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THE NEW PARAPOLICE:
RISK MARKETS AND COMMODIFIED SOCIAL CONTROL

George S. Rigakos

B.A. (University of Toronto) 1991
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A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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The New Parapolice: Risk Markets
and Commodified Social Control

by

George S. Rigakos

a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
York University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

By conducting a case study of Intelligarde International, The Law Enforcement Company, this dissertation considers the increasingly important role of the parapolice for maintaining social order within late modern capitalism. The theoretical orientation for this investigation emanates from a consideration of risk society, governance, pluralist, and Marxian understandings of social control and the private police. A risk markets perspective is proffered which emphasises the processes of fear and commodification, previously undeveloped in these literatures. This thesis investigates first: how discipline and surveillance is achieved organisationally and sold externally to risk markets, and second: how both security agents and those they are tasked with policing resist social control.

This line of inquiry produces questions answerable through archival (including statistical) and observational data. Critical ethnography, field interviews (n=50), an analysis of occurrence files (n=340), a 'bannings' database (n=2,617), personnel files (n=141), internal correspondence (n=15), and media reports were utilised in this investigation. In pursuing an ethnography of the Intelligarde parapolice, this dissertation departs from previous research that neglected to investigate the role and mobilisations of private security personnel from the perspective of line officers. Additionally, new descriptive information is made available about the crime control and order maintenance function of this parapolice organisation.

Findings show that Intelligarde officers issued 2,617 banning orders in 1996-97, and that they affected arrests or detained persons in 32.4% of all recorded occurrences. Comparisons with the Metropolitan Toronto Police demonstrate that the parapolice, on a per uniformed officer basis, are more likely to file paperwork on the public, are three times more likely to suffer from proceedings being launched against them, and are five times more likely to be attacked in the course of their duties. These findings, along with observational and marketing data, establish the crime control function of the parapolice.

The data also demonstrate the means by which the very techniques utilised for amassing information about suspect populations and for controlling their own workforce is sold as 'product' to the client by Intelligarde managers. For almost every technique of hyperpanoptic management, there exists a means for its circumvention. Intelligarde officers employ many ingenious methods of 'ghosting' their presence within artificial, digital representations of their labour. As a result, managers are tasked with purchasing even more comprehensive tools of surveillance or developing additional techniques to discipline their staff in a dialectic of control. On a much less nuanced level of resistance, the parapolice themselves are forced to confront groups of suspects who, on many occasions, physically attack and collectively defend themselves. Finally, the subculture of the parapolice (as with the public police) plays a vital role in defining occupational rules and organisational mobilisations in risk markets.

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I would like to thank all of the men and women of Intelligarde International, and especially Darrell Hayward, for allowing me into their lives – they made this dissertation possible. Although Intelligarde president Ross McLeod and I harbour fundamental political differences, I have no doubt that he supports this research and the production of knowledge in all its forms. Rather than offer obstacles of the type most criminologists have come to expect from police managers, Mr. McLeod was a keen facilitator for this research. I thank both him and his *parapolice* – a term that I borrow from him in titling this project. I would also like to thank my committee members: Margaret Beare, Barbara Hanson, and Livy Visano for their careful editorial work and many suggestions for the improvement of this thesis. Walter DeKeseredy, Leo Davids, and Regina Schuller helped hone the final version. My supervisor, Desmond Ellis, always encouraged me (among others) to pursue an ethnographic mode of investigation and I thank him for doing so. John McMullan challenged the theoretical content of this project and methodically queried its assumptions, both in ink and in countless conversations in the corridors of Saint Mary's University. Michael Overington reviewed the ethnographic presentation of material in this thesis and offered considerable insight. Stephanie Duncan provided invaluable journalistic information. I also appreciate the assistance of Veneise George and Colleen Lightbody, who helped me sort through mountains of files. Thanks also to the gang at CCAYU and especially Arden Smelser for being a friend. Finally, thanks to Anne Pleydon for being my escape.

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Introduction

On my first ride-along with Intelligarde, the Law Enforcement Company, I accompanied a Quality Control Manager while he investigated an allegation of excessive use of force by one of his security officers. After speaking to a working class Romanian man in an arm sling – who was injured during the ordeal – and his wife, the supervisor was sympathetic and bothered by the occurrence and immediately set about finding who was responsible. As we walked toward the elevator he turned to me and admonished, “this isn’t what private policing is about” – referring to the heavy-handed measures of his fellow officers.¹ Of course, he was only partially correct. While some of my preconceptions of Toronto’s most talked about security force were confirmed, I soon came to understand that I was missing the very big picture. This dissertation describes these broader political, social, and theoretical issues.

Limitations of Previous Research

A literature review revealed that not a single published study of the private police has examined the *doing* of security work from the perspective of the line officer. This project adds to the literature by providing the first ethnographic account of a private security company in the tradition of past qualitative works in the sociology of policing (e.g. Manning 1997; Manning and Van Maanen 1978; Skolnick 1966; Westley 1970). I

extend this body of police scholarship into the business of security. This is not to say that researchers have not previously concerned themselves with the expanding population of security officers in Canada. Such studies (Erickson 1993; Shearing, Farnell and Stenning 1980), while instructive, have relied on survey instruments to produce demographic data about security officers rather than employ direct observation of private police mobilisations. By maintaining a from-the-outside focus rather than assessing the dynamics of private policing from within, information about the function and role of the private police has often reflected the attitudes of outsiders such as corporate managers (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985a), the public police (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985b), or the general public (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985c). My ethnographic analysis reverses this tendency by making the attitudes of private security officers the centre of my analysis. Thus, the parapolice of Intelligarde are asked to comment on management tactics, their relations with the public police, their interactions with the general public and their opinions of media reports.

Previous studies of the private police have also maintained a distanced and abstract appreciation for their object of analysis. Social control theorists and theoretical criminologists have astutely observed the important role of the private police and private justice systems in maintaining social order and resolving conflicts (Christie 1993; Cohen 1985; Henry 1983). It is rare, however, for these analyses to be tethered to observations of private policing in action. A notable exception is Shearing and Stenning's (1987b) analysis of the 'Disney order' in which the mundane rituals and routinised procedures of

¹ It was later revealed that the fellow in the arm sling was hurt during an arrest for punching and breaking a window as well as being intoxicated on private property. The security officer in question is now no longer with the company.

maintaining surveillance are revealed and linked to extant theory.² By analysing the official documents, procedures, work rules, and work environment of Intelligarde International, this dissertation extends theory to a direct observation of the processes by which social control is maintained. How is compliance achieved? How is eviction and banishment handled? And how are the private police disciplined and surveilled as they control others? The answers to these questions cannot be gleaned from approaches that do not employ direct observation and interaction with street-level officers and managers.

Objectives of this Study

This dissertation can be divided conceptually into two major thrusts: descriptive and theoretical objectives. By descriptive I mean that I offer the type of exploratory information, through a case study of a private policing organisation, not previously available in published studies. Especially including information pertaining to: a) arrest statistics as well as the everyday work of private security officers at Intelligarde, b) data on the occupational culture and recipe rules of Intelligarde security officers, and c) statistical information about officer's demographic make-up, attitudes toward the police, public, media, work, management, and other security companies.

In this sense, some of what I offer in this dissertation fulfils a necessary exploratory agenda for a nascent area of research. Private policing began receiving academic attention in the late 1970s, but the published findings in this area are still sparse and concentrated amongst a relatively small number of scholars. Simply because arrest statistics, the demographic composition of persons arrested, and the mobilising

² In this study, the reader is taken through a trip to Disneyland. During each moment of enjoyment, the authors draw attention to the myriad ways in which social control is unobtrusively maintained. The agents,

characteristics of a private security company have not previously been recorded may itself constitute reason enough for now doing so. But this is not the overarching rationale for collecting the data presented herein. The theoretical extensions and departures this project pursues, explains the logic behind the core of what is to follow.

At the outset, it is important to note that the theoretical foundation for this dissertation stems from a consideration of what I identify as four, often overlapping, criminological discourses. The first two include the deeply intertwined ‘risk society’ (e.g. Beck 1992b; O’Malley 1992; Simon 1987), and governance (e.g. Burchell, Colin and Miller 1991; Foucault 1991a; O’Malley, Weir and Shearing 1997) literatures. The next two comprise Marxian (e.g. South 1988; Spitzer and Scull 1977; Weiss 1978) and pluralist (e.g. Shearing 1992; Shearing and Stenning 1983) conceptions of the private police. Each of these perspectives has something unique to offer to our understanding of private policing. Specifically, risk society, governance, and pluralist discourses illuminate the processes of surveillance and discipline inherent to social order in late modern capitalism. These processes are typically replete with corporate logics that promote actuarial practices as the privileged formula for making populations ‘known.’ I argue, however, that absent a Marxian conception of commodification and fear (Spitzer 1987) these approaches cannot appreciate the overriding profit motivations of private security firms. The private police do not engage in social control for its own sake, there is an obvious money making incentive to organise their businesses using corporate and panoptic templates. The task for the ‘risk markets’ perspective I proffer in chapter one is to uncover these processes.

themselves, are not analysed in this manner.

My analysis is guided by four ideas about the 'selling' of risk. First, a risk markets orientation recognises that policing is centrally alienated and commodified labour. I argue in the chapter to follow that the modern organisation of policing can best be understood in this way. The early duty-bound organisation of policing gave way to policing for profit as soon as the mode of production which governs it mutated from feudalism to capitalism. If new actuarial logics govern policing institutions, how are these knowledges sold back to the consumer? This dissertation analyses police work as knowledge work for sale – a management system for hire.

The second idea proffered in this dissertation is that 'risk society' and the 'fetishisms of security' are inherently political phenomena. A risk markets perspective problematises the recent trend in 'risk society' social theory which uncritically accepts the organization and categorization of populations under institutional surveillance. My argument is that while sociologists have correctly identified the organising logics and institutional rationales of risk systems, they have failed to offer perceptive critiques of these schemas. Instead, they have uncritically adopted these productions of knowledge as the actual organisers of society rather than revealing their legitimating functions within late modern capitalist economy. These processes are thus reified, as if the corporate-managerial epistemes that fuelled them are self-evident, transparent, and in no further need of inquiry beyond their representational facades. Often, this propensity is masked within the (misused) Foucauldian project of the archaeology of knowledge (or the history of the present) which supposedly sheds its critical incubus by making such political positionings extraneous to its project. A risk markets perspective places the political process of ordering populations at the forefront of its analysis.

The policing of Jamaicans in west North York cannot be understood by merely analysing managerial procedure and deployment practices. These are seemingly cold and calculated decisions that ostensibly do not have a political motivation. In the eyes of both the security officers meant to police that territory and the persons meant to be policed, however, the process is nothing if not political.

A third idea from a risk markets perspective is that, given the commodified nature of both public and private policing, there appears little ground to maintain a strict demarcation between the missions of these two institutions. One of the assumptions about the differences between the public and private police is that their goals are fundamentally divergent. That is, while the public police concern themselves with controlling criminal activity and especially physical harms to persons, the private police are tasked with preventing the theft of or damage to property. These orienting logics are described as either 'loss prevention' or 'crime prevention' missions (Shearing and Stenning 1982b; Shearing and Stenning 1983). This dissertation challenges this assumption by providing both observational and statistical evidence that, at least in the case of Intelligarde, demonstrates that the role of the modern private police closely resembles that of the first private constabularies in 18th century England. The 'parapolice' of Toronto are in rhetoric and reality private law enforcement officers who task themselves and are retained on the basis of their ability to 'control crime.'

Finally, a risk markets orientation examines both the processes of surveillance and resistance in private policing in a dialectic of control. New 'governance' discourses and their correlative applications to the study of policing institutions reduce officers to mere automatons (Ericson 1994; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Ericson, Haggerty and Carriere

1993). This mode of investigation privileges paper realities and organizational schemas at the expense of the actors imagined to fall within their purview. Classic studies in the sociology of policing focused almost exclusively on the occupational culture of line officers (e.g. Manning 1997; Skolnick 1966; Westley 1970). These subcultural approaches have a long history in criminological inquiry, being imported from anthropology by Albert Cohen in 1955 when he wrote *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang*. The general aspects of subcultural criminology are summarized by Ellis and DeKeseredy (1996:36-37). Subcultural theory assumes that social life is guided and regulated by shared values and norms and that these are different from those in broader society. These shared values are a product of the groups similar aversive subjective experiences – such as status frustration in the case of the parapolice – that can be directly traced to the group's social location. The conception of deviant behaviour in the subculture is learned and diffused as a collective, problem-solving behaviour.

This dissertation examines both the managerial logics and informal rules of Intelligarde International and especially the dialectic interplay between surveillance and resistance. Each of these four ideas act as sensitizing constructs to guide inquiry, organize ideas, and suggest theoretical advances.

Organisation

Chapter One examines previous theorising on the private police as well as recent developments in the sociology of policing. I explore the connections between critical and 'governmentality' discourses affecting analyses of the police. Recent 'risk society' approaches are problematised, as are more dated Marxian interpretations. I proffer a perspective aimed at fusing critical and post-structural theoretical applications in an

attempt to understand the modern manifestations of private policing within politically and emotionally charged 'risk markets.' How do private police organisations effect surveillance and why are they charged with these responsibilities? What changes in the structure and ideology of neo-liberal risk markets give these initiatives legitimacy? I argue that the nature of modern parapolicing is organised around the fetishistic desire for commodified security and the management of risk. This process is fuelled by neo-liberal actuarial logics that simulate surveillance while simultaneously selling it. This is achieved in multiple ways but relies upon making both security agents and those they are tasked with monitoring 'known' to the parapolice machine.

Chapter two outlines the methods employed for this dissertation: critical ethnography, formal interviews, and archival research. The multiple investigative approaches used mesh with both the descriptive and theoretical objectives of the dissertation. The formal interviews focus on the negotiation between surveillance and resistance by examining the attitudes of both management and line officers. The interviews also clearly establish the private law enforcement and culture of 'crime control' amongst Intelligarde employees who work under conditions of 'perpetual dread.' This critical ethnography links the micro-sociological practices of private policing to the macro-sociological processes of risk markets. Through direct observation of patrol duties I reveal the embedded commodified nature of parapolicing and attempt to expose the mundane procedures of private law enforcement and surveillance as products of neo-liberal actuarial rationales. This fulfils an exploratory mandate for providing a first-hand account of parapolicing, absent from the literature. Ethnography demarcates the heated political nature of relations between Intelligarde security officers and the populations

they police. The archival materials (bannings database, occurrence reports, personnel files, internal documents, and media reports) statistically establish the crime control function of the parapolice and thus their saleability within late modern risk markets. The materials also provide descriptive organisational information about personnel and practice.

In chapter three I begin my analysis of the new 'parapolice:' that body of security companies (or contracts) that explicitly bridge the gap between the public and private police, thereby increasingly rendering the distinction meaningless from an analytic perspective. These are the private prison, court security, and residential police of North America. They are not solely concerned with loss prevention as their only responsibility. They are also vanguards in the emerging risk markets of urban fear and neo-liberal rationales. I then explore the powers of the Intelligarde parapolice of Toronto and conduct a statistical comparison between their activities and those of the public police. Finally, I take the reader on what one of the officers called 'a trip through the sewer' – a patrol of Intelligarde sites in the Sherbourne and Dundas area – as an indication of the functions of the parapolice.

In chapter four, I continue my exploration of Intelligarde International by examining the recruitment, pre-employment testing, and training practices of the company. I consider the destabilising effect of new recruits on the culture of parapolicing before providing a statistical profile of the security staff at the Law Enforcement Company. Finally, toward the end of this chapter, I begin to consider issues of race, class, and gender in both the internal machinations of the company as well as the external politics of parapolicing Toronto's inner-city neighbourhoods. It is here that I

first discuss allegations of excessive force and racism lodged against the company by the Toronto media as well as advocacy groups.

Chapter five catalogues the hyperpanoptic characteristics of Intelligarde's surveillance system – as it effects both the security officers doing the monitoring and those meant to be monitored. At this point I set aside the dialectic of control and resistance inherent to all systems of surveillance and entertain the fantasy of total control and perpetual examination of the physical and virtual architectures of panopticism. Most importantly, however, I reconnect this *virtual* system to the very *material* necessities of selling surveillance in late modern risk markets. While selling policing and the skill of making 'unruly' populations 'known' is not a new practice, the virtual ordering, digital representation, and fluidity of information exchange makes the process qualitatively different.

In the sixth chapter I take up the modes of resistance employed by both Intelligarde staff and subject populations to avoid detection within the Law Enforcement Company's hyperpanoptic surveillance system. The reader is introduced to modes of routinised resistance such as the art of 'ghosting' as well as more base responses to the 'police machine' including mob justice and 'swarmings.' Intelligarde's occupational culture of fear and mutual assistance is then described as facilitating an often romanticised mercenary 'legionnaire' quality. This revolves around feelings of isolation, reliance on fellow officers, and the perceived abandonment by the public police and community.

Chapter One: Theorizing the Private Police

This chapter is organised into four parts which delineate a theoretical orientation for this dissertation. It draws on a review of extant theorizing on private policing and social control by dividing the literature into four overlapping areas of scholarship. My discussion begins with Marxian orientations that identify the function of the private police as instruments of class domination, whereby the private police serve as tools for maintaining a disciplined labour-force. Second, I consider approaches that eschew notions of 'state centrality' and argue that the private police are best understood in the context of an integral plurality of state and corporate interests. The next two discourses I identify comprise the emerging 'risk society' and governance literatures. Since they are often linked in the literature, I consider them in tandem. Each of these models of inquiry uniquely contributes to our understanding of the private police and social control, and each also suffers from limitations. I propose to transcend these theoretical constraints through a 'risk markets' orientation formulated for understanding the private police.

In the final section of this chapter I proffer a theoretical framework that builds upon the scholastic traditions reviewed. At the same time, however, the theoretical perspective posited herein is unique (in its own right) for the distinct research agenda it produces and the divergent questions it elicits. My approach is a re-connection of the

actuarial, risk, and pluralist discourses with Marxian conceptions³ of 'commodification' and 'fear.' These are important strategies for understanding the private police because they focus attention on both the supply and demand side of selling security. Consumers buy the alienated product of security to alleviate fear, while security firms are tasked with demonstrating that they are actually engaged in the business of stopping crime (or other fear-inducing activity), thereby creating a number of unintended but interesting ironies in the process. I will leave a discussion of these attributes of commodified security for the final section of this chapter when I take up the topic in greater detail. For now, it is important to establish a requisite introductory backdrop for the discussion to follow.

One of the reasons private policing has received increasing academic interest is due to its tremendous growth. If there is one 'truism' about private security, it is that the size of the sector has been expanding exponentially in the post war era (Cunningham, Strauchs and Van Meter 1990; Kakalik and Wildhorn 1971), overtaking the public police in personnel in the United States around 1977. Since then, private policing has continued to grow, tapering off only slightly in the last decade where today, private security agents outnumber the public police by approximately three to one in the United States (Cunningham, Strauchs and Van Meter 1990). In 1994, there were over 100,000 persons employed as 'watchmen' or guards in Canada, and over 19,000 of them were licensed security guards in Ontario (Leclair and Long 1996:15).⁴ Additionally, there were 1,641 dual security guard/private investigator license holders operating in Ontario. Although the 1991 census reports that there were 61,500 police officers and 104,800 security

³ I do not mean to construct essentialist notions of the private police. Rather, these concepts may be understood as new areas of investigative priority.

⁴ This does not include the sizeable in-house security guard population.

guards in Canada, current interpolations place the public police down to 54,311 and the number of security guards at over 200,000. This means that the private police now outnumber their public counterparts by an almost four to one ratio in Canada (Palango 1998:10). As the number of persons employed in private security increases, so does academic interest with this social phenomenon (e.g. Kakalik and Wildhorn 1971; Shearing, Farnell and Stenning 1980; Shearing and Stenning 1982a).

‘Police’ has historically been linked to the idea of the city-state itself in the context of Ancient Greece (from *πολις* – *polis* meaning city) and later with the notion of safety and security (Shearing 1992). But ‘policing’ has now come to include a broad collection of social controls which may encompass both private and public techniques of governance (Shearing and Stenning 1987a). As the relative size of the private security sector vacillates in comparison to the public police, it becomes increasingly important to understand the different roles of the state relative to these changes. It is no wonder, therefore, that policing theorists – whether focusing on the public, private or both spheres – also consider the importance of state apparatuses in their discussions. Since policing is a “multiple subject” that enjoys many meanings, “policing, therefore, is both a political process and a politicized structure” (McCormick and Visano 1992:xii).

Marxian Approaches: The Centred State

There are multiple Marxian theoretical applications in the study of the private police. In each case, there appears either an instrumentalist understanding of the state as a managing committee for bourgeoisie affairs (e.g. Couch 1981; Klare 1975; Weiss 1978) or a conception of the state as a focal point from where developments in private policing

may be analysed (e.g. South 1988; Spitzer and Scull 1977). In either event, the role of the state is at the centre of analysis.

The historic deployment of the private police as 'private armies' to suppress labour is undeniable. There is ample evidence to illustrate, at least in the United States, that early private police forces consisted of little more than ruffians and strike breakers employed by overzealous firms such as the Pinkerton Detective Agency, or consolidated into semi-public bodies such as the coal and iron police (see especially Couch 1981). Often, clashes between striking labourers and paid pugilists led to bloodshed.

There is much to be learned from these critical analyses. To be sure, there is strong evidence to suggest that most western democracies experienced varying degrees of state-sanctioned private policing under the direction of industrial interests. Unlike the United States, however, Canada and England quickly mobilized public, federal police organizations to quell anti-government peasant revolts or Métis and Native rebellions. Private agencies, like the railway police or the coal and iron police, existed alongside the North West Mounted Police in Canada, or the police of the Metropolis in England, but they hardly rivaled their American counterparts in their use of violence. So while the 'iron fist' of oppression (Cooper et al. 1975) was often flexed by elites, industrialists and landowners in the U.S.A. with the blessing of the state, this was a rarity in other developing nations of the period. Aside from this spatial limitation, instrumental approaches do not help explain temporal changes in private policing. In fact, there seems little among private security companies today⁵ that resembles an organized strike-suppression capability or mission. On the contrary, most social control exercised by the

private police is accomplished with the full compliance of subject populations. This is well documented by Shearing and Stenning (1987b) when they examine the 'Disney order' of compliance. Instead of using intrusive measures to control populations, visitors to Disneyland pass through myriad controls aimed at maximizing enjoyment, minimizing risks, and avoiding litigation.

The instrumental Marxian tradition from which these studies emanate may well explain the organization of private security in the early development of the American labour movement during an era of industrialization, but would have difficulty explaining the multifarious nature of security arrangements in late modern capitalism. Marx, for example, had very little to say about the need for security outside direct production, but commercial and residential settings are now the predominant sites of security deployment. In other words, the private police do considerably more than pacify labour.⁶

Aside from instrumental approaches, however, other state-centred formulations fall into similar traps. Some Marxian approaches have described a process of state-police relations that go beyond uni-dimensional, instrumental notions. Spitzer and Scull (1977), have proffered a three-stage description that seeks to incorporate the changing nature of private and public police functions in relation to the state. They theorize that capitalist development erodes the basis for traditional forms of social control paralleling changes in

⁵ Including agencies involved in early U.S. strike-breaking that continue to operate (e.g. Burns and Pinkertons).

⁶ Rather than focus on the state and labour, Klare (1975) has likened post-World War 2 private security firms in an era of McCarthyism to 'private C.I.A.s' that collude with state interests in amassing information on organizations and persons deemed a security threat to the establishment. But his account does not adequately explain why this information is kept and its purpose. For Klare, it is insidious enough that such materials are amassed in the first place. The context of this piece implies the private police are part of an agenda to undermine progressive politics.

the mode of production.⁷ The second stage is characterized by an established capitalist state sharing in policing costs by inaugurating a public domestic force. This, the authors argue, is done because it is more attractive than private arrangements in facilitating legitimacy and promoting a 'false consciousness' among labour. Finally, a state fiscal crisis results in the redistribution of policing responsibility to large corporations "to guarantee profits and secure an environment for uninterrupted growth" (Spitzer and Scull 1977:27).

The relative autonomy of the police from the state is most clearly advanced by South (1984) when he argues:

It is a commercial compromise between the sovereignty of the state, which constitutionally represents the status quo, and those sections of society whose commercial interests are most benefited by the maintenance of that status quo. In accommodating the development of the private security sector with whatever mixed degrees of caution or enthusiasm, the state is not simply 'saving money.' It is not reducing its commitment to more social control intervention - economically or politically. It is, at one level, acceding to a new (or at least renewed) dimension of capital's assertion of its relative autonomy from the state. (190)

Accordingly, whether we view the advance of privatization as creeping laissez faire capitalism, a crisis of state budgets, or racially-inspired stigmatization (see Johnson 1976), the police (both private and public) have their own distinct interests and agendas, but they nonetheless collude with the bourgeoisie to promote an environment for profits and economic growth. For South (1984:109; but see also South 1987; South 1988), the private police provide a 'buffer' function for capitalist interests. By portraying

⁷ A slightly different interpretation has been offered by Johnson (1976) who makes race central to his sociohistoric account. Labour in the eastern U.S. cities, Johnson argues, has struck a relationship of solidarity with the public police. This alliance promotes a 'legitimizing' atmosphere of persecution against cheap black labour. As blacks are kept out of the labour pool through arrest and stigmatization, whites enjoy wage and job security. Since criminal record information is routinely passed between public and private police services, blacks are thus restricted from accessing the job market. For their part, elites have repeatedly tried to 'professionalise' the police, but according to Johnson, this challenges both police and popular sensibilities about the function of the constabulary as an intervening line between the proletariat (whites) and the lumpenproletariat (blacks).

themselves as neutral arbiters in law *enforcement*, the police act to disguise the political motivations behind law *enactment*.

Like instrumental models, relative autonomy perspectives centre the state as the focal point of analysis for understanding the police. Johnston (1992:210-214) has criticized this tendency because it limits our understanding of the multidimensional nature of both the state and the police. It is assumed that at the essence of state interests are fixed and ever-constant goals: through whatever means possible to advance the interests of the bourgeoisie. This assertion, however, raises doubts about the state-police relationship espoused by Marxist theorists – doubts that may not be entirely answerable using relative autonomy or instrumental conceptions. Does the ‘state fiscal crisis’ occur in all quarters at the same moment and for the same duration? It is undoubtedly true, in the first place, that the structure and relationship of the state-private police arrangement varies considerably over space and time (Spitzer 1987:56-57). Second, however, these Marxian perspectives seem to inevitably trace the cause and effects of social control back to the function of a reified state. The paradox surrounding such approaches is that in societies where there is the weakest link between the state and the private police – i.e. advanced western democracies – theorists place the greatest emphasis in establishing such a link.

Pluralist Approaches: The De-Centred State

In antithesis to conceptions of the state which assume its centrality in all social relations, including especially social control (e.g. Cohen 1985; Cohen 1987), Foucauldian theorists argue for local, fragmented, conceptions of power that incorporate notions of discipline and surveillance (e.g. Burchell, Colin and Miller 1991; Miller and Rose 1995;

Rose 1996; Rose and Miller 1992). De-centering the state as an object of analysis when investigating power (Lowman 1990) runs through most recent studies of neo-liberalism and its effect on systems of discipline (O'Malley 1992; O'Malley 1993):

By focusing primarily on the semi-autonomous relations of policing domestic security developed by private insurance companies, it has emerged quite clearly that the major processes of law enforcement are located in the nonstate field, and that these are formed in very significant ways independently of state initiatives for control. (O'Malley 1991:186)

Laissez-faire economics and their correlative modes of governance are linked to a retreat of the state (Garland 1996) from its post-war proclivity toward providing assistance to both citizenry and the market – a Keynesian logic (O'Malley and Palmer 1996). In place of this mission, state logics abdicate responsibility to citizens for providing the means for their own safety, security, and general well-being (Rose 1996). In tandem, communities are promoted as a locally mediated solution to the crime problem. Thus, in opposition to what they see as Marxist sociology's inherent reductionism and essentialism, pluralist theorists insist that the objectives of governmental power are multiple, and that these techniques are dispersed and differentiated through locales largely beyond the state. Additionally, they argue, people relate to this exercise of control as autonomous subjects and not 'ideological dupes' (see Garland 1997:183, for a review).

In the same tradition, Shearing and Stenning (1983) have proffered the most well-known thesis on private policing which focuses on the emergence of 'mass private property' holdings by large corporations. They argue that under the guise of privatization, a fundamental shift in the responsibility of maintaining (and thereby redefining) peace is being transferred to corporate entities (Shearing and Stenning 1983:503). North America is thus experiencing a 'new feudalism' wherein huge tracts of

property, both private and public spaces, are controlled and policed by private corporate interests.

These emerging conceptions conjure up an image of a world in which corporate 'private governments' exist alongside state governments... of shifting relations and claims with respect to sovereignty that change over both time and terrains. (Shearing 1992:425)

Under such arrangements, policing is reconceptualised as a 'generic function' that is not a monopoly of the state. The state is but only one guarantor of order among others. In this emerging redistribution of security the state is no more relevant to the protection of property or people than the local 'government' of the corporation. To this we might add local community groups and tenancy associations who also purchase security in addition to guaranteed state-funded public policing.⁸

Accordingly, the analyst is encouraged to account for the local contingencies that lead up to or facilitate changes in police functions. We are left with a series of different questions that are best answered utilizing more robust theoretical applications not tethered to universalizing notions of the state. The pluralist perspective, however, is not without its limitations.

Although the pluralist approach maintains that both the state and corporations are interchangeably important in security provision, and that their horizontal and autonomous natures are "characterized by considerable fluidity and flux" (see also Henry 1983; Shearing 1993), there is nonetheless an adherence to a conceptual dichotomy between corporate and state security interests. Additionally, there is no further consideration of alternative policing arrangements not sponsored by either the state or large corporations. One of the differences assumed about the public and private police is that their goals are

⁸ In fact, much of Intelligarde's client base depends upon such arrangements.

fundamentally divergent. While the public police concern themselves with controlling crime and especially physical harms to persons, the private police are tasked with preventing theft, minimizing the chance of litigation against the property owner, and preventing property damage. Thus, while the public police concern themselves with making ‘good pinches’ under their crime prevention mandate, the private police drop ‘snowflakes’ (or notices of risks to property) in order to responsibilize workers under their ‘loss prevention’ mandate (Shearing and Stenning 1982b; Shearing and Stenning 1983).

This binary understanding of the organization of security provision elicits conclusions about the nature of private policing that cannot account for its multiple manifestations. In chapter three I take up this argument in greater detail, but for now it will suffice to say that many private security companies *do* engage in crime control activities, whether they be at prison, court, or public sites. In addition, many public police agencies are actively pursuing ‘preventative’ logics and employing business terminology to legitimize their activities and budgets. Besides large corporate ownership and management of policing services, there also exist more complicated arrangements such as private police officers working for public housing corporations under the directorship of elected tenant’s associations.⁹ The private police in this scenario (or parapolice), I argue, take on the responsibilities of crime control and become a *de facto* small municipal police service. Thus, dividing up the deployment logics of policing services into public-private, crime prevention-loss prevention, and state-corporate can miss much of the diversity in modern policing arrangements.

Governance and Risk: A Critique

Criminological applications of the Foucauldian concept of governance and recent treatises on risk are both closely linked to pluralist understandings of the state. In this section, I critically analyse the basic assumptions of these two schools of thought and consider how they have been applied to the study of policing. This acts as a necessary introduction for the final section of this chapter, where I seek to wed these discourses to Marxian conceptions of commodity.

Many cite the end of World War 2 as the starting point for the emergence of what has recently come to be known as the 'risk society' perspective (Beck 1992a; Beck 1992b; Castel 1991; Defert 1991; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Ewald 1991; Giddens 1991; O'Malley 1992; Reichman 1986; Simon 1987). It was not until the last three decades, however, that risk became central to the organization of social institutions (Douglas 1986) and an 'insurance-based' (Reichman 1986), 'prudentialist' (O'Malley 1992), actuarial (Simon 1987), 'cost/benefit' (Lowi 1990) epistemology became a dominant social phenomenon. Simon (1994) attributes this interest in actuarial prediction after the war to "the prestige that systematic quantitative analyses gained in military use" (172). In the 1950s and 1960s, multiple regression and other multivariate analyses facilitated the spread of predictive models into first, the social sciences, and later the

⁹ These tenant's associations pay for their policing services indirectly through their rent – both public and private.

corporate world. Equipped with this new information capability, institutions were able to aggregate knowledge of populations for their own interests (Ewald 1991; Poster 1990).¹⁰

Interests in actuarialism reflect the need for surveillance among social institutions in order to minimise risk, both litigious (Priest 1990) and economic (Lowi 1990).

Surveillance, however, should not be construed as something clandestine (Marx 1987) but rather it is the amassing of knowledge about and supervision of subject populations – which translates into processes of monitoring and compliance (Dandeker 1990). Ideally, surveillance mechanisms are established so that populations produce knowledge about themselves, routinely and voluntarily. Risk, the pivotal condition around which late modern society is said to revolve, comprises two linked notions: first, as a threat or danger and second, as a probability statement (Hacking 1991). Subject populations become the objects of knowledge in order that they can be classified and profiled into risk categories. Security connotes assuredness, confidence and safety (Spitzer 1987:44). It simultaneously signifies the ‘rational’ need to minimise risk through science and legal remedy, while also signifying the irrational need to alleviate individual and institutional fears. With the march toward scientisation “all productive forces are being converted in one way or another into applications of science” (Böhme and Stehr 1986:16). Science is crucial to production in late modern society but it also creates risks such as environmental degradation and ‘dangerous’ populations. While these new threats can be detected and countered through new technologies, even more risks are uncovered in the process. This “system-immanent normal form of the revolutionizing of needs” (Beck 1992a:208)

¹⁰ Poster (1990), has argued that transformations in the way we communicate reflect more than an incidental change, but rather a schism in the preferred mode of information: “the conquest of space and

means that risks can be symbolically controlled but never eliminated, producing an environment of 'limitless dread' (Ericson and Haggerty 1997).

Within this framework, the police are said to become an expert system of 'communications policing' (Ericson, Haggerty and Carriere 1993) wherein societal unease with both the lack of state intervention and impending dangers elevates the constabulary to the status of a risk reducing information hub. As the focal point of information exchange for risk management among social institutions, the public police are an important facilitator of knowledge for various security units including, perhaps most importantly, insurance companies (O'Malley 1992). In the same way as the expert system of public policing formalizes and routinises information, it has been greatly aided with the emergence of these security units working in large public and private bureaucracies. Private "security operatives have specific documents, as well as information banks, which can be 'plugged into' by the public police" (Ericson and Shearing 1986:143).¹¹ These emerging, automated private control mechanisms are not new (Henry 1983) but they are characteristic of the immediacy of communication (telematicism) found only in late modern society:

But now surveillance can be practised without any contact with, or even any immediate representation of, the subjects under scrutiny. Doubtless the police have long kept their secret files. But the logic of such subterranean dossiers now attains the sophisticated and proudly proclaimed form of 'scientific' predetection. (Castel 1991:288)

time by electronic media augurs more for institutions and for theory than a mere retuning of practices and ideas to new communications frequencies" (3).

¹¹ As previously mentioned, Klare (1975) holds that private security companies maintain millions of files for personnel and other client interests, bringing them closer to a private C.I.A. than a private police force. O'Toole (1978) notes that at least a half-million files are kept on shoppers and employees by just one information network managed by New York City store owners and their security agents. Some prospective employees have been denied jobs because of suspicions entered on the automated network – which operates outside the realm of 'access to information' legislation governing public databases.

Associated with this trend toward the scientisation of policing, is bureaucratization which entails a de-skilling of the police officer and the centralization of discretion amongst a select few senior officers. For Dandeker (1990), this process is part of the overall move to 'professionalisation' but this is unfortunately a misnomer since professionalism entails discretion is invested with the constable or street/line officer. To the contrary, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) make the case that police officers are now only data collectors in the larger machine of communications policing, reducing the constable to mere fieldworker.

I want to take up this last point as entry into a discussion of what I see as some of the limitations of Foucauldian-inspired analyses of the techniques of social control (governance). In order to understand what is meant by governance, and from where scholars using this mode of analysis (e.g. Burchell, Colin and Miller 1991; Miller and Rose 1995; Miller and Rose 1997; Rose 1996; Rose and Miller 1992) procure their theoretical sensibilities, we must return to Foucault (1977) who argued that discipline 'makes' individuals – it is a specific technique of a power that not only regards individuals as objects but as instruments of its exercise. It is a modest, suspicious power that operates in the mundane procedures and modes of institutions. It is not a majestic and imposing power like that of the state but is just as relevant and important. Discipline is achieved through hierarchical observation, normalising judgement, and examination and is wedded to the practice of surveillance.

The tension between doing Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis and critical sociology is best expressed in the contradictory assertions of the theoretically astute David Garland. After reviewing the governmentality literature for its applicability to criminology and sociology, Garland (1997:186) notes that "this approach will tend to

imply a critical stance – insofar as it is describing modes of exercising power” but instead “it seeks to maintain the neutral gaze of an analyst rather than the hostile glare of a rival with competing truth claims” which Garland finds “valuable.” Now, I will leave for a moment the long since resolved impossibility of ‘neutrality’ in criminological theorizing (Becker 1967), to quote from Garland only a few pages later:

But, alongside this knowledge of the authorities’ knowledge, I *also* want to be able to propose a different reading of what causes crime, why controls are failing, and why penal-warfare measures no longer seem adequate. I want to be able to offer an account of the dynamics of the social field, or the life-world that is to be governed, that may be at odds with that of the governing authorities. (1997:201)

Of course, there should be nothing to stop Garland (or anyone else)¹² from doing so, except for the fact that this means that we are no longer engaged in a strictly Foucauldian analysis. It means that scholarship on techniques of governance has been extended to envelop critical sociological problematics. And this, I am arguing, is a positive development. It allows the piercing analytic tools of ‘governance’ theorists to be taken up by critical scholars (see also O’Malley, Weir and Shearing 1997:503-505).

Some governance theorists have often constructed more totalising and deterministic models than their state-centred predecessors. These theorists have been able, however, to couch their assertions within the language of ‘system imaginaries’ (Bogard 1996) or schemas and programmes (Foucault 1991a), wherein responsibility for analysing how paper realities translate into praxis is bypassed: “[y]ou see that this has nothing to do with the project – an admirable one in itself – of grasping a ‘whole society’ in its ‘living reality’” (Foucault 1991b:181). When asked about how the experiences of the prisoners within a Benthamite panopticon might translate into his own genealogical approach, Foucault replied:

...if I had wanted to describe 'real life' in the prisons, I wouldn't indeed have gone to Bentham. But the fact that this real life isn't the same as the theoretician's schemas doesn't entail that these schemas are therefore utopian, imaginary, etc. One could only think that if one had a very impoverished notion of the real. For one thing, the elaboration of these schemas corresponds to a whole series of diverse practices and strategies... For another thing, these programmes induce a whole series of effects in the real (which isn't of course the same as saying that they take the place of the real): they crystallize into institutions, they inform individual behaviour, they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things. (Foucault 1991b:81)

In these cases, submersion within the logics of an institution's techniques of social control often results in an unfettered acceptance of these schemas, misrepresenting the realities of those meant to be ensnared by the system. In short order, its members, like Foucault's prisoners, are reduced to mere automatons:

The essential component of intervention no longer takes the form of the direct face-to-face relationship between the carer and the cared... It comes instead to reside in the establishing of *flows of population* based on the collation of a range of abstract factors deemed liable to produce risk in general... The specialists find themselves now cast in a subordinate role, while managerial policy formation is allowed to develop into a completely autonomous force, totally beyond the surveillance of the operative on the ground who is now reduced to mere executant. (Castel 1991:281) (*italics in original*)

The way government is imagined in programmatic form, how it is re-imagined in the face of failure, how subjects are made governable are all important questions within the governance literature. But as O'Malley et al. (1997) argue, this is different "from the more familiar historical and sociological approach of examining rule through the observation and documentation of 'what *actually* happened'" (502). Now, these issues have surely been debated elsewhere (O'Malley, Weir and Shearing 1997; Seidman and Wagner 1992), but I think that here we can see the first important instance in which Foucauldian conceptions and methods may be at tension with the general sociological enterprise. Foucault cannot be faulted for not theorising about something he had no intention of examining in the first place. And this is not my intention. But rather than limit investigations to the 'paper reality' of schemas and imaginary systems, there is

¹² See Henry and Milovanovic (1991).

nothing to preclude us from extending Foucault's analysis to the lived realities of those within the wider system or programme.¹³

In Ericson and Haggerty's (1997) treatment of risk systems operating in the public police throughout Canada, we see this same dynamic developing. As auditing systems, report formats, and the hierarchy of communications becomes privileged, the street-level officer is re-imagined as a fieldworker checking off boxes in a prescribed non-narrative reporting system. Police officers are thus de-skilled and have a limited range of decision-making choices – all of which must fit within the policies and procedures constructed by professional senior officers and policy makers. Ericson is arguing here against his own work on police subcultural 'recipe rules' and occupational mores (1982) as important determinants of actions and mobilisation. Even within Ericson and Haggerty's risk treatise, however, there are many examples of police officer resistance to these de-skilling systems, including the circulation of bootleg report forms, the misuse of information technology, and the refusal to work with computers. Instead of system-sidenotes, these games of resistance demonstrate the fallibility of Foucauldian applications that privilege the regime ahead of its players (see also Manning 1992; Manning 1996).¹⁴ Absent an appreciation for the agency of its membership, the paper-reality of an institution through policy and procedure or the operational logic of

¹³ O'Malley et al. (1997) note: "[t]he tendency to separate out programmes from the processes of their 'messy' implementation, and the related silencing of the constitutive role of contestation, almost inevitably produces a characterization of programmes as if they can be captured or encapsulated at a moment that exists *between* successive implementations, failures and evaluations" (512).

¹⁴ In the case of responding to 'domestic violence' for instance, policy books and legislative amendments produce wildly varying levels of compliance between and within police departments. Even when there are legal and procedural requirement to enforce a restraining order on behalf of a battered woman, for example, the police rarely do so (Rigakos 1995).

management does not reveal all there is to know about a police organisation. Contrary to the intent of post-structural analyses:

[s]ocial theorists here, as elsewhere, fall into the trap of constituting ordinary people as 'cultural dopes,' whereas in practice they may be just as fast (perhaps faster) at recognizing the potential effects of emergent regimes. Thus if the dangerous classes could come to recognize themselves under disciplinary regimes, so too may those grouped under the actuarial categories of risk. (O'Malley 1993:164)

Bogard (1996) is even more daring in his treatment of hypercontrol in telematic societies.¹⁵ In his social science *fiction* project he argues that "a picture emerges of an 'observation machine' that fashions its own images for its own consumption" (Bogard 1996:24) where nothing is left to chance and everything has been accounted for from the very beginning. The police officer of the future allows the computer to scan information on the network for profile anomalies and selects targets that are immediately arrested:

Direct, 'hands-on' surveillance, if you will, is bypassed or short-circuited: it's already done, or at least on automatic. Having to watch or wait for an infraction is a thing of the past, if you're a police officer. (Bogard 1996:54)

To be fair, Bogard's exercise is a study of a system imaginary, in which none of these trends actually exist in their ideal today. Like other Foucauldian-inspired approaches,¹⁶ there is little concern with the individual agency of those affected by the regime. In Bogard's understanding of telematic society, labour (cyborgwork) is allowed leisure time but only because this ultimately feeds back into the totalising system of production. In other words, even loafing is actuarially pre-coded to elicit maximum profit. Nothing, therefore, escapes the monolithic march of the machine, as every action and reaction has already been accounted for (read: actuarially predicted) and serves only to feed back into the system.

¹⁵ See Rigakos (forthcoming) for a detailed review.

¹⁶ Bogard is as influenced by Baudrillard (1983) as he is by Foucault.

With a few exceptions (see Simon 1987; Simon 1988; Simon 1994), most authors within the risk society discourse are post-structuralists. Discipline and sovereignty are said to be pervasive enough to permeate all institutions, transcending the state and interlinking police forces, insurance bureaus, security firms, etc., until everyone and everything has been risk profiled. In Ulrich Beck's (1992b) treatment of risk, we are presented with a litany of declarative sentences – obiter dicta (Leiss 1994) – on the nature of late modern society that aim to explain how social inequality has become individualised. In one of these assertions Beck argues that class divisions have been transformed by risk society's 'boomerang effect':

Some people are more affected than others by the distribution and growth of risks, that is *social risk positions* spring up... Risks of modernization sooner or later also strike those who produce or profit from them. They contain a *boomerang effect*, which breaks up the pattern of class and national society. Ecological disaster and atomic fallout ignore the borders of nations. Even the rich and powerful are not safe from them. (Beck 1992b:23) (italics in original)

How sanitary to speak of 'risk positions,' instead of ghettos, hoods, barrios, and projects. Of course, the affluent *can* and *do* escape the fallout of risks – both environmental and social – by simply moving to 'safer' neighbourhoods (see Davis 1990) or purchasing technology, health care, and insurance. Additionally, third world citizens bear the brunt of toxic dumping and lack of pollution standards – which Beck identifies as 'new international inequalities' but are elsewhere better understood as the symptoms of capitalism at its highest stage (Lenin 1952/1975).

Following from Beck, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) have recently argued that the policing of risks can be best understood by compartmentalising these disciplinary techniques into territories, securities, commercial regulation, financial instruments, insurance, credentials, health, and finally identities including age, race and ethnicity. An indirect reification has taken place: institutional risk profiling mechanisms have been

uncritically accepted as constitutors of identity rather than classifiers. This is an important distinction because the probabilities themselves are seen to be constructing classes (Ericson and Haggerty 1997:170) rather than the other way around. To borrow the language of actuarialism: the compartmentalising of risk identities is actually a spuriously correlated constellation of traits that, in reality, hinge upon the *actual predictors* of socioeconomic status, race, gender and age. In other words, contrary to Ericson and Haggerty's (1997) 'political economy of the self,' one's position in society dictates one's credit rating, health benefits, and the amount of attention one is afforded by policing institutions. The banking and insurance practice of 'red-lining' geographic districts populated by low income residents in the U.S. is merely a cold, instrumental decision designed to minimise economic risk, but it is simultaneously a politically heated resolution that serves to ghettoise blacks. Similar statistically-based 'policing' decisions are made daily about dangerous populations that, as it turns out, tend to target 'suitable enemies' (Christie 1986) that are low income, ethnic minorities. We must pay careful attention not to misread risk systems as operating on a separate or detached logic from 'unscientific' impulses such as racism, heterosexism, classism, etc..

In sum, theorizing about the private police (specifically), and the organisation of social control (more generally) add to our understanding of the new parapolice in the following ways:

1. Studies of governance and risk draw our attention to the nuances of exercising control in late modernity by examining the way in which populations are made 'known' through the disciplining practices of surveillance;

2. The actuarial practices of institutions create new risk categories that help define organisational actions;
3. Pluralist approaches draw our attention away from the state and toward the important role that private corporations play in maintaining social control in both large public-access spaces and workers' environments;
4. Marxian approaches alert us to the political nature of security provision and compel us to ask the question 'security for whom?'

On the other hand, these perspectives are not without their limitations. I have also argued in this chapter that:

1. Instrumental Marxian approaches assume a coercive and uni-dimensional mission for the private police by defining them as tools for a state machinery that is simply a management committee for the bourgeoisie;
2. Both instrumental and relative autonomy Marxian perspectives erroneously centre the state in policing analyses while ignoring other security arrangements in late modern capitalism;
3. Pluralist approaches divide the public and private police along the overstated deployment logics of crime versus loss prevention;
4. By privileging the paper reality of managerial techniques, some applications of governmentality and risk theory result in totalising institutional models that ignore processes of resistance;
5. Risk perspectives depoliticize gender, race, and class by uncritically accepting the organisational logics of institutions as constitutors of identity and by accepting a cold, rationale terrain for actuarial practices.

The task I have set for myself in the final section of this chapter is to build upon these extant theories by addressing their limitations. I argue that research on the private police has much to gain from an approach that investigates the processes of commodification and fear fuelling changes in public and private police relationships. In what is to follow, I set about delineating a 'risk markets' perspective as the theoretical orientation for this dissertation.

Commodified Social Control: Critical Ethnography of Risk Markets

Critical criminologists have repeatedly lamented the continuing appeal of retributionism ahead of any sane preventive techniques aimed at stopping violence in the first place. There is no evidence that populations or their governments care enough about prevention (read: prediction) to place it before vengeance on the political agenda. A CNN/Gallup public opinion poll taken in 1991 shows that of the 76% of Americans who said they were in favour of the death penalty, 13% cited deterrence as a reason, 19% cited protection, and 50% revenge. Are we to believe that the cold logic of instrumental science will surpass the heat of retribution? As O'Malley (1993:163) has noted: "the emerging regime of neo-liberalism relies less on risk-based power, and more on contractual and punitive (sovereign) forms than risk theorists perceive to be the case." Contrary to the assumptions of cold, actuarial practices, a risk markets perspective places fear and the emotional need for security at the core of its analysis. Here, I am heavily influenced by the intent of Spitzer's (1987) article on the fetishism of security in capitalist societies. In it, Spitzer critiques Marx's conception of the state while retaining his insights on commodification and the subjective nature of security. This analysis reveals that while capitalist (and perhaps socialist) societies need security, this

conservatism is actually antithetical to market economics. As Spitzer puts it: “[t]o be secure is to be safe, but to be safe is to be moribund – at least within the general logic of the capitalist system” (1977:47). In addition to this, people are compelled to make their existences safe, but the more we invest in the alienated product of security, the more detached physically (through walls and gates) and psychologically (through mistrust and fear) we become from our fellow citizens, fuelling this cycle in perpetuity. Unlike Marxian and other economic utilitarian approaches to the study of security we must “seriously consider the role played by needs in the organisation of social control [and] attention must be focused on the ways in which fears and desires are channelled through social institutions” (Spitzer 1987:57). This means that attention must be diverted down toward ‘consumption communities’ and ‘lifestyles’ in addition to idealised nation-state agendas. Within this more localised context:

...security becomes a personal and immediate concern, a problem which is much more likely to be solved by purchasing the right product or service than by either persecuting an objectionable minority or conquering the world. (Spitzer 1987:58)

The task for researchers of private policing becomes mapping the how security is constructed and sold in the very act of its provision.

Before embarking on an exposition of the perspective I proffer throughout this dissertation, it is wise to define the concepts I intend to use. Commodification is defined as a process by which an object attains the ability to be exchanged. The commodity has the power to satisfy some human want and has the power to command a negotiated value (Marx 1972:378). Security became commodified at the moment it attained these characteristics. This transition is signalled by the mutation of the mode of production from feudalism to capitalism.

In general, man (isolated or social) always comes on to the stage as a property owner before he appears as a worker, even if the property is only what he procures for himself from nature (or what he as a member of the family, tribe, communal organisation, procures partly from nature, partly from the means of production which have already been produced in common). And as soon as the first animal state is left behind, man's property in nature is mediated by his existence as a member of a communal body, family, tribe, etc., by his relationship to other men, which determines his relationship to nature. The 'propertyless labourer' as a 'fundamental principle' is rather a creature of civilisation and, on the historical scale, of 'capitalist production' (Marx 1972:378).

There was a time when policing was not alienated labour or a commodified service. In the political economy of policing, pre-capitalist safety and order maintenance was guaranteed through various non-commodified policing arrangements. These 'collective liability' orders were organised around the presumption of self-help. Thus, under the Anglo-Saxon 'frankpledge' system, each member of a 'tything' would be responsible for the other nine in his group. A Hundred was a group of ten tythings. Any time a crime was committed the information was passed onto the tythingmen and Hundredmen of the district who would be responsible for the culprit's capture. If the criminal was not produced before a court of justice where he was summoned, his nine fellow pledges were responsible for producing him within the month, and, if failing that, his property. Any additional compensation would be charged first to the tything, and second the Hundred (Lee 1901). Similar duty-bound arrangements existed in pre-capitalist Japan, China, and even during the Inca empire (see Spitzer 1981:318-321).

Thus, pre-capitalist policing comprised of persons who redeemed the full value of their security labour. In Marxian terms, these were 'natural production units' that did not produce surplus value for an employer. The nature of security was communal and direct. Each member of a tything, poa-chia (China), or Shogunate (Japan) was responsible for their fellow member's conduct and protection. Thus, as security work (or what we now commonly refer to as 'policing') becomes divorced from its communal and duty-bound structure, it attains a reified air. It becomes something that can be purchased to fill the

need for safety and to alleviate fear. In Marxian terms, it attains an ethereal quality because of its 'fetishistic' symbolism. The commodity system of security takes on meanings which are divorced from the process of production and are socially represented through the claims and promises of the industry (both public and private) that sells it (Spitzer 1987:52).¹⁷

In chapter three I detail the difficulties of maintaining the dichotomous adjectives of 'private' and 'public' to describe policing. This is because both forms of policing are commodities, *but not equally commodified*. The distinction arises not from their state or private status, but rather from determining whether they produce 'surplus-value' for their employer. The municipal police do not operate in this way, but municipal police officers do engage in pay-duty functions, often organised by their union, for which the union charges its usual membership dues. Who is the employer in this case? The private citizen, the union, the police service, or the officer himself? Attempting a rigid public-private demarcation is less fruitful than conceding that policing exists on a continuum of commodification in capitalist societies.¹⁸ This does not mean that the concepts of 'private' and 'public' should be abandoned by sociologists – in fact I use them throughout this dissertation. But while private and public specifications tell us something about ownership and official designations, these adjectives should not connote any additional attributions such as organisation, mobilisation, mission, quality, or legitimacy when preceding the noun 'police.' Even under capitalism, the possibility of non-

¹⁷ The provision of security is part of the 'service economy' of late modern capitalism. Orthodox Marxism would have trouble incorporating the service industry, such as today's security corporations, within its analytical model because while Marx's materialist stance enabled him to understand the use-value of production, it left him ill equipped to understand commodities with extra-material effects.

commodified policing also exists in the form of vigilantism (Johnston 1996) or local uncompensated citizen patrol initiatives. Of course, this is hardly the norm. In this dissertation, I analyse Intelligarde International as a case study of the new parapolice – a commodified policing organisation that closely resembles its public, municipal counterpart.

The ‘new parapolice’ refers to that element of the private policing sector that actively seeks to promote itself as a solution to volatile or high profile risk markets which often include, but are not limited by, policing arrangements normally managed by the state in advanced capitalist societies. Risk markets constitute individuals representing organisations, or groups of people typically located in a specific territory, demanding the risk management skills of commodified policing. This demand is fuelled by individual, communal, or institutional fear and/or the need to maintain ordered spaces.

Commodified social control thus refers to the processes by which conformity is enforced through disciplinary techniques of surveillance by purveyors of commodified security.

I think what is needed for a sociology of private policing is a synthesis between Marxian conceptions of capital and commodification with post-structural notions of the state ensconced within a nexus of corporate-institutional social controls in an ‘integral plurality.’ Even grandiose global political movements have specific effects on criminality, dangerousness, uneasiness, and risk. Often, neo-liberalism reifies “the spread of a civilization in which the pursuit of personal economic gain becomes increasingly the dominant organizing principle of social life” (Currie 1997b:151-152). This has serious repercussions for a collective sense of safety and well-being because

¹⁸ My thanks to John McMullan who helped organise my thoughts on this matter during our many

'market societies' and 'market cultures' leave citizens to their own device in mustering a sense of economic, social, and physical security. A perpetual fear becomes dominant and risk eradication becomes a scientised commodity to be bought and sold:

Market society promotes violent crime in part by creating something akin to a perpetual state of internal warfare in which the advancement of some is contingent on the fall of others, and in which a corresponding ethos of unconcern – of non-responsibility for others' well-being – often legitimized under the rubric of beneficent competition, pervades the common culture and the interactions of daily life. (Currie 1997b:163)

The commodity of security can be exchanged, liquidated, and competitively sold.

This operation is intrinsically cultural because commodities are attached values within social and economic contexts. Ewick (1993) has argued that a strict definitional demarcation needs to be employed when discussing commodification and privatization because there is an assumption of unitary historical process in the case of the latter term:

Whereas 'privatization' connotes the *circulation* of subjects and the *transference* of power from the public sphere to the private sphere, 'commodification,' more broadly defined, suggests a process that generates new forms of power and constitutes new subjects. (Ewick 1993:140) (*italics in original*)

We are in an age where the use of private policing is a more common and probable development. But there have been other such times in history resulting in quite different policing and power-sharing arrangements. The Pinkertons of the late 19th century United States, the semi-public Commissionaires of post-war Canada, the pre-public thief-takers and monied police of London, the new corporate concierges staffing the highrises and condominiums of late 20th century North America, and the recent parapolice of risk society reflect very different subjects and sites of surveillance, invoking drastically divergent responses from employees, the media, politicians and the corporate elite. Of course, we may just as easily cite a litany of cases where the reverse has occurred:

conversations about the commodified nature of policing.

episodes during which the state has taken over policing duties formerly handled by private interests.¹⁹

To talk of privatization when describing policing often misses the point because public law enforcement agencies are engaged in the very process typified by private enterprise, competition, and the trade of commodities. In the history of Canadian policing, competitive contractual 'bids for service' have been the historical norm as federal, municipal, and provincial police services vie for policing contracts. Private firms are now invited into the bidding process – as in the new municipality of QuinteWest, Ontario (Palango 1998:12). Does this mean that the process has inherently changed? It makes little sense to assume that the nature of privatization is intrinsically different from commodification when discussing policing. There is no unitary historical movement, no generalized effect in the transference of responsibility, and most importantly, no real value in assuming that the public and private police are more or less definable as commodities. They are on a sliding continuum in this regard, both because of their historically variable importance in security provision, and because late modern market culture has transformed the citizen into a consumer (Miller and Rose 1997). This point is missed by Johnston (1992:137-179) who concentrates on responsible and autonomous citizenship. The police-citizen inter-associations he identifies – such as 'specials' and uncooperative 'vigilantes' – do not reflect the contemporary nature of security provision. Rather than choosing between the bipolar extremes of opting 'in' or 'out' of sanctioned police co-operation, the vast majority of citizen connections with the police (both public and private) in North America are actually commercial in nature. An individual's

¹⁹ As in the case of the Thames River police of the early 1800s. They were at first private, then jointly

relationship to the police is frequently governed by their place in a procurement hierarchy – both at home and at work. Often, this will include the formation of residential ‘purchasing collectives’ (in lieu of communities) to ensure safety and take on responsibility for self-protection. Thus any ‘power’ emanating from ‘responsibilisation’ discourse seems to inevitably translate into a commodified process in capitalist society.

In short, policing, both public and private, is a commodity to be bought, sold, managed, marketed, and tested against corporate templates in assessing ‘success.’ What is the value per cost? Is customer satisfaction high? How is service delivery managed? What is a particular service’s competitive advantage? During the writing of this chapter, the city of Moncton, New Brunswick dissolved its constabulary and contracted the RCMP. These episodes are now common. It is no wonder that the next conference of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (Edmonton Alberta, August 1998) will focus on ‘Innovative Methods for Evaluating Policing Initiatives.’ The circular notes: “[e]valuation has become increasingly important in recent years as police organizations are required to maximize their results and achieve greater efficiency during times of fiscal restraint.”

I argue that a notion of the state as ‘central’ to the operation of private policing, or approaches that ignore the profit motivations of the private security sector need to be abandoned. Similarly, an appreciation for the complexities of governance and actuarial logics should not supplant an investigation of the political implications of risk and neo-liberal political economy. Instead, we need to continue analyses of both the macro- and micro-sociological minutiae that make up an institution’s existence. Rather than

financed by the state and river elite and eventually became fully public.

privileging organizational schemas at the expense of its membership, and calling this 'governance,' a sociology of (private) policing should investigate the dialectic natures of systems of discipline and surveillance with that of techniques of resistance.

In this way, critical ethnography aids our understanding of social control in risk society. "As a metaphor, critical ethnography directs attention to symbols of oppression by shifting and contrasting cultural images in ways that reveal subtle qualities of social control" (Thomas 1993:20). In examining how risk systems penetrate and are blocked by social groupings, we must understand the historical processes that shape resistance and acquiescence in prepatterned ways within a given organization. Ethnography entails that the researcher defines as his/her goal, the discovery of the values, norms and meanings of a small community or social group. These relationships must tell us how these attitudes, symbols and narratives relate to the whole. In this sense, ethnographers are also 'cryptographers' (Alvi, DeKeseredy and Ellis forthcoming; see also Goffman 1961) that also charge themselves with understanding the codes people use to justify their behaviour and the actions of those who act with, against, or upon them.²⁰ By doing so, we avoid the trap of relying solely on paper realities and thus ignore the lived realities of those within the system.

In the case of the private police, I use ethnography to explore how constellations of influences affect the daily operations of business. At one level, government regulation will dictate the limits of organizational and individual conduct, yet these boundaries can

be tested, expanded, and even breached by private security companies. Additionally, macro-political influences, such as neo-liberal rationalities that have at once transformed the citizen into a consumer and the state into just another powerful arbiter of social control will have more than ethereal effects on both the organization of private policing and its constituent players. This means that mapping the ephemeral and transforming techniques of governance is an important task, but not insofar as it will eclipse our interest in how these processes affect those persons within their scope of influence. Such regulatory and political developments affect a multiplicity of actors, including the public police, Commissionaires, alarm companies, clients, the media, and the general public, that respond with competing motivations to developments in governance and surveillance. All of these actors (and more) must be mitigated by the organizational and cultural interests of the private security organization under scrutiny.

As techniques of surveillance and control become diffuse throughout late modern society, private policing organizations are called upon to manage risks to persons and property. These developments create new markets and potentials for policing. As longstanding alienated labour, to varying degrees both public and private policing is commodity and the ability to purchase more security per cost becomes of paramount importance to a consumerized citizenry. Motivated by a political economy of risk reduction, the private police respond to new dangers and insecurities as an avenue for expansion and opportunity. Sociologists of private policing are thus tasked with

²⁰ As Currie (1997a:41) observes of the connections between market culture and its effects on individual emotions and psychology: "[t]here are other links as well among the growth of market society, market culture, and crime. A full analysis of those connections would need to consider, for example, the impact on crime of the specifically psychological distortions of market society – its tendency to produce personalities

understanding how private policing organizations navigate within these politically charged 'risk markets.' Rather than separating neo-liberal, provincial, and even municipal politics from the whole, we must query how such strategies affect persons and organizations within and without the system. How is discipline achieved organisationally and sold externally? How do both security agents and those they are tasked with policing resist social control? These questions, which constitute the problematic for this dissertation, are answered within the context of profit-motivation and the local political and economic situations under investigation – employing critical ethnography to expose the linkages.

less and less capable of relating to others except as consumer items or as trophies in a quest for recognition among one's peers"

Chapter Two: Methods of Inquiry

In the previous chapter, I outlined a theoretical framework for this project that seeks to bridge gaps in previous research, while also asking new questions about the parapolice. This investigation extends the scholarship of pluralist, risk, and governance discourses while emphasising the role of Marxian conceptions of commodity fetishism and fear. As Wagner (1984) has pointed out, behind each set of research questions, there exists a sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit orienting strategy. The assumptions for the analysis to come are based upon the literatures reviewed in the previous chapter and may be summed in the following way:

1. The modern institutional response to risk relies heavily upon the production of knowledge about 'dangerous' populations. This knowledge is based upon actuarial practices and seeks to make risky populations known through the disciplining practices of surveillance. Although these techniques appear to depoliticize the construction of suitable enemies by erecting rationalistic and economic decision-making templates, they nonetheless reproduce the same disparities.
2. Actuarial practices come to define both internal and external risk categorisations for both organisational staff and populations to be policed. These managerial techniques provide insight into the operational logics of an institution but do not explain the multiple modes of resistance, and subcultural logics of the policers

and policed. For every disciplinary schema, there exists a correlative mode of resistance in a dialectic of control.

3. The modern organisation of security provision does not typically revolve around the state. Multiple private arrangements operate under corporate and other local controls that defy artificial dichotomous formulations such as public-private, crime prevention-loss prevention, and state-corporate constructs.
4. The nature of security provision in late modernity is characterized by the selling of commodified social control to fear-induced risk markets. This process is amplified by neo-liberal assessment logics and the continued consumerization of citizens.

This dissertation carries these assumptions into a case study of the Intelligarde parapolice. The central research questions emanating from such a model, and that drive this project, are:

1. How is discipline and surveillance achieved organisationally and sold externally to risk markets?
2. How do both security agents and those they are tasked with policing resist social control?

These questions first task the researcher with describing the provision and marketing of commodified security and second, explaining how this process is resisted by both the populations meant to be policed and those doing the policing. In the summer of 1997, I conducted research on the private security industry in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) with Margaret Beare. The focus of the project was to query selected security executives about the privatisation of policing and the overlapping functions of the public

and private police (Beare and Rigakos 1997). In the course of that separate study I came upon Intelligarde International, which was the most active in extending the scope and function of private policing to the public domain. In fact, during data collection I was continuously directed to Intelligarde by competing security executives who would often derisively refer to their “breaking the law” or “trying to be cops.” After meeting with company president and owner Ross McLeod, it became obvious to me that if the sociology of policing was to get serious about ‘commodification,’ ‘privatisation,’ ‘risk management,’ and the new parapolice in Canada, it would have to start here.

As the Canadian public grows uneasy about security provision (both public and private), Intelligarde International has begun to receive considerable media attention. During the course of my research, Intelligarde was featured in Canada’s national news magazine (Palango 1998) and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s *Witness* program (Jan. 23rd, 1998). The company is a six-million dollar business and has been operating for 16 years. It functions primarily within the GTA, although it may soon have a presence in small communities across Ontario. I will discuss Intelligarde’s structure, deployment, mobilisation, and personnel in upcoming chapters. Unlike many other firms, Intelligarde policy dictates that security officers shall make arrests and the company takes on parapolicing functions such as clearing crack-houses, processing evictions, and even disrupting the business of ‘drug gangs.’

The methods employed for this research project reflect the overall objectives of this dissertation. That is, they serve both descriptive and theoretical rationales²¹ which

²¹ As such, the absence of particular data in the literature may reflect the absence of requisite theorising to precede it.

necessitate multiple investigative techniques.²² There are seven sources of data for this dissertation: ethnography, formal interviews, the occurrence database, personnel files, the banning database, Intelligarde communications and internal documents, and media representations of Intelligarde (including a search of the *Toronto Star* database).²³ This research project was negotiated in late August, but data collection did not commence until mid-September 1997. In this chapter I consider each method in turn, discussing the theoretical and descriptive rationales behind them, as well as the actual process of data collection.

Critical Ethnography

Lofland has argued that “in order to ‘do’ qualitative field research, one needs only himself [or herself], time, some people to watch and/or talk to, and writing materials. It is organizationally and technologically the most individualized and primitive of research genres.” (1974:111). I have already noted, however, that critical ethnography involves more than simple observation. Critical researchers begin from the tenet that all cultural (and subcultural) life is in a constant state of tension between control and resistance (Thomas 1993:9). Even mundane events are exposed for their broader social processes of coercion, evasion, control, and reform. These tensions are to be found in the rituals, behaviours, sustaining narratives, communications systems, and general mores of a given culture.

The complete absence of ethnographic analyses of the private police in the published literatures means that an entire constellation of questions that attend to the

²² Such approaches have elsewhere been described as attempts at ‘triangulation’ (Denzin 1978) – a series of methods utilised to limit the margin of error or inaccuracy when only one investigative tool is employed.

everyday routines of private security officers have not been answered. This absence is particularly striking for the sociology of policing where there exists a long tradition of ethnographic analyses of the public police (e.g. Skolnick 1966; Westley 1970). More importantly for a risk markets perspective is that absent an ethnography of parapolicing, we cannot answer the empirical questions posited above. Without immersing oneself into the daily practices of maintaining surveillance and managing risks, the nuances of selling commodified social control would remain unanalysed.

Unlike recent work on the police which has invoked intellectual schisms between early subcultural investigations (e.g. Ericson 1982; Manning and Van Maanen 1978; Skolnick 1966; Smith and Gray 1983) and modern analyses of 'governance' (e.g. Dandeker 1990; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Ericson, Haggerty and Carriere 1993), a critical ethnography of risk markets does not compartmentalise investigations of control from resistance, systems from persons, or governance from agency. Exposing the dialectic nature of these relationships is central to the ethnographic enterprise (cf. Goffman 1961).

Thus, a risk markets perspective employs critical ethnography to unravel the processes by which discipline, surveillance and resistance are negotiated. By doing so, critical ethnography links the micro-sociological practices of private policing to the macro-sociological political processes of risk markets. The mundane procedures of private law enforcement and surveillance as products of neo-liberal actuarial logics are revealed for their commodified nature. In chapter five I examine the modes of control exercised on both staff and the general population, while in chapter six I analyse the

²³ My thanks to Stephanie Duncan at the *Toronto Star* switchboard for her assistance.

multiple means of resistance used by both groups. A culture of surveillance and resistance emerges. In addition to this, it is difficult to examine the competing logics of commodified police organisations without actually witnessing what transpires on a daily basis. If Intelligarde security officers engage in crime control, then this will become evident during the ethnography.

In the case of investigating the (private) policing of 'risk markets,' therefore, we must understand how the development of current practices impact the Intelligarde parapolice. How is surveillance and discipline imagined and how is it resisted by those within and outside the organization? Linked to this: how is Intelligarde's social control capability sold as commodity to private clients, tenants' associations and police boards?

In the next section I outline how I went about conducting formal field interviews with an assortment of respondents both within and outside the organization. Although the primary aim of the interviews were to gain an understanding of the goals, fears, and desires of respondents, field observations sometimes yielded more candid responses. On tape, security officers would occasionally be reserved but when they congregated in groups (as they often did) the banter and story-telling generally proved more interesting – revealing 'war stories,' and gossip that quickly suffuse the organization. These gatherings typically took place in the briefing room, in front of the duty desk, the car bays (when the supervisor was absent) or at selected sites in the downtown area. It immediately became apparent to me that certain stories had achieved the status of subcultural lore since I would hear them repeatedly from both veterans and rookies. I make reference to these fieldnotes throughout the dissertation.

Field observations began in September of 1997 and lasted until early November. I spent most of my time with either mobile or static officers. I would ride along with mobile patrol officers as they attended 'hits,'²⁴ alarm responses, or backed up fellow officers. In other instances, I would be moved to a vehicle patrolling an adjacent district or I would request that I be dropped off at various sites to interview static officers. While I managed to conduct formal interviews with one-quarter of uniform officers, I actually spoke to and noted the comments of a considerable number more. Including both fieldnotes and interviews, I recorded contacts with approximately half of Intelligarde's staff.²⁵ The ethnographic fieldwork produced 350 pages of notes²⁶ and approximately 126 hours of observational data. Daily field observations lasted between one to 14 hours.

Throughout this dissertation, I provide observations in a narrative format. Intermixed with recorded discussions and other occurrences are my own subjective interpretations. My placement in relation to the data is a task of paramount importance for doing good critical ethnography (Thomas 1993) and so I provide data on my movements and speech relative to the activities around me. Most importantly, the direct observation of parapolicing allowed insight in the processes of surveillance and commodification.

Formal Interviews

Much like the general ethnographic enterprise in this dissertation, the purpose of the formal interviews was to gain insight into the commodified nature of security

²⁴ Refers to scheduled visit and patrol of site lasting between 30 – 50 minutes.

²⁵ Based on fieldnote entries.

²⁶ Most of the fieldwork also involved audio-taping respondents. These recordings, however, were quickly transcribed. This allowed me to save the tapes for future interviews.

provision in risk markets. More specifically, interviews place a focus on the negotiation between surveillance and resistance by examining the attitudes of both management and line officers. Thus, more candid information about the logics of company mobilisations became available that would not have otherwise come to light by merely investigating internal and external operations and sales documents. Interviews also seek to establish the mission of parapolicing as crime fighting within a 'wannabe' culture, thus reversing a tendency of previous research which focuses on the attitudes of corporate managers (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985a), the public police (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985b) or the general public (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985c).²⁷ Instead, the parapolice are asked to comment on their perceptions of outside agents.

There were a total of 50 interviews conducted for this dissertation. Ten interviews were of security executives and a former president of the Independent Professional Alarm Dealers (I.P.A.D.) association, which also formed the basis of an earlier investigations (see Beare and Rigakos 1997:1).²⁸ These interviews were designed to test the attitudes of select security executives about the history, growth, and future direction of private policing (see Appendix for interview schedule). In almost all cases the open-ended style of the interviews, and the company-specific nature of the inquiries resulted in considerable deviation from the interview schedule.²⁹

²⁷ Researchers have distributed surveys to Ontario (Shearing, Farnell and Stenning 1980) and Toronto (Erickson 1993) security officers but the research instruments did not query them about attitudes.

²⁸ Representing the following firms: Intelligarde International, Metropol Security (West Toronto), Intercon Security, Wackenhut Security, Metropol Security (East Toronto), Burns Security, Pinkerton's (Canadian HQ – Montréal), Pinkerton's (Toronto), Group 4 Securitas, Fidelity Alarms.

²⁹ The original study's selection criteria targeted respondents who worked for companies that:

- offer innovative security products such as complete vertical product and service integration;
- or currently held high profile contracts that were formerly within the realm of the public sector; or

In addition to the ten extra-organisational interviews, 40 interviews were conducted with Intelligarde staff, ranging in rank from president to security officer. Different questions were posed to Intelligarde field staff, management and other security executives. In brief, the interview schedule addressed issues concerning personal attitudes toward work, the company, media coverage of Intelligarde, training, career aspirations, contact with the public police, and any additional issues that may have arisen throughout the interview (see Appendix for the full interview schedule). Management staff was asked about the organisational direction, history, and mobilisations of the company. In each case, job-specific queries were also made.

Table 2.1 illustrates the number of interviews conducted with various personnel in the course of research. Unlike the interviewee selection criteria for security executives, choosing from Intelligarde personnel was less systematic. Of the total 141 uniform security personnel in the company,³⁰ 35 (24.8%) were assigned to mobile patrol, 92 (65.2%) to static sites, and 6 (4.3%) were engaged in both functions. Additionally, six (4.3%) employees were working in dispatch as communications officers. An equal representation of mobile and static security officers was attempted because there were grounds to believe that divergent subcultural mores may be at work. This was evidenced by competitive pronouncements by each group against the other regarding the difficulty.

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- are part of large multinational security syndicates that are engaged in private correctional services, public-purview policing (such as court security or prisoner transport), or consulting on the reformation of former Easter Bloc police services; or
 - maintain a high-profile guard force trained in self-defence and/or dog-handling, are instructed to make arrests, or are engaged in other non-customary security functions.

I make no claims about the representativeness of this sample for this study. For instance, private policing outfits such as forensic accounting firms and other 'high end' corporate security companies may constitute another level of parapolicing activity (e.g. PERF, KPMG, FIA Inc., Deloitte Touche, and Public Safety Innovation).

³⁰ Job placement for two of the 141 employees could not be obtained.

excitement, and rewards of respective postings.³¹ There is also evidence to suggest that there is a difference in status between mobile and static assignments, as Intelligarde staff often relate that it is a “privilege” to work in motorised patrol. Special efforts were also made to oversample members of visible minority populations and women. In fact, of the 11 women employed in uniform duties for Intelligarde, I interviewed five (45%) of them. Similarly, I spoke to nine (28%) of the 32 visible minority members employed by Intelligarde. In total, therefore, I conducted formal interviews with 35 of 141 (24.8%) uniform personnel and five of the seven members (71%) of the management or office staff. Many of Intelligarde’s employees perform multiple functions which makes it difficult to categorise their activities. This is especially true of personnel listed as both mobile and static site officers. Most of the management staff are licensed security guards and wear uniforms while doing office work. The Quality Control Manager spent a considerable amount of his shift in the office, but would alternately engage in patrol and investigative functions, often along with the Operations Manager who would exchange his suit for a uniform when on patrol.

The process of obtaining interviews began by approaching security officers and presenting them with a letter of permission signed by Intelligarde’s Director of Sales and Marketing (see Appendix). Thereafter, I would ask the prospective respondents if they would provide me with an interview. Often, I would conduct interviews during the course of ethnographic observation. Typically, this involved in-car or on-site interviews while the mobile or static officer was on patrol. In other instances, interviews were conducted at the station while I was analysing electronic databases, or immediately after

³¹ I will discuss this – and the subcultural mores of Intelligarde officers generally – in greater detail in

briefings. Only two security officers initially refused to be interviewed. In both cases, however, they later approached me and agreed to be questioned. In the first instance, a security officer was kilometres away from his assigned property and did not want to be recorded astray from his post. In the other case, the security officer was too busy to talk and eventually sought me out when our paths crossed two weeks later. For the most part, Intelligarde security officers were initially suspicious of outside intrusion, as in the case of the public police (e.g. Ericson 1982; Manning 1997; Rigakos 1995; Skolnick 1966), but they gradually accepted the research project.³² Some officers were convinced that I was a spy for company president Ross McLeod and I had to assure them to the contrary. In other cases, however, some security officers wanted me to pass messages onto management regarding working conditions and morale so long as anonymity was guaranteed.

Table 2.1: Formal Interviews Conducted

PERSONNEL	MALE		FEMALE		VISIBLE OTHERS	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Mobile security officer (N=14)	12	85.7	2	14.3	3	21.4
Static security officer (N=17)	14	82.3	3	17.6	6	35.3
Communications officer (N=4)	4	100	0	0	0	0
Intelligarde management (N=5)	5	100	0	0	0	0
GTA Security executives (N=10)	10	100	0	0	0	0

upcoming chapters.

³² Since Intelligarde has received considerable media attention of late, some select veteran security officers who are typically interviewed by the press at management's direction, treated my inquiries as routine. It was clear that this was not the first instance in which they found themselves being questioned and taped.

Most interviews (45 of 50 = 90%) were recorded to audio-tape but a few respondents requested that notes be kept instead. On another two occasions I ran out of tape. In total, I recorded over 11 hours of interviews that were eventually transcribed. The interviews lasted between 15 minutes and one hour. The original tape recordings were destroyed in accordance with ethics requirements concerning the confidentiality of respondents' answers. There are no identifiers on the transcripts except for the officer's rank, ethnicity, and gender. In order to maintain a degree of anonymity, office or managerial staff will be referred to as 'Intelligarde managers' when they are quoted throughout this dissertation. These interviews add the component of greater structure and consistency of data.

Occurrence, Personnel, and Bannings Databases

Occurrence reports are used to relay important information in narrative form to both Intelligarde management and clientele. This makes them vitally important for understanding the mobilisations of the company. The modern institutional response to threats is wedded to the production of knowledge about 'dangerous' populations. The occurrence reports can help test whether the parapolice of Intelligarde are indeed engaged in crime control activities – providing triangulative data to support or challenge ethnographic observations. Data gathered from the occurrence reports also fulfil a descriptive mandate because statistical information on the parapolicing mobilisations has not previously been available.

Unlike the routine reporting of patrols, these documents communicate 'incidents' considered special or out of the ordinary. Unfortunately, there is little systematic understanding among line officers about what constitutes cause to produce an occurrence

report. Often, relatively unimportant matters such as resident queries or noise complaints are routinely filed as occurrences at one site but not at another. Often, this would reflect client demands and is, in itself, an example of the commodification of information. Alternately it would reflect the inexperience of newer security officers who were reportedly more likely to produce paperwork in hopes of looking busy and impressing management. Whenever police or outside agencies were involved or arrests were made, Intelligarde security officers would invariably file occurrence reports for litigation purposes and, as one respondent put it, in order to: "C.Y.A. man, cover your ass."

Intelligarde International files all occurrence reports completed by security officers. Most of the more recent reports had not yet been filed and were most likely to be referred to in case of client requests. I thus selected a one year period (September 1996 to August 1997) for analysis that would not interfere with the immediate operations of the company. These files were archived by month submitted and site, along with other routine site reports (e.g. mobile inspection reports). The occurrence reports had to be separated from their folders, coded, and input to a SPSS data file. The variables constructed from the occurrence files include:

- the type of occurrence
- the badge number of the security officer filing the report,
- whether police, ambulatory, fire or other services were called,
- the number of security officers involved,
- whether a weapon was used and its type,
- the outcome or result of intervention, and
- whether injuries resulted and to whom.

There were a total of 1,703 occurrence reports filed at Intelligarde headquarters between September 1996 and August 1997. A systematic random sample³³ of these yielded 340 reports for coding, data entry, and analysis. This results in a margin of error at the 95% confidence interval of $\pm 4\%$ ($p = .05$).

Who are these private cops? Where do they come from? What experience do they have? What education do they come equipped with? If we are to begin answering these questions, we have to know about the demographic particulars of Intelligarde's staff. Access to the company's personnel files was granted by the president, marketing director, and general manager after consultation with the director of human resources. In total, 141 files were coded and input to a SPSS database. Sixteen files represented Intelligarde employees securing an Ottawa shopping mall ('satellite site') and were not included in the sample population. An additional 34 files were omitted from the personnel database because these employees were no longer with the company.

The major source of personal information in the staff files was the employee's application for a security guard and/or private investigator licence. These forms included the applicant's date of birth, country of birth, residence, criminal record, complexion, height, weight and other optional particulars such as past employment as a security guard and education. The company's application forms³⁴ offered additional information that may have been incomplete on the security guard application form. A final source of information was the applicant's resumé which typically included training information and previous security, police, or military experience. Unfortunately, some files were

³³ The occurrence reports were shuffled to avoid systematic sampling bias due to Intelligarde's procedure of organising the files by site. A six-sided die was rolled and every fifth file thereafter was selected until 340 were picked.

incomplete and I was not permitted to contact Intelligarde personnel by telephone to complete the dossiers due to company privacy policies. In any case, the file information was coded onto an Intelligarde Security Officer Personnel Summary Sheet (see Appendix) and included the employee's name, license information, residence, previous employment, citizenship, height, weight, complexion, education, offences, and training with the company. After the summary sheets had been prepared, they were turned over to Intelligarde's chief scheduling officer who would indicate whether the employee was working in mobile patrol or at a site and what duty the security officer was qualified to undertake.

Intelligarde's 'banning' database is integral to the daily operations of the company, and is the primary source of information about individuals issued a N.P.E. (Notice Prohibiting Entry) on properties they secure. The police produce information about risky populations in response to institutional demands for safety. In this regard, the NPE database is central to Intelligarde's operations and the maintenance of its risk markets. The ability to amass information about a corporation's populations considered a threat is a commodified ingredient of modern policing arrangements and simultaneously helps guide appropriate police actions in the future. The construction of 'persons known to the police' is a powerful determinant of subsequent police-citizen interactions. If we are to answer the question posed earlier (how is discipline and surveillance achieved?) we must analyse the information upon which an organisation comes to 'know' the populations under its purview.

³⁴ They have changed frequently in the last few years.

The bannings database was not constructed by the author but pre-existed in electronic format for a number of years. I selected all entries between August 1996 and September 1997³⁵ in order to construct a one year sample. The database was then scanned and translated into SPSS format, in the process converting thousands of string variables into numeric codes. Although the database served Intelligarde's communications needs, it could not be used for statistical analysis without significant manipulation. Surveillance variables that would appear on an N.P.E. such as the banned individual's hair length, height, weight, clothing style, markings or tattoos, or even eyewear was omitted from analysis. Significant re-coding was required of all other variables, including sex, location, complexion, age, address, and the reasons for banning.

In total, there were 2,617 cases gleaned for statistical analysis from the Intelligarde banning database representing one year of mobilisations by Intelligarde security officers. This raw frequency alone demonstrates the impressive social control function performed by Intelligarde.³⁶ Data from this information source is referred to repeatedly throughout this dissertation.

Communications and other Internal Documents

Like other policing organisations, Intelligarde invests a tremendous amount of time collecting and disseminating information (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Ericson, Haggerty and Carriere 1993). These materials provide tremendous insight into the

³⁵ This proved quite difficult because there was a lack of standardisation in the 'date of offence' field. Often, months and days were variably ordered which made it nearly impossible to tell if a N.P.E. had been issued on, for example, January 10th or October 1st. Since N.P.E.s were often entered chronologically, however, I was able to make some judgements about their inclusion in the sample.

³⁶ There are probably just as many individuals banned from Intelligarde sites informally – warnings are given and no paperwork ensues.

workings of the company and reveal the marketing techniques and visionary goals of the firm. The selling of parapolicing involves both public and private clients who need evidence of a tangible security product. Endemic to the management of risks is a litany of report writing that serves multiple purposes, most importantly in monitoring both staff and public and minimising liability. There are over a dozen report forms to fill out, including: tag tow reports, parking tickets, weekly time sheets, evidentiary cover reports, occurrence reports, alarm reports, alarm response reports, 30 minute plus alarm response forms, N.P.E.s, equipment and key sign sheets, mobile inspection reports, checklists for fire related incidents, run sheets (including 'non-revenue' items), vehicle inspection sheets, officer k-9 reports, and roll call. Additionally, internal memorandums (n=10), training materials, and letters or faxes into or out of the company (n=5) were utilised to understand the mobilisations and organisational logics of Intelligarde. In total, the report formats, training literatures, and communications amount to over 300 pages of information.

The Media

A final area of investigation involves media depictions of Intelligarde. This is not only important from the perspective of amassing information about the company's reputation among journalists or the general public, but also affects the Intelligarde security officer's own self perceptions. Often, police officers assess job fulfilment and 'good pinches' in relation to cinematic and media portrayals of the police occupation (Mallett 1996). We also know that the dramaturgical nature of police representation depends heavily upon public presentations and the symbolizations and meanings attached to them (Manning 1997). The private police are no different.

Recent mass media stories about Intelligarde coincided with the period of data collection – these included both national print and television stories. In Toronto, there has been a long-standing curiosity among the print media with Intelligarde's operations (Bragg 1987; Bugbee 1983; Di Matteo 1997; DiManno 1993a; DiManno 1993b; Girard 1989; Hall 1993; Mascoli and Pron 1991; Mitchell 1990a; Mitchell 1990b; Pratt 1995; Stancu 1996) that has produced wildly different, but mostly simplistic, interpretations of Intelligarde's function. These stories have an important effect on private policing because Intelligarde security officers commonly refer to media depictions as touch-stones for other issues. A 'misunderstood' social group can often rally against 'misplaced' vilifications or around positive and re-affirming portrayals – it is important to map these tendencies and their effects on Intelligarde personnel.

Although this dissertation employs multiple methods it is not organised around distinctions in data collection. I do not believe it fruitful presenting qualitative and quantitative data in different sections or chapters for the sake of maintaining a misplaced allegiance to methodological divisions. Instead, divergent sources of data are often presented simultaneously (or alternately) and organised on the basis of general observational themes. Having outlined the theoretical orientation and the methods of analysis for what is to follow, I now turn to contextualising the new parapolice in the following chapter.

Chapter Three: The New Parapolice

As one enters terminal three at Toronto's Pearson International Airport, one notices the newness of the structures, the cleanliness of the walls and ceilings, and the brightness and bustle of the building. Passengers move about various cues for airline tickets, baggage checks, and car rentals. Perhaps less noticeable may be Canada's federal police talking to a pair of constables from the Peel Regional Police Service. As they finish their discussion, the RCMP officers begin to patrol, nodding in acknowledgement to a pair of security officers from Excalibur Security making similar rounds. Further along, they watch two armed Brinks' guards carry money satchels from a nearby currency exchange kiosk. They continue to wind by both Commissionaires issuing parking tickets and Group 4 Securitas security guards checking the luggage of passengers. On the lower level, Canada Customs agents check a suspicious traveller and call the RCMP and an Immigration Officer to attend. In a processing centre just off the tarmac, security guards from Metropol Security meet with the immigration officials as the suspicious detainee is handed over to the security firm for transport to the privately-run Mississauga Immigration Detention Centre (MIDC). The detainee is handcuffed and placed in the caged rear of an unmarked van until his arrival. The Centre is on the airport strip and disguised as just another inconspicuous motel. When one gets close enough, however, a 12' chain-linked fence topped with barbed wire encircling the rear of the building comes into view.

Just an unremarkable tour of Canada's busiest airport? Perhaps, but after taking this short imaginary stroll you will have come under the gaze of three federal policing agencies, one municipal police service, a quasi-public security force, four privately contracted security companies, and an unknown number of in-house airline security agencies all working alongside one another in a generally unproblematic chain of surveillance. This is the nature of securing peoples and properties in a risk market system. The RCMP took on the policing contract at the airport but must work alongside the local police service to conduct investigations and pass information on offenders and other threats. Part of the contract involves hiring a private security firm to undertake more monotonous policing functions. Similarly, the RCMP hired the Corps. of Commissionaires to issue parking tickets so that their officers did not have to do so. The baggage-inspection contract was a separate bid won by the security multinational Group 4 Securitas. For their part, the Department of Immigration also contracted out the MIDC and detainee transport to Metropol Security. There are myriad threats to social order in an airport, creating myriad opportunities for the selling, trading, and contracting of security provision. All of the providers, however, are governed by the same market logics for maintaining their clients: provide a service for fee that is competitive and attractive to the buyer. In the US, growing litigiousness in the civil courts (Priest 1990) has resulted in institutions taking steps to minimise liability by enforcing regulations in certain spaces. Enforcement necessitates surveillance and agents to point out and react to violations. By attempting to minimise the risk of liability, therefore, social institutions come to rely more heavily on private security agents and technologies.

While it may be worthwhile investigating specific sites of security provision we may just as easily trace respective security organisations instead. In the case of the Toronto airport scenario we may, for example, decide to more closely scrutinise Group 4 Securitas. We would first have to note that this trans-national corporation has security offices in 29 countries including Canada. Second, they own security technology companies in 11 countries and run private correctional services in the United States, England, and Australia. And finally, their operations are quickly spreading with new policing contracts to safeguard New Zealand's parklands, and much of southern Australia's prisoner transport and correctional services (Stemman 1997). We might imagine therefore, having our carry-on luggage checked through metal-detectors operated by Group 4 Securitas at Toronto's airport and then observe Securitas guards similarly checking passengers when we arrive in Australia. If we were to take a trip to a south Australian mall or condominium, we may very well be under the watchful gaze of Securitas. If, for argument's sake, we were caught shoplifting, a Securitas guard would arrest us and turn us over to the police. When we appeared for court we might be surprised to find a man in a Group 4 Securitas uniform providing security. Had we done something more heinous and were detained, chances are that a Group 4 Securitas guard would be patrolling outside our cell. If found guilty and sentenced to a jail term, we would be transported in a prisoner van by Group 4 Securitas to a Group 4 Securitas-run private jail such as Mount Gambier or the Metropolitan Men's Prison.

All of this makes most people nervous for various reasons ranging from the multinational nature of security provision and the correlative questions of accountability that are thus raised, to more mundane concerns like questioning the training, competence,

and motivations of those who staff such organisations. Multinational security corporations such as 'Wackenhut,' 'Burns,' and 'Pinkertons' are making our trip through Securitas' security network less and less unusual. As post-war public policing functions have been slowly taken over by private security firms, we are left with some rather important questions about the conceptual division of 'public' and 'private.' Does this dichotomy disguise more than it reveals about policing?

Public vs. Private Policing: The Problematic Dichotomy

Co-operation between the public and private police is often facilitated by the movement of retiring police officers to the private security sector. This 'old boys network' (Shearing, Farnell and Stenning 1980) is yet another mechanism for the exchange of information between agencies. It may come as little surprise, for example, that Excalibur security – the firm contracted by the RCMP at Pearson International Airport – is owned and run by a former RCMP officer. Relations between the public police and private security sector have become so close that South East Florida police cadets receive security instruction as part of their standard training (Bottom and McCreedy 1984). In some cases, police and security firms have formed co-operative associations to meet and discuss topics such as bomb threats, executive protection and burglary investigation (Peterson 1983).

Increasingly, the police have become not only institutional partners with private security units – under the umbrella of community based policing – but advocates also. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) now has a liaison committee devoted to strengthening ties with the private security sector in an attempt to "give the police agency additional eyes and ears with which to locate wanted persons" (Hertig

1986). The IACP, along with the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), drafts model legislation and advocates for its passage. The legislation is geared towards allowing private firms access to police records as a tool in employee screening (Moulton 1987). In Amarillo Texas, the police and Allstate Security have worked out some interesting agreements. Beginning in August 1981, Allstate had assumed responsibility city-wide, for responding to alarm calls. Within the same period, Amarillo police hired security officers to patrol the downtown core during peak hours in tandem with the police. Today “most clients...call Allstate on minor emergencies or prowler calls” (Pancake 1983:36). Similar initiatives are in place in New York City where a police-private security liaison program links police precincts with 30 security organisations in a “structured anti-crime effort” (Bocklet 1990). In Tacoma and Philadelphia (see Greene, Seamon and Levy 1995), as in Amarillo, private security guards assist the police in patrolling the downtown areas. There are even more drastic examples to be found in Los Angeles where middle-class citizens/consumers have pooled their resources to build private residential enclaves, patrolled by armed private security (see Davis 1990: chapter 4). In Canada, the explosion in closed developments has mostly been a regional phenomenon. British Columbia is home to numerous such gated communities.

The situation in shopping malls is just as interesting. Despite being ‘public places’ (but also private spaces) most shopping malls are patrolled by private security personnel. Increasingly, however, community based policing has meant the installation of community police kiosks or storefronts within malls. The result is that police and private security agents are responsible for the same ‘patches’ (territories). In some situations, the police alone are asked to patrol the mall on a contract basis, at a cost shared by the city

and mall management (Rygier 1983). In other situations, the mall tenants bear the full price. In North York's Jane-Finch mall, the Metropolitan Toronto Police share office space and even information and photographs about banned individuals. Is it meaningful to call one police officer a private agent and the other a public agent on the basis of sponsorship? This is a long-standing question in the sociology of policing (Becker 1974).

There are clearly many difficulties associated with using sponsorship as grounds to differentiate between public and private policing. In the example of shopping malls, Pearson International airport, or even downtown Toronto, this becomes glaringly obvious. Does the real function, purpose, or operation of a private security firm significantly change depending upon the client? To a certain extent it does, but does this change depend upon the *public or private nature* of the client? The answer again, I think, is not very clear. A private security firm does not cease being 'private' if hired by a state client. This applies even if the security firm is hired by the public police – a more and more commonplace arrangement. This is also true of pay-duty police officers employed by private interests. In this latter case, the officer is paid privately via a police association or union but is a state law enforcement officer making additional moneys by selling his or her training, expertise, and most importantly, air of authority. In essence, all of these attributes are thrown onto the market as commodity in competition or co-operation with other private security services. This is further evidenced by the RCMP contracting services in airports to both the quasi-public Corps. of Commissionaires or private security.

In Sussex Borough, New Jersey the municipal police could no longer be afforded and were dissolved. The Borough was to rely on the State police and hired a private

security firm to provide a more constant uniformed presence. It became clear, however, that the actual mission of the security firm was to act as an independent municipal police department. When the security officers began to immediately issue traffic tickets, summonses, and detain and arrest suspects, the Sussex county prosecutor sought an injunction against the Borough. In a published paper on the issue, the Sussex county prosecutor notes that had the security firm constructed some hierarchy of accountability similar to the public police and had the contract stipulated that competing firms should follow state guidelines for screening and training, the private contracting of policing would have been legal (O'Leary 1994). Today, a new Ontario municipality is entertaining bids for policing from private security firms (Palango 1998). Does this transform private security into public policing?

In Canada, the call for greater "strategic partnerships" (Normandeau and Leighton 1990) with private security will continue to accelerate these developments under the rubric of community based policing. Thirteen Montreal area municipalities hired security firms to shore up a perceived lack of police patrol. Although their powers are limited primarily to enforcing parking bylaws, by 1987 at least nine municipalities had passed motions requesting that the police officers be granted powers to enforce moving traffic violations (Forcese 1992:113-114). Intelligarde International has contracts with Cityhome properties, the Toronto Economic and Development Corporation, the Toronto Parking Authority, and Peel Living. This means that Intelligarde polices a great share of both Toronto's and Mississauga's affordable housing, the Toronto Harbour and beach areas, and all of Toronto's ninety public parking lots. When one adds Cabbagetown

properties alongside Metropolitan Toronto Housing Association (MTHA)¹⁷ buildings, the number of citizens under Intelligarde's purview is staggering.

In this downtown Toronto area, Intelligarde polices a neighbourhood the size of nine city blocks. The company has negotiated arrangements with at least two different landowners of over a dozen building complexes allowing Intelligarde security officers to leave sites unattended and assist their partners at adjacent properties in need of assistance. This unique contractual reciprocity benefits all clients because culprits can be pursued, captured and banned without fear of crime displacement.³⁸ It also creates a multi-cliented, multi-tasked, multi-territoried, co-operatively governed police service that closely mirrors the municipal police. Geographically, the area is bordered by Howard Street to the north, Wellesley Street to the south, Sherbourne Street to the west and Parliament Street to the east. If we include the handful of MTHA buildings dotting the same territory, private agents police over three square kilometres of high-rise buildings, walkways, and roadways, as well as over 30,000 working-class persons in the heart of Toronto. Cityhome, Intelligarde's major downtown client, is a publicly funded corporation with elected tenants' associations who oversee security provision.

Intelligarde International is functionally answerable to these associations:

Look, we're paid by Cityhome management but we're also paid by the tenants because they pay rent. Often, there are some subsidies involved so, in effect, the taxpayer also chips in for our services. Then, we're answerable to an elected and very political body called a tenant's association. One phone call from a disgruntled tenant association president to the property owner and we're in serious trouble. A couple more phone calls and we could lose a major contract. So it's our job to make sure these people are satisfied with their service... That means making arrests, cleaning up the streets, letting them know we care about their neighbourhood. The only difference between us and the cops is that we can get fired. But the way I figure it, if we're there, they've already been fired. (Intelligarde manager)

¹⁷ MTHA has its own in-house security – many officers have the power to issue Provincial Offences Tickets. They are, in effect, Provincial Offences Officers.

³⁸ Displacement refers to the direct effect police (or other) interventions have in moving criminal activity to another area rather than actually stopping it (see Gabor 1981).

Add this to Intelligarde's law enforcement focus, and there are strong grounds to question the utility of using a rigid private/public distinction to understand the police – this division becomes less and less meaningful.³⁹

Just as convoluted as sponsorship, however, is the question of legal status. Security and police officers in Canada are governed by separate legislation. In Ontario, security guards are governed by the *Private Investigators and Security Guard Act (R.S.O. 1990)* and the police by the *Police Services Act (R.S.O. amended 1997)*. But besides police officers, security guards, and private investigators, there exist a litany of other law enforcement statuses: municipal law enforcement officers, Commissionaires, special constables, provincial offences officers, and a wide assortment of federal and provincial agents empowered by regulatory acts governing parklands, transportation, immigration, customs, etc.. All of these titles have typically been assigned to state bureaucracies or institutions with specific regulatory mandates.

Special constables, for example, usually comprise university security services or parliamentary protective bodies in Canada.⁴⁰ There is nothing to suggest, however, that these statuses cannot alternate between public and private policing services or that deployment governs legal status. To the contrary, many private security services in Ontario used to qualify their security officers as special constables in order to issue parking tickets on private property. Along with the security officer's power to enforce municipal codes, however, came general 'peace officer' powers, usually reserved for

³⁹ A similar arrangement is in place in the Borough of Southwark, England. In that council estate, private security is employed to conduct low level drug enforcement. The security guards report to twenty local councillors, a local community tenants' representative, a neighbourhood housing office, and community safety co-ordinators (Lee 1991).

public police services (Freedman and Stenning 1977:271-274; reprinted in Stenning and Shearing 1979: Appendix A). Today, a new status exists that confines authority to municipal parking regulations: the Municipal Law Enforcement Officer (MLEO). It is not wise, therefore, to link deployment or tasks to legal status. Large private security firms, or even in-house security bodies, arguably engage in more arrests and order maintenance in downtown Toronto malls⁴¹ or public places⁴² than many sleepy suburban or rural Ontario police forces. They do so routinely without peace officer powers. Both the University of Toronto and York University have similar security requirements. At the U of T they are met by a police service (or special constabulary) while at York, much to the officers' chagrin, it is a simple in-house security arrangement:

The actual tasks performed by the coppers and the highly positive attitudes that they display toward their peace keeping and crime fighting work reinforce the strategy of achieving collective upward mobility by means of professionalization. Both their work and their occupational ideology buttress the pursuit of special constable status. (see also Miccuci 1995; Micucci 1994:391)

So, while job tasks may imply varying levels of policing status, this is not to say they are borne out in practice. To the contrary, local and extra-local needs are tempered by individuals in positions of authority who must make decisions about the needs of a given organisation. At Saint Mary's University, the quasi-public Corps. of Commissionaires hold the security contract.

More divergent than the operational scopes, mandates, and missions between Intelligarde International and the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service (MTP) are the differences between Intelligarde and other security firms. While Intelligarde considers

⁴⁰ In England they have a much more pronounced role as functioning auxiliaries to the public police (Johnston 1992:140-146).

⁴¹ I am referring here to the Eaton's Centre, the Jane-Finch Mall, and Dufferin Mall.

⁴² As in the case of Intelligarde's cabbagetown properties.

itself a 'The Law Enforcement Company,'⁴³ executives from other security companies regard this pronouncement with considerable reservations:

No. There's no overlap. We're a security company that provides a guard service and quite a lot of alarm response but I keep hearing you say policing, private policing and we don't do that... See, there are companies who take that on, who think they're police but they're not. We don't go around harassing people, we are the eyes and ears of the police and management and we safeguard properties but we don't make arrests. That's not our job. (Security executive)

In another case, one executive's need to create a sharp demarcation between Intelligarde and his own operations results in outright disdain and an assortment of groundless accusations:

Yeah, Intelligarde, which is basically run by an ex-policeman who has close associations with certain divisions in the police force, who is trying to take on, and lobby for taking on certain functions which are currently being provided by the police. Who [sic] is breaking laws right now, both in terms of their uniforming standard and their behaviour – literally. (Security executive)

I do not intend to analyse outside perceptions of Intelligarde until later chapters, but these comments illustrate that there is arguably more distance between Intelligarde and other security companies than Intelligarde and the public police, both in terms of mobilisation and mission. This last point is an important one because previous theorists have argued that private and public policing organisations have been governed by two very different logics: the police are concerned with crime control and *apprehension* while the private security sector is concerned with loss *prevention* (Shearing, Farnell and Stenning 1980; Stenning and Shearing 1979:16). It is assumed that while the public police task themselves with "good pinches," private security agents drop "snowflakes"⁴⁴ in a more subtle form of coercion (Shearing and Stenning 1982b). This is clearly no longer the case, if it ever was. We know that, in the history of the monied police, these

⁴³ They have trademarked this phrase.

two duties were intertwined within a 'political economy of thief-taking' (McMullan 1995):

...state rewards, unsystematic at first, eventually enhanced the role of monied police. Proclamations and orders from King and Parliament offered sums of money or commodities in kind to enterprising searchers. Neighbours and fellow tradesmen were encouraged to spy and turn evidence on each other... In London, informing and thief-taking developed into specialized trades and came to prominence with the development of government rewards, inducements and pardons for checking crime and social unrest (Elmsley 1987:175). (McMullan 1995:123 and 125)

In the face of today's neoconservative politics that legitimate private prisons, private prisoner transportation, private court security, private forensic accounting, private second tier policing, and private security in expansive outdoor residential areas, private policing is clearly not just about loss prevention. This is especially true when one considers the tremendous risk aversion and fear (Hollway and Jefferson 1997) – particularly of violent crime – endemic to neo-liberal risk markets. But even as traditional private security arrangements may be just as much about crime control as loss prevention, so is public policing equally about loss prevention as it is about apprehension. This latter dynamic is typified by public police co-operation with insurance companies aimed at minimising loss (O'Malley 1991) and new 'communications policing' (Ericson, Haggerty and Carriere 1993) approaches geared to encourage the public to police themselves. A process of 'responsibilisation' – well entrenched among private corporate logics – ironically seeks to irresponsibilise corporate elites and police managers from both ethical and litigious liability. This downloading of responsibility, of course, fuels unease among the general workforce, neighbourhood, or purchasing collective, eliciting further demands

⁴⁴ When a particular omission or negligent act is observed that places peoples or property at risk, the security officer leaves a form (snowflake) aimed at bringing the potentially risky situation to the attention of the employee and management. Habitual violators are thus tracked and reprimands can be issued. An example of a violation might consist of leaving a portable computer insecured.

for protection against industrial accidents, crime, or intrusion – accelerating the need for commodified security.

The pursuit of security, therefore, is both a state and corporate business. Not unlike plans for the CACP conference in Edmonton (see chapter one), the National Institute of Justice's report on 'measuring what matters' in policing (Greene 1997), reflects an ongoing trend to corporatise state institutions (including welfare). The jingoism of market dynamics, segmentation, and demand has already infiltrated the logics of public police management as the need to justify resources becomes paramount. How does a police chief justify cost, improve products, diversify her product line, and compete with the industry norm? How different are these operational decisions from the determinations being made by private security managers across the globe? Especially in light of the fact that public and private police agencies no longer secure different populations, territories, or markets. "We're looking at where this industry is going and where individual firms in the marketplace are" notes Greene (1997:8). Police chiefs are no longer traditional managers – even their titles are being re-imagined as Chief Executive Officers.

It is also more difficult than one might think to label police services as either 'public' and 'private' on the basis of profit motivation. Canada's federal police force actively seeks out contracts – an entrenched historical practice – in an increasingly lucrative and competitive market. Not unlike the sales literatures of private security firms, the Solicitor General disseminates circulars promoting the RCMP product:

With more than a century of expertise, co-operation and respect to build on, and a national infrastructure that extends from the nation's smallest, remotest communities to the international level, the RCMP is equipped to deliver objective, efficient and sympathetic policing services.

The RCMP provides excellent provincial and municipal policing at a cost equal to or less than what its contract partners would have to spend on police forces of their own. (Solicitor General Canada 1996)

In a marketing technique most corporate executives would envy, the Solicitor General's long-term policies have resulted in the gradual retreat of federally-assisted funding for contracted police services. From 1928 to 1966, the federal government paid for 60% of local or provincial budgets. By 1990, the federal share had dropped slowly to 30% and continues to decrease by one or two per cent per year (Solicitor General Canada 1996). With an annual budget of one billion dollars and a staff of 10,400 police officers and civilians delivering services under contract, the RCMP brings the government \$700 million in revenue every year (Solicitor General Canada 1996). While it still suffers a net loss of \$300 million each year, through a process of 'vote-netting' the RCMP recovers this loss from general government revenue.

Today, the RCMP competes for contracts on a direct competition basis because the federal government no longer subsidises the contract services they provide. All 'expansions' in contract services must be 'cost neutral' to the federal government. In other words, when the RCMP 'won' the municipal policing contract for Moncton, New Brunswick, they did so by bidding with 100% of the proposed cost to them (personal communication: Staff Sgt. Barry Dunn, Policing Contract Services, Finance Branch, July 3 1998). This is already the case in many British Columbia jurisdictions where the local 'partners' (read: clients) pay between 90-100% of the policing costs. In this sense, public police services now actively compete for both mature and newly emerging risk markets. In order to become more cost-effective, Intelligarde International is hoping local police services will sub-contract Tier II policing with them.

There are a multiplicity of factors, therefore, that blur our ability to accurately make distinctions between public and private policing. Johnston (1992:195-196) has argued that we are best served locating policing institutions on two interacting continuums: from public to private forms and from local to supranational levels (see his figure 9.1). As I have noted above, however, this does not tell us all there is to know about different forms of policing. Just as important as sponsorship may be functional accountability, the environment being policed, the veracity and frequency of detention and/or arrests, legal status, training, and even uniforming. These are equally important factors in gaining compliance from the public. There have even been discussions about changing the mandate of Toronto's Police Services Board by wresting responsibility for policing functions into the hands of city council, incorporating private security companies within a new scope of oversight alongside the public police (Stenning 1997). This has already happened in certain jurisdictions. In Nova Scotia, the Police Commission regularly sets aside time in its itinerary to hear complaints against private security guards licensed in the province. So practically connected are notions of public and private security that even police research centres are proposed with this overlapping function in mind – as in the case of York University's Centre for Police and Security Studies (Eustace 1992).

The new parapolice are thus conceived of in this dissertation as that body of security companies (or contracts) that explicitly bridge the gap, both philosophically and functionally between the public and private police – increasingly rendering the distinction meaningless from an analytic perspective. These are the private correctional, court security, and residential police of North America. They are not simply concerned with

loss prevention as their sole responsibility. They are actively engaging the new risk markets of urban fear and shrinking state budgets to redefine policing. They have taken advantage of neo-liberal rationales and sold themselves as not only viable additions but also alternatives to the public police. This is the type of organisation increasingly typified in North America by 'law enforcement companies' such as Intelligarde International. To a certain extent, the adjective 'new' preceding the noun 'parapolice' is a misnomer. This is because there is a historical precedent for parapolicing arrangements (as defined above) – especially in the history of British policing. Notwithstanding this fact, I want to draw specific attention to new developments in both societal demands for changing security forms and the industry's response. Additionally, as I have demonstrated above, the drastic differences between Intelligarde and other security companies in the GTA undermines attempts to group all security firms within a single mode of analysis.⁴⁵

Powers of the Parapolice

We don't have special powers. Everybody always asks us where we get our authority from. I've been to contract bids, presentations, with even a cop on the panel, a police officer and he should know better, and he asked the same stupid question: 'you guys aren't cops, how can you do all the things you promise?' Well we just do our job and we use the powers every citizen and every landowner already have. It isn't magic, it just takes guts. It takes training. It takes skill. And it takes a company that will back up their officers if someone wants to sue. We are that company. It's what we like to call 'pushing the envelope.' (Intelligarde manager)

I do not intend, in this section, to present an exhaustive summary of case law concerning the limits of search, seizure, arrest or detention powers for security personnel. This has been expertly considered elsewhere (Stenning and Shearing 1979). Instead, I want to briefly discuss the sociolegal context in which Intelligarde security officers ply

⁴⁵ This is buttressed by assertions made by both Intelligarde and other security executives. Indeed, other

their trade. In upcoming chapters I will more closely examine how the enabling and disabling qualities of these powers affect Intelligarde security officers' sense of job satisfaction and lead to a malaise within a 'wannabe' culture. For now, I intend to provide a rudimentary understanding of the legal devices Intelligarde security staff employ on a daily basis. As I am sure will become obvious, Intelligarde staff do not have special powers. They have an organisational philosophy, and security officers willing to 'push the envelope' in citizen and landowner-agent powers.

In order to understand the fundamental nature of security work in Ontario, one needs to appreciate the form and context of private property ownership. This is the incontrovertible 'right' of every person in capitalist society – the right to the exclusive enjoyment of his or her own property without trespass. In the province of Ontario, this entitlement is ensured by the *Trespass to Property Act (R.S.O. 1980, c.511)*. Under the Act, section 9(1) notes "a police officer, or the occupier of the premises, *or a person authorized by the occupier* may arrest without warrant any person he believes on reasonable and probable grounds to be on the premises in contravention of section 2." Section 2 of the *Trespass to Property Act* makes explicit the grounds upon which an arrest may be effected:

- 2.-(1) Every person who is not acting under a right of authority conferred by law and who,
- (a) without the express permission of the occupier, the proof which rests on the defendant,
 - (i) enters on premises when entry is prohibited under this Act, or
 - (ii) engages in an activity on premises when the activity is prohibited under this Act; or
 - (b) does not leave the premises immediately after he is directed to do so by the occupier of the premises or a person authorized by the occupier
- is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than \$1,000.

In other words, if an individual enters an area of private property to which access is restricted by either notice/sign or physical barrier (section 3) that person may be arrested

than licensing, there are scant grounds for comparison but umpteen points of contrast.

for trespassing. A security officer, therefore, who is considered an agent of the landowner is able to arrest any individual who enters a private space expressly prohibited under section 2(a)(i) of the Act. Intelligarde officers are schooled to 'read them their rights.' A security guard, like any private citizen or peace officer must inform suspects that they are under arrest, what they are under arrest for, that they may remain silent, and that they have a right to retain counsel (see section 10 of the *Constitution Act*).

A more interesting situation arises when a person is on a property with permission (i.e. access is open to the public) but engages in 'prohibited' activity. Obviously, prohibited activity is an act open to interpretation. It certainly covers all criminal offences and may also include municipal by-laws or provincial regulations, but what of actions that simply offend the sensibilities of the landowner? As far as Intelligarde officers are concerned, prohibited activity consists of anything they can justify as 'immoral, illegal, or unethical.' Section (b) of the Act additionally grants security agents tremendous discretion because it also allows them to ask a person to leave a property without having to provide a reason. In practice, however, this section of the Act is typically used to avoid having to make an arrest. For instance, when someone is singing on private property and this is not permitted, she may be arrested immediately under section 2(1)(a)(ii) for engaging in prohibited activity, or may be asked to leave. If she refuses, the security officer may arrest her under sections 2(1)(a)(ii) or 2(1)(a)(b) of the Act.

Intelligarde officers are instructed that they should request a person leave the property at least three times before arresting under section 2(1)(a)(b), otherwise the courts might view their actions as overzealous. These sweeping powers are often

buttressed by additional enabling mechanisms. Strategically placed signs prohibiting certain activities on private property can further extend a private security guard's grounds to arrest. While there is nothing at any level of public governance making loitering explicitly illegal, a well placed sign makes it a prohibited activity on private property and allows a security guard to either immediately arrest or request the departure of undesirable persons. If the offenders resist, they can now be arrested under section 2(1)(a)(b) of the Act. In other words, while courts might frown upon private law-making through the arbitrary posting of signs, they cannot very well take away a landowner's right to remove individuals from his property found in direct violation of a prohibited activity. If those individuals refuse to leave, he is within his (and his agent's) right to arrest them.

No matter what the grounds for arrest – they seem nearly limitless – the private landowner or her agents must turn over an arrested individual to the police:

9(2) Where a person who makes an arrest under subsection (1) is not a police officer, he shall promptly call for assistance a police officer and give the person into custody of the police officer.

Of course, the police do not always proceed with charges against the individual and this sometimes leads to tension and frustration among Intelligarde security staff. When a police officer takes the arrest seriously, the security officer receives a sense of validation. Often, less serious offences (i.e. non-criminal) are handled through the issuance of Notices Prohibiting Entry (NPEs) in order not to involve the police in trivial matters. This allows the security guard additional discretion while reserving only more serious offences for police assistance.

In lieu of arresting someone immediately, therefore, a security agent may issue that person "orally or in writing" under section 5(1) of the Act "sufficient notice."

Almost invariably, banishments are handled through the issuance of NPEs – in a one year period between August 1996 to September 1997, Intelligarde staff issued 2,617 such notices. The NPEs also begin an important paper trail that makes it easier, or more justifiable, to arrest someone after a second or third trespass incident. If a banned individual returns to a site he is not permitted to enter by NPE, no matter what the reason, he may be arrested under section 2(1)(a)(ii).⁴⁶ Intelligarde staff photograph banned individuals at each site but also file all NPEs at headquarters so that these individuals may be entered into an electronic database for future reference. If an Intelligarde officer obtains the name of a suspicious person he believes to have been banned from a property, he may radio dispatch for confirmation and decide whether to issue an NPE or arrest the trespasser.

A second arrest power for security personnel stems from general *Criminal Code* provisions allowing for citizens' arrests. In many ways, this power is redundant for private security agents since they can already arrest for prohibited activity on private properties they police. This power is extended, however, to all properties, both public and private when a criminal offence is occurring:

494 (1) Any one may arrest without warrant

- (a) a person whom he finds committing an indictable offence; or
- (b) a person who, on reasonable and probable grounds, he believes
 - (i) has committed a criminal offence, and
 - (ii) is escaping from and freshly pursued by persons who have lawful authority to arrest that person.

Landowners are specifically mentioned in the *Criminal Code* but there is nothing that extends the powers of arrest for private security beyond those already provided for in Ontario's *Trespass to Property Act*:

⁴⁶ A person may also be banned from certain sections of a private property while allowing access to others.

494 (2) Any one who is

(a) the owner or a person in lawful possession of property, or

(b) a person authorized by the owner or by a person in lawful possession of property

may arrest without warrant a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence on or in relation to that property.

As in the case of the *Trespass Act*, anyone arrested by a citizen must be turned over to a peace officer (section 494(3)). The primary difference between private citizens' powers of arrest and those afforded police officers is that the latter may arrest on suspicion that an indictable offence has or will be committed.

There are also other sections containing redundant powers of arrest throughout the *Criminal Code*. These include defence of dwelling (section 40), defence of movable property (section 38) and defence of house or real property (section 41). A property owner or his agent can arrest for assault when a trespasser refuses to return property or leave the premises. These sections of the Criminal Code are rarely, if ever, used by Intelligarde security officers.

Search and seizure powers are chiefly limited to peace officers in Canada, although common-law judgements have allowed searches by private persons for weapons or evidence immediately after the arrest of suspects (Stenning and Shearing 1979:62-63).⁴⁷ Common knowledge among Intelligarde security officers dictates that searches for weapons are admissible but that consent should be obtained to avoid legal difficulties. Typically, this consent is forthcoming. As in other jurisdictions (Sarre 1994), a security officers' uniform and appearance of authority can have a significant impact on eliciting

This is typically done under section 4(2) of the *Trespass to Property Act*.

⁴⁷ The authors cite *Dillon v. O'Brien* (1887) 17 Cox C.C. 245, at pp. 249-250, *Reynen v. Antonenko et al.* (1975) 30 C.R.N.S. 135. For post-*Constitution Act* rulings, see Hoskins (1997) and the case of *Cloutier v. Langlois* (1990), 53 C.C.C. (3d) 257 S.C.C. where the court spells out that searches may be conducted on persons incidental to arrest in order to secure objects that may be used in evidence, weapons that may be a threat to public safety, or objects that may aid in escape.

compliance from the public. Intelligarde Security officers are instructed to leave all evidence, other than weapons, in the suspects' pockets. When the police arrive, they are to discreetly indicate to the responding officer that narcotics were found on a particularly piece of clothing or pocket. This alleviates the legal uncertainty of searches by private persons and:

...makes [Intelligarde look like] very co-operative campers in the eyes of the police. We make their jobs easier. I'm sure the paperwork and case processing would be much more difficult if a security guard walked up to them with some crack in his hand and said 'look what I found.' This way we don't even have to testify – it's entirely a police matter and we're more than happy to give them all the credit. (Static security officer - Male)

In short, the most well-worn piece of legislation by Intelligarde staff is the *Trespass to Property Act*. It provides security personnel with expansive powers of arrest on private property and is the statute of choice among a litany of provisions making it very easy for private security staff to arrest citizens in Ontario. While other federal provisions may be used from time to time, the ability to arrest persons on private property for engaging in 'prohibited activity' is wide-ranging. It gives Intelligarde security officers the grounds upon which to arrest someone before handing them over to the public police. When the police arrive, an entirely new set of enabling recipe rules (Ericson 1982; McBarnet 1981) can be deployed to process the suspect.

Private Justice

Aside from the enabling mechanisms of the law for the security guard and the police officer, Intelligarde offers legal services to its clients as a means of facilitating actions against tenants or trespassers. Pursuing an eviction case through the courts is a time-consuming and involved process of serving summonses and notices. Often, clients are intimidated by tenants and hire paralegals to carry out the litigation. Unfortunately,

paralegals are also often fearful of entering high crime areas or knocking on doors of potential or known drug dealers. In fact, Intelligarde used to contract out its paralegal matters but found that the cases were not handled with due diligence. Instead, management sponsored a company employee for paralegal training. For the last three years most of Intelligarde's routine legal proceedings have been handled by an internal paralegal.

The actual designation of Intelligarde's legal worker is 'Commissioner' which allows him to swear affidavits, and conduct oaths. The company also employs a Deputy Commissioner with similar responsibilities.⁴⁸ This official standing is used to offset Intelligarde's consistent legal expenses. Intelligarde's commissioner can appear for pre-trial motions, set dates, and interview witnesses. This capability helps offset the legal fees and ensures that the company is represented during what are perceived to be vindictive and unsubstantiated proceedings:

There have been six cases against us on private counter-charges and we usually present medical records showing our guys were attacked. Many days they'll wait for the last day of the sixth month to lay a private information. Twice they waited until the last day... During the OCAP scandal, I appeared for the guys involved. They have already brought a total of five charges against us but the police hate them even more than they hate us. (Intelligarde paralegal)

Given the complicated and laborious process of proceeding with an eviction, it is little wonder that the Law Enforcement Company has elected to employ internal counsel for their clients. The first step in the process involves the issuance of a notice of termination which requires that a reason be stipulated for eviction. This may include rent in arrears, breach of obligation, illegal parties in the apartment, illegal activities on the property, general breaches of the *Landlord Tenant Act* or contractual violations. If, for

⁴⁸ According to the respondent there are approximately 1,000 Commissioners in the greater Toronto area. A Commissioner is usually represented by a law firm and is sworn in by the Lieutenant Governor.

example, a tenant has committed a criminal act, as is so often the case in Intelligarde sponsored proceedings, then he or she must be given 20 days to vacate the premises. Typically, however, the tenant receives an additional 40 days by the courts.

When the tenant does not leave, a Notice of Application and an Affidavit of Service is filed with the landlord-tenant court specifying the reasons why the tenant should be removed. A pre-trial date is set three weeks to a month after the submission of the Notice. If the tenant does not appear for the pre-trial hearing a default judgement is entered, but if the tenant appears, then the case must be referred to a judge since the registrar does not have judicial authority. This first default judgement can later be turned aside because it has not been issued by a judge. A trial date is thus set a few weeks from the date of the appearance before the registrar. If the tenant appears for the trial, then the judicial process is underway. If the tenant does not appear then another default judgement is filed that cannot be turned aside. The judgement is received two weeks later by the landlord (or her agents) who then serves the tenant and waits another eight days.

After this period, the landlord must go to the original court and file a Right of Possession, a Requisition to the Sheriff, an information sheet pertaining to the unit (needed by the police), and an Affidavit of Service indicating when the judgement was served with the court clerk. Finally, an information sheet is presented to the landlord three weeks later and the Sheriff can take action. Even at this stage, the papers may be questioned if they contain a registrar's affidavit and not a judge's. An *ex parte* hearing may be called so that evidence and updated information can be filed in support of the affidavit.

Sometimes the combined eviction proceedings can take up to six months. In the environment of parapolicing, the municipal police and paralegals are thus bypassed to facilitate expediency for the consumer. In effect, Intelligarde supplies a vertically integrated and operationally autonomous justice system for their clients – a commodified system of policing that seeks to satiate a risk market.

Public vs. Private Law Enforcement: A Statistical Comparison

Up until now I have presented the reader with an inventory of arguments and examples, both conceptual and practical, that support an assertion of symmetry between public and private *para*-policing functions and operational philosophies. It does no good, however, to simply employ the rhetorics of parapolicing – be they corporate, communitarian,⁴⁹ or even militaristic – as unassailable evidence of the congruency of private and public law enforcement. I have argued the limitations of such approaches throughout this dissertation. In this section, therefore, I intend to provide a statistical comparison of the mobilisations of Intelligarde International and the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service as an initial indication of the ‘reality’ of similarities between both policing organisations. Of course, in the section to follow and throughout the chapters ensuing, ethnographic data will further support these opening observations.

The data presented in Table 3.1 are derived from numerous sources. All of the Metropolitan Toronto Police figures are taken from the *1995 Annual Report*

⁴⁹ Shearing (1997) contends that the origins of the new community policing rhetorics may, in fact, be located within the growth of private security – challenging contemporary policing arrangements. For a comprehensive review of community based policing evaluations, see Rigakos(1997a).

(Metropolitan Toronto Police Service 1995a).⁵⁰ Intelligarde data is based upon occurrence reports files, alarm response frequencies, banning data, personnel files and interviews with management. It can hardly be ignored that the public police and the parapolice do not engage in identical mobilisations. First, the parapolice cannot issue moving traffic violations or any provincial offences tickets. Second, they do not engage in homicide investigations and other major crime analysis. But, of course, *most* police officers also do *not* engage in either of these two functions. Most traffic and criminal investigations work has been hived off into specialised units. The overall data, however, should not 'isolate away' these operational differences. An Intelligarde officer is exponentially more likely to make a 'drug' arrest than a member of a rural Ontario police service, does this mean that comparisons are unfair? Of course not. The data simply reflect an anticipated outcome based upon, in this case, the environment being policed. The data are artefacts of different police mobilisations. This only serves to support the assertion that the parapolice engage in as much (or in this case more) crime control than many public police. In short, the data in its aggregate form is a more or less sound approximation of the daily routines of both policing services.

The data presented in Table 3.1 concerns three important policing elements: (1) *business* or the rate of mobilisation; (2) the chance of being disciplined, fired, or having legal processes initiated against public or parapolice officers; and (3) the likelihood of being injured in the line of duty. These categories, in various forms of analysis, represent

⁵⁰ The 1996 *Annual Report* does not contain the same level statistical exposition provided in the previous year. I could not obtain the same tables presented in the 1995 Statistics Companion to the Annual Report from MTP Corporate Communications. In any case, a 7.2% drop in *Criminal Code* offences from 1995 to 1996 in Toronto means that 1995 statistics for MTP (Metropolitan Toronto Police Service 1996:28) may be

the three ingredients central to the police occupational culture identified by many police sociologists. Manning (1997) views the symbolic nature of danger and sacrifice as central to the 'drama' of doing police work. The police in isolation (as unsung heroes) are typified in Manning's treatment of the police funeral. Others have looked directly at the 'reproducing' nature of police mobilisations (Ericson 1982) or have specifically identified important components of police subculture: danger, authority, and the need to look busy (Skolnick 1966). The available sources of information permit comparisons across the following operationalised items: (1) OMPR: the Organisational Mobilisation and Processing Ratio; (2) PAUR: Proceedings Against Uniform Officers Ratio; and (3) Dangerous Incident Rate per Uniform Officer.

Each of the three items of comparison needs careful explanation before proceeding with the findings. First, the OMPR is a measure of the amount of official paperwork filed about or against citizens being policed, divided by the number of uniform officers in the organisation. In many ways, the OMPR reflects how busy (officially) the average officer is in a calendar year. Of course, the OMPR must be collected differently for both organisations because of their variable modes of reporting. Throughout the process of calculation, however, the epistemic relationship between nominal ('being busy') and the operational definitions (OMPR) must be maintained (Palys 1992:403). The OMPR for the Toronto Police was calculated by adding all *Criminal Code* charges (n=54,715) with drug charges (n=6,438) (*Food and Drug Act*, *Narcotic Control Act*), other federal statute charges (n=1,162), *Liquor Licence Act* charges (n=2,477), other provincial charges (n=9,823), and municipal by-law charges

comparatively inflated in Table 3.1 – making the resultant similarities with Intelligarde even more

(n=2,429) in 1995. This sum ($\Sigma=77,044$) was then divided by the number of uniform police officers (n=5,059). The OMPR for Intelligarde was a little more difficult to calculate. The total number of occurrence reports filed (n=1,703) was added to the number of total bannings (n=2,617), but not before the occurrence total had been reduced by 30.6%: 13.5% for the number of NPEs issued + 17.1% for the number of outcomes indicating arrest and banning. This eliminates overlap with the bannings database and reduces the number of occurrences to 1,180. This new sum ($\Sigma=3,797$) of bannings and occurrences was then divided by the number of Intelligarde uniform staff (n=141).

The PAUR item is an indication of the average uniform officer's chances of having proceedings launched against him/her. This operational term attempts to measure the actual risk of internal reprimand as an indicator of often noted 'siege-mentality' subcultural police mores. Similarly, this measure also alludes to use of force and public hostility against the police. The PAUR for the Toronto Police was calculated by adding the number of cases where formal proceedings were launched against uniform officers through either the Chief's discretion which can include criminal charges (n=3), disciplinary charges (n=3), and third party counsel or caution (n=6) or proceedings launched by Complaints Bureau dispositions resulting in some resolution other than withdrawal (n=106). This sum ($\Sigma=115$) was divided by the number of uniform officers (n=5,059) and multiplied by 100 to reflect each police officer's percentage chance of ever suffering reprimand, caution, or even criminal charges. Such structured forms of accountability are not in place for security guards in Ontario. There are, however, a number of other specialised and non-specialised forms of accountability. The OPP

remarkable.

Registrar is an obvious body of oversight but actions are typically taken against firms and not individual security officers. On the other hand, security companies do not have immunity from litigation, both criminal and civil. This often results in civil suits against firms or the laying of 'private informations' against individual security guards. As far as the parapolice of Intelligarde are concerned, this is an all too frequent occurrence. As an indication of PAUR for Intelligarde, therefore, I added the number of criminal legal challenges⁵¹ against the firm in the last fifteen years (n=55) divided by 15 to arrive at a yearly average indicator of official sanctions beginning in the public courts. This number was added with the number of internally initiated dismissals in the last year (n=6)⁵² and then rounded off and divided by the number of uniform staff (n=141) multiplied by 100.

Risk and policing are believed to go hand in hand in the 'police myth' (Manning 1997:45) of immanent danger. The DIRU measure seeks to quantify an officer's percentage chance of being assaulted, attacked and/or injured per response. For the Metropolitan Toronto Police this was calculated by dividing the number of offences against police officers (n=1,083) by the number of dispatched calls (n=715,768) – this quotient was multiplied by 100. Ascertaining the DIRU for Intelligarde required some creativity since the number of injuries to officers is not systematically recorded. The percentage of injuries to security officers gleaned from a systematic random sample of occurrence reports (2.4%) was multiplied by the total number of occurrence files (n=1,703). This was added to the number of assaults against security officers listed in the bannings database (n=12) and divided by the total number of dispatched calls (n=2,628

⁵¹ All of which began with private informations.

⁵² The rationale for these dismissals included unauthorised use of computer equipment, sleeping on the job, and warning other officers that a supervisor was in the area.

alarms⁵³ + 1,703 occurrences + 2,617 bannings = 6,948). The sum of assaults against officers ($\Sigma=52$) was then divided by the total number of dispatched calls and multiplied by 100. The number derived from these calculations estimates the percentage chance an officer will be attacked or assaulted when responding to a call, whether dispatched from headquarters or addressing an occurrence that arises while on patrol.

Table 3.1: Public versus Private Police Organisational Mobilisation Characteristics

COMPARATIVE CALCULATION	MTP †	INTELLIGARDE ‡
Organisational Mobilisation and Processing Ratio (OMPR)	15.23	26.93
Proceedings Against Uniform Officers Ratio (PAUR)	2.27	6.86
Dangerous Incident Rate per Uniform Officer (DIRU)	.151	.748

†Based on Metropolitan Toronto Police Service Annual Report (1995) statistics.

‡Based on occurrence report files, alarm response frequencies, banning database, and personnel files.

The final calculations presented in Table 3.1 yield some surprising conclusions. First, the OMPR score for Intelligarde is much higher than that of the Toronto Police. This seems to suggest that Intelligarde officers are more active in processing individuals and filing information about those contacts. There are a number of caveats, however that should be added to this finding. Police officers may spend a greater amount of time in the actual act of filing paperwork. Ericson (1997) reports that large amounts of shiftwork

⁵³ This is an estimate based upon the 4,560 alarm responses in the alarm database. 'System crashes' resulted in five months of missing or partial information so that only 21 months of data were deemed reliable. At 7.2 dispatches per night, interpolations suggest Intelligarde dispatches approximately 2,628 alarm responses per year. According to one communications officer, however, this figure may be a conservative calculation. The respondent noted: "on a Monday we may have five but on a Saturday we

are spent by officers completing mountains of redundant paperwork on behalf of a number of outside agencies. This may actually help explain why many less serious charges are not processed – the police choose to handle them informally. The relatively simple reporting formats of the parapolice may not require such an investment in time. Nonetheless, the *opportunity* to be busy must be exponentially higher for the public police since the calculations presented in Table 3.1 also include traffic violations, and the enforcement of various provincial statutes not within the realm of the parapolice. To extend the argument even further, some percentage of official Metro Police charges must reflect cases brought to their attention by arrests made by Intelligarde. All these factors notwithstanding, the high OMPR figure for Intelligarde International is demonstrative of that organisations' impressive social control function.

Interestingly, the public police and Intelligarde officers are equally likely to have to defend themselves from formal legal proceedings launched by outsiders in answer to their conduct while on the job. When one adds informal and internal dismissals carried out by Intelligarde management, however, the parapolice are three times more likely to suffer from proceedings being launched against them. This lends credence to the notion that as parapolicing organisations take on more and more responsibility for raiding crack houses, arresting drug sellers and users, and clearing neighbourhoods, they will encounter the same civic resistance as the public police. In many ways, criticisms of 'gestapo tactics,' racism, and beating down the poor have actually helped legitimise Intelligarde as a bona fide police agency, with all the troubles and resistance that role entails.

may have up to twenty." The other problem with such an estimate is that Intelligarde alarm response business has reportedly grown in the last year.

Without doubt, the most striking finding in comparing Intelligarde to the public police is the gross difference in the DIRU. Intelligarde officers are five times more likely to be attacked in the course of their duties than a Metropolitan Toronto Police officer. This has important repercussions for understanding the role of policing – especially the comparative ‘airs of authority’ these two organisations carry. A lack of legal standing may impinge on private security officers’ ability to cope with non-compliant detainees and angry observers. Perhaps most importantly, this last finding meshes perfectly with the perceptions of Intelligarde officers who are in constant fear of being outnumbered in a surprise assault:

Afraid? Well, I guess if I had to say, I'd say the worst thing I worry about is being outnumbered. Have you talked to H? He'll tell you man, these fuckers can jump out of nowhere. I know that I can handle one guy or maybe two. If I'm in charge I can talk them down... but sometimes, I guess, yeah, the worst thing is being swarmed. (Static security officer – Male)

I fear lack of back-up. That the guys won't get there in time and I'll be dead. You know, I often wonder what would happen if one of us died, you know. The cops get this big funeral procession and stuff. I wonder what R would give us? [Laughter] But I mean, it's not an unjustified fear – I wouldn't call it fear, it's more like caution – that you might get jumped. It depends on the security officer, I have good relations with everybody... but then you never know. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Oh that's easy. Up in this area we've had problems. Not to long ago a guy got swarmed and some of them had weapons... so that's what everyone around here is worried about. There are five guys here today but what about next month when you're up here alone? That's why you need a good dog. (Static site officer – Male)

It is little wonder that ‘getting back-up’ is such a crucial occupational code for Intelligarde officers. The metal of most rookies is tested by their willingness to handle situations without having to continuously call for assistance – this also applies to their ability to bend rules and get to a scene quickly when requested. This contributes to what I will later analyse as a ‘swarm or be swarmed’ occupational ethic.

So, besides arguments about muddled oversight, sponsorship, operational logics, and actual tasks, there is now strong statistical foundation to argue that the parapolice in function and in mobilisation, closely mirror the public police. In fact, there are grounds

to argue that parapolicing is just as relevant to crime prevention as public policing – transcending previous perceptions of the security sector as responsible solely for loss prevention. Indeed, the preceding analysis indicates that the job of being an Intelligarde officer means that you are just as likely to suffer the consequences of legal proceedings launched against you as a police officer and are five times as likely to be assaulted in the course of duty. In philosophy and practice, Intelligarde International is a police force. Beyond even the statistics, however, there is no better way than an actual ‘trip through the sewer’ to illustrate this point.

A ‘Trip through the Sewer’

At around 1:30 am on a Wednesday night, I am driven to an Intelligarde site near the intersection of Dundas and Sherbourne in the downtown Toronto area. As we turn up the driveway leading to the front of the residential building, the mobile officer escorting me points to a dark stocky figure emerging from the lobby and smiles “there he is.” After being greeted at the door, we complete the obligatory introductions and the two co-workers begin to confer about company gossip. I have by now grown accustomed to these discussions and decide not to take notes: who is up for what stage of which police recruiting process? What is the last major incident involving violence? And who has been assigned to what duty? I begin my patrol with P, the officer on duty at this site, and we make arrangements to meet up with C when he returns from another ‘hit.’

P: So what are you doing exactly?

Me: I’m studying private policing.

P: For what?

Me: It’s for my degree. I’m studying what you guys do and how everything operates. You know, how you do your jobs and such.

P: And so... what do you think?

Me: Well I don't know yet, otherwise I wouldn't need to be here, right?

P: OK, well let me show you around a bit.

We are passing through poorly lit walkways outside the building, amongst garbage bins and debris strewn across the pathways. P's flashlight points to another crack can.⁵⁴ I know how to recognise them by now. We talk briefly about double-spent matches,⁵⁵ and the circus of 'welfare night:'

P: You should come back when they get their welfare cheques. This whole back area is covered with people lying around as high as a kite.

Me: When is that?

P: I think the end of the month is this Friday. You should come on the weekend. (Smiles) Man, if you want to see what we do come back then.

Me: Where are we going now?

P: I've gotta check on things in this building... You see those houses over there. We take care of all of them. You know, they now I'm coming but I don't bust them in exchange for information sometimes.

Me: What kind of information?

P: Anything. Who's coming, who's going, what they're selling.

Me: Shouldn't the cops be doing that?

P: They've got no time or they don't care. I know everybody here, and if I don't know them I ask questions. I get to know everybody. There isn't a cop in this city who knows more about who's dealing down here than I do. It's not bragging or anything, it's just the way it is.

We continue walking through a back alley and into the brightness of street lights. Only ten yards from the direction we came is another world inhabited by 'crack heads' and dealers and policed by Intelligarde. We continue to another building with external

⁵⁴ A used soda pop can is intentionally dented on the end opposite to the drinking hole so that the user can rest a crack rock on it for cooking. The indented area is punctured to allow the fumes to be sucked through the can and out the spout for inhaling.

⁵⁵ Double-spent matches mean two matches torn from a match casing and burnt simultaneously. This is apparently the optimum heat necessary to liquify and make gaseous the methamphetamine 'rock' for inhaling.

balconies and a paved courtyard. The building is not a hospitable place. It is much too dark and litter is scattered about the property. Graffiti is sprayed on most of the walls. I know I would not feel comfortable here alone.

P: On my third night at this site I had a B and E. Right there (pointing) on the third floor.

Me: What happened?

P: I saw him breaking in, I jumped into the hallway and pursued him. I called for back-up and three guys were coming. He came down here and they got him just outside the property and down the alleyway.

Me: How long did it take them to get here?

P: Oh, seconds. We've got about four guys in the area at any given time, not to mention mobile and PAT,⁵⁶ they like to hang around here too.

As we pass by a tattered and unlit 'neighbourhood watch' sign I begin to chuckle. I cannot believe anything resembling a 'neighbourhood' or community could be said to exist here. I consult my meagre mental library on failed police attempts to construct artificial neighbourhoods and the 'lip service' given to community rhetorics. I shake my head and continue chortling as the sign vanishes in the darkness behind us.

P: What are you laughing at? Are you laughing at the sign?

Me: Yeah, actually. Is there actually anything like a community here? Do people really care?

P: You know something? When I found that guy breaking in, I found him because all these people were hanging off their balconies pointing at the guy. They were screaming. And when I lost him, they pointed him out again so that I could tell back-up where he was going.

Me: You're kidding me.

P: Nope.

Me: But you said these people are all drugged up. You made it sound like that's all they do.

P: I meant it. I wouldn't go ten feet near some of these people if I didn't have to. I swear to you they can't even get up enough energy to walk their fucking dogs. You knock on their door and a wave of this smell of dog shit hits you. Most of them are doped up, alcoholics, or just MI.⁵⁷ They won't even open the fucking door. Animal control comes down here to take the dog and they can't get

⁵⁶ Parking Authority of Toronto car. An Intelligarde security vehicle exclusively devoted to patrolling Toronto's public parking lots. It is equipped with an on-board camera.

⁵⁷ Mentally ill.

in. But you can smell the shit in the hallway. So then we have to take matters further through eviction...

Me: So they helped you get the guy?

P: I didn't believe it myself. But here are all these losers, guys we've busted before screaming directions at me. It's almost as if you can do all the dope you want, and sell all the dope you want but just don't rip anybody off... (Laughter).

By now we have left the building and are crossing back towards the site I was originally dropped off at. P stops at another rooming house along the way. He asks a tenant an assortment of questions through a door he only barely opens. The tired older white man looks intoxicated. There is an odour.

P: Well.

Me: Well, what?

P: Didn't you fucking smell that!?

Me: Oh, yeah it smelled like a toilet.

P: You mean shit. Are you not supposed to say that on tape? I just wanted to make sure you didn't think I was pulling your chain.

Me: How do you work in conditions like these?

P: Actually, this isn't so bad. This is a tolerable risk factor but there's action. You can make this place as busy or as slow as you want. There's always going to be somebody doing something. If you don't do anything about it, no one's going to get hurt. Up at Kipling and Steeles it's different. If they say they're going to shoot you they probably will. You have to take that sort of thing seriously. At least once per rotation we're threatened. You gotta make sure everybody knows about the threat and who made it.

Much like the public police, therefore, Intelligarde officers are able to 'make crime' in an environment of 'dependent uncertainty and boredom' (Ericson 1982:61-72). They sit on a veritable goldmine of potential arrests that can be harvested on a whim – to 'look busy,' to 'pump the stats' or to alleviate boredom and create excitement. This dynamic will obviously vary from site to site. Young gang members in western North York may be less willing to tolerate arbitrary arrests than older drug-dependent tenants in downtown Toronto.

P decides to detour through one of the building's hallways. I notice a number of deister⁵⁸ strips on the walls and door jambs and ask him why he is not striking them. He has already completed his patrol. This walk-about is purely for my benefit. As we pass through the second floor hallway, P stops outside one of the doorways.

P: Do you hear that?

Me: Yeah, what are you going to do?

He does not answer but knocks repeatedly on the door. The music remains on and the volume constant. P makes a fist and bangs on the door, "security!" Finally, a lean, tall, young, shirtless black man answers the door. His eyes are glassy and bloodshot and he is angered by our presence. He looks either drunk or high.

Man: Too loud? (Mumbling)

P: Yeah, it's way past 11:00. can you turn it down a bit?

Man: I respect what you gotta do. I do.

P: If you can just turn it down.

The man goes back into his room and turns down the music. We walk away, but P stops us only a few paces later. "Wait a second," he says. It sounds as if the man has now turned the volume back up again and P shakes his head in disappointment. He asks me to confirm that the music volume did go back up again. I tell him that I think it did and I quickly regret my honesty as P marches back toward the door. I cringe as P begins knocking again.

Man: Still too loud? I need to unwind man. It's been a long day.

P: Yeah, but there are other people trying to sleep.

Man: Want me to turn it down?

⁵⁸ An electronic patrol checkpoint. More on this in chapter 4.

The man stands at the doorway and sucks his teeth. He sways from side to side in an intimidating manner, dropping one shoulder and then the next as he moves toward P. He is not going to go back into his room. He walks out into the hallway and toward me. I fear he has mistaken me for a security agent.

Man: You want me to turn it down?

Me: (Looking over at P) Yes, please.

Man: Wait right here.

As the young man goes back into his apartment, I begin imagining every possible ensuing horror. I see my own demise. I envision him spinning out of the doorway with a machine gun, or an axe, or a knife, or a bat. I have watched far too many television crime dramas. My heart is pounding until I finally hear the music go down.

P: Thank-you.

Me: Yes, thank-you very much sir.

Man: I respect you. You got a job to do. (Shakes my hand)

As we walk toward the meeting place, I know I could never do this for a living. Just when I think my heart rate is back to normal, P stops outside a doorway to an apartment with the hinges removed. There are signs of forced entry as the screws look as if they have been ripped from the frame. The door is resting on the jamb. P begins to knock and a crackled female voice is heard in response.

P: Hello? Are you alright? Miss?

Woman: Oooh.

P: (To me) I know this woman, she's a prostitute.

P: Are you O.K.?

Woman: (Moaning).

P: Can I come in? Are you alright?

Woman: Oh, just fuck off! I'm trying to get some fucking sleep.

P: What happened to the door ma'am?

Woman: I dunno.

P: Do you know it's broken?

Woman: Fuck off!

P: (Under his breath) Fine, fuck you. (To me) I'll fill out a report on the door.

P makes notations in his booklet and we move across well-lit city streets and back to the original site. In the lobby of the building we are met by M. A check by radio confirms C is on his way. Some more gossip ensues. I am surprised that P reports none of our adventures to M while we are waiting, but I soon realise that nothing has actually happened. I begin to appreciate the routine terror that policing alone, without a dog, and without a gun might bring in this environment, and how important meetings with fellow security officers become. But these are my interpretations and I want to test them with P, M and C. I want to ask them how they feel about each other, the fear involved in their work, and their reliance they have on one another. I look forward to interviewing them independently in the next few weeks. C arrives.

C: Let's do it.

M: Are you ready for a trip through the sewer?

Me: What do you mean.

P: It's the underground parking area. We've got squatters. When was...?

M: It's about one week ago. We had people living down there. In the back entrance, actually. They live in the abandoned cars on the very bottom level.

Me: Are they still there?

C: Are they?

M: No. I don't think so... Did you hear what happened?

C: With the rocks?

P: Tell George.

M: They threw rocks at us.

Me: Rocks?

M: Yeah, they brought rocks with them and started throwing at the s/o. (Laughter)

As we descend toward the lower levels it gets more difficult to breathe. The air is stagnant and filled with dust. There is dust everywhere. It cakes the concrete stairwells, the handrails, and turns everything to grey. It is also very dark. All of the light bulbs have been broken and there is nothing but a couple of flashlights to lead our way. M kicks open a sheet metal door and rummages through storage lockers. He finds some blankets and a burnt mattress. The security officers are all familiar with the mattress. We enter the parking level. It is so dark I cannot see my own hand in front of my face. As the flashlights are turned toward abandoned cars, eerie shadows are cast, providing the illusion of movement. The cars are missing tires, have broken windows, missing doors and buried in close to a quarter-inch of grey dust.

Me: I can't believe this is Toronto.

M: Pretty bad, huh?

I am reflexive at this point about what we are doing. My sociological training tells me I am excited and apprehensive because I have vilified the squatters based upon stories and unflattering narratives.⁵⁹ We eventually find an abandoned car with the dust wiped from the rear window. It is in the very far corner of the parking level, in complete darkness. M approaches the car and shines his flashlight into the passenger-side window. There is broken glass at his feet and garbage about the car. The security officers believe

someone was recently using it as a home. M finds something. It is a pair of boots and a paper bag with a few tins of preserved food.

Me: What are you going to do now? (With much apprehension)

M: Nothing. I'm not going to take the guy's food if that's what you're worried about. If I see him here, I'll remove him. But I don't need any SPAM, do you?

This chapter introduced the parapolice function as a crime control model and problematized popular assumptions about the role of the public and private police. By reviewing the multiple and overlapping characteristics of the public and private police, a clearer appreciation for the modern organisation of commodified policing in risk markets emerges. In addition, an examination of security officers' powers of arrest and the role of Intelligarde in exacting private justice, further reveals the organisation's law enforcement focus. A statistical comparison of the mobilisations of the Metro Toronto Police and Intelligarde International, as well as an ethnographic account of parapolicing, elicits findings that provide evidence of the commodified nature of law enforcement and the interchangeable logics of the public and private police. In the following chapter, I examine the recruitment, employment, and training practices of The Law Enforcement Company as a precursor to a discussion of the politics of private crime control in risk markets.

⁵⁹ This may be what police officers do when they commiserate with their colleagues and reconstruct ungrateful battered women into 'symbolic complainants' (Rigakos 1995). My position (or 'indexicality') governs my perceptions and I wonder how terrified I would be if I was a sleeping homeless man and a group of uniformed men broke through the darkness, silhouetted only by their scanning flashlights. I remember that "objects exist only in relation to the interpretative meaning they have for the people who behold them" (Pfohl 1985:294, referring to the work of ethnomethodologists).

Chapter Four: Inside a Law Enforcement Co.

Intelligarde's advertising circular begins with a prosaic declaration of our times:

"Demand for policing is up. Police resources are down." At the very outset, The Law Enforcement Company positions itself as an answer to citizen fears and shrinking state security budgets:

Every day our news media is full of reports of break-ins, vehicle theft, vandalism, fraud – the list goes on. More recently, crimes like carjackings and home invasions are becoming commonplace. Disorderly conduct and the drug culture threatens most neighbourhoods, in cities and towns alike.

At the same time, budgets for police services are being drastically reduced. Responsibility for protection is being downloaded onto municipalities. The number of police officers available to answer calls for help is being cut.

Result? An increasingly concerned and frustrated public is turning to private companies for the security services they so desperately need. Municipalities, business and property owners, institutions, corporations, and individuals are looking for reliable, affordable policing that can be tailored to suit their special requirements.

This is where Intelligarde comes in. (Intelligarde nd)

Founded in 1982, the firm has steadily grown from an initial fleet of four cars and a dozen security officers to 20 cars and 150 staff. Intelligarde sells itself as an alternative to complete reliance on the public police. The circular promotes Intelligarde security personnel as top calibre, well trained, and highly skilled. Intelligarde considers its market advantage to be staff 'empowerment' – in this context meaning that "their up-to-date knowledge of the law and their high standard of training...[prepares them to] take charge of the most challenging situations...and make arrests when necessary."

If we are to understand this competitive 'advantage,' therefore, we must assess the product being sold (the security officer) and the production process itself (training). For

all intents and purposes, this chapter will reveal the procedures and techniques for recruitment, pre-employment testing, training, and initial deployment utilised by Intelligarde. More importantly, however, it will demonstrate how these templates are borne out in practice and how they are received by new employees. I offer observational data from the actual training sessions – I went through the process of selection and indoctrination as an observer-participant.⁶⁰ Although I did not engage in all of the training exercises, I managed to record instruction sessions throughout testing and training. Later in this chapter I take up the politically heated issues of race, class, and gender in the doing of parapolicing.

Recruitment

Prospective Intelligarde employees are drawn to the company by myriad means. One of the most common recruitment technique is actually the least expensive. Often, interested applicants learn about Intelligarde by simply spotting company vehicles about the city. This indicates that the mere aesthetic of an Intelligarde officer or vehicle is an attraction to particular applicants.

We get quite a few that way. They see the car. They like the car. They're like roving advertisements for people interested in law enforcement. (Intelligarde manager)

Uhm, I saw a car drive by once and I called the number. I was already working with another security company and I wanted to get involved with a company that wasn't mickey mouse. So I checked them out and liked what I saw and here I am. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Another recruitment tool is 'word of mouth' or personal contacts with current Intelligarde security officers. One mobile security officer reported that he was

⁶⁰ I was introduced to the incoming class by the trainer on the first day. It was easy to ask questions of the recruits because they were the ones who actually initiated contact – asking me about my purpose and perceptions of the company. They were as eager to know about Intelligarde as I was to know about them.

responsible for recruiting five friends away from other security companies. Movement between security firms is quite common in the industry. Erickson (1993:24, see Table 7) reports that 51% of licensed security guards in Toronto have worked for at least two companies within the last five years of their careers. In the case of Intelligarde, 60% of all uniform staff (for whom such information existed in the personnel files, n=112)⁶¹ had been previously employed in the security industry before coming to the company:

I heard about Intelligarde from a friend. He told me about the company and I thought I'd check it out. (Mobile security officer – Female)

Me and my buddies came over from Intertech. We all decided to give it a try. This is nothing like any other security company and I've worked for four different companies. (Static site officer – Male)

The most common way to attract applicants is by placing an advertisement in the local papers. In Intelligarde's latest effort to fill employee shortages, this has been the option of choice.

I don't know why but the calibre and even the quantity of available labour in the Toronto area is shrinking. I've been trying to get us to expand our search outside the GTA. (Intelligarde manager)

I came here through an ad in the paper. I needed a job... Actually, my background is in the military. (Static site officer – Male)

There have also been more creative measures employed. Some senior Intelligarde security officers responsible for staffing visit community colleges that offer programs in law and security or law enforcement to cultivate interest. The differences in quality between programs, however, is said to be significant, and Intelligarde staff have been more selective about the colleges they are willing to visit.

Erickson (1993:27, Table 9) finds that 80% of security guards in the Toronto area have been recruited through either newspaper advertisements or personal contacts.

My presence may have further legitimised Intelligarde's parapolicing program in the eyes of the recruits. It is not often that security companies are studied by a university researchers.

Similarly, the majority of officers I interviewed (n=40) have migrated to Intelligarde by hearing about the company's reputation. Often, this is facilitated by friends who have moved to the firm or by media coverage of Intelligarde's operations. During the writing of this dissertation, a national CBC special on private policing which focused on Intelligarde resulted in a spurt of new applicants. Intelligarde's most recent applicants, however, are being culled from a shrinking labour market – newspaper advertisements are becoming crucial to recruiting.

Pre-employment Testing

Any person interested in becoming a security officer at Intelligarde International must fill out an application. If the paperwork looks attractive to human resources, the applicant is called in for an interview. Often, the interviews take place at the time of application. Soon thereafter, the applicant is tasked to a training officer, signs a waiver and embarks on a mandatory ride-along before proceeding with the hiring process. The purpose of the ride-along is two-fold. First, it allows the training officer to assess the applicant in an actual job setting. Second, it allows applicants an opportunity to witness, first hand, the job environment they will be thrust into. This stage is where most applicants decide not to continue with the process. The training officer always informs prospective employees that they will be returned to headquarters at any time if they feel this is not a job they wish to pursue.

I accompanied one prospective Intelligarde employee on such a ride-along. The training officer begins the session by verifying that the waiver has been signed and that

⁶¹ The number of cases in the personnel files for which information about previous employment is available.

the applicant is aware of the evening's purpose. He tells the interested applicant that while he will be evaluating her, she is also to decide whether she wants to continue with the training and hiring process herself. It would appear that the major task of the training officer is to expose applicants to the gritty components of parapolicing, and to dissuade them if they are skittish about doing such work.

An additional component of the ride-along is to assess the applicant's ability to write reports, hit deisters, and take notes. The ability to produce information is crucial to security work. The applicant is told that her ability to write quickly and take notes will be assessed. The notes themselves must be recorded in a specific format identical to police note-taking procedure. There is also a great emphasis on a narrative reporting style. This differs significantly from much of the report writing done by public police officers who are typically asked to fill out forms replete with check-boxes. These mobile inspection reports are left on site for the landowner's perusal. No matter how efficient a security officer's ability to patrol, handle crises, and make arrests, this will be all for not if her actions cannot be justified in a courtroom or successfully sold on the market.

Representation, therefore, is of paramount importance to parapolicing. Applicants are thus evaluated on their ability to generate a product that will be satisfactory to the client.

You've got to make nothing into something. Even though nothing happens on your patrol when you hit a site, you have to fill up the page. Writing 'nothing to report' is unacceptable. Something did happen. You must have seen something irregular. If not, then write where you went and what you did. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Training

As I enter the briefing room at Intelligarde headquarters, I notice five young white men and one woman already seated. Most of the men have shortly cropped hair. They are evenly spaced throughout the room but no one sits at the front table. I catch a few of

them looking at me curiously as I take up a chair off to the side. I detect considerable tension. There is complete silence as they await their instructor. Through an office adjacent to the briefing room, one can see at least three hopefuls filling out applications. The applicants look in at the trainees as they continue about their business of completing the paperwork handed to them by a communications officer. I take out my tape-recorder and place it on a filing cabinet beside me. No one is talking. My note-taking is putting everyone on edge. I surmise that they must think I am evaluating them, so I stop writing. Finally, two of the young men in the back row begin to chatter about the expected length of the course today. By now it is past nine a.m. and we are becoming restless.

An Intelligarde manager arrives by car. A few of the applicants look over. The briefing room is walled by large windows facing the lot and car bays so that the comings and goings of staff can easily be monitored by the recruits. I suppose they are wondering who their instructor will be. A strong, stocky figure marches into the room. He is wearing a black Intelligarde uniform with utility belt, handcuff pouch, holster and 9 mm. handgun. He is animated when he speaks:

D: So, I guess you got approved (Smiles and shakes my hand).

Me: Yep.

D: You should have gone out and got drunk!

The rest of the group eyes me suspiciously.

D: I was talking to a nice old lady the other day and she was complementing us on our appearance. She asked "is that a real bullet proof vest?" I said "yes ma'am it is." And then she says, "it doesn't stick out like it does for the police." (He laughs)

Me: (I smile while taking these notes)

D: We drink but we don't get fat.

The recruits are smiling in the background. I know that D is using me as a foil while cleverly indoctrinating the group on the differences between the police and Intelligarde:

they are old and fat, we are young and vital. I do not like being used but D has immediately set the tone. He continues:

D: I don't know what kind of a group we've got here, they laugh like girls. (Smiling)

Me: (I smile)

D: We've got to look tough but we're nice guys.

Another recruit has joined us. There are now six men and one woman. Soon the four men in the back row begin to talk about their previous employment. They discuss security work at a Montreal casino, working for the government, and finally the possibility of doing armed escorts at Maple Leaf Gardens. One of the recruits hopes he will see some hockey games while at Intelligarde. D begins the session and everyone is given a training package. They will continue to be tested throughout the course. The candidates are expected to complete reports while the training session continues. They will hand them back at the end of the day for evaluation.

D asks the candidates how they came to the company. Three of them answer that they responded to a newspaper advertisement. One says he saw the cars and decided to apply. Another cites 'word of mouth' and another says he has a friend at Intelligarde. D takes advantage of this to fill in the candidates about the differences between Intelligarde and the rest of the policing market.

D: We're not just another security company. No other security company compares to Intelligarde. We're not police either and we're not trying to be the police. We are a private law enforcement company. We are ourselves.

D: The cops don't know what community policing is. They will either arrest or not. At Intelligarde we build a history and a case. We know our environment. We interact with the people daily. When a suspect vehicle – a drug car – is around you may be better off doing intelligence. Who is the tenant being visited? Do I know him? Why don't I know him?

By now the recruits are taking notes and listening intently. This is what many of them came here to do – real law enforcement, real police work. Immediately, they have

been equipped with the organisational rhetorics necessary to argue against Intelligarde's detractors. More specifically, they are quickly being told they can do much more than the public police in maintaining social order.

D: An Intelligarde officer can do much more than a cop in stopping a noise complaint. They have to rely on by-laws that are not very strict. You can blast your stereo until 11 o'clock in Toronto. That's just not acceptable. If somebody calls the police for a noise complaint in this city guess what happens? Nothing. They don't show up. And if they do show up they'll take an hour. And when they do show up, they'll ask the tenant to turn it down and when the cops leave it will go right back up again. They have to rely on by-laws. We rely on contract law. They can lose their apartment much quicker if we're called. So, you visit the complainant and make sure he knows you're on his side. You empower him. Then you take care of the problem. And you go back again and again while on patrol.

Talk of private powers captivates the candidates. Many of them are in disbelief about the tremendous powers they can exert on private property. They are told "as long as you can justify it, make the arrest." When D begins his discussion of the *Trespass to Property Act* we all begin to see the extraordinary powers of arrest at the security officer's disposal (see chapter 3). Under section 2(1)(a)(ii) anybody may be arrested for any prohibited activity. D lists all of the possibilities under federal, provincial and municipal laws.

D: We take the *Trespass to Property Act* as seriously as the police take the *Criminal Code*. The *Trespass to Property Act* is your best friend, treat it with respect.

This part of the training elicits numerous questions and 'what if' scenarios. D handles them patiently at first and then halts discussion later. There is much more material to cover.

D outlines the process of arrest and the legal requirements on the security officer. The candidates are told how to escalate detention to arrest. One must always attempt not to arrest if possible because this places legal onuses on the officer and the company. Instead, the recruits are told to detain first, and if the suspect attempts to flee, stand in his way. In this manner, less serious offences can be escalated into assault. He then moves on to discussing "politically correct" terms for report and note-taking. The recruits are to

use words like 'restraints' instead of handcuffs, 'dark complexion' instead of negro, and the list goes on. The race-relations tutorial continues haphazardly:

D: You have to be aware of cultural differences. Sometimes you see garbage in the hallways or you might see garbage piled up in a garbage room right next to the chute. And you asked yourself, "what's the matter with these people, are they fucking pigs?" Well, often they don't know any better. As silly as it may seem, they've never been shown how the garbage chute works. So sometimes you take have to take them by the hand and show them. It's the same with these Sri Lankan women. Their toilet is overflowing and you realise it's because they're trying to flush tampons or diapers down the toilet. They've never seen a toilet before.

D begins to discuss the uniforming requirements in response to a question from the candidates. Everyone wants to know when and where they will get their uniforms. The candidates are upset to hear that the company does not pay for the cost of uniforming but will help finance their purchases – especially bullet-proof vests. Eighty per cent of outfitting expenses can be recovered through the federal government. D notes that Intelligarde has all the necessary paperwork for the application.

D: I'll give you the address and number of a place where you can get your handcuffs – it's where many of the guys go. You have to have your own personally tailored vest and depending on how big you are, you're looking at around four hundred dollars. You will purchase a garrison and utility belt with six cheaters and a six cell mag-lite flashlight. When you buy your handcuff pouch, you must make sure it is one that fully encloses over the handcuffs.

After hours of tutoring on report and notebook writing, time management and company policies, the candidates are all given radios to practise their phonetic alphabets, and radio codes. The briefing room comes alive with chirps and beeps as the students key their cellular radios. I take up a radio myself and soon realise that the buttons and digital window baffle me. Eventually, I begin to understand how the system works and am alarmed by the fact that there is no single communications frequency. Instead, one must key the officer (or district) desired and speak on a private channel. The same process is used to call the dispatchers – which means that only one officer may speak to headquarters at a time. If an officer in distress needs to call for help, however, he may scroll to the 'group call' channel that overrides all other communications. We are told

that this is an expensive option of last resort – costing Intelligarde hundreds of dollars every time it is used. The radio system is a source of much confusion for the recruits and much consternation by seasoned officers. As I am to find out in upcoming interviews, the latter group invariably ridicules the existing communications system (see chapter 6).

One of the last requirements of the day is a trip to the kennels. The candidates are eager to take a look at the dogs as Intelligarde's canine trainer (F) completes his speech. We all walk over to two small structures housing over twenty dogs. The barking is deafening as we press into the small walkways separating the cages. This trip is harrowing for me. The dogs are lunging at us through the wired frames of their stalls. Dog training is an essential component of security provision at Intelligarde International. We are told that a dog is often worth five partners in subduing crowds and keeping a security officer safe. F is a grizzled and experienced veteran of security work. He will be responsible for initial canine training and for subsequent continued education. The candidates ask numerous questions. Each security officer is trained with two dogs. A primary and back-up. And every security officer is responsible for the grooming and maintenance of the animal.

The next day of training consists of self-defence and the tactical use of handcuffs. Everybody but the lone woman applicant is present. She would later resurface as communications officer. The trainees are eager to meet their instructor as his reputation exceeds him. He is a Metropolitan Toronto Police training Sergeant (J), but today he is close to an hour late. While we wait outside an inconspicuous garage, the discussion turns to previous employment. Everyone has stories to tell. Finally, the recruits ask me to call Intelligarde to find out what is keeping J. Nobody else feels comfortable enough

to make the call so I oblige. I return with the news that he is on his way and that we are to wait for him. When J arrives he is wearing athletic wear and carrying an assortment of pads. He apologises for his lateness but was apparently misinformed about the date. He also had to drop his daughter off at school.

We descend into a church basement. There are mats lining the floor and a Portuguese and a Canadian flag on the wall. J begins speaking and everyone strains to hear. There is some construction underway upstairs. A heavy Dutch or German accent augments his instructions:

J: Self-defence training is always ongoing. You should be coming back to keep sharp and continue learning. You must be in shape to be able to capture a suspect. There is always the possibility you could get hurt if you are not in shape. Your partner relies on your assistance. I'm 60 and I still work out and look after myself. It's up to you after this initial law enforcement self-defence.

J has an enraptured audience. This is what most of the recruits have been waiting for – training on how to subdue a suspect, how to make a lawful arrest, how to be and act like a real police officer. J continues his introduction by emphasising that all actions must be justifiable in court.

J: In law enforcement we counter-punch. We do not strike first... Always step back from your opponent. Distance equals safety. You should remain at a 45 degree angle to the person with your hands up. Especially the lead hand... Mobility and stability.

By now everyone is beginning to understand that all actions must be imagined as defensible in a courtroom before a judge or jury. We are to assume that every movement may be used against us at a later date. Thus, J equips us with the vocabulary of law enforcement:

J: You have to speak the legal language of defence. Imagine yourself in a courtroom. We don't kick, we step forward. When he's down, we step forward to relax him... we never say 'I kicked him into submission' (Smiles)...

The recruits laugh. Some of the trainees are having difficulty mastering some of the take-downs demonstrated by J. He is patient and continues with his tutorial on justifiable behaviour.

J: The bad guy can hit you anywhere he pleases but we have restrictions, so aim for the central body mass. No head shots because it makes for lousy pictures. Besides, people can take head shots, and the head is hard to hit. Do not strike for the kidneys, kneecaps, groin, throat, or neck area. Aim for the stomach. You try to wind him with no serious physical effects.

J teaches the trainees how to make a fist and throw a punch. The fist two knuckles are to be used. The recruits begin to experiment with the various techniques, mixing and embellishing them. Their actions become more feverish when the punching pads are introduced. J begins to instruct them on the correct way to deliver a kick. By now the trainees are working up a sweat and most of them are panting. There are melees underway in all parts of the makeshift gymnasium. Now J brings forward boxing gloves. I surmise that hours of sparing must improve confidence. The recruits seem to be enjoying themselves. The trainees are then given instruction on how to search suspects:

J: As a private citizen you cannot search for identification. You are empowered to look for weapons or tools that may aid in his escape... ask for consent. If you find something, play stupid until you receive consent. Now anything you find can be used in evidence. If you find drugs, leave them for the police...

Eventually, J begins to instruct the students on proper handcuffing procedure:

J: Grab for the elbow to control the bad guy. Do not force a reaction. Once he co-operates, reward him with less pain...

The class is told that while this basic handcuffing information is mandatory, subsequent handcuffing techniques at the advanced level are not. All Intelligarde officers, however, are encouraged to enrol for the extra training.

J: The law is your tool – like a mechanic. If you know the law, you can better do your job. If I don't have him under this section, I'll use another one. As a police officer, I'll place a guy under arrest for littering so that I can get his name.

Intelligarde's chief trainer has an arsenal of anecdotes with which to pepper his entranced audience. He cites cases where suspects were charged under obscure sections of the *Environmental Protection Act* for shaking cigarette ashes onto a public sidewalk in order to identify them and begin interrogations. In another case, suspects were arrested on suspicion of picking worms in the park after dark.

When we break for lunch, J tells me that he feels the level of legal training the recruits are receiving is slipping. They have too many questions by the time they come to him for physical training. He tells me that he has a special appreciation for both the public and private side of law enforcement as a police officer and a trainer of security officers. The class retires for lunch at a nearby delicatessen. It is here that we get to know Intelligarde's top instructor. As a former Dutch Marine in Indonesia and an advisor in the French Foreign Legion, J has seen more bloodshed in his lifetime than anyone else I have met. His brother, a member of Hitler's Nazi youth, was allegedly executed by invading American soldiers. Later J would go on to become a prolific soldier. He notes that the Dutch Marines would reward their most effective killers with a free trip to the whorehouse – he was there regularly.

When we return to the gym, J revisits the *Trespass to Property Act*. The class is confused. I decide to return to Intelligarde headquarters and wish the group well. After today, each of the trainees will undergo three nights of site exposure and hours of canine instruction. Some might go directly to mobile patrol but they are to typically begin at static sites. This is because mobile patrol is often considered a prestige appointment by management and is usually reserved for proven security officers or exceptional neophyte applicants.

‘Cherries’

New Intelligarde officers can exert a great deal of stress on existing social networks. Even the term ‘cherry’ has a negative connotation which refers to the unblemished and inexperienced nature of new officers. Of course, it also reflects a masculinist perception of untested employees – that is, they are inherently virginal until they have proven themselves to the rest of their platoon. The rookie security officer presents a number of challenges to the rank-and-file membership because no one is sure of his or her character or readiness for duty. This is magnified if the security officer is assigned to mobile patrol:

The worst thing they can do is when they put someone on mobile who doesn't know what they're doing. We rely on mobile for back-up. In some places there's no one around except the closest car. It's happened before where a car from across the city got to the scene first because the new officer did not know where the site was. That's totally fucking unacceptable. (Static site officer – Male)

There's no point putting someone in mobile who doesn't know where all the sites are. They train them on that but sometimes they get transferred into a new district and then we're in trouble. Everybody has to keep on top of that and help out. (Mobile security officer – Male)

But a fear of whether or not a new security officer will find his way to aid his colleagues only begins to describe the reservations seasoned guards have for cherries.

A more common fear is that new security officers will be overzealous and sabotage years of relations with tenants at a given site:

Up here in the west end things are rough. They can be pretty scary sometimes. We can't have some gung-ho guys trying to kick heads every night. If somebody's doing that my life gets harder. If I have to run to help out some new guy all the time, I'm running into danger. (Static site officer – Male)

When this guy comes around here and thinks he's going to make a name for himself and I'm supposed to cover his fucking ass, that pisses me off. We don't need people like that, and I do what I can to get rid of them quickly. Because if I don't, it could be my life. Many times they see the uniform, they see that I'm alone and I could end up paying for his stupidity. (Static site officer – Male)

Rookie security officers, therefore, may compromise a state of social order that has taken months or even years to manufacture. This makes veteran officers nervous until they are comfortable their new partners understand the threshold of tolerance at a given location.

Quite often, security officers who do not appear to function well at a certain site are transferred to another at the request of senior site training officers. These assessments are purportedly taken seriously by management staff as the potential for violence due to a new security officer's overzealousness is substantial.

A final source of concern lies with rookies who are women. Intelligarde has been receiving more applications from women lately. Many seasoned officers were reluctant to negatively assess the women they work with but their body language and gestures clearly indicated displeasure. Respondents would roll their eyes and say "next question" or would simply offer a "no comment." Some officers were unreserved about their opinions:

What are they good for? I mean, I'm not a sexist or anything but what the hell is a female going to do if I need back-up? What if she's the first one on the scene? It's not like we have guns or anything, so I mean... you tell me, what are they good for? (Static site officer – Male)

Well, thank goodness there's not that many of them. I don't have any personal grudge against women doing police work. It's just that if I need assistance I want a very very big man to help me. (Mobile security officer – Male)

I agree that if I'm in a jam I would also want a guy to back me up. But then again, I don't plan on getting into jams. The guys who end up in brawls are usually the guys looking for it. I don't look for it... Well, then yeah, if you put it that way and I had to choose, I'd say I'd want the police or a bunch of guys to come running, but that's a loaded question. (Mobile security officer – Female)

So long as they do their deisters and don't cry wolf, everybody's happy. I mean, I'm friends with them. I'm just not going to call them, and frankly I don't think they *want* to be called. (Mobile security officer – Male)

These attitudes are not merely reflective of attitudes toward new female officers but general subcultural attitudes toward women in police work. I will have more to say about this later.

Who are the Parapolice?

While Intelligarde officers are trained on powers of arrest, legal note-taking, self-defence, and usually have some college law enforcement training, this does not seem to

reflect the security industry norm. Only between 43% (Shearing, Farnell and Stenning 1980:157) to 53% of security guards (Erickson 1993:30) have undergone any training on the legal powers of arrest for security officers. Similarly, only 58% (Erickson 1993:30) of industry security officers have taken instruction on proper note-taking techniques.

At Intelligarde, self-defence training is a standard one-day course with extensive additional training thereafter, but only 38% (Erickson 1993:18) of security officers in Toronto report ever having received any self-defence instruction. More importantly, only 15% (Erickson 1993:30) of those who have undergone defence training have received their schooling at their present employer. Either a few security companies are offering self-defence training in an industry with a nomadic employee base or many security officers enrol in martial arts training in the own. Surprisingly, an increasing number of security employees are undertaking college education in law enforcement or security. Erickson (1993:18) reports that 42% of Toronto security guard respondents reported some related college training, while close to 70% of Intelligarde officers are currently enrolled or have completed law enforcement or criminal justice training. In fact, while the overall number of contract security guards with post-secondary diplomas has increased from 10% in 1980 (Shearing, Farnell and Stenning 1980:140) to 47% in 1993 (Erickson 1993:16), 67% of Intelligarde staff have college or university diplomas or are near completion. Almost 10% of Intelligarde security officers have university training.

The parapolice of Intelligarde are young, white males, with some college training in law enforcement or security and just under two years of security experience (see Figure 4.2). While Erickson (1993:15) finds that 34% of security guards in the

Table 4.1: Composition of Uniform Intelligarde Security Staff.

CHARACTERISTICS		n	%
Sex (N=141)	Male	130	92.2
	Female	11	7.8
Age (N=123)	>19	3	2.4
	20 – 25	69	56.1
	26 – 31	32	26.0
	32 – 37	12	9.8
	38 – 43	3	2.4
	<43	4	3.3
Complexion/ Race ‡ (N=134)	White	102	76.1
	Black	13	9.7
	Hispanic/Olive/Med.	9	6.7
	East Indian	9	6.7
	Asian	1	.7
Education (N=138)	High School	45	32.6
	College	80	58.0
	University	13	9.4
College or University Major (N=93)	Law Enfor. or Crim.	66	68.7
	Other	30	31.3
Citizenship (N=132)	Canadian	123	93.2
	Other	9	6.8
License (N=141)	Security Guard	118	83.7
	Dual (+P.I.)	23	16.3
Military or Police Exp. (N=123)	None	95	77.2
	Military	24	19.5
	Military Police	2	1.6
	Police	2	1.6
Offences (N=126)	None	119	94.4
	One or More	7	5.6
Residency (N=133)	Outside GTA	33	24.8
	Within GTA	100	75.2
	Toronto	49	36.8
	Scarborough	16	12.0
	Mississauga	12	9.0
	Etobicoke./ Rexdale/Weston	6	4.5
	East York	6	4.5
	York	6	4.5
	North York	5	3.8

Based on employee personnel files (N=141). GTA = Greater Toronto Area,
P.I. = Private Investigator, ‡ based on employee self-report item on
application for security guard and/or P.I. licensing

Toronto security industry are women, this is not reflected in Intelligarde's staff

composition which is 92% male. This may be as a result of the dangerous nature of

Intelligarde security work (see chapter 3), the macho culture this cultivates (chapter 6), or general recruiting practices. As reported in other studies, (Erickson 1993:22 (8%); Shearing, Farnell and Stenning 1980:150 (3%)) very few security officers have been previously employed in public policing. This also holds true for Intelligarde officers (see Table 4.1).

Figure 4.2: The Average Intelligarde Security Officer.

CHARACTERISTICS	MEDIAN†
Sex	Male
Age	25
Complexion	White
Height	5'11"
Weight	180 lbs.
Education	Some College
Major	Law & Security Related
Service with Intelligarde	16 months
Previous Security Experience	6 months

†Population varies (n=96 to 141) depending upon missing data.
Based on employee personnel files (N=141).

The average age of an Intelligarde officer is 26.2 years, which is significantly lower than the industry norm. It is also lower than the local public police service's mean age for uniform officers at 38.7 years (Metropolitan Toronto Police Service 1995b). Shearing, Farnell and Stenning (1980) found that 65% of security guards in Ontario were over the age of 30 in 1980, while Erickson (1993:15) has more recently observed that security officers' mean age in Toronto is 37 years. There are further differences between Intelligarde officers and the rest of the security industry. While it appears that the percentage of Canadian-born security officers employed by contract firms has dropped from 57% in 1980 (Shearing, Farnell and Stenning 1980:141), to 44% in 1993 (Erickson

1993:15), 77% of Intelligarde staff were born in Canada – a percentage markedly higher than the rest of the industry. The second most frequent country of birth for Intelligarde staff was Jamaica (4%). The reputation and recruiting of Intelligarde International has produced a well-educated, male, young, white, labour force specifically seeking the type of law enforcement activities the company is currently engaged in. In support of Intelligarde's promotional rhetorics, therefore, the company differs significantly from the industry standard.

Race, Class, Gender

The demand for security, fear, and the need to minimise risk are political processes that cannot be divorced from race, class, and gender. Fundamental to the rhetorics of actuarialism is a barely hidden emotional impetus that is actually counter-intuitive to instrumental logics. This only fuels further calculation, collation and the purchase of security products. Risk markets are not cold, calculated, rational terrains – this is only their representational form. In this section, I intend to expose the more base (or 'classic') ingredients for the mobilisation of security.

Intelligarde is used to allegations of racism levied by both tenants and the media against the company. The idea of private stormtroopers harassing young black men prompts images of 'Soweto-style' oppression (DiManno 1993a). The reality of prejudicial police and criminal justice practices on the basis of race is well established in the criminological literature (e.g. DeKeseredy and MacLean 1990; Lynch and Patterson 1990; Reiman 1995). In August of 1993, Intelligarde raised the ire of newspaper journalists and prompted scathing commentaries about the company's activities at a harbour-front affordable housing complex:

They've called off the dogs in the Bathurst Quay Cityhome complex. But not the privately hired security guards who chase black kids through the neighbourhood, harass visitors walking their girlfriends back home, threaten residents with eviction, and browbeat their way through the community making citizen's arrests. (DiManno 1993a:A7)

Jake seethes with resentment at the security guards. "Last month, I was riding my bike from the park. I stopped for a minute on the Cityhome property. These two guards jump me, throw me to the ground, slap handcuffs on me. I get away and I start to run. They chase me, with their dogs, all the way over to the Tip-Top building. So now they've got me cornered and one of them says: 'Don't move nigger, we've got the cops with us.' Hey, I was glad to see the cops. They took me down to 14 Division. Got a ticket for trespassing and they let me go." (DiManno 1993b:A7)

Cleverly, the columnist questions the motivations of tenants who desire Intelligarde's presence, arguing that their fears are racially motivated:

To be sure, many – probably most – community residents would agree with McLeod. They supported the security blitz, want the dogs back, and are anxious to get those loitering kids out of sight and out of mind. But when you ask these trembling tenants what, in fact, is so threatening, so objectionable, about the youths' behaviour, the answers are vague and unsatisfying. "I've seen them drinking in the park," offers one woman. Golly. But their resentment, their fear, their silly little acts of urban espionage, none of this has to do with the fact that these idling teens are black, does it? (DiManno 1993b:A7)

Much like Spitzer's ruminations (1987) and my own second-guessing of 'risk society' literatures (Rigakos 1997b), private security is adeptly observed as constituting not some calculated principle of governance, but rather the *political* microphysics of a neighbourhood.

After this episode, Cityhome's acting director sent a letter of reprimand to Intelligarde management requesting that the officers merely observe and report wrongdoings instead of making arrests. Intelligarde was in need of positive public relations and hired black activist Dudley Laws to school the officers at the Cityhome property in question. When Laws was reported to be under the 'employ' of Intelligarde, the *Toronto Star* was forced to publish a correction:

Black activist Dudley Laws has been invited to deliver a lecture on racial sensitivity, for a \$150 fee, to Intelligarde International Inc. security who work at the Bathurst Quay complex, but is not on the payroll of Intelligarde International Inc. as a story implied. (*Toronto Star*, August 23 1993:A3)

Clearly, Mr. Laws wanted to distance himself from an organisation that was publicly perceived to be racist in its policing practices.

There is very little doubt that residential buildings heavily populated by black tenants pose a particular policing problem for Intelligarde staff. Often, resident affiliations may extend into 'gang' memberships or may more commonly reflect loosely organised coalitions of convenience in the face of a perceived racist threat.⁶² This tension often exists before Intelligarde's arrival but can also be exacerbated by the presence of overzealous security officers. As I patrolled the corridors and exterior of a North York apartment building with three Intelligarde security officers, we passed by inflammatory graffiti: "All niggers must die!" and "Security pigs can kiss my purple ass!" The latter message was sprayed on the building's rear external wall in foot-high lettering.

In a more recent case, the company was again levelled by allegations of racism and beating up on the poor. On May 24th, 1996 a black tenant of 200 Sherbourne Street, an Intelligarde secured property, was allegedly tackled, beaten and kicked by two of the company's security officers. The case was processed, as is often the case with Intelligarde, through a private information to a Justice of the Peace. Mr. Carr claimed that he had been beaten by the security officers – the incident was captured on videotape and eventually released to the television media. This was a public relations disaster for the company. The judge assigned to the case eventually ruled that the incident was precipitated by Mr. Carr when he returned to the lobby security cage with a coat hanger:

The lobby is covered to a limited degree by a video camera. Counsel agree and I concur that the video is not perfect, but it is helpful. It shows, and I find, an agitated Carr at the bars of the cage, which is in

⁶² This is also true of non-residential spaces. In North York's notorious Jane-Finch Mall, security officers are leery of arresting black suspects in the open. The preferred tactic is to isolate them by asking to 'talk' in a more private setting. Here, an arrest can ensue. Otherwise, the arresting officer calls for assistance in advance of the arrest so that three or four security personnel will dissuade public involvement. Of course, this can inadvertently result in a display of overwhelming force in the face of a rather insignificant offence such as shoplifting.

keeping with the evidence of the guards. It also shows Huyton leaving the cage and Carr approaching him, in what I consider an aggressive fashion, with a coathanger in hand.⁶³

Judge Porter goes on to find that Huyton defends himself by taking Carr to the floor, and when Carr resists, another security officer comes to assist. The charges were dismissed, the Judge noting “there is no doubt that Carr suffered injuries, but I find that he was the author of his own misfortune.”⁶⁴ This case, however, is only demonstrative of a general antipathy toward Intelligarde by many members of the communities they protect.

The Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP), for example, has mounted a campaign of protest against what they perceive as “Intelligarde’s assault on the poor” (OCAP 1997 (May 8)). They have organised protest rallies and circulated pamphlets and posters in support of Roger Carr:

The Carr case was a focal point for us but we know that once the heat is off, Intelligarde will resume their heavy-handed extremes. Sooner or later there will be another situation. (John Clarke – Provincial Organiser, personal communication, March 12, 1998)

OCAP’s efforts against Intelligarde are the only such protests targeting a private company. The Coalition’s organisers concede that Intelligarde has no monopoly on violence against the poor but they engage in their jobs with such zeal that they stand alone in comparison to both MTHA security or the Metro Police. OCAP cites repeated difficulties with Intelligarde’s use of force. In one instance a man was visiting a friend at a nearby Cityhome property when he was arrested for trespassing by Intelligarde security officers and banned from all Cityhome properties. A problem arose when it was discovered that the trespasser was also a Cityhome resident of another building – in effect, he was banned from entering his own apartment.

⁶³ *R. v. Chraba and Huyton* (1997) Ont. Unreported, p.3

Have Intelligarde officers displayed racist attitudes? Have their mobilisations been racially motivated? To some extent, this has been the case. Indeed, Intelligarde's own management invited black activist Dudley Laws to lecture its officers and there have also been allegations of racial slurs directed at black suspects. Despite my diligence in this regard, I could find no overt suggestions of racism in security officer attitudes. In action, however, I witnessed at least two incidents where Intelligarde security officers seemed overzealous and confrontational with black suspects.

On one occasion, I was interviewing two security officers in an office at a North York apartment building when a mobile security officer arrives to report that there were "a couple of black guys drinking in their car outside." The youngest security officer leaps to his feet and reaches for his radio. The four other security officers also begin collecting themselves for a confrontation. I immediately wonder why everyone is getting so excited, especially considering that there had reportedly been recent incidents of physical battles between the security officers and black tenants. Why would we want to start something? The security officers run out into hallway and through the lobby to the roadway key in front of the building, finding three young black men in a white sports car. It is after 11 pm and it is raining:

S/o #1: Are you drinking? You can't have an open drink in the car. You're under arrest.

Driver: Oh, man what's your problem?

Pass #1: You're not police. You ain't no fucking police!

S/o #2: Get out of the car!

Pass #2: Fuck you man. You can't arrest us.

Pass #1: What the fuck (Punching seat). You can't arrest us!

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p.4

S/o #3: (To me) This is what I mean when I say some guys take it too far. You should stand up against the building because people will start throwing stuff down on us. Somebody threw a couch on one of our cars once. But they might throw bottles or knives. You should get out of the way.

Me: Here?

S/o #3: Yeah, good.

After some grappling through the driver's side window, the young men drive off. I question the security officers about why they decided to attempt an arrest. One confides that they "looked dangerous." Another says that "the law is the law." I asked why they do not simply call the police and there is no real answer. This is their turf and since the incident did not escalate into a serious one, police assistance was not necessary. The security officers are adamant that the youths were engaged in prohibited activity on private property and that they can therefore be arrested. I wonder whether the same tactics would have been used if the young men were white.

The intersection of race and class (Schwartz and Milovanovic 1996) is a topic of some interest in criminology's theoretical discourse. While most would concede that there are surely overlaps between racism and poverty, others choose to privilege class ahead of, or as a function of, race (Reiman 1995). This debate need not concern us here. It suffices to assert that the two are often linked – especially as it affects Intelligarde's contacts with populations they are tasked with controlling.

One Intelligarde officer relates how his actions often come into conflict with the homeless:

C: I'll tell you about this one time I was at the Greyhound Bus Station. Well, we took over the contract from another security company that, I don't know, I guess none of them did anything. So, I'm on patrol and I come across this sleeper in one of the stairwells, you know in an area where people can walk by all the time. So I tell him he has to go and he goes crazy.

Me: He attacked you?

C: No, nothing like that. He just couldn't believe we were telling him to leave. He was angry. You know, he's thinking 'this is my home, *you* get out.'

Me: Did he leave?

C: Oh yeah, sure. But the point is that the guy was living there for something like two years. It's like I walked into your home and told you to get out. I don't think you'd want to leave.

Me: Nobody had said anything?

C: I guess none of the other security guards from the other crappy companies ever told the guy, or made him leave. The old guy had set up shop, he had his little radio there, and blankets and food... The thing is, they must have had to step around him to do their patrols. (Laughs) Unbelievable.

To be fair, Intelligarde has involved itself with charitable work for the homeless. In February of 1996, Intelligarde teamed up with the Canadian military and the St. John patrol, in operation 'cold snap.' While soldiers staffed the warm-up area inside Moss Park Armoury, Intelligarde patrol officers picked up any homeless persons along with St. John Ambulance personnel (van Rijn and Stancu 1996). The community pitched in with donated pots of stew, sweaters, sleeping bags, candles, coffee and doughnuts (Stancu 1996). The operation received considerable media attention and Intelligarde's efforts were mentioned in Toronto's largest daily newspaper:

Intelligarde International security officers, who are contracted to patrol housing complexes, public buildings and transportation systems, have made a commitment to check on people huddled outside. They are offering any takers a ride to the armoury, and are giving out candles provided by Acadian Candle Co. to those who won't come. (Stancu 1996:A2)

Some Intelligarde staff defined the operation as simply "good P.R." for the company.

With all of these incidents in mind – from the Carr case to newspaper reports and OCAP protests – I decided to more closely examine Intelligarde's deployment and training assignments as an indicator of racial prejudice. If the company really is prejudicial with populations under its purview, surely these attitudes would also manifest themselves structurally, in its internal politics, and publicly in arrest reports. I applied the same test for gender discrimination, a topic that I will more systematically address later in this section.

First of all, there is little doubt that Intelligarde polices the most economically disadvantaged populations in Metropolitan Toronto. This is clear from statistics collected on persons issued NPEs. If one collapses individuals who reported having no fixed address with those who would not divulge their residency or for whom no information was listed, 41% of persons banned from properties policed by Intelligarde are homeless. There are some additional notes of interest here. First, there is no statistically significant difference for residency between males and females issued NPEs ($X^2=2.012$, $df=2$, $p=ns$).

Table 4.3: Residency Reports of Persons Issued Notices Prohibiting Entry.†

RESIDENCY‡	n	%
Gave address	1543	59.0
No Fixed Address	917	35.0
Unknown, Blank, Refused	157	6.0
TOTALS	2617	100

† Based on one-year sampling (August 1996 – September 1997, N=2617) of Intelligarde bannings database.

‡ item entered by security officer on Notice Prohibiting Entry.

There is, however, a statistically significant difference with regards to residency between banned individuals on the basis of race ($X^2=65.350$, $df=10$, $p<.001$, not shown).⁶⁵ This difference is particularly noticeable among the Native banned population where 63.4% (n=45) reported having no fixed address in comparison to whites, Hispanics/South Americans, blacks, and East Indians whose reported homelessness ranged between 23.7% to 37.9% of their respective banned populations. Only 7 Asians (9.5%) reported having no fixed address to return to. Another queer statistical finding is that the mean age of

⁶⁵ Caution should be exercised with this finding, however, because 3 cells (16.7%) had expected cell counts of less than 5. The minimum expected count was 3.95. This 2 X 2 table fails DeLucchi's (1983) amended Lewis and Burke goodness-of-fit standards. See footnote 8 for more information.

banned males and females also varied significantly ($t=6.465$, $df=1189.174$, $p<.001$, not shown) between 31.8 for men and 28.6 for women. I do not know why such a variance should exist, particularly when one considers that the mean age for women banned from Intelligarde properties for prostitution is 31.9 years. This should raise the overall average age for women since they monopolized that NPE category. Instead, there is an overall trend across all NPE categories showing women are younger than men which also translates into an aggregate difference. These latter findings, however interesting, have little to do with assessing Intelligarde's possibly prejudicial mobilisations.

Most persons banned from Intelligarde properties are reportedly white (63.9%) while over one in five persons issued NPEs are black (21.4%). The remainder of banned individuals are either persons described as having a 'medium' complexion (5.4%) or are believed to be of East Indian (3.1%), Asian (3.1%), or Native (2.1%) ethnicity. Even if we were to know how reflective this banned population⁶⁶ ($n=2406$) is of actual Intelligarde secured populations, we would still not be able to discern bias in policing. This is because a large proportion of individuals banned from Intelligarde properties are obviously not tenants. In this case, we would be prompted to compare NPE issuances against the general population. But this would also be unfair because members of ethnic minority groups frequently interact socially with members of their own community. In other words, there is no guarantee that the population visiting, and/or intruding upon Intelligarde properties reflects the general population of Toronto. No completely defensible conclusions can be culled from such an approach because a justifiable

⁶⁶ There are 211 cases for whom complexion, race, or ethnic characteristics are not listed.

comparison (or base) population cannot be ascertained without long-term systematic observation of Intelligarde secured lobbies and properties.

For this reason, it may be beneficial to investigate Intelligarde's internal deployment of visible minority and female officers. The first point of comparison we might make is that when compared to the public police, Intelligarde is three time more likely to employ a member of a visible minority group – 7.6% of uniform officers in the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service are visible minority group members (Metropolitan Toronto Police Service 1998:form #c-3.1) compared to 23.9% for Intelligarde. This dynamic does not translate into gender composition. While 7.8% of Intelligarde's security personnel are women (see Table 4.1), 11.2% of police officers in Toronto are female.

Table 4.4: The Relationship between Employee Demographics and Job Training.

EMPLOYEE DEMOGRAPHICS							
TRAINING		Male (N=129)	Female (N=11)	X ² value† df=1	White (N=102)	Visible Others‡ (N=32)	X ² value† df=1
	Baton	3.9	0	.442	2.9	0	.963
	Dog	53.5	27.3	2.789	53.9	34.4	3.723
	Gun	45.0	9.1	5.349*	44.1	28.1	2.589
	MLEO	23.8	0	3.362	23.5	9.4	3.033

*p<.05, † all Pearson chi-square calculations based on 2 X 2 table (df=1),

‡ based on employee self-report item on application for security guard and/or P.I. licensing. Numbers presented in percentages. MLEO = Municipal Law Enf. Officer (Parking).

When Intelligarde's training practices are scrutinised, there does not appear to be any statistically significant difference in employee courses. This holds true for both race and gender with the exception that women are significantly less likely to be qualified in

handgun certification (see Table 4.4). Across all other training qualifications – including MLEO, dog handling, and baton licensing – there are no significant differences.

Despite not being statistically significant – both visible minorities and women are less likely to be trained across all additional (i.e. beyond standard training) aspects of security work compared to their white male counterparts. The fact female security officers are significantly less likely to be qualified in handgun training may be a product of gender role socialisation, management’s reluctance to involve them, or both.

Table 4.5: The Relationship between Employee Demographics and Job Placement.

EMPLOYEE DEMOGRAPHICS							
PLACEMENT		Male	Female	X ² value† df=1	White	Visible Others‡	X ² value† df=1
		(N=128)	(N=9)		(N=100)	(N=32)	
		25.0	27.3	.028	30.0	12.5	3.882*
	Static/ Comm.	75.0	72.7		70.0	87.5	

*p<.05, † all Pearson chi-square calculations based on 2 X 2 table (df=1),

‡ based on employee self-report item on application for security guard and/or P.I. licensing.

This slight racial and gender bias in training extends to deployment for race only. In other words, white security officers are statistically significantly more likely to be deployed in mobile patrol than their minority counterparts (see table 4.5).⁶⁷ This is a

⁶⁷ In the 2 X 2 chi-square crosstabulation for gender, one cell (25%) had an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.77. In the 2 X 2 chi-square crosstabulation for race, 0 cells had an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.24. In order to test the veracity of the tables, DeLucchi’s (1983) amended Lewis and Burke goodness-of-fit standards were met. He notes:

provocative finding because mobile patrol is considered a prestige appointment. This result holds true even when we consider the presence of possible differences in the employee pool between white and non-white security officers. For instance, when comparing factors such as age ($t=.164$, $df=118$, $p=ns$), education ($t=.596$, $df=132$, $p=ns$), previous security experience ($t=.501$, $df=107$, $p=ns$), or service to the company ($t=.692$, $df=128$, $p=ns$) – factors that might otherwise explain differences in career advancement – we find there is no statistically significant difference between white and visible minority security officers. Absent employee preference, therefore, one must conclude that assignment to either a mobile or static security function can be attributed to extra-meritorious factors such as race.

When these results were put to Intelligarde middle-management, the response was that no bias exists. The differences exhibited were as a result of “individual motivations” (for training) and job success (for placement into mobile patrol). I would have thought that deployment practices might be contingent on company needs. A lack of minority officers in mobile patrol would thus simply reflect management’s purposeful deployment of these officers in specific locales – reflecting the ethnic composition of the site policed. This, I was assured, is not the case.

Intelligarde officers who are members of visible minority groups reported no overt discrimination against them in the company. Some, however, did note that it is a much more subtle process that transcended overt actions. In any case, black officers in

“Summarizing this work on minimum expected values for both association and goodness-of-fit hypotheses, it seems that, as a general rule, the chi-square statistic may be properly used in cases where the expected values are much lower than previously considered permissible. In the presence of small expected values, the statistic is quite robust with respect to controlling Type I error rate, especially under the following conditions: (a) the total N is at least five times the number of cells, (b) the average expected value is five or

particular reported that they are forced by the occupation and the populations that they police to confront 'working for the man.' One black officer noted:

Some of these Jamaican guys, they suck there teeth to disrespect you but that stuff don't bother me. These guys call me 'roast bread fruit' sometimes. It means white on the inside, black on the outside. Like an oreo, you know? But I don't let that stuff get to me. (Static site officer – Male)

Women, on the other hand, were not hesitant to voice their concerns about an unpleasant working environment:

A couple of guys, one guy in particular, was spreading rumours about me in the company. He was saying that I was a slut. It got back to me and I dealt with it. I confronted him about it and made him stop. (Mobile security officer – Female)

You always have to watch yourself because many of these guys don't think you should be here. I'm trying to make it into the police force and so are most of these guys. They already have negative attitudes toward female officers. (Mobile security officer – Female)

Macho subcultures, like those of the police, do not provide hospitable environments for women (Rigakos 1995; Smith and Gray 1983). As men test their masculinity (see Messerschmidt 1993) against one another, they must repeatedly re-constitute their bravado. One of the methods employed involves the objectification, sexualisation or diminishing of women.

The doing of security work at Intelligarde is also the doing of 'gender' (Newburn and Stanko 1994). This means that being a man is a social action that requires a consistent re-assertion of that position of masculinity. Messerschmidt (1997) asserts that masculinity is stratified, in that more affluent men are more masculine than poorer men and heterosexual men are more masculine than homosexual men. In this way, while Intelligarde security officers may be less masculine than the public police because they lack peace officer status and are considered 'wannabes' they are nonetheless, after all, men and can assert their masculinity against women. In any work environment

more, (c) the expected values tend toward homogeneity, and (d) the distribution of the margins is not

dominated by men, women will be seen to be devaluing that cultural status of that organisation because it loses its claim to universal masculinity.

On many occasions this dynamic was operative in casual banter and briefing room discussions. With a female trainee present in the briefing room for her first ride-along, an Intelligarde training officer queried why another woman was being assigned to a dangerous site.

You know what's going to happen don't you? The call will come over the radio, "help me I'm being raped" (Laughter)...

On her first day of interaction with Intelligarde, the applicant was made aware that female security officers are not thought of highly at the company.

On many other occasions, security officers preparing for shift work would look out into the walkway to assess the attractiveness of any female applicants in the lobby. They would typically comment on the women's physiques and the type of sexual activities they would like to engage in with them – often in the company of female mobile security officers who would simply ignore their comments. But the bias extends further than this – it is systematic.

Female security officers are not assigned to dangerous districts unless absolutely necessary and do not typically patrol high risk sites unless partnered with a male security officer. There is also a heavy bias in placing women on day shift to avoid difficulties. Often, female officers are well aware of these procedures but do not voice concern. One female mobile patrol officer noted:

I have to work twice as hard as the male does to earn respect. To prove myself. I've been here for a month and I'm already mobile and the only reason is because they need more women out in the public eye. I wasn't moved into mobile because I was good or had something special to offer. It was just the sort of

skewed" (Delucchi 1983:168).

thing where they needed more women so I have to work twice as hard to prove myself. (Mobile security officer – Female)

In another case, a female security officer was grateful that she was not being thrust into more dangerous situations:

I'm not here to get killed. I'm here to get a paycheque, and I'm happy doing what I'm doing... Sure, I worry if I get moved to another shift or district. (Mobile security officer – Female)

Whether motivated by the dangerous reality of parapolicing in Toronto's underbelly, a sexist understanding of women's limitations in hostile environments, or a paternalistic, indeed chivalrous, attitude towards protecting women, Intelligarde treats its female security officers differently than male employees.

The purpose of this chapter was threefold: to describe the process of becoming an Intelligarde officer, to outline the demographic composition of the company, and to discuss the political nature of parapolicing. I began with an introduction of Intelligarde's mission statement and turned to recruitment, pre-employment testing and initial deployment. Modern risk markets comprise political terrains that fuel fears, insecurities and commodify policing. In the chapter to follow, I will turn to describing the processes of surveillance and control in Intelligarde's mode of operation. And finally, how these systems are sold on the security market.

Chapter Five: A Parapolice Surveillance System

Tasking private police forces with controlling 'unruly' populations is not a new phenomenon. Since the private Marine police of the Thames river, under the direction of the early police scientist Patrick Colquhoun, such organisations were required to engage in the minutiae of public and private order: to pay labourers, prevent losses and apprehend thieves (McMullan 1998:105-6). The Marine police were to enforce strict rules of conduct and monitor the river's proletariat by implementing dress codes, paying 'lumping rates,' managing accounting, determining wagelessness and stopping illegal activities on London's shipping lane. They did so by applying themselves to the apparent trivialities of order maintenance: no frocks, wide trousers, jemmies, or hidden pockets were allowed on board boats; any on-the-job takings were forbidden and confiscated.

Surveillance thus becomes a decisive economic operator both as an internal part of the production machinery and as a specific mechanism in the disciplinary power. (Foucault 1977:175)

The police were to come 'to know' their populations by categorising and administering them. Colquhoun (1800, as cited in McMullan 1998:108) and other police intellectuals (e.g. Chadwick) developed classification systems aimed at transforming transient masses into known populations that could be counted and managed. Factory discipline, prison administration, poor houses, child support, public health and sanitation all lay at the feet of a strategically erected pyramidal hierarchy aimed at pastorizing the poor. All networks were incorporated within an elaborate top-down state programme.

Modern private police organisations ply their business under different social and structural conditions. While there is little doubt that workplace populations require monitoring, surveillance is embedded within the matrix of doing business: in the technology of producing and in the very act of movement. To a lesser extent, this involves the same policing dynamic of early 19th century England; outsiders must be monitored as potential threats, as illegitimate interlopers in the legitimate pursuit of profit. But now they are electronically tagged (Lyon 1994:102) and their movements regulated within a labyrinth of technological passkeys and recognition systems instead of familiarity and personal history. Access is determined by risk categorisation at the moment of contact with the production system. Modern security is a function of loss prevention and access control – neo-liberal economic logics that have profound depoliticizing, and therefore ideologically insidious, effects. Within the system, confrontation is bypassed, the key either fits the lock or it does not – in either case access is a product of your classification, and your stamping is sufficient to warrant official disinterest until a blatant violation has occurred. This is the world of ‘snowflakes’⁶⁸ (Shearing and Stenning 1982b) as apparatuses in a network of fluid inaccessibility. Where culpability is diffused amongst both offender and victim. Under corporate logics, both parties are to blame for the loss of hardware, time, manpower, and ultimately, and most importantly, profits. On the aggregate, the institution knows that security precautions (target hardening, routine activities) are central to minimising risk and therefore loss – the two are definitionally inter-linked within this actuarial fantasy. This

⁶⁸ See ch. 3, fn. 44.

is the major part, and the overarching ideological mobiliser, of the modern dominion of private security.

Parapolicing, however, has merged the loss prevention impetus of fluid access control systems with the gritty chaos of street-level law enforcement. Private security officers are not imagined as professionals – at least not in the sense of having ultimate accountability and an independent occupational code. But even if they were, this would not mean immunity from constant examination and a diminishing level of autonomy under the weight of procedural dicta. This has purportedly been the case for doctors (Castel 1991) and public police officers (Ericson and Haggerty 1997) within new modes of actuarial governance. Like their proletariat brothers, security guards and watchmen have historically been low paid wage labourers that need constant scrutiny. While the factory worker punches a time clock under the watchful eye of the owner and his ‘police,’ the security agent himself is also required to make his whereabouts known. He must punch a mobile card mounted to a clock dial saddled over his shoulders at intermittent stations throughout the plant. The indentations left on the card are then scrutinised and the guards’ whereabouts known. The watcher is also watched.

Perpetual Examination

The means of correct training (Foucault 1977:170-194) for security personnel ensure that they will remain vigilant in monitoring populations they have been assigned: white or blue collar workers, tenants, the homeless, prisoners, detainees, and courtroom personnel. The fantasy of knowing immediately (telematicism) or of knowing ‘in advance’ of the occurrence is the dream of the new ‘police machine’ (Bogard 1996). Actuarialism and the art of prediction is the epistemological backdrop that makes this

apparition possible within the logic of modern governance. It is a fiction, but it powers apparatuses of social control, in contest with the populations it is meant to ensnare. It is a complex system of relationships wherein the state's monopoly over control is replaced with a constellation of interests, at once contractually and economically at variance and in alliance. A spectre of control within a nuanced system of unobtrusive management, safety, and risk management systems, amplified by technologies of surveillance. How do the parapolice become 'known' while producing knowledge about others? How is surveillance of the parapolice managed? More importantly, how are these techniques sold as commodity?

I have already established that Intelligarde International is not representative of the general private security market. They are, however, harbingers of a new order in the private management of populations – that body of organisations specifically geared to addressing (late) modern angst and fear of crime and disorder. An enterprising culture of companies resolved to step into the receding spaces and functions of state jurisdiction (Rose 1996). The Law Enforcement Company is as interested in crime prevention as it is in loss prevention – Intelligarde's mobilisations are testimony to this. Rather than being confined to the smooth surfaces and calculated access-points of the modern security-industrial⁶⁹ installation, the parapolice of Intelligarde are charged with organising the chaos of public housing developments, the transient populations of rooming houses, the drug-addicted prostitutes of cabbagetown, and the 'gang-bangers' of North York. The site and context of private security surveillance radically reverts to its early modern manifestations. The mass private property (Shearing and Stenning 1983) holdings of

⁶⁹ Or commercial.

corporate giants gave birth to the rapid escalation of the private security sector, but they may now be territorially dispersed, in multiple locales, neighbouring landowners with similar order problems and the same contract security providers. Each episode of chaos is an opportunity for management, for risk eradication, for the purchase of comfort and the ideological dispersal of mistrust and fear. Within these chaotic environments, without state-of-the-art access control, limited informal face-to-face accountability, and absent any tangible sense of community comes Intelligarde International. They must envision a system of surveillance and order maintenance that must, in the first instance, discipline the security officer within this disordered environment; second, provide the means to monitor and 'make known' the populations they are meant to manage; and third, sell this capability on the open risk market.

This is accomplished in multiple ways. Foucault (1977:184-194) offers a mode of examination in the establishment of discipline that is highly ritualised, ceremonious, and intrusive. Over time, this process is normalised within the routine of management. It becomes perpetual, unobtrusive, and devoid of its previous regalia. This is not to say that ceremonial examination entirely disappears, but it does mean that as the techniques of management are 'perfected,' the examination ceremony becomes little more than an adjunct to the everyday and more routinised surveillance systems of an institution or organisation. As mechanisms of examination become embedded within the very process of information production (Lyon 1994; Poster 1990), 'closing the gap' between the body of doctors; soldiers, or, in this case, security officers becomes paramount.

The briefing serves many purposes. It keeps everyone up to date about problem areas or tenants – it's an information sharing opportunity. It also acts as an opportunity to set problems straight. If guys are slacking off, we can deal with it right there. (Intelligarde manager)

Uninterrupted processes of surveillance are now the imagination of all risk-reducing organisations or institutions (Dandeker 1990). It is an obsession that fuels the contracted risk-reducing capability of security firms. Perpetual surveillance within the Law Enforcement Company consists of an electronic monitoring system that seeks to 'wire' the disordered spaces of Toronto's outsider populations, hooking these territories into the circuitry of ordered and accountable society. Intelligarde performs this seemingly impossible task through a process of documentation and virtual ordering. All Intelligarde-secured buildings undergo a process of virtual mapping. The site is first visited by Intelligarde managers and an array of 'deister' strips⁷⁰ are strategically affixed within and outside the property. The checkpoints are adhered to the inside of fire hose cabinets, door frames, roof access points, underground parking supports, and any other spaces frequented by 'sleepers' and 'druggies' or posing any other possible risk. Fire hose cabinets are notorious drug stash points – security officers are also to report misuse of fire equipment or poorly charged fire extinguishers in order to minimise corporate liability. Strips are even inconspicuously attached to the rear of public road signs and railings in large outdoor areas such as Toronto's harbourfront. These strips contain bar code information and numeric digits that are recorded and ascribed positional information within a 'deister' database. Each Intelligarde security officer carries a deister gun that is comparable to a Universal Price Code reader not unlike, but considerably smaller, than those found in supermarket check-out lines. As the security officer conducts patrols, he is to scan the deister strips and download this information into a computer upon returning to headquarters.

⁷⁰ This is a name-brand for an electronic patrol checkpoint system.

Each Intelligarde mobile officer also carries a small portfolio of deister strips. These deister strips represent various happenings: from reporting on or off site to calling for PRO support (see below), investigating drug activity or solicitation, reporting defective lights, abandoned vehicles, and even effecting arrests.⁷¹ The multiple occurrence possibilities are necessary for accountability, documentation, and in order for the company's inspectorate to quickly glean why a particular patrol took longer than scheduled. Each incident matches a coded checkbox on Intelligarde's occurrence reports. Paperwork needs to be filed along with important electronically reported occurrences, collating the official digital incident. Ironically, there are even deister strips within each security officer's portfolio to account for time spent writing reports in support of these electronic records.

Intelligarde managers are challenged to order the world of satellite problems with satellite employees. This is accomplished by manufacturing a virtual city of patrol checkpoints and digitally pre-figured occurrences. All actions within this virtual matrix consist of close-ended and pre-coded outcomes within a computer mediated system of total surveillance. The radio communications system facilitates a similar control mechanism – a process of perpetual accountability.

In this latter case, mobile patrol officers and site officers working in specific locales are required to radio incidents to headquarters. Thereafter, appropriate organisational responses can be mobilised at the discretion of the communications officer. A hierarchy of communication advances centralised decision-making based upon a centralised pool of information. There are no communal or open lines (except in dire

⁷¹ see Appendix for an example of an Intelligarde International deister collector report.

emergencies) – the new Mike system only allows for one-to-one cellular communications, most often between dispatch and line officers. Security officers are advised to keep their radios dialled into dispatch at all times, in case they need immediate assistance, rather than district or neighbouring security officers. This structured informational isolationism is a product of management's need to cultivate a dependent and responsive (Manning 1996) employee body. It also eliminates wasted single-frequency open communications between security guards – an action that often results in communications officers having to wait for their turn in the information dissemination process. Within these alternate communications parameters, the hierarchy might be flattened, opened up, and transparent to other security personnel, allowing them to make proactive decisions on the basis of this candid information flow. Instead, a concentrated information hub now manages the movements of dociled officers on the basis of organisational procedure – ostensibly cutting out all 'other' units from the decision-making process, and bypassing unofficial or unsanctioned mobilisations.

The examination system also extends to more antiquated techniques. Security officers are scrutinised for the cleanliness of their vehicles, the maintenance of their dogs, and their uniforming standards. Paperwork is filed on each of these components. Mobile security officers report that there is very little room for deviation from the uniforming code. One security officer noted that he was disciplined in front of his co-workers for wearing an undershirt with coloured lettering that was visible through his Intelligarde work shirt. The officer was reportedly humiliated by his superior and ordered to either remove the undershirt immediately or turn it inside out. Another security officer reported that he was castigated for not wearing a tie during a hot afternoon in the Fall. One

training officer reported that a security officer had been summarily dismissed for failing to wear a tie after October 1st. Intelligarde policies clearly stipulate when ties become optional. In many other instances, security officers attempt to hide the provincially legislated “security guard” lettering above the front pocket of their shirts with either a tag book, notebook or NPE book.

I see what these guys try to do sometimes with the notebooks. They try to disguise the words ‘security guard’ but we do not tolerate that. The first time you’re given a warning, the second time, you’re fired. I don’t put up with that. We are a Law Enforcement Company, we do not flout the law ourselves. I understand their motivations, but we are legally licensed as security guards and have to abide by the law. (Intelligarde manager).

Security officers who wear bullet proof vests or stab armour over the top of their shirts must sew a “security guard” patch on the vest in order that it be clearly visible to public.

Perpetual examination is part of a sometimes formalised, often inconspicuous form of power that requires repetition, uniformity, and consistency:

Disciplinary punishment is, in the main, isomorphic with obligation itself; it is not so much the vengeance of an outraged law as its repetition, in reduplicated insistence. So much so that corrective effect expected of it involves only incidental expiation and repentance; it is obtained directly through the mechanics of training. To punish is to exercise. (Foucault 1977:180)

Hierarchical structure is yet another mode of correct training as it establishes privilege and a role model system. In the organisation’s attempt to improve the uniform qualities of security officers, skills, aptitudes and experience are organised along a distribution system of competence and ranking. In other words, Intelligarde supervisors are to be the ‘best of the best,’ – officers who have internalised company logics and are made responsible for ensuring an effective guard force. As one Intelligarde manager put it: “we’re looking for company men.”

This mission is partially accomplished by co-opting subcultural priorities and making them part of the regimented system. Intelligarde’s Problem Resolution Officer (PRO) competition consists of timed push-ups, sit-ups, runs, and a regimented application

system that closely mirrors that of the public police. Upon completion, PROs are *de facto* capable of passing public police tests and are considered the optimal candidates for recruitment. Within a 'wannabe culture,' (see chapter 6) this status is respected. As security officers strive toward professional and well-paying careers in public law enforcement, their direct superiors already possess the physical skills necessary for the job and are ostensibly well on their way to fulfilling their vocation. The PROs are thus closer to both the specific career goal of security officers and simultaneously regarded by Intelligarde executives as the best in the company. This new PRO program has been implemented in the aftermath of a wholesale dismissal or reassignment of five previous supervisors who were seen as failing to uphold company rhetorics and policies. After careful re-examination the PRO competition was imagined.

PROs are to be clearly distinguished from other security officers. They are to wear distinctive uniforms consisting of black shirts and tactical pants with cargo pockets – bringing them closer in appearance to militaristic SWAT team members than security officers. Such tactical teams are not coincidentally considered a prestige law enforcement posting by public police officers. In appearance, qualifications, and mission, the PRO is to embody the quintessential police professional while enforcing Intelligarde policies. When finally assigned to patrol, the PRO can alternately take on district watch, simply conduct inspections of other security officers, or serve on special assignments and back-up fellow security personnel. It is a freelance position of troubleshooting and improving security officer compliance to organisational schemas.

The final component of examination is perhaps the most important – the ordering of populations under company jurisdiction. Much like their public police counterparts,

the parapolice must make sense of an often chaotic work environment and produce knowledge of persons within their scope of intervention (Dandeker 1990; Ericson 1994; Marx and Reichman 1987). This is done in order to establish a 'paper trail' so that banishments or arrests can be justified with the support of a substantial case history.

The database does a couple of important things. It allows officers to immediately check a perp's history with us, it lets us know if this guy has been doing whatever he's been doing repeatedly so we can tell the police that when they arrive and it lets the officers know if the guy is dangerous. Often many of the guys we have records on, the police have warrants outstanding against them. We may arrest them on one thing but the police want them for something else. (Intelligarde manager)

Intelligarde accomplishes this by compiling a database on all persons issued NPEs. When notices are issued against trespassers, they are filed with headquarters along with shift reports and other paperwork. Part of the regular duties of daytime communications officers is to input this information into the bannings database. In effect, the Law Enforcement Company dispenses thousands of NPEs and maintains an electronic case history of all individuals coming into confrontation with Intelligarde staff. While the NPEs contain information regarding the names, addresses, and offences of banned individuals, they also record more detailed facts. These include the specifics of the offence, including the date and time; the exact section of the *Trespass to Property Act* enforced; specifically where the offence occurred (i.e. in what stairwell or hallway); the offender's gender, height, weight, hair colour, hair style, and even attire. The banned individual's appearance is also noted, especially skin complexion, possible ethnicity, tattoos, markings, and glasses. Perhaps most importantly, since much of the parapolice officer's time is spent interacting with the homeless (see Table 4.3), Intelligarde has the most comprehensive electronic registry of illegal or unofficial residences in Toronto. These are the particular stairwells, alleys, and underground parking lots or entrances of the megacity. Much like their private police forbears, the Law Enforcement Company

comes to accumulate information on the movements and particulars of a city's underclass. Unlike the Thames police of 1800, Intelligarde, like other late modern observation institutions, benefit from the power of computerisation:

Computers differ from other machines because they possess 'memory' and because they can 'talk' with each other using telecommunications... it does enable human beings to do more easily many tasks that requires brainwork. Unlike the machines of early industrialism, which multiplied muscle-power, computers can be programmed to perform functions associated with mental power. (Lyon 1994:46)

Sociologists continue to ponder whether the nature of surveillance has actually changed because of new technologies. While some argue that computers qualitatively transform the nature of surveillance (Marx 1988:208), others are more reserved but nonetheless intrigued by these developments (Lyon 1994:53-55). But the simple ability to make populations known almost immediately by merely employing common Free Text Retrieval to comb an organisation's database, accelerates and widens nets of surveillance (Cohen 1985).

In one year (August 1996 to September 1997) Intelligarde personnel submitted approximately 56, 400 written reports that ranged in importance from major occurrences to simple shift summaries or alarm responses. In this sense 'knowing' means remembering previous incidents or interactions – and this is accomplished by a centralised computer system not unlike that of public police systems such as CPIC. This is also why Intelligarde has repeatedly flirted with the idea of a permanent 'crime analyst' position to collate and structure the piles of information filed by security officers daily. The position has reportedly been alternately introduced and then dissolved by management.⁷² It is when the information gathered governs actual mobilisations rather than simply recording them that the new 'parapolice machine' will rival its public police

manifestation in the use of surveillance technology. The act of information collection becomes part of the process of informed decision-making through the use of actuarial logics.

Ericson and Haggerty (1997:84) believe that the very act of information gathering *is* knowledge production and that this, therefore, makes the police officer a knowledge broker. Even without secondary analysis, that is, reflection, collation, or argumentation, information is considered knowledge because it is organised in prescribed institutional formats. It serves the knowledge requirements of that institution. Accordingly, we might therefore conclude that the parapolice too are knowledge brokers. Indeed, the electronic bannings database can often dictate security officer actions based upon immediate case history retrieval – should a suspect be arrested, escorted from the property, or issued a NPE? This will be mediated by a radio call to a communications officer who will enter the suspect's name (or other particulars) into a digital search field. The result of that query will govern immediate parapolice action. On the other hand, this process represents a very small array of mobilisations and is only initiated at the security officer's discretion. For the most part, the occurrence files, alarm reports, and shift summaries are used for disciplining and assessing the quality of security work. Or, occasionally to answer client queries. While there is very little doubt security officers must navigate a digitally Taylorized workplace that produces streams of data about their own activities, it is unclear whether this information and the movements of the populations they are charged with monitoring constitutes knowledge production. In the end, if information *is* knowledge, then what is information? But this need not cloud the more important

⁷² One communications officer was upset to see me analysing the various databases and files because this

observation that the parapolice are part of a structured, digitised, and perpetually scrutinised crime control company that at once observes not only the populations it is charged with monitoring but those it employs to monitor them.

Hyperpanoptic Fantasies

Since Foucault's (1977) examination of the Benthamite prison, the ideological prominence of panoptic surveillance has prompted considerable discussion and scholarship. The idea of constructing all-seeing, all-knowing architectures of observation has been extended into the digital fabrics of modern social existence (e.g. Lyon 1994). Beyond the physical structures of Benthamite prison design, panoptic surveillance has been employed as a metaphor for the general social control apparatuses of state or corporate institutions. Poster (1990) has argued that 'superpanopticons' consisting of digital information networks produce routine knowledge of populations within a social ordering increasingly contingent upon information and communication. In this sense, the panoptic architecture is virtual. It does not have a physical presence but is exponentially more successful in amassing information about populations and individuals.

In Bogard's (1996) analysis of telematicism and surveillance, the panoptic metaphor is extended further to a *panoptic imaginary*. This means that the system of surveillance is one in which the goal is to know everything, always, immediately and eventually even before it happens. This is theoretically possible within a landscape that is a simulacrum of some, now only *relatively* important, reality. If the task of technology is to construct its own more impressive virtual order which is actually more real than the reality it was meant to represent, then the gap between reality and simulation becomes

threatened a planned reinstatement of the crime analyst position for which he was in line to fill.

meaningless (cf. Baudrillard 1983). In the end, the technologies of present are simply a step toward the ultimate virtual order of hyperpanopticism – it is this imaginary future Bogard seeks to theorise.

...instead of architectures of control, walls and floors and viewing locations, we need to talk about cyberarchitectures, digital structures, and environments; instead of orderings of space and time, virtual space-times and coding conventions for displaying them onscreen; instead of visibilities and temporal series, about virtual light, programmed images, and cyberloops. (Bogard 1996:19)

While I do not intend to take a similar ontological leap (see Rigakos in press), Bogard's description of a hyperpanopticism and the fantasy of control it envelopes nonetheless offers impressive theoretical utility. We need not entangle ourselves with epistemological pitfalls to make use of Bogard's thoughts for understanding the fiction of total control imagined within the Law Enforcement Company.

In the first instance, the Taylorized and panoptic workplace of Intelligarde International is obvious to most who enter it. The architecture of the compound makes the visual monitoring of security personnel effortless. Most predominantly, the company's inspectorate occupies an office immediately adjacent to the car bays. The office is organised so that the Quality Control Manager (QCM) has full view of the comings and goings of security personnel. West of the office, an open doorway leads to the main corridor of traffic, immediately opposite the communications room. If security officers report late for duty, this is immediately apparent to management. It is here that mobile Intelligarde security officers must report at the beginning and end of their shifts to pick up their run sheets, report forms, deister guns, site keys, radios and two batteries. All of this material is signed for by the security officer and a record is logged by the communications officer who oversees the dissemination of workplace equipment. All of the equipment must, of course, be returned at shift's end. The security officers accept

their daily assignments through a large window separating the corridor from the communications centre. This is a design very similar to a police duty desk.

The east wall of the QCM's office leads to the briefing room. This anti-chamber configuration makes it easy to prepare for his summaries and present himself to the platoon. Typically, the QCM prints out the deister readings onto perforated computer paper in his office, and lays out the results across the tables in the briefing room. The security officers are not only assessed and briefed before beginning their shifts but they are also forced to reckon with their performance the previous night. Often, platoon tallies are posted so that all security officers are aware of the relative 'production' rates of each shift. This is done to infuse security officers with a sense of competition in attempting to hit as many deister checkpoints as possible. The security employee is made aware that he is always examined – both physically and digitally within a hyperpanoptic architecture that consistently seeks to 'close the gap' between workers within its purview. Questions can be raised about elongated patrols, missed hits, and other disciplinary concerns that come to the attention of management through run-sheets, reports, deister readings, client or tenant complaints.

Perhaps one of the only places where a group of Intelligarde security officers can converse is the briefing room just after signing in and before the supervisor's presentation. Even if security officers want to complain or commiserate, they must consider that their conversations can easily be heard by the QCM in the adjacent office. This is why there is often whispering in and around Intelligarde headquarters. On one occasion I was discreetly signalled by a security officer that he would rather speak to me later as I was trying to conduct an interview. He gestured to the QCM's office. On

another occasion a training officer tried to complain to a fellow mobile security officer that he was being unfairly demoted. He was frustrated that his colleague would not listen to him, as he mumbled “that’s your business, I don’t want to hear about it” and then soon after murmured “later” under his breath. The same demoted training officer indicated that he wanted to talk to me in the washroom, but nonetheless *whispered* his complaints when I accompanied him there.

The elevated position of the QCM’s office also provides a panoptic view of the car bays where all mobile security officers prepare for duty (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). This position is symbolic but also allows the QCM to see security officers make ready their vehicles for the road. The care and maintenance of vehicles is of great concern to the company since they are crucial to its operations. The supervisor takes this opportunity to ritualistically re-establish the company’s hierarchy and bond with employees:

I sat here one time and watched this one guy spend close to half an hour cleaning the car because the fucking shithheads before him left it like a pig sty. The stuff just accumulates and finally this guy decides that this car needs a good cleaning inside and out. And I know the guy is a good officer. It’s not his fault the car is the way it is. Now this is cutting into his shift and he has to rush around to get his run completed. So I decide that I’ll help him out. I felt sorry for him. I helped him and other guys wash their cars. It’s a form of socialisation. (Intelligarde manager)

This notion of ‘socialisation’ and bonding best meshes structurally within the dominion of surveillance the Law Enforcement Company imagines – in this latter case to oversee even proper leisure activity.

The idea of an officer’s club was coming to fruition as this research project was coming to a close. Contractors had been notified, estimates had been submitted, the location decided upon, the financing negotiated, and the officers’ club management board finalised. The officers’ club was not a management idea. It began with employee interest in establishing a productive means of socialising, fostering an atmosphere of

professional solidarity, and perhaps most importantly a convenient place for physical training. The two mobile security officers who thought up the club were tired of paying exorbitant fitness club fees and wanted to establish an organisation akin to a police association but without the political or unionist sentiments:

This is not a union, it's a club. Like a military officers' club. It's a place to meet, talk, and relax without having to always make arrangements to go out somewhere. (Mobile security officer – Male)

It's an association of sorts but it's not a union and I think that maybe R was afraid of that when we first came up with it but no it isn't and don't let him hear you calling it that. (Mobile security officer – Male)

After proposals were submitted and presentations made to the company's management, Intelligarde agreed to deduct membership fees from the paycheques of those who might join and would also contribute to the purchase of equipment and donate car bay 'a' for the structure.

Not surprisingly, however, Intelligarde management is interested in the officers' club for quite different reasons:

I'm excited by it and want to be involved with it. We want a management member on the board... It'll be an excellent facility allowing for *structured socialising*... this club will be a constructive way to socialise... Spotting for example – that develops trust among security officers... These guys probably don't even recognise the potential. (Intelligarde manager) [emphasis added]

Structured socialising, therefore, is a company imperative not unlike the disciplining of workers since the beginning of alienated production. In this case the hyperpanoptic gaze extends physically into the leisure activities and developing occupational ethics of the workforce. While this opportunity fell into the lap of Intelligarde managers, they nonetheless took the opportunity to sponsor and maintain control over a productive form of socialising that was under the scrutiny of management. At a moment's notice, the officers' club would fail without the company's co-operation on space, funding, and payroll deduction agreements. Not coincidentally, the planned clubhouse is immediately opposite the QCM's office – enmeshed perfectly within the panoptic architecture of the

facility (see Figure 5.1). When completed, this would allow the effortless monitoring of both work and play by the company's inspectorate.

The notion of hyperpanopticism, of course, is meant to transcend the physical spaces of observation delineated by Bentham. The communications and monitoring systems of today are merely antecedents to a system of total control for the future (Bogard 1996). These digital and virtual orderings are in their infancy at Intelligarde but their possible future manifestations are part of the mobilising logics for current disciplinary techniques. Today, when a security officer is dispatched to an alarm call, this information is transmitted digitally from a computer console at Intelligarde headquarters to a display window on his Mike radio system. The page is then responded to by the patrol officer by radio, announcing his receipt of the message, and his estimated time of arrival. The communications officer inputs the address of the alarm into a mapping software program provided by Perly's and transmits a map book page number and co-ordinates to the mobile security officer. The officer then checks his own Perly's map book and the co-ordinates and sets off after the alarm. It is not uncommon for communications officers to 'talk' mobile security officers directly to a specified alarm location by maintaining communication with them as they travel cross-streets toward the address.

This system is problematic, however, because the communications officer is not always sure where the closest security officer is located. Often, security officers are on patrol in underground parking areas and the page cannot be sent or it must wait for many minutes on a cellular transmission cue. Additionally, simply because an alarm happens to occur within an officers' district does not mean a neighbouring district officer may not

be in a better position to respond. Of course, the security officer is expected to arrive at the scene of the alarm within 30 minutes or face having to explain himself in writing by issuing a 30 minute plus alarm response report.

In order to avoid this problem, Intelligarde management is contemplating a new GPD (Global Positioning Device) system that would virtually map the location of all units within the megacity of Toronto. GP devices would be affixed to all vehicles so that their whereabouts would be triangulated by orbiting satellites to within a few feet of their actual location. The resultant information would be beamed to the communications centre computer so that the entire mobile security force would be under perpetual surveillance. This is scarcely a hyperpanoptic fantasy as much as an inevitability given the tone of management's testimonials:

I'd really like to see, you know, and it's a strong possibility we'll be moving into GPDs especially for our more inactive vehicles that have considerable down-time. I would favour entirely splitting alarm response from mobile patrol duties to save costs and then going with the GPDs. (Intelligarde manager)

I like the GPDs. If hooked into the cars it'll measure location but also acceleration, deceleration and how many times the engine has been turned on or off. And by the way, this technology is now becoming affordable. I'd like to see it cheaper but it can do some exceptional things. Another thing we have problems with is that some guys don't like to use their dogs on patrol. The dog gets taken out and then sits in the back of the car for the entire shift. We can hook the GPD into the doors of the cars so that we know if the dog's been taken out at that site. (Intelligarde manager)

Within this new GPD system, all pertinent status information is telematic: from the location of the security officer, the distance to his next destination, the mileage and speed of the vehicle and an automatic digital registry of occurrences. Given this constant flow of information, the communications officer can make deployment decisions based upon a virtual landscape of parapolicing mobilisations, in effect ordering a quintessentially chaotic reality. But this is only the beginning for the hyperpanoptic eye. The same regimes of surveillance that make the security officer's world transparent can also be used to track the work habits of employees throughout the country or the world.

Selling Surveillance in Risk Markets

The parapolicing surveillance system is inherently a management system for hire. It is a risk-reducing, profit-securing virtual network organised around the premise of ordering residential and commercial territories. In this sense, risk reduction is a contractual arrangement wherein residencies are made liveable and factories made profitable. Loss prevention and crime prevention have interchangeable logics and mechanisms of compliance. The end purpose for a hyperpanoptic, Taylorised work environment for hire is its marketability, and its demonstrated internalisation of late modern actuarial practices in the pursuit of securing profits or persons. While controlling, it amasses information on, as well as disciplining, the populations it is charged with monitoring – which make the parapolice closer to the original idea ‘police’ than their public competitors.

I have already noted that Intelligarde’s electronic compendium of Toronto’s underclass rivals that of any other social service or policing agency in the city. But amassing information about this population is not profitable in own right absent the client’s belief that these mechanisms constitute Intelligarde’s pre-eminence in securing hostile and chaotic spaces. The ability to make your contracted staff endlessly accountable to the clients who indirectly employ them is an unrivalled selling tactic within late modern risk markets. Neo-liberal logics dictate that citizens are consumers (Miller and Rose 1997) and that historic state monopolies such as policing are now simply products (O’Malley and Palmer 1996) to be bought and sold dependent upon their market demand. This process includes not only large landowners and corporations but also community groups and private citizens:

One of the reasons we're flourishing is because people do not get redress. They don't feel their police are answerable to them – not just corporate Canada but the little guy. Residents' and tenants' associations demand service. The facile assumption that we work for the rich is patently false. Look at our clients – Cityhome, the Parking Authority, TEDCO – they're all municipal bodies where the little people are the end users and they enjoy the most advanced security service in the city. (Intelligarde manager)

One way that consumers are guaranteed that their police will be accountable to them is through Intelligarde's deister system.

The deister system is a metaphor for the selling of policing services in late modern risk markets. It is ironic to note that deister strips are fashioned after Universal Price Code stickers because the act of striking such surfaces announces clearly its commodified nature. Clients are routinely supplied deister read-outs along with their invoices. This billing practice is akin to providing the purchaser with an inventory of products being bought but actually represents the internal digital surveillance system of the company. The two are thus interchangeable – clients want to purchasing total control, total accountability, and the Law Enforcement Company sets about providing this. The next imaginable step, of course, is to place the bar code on the security officer and the readers in the building. In this system, surveillance *is* commodity.

Clients also want these systems in place for purposes of minimising liability. Now there will be irrefutable evidence that a security officer was in the building, that patrols were made, or that the said occurrence could not of happened as reported because the security officer was 'in that hallway at the time.' All of this is clearly recorded on the deister read-out. The management of risks, therefore, is ingrained within the process of selling surveillance – it is the product. Of course, the digital surveillance system can also minimise liability for Intelligarde. On one occasion, deister read-outs were presented to a Justice of the Peace as evidence that a security officer could not have been involved in an assault because he was in another part of the city.

The next logical step for a hyperpanoptic private policing institution is to sell their wares to the public at large – in direct competition with the public police. Since the provincial neoconservatives under Harris in Ontario made changes to the *Police Services Act*, it has become possible for municipalities to contract policing services through alternative agencies. In the new municipality of Quinte West, Intelligarde was invited to enter a bid for policing services alongside the Trenton and Ontario Provincial Police. During his presentation, Intelligarde president Ross McLeod held up the latest gadget in security officer surveillance equipment, a baton that would replace the aging DOS-driven deister system. Throughout, he used the prop to punctuate his central message: financial and quality control over your local police service. If only five of the six officers assigned to a shift in a given night report for duty, then the municipality will be refunded the cost of the missing officer. Squarely within the dictums of neo-liberal risk eradication, consumers pay for only the immediate surveillance they receive. “Can the public police promise you that?” he asked. Given the nature of police unionism, the answer, of course, is obvious.

The Quinte West police board, much like the average Intelligarde client today would receive a print-out of the mobilisations of each security officer. Electronic checkpoints would be placed outside and inside merchant storefronts, on public road signs and at problem areas such as schools or parking lots. The police board would have direct control over its officers without the political distance of a provincial police service situated at Queen’s Park or the legal autonomy of the Trenton police. While placards outside the heated meeting demanded ‘local control’ and the continued presence of the Trenton police, on the inside, Ross McLeod was introducing the newly constituted police

consumer to the future of total control and total accountability under the direction of his hyperpanoptic organisation. This is the ultimate evolution in police resource control and management.

With all of this talk of professionalism and detachment the public has lost control. The cops say 'don't ask us what we're doing' but the people want to know 'is anyone going to rattle the locks on my place of business after dark?' Well, the answer is that we will. (Intelligarde manager)

For Ross McLeod, the police are seen as "distant technocrats" that are incapable of addressing client needs. In the vacuous chasm left in their wake, Intelligarde steps in with the support of prevailing political winds and a discontented consumer.

Do you know what's happening in the U.S.? They're using cardboard cut-outs of cruisers to slow traffic in highways. Some merchants are actually pooling their money and buying old cruisers, repainting and washing them daily, just so it appears that the police are around. People are starved for the type of service we can provide for them. (Intelligarde manager)

Within the digitally pre-figured city of the Law Enforcement Company, these scenes of desperation would be eliminated because everyone can purchase an electronic checkpoint and someone in a uniform will be there to strike it. And the process of surveillance would be open to all without mystification.

But the capability to monitor and make security officers accountable and known can also be applied to other populations. The surveillance system can be widened so that workers in disparate locales might also be policed. Here, the nature of private policing is further revealed – a surveillance system that is inherently a management system for hire. Plans are being discussed to detach and re-sell Intelligarde's communications centre as an international monitoring business. The digital assemblages of the parapolice surveillance system can be transplanted to the most remote reaches of Canada and the world. The new system being imagined can receive over 600 check-ins per hour for service staff across the country. Each client can leave recordings for their staff as well as news or

other instructions. The service person must check-in from a prescribed phone in a designated premise.

This applies to home care professionals as well. They have to call in from a pre-determined phone which will automatically be set in the computer. If someone is not calling from where they're supposed to, we'll know. (Intelligarde manager)

Not surprisingly, Intelligarde management is considering assigning electronic check-point wands or guns to track the movements of workers in isolated locales or in conditions of limited or no supervision. The employees must hit stations throughout the facility and download this information into a console which will immediately be relayed for analysis to a computer at Intelligarde headquarters. Any anomalies would alert the hyperpanoptic registry so that clients (or in this case absentee managers) might be notified.

The Law Enforcement Company is thus a contracted policing service in the full and historic sense of that term. It is concerned with the order maintenance of the city by knowing the places, spaces, and movements of persons it is charged with monitoring. The company charges itself with both crime control and the hyperpanoptic surveillance of those it is entrusted with monitoring – including its own security officers. By managing a disciplinary regime across its own employees, Intelligarde can successfully flog its risk-reducing ability within a politicised and fear-inducing neo-liberal risk market. The private police are endlessly known as they know others. In practice, the parapolice become the contracted inspectorate for a plurality of state and corporate organisations seeking to purchase both the transparent labour (Lyon 1994:119-130) of security work and its techniques for producing transparency in others.

In this chapter, I have suspended an examination of the multiple modes of resistance employed by both the parapolice and the subject populations they are tasked

with controlling in order to entertain the complete managerial fantasy of control. In this way, the risk-reducing, actuarial practices and their correlative modes of surveillance and discipline are revealed. As expected, the properties of social control endemic to policing institutions in late modernity revolve around information collection, and it's proliferation as a means of commodifying security. Not only are the apparatuses of surveillance characteristic of risk society, but simultaneously signal their commodified nature through the virtual panoptics of the deister system, GPD systems, and centralised communication. The saleability of these security accoutrements is demonstrative of both the mode of production and mode of information in which they are fabricated. In other words, the system must produce knowledge about both the populations meant to be policed and those doing the policing so that the disciplinary techniques of the company are attractive to the consumer. The security product that is therefore sold reflects an integrated risk management system. In the chapter to follow, I turn to examining how this management model can be little more than 'fantasy' when the lived realities of those imagined within the assemblage is unveiled.

Figure 5.1: Intelligarde Headquarters - Floor Plan

Figure 5.2: Intelligarde Headquarters - Cross-section Showing Elevation

Chapter Six: Solidarity, Fear and Subculture

Police subculture is a well documented social phenomenon. The early works of Skolnick (1966), Westley (1970) and others (e.g. Manning and Van Maanen 1978) demystified the working environments and occupational mores of the men who made up the 'thin blue line.' More recently, investigations have continued to centre on the attributes of police work (e.g. Chan 1996; Ericson and Shearing 1986; Manning 1996; Manning 1997; Rigakos 1995) in order to understand the effect of 'recipe rules,' 'dramas of control,' or experiential constructions on official (and unofficial) police mobilisations. So much qualitative data has been amassed about the occupational culture of policing that Johnston (1992:186) has criticised "sociology's preoccupation with front-line police behaviour." He argues that attention needs to be diverted to the top of the policing pyramid, lest theorists be endlessly embroiled in the micro-sociological minutiae of street-level practices.

A focus on both the imaginaries of surveillance-power *and* an analysis of the forms of resistance and negotiation that constitute dialectics of control, of course, are equally valuable to sociological theorising. In the previous chapter, I described how Intelligarde's perpetual system of examination and its hyperpanoptic imagination virtualises and digitises the environments to be policed, the employees who police it, and those falling within its gaze. In this chapter, I am concerned with describing the means of resistance employed by security officers and suspects in opposition to the apparatuses of

control constructed by the Law Enforcement Company. I also wish to explore the embattled, yet resilient body of parapolice officers with their constituent 'wannabe' and pugilistic elements. Both the bravado and caution exercised by Intelligarde security officers stems from conditions of dependent uncertainty, status frustration, and the fear of being swarmed by angry mobs. This constant risk-taking and/or risk-aversion results in a strong occupational ethic of interdependence in the face of immediate or impending dangers. This is not unlike the occupational codes of public police agencies – they tend to display a heavy emphasis on organisational and occupational mobilisation in response to threats or violence against their members.

The parapolice culture, however, is qualitatively different because of what I will later describe as its romanticised 'legionnaire' characteristics. Reliance on fellow security officers and a correlative internalising of subcultural norms concerning emergency response or risky incidents results in frustration, isolation, and constant emotional anxiety. The resultant collective psyche of the parapolice produces contradictory and skewed responses ranging from resigned martyrdom, to perpetual dread, and fierce fraternal allegiance. Often, these mores may act upon a security officer variably throughout the completion of a single shift, rotation, month, year, or career.

Resistance from Within: The Art of 'Ghosting'

The Intelligarde surveillance system is far from perfect. Despite a hyperpanoptic gaze of continuous digital examination, security officers have found ample room to manoeuvre within the virtual system. Although Intelligarde's deister system demands constant reporting through the swiping of either coded checkpoints or occurrence strips, these close-ended and automating duties can actually free up security officers for 'non-

revenue' actions. The ability to evade or fool electronic detection is considered by Bogard (1996:100-113) when he builds upon the thoughts of de Certeau (1986) on *la perruque* or 'the wig.' On the one hand, the act of 'looking busy,' 'looking productive,' or 'going through the motions' has been a long perceived quality of police work (Skolnick 1966; see also Smith and Gray 1983). But on the other hand, it has never been as difficult, nor as involved as it is within a hierarchy of perpetual examination, a digitally demanding system of immediate accountability.

La perruque is about reclaiming personal time from the monotony of work. It is about fooling supervision, surveillance, or in the case of Intelligarde, the deister system meant to make security officers constantly known to management. It is appropriate, I think, that Intelligarde security officers have termed this practice 'ghosting.' Intelligarde employees have adeptly captured their presence within the matrix of checkpoints and close-ended occurrences they must virtually inhabit. The act of being seen is merely a simulation of the *real* disordered and chaotic streets and buildings they actually traverse. Thus, their existence within the virtual and wired city of (Intelligarde's) Toronto is spectral in nature, fleeting and indeterminate, and only a representational strategy.

...workers find ways to utilize their *worktime* to resist the *spatial* control strategies of their employers or, more simply put, to elude workplace surveillance and discipline. These temporal manoeuvres, which take advantage of contingencies within the architectural and political order of the workplace, take place 'out of view,' unnoticed by supervisors (or their optical-mechanical surrogates, cameras, listening devices, monitors). (Bogard 1996)

Ghosting is about appearing to be somewhere and doing something necessary to the production of surveillance when, in fact, time is being diverted to one's personal use or leisure. Many security officers were reluctant to discuss ghosting on tape but did comment when the recorder was turned off. But I also came to observe how ghosting is

accomplished in the satellite workplaces of the Law Enforcement Company on numerous occasions.

The most obvious method of ghosting is completing 'hits' (or site visits) ahead of the allocated time reserved for such patrols. A security officer can often complete the swiping of deister checkpoints for a small building within two or three minutes while the patrols might be scheduled for twenty. Security officers are instructed to stay on sight after the last checkpoint has been struck but this, of course, is not a dictum that is always adhered to. A common tactic is to strike half the deister checkpoints at a building, and then drive away to visit a nearby static site officer, or rendezvous with another mobile security officer. Often, mobile officers will take deliveries of coffee or food to static site officers, or might generally socialise with other security officers before returning to the site after 15 minutes to strike the remaining deister strips. For all intents and purposes, the deister collector report will show that the security officer was on site for the required time. Some more daring mobile security officers will actually strike all of the deister checkpoints and then sign off from the site many kilometres away since the 'on site' and 'off site' deister strips are generic ones carried by all security officers in their portfolios.

Most security officers are careful not to report when they arrive and leave a site to the dispatchers in order that they can negotiate their patrol time, allowing for greater 'down time' and opportunity for leisure activities. A common practice for mobile officers is to radio communications officers with a long list of 'on' and 'off' site times. Although this is not permitted, communications officers typically ignore this procedural dictum because of their close social connections to veteran mobile security officers, or because mobile officers typically take deliveries of take-out food to the dispatchers. In

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such security officer led all others in average deister hits as he was preparing for the PRO competition. For their part, management posts deister production numbers to 'close the gap' (Foucault 1977) between the body of security officers. High producers are rewarded with praise while low deister counts looked badly on an entire platoon. This is intended to increase peer pressure on security officers who are not vigilant in this regard.

Another mode of surveillance and accountability is the Intelligarde Clear-net radio system which, according to the description I offered in chapter 5, should promote isolationism, general anomie and a centralised decision-making process over Intelligarde mobilisations. If all communication was filtered through communications headquarters, as was intended, then this would work quite nicely. Of course, this is not how the radio system is used in practice. Many security officers refuse to keep their radios keyed to the communications centre, favouring instead to communicate with a nearby partner, site security officer, or mobile district officer. While the radio system pre-empts general radio traffic over an open frequency, it also allows for unchecked levels of communication between security officers on innumerable private channels. This results in an unofficial chain of communication between security officers negotiating a wide host of unsanctioned mobilisations.

Rather than relying on communications officers for orchestrating back-up and support, many security officers call district colleagues ahead of an actual incident or occurrence. Indeed, one of the most troubling developments about the Mike system, according to a majority of parapolice officers, is that the lack of an open frequency stunts a collective sense of imminent danger and thus stifles preventive actions that might have alleviated disorganisation. For example, in the past when a security officer was about to

effect an arrest and was unsure about being outnumbered, a neighbouring security officer could overhear and volunteer support. As many mobile officers withhold information about their current whereabouts from dispatch, communications officers must call out to a series of security officers in order to ascertain their proximity and ability to assist. This is a highly centralised system but inefficient and dangerous in the eyes of many officers. Thus, unofficial communications take place, wherein a parapolice officer calls ahead and checks support and back-up on his own. These mobilisations are accomplished without the forwarding of information to the communications office.

While a 'group call' function is available to the security officers, they believe that it can only be used in emergency situations since it is a costly measure. One officer told me that "it costs over \$400.00 to activate a group call" while another security officer estimated the cost in the thousands of dollars. Yet another mobile security officer noted that "group calls are a last resort, even [the president] hears the message on his personal radio at home." As a result, this security officer chooses to negotiate his own support in lieu of official company mobilisations because he does not want to be held accountable for its misuse. Even scarier for many security officers is that only one line to the dispatchers can be activated at once. This means that they may very well get a busy signal when trying to call for help. This last problem is anathema to the occupational code of Intelligarde International since at its core is an ethic of mutual assistance. In this way, official attempts to structure and centralise the flow of information has resulted in a wholesale rejection of the radio system and the formulation of a network of unofficial information exchanges and mobilisations that are never documented on official report

forms or broadcast to the communications centre. I recorded at least fifteen such incidents.

On one occasion a mobile security officer lit his vehicle's police light bars to make his way through traffic in assistance of a fellow officer. He sped dangerously through downtown traffic and shouted "you're not seeing this!" The occurrence was never reported to dispatch and had we been stopped by the public police, charges could have been laid under the *Highway Traffic Act* for using emergency lights on public roadways and for speeding. The Mike system has also facilitated socialising by Intelligarde officers because closed frequencies allow for sustained and insulated discussions. Inadvertently, the radio system has spawned an expansive informal communication system hidden to management.

The favourite pastime of Intelligarde security officers is to socialise, gossip, and exchange police recruiting information in informal gatherings. I was often used as a rationale for such meetings because when transferring from district to district, mobile security officers would meet at well manned static sites for the 'escort exchange.' This would often result in gatherings of five or more security officers at a given site. There is a strong subcultural necessity for such meetings because they serve to create a bond between officers and also produce a visible display of authority, solidarity and cohesion for tenants and 'bad guys.' This is re-affirming for the site security officer – it is a reminder to loiterers and dealers of the availability of support at the site officer's disposal. To be sure, Intelligarde managers are not duped into believing that such activities do not exist. 'Ghosting' is not a secret term of the parapolice subculture. Intelligarde managers, who have also spent time in patrol duties, are aware of these

practices but add the possibility of more totalising surveillance techniques to their repertoire. These include Global Positioning Devices, a new radio system, vehicle monitors, etc. In the meantime, current hyperpanoptic apparatuses are buttressed by vigilant supervision. This mostly includes the QCM following, or shadowing, security officers on patrol. If a security officer is not at the same site he reported to dispatch, then the QCM can seize his run sheets, and deister gun to examine his whereabouts.

These activities are unpopular with some security officers who note that 'sneaking about' is devious and shows mistrust.

D lives, eats, and sleeps Intelligarde. He thinks everybody else should too. That, for me, is not going to happen... He's been known to sneak up on people on the job, you know. That, for me, is not what a supervisor should be doing. There are two ways to make people work for you: they fear you, or they respect you. This company is run on fear and constant supervision. (Mobile security officer – Male)

On the other hand, more security officers reflect the attitude that attention from management comes from repeated abuses and that oversight is simply the nature of security work. For them, there is a respect for managerial inspection but a weariness that actions may sometimes be arbitrary.

There have been guys fired from this company, just like that [snaps fingers]. You should ask around. It's unfair when you think about it. Some guys were knobs and deserve it. My opinion is that most of these guys did deserve it but what happens if I make a mistake? Am I history? (Mobile security officer – Male)

I think D does a good job and I respect his position but sometimes he comes on too strong. Most guys here I think respect him but he's also rubbed guys the wrong way too so they have a grudge. As far as I'm concerned, I don't fuck the dog so I have nothing to worry about. (Static site officer – Male)

Another concern for many security officers is that a double standard exists between managerial and line-officer accountability. It is believed that the intense scrutiny and high standard of performance demanded of the parapolice does not apply for Intelligarde management.

If there's a problem, then there's a chain of command that has to be followed in order to rectify something. So, if I've got a payroll problem, I have to go through the supervisor, who then sends it to someone else and then it gets to payroll. For them, no one is accountable. For me, I'm always accountable. If I fuck up,

I'm history. What happens if management fucks up, which they do regularly? Nothing, it's just a mistake. (Mobile security officer – Male)

When a managerial error does arise, the parapolice subculture quickly diffuses the incident to other line officers. This serves to delegitimise supervisory orders – stories of managerial blunders induce employee indifference to directions. On one occasion I observed a chain of secrecy and coded communications by a number of security officers on a given platoon. The incident they were originally guarding from me consisted of an Intelligarde supervisor leaving a handgun, without a trigger lock and outside of the lockbox, in the trunk of a company cruiser. The incident was used as a foil for entry into a general discussion of the inadequacies of management. While most security officers went along with the complaints, others later confided to me that their colleagues sometimes “whine too much.”

Crime Fighting and the Wannabe Culture

The subculture of Intelligarde parapolice cannot be understood without an examination of the shared experiences of frustrations of its membership. Subcultural orientations dictate that it is these shared subjective, aversive experiences that hone a necessary logic for deviant behaviour.

Almost all Intelligarde security officers want careers in law enforcement. They are young, energetic, and eager for employment with public policing agencies. Most would like to join the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service but others are not particularly selective about where they might end up. Some Intelligarde security officers have made applications to police departments as far away as New York, Boston, Houston, and New Orleans. The effect of this ‘wannabe’ subculture is to instil a sense of collective purpose among security officers. Everyone wants law enforcement experience and everyone is

undergoing recruit screening or has information about police departments that are hiring. This continuous information exchange about physical, psychological, and personal interview testing provides a common social grounding and important preparatory information. Many officers from the Law Enforcement Company have moved into careers in public policing – this is reinforcing for those officers still with Intelligarde. Promotions to public police agencies buttress an organisational commitment to professional law enforcement and sends a message to security officers that their efforts are supported. For their part, Intelligarde managers are not hesitant to re-schedule shifts and provide off days for employees that must undergo police testing during one of their rotations.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Intelligarde security officers measure their success against law enforcement ideals: ‘good pinches,’ court testimony, and crime control.

I was trying to arrest a guy in a stairwell for smoking crack and we got into an altercation and he wouldn't leave so I tried to place him under arrest for failing to leave when directed... He just went offside and we were in a stairwell so I couldn't call to anyone... We ended fighting in the stairwell for a good five or six minutes. And he was huge, probably twice as big as me. And he was throwing me around the stairwell like a dart. I had back-up coming but they just weren't getting there quick enough, you know... I had this guy pinned three times and every time he broke free and I thought ‘man, this is it’ because I just couldn't handle this guy... He took off down Pembroke street and one of our guys off duty had his radio and spotted him on Shuter and radioed his position to everyone else. He couldn't get him because he wasn't in uniform. But he pointed him out to our guys as two of our cruisers closed in. The guy was hunched over and out of breath. We grabbed him and he still had \$50.00 worth of crack on him. Metro showed up and got the arrest. I just had court for that three weeks ago... He eventually got six months and two years probation. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Most Intelligarde security officers can relate a story about a ‘good pinch’ while at the company. One officer investigated and arrested a suspect on Intelligarde property at the request of a Metro Police sergeant. In this case, the security officer was being deployed in lieu of public police response.

I guess my best pinch was one time I was shooting the shit with this Metro sergeant and he gets a call over the radio that there's a suspicious person in behind one of our lots on Bleeker Street. So the guy, he's from

51 Division, asks me to check it out since it was on one of our sites. I go around back and find the guy who fit the description – blue blazer, baseball cap. So I arrest him and find a sparkplug he was using to smash the car windows with in his hand. Anyways, the guy was charged with three counts of possession of stolen property and other stuff. I've got court for that one next week. That was a nice, clean, easy one. (Mobile/Static officer – Male)

Handling dangerous incidents without the assistance of the local public police are considered especially meritorious arrests. The following security officer relates an incident where he and his partner may have saved a woman from rape and possible murder.

My partner and I got called to an apartment where there was a guy living in there who we had ongoing problems with. The neighbour had called and said that he heard a female inside the next door apartment screaming for help and he thought there was some kind of domestic going on. So we got there and we know this guy. I mean he's a crack-head, he's a problem-child, he's done all sorts of crime. So anyways, when we got there, we bang on the door and we can hear the female inside calling 'help,' 'help me,' you know, 'let me go,' 'he's grabbing me' and all sorts of things. So we banged on the door and announced who we were and he told us to get lost and started screaming at us to mind our own business and that it had nothing to do with us. But we could hear inside that tables and chairs were being thrashed around and someone was in need of help. So, two seconds before we were about to kick in the door, he opens the door and a female comes running out with her face covered in blood and her pants all ripped and goes tearing off down the hallway 'he's trying to rape me,' you know 'he's trying to rape me.' And he comes out all foaming at the mouth, all hyped up on crack or whatever and he's armed himself with a billiard stick, a pool stick. So we tried talking to him and de-escalating but nothing was working. He was just intent on fighting with us. Sure enough, the pool stick came up and he was about to hit us with it so we got into it with him, and we were restraining him and I was trying to get the stick out of his hand. I knew that if he got his hand free, someone was going to get clobbered with it. I couldn't break his grip – he was pretty strong and he was pretty high so I ended up having to hit him across the knuckles here with my mag-lite. And I got told later on that I apparently broke two of his knuckles... I actually got court for that next week. He got forcible confinement, sexual assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and all kinds of stuff. (Mobile security officer – Male)

When I asked the security officer why the police were not called by the tenant in the first instance, he replied "because we are the police in that area, and by the time they come the woman would be dead." As far as the security officer was concerned, the woman would have been looking at a two to three hour wait unless it's a 911 emergency call.

"Besides," the security officer adds, "we're just as capable of handling it as Metro."

The ability to effect an arrest before or despite public police involvement constitutes the most remembered and related stories. In the following incident, the Law Enforcement Company captured a wanted person before the police could on an

Intelligarde property. The apprehension of the suspect was considered a success for the entire firm because it involved two sites and demonstrated the organisation's communication capabilities and the security officer's vigilance. It was a display of organisational effectiveness.

One of our best pinches, I think, was when this one lady stabbed a guy on one of our properties and fled. Metro was looking for her and the call went out but we also had a description because we knew what was going on. Three hours later we arrested her on another one of our properties for attempted murder and turned her over to Metro. Because, as I'm sure you know by now, we control a major section of the downtown core from Bloor and Sherbourne to St. Hubert and the Esplanade, that's ours. So, she was making her way through our adjoining sites. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Intelligarde security officer zeal to effect arrests sometimes leads them onto unsafe legal footing. In the following incident, a suspect was pursued by Intelligarde security officers in what amounted to a car chase through the city until the suspect finally jumped from his vehicle while it was in gear. Had the incident not ended so fortuitously, there may have been legal repercussions for Intelligarde.

About a year and a half ago. We had a guy working Parking Authority of Toronto and he caught a guy prying a cash drawer from one of the booths. He got to his car and took off. So, our guy got into his car and took off after him. It was kinda cool. They were headed west through the city. I was headed east through the city and we just sort of kept on going till we were gonna meet up not really knowing what we finally got together. Dispatch was on the phone to Metro giving them directions as we were calling them out. The guy bailed out of his car, left it in gear and took off down the street. We chased him down, took him to the ground, 'cuffed him. And there was a whole pile of people watching. We got him down, kept him down, kept him in 'cuffs until the cops showed up... that was a nice one. I think the cops were a little jealous. But they were really good, they were patting us on the back, telling us we did a good job and this. The sergeant showed up and was yelling 'you shouldn't have been doing that' and then on the side was kinda like saying 'that was a pretty good arrest on that.' (Static site officer – Male)

Some Intelligarde stories border on the incredible, as the following tale indicates.

In any case, the overriding logic of notable Intelligarde interventions reflect 'real police work.'

There's stories up at the Kipling building. Two of our guys found a carload full of machine guns, uzis, and a shotgun. Have you heard this one with the machine guns? This one is phenomenal, oh my God, you haven't heard it? They picked up the guns and say 'whoa, we have to call the cops' in the underground. Well, the guys who own the cars are coming around the corner, 'what are you guys doing with our cars?' They ended up getting shot at and so one of our guys that was holding a uzi started shooting back at them. So, this is the type of stuff... This was before the second last time we lost it. We always lose that site. We're our own worst enemy because we clean it up and they hire some crappy security company and we're

back where we started again. We've had and lost that site so many times that we just leave it on the listing now. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Are these anecdotes typical of Intelligarde mobilisations? Do the parapolice often get involved in crime control activities? If so, how often do they effect arrests absent public police interventions? An examination of Intelligarde's occurrence report files yields some interesting answers to these questions (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Types of Occurrences on Intelligarde Properties

OCCURRENCE TYPE		n	%
Tenant Complaint or Info.	I	58	17.1
Violence and Disputes	II	52	15.3
Theft Related	III	44	12.9
Prohibited or Forced Entry	IV	38	11.2
Vagrancy Related	V	38	11.2
Assist Public Agency	VI	36	10.6
Suspicious or Threatening Behaviour	VII	30	8.8
Maintenance Related	VIII	22	6.5
Vandalism/Mischief	IX	14	4.1
Drug Related	X	8	2.4

Based on systematic random sample (n=340) of company occurrence report files (N=1,703), (at 95% confidence interval, $p = 0.05$, precision= $\pm 4\%$). Items re-categorized from 42 incident types listed in order of frequency: I = noise complaint, info. from tenant, found person, found property; II = domestic dispute, common assault, assault security officer, sexual assault, tenant dispute, assault with weapon, deaths; III = theft under, vehicle break-in, attempt theft, fraud, stolen vehicle; IV = previously banned – arrested; forced entry, attempt forced entry; V = loitering, soliciting/panhandling, drunkenness; VI = fire alarm, medical emergency, vehicle accident; VII = suspicious person, suspicious activity, obscene calls, threats; VIII = insecure door, safety hazard, health hazard, leaks, floods, elevator maint., door maint., fire hazard; IX = vandalism, misuse fire equip., vandalize fire equip.; X = suspicious drug activity, drug abuse.

First, the most common reason for parapolice mobilisation involves tenant noise complaints or information (17.1%), followed closely by violence and disputes (15.3%)

and theft-related occurrences (12.9%). Stopping forced entries, or enforcing vagrancy related offences takes up most of Intelligarde's time and represents 20.4% of occurrence reports. With this in mind, an examination of what incidents prompt Intelligarde officers to arrest and/or call for police assistance is necessary because this will identify important mobilisation characteristics of the parapolice (see Table 6.2). While tenant complaints or information may be the most frequent occurrence it rarely results in Intelligarde (0%) or public police (6.9%) arrests. In fact, the most important arrest-producing incident on Intelligarde properties may involve vagrancy-related incidents (100%). On the other hand, the police will be called in only 26.3% of such cases.

Table 6.2: Incidents Prompting Arrests and/or Police Assistance.

OCCURRENCE TYPE	ARREST or DETAIN		POLICE CALLED	
	N	%	N	%
Tenant Complaint or Info. (N=58)	0	0	4	6.9
Violence and Disputes (N=52)	14	26.9	38	73.1
Theft Related (N=44)	12	27.3	32	76.2
Prohibited or Forced Entry (N=38)	22	57.9	30	78.9
Vagrancy Related (N=38)	38	100	10	26.3
Assist Public Agency (N=36)	2	5.6	2	5.6
Suspicious or Threatening Behaviour (N=30)	16	53.3	8	26.7
Maintenance Related (N=22)	0	0	0	0
Vandalism/Mischief (N=14)	0	0	0	0
Drug Related (N=8)	6	75.0	4	50.0

Based on systematic random sample (n=340) of company occurrence report files (N=1,703), (at 95% confidence interval, $p = .05$, precision = $\pm 4\%$).

The most common reasons to call the police were prohibited or forced entries (78.9%) – so that P.O.T.s may be issued, violence and disputes (73.1%), theft (76.2%), and drug-related incidents (50.0%). Caution must be exercise with these percentages because they

Table 6.3: Reported Results of Occurrences on Properties Secured by Intelligarde.

OCCURRENCE RESULT		n	%
SECURITY OFFICER ACTION(S)	Arrest or Detain	110	32.4
	No Arrest	230	67.6
	Investigate and Report	96	28.2
	Arrest, Ban, and Turn Over to Police	58	17.1
	NPE Issued	46	13.5
	Warning/Keep the Peace	49	11.8
	Assist Police	28	8.2
	Unsubstantiated	20	5.9
	Assist Fire Dept.	14	4.1
	Assist Ambulance	12	3.5
	Suspect Escaped	10	2.9
	Escort from Property	8	2.4
	Assist Police in Effecting an Arrest	6	1.8
	Verbal Banning	2	.6
WEAPONS	None	318	93.5
	Stick, Bat, or Blunt Object(s)	12	3.5
	Gun	6	1.8
	Knife	4	1.2
INJURIES	None	294	66.5
	Victim or Other	32	9.4
	Security Officer(s)	8	2.4
	Suspect(s)	4	1.2

Based on systematic random sample (n=340) of company occurrence report files (N=1,703), (at 95% confidence interval, $p = .05$, precision = $\pm 4\%$). NPE = Notice Prohibiting Entry.

reflect only reported (or officially observed) occurrences, and not the actual number of incidents. It is highly unlikely, for example, that vagrancy would be observed, with no action taken and an occurrence report subsequently filed. Not only is this not worthy of reporting but may reveal a security officer's less than vigilant disposition.

Statistics gleaned from an analysis of Intelligarde occurrence reports indicate that 32.4% of occurrences result in arrest and 17.1% of suspects are handed over to the police after banning. An additional 8.2% of incidents involve assisting the public police in effecting arrests (see Table 6.3). By additionally tallying all public agency responses to Intelligarde secured properties, we find that 37.9% of occurrences involve police presence, followed by ambulance (8.2%) and fire (5.9%) services (see Table 6.4). This clearly established the routine interaction between the public police and Intelligarde International.

Table 6.4: Reported Public Agency Responses to Properties Secured by Intelligarde.

AGENCY	n	%
Police	128	37.9
Ambulance	28	8.2
Fire	10	5.9
MTHA	2	.6

Based on systematic random sample (n=340) of company occurrence report files (N=1,703), (at 95% confidence interval, $p = .05$, precision = $\pm 4\%$).
MTHA = Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority Security.

Previous research in Canada, has indicated that police officers view security guards as 'Mickey Mouse' in training, deportment, and mandate. This is particularly evident in their understandings and constructions of the private security sector's loss prevention focus (Shearing, Stenning and Addario 1985b). Would the same attitudes affect relations with the parapolice given their crime prevention mandate? Due to regular contact with the public police, and the zeal and bravado with which Intelligarde security officers

sometimes exercise their crime control duties, it is little wonder that they sometimes come into conflict with public law enforcement.

There was this one guy who was loaded and I tried to arrest him because he was pissing on the property. So, I go to arrest him and I apply a very simple procedure on him but he's flinging at me and when I take him down the guy is bleeding all over the place because he banged his head while going down. The cops arrive and ask me what happened. And when I told them they're like 'what, you did this to the guy because he was peeing?' And, of course, now they think I went to town on this guy and all that happened was that he landed on his head. They said that he could actually charge me for assault if I charged him. So I said, just get this guy out of here on the trespass. So they ended up letting him go because they thought he already suffered enough. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Sometimes, however, the professional relationships between Intelligarde security officers and some GTA police services border on an auxiliary function:

I don't know if anybody has already told you this but everybody calls me the traffic cop. I work out in the west end where there's a lot of highways. I'm out there every night and I've done a lot of impaireds. In the last two years... I follow them on the road and I radio the cops and it's very crucial that, you know, its not like I'm an ordinary citizen. You have to know what they're looking for: weaving, changing lanes, acceleration, deceleration, erratic driving. They'll ask 'what did you observe?' In the last four months, I've done about six. I have a lot of down time. The last one I called OPP. I don't want to tie up dispatch with non-revenue items. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Relationships with the public police, therefore, are often contingent upon the specific histories with certain services or Divisions. When there has been a consistent positive association between the police and Intelligarde, personal ties may develop between public police officers and the parapolice, fostering a student-mentor relationship.

I get along with them. No problems. The only time they get upset with our guys is when we go beyond our job. (Mobile security officer)

Metro many times will instil this teacher-student relationship by looking for what you did wrong. They'll point out where you went wrong in the arrest. They won't dwell on it but they'll let you know where you basically fucked up. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Well, I guess because I've been here for so long, they coach us. They tell us how to do things and get around stuff. They say 'if you can't handle it, give us a call.' They help us with how the law works. (Static site officer – Male)

As far as dispatch, we have to deal with Metro dispatch daily, if not hourly. So there's a mutual respect. As far as the cops down here, I find that I get rides in from the bridge and stuff. They're good guys. But, I guess in some other areas that isn't necessarily the case. I hear stories from the guys coming on or off shift and it's sad to learn that some cops don't give a shit, you know. But others are great. A lot of it has to do with youth, I think. (Communications officer – Male)

In other areas, relations between the public and private police depend upon the individual security officers and police who respond. These transactions can vary between amicable exchanges to adversarial meetings.

It varies. It depends on the officer. It's the same as if I was Joe Citizen. Everyone has had good and bad experiences with the police. I swear to you that some police officers turn around and follow us and if I go one kilometre over the speed limit they'll pull me over. They go out of their way to follow the cars and some will just casually wave. They'll turn around and follow you right up your ass, and if you've got an alarm response, you're screwed. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Uhm, 23 Division has been really co-operative with us. Whenever we've had arrests, they've responded very quickly. All of our arrests, the majority have been issued P.O.T.s, Provincial Offences Tickets. (Static site officer – Male)

It depends on where you're working. Each Division has its own positive or negative views of Intelligarde. For example, 23 Division had a very negative view of Intelligarde because we had some real just bad instances where security officers over-exceeded their authority or did bad arrests. That sort of thing. And it took a lot of work with a steady crew in that area to set up a good working relationship... because they had a real sour taste in their mouths after working with some of our officers. (Communications officer – Male)

According to many Intelligarde security officers, the best arrangements with the police exist in downtown Toronto, where most of the veteran and professional parapolice interact with Divisions accustomed to their presence. On the other hand, some outlying Divisions and police services do not have the same professional relationship with the Law Enforcement Company.

We work well with the Metro Police generally in the downtown area. When you get out to some of the outskirt areas, they tend not to be very useful to us. One of the divisions, I needed back-up once. They came, drove around the parking lot, didn't see anybody and left. (Mobile security officer – Male)

It varies from division to division. The guys downtown we get along with. There's, I think, a mutual respect there. We do our jobs and stay out of their way. Out in the suburbs, especially out in the west end. I think a lot of police, the public police, see us as their rivals like we're trying to cut their lawn. Like we're trying to be them or trying to do their job... But, of course, we're trying to do a job similar to that on an entirely different level with an entirely different set of rules. (Mobile security officer – Male)

It depends on their past experiences with us. I was working out in 23 Division and I heard that the cops were assholes and this and that. But I did what I had to do. I had the paperwork for them when they got there and by the end I was playing hockey with them on Thursday nights. Cops know when they come out here, they're going to have everything they need. All they have to do is write the ticket or take the guy in. (Static site officer – Male)

Intelligarde officers report that the public may or may not respect them. This is dependent upon the population being policed, the population being police for, and the general environment of policing.

You get some people who will treat you like a police officer. You'll get some people who will treat you like you're nothing. Out here, in Peel, they're a higher class of people. But they're basically helpless snobs that don't have clue. They'll call and say 'come quick, the kids are making noise' and if you're a couple of minutes over your expected time they'll start beaking at you. They're real idiots. It's hard to respect their pettiness after coming from St. James Town and North York, you know? (Mobile security officer – Male)

The negative view that a lot of people have about us gets a little frustrating. You're there and you're trying to help people and you're dealing with a bunch of people that don't want you to help them. They see you as making an imposition on their lifestyle or something and it gets very frustrating... (Mobile security officer – Male)

The store community they really support us. They [others] criticise us because they think we're arresting someone because they're black. I have to watch for the crowd because they'll come and try to help him. If I think that it's going to be a bad arrest or that there are too many people in the area... If you call for back-up you're gonna get a riot. You're going to get a lot of people who are going to help this one person who maybe stole something from K-Mart. And then you've got guards fighting or holding people back. So, the best thing to do sometimes is just to let it go... In the three years I've been here, we've had about five severe swarmings. (Static site officer – Male)

These comments are in line with previous research on public perceptions of private security. Shearing et al. (1985c:227) note that "private security has not established itself as a stereotypic cultural object about which people have clear and distinct images." It is also true, however, that Intelligarde carries a reputation of swift and severe action against populations it is charged with policing (see chapter four). This is illustrated by a security officer who argues that he benefits from Intelligarde's 'no nonsense' reputation.

I don't know if they respect us as much as fear us. Intelligarde has the reputation where you don't screw with us. Or if you do, you'll have six cruisers there in about five minutes. And like look at me, I'm not the most intimidating guy. I'm not six feet, 200 lbs. I like when I'm doing my patrol that I can hear guys saying don't screw with Intelligarde because you're going to have six guys here in five minutes. So that works for me when I do my patrols because it's not like 'oh, he's just some numbkey [?] security guard.' (Mobile security officer – Male)

Despite all of the bravado, however, Intelligarde security officers are also a weary lot who feel they get little respect from both the public and the police. This was evident to me on one occasion when responding to a call for back-up with a mobile security

officer. When we arrived at the site – a downtown rooming house – we noticed two black middle-aged men outside the residence, yelling at a beleaguered security officer. Soon after we arrived, another vehicle and two foot patrol officers from a nearby site joined us. The incident had started because the security officer began making inquiries about the occupants of the rooming house. One of the persons should not have been there because of a previous banning.

The suspect fled when more officers arrived. As we stood about the front of the house, the resident who had invited the banned individual inside and had refused to allow him to leave by challenging security, was now being conciliatory. “Thanks man, we cool right, we cool?” he asked. The officer found out that the resident did not want him there either but had put up a display in order not to appear to be betraying his ‘friend.’ The man shakes the security officer’s hand and thanks him.

S/O #1: See the type of shit we have to put up with? That guy wanted him out too but was giving me a hard time. He was belligerent and wouldn’t provide a name.

Me: Yeah?

As we turn to leave, a older man staggers towards us as he passes by the front of the house. He begins to yell over the top of the fence.

Man: Hey, why don’t you go home you fucking wannabes?

S/O #2: Sir, don’t you anything better to do?

Man: You guys are all just a bunch of fucking wannabes!

S/O #1: Hey, you’re drunk, just go home.

Man: I may be drunk, but at least I’m not a fucking wannabe.

S/O #2: (To me) This happens every fucking night.

Man: W-a-n-n-a-b-e!!

S/O #1: Why don’t you come here and say that?

Man: Why, so you can arrest me? I may be drunk but I ain't stupid. I'm on public property you fucking wannabe. You come here. If you so much as touch me I can sue your ass.

S/O #1: Just come here.

Me: Sir, just go home.

S/O #2: Ok, guys just forget it.

Man: Fucking wannabes!

S/O #2: Yeah, we're wannabes. We want to be something, do something. What about you? What are you gonna fucking do you old drunk? You wan' another drink? Huh, asshole? What do you wannabe? A fucking alcoholic? Now fuck-off old man, we're trying to do our jobs!

The man staggers away but not before yelling out a few more parting remarks. The status frustration the parapolice experience in performing their duties was aptly summed up by one officer when he noted:

Our major obstacle when dealing with the public is the 'security guard' patch. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Resistance from Below: Safety in Numbers

Whether tasked with instilling order, collecting debts, or apprehending fugitives, collective resistance against the private police⁷³ has been a historic practice amid the populations they have been charged with governing. In early 18th century England, debtor's sanctuaries such as 'the Mint' outside of London facilitated routinised criminal activity and a resilience to 'lawful' intrusions (McMullan 1996:121). These collective protectorates were havens for thieves, burglars, and prostitutes. Brewer (1980) notes that any official who ventured into this area, did so at their own peril. They ran the risk of being thrown into tubs of urine, covered in filth and tossed into the open sewers that lined the city streets. In 1705, it took four justices of the peace with 21 constables battling

⁷³ At this stage in English policing, it was common for constables to be paid replacements for more affluent citizens. Typically, many Justices of the Peace and Marshalls (as in the case of Jonathan Wild) ran private thief-taking organisations alongside their public duties.

numerous 'shelterers' to apprehend a bankrupt and his wares. Two-hundred and ninety-two years later, a parapolice officer relates the following:

Y: This one guy kept saying that he's here to visit his aunt but he was already banned. So me and my partner tell him to go up and see her but that he can't hang out in the lobby. So he's giving us lip and stuff and we tell him to leave and he refuses to do so. So I arrest him for failure to leave... We attempted to put him in restraints and he began to struggle with us, so we took him to the ground and tried again and he kept on struggling. Then we look up and see six guys coming at us.

Me: Where did they come from?

Y: Outside mostly. So we try to get him in restraints and can only get one arm so we handcuff him to the doorknob in the lobby there. So, within a matter of seconds there was twelve guys on us, and by now we're shitting our pants.

Me: Twelve?

Y: Well, actually by the time we had him up against the wall and cuffed to the doorknob there were about 36 of them. It's like a pack of hyenas. One person would come in, throw a punch and then duck out. And then another one would come in...

Me: How long did it take for help to arrive?

Y: The response time from our company was approximately three minutes until back-up got here. From the moment when we notified them that we'd be placing someone under arrest, we knew we had back-up coming. And then we radioed that he was resisting arrest and then eventually it was 10-33 [emergency], so we had two guys running from another site down the street. We also had District 11 come from the west end.

Me: So I guess you made a group call on the Mike system?

Y: Group call, yes. So then there were about four or five districts here and then all of a sudden Metro rolled up. It took about twenty minutes for 23 Division to show up, because, for some reason, I don't know why, I guess they had another call. So then we handed him over to MTP and then we did up statements for them. And then we had to go to the hospital, because, myself, I suffered a concussion throughout the whole ordeal. I got my head slammed off the floor and the pillar when they were on top of us. So I didn't know what was going on so we went to the hospital and my other partner suffered a broken hand, strained back, and almost a blown out knee... We've had a couple of other smaller swarmings but nothing as big as that.

Me: Was 23 Division co-operative when they finally showed up?

Y: Very co-operative.

Me: What did they say about the guy being handcuffed to the doorknob?

Y: Well, they understood that under the situation, that was the best thing we could have done. He was under arrest. Once you arrest someone you can't let him flee. Because we're not proper authorities to let him go, we can't issue a P.O.T.... They said we did a good job keeping him there because there were guys trying to kick the doorknob off. They actually rolled in a couple of units which helped disperse the crowd.

Me: How did all of these people descend on you?

- Y: Most of the people we deal with live on the second floor or some of the lower floors so they can sell their drugs and they can get down the stairs very quickly. The lobby has a camera with monitors in everyone's apartments so they can see who's buzzing in so that's how they knew.
- Me: So they saw it on their CCTV monitors and ran down.
- Y: Yep.
- Me: So the CCTV in that case worked against you guys.
- Y: Yep. That's right. And it was designed to get the community involved in their own safety. It didn't work out that way. (Laughter)

The irony of social order and resistance in this attack demonstrates how technologies of surveillance can be turned against the watcher. Rather than utilise the CCTV system to assist the officers or call the police. The 'community' of dealers instead, employed the surveillance system as an opportunity to resist the parapolice.

The possibility of racially-motivated swarmings is an ever-present deterrent to parapolicing overzealousness:

If you take down one guy, the way that we work is that you take him down fast and then get out of the public sight fast. Because, otherwise you'll have about fifty guys on... (Static site officer – Male)

The gang-style 'rumbles' that occasionally ensue when Intelligarde security officers attempt arrests on black suspects put black security officers in an interesting position, yet they maintain that their decisions are not tainted by skin pigmentation. One black officer notes:

Well, you see, the thing about me is that when I'm doing my work I don't see colour. I try to blind my eyes to colours. I don't deal with colours when I'm doing my work. You're black, white, or whatever, if you are doing something that's wrong I'm gonna give you the full length as I'm trained to do... They scorn me just like they scorn anyone around this place because they think we're all the same pack. You have the average black guy who might say 'hi' to me and not say 'hi' to B [a white security officer], right? That doesn't mean that they're gonna be looked at different if they do something wrong because I'm going to kick their ass just the same. (Static site officer – Male)

Another black officer has strong feelings about the role of the Law Enforcement

Company in predominantly black neighbourhoods, arguing that while young residents put up a front of resistance, they are actually happy that the parapolice are there.

I can tell you that this not a racist company. I'm sure that there have been a couple of idiots in the past that are no longer with us who have said things they shouldn't. But I go to sites and I talk to young guys. Kids that act tough around their friends because they live there. I understand that. They say to me, you know, 'I'm glad you guys are here.' Because they know if we were gone, black or white, there would be no order. Nobody wants to live like that. (Mobile security officer – Male)

In one North York mall, a near riot broke out when security officers tried to arrest a black suspect.

We got swarmed up here once. One of our guys lost his billy stick and was getting hit in the side of the head with it. Just chaos. And it was free swinging. There were about ten of us here that showed up. When it was all over, we just sat by the water fountain trying to catch our breath. We pointed out all of the guys who were still in restraints or who the police cornered. It was like 'he assaulted him, that guy assaulted me, that guy tried to choke me, and on and on...' (Static site officer – Male)

The Intelligarde uniform is unwelcome in many quarters of downtown or north Toronto. The parapolice officer's patrols and mobilisations are thus enveloped within the very real possibility of violence. The fear of being swarmed is palpable when entering building lobbies or patrolling malls governed by the Law Enforcement Company.

'TIPs'⁷⁴ and 'Swarmings:' The Dialectics of Fear

Thief-taking and the art of private policing has always been a dangerous business. Eighteenth century descriptions of the self-proclaimed and charismatic 'Thief-taker General,' Jonathan Wild, reveal a strong, stocky man who was irrevocably marred by his dealings with London's criminal class:

By 1725 he had two fractures in his skull and his bald head was covered with silver plates. He had seventeen wounds in various parts of his body from swords, daggers, and gun-shots, contracted in the innumerable affrays, set-to's and riots he always seemed to be engaged in. His throat had been cut. (Howson 1970:245-246)

The threat of imminent danger, of constant risk, is part of the occupational hazard of doing parapolicing in Toronto. In chapter three, I described how Intelligarde security officers are five times more likely than their public police counterparts to be attacked

⁷⁴ Trespass Interdiction Program

while on duty. Despite the low probability overall (i.e. only .748% chance per response – see Table 3.1), stories of ‘swarmings’ are ingrained within the subcultural fabric of Intelligarde International.

One specific incident was repeatedly referred to by numerous officers while I was in the field collecting data. This illustrates the immeasurable impact of subcultural narratives on the general parapolice workforce. I finally met the security officer involved in the swarming and he told me about the attack:

J: I guess the things that frighten me are... I guess multiple persons. When you're confronting multiple persons and you're a solo officer with maybe a canine. I'll give you a little story, just very quickly. About a year ago, just over a year ago, I was working static at a place we do at Jane and Woolner. It's a place we call 'the corridor.' We got a call – myself and my partner. It's a really, really bad area.

Me: Yeah.

J: Anyways, we get a call that there's some guy dealing crack behind one of the buildings. We take a stroll back there and we see one guy so we go up and we start talking to him. Another guy shows up, he's saying to let his buddy go, stop hassling him. We try to keep the two separated... the second guy that shows up pulls a gun on us. We take him to the ground and within five seconds we were swarmed by about 25 guys. We were beaten to a pulp. We linked arms and basically stayed down. I got kicked, punched, I had an X-acto knife stabbed in my neck. I had a champagne bottle smashed over my head and the guy just kept sticking it in my head and literally tore my scalp to shreds.

Me: Holy...

J: The last thing I saw was this guy standing over me taking a two by four to my face... Uhm, and then it was lights out. Yeah, and I guess you don't even have time to be scared in a situation like that but that's what everybody fears happening to them.

Me: And you're still doing it?

J: I was back a week later. My nose wasn't even busted but I still had black eyes. Uhm, it's...

Me: How did you guys deal with that situation?

J: We went unconscious, basically.

Me: No; I mean after...

J: Afterwards? The manpower up there was stepped up a little bit, and then we essentially went back to doing what we do every day. Uhm, that's my job. It's one of the grim realities of doing my job. And that was the second time I was swarmed. I've been swarmed three times so far in this company. That was, by far, the worst. The other time I was arresting a drunk driver on our property, and I got swarmed by about twenty people who just kicked and punched. Uhm, there

were no weapons involved. I got out of that one relatively unscathed. I had back-up very quickly with canine and they were able to keep the group off while I made the full arrest.

Me: So...

J: So, I mean. Stuff like that is a grim reality. We could go into a stairwell right now and run into three or four people who are smoking crack or shooting heroine. They're completely unpredictable. They could have an open-capped syringe that's got Hepatitis B or C or HIV on it and if they stick you with that it's over. You're done. Yet you're still required to stop these guys and put them into custody. We don't have the use of force options that Metro Police have, we have our hands, and we have a flashlight, and we have our mouths...

J's partner took considerably longer to return to duty. Like most, the effects of the assault had a more pronounced psychological effect on him. Although, he did eventually return to work and is currently assigned to Toronto's downtown bus terminal.

These tales of serendipitous gang assaults on Intelligarde security officers are not considered rare or insular. They are considered part of the possibility, if not the *probability* of patrol work.

I don't like dealing with a large group. That's the biggest fear I've had. That never really hit until I worked at our Kipling and Steeles site, that's where we got swarmed... This one was in May. We had the site for three days. And we were making an arrest on one person and it ended up with 36 of them on top of us. (Static site officer – Male)

I'm afraid when I'm arresting someone because I don't know how the people are going to react. Uhm, if it's the one person I can handle. It's the people around him. I'm like everybody else, nobody wants to be swarmed. We patrol some very political areas and anything can happen. (Static site officer – Male)

It is hardly surprising, therefore, to find quick response and a more of mutual aid central to the occupational climate of parapolicing. If one ingredient can be isolated away as the most important for the general subcultural ethic of Intelligarde security officers, it is this code of mutual assistance.

The worst fear is getting jumped and having lax back-up. In Peel, there's no back-up. There's one other officer but he's usually closer to the Etobicoke border. So, if I'm out at Winston Churchill, I'm screwed. (Mobile security officer – Male)

I fear not being able to call for back-up. Sometimes we're on the third level of an underground parking area and if something happens down there I'm all alone with a flashlight and body armour. The radios don't work through five feet of concrete. Some sites actually have repeaters but that's still not enough. If they have weapons and confront me, what am I supposed to do. You can't run. Everybody has that fear. All you have is your radio, your dog if you have one, and your partner. (Mobile security officer – Male)

One particularly eloquent officer summed up the plight of Intelligarde security employees by referring to their isolationism, constant anxiety, and lack of respect from the police and public. The resultant romanticised construction of the parapolice he harbours is telling of the occupational culture he inhabits.

(Sigh). It also gets to your head when you spend 12 hours of your day patrolling underground lots and shitty stairwells across the city. You only see crap and you get crapped on by the dealers, the druggies, the prostitutes, and some of the tenants. You know, you're on patrol and people think you're just a wannabe, or a fucking racist and it gets to you. The worst thing of all is when on top of all of that, the cops, who should sympathise and understand, they shit on you too after risking your life in some fucking dark alley at 2 am. It's disheartening... For the money we make, sometimes I think we're the last true, bona fide, and unsung heroes of the city. And the only people that know that are our fellow officers. That's why we can't let each other down. Because no one is gonna help us. The tenants pile on top of you in a swarming, the newspapers think you're 'Intelligoons,' and the cops arrive after half an hour. If I don't rush over there to help an officer, who else is? I know it, he knows, we all know it. (Static site officer – Male)

The corollary of not getting support in dangerous situations is not being able to provide it or failing to get to a scene quickly enough. Intelligarde security officers who have been in swarmings know exactly how long it took for their colleagues and for the police to arrive. No one wants to be the last one to arrive in relief of a fellow officer. And no one wants to fail their friends on their platoon. This is why Intelligarde officers often break the law and activate their vehicle's emergency lights to get through traffic in support of an officer in distress.

I'm afraid all the time, actually. The whole thing is running on adrenaline... Yeah, I'm absolutely afraid of swarmings, but honestly the thing I'm most afraid of is not knowing where to go when somebody else needs my help. I mean that fucks me up. When they put me out there, you know, they put me in the west end district not knowing of the demographics of the sites, not knowing the type of people there, which they definitely need to do. So, that's why in the briefing today I was asking for a new site list, 'cause my old one is shit – it didn't have all of them on there. (Mobile security officer – Male)

I guess my biggest worry is not being able to get somewhere and help out one of the other officers who needs my help. As a mobile officer, you're the back-up to all static sites in the area. If they get into the real deep shit, my biggest worry is being able to get there in time to help. (Mobile security officer – Male)

My biggest fear, bar none, is dropping a call... That means not getting people there quickly enough or not being aware of what's going on. I couldn't live with myself if someone got hurt because I fucked up. (Communications officer – Male)

Of course, fearing the possibilities of failing to assist or being outnumbered are only the most powerful anxiety-producing incidents. There are, of course, others:

The scariest thing lately has been the alarms where you don't know what's going on. Especially motion alarms in secluded areas. You have to check things out before calling Metro. You have to go into backyards bordering ravines or wooded lots in the middle of the night. Who knows what's back there? The other thing, of course, is being outnumbered. Especially if back-up is miles away. But being swarmed, that's high on everyone's list. (Mobile security officer – Male)

Anyone who's on drugs or alcohol is a problem. That scares me. I can talk my way out of most altercations but where I am there's hardly any trouble. I'm looking after the cars of affluent people in the Yonge-Eglinton area. You know, constant motorised patrol. So, it's not like I'm in any imminent danger. (Mobile security officer – Female)

One of the more common resentments stems from overzealous 'cherries' (new officers – see chapter four) who continuously 'cry wolf' after getting themselves involved in dangerous situations. Some veteran officers are weary of new recruits whom they have few social ties with and whom they generally do not trust to size up the potential dangerousness of incidents. This, therefore, also imperils them.

A lot of times I'm afraid some of these stupid and gung-ho young guys are going to get me killed. They can also fuck up an entire site because they want to kick some ass and they make it dangerous for you in the future. I'm older, but I've got to go when called to a site. They're playing with my health. (Mobile security officer – Male)

The thing that's the worst is when new guys are trying to make a name for themselves or don't know what the fuck they're doing. My biggest fear is not getting myself beaten up under uncontrollable circumstances. I want to go home in one piece. I have a family, a girlfriend to go home to. If there are thirty guys there who want to drink and party, I'll back down, you know, 'OK guys you win, we're leaving.' But then I'll be back with seven guys and four dogs to disperse them. There's no point trying to be a hero and getting your head kicked in every night. (Mobile security officer – Male)

This latter respondent raises the possibility of pre-emptive back-up, which is not an uncommon parapolice practice. Perhaps the most well-known, and organisationally sanctioned, practice of deploying numerous officers is the Trespass Interdiction Program (commonly referred to as TIPs).

TIPs are designed to engage multiple suspects with many security officers and canines. The purpose of the TIP is to arrest drug dealers, trespassers, and offenders in a single sweep of a building, lobby, or other structure.

They just did a TIP recently. We get five or six guys in a van and closed in on them. The property was slipping and we didn't have the presence there that we would have liked so in we go. Everybody was notified ahead of time. I'm not sure how the billing works. (Mobile security officer – Male)

If we ever perform any special duties or special TIPs we try to inform them first. They don't like surprises.
(Mobile security officer – Male)

The logic of a TIP emanates from using collective action to dissuade drug dealers, prostitutes, or other 'undesirables' from using Intelligarde secured properties for their business. Intelligarde maintains that by making it increasingly difficult for offenders to ply their merchandise on their sites, they will simply move to another location.

However they are rationalised, TIPs are simply swarmings orchestrated by the Law Enforcement Company. Officially planned TIPs involve site surveillance and the videotaping of suspects before collective action is implemented. With the consent of the property owner, ten or more Intelligarde security officers descend upon a site in vans with guard dogs and arrest predetermined suspects congregating in the lobby areas or clear squatters from crack houses (see Girard 1989; Pratt 1995; Pron 1989a; Pron 1989b). Often these actions are highly visible and are greeted with cheers from residents. But they are also highly dangerous and often brutal. It is possible for suspects and Intelligarde officers to be injured in these altercations. While these interventions are deliberate and planned, they are just as intimidating to Intelligarde's enemies because they are swift, brutal, and unexpected.

Less talked about are unsanctioned TIPs that are mustered by security officers without the management's consent. After the swarming involving J (above), Intelligarde management decided that reprisals would only escalate matters. Frustrated by the Metro Toronto Police Service's inability to investigate and bring the offenders to justice, a few Intelligarde leaders orchestrated an informal TIP of their own. This involved gathering up six officers and a few dogs for a patrol in force of the site. All of the officers took time out of their patrol runs to get involved. Although the deployment did not produce an

altercation, it was important for symbolic purposes. As one veteran mobile security officer put it, “nothing happened but if we saw any of those guys ourselves, we would have taken them down.” But as it happened “there was no way they’d poke their noses around there so soon after the incident. I know that their friends and look-outs got the word back to them that we were there looking for them and that’s enough.”

The ability to muster more people, more quickly than the enemy is a constant challenge to Intelligarde security officers. This is true whether these are official or unofficial mobilisations. It is no wonder, therefore, that the parapolice call for assistance before they attempt an arrest in public areas or under circumstances that might elicit collective resistance. In 1997, mobilisation records demonstrate that there is a statistically significant difference between the mean number of officers responding to incidents involving the public police or arrests. In both cases, the average number of officers present is significantly greater (see Table 6.5).

Table 6.5: The Relationship Between Arrests, Police Presence, and Security Officer Response.

		MEAN NO. OF S/Os	t
POLICE	Yes (n=128)	2.00	9.558*** df=336
	No (n=210)	1.21	
ARREST	Yes (n=110)	1.75	3.756*** df=338
	No (n=230)	1.39	

***p<.001

Based on systematic random sample (n=340) of company occurrence report files (N=1,703), (at 95% confidence interval, $p = .05$, precision= $\pm 4\%$). S/Os = security officers. ARREST also includes detained persons issued Notice Prohibiting Entry.

To a certain extent, these findings are hardly surprising. It is only logical that more officers would respond to more volatile incidents. But when these statistical findings are wedded to the ethnographic observations presented above, a picture emerges of serendipitous TIPs and swarmings that are tantamount to what has elsewhere been termed 'fire brigade policing' (Smith and Gray 1983). In effect, these findings support the conclusion of a 'swarm or be swarmed' occupational ethic which invariably breeds fear, uneasiness, and perpetual reliance on mutual assistance.

When Tony Geraghty (1986) describes the history of the French Foreign Legion, he focuses on the mercenary lore of the *Régiment Etrangères* as fostering a fierce regimental loyalty. Considered not quite as good as France's 'true' army, looked down upon by many Frenchmen and political figures, and deployed in the most hostile (and often suicidal) theatres of war because of their 'expendable' nature, the legionnaire has had to look within to construct some meaning for his existence. At the obvious risk of romanticising the monotony of security work in Toronto's underbelly, I find similar attributes among Intelligarde's men and women. Often looked down upon by the public, attacked by angry mobs, treated with indifference or disdain by the state's 'true' police, and asked to patrol areas where most would not tread, Intelligarde security officers can look only to each other for support.

On the other hand, fear and group solidarity can often result in negative effects. Skolnick (1966) refers to the construction of 'symbolic assailants' in order to explain why police officers respond differently to various members of the public. A person whose clothes and mannerisms suggest that he or she will cause trouble is a more likely candidate for harsher treatment. The subculture teaches officers how to identify

dangerous situations. Stories of resistance or, in the case of Intelligarde, swarmings act to develop a cultural narrative of the 'typical' violence-prone suspect. For Intelligarde officers, this is clearly a young black man, usually of Jamaican descent. On one level, these perceptions are merely the product of doing police work – one makes decisions on the basis of previous experience, both individual and organisational. As one Intelligarde manager put it "your longevity is based upon your ability to apply labels." On another level, however, a pre-determined course of action based upon the 'look' or skin colour of a suspect is clearly prejudicial and smacks of systemic racism, whatever the rationale.

It is not surprising to learn that Intelligarde security dogs have a reputation for lunging at black people.

People sometimes say to us "you train your dogs to hate black people." My answer to that is "no we don't, they train themselves." We never train our dogs to react on the basis of clothing or skin colour or anything like that. Our dogs are there to protect the security officer. If the officer is tense or roused, so will the dog... In this business, dogs quickly become systemic racists because they don't have to rationalise their actions, they act out of instinct and past experience. (Intelligarde manager)

Much like their handlers, and often indirectly cued by them, the dogs reflect their own socialisation towards particular populations. When the handler is roused, so is the dog that is trained to protect him or her.

This chapter has dealt with resistance and subcultural mores among the Intelligarde parapolice. As expected, multiple modes of resistance were found to be operating in opposition to the techniques of hyperpanoptic control delineated in chapter five. The managerial logic for deploying disciplining techniques leads to counter-productive and unforeseen consequences when applied to the general guard-force. Tied to our knowledge of parapolice resistance is an appreciation for the subcultural priorities that shape it. Crime fighting and the wannabe culture, as well as the environment of limitless risks that must be policed, breed uneasiness and the urge to maintain a strong,

unofficial, collective resistance strategy in the face of these threats. The result is the dialectic reproduction of more threats and fear, both for the populations being policed and the parapolice themselves.

Closing Remarks

It was near the end of my time in the field that I was escorted over to a property in the Intelligarde territory of St. James Town. As we walked toward the site, I noticed that the evening pedestrian traffic on this private roadway was strangely polarised. For some reason only the south sidewalk was being used for walking but there were numerous persons idling about the lobby and front entrance on the north side. When I came to the Intelligarde building, I asked the site officer why it was that nobody was congregating about their property but at least twenty people were on the other side of the roadway. The simple answer, according to him, was that the building opposite was not secured by Intelligarde.

As I sat against a landscape wall, the Intelligarde officer looked over to the other building as he puffed on a cigarette. As far as he was concerned, the 'dealers' would not dare ply their trade on his side of the street so long as he was on duty. We sat under a 'no loitering' sign posted to empower site security officers with the ability to arrest for 'prohibited' activity on their patch. Only a few moments later, an older woman who was walking her dog came across the street to strike up a conversation. I stopped my interview and listened to her query the security officer about what a handgun laser-sight might look like. She reported that while walking behind the other building, someone had shone a red dot on her leg and on her dog. This terrified her. The woman began complaining that she could not even walk her dog without fear of being shot. The security officer asked her to report the incident to MTHA security because he was not

responsible for the property in question. The woman moaned that they would not do anything for her and said she would call the police.

Soon after, two other women came across to us reporting the same occurrence. Again, the security officer asked them to report the incident to MTHA security but this only prompted the women to deride them as being 'scared.' "They're not like you guys," one woman added, "they're afraid to approach these guys. When are you going to come to our buildings?" she asked. The security officer smiled and said "talk to your tenant's association." Is this the future of policing? Territorially bounded services for hire? A series of organisations poised to fill the emotional and material voids of security within emerging risks markets? In this final chapter, I intend to review the theoretical assumptions, research questions and central findings presented herein, as well as offer a discussion of some of the political implications of this research.

Parapolicing Risk Markets

At the beginning of chapter two, I distilled two central questions that emanate from the perspective I proffered in the theoretical set-up for this dissertation. Before I summarise the short answers to these questions from the information presented in this investigation, we need to take stock of the theoretical assumptions that produced them and the data this problematic elicits.

The cyclical properties of a 'risk society' produce a constant spiral of fears and the necessity for their management. The very act of securing properties and persons is a visible, physical reinforcement of this reproducing pattern: more security breeds more insecurity. This is most clearly evidenced in the dialectic of TIPs and swarmings between the parapolice and subject populations. Much like policing institutions in the

public sphere, the Intelligarde parapolice produce information about risky populations made known through the disciplining practices of surveillance. These practices are nonetheless politically charged and contested when applied to the chaotic environments they are meant to order. It is no coincidence that 35% of persons banned from properties secured by Intelligarde are homeless, and that the populations most likely to engage them in street brawls are young West Indian males. The actuarial practices of policing can do nothing more than perpetuate existing inequities.

The nature of parapolicing presented brings into question the dichotomous constructions of private and public and the connotations they elicit about the nature of security provision. One of these assumed differences has been the conceptual division of loss and crime prevention to describe the private and public police, respectively. This dissertation has argued that such divisions are increasingly problematic, and in the case of Intelligarde, altogether unhelpful for understanding the deployment practices of the parapolice. Both ethnographic and statistical data support this assertion. The interchangeable logics of the private and public police have much to do with the fact that both forms of security provisions are commodified under capitalism. Thus, private and public can refer to little more than the official designations of the policing service in question – and this tells us very little about their operation. Perhaps the reason state and corporate police services are increasingly behaving in similar ways, and crowding each other for the same risk markets is because of the very fact they constitute similar roles under unfettered (neo-liberal) capitalism. If Intelligarde's management gets its way, their parapolice will soon acquire special constabulary or provincial offences officer status making the already muddled distinctions of 'private' and 'public' even more meaningless

for policing. And this only further reveals their inherently analogous 'commodified' nature.

The only real 'alternatives' to current policing practices, therefore, comprise pre-capitalist, non-commodified security arrangements where each citizen is duty-bound to protect his or her own collective. This means that the labour of security produces no 'surplus-value' and that each person who provides such labour constitutes his or her own 'natural production unit' (Marx 1972:130-139). Today, this may be found in uncompensated citizen patrols or even vigilantism. Only in this way does the fundamental organisation of security provision materially transform itself. Otherwise, the nature of security provision is characterised by the selling of commodified social control to fear-induced risk markets.

In answer to the two orienting questions for this dissertation, therefore, the short answers become rather obvious:

1. *How is discipline and surveillance achieved organisationally and sold externally to risk markets?* Through the embedded process of surveillance within the actual act of symbolically producing commodified security. In the case of the Law Enforcement Company, this means that the very techniques utilised for amassing information about suspect populations and for controlling their own workforce is depicted in a digitally encoded 'product' for the client. This includes both the 'deister' management system and the production of reporting formats (and the knowledge this elicits).
2. *How do both security agents and those they are tasked with policing resist social control?* Within the very techniques and virtual templates of social control constructed by managers. While electronic checkpoints, video surveillance and the

constant monitoring of security officers may imply total control within a digitally pre-figured workplace, the reality described in this dissertation is quite different. For almost every technique of hyperpanoptic management, there exists a means for circumventing it. Intelligarde officers employ many ingenious methods of 'ghosting' their presence within artificial, digital representations of their labour. As a result, managers are tasked with purchasing even more comprehensive tools of surveillance or developing additional techniques to discipline their staff in a dialectic of control. On a much less nuanced level of resistance, the parapolice themselves are forced to confront groups of suspects who, on many occasions, physically attack and collectively defend themselves.

Finally, it cannot go without re-emphasis that the subculture of the parapolice (as with the public police) plays a vital role in defining occupational rules and organisational mobilisations. Given this theoretical framework and the data presented in this dissertation, a number of interesting political implications arise.

Some Political Considerations

If it were up to anarcho-libertarians, such as Friedman (1973) and Rothbard (1978) both the provision of policing and the law itself would be little more than products in a system of laissez-faire competition. The best police, the most popular, would be the most successful, the most profitable. People should have the ability to choose between a multiplicity of police services, as they now do between bras and books. If you wanted to ban alcohol, you would buy a strip of land and ban it there. If you wanted to outlaw loitering, you would hire a law enforcement company to enforce these provisions. There is very little doubt that the organisation of policing is historically and politically

contingent. It is no coincidence that the recent amendments to the *Police Services Act* in Ontario that make it possible for private firms to enter into competitions for tertiary policing duties was implemented by a neoconservative regime. It is also not surprising to find Intelligarde's president Ross McLeod quoting liberal economic dogma in support of his attempts to sell his security product to institutions, corporations, and even the police. On January 12th, he sent out a circular to all Ontario municipal police chiefs itemising, in economic terms, why they should speak to him about contracting some services from Intelligarde (see Appendix). Mr. McLeod also presented before the Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice (Tuesday March 18, 1997) in regards to amending the *Police Services Act* in this manner. He argued that private police agencies should be granted a limited range of powers to supplement public police services. Of course, the New Democratic Party (social democrats) representative from Hamilton Centre, David Christopherson, was resistant to the idea.

Mr. Christopherson: Thank-you for your presentation. Before I comment, to be fair, I'm not real keen on the idea of the proliferation of private policing as we're seeing in the States. I offer that up front, before I ask my questions.

You said it's cost-effective. The first question is: Are you proposing that these officers would have the full powers of a police officer?

Mr. McLeod: No. You can have a range, from the powers we largely now, which are no additional powers to the average citizen of the age of majority, right up to special constable status. The special constable status can be a warrant limited to a time, a place, while in uniform, working for a named company, and only for a listed number of offences, for instance, noise bylaw, environmental, stoop and scoop, that sort of thing. It can be delimited to a very, very set number of low-level offences.

Mr. Christopherson: It can be similar to a security guard, so clearly not offering private policing per se, which is the impression that was certainly left with me.

Mr. McLeod: I think "private policing" is an unfortunate name that summons up all sorts of different images with different people. What we're talking about here is a sort of value-added security service; it's a bylaw enforcement service; it's community-based policing. I'm not talking about a totally privatised law enforcement effort, as we see in small American communities where the police force is totally privatised. I'm talking to a para-police function that assists and

segues into and is used by the public police who still maintain their exclusive access to all Criminal Code enforcement.

Mr. Christopherson: I think the concern is that it's a slippery slope.

Social democratic governments (such as the NDP) would be hard-pressed to justify such measures.⁷⁵ Indeed, critical policing experts, such as the Left Realist school of Britain have repeatedly sought to make local police more accountable (see Currie, DeKeseredy and MacLean 1992 for a review). These initiatives have revolved around the production of knowledge about crime and the resultant community interest this galvanises – including the police themselves. Local crime surveys, with their correlative unearthing of attitudes toward the police, fear levels, and actual victimisation data, attempt to make the public police answerable to the community. These initiatives led to only limited success (Currie, DeKeseredy and MacLean 1992:293) in the Borough of Islington. Despite decades of critical scholarship and public outcries about the lack of police accountability in western democracies, little has managed to change the status quo. Perhaps the greatest irony here is that the most concerted and penetrating assault against the institution of public policing has been mounted by neo-liberal ideology. The very political economy they fervently supported in the past might ultimately lead to the undoing of the public police in its present form. Even more amusing is that their last great appeal for legitimacy might have been aimed at the social democrats and critics they disagreed with throughout their history.

Thus, crime prevention, much like loss prevention can be purchased and no longer resides exclusively within the monopoly of the modern state. Communities may buy

confrontational or 'social' policing, (Intelligarde or MTHA) dependent upon their needs (Carder 1994). This requires that we reassess our current understandings of private policing and community. Both are dynamic and multi-faceted constructs that do not easily lend themselves to definitive assertions. First, some private policing agencies engage in similar activities as the public police. Second, they are alternately vilified or glorified depending upon the 'community' you query. Who makes up the tenant association membership? Who are its suitable enemies? These are the same questions critical scholars have levelled against public police agencies and recent community-based policing rhetorics. It is not surprising to find them resurfacing as private police organisations take on the functions of the public police. How will private police organisations be accountable? Are current mechanisms comprehensive enough, or will new forms of accountability need to be implemented as the private police become more involved in crime control and private law enforcement? Is the market the best mode of accountability? Who will the private police be answerable to? What is the community? Is the rate-payer, the landowner, the tenant, the merchant, or the trespasser equally capable of obtaining redress? This becomes increasingly important as forensic accounting firms and corporate security services take on responsibility for private actions that are also *Criminal Code* offences.

Future Research

Despite the impressive accomplishments of the Toronto school (i.e. Shearing and Stenning et al.) and large-scale American survey research (e.g. Hallcrest, Rand), the

⁷⁵ See Johnston (1992: 24-44) for a thoughtful examination of the links between private and public state functionings and their correlative political rationales.

sociology of private policing is still in its infancy. There remain many areas of exploration open to new scholastic endeavour that this dissertation has only begun to touch upon. The most significant is private policing subculture and corporate ideologies. Is the 'white slave trade' (Shearing, Farnell and Stenning 1980) of security work being transformed into a more professionalised sector? Or is The Law Enforcement Company an exception? Has this had an effect on both security managers' and security officers' self-perceptions?

The parapolice are everywhere, doing both low-level and highly-skilled police-work. While the Intelligarde parapolice may be satisfied with providing second tier policing, private forensic accounting firms and corporate investigators conduct complete internal investigations before turning information over to the less capable public police. Often run and staffed by experienced police managers, the constellation of interactions between firms such as PERF, FIA Inc., and KPMG with the public police will be qualitatively different than those described for Intelligarde and GTA police services. More research is needed on these specialised and often secretive organisations.

Similarly, few have bothered to investigate the technologies and practices of private security surveillance and its marketing as commodity. This is one Spitzer's (1987) main entreaties when he examines the commodified nature of security provision – we need to more closely examine the demand side of the economic relationship between policing service and consumer. What is it about inhabitants of gated communities that legitimise their pursuit of physical fortifications and a constant uniformed presence? More specifically, how is that risk market developed?

It is through a critical ethnography of risk markets and private police organisations that most of these questions can be best answered. It is hoped that the theoretical considerations and descriptions of the parapolice offered in this dissertation might encourage further research in an area of considerable transformation.

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Appendices

- Research ethics statement involving human participants
- Memorandum: Request for approval of dissertation proposal and supervisory committee
- Letter of agreement to participate in study – Intelligarde, The Law Enforcement Company
- Intelligarde security officer personnel summary sheet
- Interview schedule
- “Community forum on Intelligarde” poster – Ontario Coalition Against Poverty
- “Yuppie residents back off!” poster – Ontario Coalition Against Poverty
- “Intelligarde’s Assault on the Poor” – limited circulation publication by Ontario Coalition Against Poverty
- Intelligarde Quality Control Verification – sample print-out from deister system
- Memorandum: Fax to all municipal police chiefs in Ontario re: contracting Intelligarde, The Law Enforcement Company
- Quotation Request – Transition Board, City of Quinte West
- Map 1: Quinte West
- Map 2: Quinte West

RESEARCH ETHICS STATEMENT INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS
(To be submitted as part of the Thesis/Dissertation Proposal Form)

Student's Name: George S. Rigakos

Proposal Title: Private police force

To be signed by Student:

1. I have read and studied the York University Guidelines for Research Involving Human Participants and have reflected on how these guidelines apply to the present Proposal. By affirming my signature below, I am confirming that the proposed research does not involve more than minimal risk to human participants.

Signature - Student

To be signed by Supervisor:

2. The Supervisory Committee has discussed with the student the ways in which the Senate Policy on Research Involving Human Participants applies to the present Proposal. The Supervisory Committee confirms that the proposed research does not involve more than minimal risk to human participants.

Signature - Supervisor

YORK UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE PROGRAMME IN SOCIOLOGY
MEMORANDUM

TO: Office of the Dean, Faculty of Graduate Studies

FROM: Director, Graduate Programme in Sociology

RE: Request for Approval of Dissertation Proposal and Supervisory Committee

DATE: _____

Name of Student: George S. Rigakos

Proposed Title: Private Police Force

Five Key Words: Private Policing; Private security; Parapolicing

The above student's Dissertation Supervisory Committee, as approved by the Director of the Graduate Programme in Sociology, has recommended that the attached Dissertation Proposal be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. in Sociology.

Supervisor, Supervisory Committee (signature): L. Eiler

Member, Supervisory Committee (signature): L. A. K...

Member, Supervisory Committee (signature): G. H...

Mary E. Beard

Director, Graduate Programme in Sociology

Copy: Student's File

INTELLIGARDE®

THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT
COMPANY®

George S. Rigakos
#110 - 6 Passy Crescent
North York, ON
M3J 3K9

August 20, 1997

To Whom it May Concern:

This letter services to confirm that Intelligarde International will be participating in a study of private policing conducted by George S. Rigakos, a doctoral student at York University. We understand that as part of his study, Mr. Rigakos will conduct ethnographic, interview, archival and questionnaire research at our firm.

Yours Truly,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ross A. McLeod', written over a horizontal line.

Ross A. McLeod, M.A., C.P.P.
President, Intelligarde International Inc.

CASE #		for coding
SURNAME AND INITIAL: _____		STRING VARIABLE
SECURITY GUARD LICENCE ISSUE ☐ PI ☐ SG ☐ DUAL		
LICENCE DATE OF ISSUE (D-MO-YR): _____		
SEX: ☐ M ☐ F		
DATE OF BIRTH (D-MO-YR): _____		
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: _____		
CITY OF RESIDENCE: _____		
CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☐ NO		
HEIGHT: _____ WEIGHT: _____ COMPLEXION: _____		
EDUCATION: (circle year)		
HIGH SCHOOL: ☐ YES ☐ NO YEAR 9 10 11 12 13 14 COMPL		
COLLEGE: ☐ YES ☐ NO YEAR 1 2 3 (4) COMPL		
UNIVERSITY ☐ YES ☐ NO YEAR 1 2 3 4 M PHD COMPL		
ANY OFFENCES? ☐ YES ☐ NO		
LIST OFFENCES: 1. _____		
2. _____		
NUMBER OF MONTHS EXPERIENCE IN SECURITY BEFORE INTELLIGARDE: _____		
TRAINING: K-9: ☐ YES ☐ NO LEVEL/TIME _____		
BATON: ☐ YES ☐ NO LEVEL/TIME _____		
GUN: ☐ YES ☐ NO LEVEL/TIME _____		
SECURITY OFFICER CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS: ☐ MOBILE		
☐ STATIC		
SECURITY OFFICER QUALIFIED FOR: ☐ MOBILE		
☐ STATIC		

Interview schedule

****Note age-sex-race-marital status-hourly rate**

1. How did you come to Intelligarde? How did you hear about the company?
2. Describe for me your function at Intelligarde (at this site). What level site/officer?
3. Do you have friends in the company? Are they close friends? What do you do together?
4. How do feel about your training and preparation for security work?
5. What do you think of the media coverage that Intelligarde gets? Have you seen the videos?
6. How would you characterize your interactions with the Metro Police?
7. How would you characterize your interactions with MTHA officers?
8. In your opinion, does the public respect an Intelligarde officer? What do you talk to the public about?
9. What do like best about your job?
10. What do you like least about your job?
11. What do you think of the management of the company?
12. What do you think of your supervisor?
13. Have you ever used force in the line of duty? (Describe -- follow up).
14. What do you consider a dangerous situation? When are you afraid?
15. What are your career aspirations?
16. *Is there anything else you'd like to add?*
17. *What is the greatest problem/challenge facing Intelligarde?*

COMMUNITY FORUM ON INTELLIGARDE

The trial of two Intelligarde officers charged with assault began Friday, June 20th. Tenants of 200 Sherbourne testified to an unprovoked assault, the use of racial slurs prior to the attack and a visit to a woman's apartment at 3:00 in the morning to question whether she was planning to act as a witness at the trial. From what we hear these are not isolated incidents, but part of a larger pattern of routine harassment and intimidation.

The Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) plans to hold a community forum to deal with the complaints people have around Intelligarde. We don't think it's right that this company should be providing "security" in places like City Home. Of course, there is a real need for safe and secure housing and these concerns must be addressed. Still, Intelligarde is obviously not the answer, and has got to go!

**THURSDAY,
JULY 17TH
6:00 PM
LOCATION TO BE
ANNOUNCED**

**If you want more
information
about the forum
or want to speak
at it, give OCAP
a call at:
925-6939.**

YUPPIE RESIDENTS BACK OFF!

Yuppie residents have made it their mission to attack the poor and homeless in the area. More interested in their property values than they are in human life, two resident groups (Toronto East Downtown Residents Association — TEDRA and Seaton Ontario Berkeley Residents Association — SOBRA) are trying to shut the doors on vital services in the neighbourhood. The already massive cuts to welfare and affordable housing have left tens of thousands of people with no alternative to hostels and drop-ins like the ones in this neighbourhood. Now these residents groups would see the drop-ins/day shelters driven from the area and people left in utter destitution. This attack, backed by some local politicians, is clearly part of a larger pattern to force the poor from the downtown core in order to make room for yuppie condominiums and retail development.

On August 5th, the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty will be leading a
→ march to the homes of these yuppies to challenge their plans! If they find the face of poverty so unpleasant that they want to drive it from the neighbourhood, we will take it right to their doorsteps and deliver the message that they keep their hands off of our services! Join us on the 5th and give these residents a taste of their own medicine!

Tuesday August 5th
7:30 PM
Allan Gardens
(Sherbourne and Gerrard)

INTELLIGARDE'S ASSAULT ON THE POOR

May 8, 1997

INTRODUCTION

During 1996, the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) had to deal with two major situations related to the antics of the private security outfit, Intelligarde. It became clear to us at the time (and events this year have reinforced this view) that we are dealing with an operation that is, to say the least, involved in a heavy handed drive to intimidate whole sections of the community. This means that residents of certain buildings in poor neighbourhoods live in fear. It also means that others, especially homeless people, are being 'encouraged' to consider various locations off limits to them. The methods used are often brutal and questionable from any legal standpoint. We attach to this brief an article from the April '95 edition of 'Toronto Life' that confirms a readiness to 'push things to the limit' that is all the more striking because it is written from an openly sympathetic point of view.

We divide what follows into three parts. Firstly, we outline some of the situations that have come to our attention. Secondly, we identify some definite patterns that emerge. Finally, we draw a few conclusions from the evidence.

1. THE SITUATIONS WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED

a. Bus Station Bullies

In April of 1996, reports started coming into our office of Intelligarde 'officers' (a term we shall continue to use from here without the ironic quotation marks) clearing homeless people out of the bus terminal at Bay and Dundas. The pattern was the same. Homeless people seeking a place to shelter were being photographed and given trespass notices banning them for life from the property. In some cases police were being called to lay formal charges after the person had been placed under arrest by Intelligarde. In several instances, people reported they had been beaten as part of the procedure of convincing them to seek shelter elsewhere.

In order to investigate the reports we had received, Gaetan Heroux from OCAP, observed by Sue Collis and John Clarke, visited the bus station and sat in the waiting area with a garbage bag full of clothing. He was soon placed under arrest and given a notice that he was banned for life from the premises. The officers tried to deny, in front of the media, that such a notice was ever issued when we returned a few days later in a public action. However, Gaetan was able to come forward with the written proof.

b. A Beating of a Resident of 200 Sherbourne Street.

On May 24 of last year, a man by the name of Roger Carr came to one of our membership meetings. He informed us that he had been beaten by Intelligarde officers in his City Home building at 200 Sherbourne. A few nights before, he had intervened when officers came to the apartment of a woman neighbour and told them to stop bothering her. The night before our meeting, they had retaliated by beating him badly in the lobby of the building. The incident involved racial name calling as well as assault. Roger had called the police but they had refused to lay a charge against the Intelligarde officers despite his obvious injuries. A Justice of the Peace would not lay a charge because he did not have the names of the officers. Neither Intelligarde nor City Home would provide this information. Vigorous intervention by OCAP obtained this and the two officers were, in fact, charged with assault.

The matter is now before the courts (it will be heard at the College Park Courthouse on June 20) and Intelligarde has counter charged.

c. A Beating of a Resident's Guest at 117 Pembroke

This incident is contained in a report completed by nurses at the agency 'Street Health'. The only fact that is not in the report is that the woman guest, Tina, was also handcuffed then kicked so that she fell face downward onto the floor, causing broken teeth.

d. A Beating for a Man Walking Past a Building Patrolled by Intelligarde

This incident is one where the individual did not wish to be identified. We include a mention of it, however, because it is one in which (see the Toronto Life article) the activities of this company seem to include a readiness to go beyond policing a property Intelligarde has a contract with and to sally forth onto the street.

In January of this year, a young homeless man reports to us that he was walking past a building on Sherbourne Street, when three Intelligarde officers accosted him with the allegation that he was a 'crackhead' and a 'fucking goof'. He was taken into the building and brought to a downstairs office where he was handcuffed and beaten.

e. The Experiences of a City Home Tenants' Committee Member.

An active member of a tenants' committee in the Parliament and Wellesley area informs us of ongoing problems with the Intelligarde officers who patrol the property he lives at. In April of this year, an incident took place that points to some of the assumptions and attitudes that underlie the problems we are describing. Late at night, he noticed an Intelligarde vehicle arriving outside his building. An officer let a guard dog out of the car and it proceeded to defecate on the lawn. He went out to challenge this behaviour and found that, contrary to an assurance he had received from City Home, the officer had no identifying number or name plate. The officer would not comply with repeated requests for his name.

Coming back into his apartment, the committee member called the Intelligarde offices.

Later the next day, after a number of calls, he was able to speak to a representative of the company who informed him that he did not consider that there was any obligation to have his staff identify themselves and, for good measure, he volunteered the opinion that, "City Home, hires us to keep you animals in line and that's exactly what we're going to do".

f. A Barring for Life

Last month a man came into our office who had just been removed from a local City Home building by Intelligarde. Some time prior to this he had visited a friend at another City Home location. He was stopped in the lobby by an Intelligarde officer who told him he could not enter the building. He refused to accept this as he was a legitimate visitor. However, officers soon came to the door of his friend's apartment, told him he was under arrest and put him in handcuffs. The police were called and they, predictably accepting Intelligarde's account of things, issued him a trespass ticket and escorted him from the building.

On the second, recent occasion he was removed from a City Home building, Intelligarde ran his name through their computer and then informed him that, based on the earlier incident, he was barred from all City Home properties.

g. Another Assault of Someone in his own Building

On May 10 of this year, Liban Adam was entering his building at 191 Sherbourne Street. An Intelligarde officer called out to him, "Hey, hey, hey!" but he kept on walking. The officer then came over to him and an incident occurred in which, as he made his way up to his apartment, Liban was called an 'asshole' and a 'nigger', his sleeve was ripped and he was punched in the jaw. The officer continued both to insult him and tell him he was under arrest.

On reaching his apartment, Liban's wife opened the door and he went inside. He was unable to close the door, however, as the officer was blocking it. At this point a second Intelligarde officer arrived and, while the first held the door, the newcomer tried to kick it open. In the course of this, the couple's eighteen month old daughter was struck on the head by the door and Liban called for his wife to dial '911'.

When the police arrived, two officers talked to the security guards while two others took Liban and his wife into separate rooms to search and question them. Liban was then taken to the 51 Division, where charges were laid against him.

THE PATTERNS THAT EMERGE

The above incidents, along with numerous others that have been reported to us, offer us a picture of the kind of operation the Intelligarde company is running. Private property owners and public housing authorities can obtain the services of Intelligarde if they are none too particular about the methods that will be used to 'keep a lid on things'. Low income residents will be 'kept in line' and 'undesirables' (as defined by Intelligarde) will be kept out. In the course of this, several patterns of behaviour emerge.

a. Assault

The cases that have been related strongly suggest that the company and its representatives are ready to use the most heavy handed tactics in carrying out their 'security' work. In two of the cases that we have outlined, racist insults were linked to the assaults. Such allegations against them have been very common in the grievances we have dealt with. We strongly suspect that racial prejudice is a factor in singling out those who are being targeted by Intelligarde.

b. Forced Entry

Again and again we hear from people who tell us of unwelcome visits by Intelligarde officers to their apartments to harass and sometimes remove guests. The attached magazine article begins with Intelligarde officers 'push[ing] into' someone's residence. Even with a reporter in tow, the readiness to 'push it to the limit' remains intact. This, of course, raises the most disturbing questions around the rights and quality of life of tenants who happen to reside in buildings subjected to the Intelligarde regime.

c. Harassment of Guests and Friends

From the above cases, it is clear that Intelligarde goes well beyond a reasonable vigilance based on legitimate security concerns. Normal social interaction is being blocked and guests harassed and barred from buildings based on the dubious assumptions of this company's representatives.

d. Role of the Police

This is not the place to expound on the kind of crackdown mentality in low income areas that the police are more and more reverting to. It does, however, need to be noted that, as the police themselves adopt a harsher approach, their readiness to accept the excesses of Intelligarde become ever more obvious and glaring. The kind of activity that Intelligarde is engaging in would be impossible if the police were not ready to turn a blind eye to their heavy handedness and be invariably ready to accept the company's version of events over the complaints of low income tenants or homeless people. In two of the cases of assault we have dealt with, the victim either had his story discounted by the police or was deemed the perpetrator.

CONCLUSIONS

The tenants of those buildings where Intelligarde operates are almost unanimous in telling us that they fully support the notion that they want safe and secure housing. No one is trying to dismiss this consideration. However, for these same tenants, the body that they might have hoped to make them feel safe has proven to be a threat to their well being. 'Keeping you animals in line' as opposed to serving a community seems to be the reality.

When it comes to homeless people seeking temporary shelter, Intelligarde offers us a dismal picture of where things are leading. The day shelters are full and people have few options when it comes to finding a place to stay warm during the day. Intelligarde offers the privately

owned public gathering place the chance to rent an imposing deterrent. The fact that the growing numbers of homeless may have no other alternative but to warm up at places like the bus station is of no concern to its guardians.

The pattern that emerges is of a company that is ready to try and intimidate people into keeping away from the locations they patrol or else to cower in their apartments, afraid to have a guest drop by. We are dealing with a goon squad for hire and the public bodies that have elected to use their deplorable services need to be forced to reconsider. Bodies like the TTC and the various housing authorities should be prevented from contracting with Intelligarde. In this regard, the role of City Home has to be viewed as being especially reprehensible. They never cease to piously promote themselves as 'caring providers' of housing for low income people and yet they knowingly continue to rely on Intelligarde's hired muscle. They steadfastly ignore all complaints and appeals from their tenants around the abuses they suffer from this company. This is a matter we will be taking up in the months ahead.

In the meantime, until this outfit has been removed from the positions it presently holds, we demand of the police that they stop their collusion with Intelligarde and discontinue their present practice of turning a blind eye to their appalling behaviour. A low income tenant or a homeless person has the same right to have his or her account of an incident taken seriously as does the representative of a security company. We will challenge the fact that the police are shamelessly biased in favour of Intelligarde.

We also urge the Crown to reconsider the evidence in a number of cases before the courts where charges have been laid against victims of Intelligarde assaults. Any semblance of impartiality on the part of the law hinges on such a review. For our part, we will be doing all we can to expose Intelligarde's antics and the degree to which the authorities are complicit in them.

People want safe communities and a serious discussion of security considerations is not to be avoided. The whole method of Intelligarde's operations, however, means that their removal from the scene is an indispensable element of any strategy towards the goal of safe and secure communities.

THE ONTARIO COALITION AGAINST POVERTY

(416) 925-6939

(249 Sherbourne St.

Toronto, Ont.

M5A 2R9

POLICE COMPLAINT INFORMATION

PART 1: GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Please give a general idea of what happened with the police. For example: "They thought I was selling drugs and they arrested me", "I called them because my landlord changed the locks, they told me I should..."

Darren + Tina were visiting at 117 Pembroke - door to friend's apt. Was jammed (sp?). Pushed door open. Manager called security. Darren says he was doing nothing. just 'drinking hot chocolate' with friend(s).

2. Can you describe what the officers did (or didn't do) that was wrong? (Eg: stopped me for no reason / called me names / threatened me / hit me / requested or demanded sex / took things of mine / handcuffed me / strip searched me)

Security officer (small, blond?) asked Darren to step out. Put handcuffs on. Said Darren was under arrest + was trespassing. "Guy was on a power trip" used tried to trip him. Darren was handcuffed with hands behind back. Guard put knee in back. Pushed him to the floor. Head was smashed on the floor. (See photo)

3. If you were searched, was it by an officer who is of the same sex or the opposite sex?

4. Were you injured? If so, were you treated for your injuries? *ice. No fracture.*

yes @ SMH emergency

5. Were there witnesses? If so, do you know their names?

Tina

6. Did the police charge you with anything? What? Did they charge anyone else? With what? If you have an "8.1 Appearance Notice" (a ticket), can we make a copy?

NO Given notice prohibiting entry &

7. When did this happen? (Please give the date, day of the week, and time of day)

Dec. 4:50 P.M.

8. Where did this happen?

117 Pembroke Apt. 5.

9. How many officers were there? *2*

10. If you got the officer(s) name(s), badge number(s), or car number(s), what were they?

6132 Intelligarde Int. Inc.

11. Do you know what division or unit the police were from?

see above

collector report

Employee: S/O BAKER "A"

[illegible]

-204-
MK1110
819009

Collector No.: 6054

Readout on: 04.02.98 at: 14:38 Page 2

Pos.	Cpt.	Time	Cpt.	Time	Cpt.	Time	Cpt.	Time	Cpt.	Time	Cpt.	Time	Cpt.	Time	
	*	23:42	-	OFF SITE (0022)											
	*	23:50	-	ON SITE (0021)											
				0849-4	23:51										
				Date change: Th	04.02.98										
				0850-4	00:04	3061-8	00:09	0847-4	00:10	0848-4	00:11				
	*	00:15	-	OFF SITE (0022)											
	*	00:22	-	ON SITE (0021)											
													3228-8	00:36	
06				3228-8	00:45										
	*	00:48	-	OFF SITE (0022)											
	*	00:56	-	ON SITE (0021)											
				3019-8	00:59										
	*	01:20	-	OFF SITE (0022)											
	*	02:08	-	ON SITE (0021)											
				0847-4	01:12	3061-8	02:13	0849-4	02:14	0850-4	02:15				
	*	02:33	-	CALLED P.R.O. (0034)											
	*	02:33	-	OFF SITE (0022)											
	*	02:39	-	ON SITE (0021)											
													3228-8	02:44	
	*	03:04	-	OFF SITE (0022)											
	*	03:10	-	ON SITE (0021)											
102				3019-8	03:12										
	*	03:38	-	OFF SITE (0022)											
	*	03:40	-	ON SITE (0021)											
				0856-4	03:43	0870-4	03:45	0875-4	03:46	2909-8	03:46	0874-4	03:51	0871-4	03:52
111				0935-4	03:54	2910-8	03:54	0872-4	03:55	2907-8	03:56	2908-8	03:57	0877-4	03:58
118				0869-4	04:03	0868-4	04:03	0867-4	04:04	0866-4	04:05				
	*	04:20	-	OFF SITE (0022)											

	*	04:54	-	ON SITE (0021)										
129				0849-4	04:58	0850-4	05:00							
	*	05:19	-	OFF SITE (0022)										
	*	05:38	-	ON SITE (0021)										
				3228-8	05:40									
	*	06:04	-	OFF SITE (0022)										
	*	06:09	-	ON SITE (0021)										
				0850-4	06:13	0849-4	06:14	3061-8	06:15	0847-4	06:16			
140				0848-4	06:17	0847-4	06:18	0847-4	06:18					
	*	06:34	-	OFF SITE (0022)										
				3040-8	07:29	3041-8	07:39							

(System codes: 0-2023, 1-0255, 2-2022, 3-2024, 4-2025, 5-3005, 6-3004, 7-3003, 8-4094, 9-0000)
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INTELLIGARDE®**THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT
COMPANY****Memorandum**

To: MUNICIPAL POLICE CHIEFS

From: ROSS MCLEOD, PRESIDENT, INTELLIGARDE, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPANY

Date: 01/12/98

Re: WHY YOU SHOULD SPEAK TO ME ABOUT CONTRACTING SOME SERVICES
FROM INTELLIGARDE, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPANY

ITEM

If you are planning an amalgamation or the extension of your police department's service to new areas, you are competing with another police service. Getting a quote from Intelligarde on supplying second tier services will allow you to significantly lower your total cost package and strengthen your competitive position.

ITEM

The OPP is marketing to your police service board to replace your police force, you need a strong financial disincentive to such a course of action. Sourcing second tier services from Intelligarde can help to ensure that in addition to various other arguments in favour of retaining your municipal police service, yours is also the more financially attractive option.

ITEM

Intelligarde's second tier services can be brought in on a fast start-up basis, or graduated over time based on natural attrition. Whichever method is used, the bottom line will be the same; namely, the freeing up of significant budget for new equipment, special units, or a general expansion of policing services.

ITEM

If there is a seasonal feature to your policing needs, bringing in second tier support services from Intelligarde can help smooth out your human resources curves. If you have summer or winter influxes, festivals or special events, a short term contract with Intelligarde will bring you the trained and experienced people to work under the supervision of your own officers. K-9 teams where appropriate can accomplish the work that would require several regular officers.

ITEM

I am available to consult with you in confidence and with no obligation to yourself or your board.

10/21/97 TUE 16:03 FAX 1 513 966 4873 SIDNEY TOWNSHIP 4000

TRANSITION BOARD
City of
Quinte West

October 21, 1997

Mr. Ross A. McLeod, M.A., C.P.P.
President
Intelligarde
55 Unwin Avenue
TORONTO, Ontario
M5A 1A2

Dear Mr. McLeod:

RE: Quotation Request

This letter will serve to clarify my earlier correspondence of today's date in which I conveyed the decision of the Police Services Task Force for the City of Quinte West to seek a quotation from your firm relative to the provision of twenty hours of foot/bicycle patrol in the existing Village of Frankford. The resolution of the Task Force also stated "that Intelligarde be requested to provide a costing for the areas currently known as Township of Murray, Township of Sidney and Village of Frankford based upon a thirty (30) minute response time for non "Crimes in Progress" incidents."

We look forward to your quotation, to be received no later than noon on October 31, 1997. Should you have any further questions please do not hesitate to call.

Yours truly,

TRANSITION BOARD
CITY OF QUINTE WEST

Jim Pine, M.P.A.
Chief Administrative Officer

cc: Bob Lockwood, Chair, Police Services Task Force

NORTHUMBERLAND

BRIGHTON

QUINTE WEST