author writes that Khomeini was against the modernization programs of the Shah (known as the "White Revolution") due to its dramatic effects on the clergy's power hold over Iranian society and polity. He writes, "From exile, Mr. Khomeini has become the symbol of all pent-up rage against

the Shah's rule, with its authoritarianism, corruption and emphasis on modernization programs instead of the conservative Islamic tradition that the Ayatollah represents."

Such constructions of the Iranian revolution and its effects on the region reproduce a global image of Iranian uprising as only a fanatic religious movement. Rather than portraying it as a populist movement, it is constructed as an anti-modernist and traditionalist uprising. But, as Amuzegar (1991:37) points out, it should not be assumed that, as some Western scholars claim, the Revolution of 1978-79 was anti-modern in nature and/or a negative reaction to modernity. Ayatollah Khomeini, in fact, "discarded many Shiite concepts and borrowed ideas, words, and slogans from the non-Moslem world" (Abrahamian, 1993:17). That is, Western conceptualization of socio-economic as well as political relations formed a pivotal foundation of the ideology of many of the revolutionary leaders.

That is not to say that such concepts were not Islamicized and/or Persianized. The point is that the revolution was conceptualized within the framework of modernity. It was seen as a global phenomenon rather than a local and national matter. In this regard, Amuzegar (1991:37) maintains that,

> By raising the religious banner, [Khomeini] revived the old doctrine that the Moslem faith was the victim of humiliation for centuries, and that his Islamic movement was to put an end to colonial domination, capitalist exploitation, tyrannial opposition by the capitalist lackeys, and their moral corruption. He also reinstated the anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and populist claim that Islam was the truly just and egalitarian religion devoted to the emancipation of the disenfranchised and the poor.

The inception of the Islamic Republic is portrayed by the leaders of Iran as a solution to Western exploitation and internal corruption. The Islamic Revolution is conceived as a third road toward the liberation of humanity. It is neither a capitalist system nor a communist one. It was an attempt by opposition to limit Western influences in Iran and to bring about equality and social justice for the poor and powerless classes within an Islamic framework within the region. Such an image is represented to students in public schools as part of the history curriculum.

Freedom, republic, order, Imam Khomeini, Islamic nation, and democracy are not only constructed as basic elements of Islam but the birth of the Islamic Republic (in 1979) is celebrated as the rebirth of Islam. Ayatollah Khomeini had already declared that the Islamic Republic "surpassed other early Islamic societies [such as the community of the Prophet] and their insoluble problems" (Abrahamian, 1992:58). The future of Islamic civilization is assumed to be interrelated with the future of Iran as a nation-state. Yet, in the West, the image contradicts what officials in Iran construct as part of the official knowledge about Iran.

Asylum seekers and their images and experiences are manipulated in the media to construct a negative image of the Islamic Republic. In all, the Iranian government is constructed as a state which undermines Human Rights. But more important, it is viewed as a country which defies the West.

As mentioned in chapter two part B, asylum seekers are often portrayed as "wanna-be-immigrants" who undermine the security of Canada and its inner cities. In reference to Iranian asylum seekers who were also former political prisoners in Iran, Adrienne Tanner (1998:A4) writes

> the five-inch scar that marks the soft flesh of Fariborz Momtahen's palm and ends at his wrist says everything about why he fled Iran. He was hanging from a ceiling, about to be lashed, when a sharp-edged manacle sliced into his palm. After ten years in jail, [he] was released and fled to Canada.

Morteza Momenzadeh, another asylum seeker in Canada claims that he was a Mujahedin sympathizer who wrote articles supporting this group (Ibid.). As a result, he was sentenced to five years in jail, where he was lashed and burnt with cigarettes. He maintains that "In Iran, they shoot people on the street. I can't shut my mouth and say nothing" (Ibid.). The article does not refer to other "Western" forms of torture practiced in Iran (See Rejali, 1994). The role of the West in promoting torture in Iran during the Shah's period is ignored. Only references to "traditional" forms of torture are mentioned, which reconstruct the same sort of images which the

orientalist representation of Iran did a century ago: a country in need of Western moral and legal intervention (See Curzon,1892). Such an image is not a reflection of Khossroshai's experiences, or informants' experiences within Iran. But, in the minds of the reader, torture and lack of freedom characterize the "actual" conditions which Iranians attempt to flee, whether or not that is the case.

In North Vancouver, immigrant youths have been portrayed in the media as a "problem." As Mina Molavi (in Ian Noble, "Newcomers facing challenges," NorthShore News, [On line]. Available: <http:www.nsnews.com/backissue.html.>, 1997) points out, the color of their skin (racism) and limited knowledge of language make it harder for them to "integrate and feel accepted." This is especially the case when "ESL" students are viewed by the general public as "slowing" the learning curve for non-ESL students. Their "problems" are also portrayed as a "gang problem," due to the involvement of a few Iranians in violence in North Vancouver, British Columbia. Social workers such as Mina Molavi and Mostafa Tofanchi assert that there is a need for more resources to ease the process of transition for newcomers and their families.

Iranian youth are also viewed as causing "problems" in West-Vancouver schools in regards to "change of guardianship applications used to move kids into local classrooms." (Anna Marie D'Angelo, "Judge blasts schools," North Shore News, [On line]. Available: <http:www.nsnews.com/backissue.html.>, 1997) writes about guardianship applications and courts rulings by references to only "immigrant" students from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Iran. In short, "problems" associated with immigrant youths are not considered as Canadian issues. Rather they are seen as issues which affect the social fabric of this country in a "negative" light (Mina Molavi also makes this point). In such cases, they are seen not as immigrants but as foreign nationals with landed immigrant status. What such representations ignore is the mere fact that, for the youth, the process of immigration is often associated with emotional "problems" and cultural shock.

4.4 Religious and Political Discrimination in Iran and Their representation in the Media

References to Iranian ethno-religious minorities is often made with respect to their status and experiences in Iran rather than Canada. More important, discrimination against them is only viewed with references to how the socio-economic policies of the current Iranian regime has affected them. In a sense, the focus is often on the Islamic Republic's "anti-modern" policies rather than discrimination faced by the ethno-religious minorities from a historical and transnational perspective. Chris Hedges (In New York Times, August, 1, 1994) in his article "Iran Cracks Down on Christian Minority" begins by stating that

> The Islamic government of Iran, which has often been criticized by human rights groups for its treatment of religious minorities, is mounting the fiercest campaign since the 1978 Revolution against the small Christian minority here, church officials and Western diplomats say.

He also asserts that evangelist churches preaching in Persian are under more pressure than the Armenian Church, whose gatherings are still held in Armenian rather than Persian (Hint: limiting Farsi speaking people to attend). Two issues emerge here. On the one hand, the revolution, Islam and Iran are portrayed in a negative light. And the West is constructed as an expert on issues prevalent in Iran rather than non-Christian or Christian intellectuals and activists within Iran.

On the other hand, the West-East dichotomy is explored by references to the activities of Western based evangelists like the Assemblies of God and the Iranian government's reaction to their activities in Iran, which has been harsh. It is, for example, blamed for the death of many religious leaders such as Mehdi Dibaj whose mutilated body was found after disappearing on July 3, 1994. Other groups such as Bahai's, Jews and Sunni's are also mentioned in this article and their sufferings known. But the real focus is on how the West, in its religious form, is viewed by the officials in Iran.

What is more interesting is that the same article written in condensed form was published in the Guardian Weekly on August 14, 1994. In this shorter version, Iran's harsh treatment of religious minorities is also seen as dangerous. And, its actions are viewed in disbelief. They are considered as a disregard for Human Rights by officials and experts in the West. Religious discrimination faced by evangelist preachers and followers find another representation in Safa Haeri's article (Middle East International July 2, 1994). He focuses on Father Dibaj's alleged disappearance and death by the Islamic government agents. The government, however, has in the past blamed such deaths on the Mujaheedin. The government blames its counterpart, another religiously oriented group which ideologically also considers Western involvement in Iran as hegemonic and colonialist in nature.

In the West, the Baha'is are considered to be facing discrimination in Iran. In contrast, in Iran, Baha'i followers are conceptualized as the agents of the United States and the Shah (*Keyan*, January 22, 1992). That is, they are thought of as part of the West and a reflection of its lack of religious morals. "From the beginning of its appearance, Baha'ism has been an instrument of Western imperialism in the Islamic countries, especially in Iran, in order to create religious dissension and to weaken the religious faith and fervor of the people" (In Baha B.E. 150/March 21, 1993:2). They are considered as a danger to Islamic government and Islam. Consequently, they must be resisted as a way of resisting the West and its hegemony. But, what comes to be shared by the Baha'is and other political and ethnic groups is their status as minorities without any social and legal rights, especially when and if they identify themselves as such (See Rejali, 1994, for a discussion of the relationship between torture and the process of modernization in Iran from a historical perspective).

4.5 **Discussion: the West or the East?**

In the above representations, the category of *otherness* is constituted by various categories with different and at times conflicting relations. From the perspective of the Iranian government,

the *outsiders* are conceptualized as Western imperialists identified by references to the United States. The list also includes agents of imperialism and enemies of Islam and Iran such as the Ba'th party of Iraq, the Mujaheedin and the Baha'is. They are viewed as spies and they are distrusted. In their cases, their beliefs are conceptualized as detrimental and their actions as resistance to the Islamic Republic's hegemonic control over the power structure.

In the case of asylum seekers in Canada who identify themselves as supporters of the Mujaheedin, they are viewed as security threats to Canada. On the other hand, members of the Baha'i faith are not considered as such, perhaps due to the fact that their ideological stance does not necessarily threaten Western hegemony. Mujaheedin are constructed in the same manner in Canada as they are constructed by the Iranian officials. That is, in both the West and the East, they are constructed and viewed as *otherness* whose actions and political views are detrimental to the national security of the Iranian and Canadian governments. In the case of the Baha'is, they are viewed as dangerous by the Islamic Republic. But, in Canada, their presence is viewed in terms of human rights violations in Iran. As such the role of Canada to provide safe heavens for the Baha'is is seen as its contribution to "solve" refugee "problems" around the world.

In such cases, Iranians are viewed, on the one hand, differently and, on the other hand, in the same light by the both governments despite institutional discriminations faced by both the Baha'is and the Mujaheedin members in Iran. In such representations of Iran, the divisions into Western and non-Western is relational and groups are constructed differently in different contexts. In a sense, it seems that the West-East dichotomy has nothing to do with the West or the East. Rather, it has become an ideological tool in the hands of ethno-national elite in promoting their interests by labeling one another with terms such as "Westerner" or "agents of the West" and "Easterners" and "traditionalist."

Conclusion

Canada is now home to a growing number of Iranian transnationals whose ethnicity and identify find expressions as hyphenated Iranian-Canadians living in a pluralistic society. For many, ethno-national identity is a significant defining criteria in their identity politics. Although, their ethno-national identity is reproduced, contested or at times rejected, national identity as a characteristic of groups of people is considered as natural: it is used as a legitimate criteria for compartmentalizing social relations in global and local contexts.

The hyphenation of Iranian identity preceded the movement of Iranian transmigrants into Canada and has its root in tribal, ethnic and religious differences in Iran. As such, the term *Iranian* is a multi-faceted category which comes to have different meanings and manifestations within a transnational context. And its meanings are affected by the events in both the East and the West. To be Iranian does not imply that one is Persian, Moslem, and was born or socialized in Iran. It does not mean that one is "revolutionary," "anti-capitalist" or "refugee." Yet, they are the criteria upon which Iranian transmigrants are represented despite economic, racial and ethnic differences among them.

Chapter Five:

A Review of Findings and Emerging Issues

Iranian transmigrant population in Canada is a collection of transnational diasporic communities in three metropolitan cities of Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal. The life experiences of the Iranians are diverse due to their movement around the world under different circumstances and during different periods. The movement of Iranians to Canada and other parts of the world reveals the importance of transnationalism as an analytical tool in research on migration. Jennifer Hyndman and Margaret Walton-Roberts (1998:2) point out that transnationalism is a characteristic of the post-modern world and the globalization of capitalism. Transnationalism points to the "increased flows of social, cultural and political life" between nation-states and metropolitan centers.

Transnationalism leads to the idea of "shifting collectivities," as citizens of different countries reside in a nation other than their birth place. As more ethno-national individuals immigrate to Canada, more diverse diasporic communities are formed outside the boundaries of their respective nation-states. As such, Iranian transmigrants come into contact with other ethno-nationalities in the French and British dominated Canadian society. Information and knowledge is communicated among Iranian communities in the world as they interact economically, socially and politically. In this sense, information and knowledge about *other* ethno-nationalities in different countries such as Canada is also communicated between Iranian communities around the world.

Information and knowledge is communicated not only between host and home countries of immigrants but also between them and other Iranians in other nation-states. In this sense, their identity construction is not necessarily a local construction but it is a global one, which finds various manifestations based on a set of factors such as age, gender, and ideology, to name a few. Iranians are not simply non-Western newcomers to Canada, rather they are

"transmigrants, whose roles and identities are constituted *across a field of translocalities*, whether that be Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, Abadan, London, Ankara, Paris, Los Angeles, Japan, Toronto, Montreal, or Vancouver" (In Ibid.:3).

In this sense, the Iranian immigrants as a part of the composition of Canadian "Vertical Mosaic" is comprised by people who have already lived and been familiarized with different nationalities in different countries through *direct* rather than *absent* relations during different periods and under diverse circumstances. Their views about *otherness* are partly constituted by how their experiences as "immigrants" were affected by the dominant views in the intermediary countries. As such, Canada is not home to Iranians from Iran, rather it is home to Iranians who are also socialized and have lived their "lives" in other parts of the world.

The transmigration of Iranians to Canada is a global/local socio-political phenomena which finds its inception during intense periods of reform in both Iran and Canada. Their migration is not simply the physical movement of individuals between two geographical locations. Their movement is affected and determined by factors such as race, nationalism, religion, and economic considerations (which are themselves dialectically related). It is, in short, the transnational movement of individuals with specific yet conflicting histories, cultural backgrounds and ideological suppositions between Iran and Canada through other countries. Their movement around the world and into Canada, however, is affected by cultural, political and economic events in Iran. Changes to the Canadian immigration policy facilitated their "immigration" into this country but it is political events in Iran which accelerated their transmigration out of Iran.

Their transmigration to the Western countries is a sign of resistance not only to the Islamic Revolution and its ideological stance but also to the events that followed the Islamic Republic's inception and its grip on Iran's power structure. Although the revolution promised greater individual and collective freedoms in political, social and cultural spheres, the Islamic Republic's

policies and actions undermined its promises of adhering to human rights, political freedom and economic equality promised during the revolutionary era. However, it is of great importance to note that the Iranian transmigrant population is socially and economically diverse; and their reasons for leaving Iran do not necessarily correspond to their active participation in anti-government movements or organizations.

The out-migration of Iranians is a sign of class, religious and power differentiation in Iran. It is as well reflective of ideological differences and the Iranian "immigrants'" views towards the West as a solution to Islamic control of Iran by the *Ulama*. It is a sign of how, in the context of modernity, class and power differentiate between groups and how reactions to capitalist and imperialist domination in Iran resulted in the transmigration of the first and subsequent waves of Iranians from different socio-political and religious groups.

Their immigration is a reflection of ideological differences and how insider and outsider divisions are constructed, maintained and over time altered. Iranian ethnic diversity, however, has been flourishing in the West as more Iranians leave Iran and immigrate to various Western countries such as Canada.

Iranian transmigration to Canada and other Western countries no longer consists of movements of students alone but also includes many "permanent immigrants," "exiles," "refugees" and "indentured workers." In Canada, Iranian immigrant population has been on the rise since the introduction of the point system in 1967. More specific, the Canadian refugee policy towards the Baha'is of Iran, accepting them as convention refugees due to the discrimination they face in Iran, has played an important role in the transmigration of Iranians to Canada. Their movement corresponds to political and ideological changes in Iran, yet this does not imply that somehow all Iranians fled Iran directly after the revolution, since many may have resided in the West during the revolution and decided to stay in the West after the events of the 1978-79 Revolution.

Their transnational characteristics are partly constituted by how their social positions during the Shah's period were affected by the Western oriented policies. It is also reflective of how they reacted to the revolution and post-revolutionary events (i.e.: the Iran-Iraq War) as members of specific socio-economic classes and ethno-religious groups with diverging ideological beliefs. Finally, their transmigration is dependent on how they view socio-economic and political events in the West versus in the East. Transnationalism, in other words, refers to the global positioning of individuals within the context of nation-building processes and ideological differences in different nation-states.

The life history method enabled me to explore how race, class, nationality and ethnicity converge in a transnational context and are employed in constructing individuals' identities differently during different time periods. The data indicate that national identity and the idea of nation-state remain important aspects of informants' lives. These factors also play an important role in how they are defined within the context of the East-West dichotomy. However, they define themselves by references to two or more nation-states to make space for their transnational socialization. National identities may not play important roles in the formulation of theory, but transnational multi-hyphenated ethno-nationalities are important aspects of one's identity construction.

In multi-ethnic-national-religious societies such as Canada, it is time to be critical of how "we" conceptualize about race, civilization, culture, morality, the West and the East. It is time to provide space for the transnational characteristics of Canada by questioning "our" basic assumptions about what it means to be "civilized" and "progressive." The East is no longer a distant territory. It is "home" for many. As such, when discussing Canadian issues then there is also a need to go beyond the boundaries of the West and account for how the West affected the East and how in turn the East is affecting the West. Perhaps, a term which is reflective of the dialectic interactions between the West and the East. This term is defined as the process of

criticizing, incorporating, reversing or ignoring ethnocentric views of Western and indigenous forms of knowledge about *otherness* by individuals who are members of different "shifting collectivities."

In conclusion, as Linda Camiono and Ruth Krulfeld (1994:xii) point out, "identity construction is often defined as situational." According to Barth (in ibid.), negotiating identity often depends on whether or not individuals interact with insiders or outsiders, how they are regarded when interacting with others and how they are regarded when they are not present amongst outsiders.

Appendix:

Tables

Table 1:			Iranian Immigrants by Immigrant Class and Year of Landing, 1980-1998								
Year of Landing	Family Class	Convention Refugee	Designated Class	Entrepreneur	Investors	Self-Employed	Assisted Relative	Live-In Caregivers	Retired	Independent & Other	Total
1998	262	803	1	152	40	28	396	0	0	1,356	3,038
1997	676	1,472	8	466	104	214	854	1	0	3,360	7,155
1996	918	1,822	6	482	68	127	518	0	0	1,886	5,827
1995	595	1,355	20	322	31	81	334	0	0	946	3,684
1994	904	695	54	298	38	43	320	2	0	340	2,694
1993	1,171	1,105	399	250	37	19	400	1	32	472	3,886
1992	786	2,472	1,887	139	16	17	225	0	32	1,251	6,825
1991	731	1,979	2,130	171	11	13	372	0	40	820	6,267
1990	502	1,595	469	225	13	19	281	0	47	399	3,550
1989	447	2,033	4	236	9	48	300	0	98	687	3,862
1988	408	1,990	6	125	17	20	536	0	77	586	3,765
1987	331	1,022	0	66	3	30	247	0	79	1,371	3,149
1986	237	894	2	55	0	35	152	0	53	572	2,000
1985	236	830	2	56	0	15	163	0	53	391	1,746
1984	243	606	4	57	0	26	175	0	79	689	1,879
1983	286	541	0	24	0	86	61	0	78	196	1,272
1982	222	293	1	51	0	112	81	0	92	359	1,211
1981	209	17	0	42	0	143	158	0	92	397	1,058
1980	191	15	1	40	0	151	247	0	49	327	1,021
Total	9,355	21,539	4,994	3,257	387	1,227	5,820	4	901	16,405	64,159

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 2: Iranian Immigrant Population by Year of Landing 1946-1970

Year	Total
1946-70	919
1970	123
1969	84
1968	162
1956-67	544
1946-55	6
1946-69	796

Source: Employment and Immigration Canada, Immigration Statistics. Quarterly Statistics Immigration, 1969 and 1970.

Table 3: Iranian Immigrant Population by Year of Landing, 1970-1979

Year of Landing	Male	Female
1979	550	494
1978	311	280
1977	222	218
1976	300	200
1975	116	89
1974	149	94
1973	171	101
1972	103	71
1971	112	93
1970	66	57
Total	2100	1697

Source: Employment and Immigration Canada, Immigration Statistics. Quarterly Statistics Immigration, 1970 to 1979.

Table 4:	Iranian Immigrants by Immigrant Class and Gender, 1980-1998		
	% of Total Population	% of Total Male Population	% of Total Female Population
Refugee	34.0	37.1	30.0
Independent	25.4	26.9	23.5
Family	14.6	11.2	18.9
Assisted Relatives	9.0	8.3	9.9
Designated Classes	7.8	8.9	6.3
Entrepreneur	5.0	4.7	5.5
Self-employed	1.9	1.7	2.0
All Other Categories	2.0	1.2	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 4a:	Male Iranian Immigrants by Immigrant Class and Gender, 1980-1998		
	% of Total Single Youth Male Population	% of Total Single Adult Male population	% of Total Married Male Population
Refugee	34.9	49.1	28.1
Independent	27.1	28.2	12.6
Family	6.0	3.4	18.5
Assisted Relatives	11.5	4.8	9.4
Designated Classes	7.3	12.1	6.9
Entrepreneur	7.9	1.2	5.7
Self-employed	2.7	0.6	2.2
All Other Categories	2.6	0.6	16.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 4b:	Female Iranian Immigrants by Immigrant Class and Gender, 1980-1998		
	% of Total Single Youth Female Population	% of Total Single Adult Female Population	% of Total Married Female Population
Refugee	33.9	35.6	26.8
Independent	27.8	21.6	20.9
Family	6.8	16.1	23.9
Assisted Relatives	12.3	10.7	9.1
Designated Classes	6.7	7.1	6.0
Entrepreneur	8.4	3.0	5.3
Self-employed	2.8	1.5	2.1
All Other Categories	1.3	4.4	5.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 5: Iranian Ethnic Population by Religion, Target Group Census 1991, 20% Sample Data

	Total	% of Total Target Group
Total Target Population	432,215	100.0
Roman Catholic	1,105	2.6
Protestant	1,680	3.9
Eastern Orthodox	260	0.6
Jewish	415	1.0
Islam	27,655	64.0
Hindu	30	0.1
Other Religions	6,720	15.6
No Religious Affiliation	5,340	12.4

Source: Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile for Population with Iranian Origins, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991.

Table 6: Iranian Immigrants by Continent, Country and City of Application, 1980-1998		
Country of Application	Total	% of Total Immigrant Population
North America		
Canada	24,209	37.7%
USA	4,047	6.3%
Sub-Total	28,256	44.0%
South & Central America	67	0.1%
Europe		
England	1,508	2.4%
Germany	1,766	2.8%
Italy	2,591	4.0%
Vienna	410	0.6%
Copenhagen	13	0.0%
The Hague	101	0.2%
Brussels	155	0.2%
Berne	333	0.5%
Stockholm	84	0.1%
Spain	292	0.5%
Greece	1,352	2.1%
Lisbon	211	0.3%
Bucharest	25	0.0%
Budapest	32	0.0%
Czech & Slovakia Republics	607	0.9%
Moscow	40	0.1%
Turkey	5,433	8.5%
Sub-Total	14,953	23.3%
Asia		
South East Asia	330	0.5%
Manila	253	0.4%
Pakistan	2,375	3.7%
India	895	1.4%
Arab Gulf States	292	0.5%
Tel Aviv	295	0.5%
Kuwait	626	1.0%
Syria	13,600	21.2%
Sub-Total	18,666	29.1%
Africa		
Egypt	256	0.4%
Narubi	32	0.0%
Abidjan	71	0.1%
Sub-Total	359	0.6%
Other Countries	1,858	2.9%
Total	64,159	100.0%

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 7: Iranian Immigrant Population by Selected Immigrant Class and Year of Landing Accepted in Damascus, Syria, 1980-1998

Year of Landing	Total	Family Class	Convention Refugee	Assisted Relative	Entrepreneur
1998	1,665	200	93	312	63
1997	3,335	467	139	467	123
1996	2,237	679	126	261	122
1995	1,012	400	43	137	47
1994	1,023	640	32	234	35
1993	1,234	861	2	283	32
1992	623	435	4	142	30
1991	390	436	30	299	5
1990	499	266	6	173	22
1989	496	254	17	179	4
1988	602	209	23	365	0
1987	84	38	5	41	0
1986	0	0	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0	0	0
1984	0	0	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	0	0
Total	13,200	4,885	520	2,893	483

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 8: Iranian Immigrant Population by Selected Immigrant Class and Year of Landing in Canada, 1980-1998

Year of Landing	Family Class	Convention Refugee	Assisted Relatives	Designated Class	Independent Class	Total
1998	37	604	0	1	25	667
1997	92	1,426	0	8	43	1,569
1996	99	1,310	2	6	34	1,451
1995	94	905	1	20	37	1,057
1994	81	427	8	54	58	628
1993	169	758	25	399	258	1,609
1992	212	1,942	32	1,885	1,123	5,194
1991	177	1,075	20	2,130	694	4,096
1990	114	439	27	466	143	1,189
1989	109	183	23	0	281	596
1988	72	93	37	0	329	531
1987	95	291	85	0	1,221	1,692
1986	72	425	89	1	513	1,100
1985	58	336	119	1	363	877
1984	87	57	143	0	645	932
1983	108	100	26	0	101	335
1982	115	66	12	0	95	288
1981	52	12	20	0	47	131
1980	106	5	7	1	160	279
Total	1,949	10,454	676	4,972	6,170	24,221

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 9: Iranian Immigrant Population by Selected Immigrant Class and Year of Landing Accepted in Islamabad, Pakistan, 1980-1998

Year of Landing	Total	Convention Refugee
1998	9	3
1997	16	10
1996	42	32
1995	38	37
1994	79	44
1993	90	71
1992	77	58
1991	165	154
1990	176	173
1989	407	394
1988	413	400
1987	143	140
1986	267	261
1985	218	216
1984	191	189
1983	32	32
1982	7	0
1981	4	0
1980	1	0
Total	2375	2214

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 10: Iranian Immigrant Population by Selected Immigrant Class and Year of Landing Accepted in Ankara, Turkey, 1980-1998

Year of Landing	Total All Classes	Convention Refugee	Entrepreneur	Family Class	Total of Selected Classes
1998	162	84	4	4	92
1997	342	160	27	13	200
1996	449	288	26	43	357
1995	429	315	51	12	378
1994	344	172	70	30	272
1993	391	205	69	59	333
1992	350	279	13	41	333
1991	572	505	12	27	544
1990	538	454	22	31	507
1989	864	759	28	24	811
1988	981	929	6	24	959
1987	11	11	0	0	11
1986	0	0	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0	0	0
1984	0	0	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	0	0
Total	5,433	4,161	328	308	4,797

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 11: Iranian Immigrant Citizenship Status Before Entering Canada by Country of Citizenship, 1980-1998

Country of Citizenship	Total	% of Total Population	Country of Citizenship	Total	% of Total Population
North & South America			Asia		
U.S.A.	77	0.1	Korea	1	0.0
Mexico	5	0.0	Laos	1	0.0
Argentina	1	0.0	Burma	1	0.0
Nicaragua	2	0.0	Philippines	35	0.1
Sub-Total	85	0.1	Indonesia	11	0.0
Europe			India	58	0.1
U.S.S.R.	12	0.0	Pakistan	36	0.1
Cyprus	1	0.0	Bangladesh	2	0.0
Portugal	1	0.0	Afghanistan	120	0.2
Spain	1	0.0	Iran	58927	91.8
Belgium	2	0.0	Iraq	209	0.3
Sweden	7	0.0	Lebanon	11	0.0
Netherlands	2	0.0	Jordan	13	0.0
Greece	5	0.0	Syria	2	0.0
Iceland	2	0.0	Sub-Total	59427	92.6
U.K.	59	0.1	Africa		
France	27	0.0	Senegal	8	0.0
Germany	25	0.0	Tanzania	9	0.0
Irish Republic	4	0.0	Guyana	3	0.0
Den. & Switz.	5	0.0	Kenya	2	0.0
Israel	9	0.0	Sub-Total	22	0.0
Turkey	8	0.0	Stateless	4455	6.9
Sub-Total	170	0.3	Total	64159	100.0

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 12: Iranian Ethnic Population by Ethnic Origin, Citizenship, Immigrant Status and Year of Immigration, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991

	Total	% of Total Target Group	% of Immigrant Population
Ethnic Origin (Iranian), Single Origin	38,920	90	*
Ethnic Origin (Iranian), Multiple Origin	4,300	10	*
Total	43,215	100	*
Canadian Citizenship	17,470	40.4	*
Citizenship Other than Canadian	25,745	59.6	*
Total	43,215	100	*
Non-Immigrant population	5,115	11.8	*
Born in Province of Residence	4,440	10.3	*
Immigrant population	29,890	69.2	*
Non-Immigrant population	8,210	19	*
Total	43,215	100	*
Period of Immigration			
Before 1961	75	0.2	0.3
1961-1970	790	1.8	2.6
1971-1980	3,085	7.1	10.3
1981-1991	25,950	60	86.8
1981-1987	11,920	27.6	39.9
1988-1991	14,025	32.5	46.9
Total	29,890	69.2	100.0
Age At the Time of Immigration			
0-4 years	2,105	4.9	7.0
5-19 Years,	6,930	16	23.2
20+ Years	20,850	48.2	69.8
Total	43,215	69.2	100.0
Place of Birth, immigrant population			
USA	220	0.5	0.7
Central & South America	20	0	0.1
Caribbean and Bermuda	25	0.1	0.1
United Kingdom	260	0.6	0.9
Other European Countries	335	0.8	1.1
Africa	170	0.4	0.6
India	540	1.2	1.8
Other Asian Countries	28,280	65.4	94.6
Oceania and Other	40	0.1	0.1
Total	29,890	69.2	100.0

Source: Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile for Population with Iranian Origins, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991.

Table 13: Iranian Ethnic Population by Age & Gender, Target Group Census 1991, 20% Sample Data

Age (Years)	Male	% of Total Population	% of Male Population	Female	% of Total Population	% of Female Population
0-4	1,930	4.5	7.7	1,790	4.1	9.8
5-9	2,305	5.3	9.2	1,770	4.1	9.7
10-14	1,795	4.2	7.2	1,425	3.3	7.8
15-19	1,570	3.6	6.3	1,070	2.5	5.9
20-24	2,010	4.7	8.0	1,625	3.8	8.9
25-29	3,715	8.6	14.9	2,150	5.0	11.8
30-34	3,860	8.9	15.4	2,200	5.1	12.1
35-39	2,345	5.4	9.4	1,865	4.3	10.2
40-44	1,735	4.0	6.9	1,330	3.1	7.3
45-49	1,200	2.8	4.8	905	2.1	4.9
50-54	745	1.7	3.0	565	1.3	3.1
55-59	560	1.3	2.2	450	1.0	2.5
60-64	410	0.9	1.6	290	0.7	1.6
65-74	550	1.3	2.2	560	1.3	3.1
75+	245	0.6	1.0	230	0.5	1.3
Total	24,990	57.8	100.0	18,225	42.2	100.0

Source: Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile for Population with Iranian Origins, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991.

Table 14: Iranian Immigrant Population by Gender, Marital Status and Selected Age Categories 1980-1998

Category	% of Total Population
Married and Single Male	54.7
Married and Single Female	40.5
All Other Marital Categories Both Genders	4.8
Total	100.0
Single	51.2
Married	45.0
All Other Marital Categories	3.8
Total	100.0
Single Male Ages 0-19	14.5
Single Female Ages 0-19	12.4
Single Males (ages 20-39)	18.3
Single Females (ages 20-39)	5.3
Single Males and Females (ages 40+)	0.7
Married Males (ages 20-39)	9.7
Married Males (ages 40-59)	9.1
Married Males (ages 60+)	2.7
Married Female (ages 20-39)	14.1
Married Females (ages 40-59)	7.0
Married Females (ages 60+)	1.2
All Other Marital Categories and Age Groups	5.0
Total	100.0

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran,1980 to July 1998.

Table 15: Iranian Immigrant Population by Family Status and Year of Landing, 1980-1998

Year of Landing	Dependent Children and Students under the Age of 19 and Single	Spouse
1998	667	437
1997	1998	1077
1996	1751	907
1995	1121	526
1994	737	484
1993	1051	531
1992	1633	337
1991	742	396
1990	1010	401
1989	1169	529
1988	1022	512
1987	687	309
1986	408	185
1985	347	193
1984	308	225
1983	265	207
1982	236	175
1981	317	180
1980	281	179
Total	15750	7790

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 16:	Iranian Immigrant Population by Marital Status and Gender, 1980-1998										
	Single		Married		Widowed		Divorced		Separated		
Year	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total
1998	892	583	696	768	2	24	22	38	3	10	3,038
1997	2,156	1,493	1,665	1,855	8	85	37	81	10	35	7,425
1996	1,637	1,132	1,303	1,473	14	129	34	76	9	20	5,827
1995	1,100		779	892	11	87	24	53	6	20	2,972
1994	667	515	606	713	17	104	17	37	2	16	2,694
1993	1,168	741	790	921	14	112	43	71	9	17	3,886
1992	2,612	1,149	1,342	1,363	19	107	63	90	37	43	6,825
1991	2,260	1,070	1,323	1,344	18	103	48	53	18	30	6,267
1990	1,204	626	783	800	9	58	24	25	7	14	3,550
1989	1,317	686	842	855	9	87	21	29	7	9	3,862
1988	1,424	641	772	767	13	89	17	24	8	10	3,765
1987	1,323	547	596	552	8	68	19	20	5	11	3,149
1986	838	311	377	360	8	62	16	17	4	7	2,000
1985	724	289	325	315	7	49	5	18	9	5	1,746
1984	800	309	363	320	5	44	12	19	5	2	1,879
1983	374	211	331	285	3	38	12	16	0	2	1,272
1982	347	202	334	272	2	33	5	8	4	4	1,211
1981	237	194	297	280	2	33	5	7	0	3	1,058
1980	236	159	307	269	5	34	6	5	0	0	1,021
Total	21,316	10,858	13,831	14,404	174	1,346	430	687	143	258	64,159

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 17: Iranian Immigrant Population by Marital Status, Gender and Immigrant Class, 1980-1998

	% of Total Population	% of Total Single Population	% of Total Married Population	% of Family Class	% of Convention Refugee Class
All Single Male	33.2	64.8	*	10.4	42
Single Youth Male	14.5	28.2	*	6	14.8
Single Adult Male	18.7	36.6	*	4.4	27.2
Married Male	21.5	*	49	27.4	17.8
All Single Female	18	35.2	*	12	18.3
Single Youth Female	12.4	24.3	*	5.8	12.4
Single Adult Female	5.6	10.8	*	6.2	5.9
Married Female	22.5	*	51	36.8	17.7
All Other Categories Both Genders	4.8	*	*	13.4	4.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100

	% of Independent Class	% of Entrepreneur Class	% of Designated Class	% of Self Employed	% of Assisted Relative Class
All Single Male	36.2	27.3	42.8	26	28.5
Single Youth Male	15.4	22.8	13.7	20.2	18.4
Single Adult Male	20.8	4.5	29.1	5.8	10.1
Married Male	21.8	24.2	19.3	25.6	22.5
All Single Female	18.3	23.8	15.8	22.5	23.6
Single Youth Female	13.5	20.5	10.7	18.2	17
Single Adult Female	4.8	3.3	5.1	4.3	6.6
Married Female	20.9	23.7	17.5	24.9	22.7
All Other Categories Both Genders	2.8	1.0	4.6	1	2.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 18: Iranian Immigrants by Intended Occupation, 1980-1998

	Total		Total
Entrepreneurs	852	Services	1,312
Investors	103	Construction	854
Manager-Administrator	1,709	Sales	880
Natural Sci-Eng-Math	4,235	Fabrication-Assembly-Repair	1,663
Social Sciences	265	Clerical	1,582
Religion	6	Transport	566
Teaching	516	Machining	427
Medicine-Health	1,033	Other	731
Artist-Lit-Per Art	466	Sub-total	8,015
Sub-total	9,185	Not Classified	15,204
		Total	32,404

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch.
Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 19: Iranian Immigrant Population by Selected Number of Years of Schooling and Year of Landing, 1980-1998

	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	Total
1998	550	76	112	79	471	214	161	107	71	24	20	11	8	8	1,912
1997	1,313	211	286	195	1,059	498	423	181	148	56	50	34	19	24	4,497
1996	1,181	185	243	187	659	332	262	145	110	49	39	21	11	15	3,439
1995	935	103	152	106	330	160	126	78	41	34	30	26	11	5	2,137
1994	695	79	130	91	210	84	102	45	27	12	8	6	9	7	1,505
1993	1,062	159	202	128	300	120	97	67	33	12	9	7	4	7	2,207
1992	2,157	398	474	324	414	192	168	73	58	21	20	13	2	4	4,318
1991	1,868	372	381	268	417	180	152	76	41	23	20	11	4	4	3,817
1990	942	175	199	147	247	100	112	50	41	16	12	12	4	6	2,063
1989	1,030	159	185	133	283	115	108	46	50	15	17	14	1	4	2,160
1988	1,051	172	234	128	199	93	90	29	25	16	15	7	7	6	2,072
1987	937	194	213	156	205	108	103	52	37	15	11	6	6	6	2,049
1986	538	119	128	143	144	94	69	34	23	11	15	6	1	6	1,331
1985	460	106	129	129	141	80	63	34	33	7	12	4	3	3	1,204
1984	383	125	191	162	178	92	80	36	49	20	17	13	2	4	1,352
1983	198	82	114	103	116	62	62	36	18	10	8	6	4	3	822
1982	158	64	79	93	132	93	88	39	47	16	26	10	5	2	852
1981	166	46	68	35	100	66	69	26	28	12	11	2	1	3	633
1980	170	44	54	44	95	59	52	30	25	2	6	2	2	2	587
Total	15,794	2,869	3,574	2,651	5,700	2,742	2,387	1,184	905	369	346	211	104	119	38,955

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Electronic Information Services, Electronic Information Management, Information Systems and Technologies Branch. Data based on Country of Last Permanent Residence, Iran, 1980 to July 1998.

Table 20: Iranian Ethnic Population, School Attendance for Persons 15-24 Years of Age, Target Group Census 1991, 20% Sample Data		
	% of Total Population	% of Total Population 15-24
Total Population 15-24	14.5	100.0
Not Attending School	3.6	24.5
Attending School Full time	9.4	64.9
Attending School part Time	1.5	10.5

Source: Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile for Population with Iranian Origins, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991.

Table 21: Iranian Ethnic Population, Years of Schooling for Persons 15+, Target Group Census 1991, 20% Sample Data

	Total	% of Total	% of 15+
Total Target Group	43215	100.0	*
Total population 15+	32205	74.5	100.0
Highest Level of Schooling , >grade 9	1310	3.0	4.1
Grades 9-13-Without Secondary Certificate	4285	9.9	13.3
Grades 9-13-With Secondary Certificate	5410	12.5	16.8
Trades Certificate or Diploma	735	1.7	2.3
Other non-University-Without Certificate	2015	4.7	6.3
Other non-University-With Certificate	3235	7.5	10.0
University-Without Degree	5805	13.4	18.0
University Without Certificate	3070	7.1	9.5
University-With Certificate	2740	6.3	8.5
University-With Degree	9405	21.8	29.2

Source: Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile for Population with Iranian Origins, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991.

Table 22: Iranian Ethnic Population With Post Secondary Qualification by Gender, Target Group Census 1991, 20% Sample Data

	Male	% of Total Population	% of Male	Female	% of Total Target Group	% of Female
Educational, Recreational & Counseling Services	160	0.4	1.6	465	1.1	7.7
Fine & Applied Sciences	225	0.5	2.2	610	1.4	10.1
Humanities & Related Fields	380	0.9	3.8	620	1.4	10.2
Social Sciences & Related Fields	875	2	8.7	630	1.5	10.4
Commerce, Management & Business Administration	1,240	2.9	12.3	1,190	2.8	19.7
Agricultural and Biological Sciences/Technologies	555	1.3	5.5	405	0.9	6.7
Engineering & Applied Sciences	2,665	6.2	26.5	210	0.5	3.5
Engineering & Applied Science Technologies	2,180	5	21.7	235	0.5	3.9
Health Professions, Sciences & Technologies	845	2	8.4	1,050	2.4	17.4
Mathematics & Physical Sciences	920	2.1	9.1	620	1.4	10.2
No Specialization and All Other	25	0.1	0.2	10	0	0.2
Total	10,060	23.3	100.0	6,050	14	100

Source: Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile for Population with Iranian Origins, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991.

Table 23: Iranian Ethnic Population, Total Labour Force, Target Group Census 1991, 20% Sample Data

	Total Population	% of Total Population	% of Total Labour Force	% of All Industries
Total Target Population	43,215	100.0	*	*
Total Labour Force 15 Years & Over	20,585	47.6	100.0	*
Not Applicable	1,400	3.2	6.8	*
All Industries	19,185	44.4	93.2	100.0
Agriculture and Related Service Industries	50	0.1	0.2	0.3
Fishing and Trapping Industries	10	0.0	0.0	0.1
Logging and Forestry Industries	15	0.0	0.1	0.1
Mining, Quarrying & Oil Well Industries	70	0.2	0.3	0.4
Manufacturing Industries	2,120	4.9	10.3	11.1
Construction Industries	1,050	2.4	5.1	5.5
Transportation and Storage Industries	1,120	2.6	5.4	5.8
Communication & Other Utility Industries	530	1.2	2.6	2.8
Wholesale Trade Industries	725	1.7	3.5	3.8
Retail Trade Industries	3,190	7.4	15.5	16.6
Finance & Insurance Industries	650	1.5	3.2	3.4
Real Estate Operator and Insurance Agent Industries	385	0.9	1.9	2.0
Business Service Industries	1,555	3.6	7.6	8.1
Government Service Industries	655	1.5	3.2	3.4
Educational Service Industries	1,190	2.8	5.8	6.2
Health & Social Service Industries	1,495	3.5	7.3	7.8
Accommodation, Food & Beverage Service Industries	2,840	6.6	13.8	14.8
Other Service Industries	1,545	3.6	7.5	8.1

Source: Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile for Population with Iranian Origins, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991.

Table 24: Iranian Ethnic Population, Labour Force Participation by Gender and Age, Target Group Census 1991, 20% Sample Data

	Total Population	% of Total Population	% of Labour Force	Male	% of Total Population	% of Male Labour Force	Female	% of Total Population	% of Female Labour Force
15 Years and Over									
In Labour Force	20585	47.6	63.9	13760	31.8	72.6	6825	15.8	51.5
Employed, 15+	16070	37.2	49.9	10915	25.3	57.6	5150	11.9	38.9
Unemployed, 15+	4520	10.5	14.9	2845	6.6	15.0	1680	3.9	12.7
Not In the Labour Force	11620	26.9	36.1	5195	12.0	27.4	6425	14.9	48.5
Total	32205	74.5	100.0	18955	43.9	100.0	13250	30.7	100.0
15-24									
In Labour Force	3245	7.5	51.7	1865	4.3	52.1	1375	3.2	51.0
Employed	2575	6.0	41.0	1485	3.4	41.5	1090	2.5	40.4
Unemployed	670	1.6	10.7	380	0.9	10.6	285	0.7	40.6
Not In the Labour Force	3030	7.0	48.3	1710	4.0	47.8	1315	3.0	48.8
Sub-Total	6275	14.5	100.0	3580	8.3	100.0	2695	6.2	100.0
25 & Over									
In Labour Force	17345	40.1	66.9	11890	27.5	77.3	5455	12.6	51.7
Employed	13490	31.2	52.0	9430	21.8	61.3	4060	9.4	38.7
Unemployed	3855	8.9	14.9	2460	5.7	16.0	1395	3.2	13.2
Not In the Labour Force	8585	19.9	33.1	3485	8.1	22.7	5100	11.8	48.3
Sub-Total	25935	60.0	100.0	15375	35.6	100.0	10555	24.4	100.0
Grand-Total	32205	74.5	100.0	18955	43.9	100.0	13250	30.7	100.0
Unemployment Rate									
15 Years+	22.0	*	*	20.7	*	*	24.6	*	*
15-24 Years	20.6	*	*	20.4	*	*	20.7	*	*
25+	22.2	*	*	20.7	*	*	25.6	*	*
Participation Rate									
15 Years+	63.9	*	*	72.6	*	*	51.5	*	*
15-24 Years	51.7	*	*	52.1	*	*	51.0	*	*
25+	66.9	*	*	77.3	*	*	51.7	*	*

Source: Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile for Population with Iranian Origins, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991.

Table 25: Iranian Ethnic Population, Employment and Average Incomes for Males and Females, Target Group Census 1991, 20% Sample Data

	Total Female	% of Female "All classes of worker" Population	% of Total Target Group	Total Male	% of Male "All classes of worker" Population	% of Total Target Group
All Classes of Workers	6,140	100	14.2	13,040	100	30.2
Paid Workers	5,790	94.3	13.4	11,710	89.8	27.1
Employees	5,625	91.6	13	10,575	81.1	24.5
Self-Employed (incorporated)	165	2.7	0.4	1,135	8.7	2.6
Self-Employed	312	5.1	0.7	1,310	10	3
Unpaid Family Workers	35	0.6	0.1	30	0.2	0.1
Employed In Labour Force	5,150	*	11.9	10,915	*	25.3
Full Time, Full Year Workers	2,110	*	4.9	5,620	*	13
Average Employment Income	$24,576	*	*	$33,420	*	*
Standard Error of Average Employment Income	$709	*	*	$890	*	*
Part Time Workers, Worked Part of the Year	3,960	*	*	6,760	*	*
Average Employment Income	$9,887	*	*	$14,836	*	*
Standard Error of Average Employment Income	$357	*	*	$532	*	*

Source: Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile for Population with Iranian Origins, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991.

Table 26: Iranian Ethnic Population, Occupations by Gender, Target Group Census 1991, 20% Sample Data

Occupation, Total Target Group	Male Population	% of Total Target Group	% of Total Male	Female Population	% of Total Target Group	% of Total Female
All Occupations (Major Groups)	13,050	30.2	100.0	6,140	14.2	100.0
Managerial, Administrative & Related	1,675	3.9	12.8	525	1.2	8.6
Natural Sciences, Engineering and Mathematics	1,180	2.7	9.0	205	0.5	3.3
Social Sciences and Related Fields	140	0.3	1.1	175	0.4	2.9
Religion	0	0	0	0	0.0	0
Teaching and Related	420	1.0	3.2	320	0.7	5.2
Medicine and Health	460	1.1	3.5	665	1.5	10.8
Artistic, Literary, Recreational & Related	210	0.5	1.6	125	0.3	2.0
Clerical & Related	1,095	2.5	8.4	1,750	4.0	28.5
Sales	1,385	3.2	10.6	815	1.9	13.3
Service	2,055	4.8	15.8	1,130	2.6	18.4
Farming, Horticultural, & Animal Husbandry	75	0.2	0.6	15	0	0.2
Fishing, Trapping & Related	0	0	0	0	0	0
Forestry and Logging	20	0	0.2	0	0	0
Mining and Quarrying	10	0	0.1	0	0	0
Processing	250	0.6	1.9	50	0.1	0.8
Machining and Related	265	0.6	2.0	15	0.0	0.2
Product Fabricating, Assembling and Repairing	1,140	2.6	8.7	165	0.4	2.7
Construction Trades	740	1.7	5.7	0	0	0
Transport Equipment Operating	1,410	3.3	10.8	20	0	0.3
Material Handling and Related	135	0.3	1.0	35	0.1	0.6
Other Crafts and Equipment Operating	185	0.4	1.4	35	0.1	0.6
Occupations Not Elsewhere Classified	200	0.5	1.5	80	0.2	1.3

Source: Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile for Population with Iranian Origins, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991.

Table 27: Iranian Ethnic Population by Income and Gender for Persons over the Age of 15, Target Group Census 1991, 20% Sample Data

	Total Male	% of Total Target Group	% of Male 15+ With Income	Total Female	% of Total Target Group	% of Female 15+ With Income
Total Target Population	24,999	100.0	*	18,225	100.0	*
Persons 15+ With Income	16,055	37.2	100.0	9,215	21.3	100.0
Under $ 1,000	700	1.6	4.4	700	1.6	7.6
$1,000-$2,999	1,045	2.4	6.5	990	2.3	10.7
$3,000-$4,999	890	2.1	5.5	835	1.9	9.1
$5,000-$6,999	1,240	2.9	7.7	910	2.1	9.9
$7,000-$9,999	1,575	3.6	9.8	1,170	2.7	12.7
$10,000-$14,999	2,395	5.5	14.9	1,505	3.5	16.3
$15,000-$19,999	1,835	4.2	11.4	975	2.3	10.6
$20,000-$24,999	1,355	3.1	8.4	740	1.7	8.0
$25,000-$29,999	1,270	2.9	7.9	415	1.0	4.5
$30,000-$39,999	1,610	3.7	10.0	500	1.2	5.4
$40,000-$49,000	755	1.7	4.7	215	0.5	2.3
$50,000+	1,380	3.2	8.6	260	0.6	2.8
Average Income $	$ 22,040	*	*	$ 13,772	*	*
Median Income $	$ 15,405	*	*	$ 9,988	*	*
Standard Error of Average Income	$ 437	*	*	$ 307	*	*

Source: Statistics Canada. Target Group Profile for Population with Iranian Origins, 20% Sample Data, Census 1991.

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