

CONFEDERATION RESOLUTIONS.

The following speech was delivered on February 8th, 1865, immediately after the reading of the Order of the Day for resuming the debate on the resolution for a union of the British North American colonies. Its delivery was frequently interrupted by the hearty cheers of the House, and at its conclusion Mr. Brown resumed his seat amid loud and continued applause.

HON. GEORGE BROWN rose and said: It is with no ordinary gratification I rise to address the House on this occasion. I cannot help feeling that the struggle of half a lifetime for constitutional reform—the agitations in the country, and the fierce contests in this chamber—the strife, and the discord and the abuse of many years—are all compensated by the great scheme of reform which is now in your hands. The Attorney-General for Upper Canada, as well as the Attorney-General for Lower Canada, in addressing the House last night, were anxious to have it understood that this scheme for uniting British America under one government is something different from “representation by population”—is something different from “joint authority”—but is in fact the very scheme of the government of which they were members in 1858. Now, it is all very well that my honourable friends should receive credit for the large share they have contributed towards maturing the measure before the House; but I could not help reflecting while they spoke, that if this was their very scheme in 1858, they succeeded wonderfully in bottling it up from all the world except themselves, and I could not help regretting that we had to wait till 1864 until this mysterious plant of 1858 was forced to fruition. For myself, I care not who gets the credit of this scheme—I believe it contains the best features of all the suggestions that have been made in the last ten years for the settlement of our troubles; and the whole feeling in my mind now is one of joy and thankfulness that there were found men of position and influence in Canada who, at a moment of serious crisis, had nerve and patriotism enough to cast aside political partisanship, to banish personal considerations, and unite for the accomplishment of a measure so fraught with advantage to their common country. It was a bold step in the then existing state of public feeling for many members of the House to vote for the constitutional committee moved for by me last session—it was a very bold step for many of the members of that committee to speak and vote candidly upon it—it was a still bolder thing for many to place their names to the report that emanated from that committee—but it was an infinitely bolder step for the gentlemen who now occupy these treasury benches, to brave the misconceptions and suspicions that would certainly

attach to the act, and enter the same government. And it is not to be denied that such a coalition demanded no ordinary justification. But who does not feel that every one of us has to-day ample justification and reward for all we did in the document now under discussion? But seven short months have passed away since the coalition government was formed, yet already are we submitting a scheme well-weighed and matured, for the erection of a future empire—a scheme which has been received at home and abroad with almost universal approval.

HON. MR. HOLTON (ironically): Hear, hear!

HON. MR. BROWN: My honourable friend dissents from that, but is it possible truthfully to deny it? Has it not been approved and endorsed by the governments of five separate colonies? Has it not received the all but unanimous approval of the press of Canada? Has it not been heartily and unequivocally endorsed by the electors of Canada? My honourable friend opposite cries "No, no," but I say "Yes, yes." Since the coalition was formed, and its policy of federal union announced, there have been no fewer than twenty-five parliamentary elections—fourteen for members of the Upper House, and eleven for members of the Lower House. At the fourteen Upper House contests, but three candidates dared to show themselves before the people in opposition to the government scheme; and of these, two were rejected, and one—only one—succeeded in finding a seat. At the eleven contests for the Lower House, but one candidate on either side of politics ventured to oppose the scheme, and I hope that even he will yet cast his vote in favour of confederation. Of these twenty-five electoral contests, fourteen were in Upper Canada, but not at one of them did a candidate appear in opposition to our scheme. And let it be observed how large a portion of the country these twenty-five electoral districts embraced. It is true that the eleven Lower House elections only included that number of counties, but the fourteen Upper House elections embraced no fewer than forty counties. Of the 130 constituencies, therefore, into which Canada is divided for representation in this chamber, not fewer than fifty have been called on since our scheme was announced to pronounce at the polls their verdict upon it, and at the whole of them but four candidates on both sides of politics ventured to give it opposition.

Was I not right then in asserting that the electors of Canada had, in the most marked manner, pronounced in favour of the scheme? And will my honourable gentlemen deny that the people and press of Great Britain have received it with acclamations of approval?—that the government of England has cordially endorsed and accepted it?—ay, that even the press and the public men of the United States have spoken of it with a degree of respect they never before accorded to any colonial movement? I venture to assert that no scheme of equal magnitude, ever placed before the world, was received with higher eulogiums, with more universal approbation, than the measure we have now the pleasure of submitting for the acceptance of the Canadian parliament. And no higher eulogy could, I think, be pronounced than that I heard a few weeks ago from the lips of one of the

foremost of British statesmen, that the system of government we proposed seemed to him a happy compound of the best features of the British and American constitutions. And well might our present attitude in Canada arrest the earnest attention of other countries. Here is a people composed of two distinct races, speaking different languages, with religious and social and municipal and educational institutions totally different; with sectional hostilities of such a character as to render government for many years well nigh impossible; with a constitution so unjust in the view of one section as to justify any resort to enforce a remedy. And yet, here we sit, patiently and temperately discussing how these great evils and hostilities may justly and amicably be swept away forever. We are endeavouring to adjust harmoniously greater difficulties than have plunged other countries into all the horrors of civil war. We are striving to do peacefully and satisfactorily what Holland and Belgium, after years of strife, were unable to accomplish. We are seeking by calm discussion to settle questions that Austria and Hungary, that Denmark and Germany, that Russia and Poland, could only crush by the iron heel of armed force. We are seeking to do without foreign intervention, that which deluged in blood the sunny plains of Italy. We are striving to settle forever issues hardly less momentous than those that have rent the neighbouring republic and are now exposing it to all the horrors of civil war. Have we not then great cause of thankfulness that we have found a better way for the solution of our troubles than that which has entailed on other countries such deplorable results? And should not every one of us endeavour to rise to the magnitude of the occasion, and earnestly seek to deal with this question to the end in the same candid and conciliatory spirit in which, so far, it has been discussed?

The scene presented by this chamber at this moment, I venture to affirm, has few parallels in history. One hundred years have passed away since these provinces became by conquest part of the British Empire. I speak in no boastful spirit—I desire not for a moment to excite a painful thought—what was then the fortune of war of the brave French nation, might have been ours on that well-fought field. I recall those olden times more to mark the fact that here sit to-day the descendants of the victors and the vanquished in the fight of 1759, with all the differences of language, religion, civil law and social habit, nearly as distinctly marked as they were a century ago. Here we sit to-day seeking amicably to find a remedy for constitutional evils and injustice complained of—by the vanquished? No, but complained of by the conquerors! Here sit the representatives of the British population claiming justice—only justice; and here sit the representatives of the French population, discussing in the French tongue whether we shall have it. One hundred years have passed away since the conquest of Quebec, but here sit the children of the victor and the vanquished, all avowing hearty attachment to the British Crown—all earnestly deliberating how we shall best extend the blessings of British institutions—how a great people may be established on this continent in close and hearty connection with Great Britain. Where, in the page of

history, shall we find a parallel to this? Will it not stand as an imperishable monument to the generosity of British rule?

And it is not in Canada alone that this scene is being witnessed. Four other colonies are at this moment occupied as we are—declaring their hearty love for the parent state, and deliberating with us how they may best discharge the great duty entrusted to their hands, and give their aid in developing the teeming resources of these vast possessions. And well may the work we have unitedly proposed rouse the ambition and energy of every true man in British America. Look at the map of the continent of America, and mark that island (Newfoundland) commanding the mouth of the noble river that almost cuts our continent in twain. Well, that island is equal in extent to the kingdom of Portugal. Cross the straits to the mainland, and you touch the hospitable shores of Nova Scotia, a country quite as large as the kingdom of Greece. Then mark the sister province of New Brunswick—equal in extent to Denmark and Switzerland combined. Pass up the River St. Lawrence to Lower Canada—a country as large as France. Pass on to Upper Canada, twenty thousand square miles larger than Great Britain and Ireland put together. Cross over the continent to the shores of the Pacific, and you are in British Columbia, the land of golden promise—equal in extent to the Austrian empire. I speak not now of the vast Indian territories that lie between—greater in extent than the whole soil of Russia—and that will ere long, I trust, be opened up to civilization under the auspices of the British American confederation. Well, the bold scheme in your hands is nothing less than to gather all these countries into one—to organize them all under one government, with the protection of the British flag, and in heartiest sympathy and affection with our fellow-subjects in the land that gave us birth. Our scheme is to establish a government that will seek to turn the tide of European emigration into this northern half of the American continent—that will strive to develop its great natural resources—and that will endeavour to maintain liberty, and justice, and Christianity throughout the land.

MR. T. C. WALLBRIDGE: When?

HON. MR. CARTER: Very soon!

HON. MR. BROWN: The honourable member for North Hastings asks when all this can be done? The whole great ends of this confederation may not be realized in the lifetime of many who now hear me. We imagine not that such a structure can be built in a month or in a year. What we propose now is but to lay the foundations of the structure—to set in motion the governmental machinery that will one day, we trust, extend from the Atlantic to the Pacific. And we take special credit to ourselves that the system we have devised, while admirably adapted to our present situation, is capable of gradual and efficient expansion in future years to meet all the great purposes contemplated by our scheme. But if the honourable gentleman will only recall to mind that when the United States seceded from the mother country, and for many years after—

wards, their population was not nearly equal to ours at this moment—that their internal improvements did not then approach to what we have already attained, and that their trade and commerce was not then a third of what ours has already reached—I think that he will see that the fulfilment of our hopes may not be so very remote as at first sight might be imagined. And he will be strengthened in that conviction if he remembers that what we propose to do is to be done with the cordial sympathy and assistance of that great power of which it is our happiness to form a part.

Such are the objects of attainment to which the British American Conference pledged itself in October. And said I not rightly that such a scheme is well fitted to fire the ambition and rouse the energies of every member of this House? Does it not lift us above the petty politics of the past, and present to us high purposes and great interests that may well call forth all the intellectual ability and all the energy and enterprise to be found among us? I readily admit all the gravity of the question, and that it ought to be considered cautiously and thoroughly before adoption. Far be it from me to deprecate the closest criticism, or to doubt for a moment the sincerity or patriotism of those who feel it their duty to oppose the measure. But in considering a question on which hangs the future destiny of half a continent, ought not the spirit of mere fault-finding to be hushed?—ought not the voice of partisanship to be banished from our debates?—ought we not sit down and discuss the arguments presented in the earnest and candid spirit of men bound by the same interests, seeking a common end, and loving the same country? Some honourable gentlemen seem to imagine that the members of government have a deeper interest in this scheme than others—but what possible interest can any of us have except that which we share with every citizen of the land? What risk does any one run from this measure in which all of us do not fully participate? What possible inducement could we have to urge this scheme, except our earnest and heartfelt conviction that it will insure to the solid and lasting advantage of our country?

There is one consideration that cannot be banished from this discussion, and that ought, I think, to be remembered in every word we utter: it is that the constitutional system of Canada cannot remain as it is now. Something must be done. We cannot stand still. We cannot go back to chronic, sectional hostility and discord—to a state of perpetual ministerial crises. The events of the last eight months cannot be obliterated; the solemn admissions of men of all parties can never be erased. The claims of Upper Canada for justice must be met, and met now. I say, then, that every one who raises his voice in hostility to this measure is bound to keep before him, when he speaks, all the perilous consequences of its rejection; I say that no man who has a true regard for the well-being of Canada can give a vote against this scheme, unless he is prepared to offer, in amendment, some better remedy for the evils and injustice that have so long threatened the peace of our country. And not only must the scheme proposed in amendment be a better scheme—it must be something that can be carried.

I see an honourable friend now before me, for whose opinions I have the very highest respect, who says to me: "Mr. Brown, you should not have settled this part of the plan as you have done; here is the way you should have framed it." "Well, my dear sir," is my reply, "I perfectly agree with you, but it could not be done. Whether we ask for parliamentary reform for Canada alone or in union with the Maritime Provinces, the views of French Canadians must be consulted as well as ours. This scheme can be carried, and no scheme can be that has not the support of both sections of the province."

HON. MR. CARTIER: There is the question.

HON. MR. BROWN: Yes, that is the question and the whole question. No constitution ever framed was without defect; no act of human wisdom was ever free from imperfection; no amount of talent and wisdom and integrity combined in preparing such a scheme could have placed it beyond the reach of criticism. And the framers of this scheme had immense special difficulties to overcome. We had the prejudices of race and language and religion to deal with; and we had to encounter all the rivalries of trade and commerce, and all the jealousies of diversified local interests. To assert, then, that our scheme is without fault, would be folly. It was necessarily the work of concession; not one of the thirty-three framers but had, on some points, to yield his opinions; and, for myself, I freely admit that I struggled earnestly, for days together, to have portions of the scheme amended. But admitting all this—admitting all the difficulties that beset us—admitting frankly that defects in the measure exist—I say that, taking the scheme as a whole, it has my cordial, enthusiastic support, without hesitation or reservation. I believe it will accomplish all, and more than all, that we, who have so long fought the battle of parliamentary reform, ever hoped to see accomplished. I believe that, while granting security for local interests, it will give free scope for carrying out the will of the whole people in general matters—that it will draw closer the bonds that unite us to Great Britain—and that it will lay the foundations deep and strong of a powerful and prosperous people.

And if the House will allow me to trespass to a somewhat unusual degree on its indulgence, I am satisfied that I can clearly establish that such are the results fairly to be anticipated from the measure. There are two views in which this scheme may be regarded, namely, the existing evils it will remedy, and the new advantages it will secure for us as a people. Let us begin by examining its remedial provisions. First, then, it applies a complete and satisfactory remedy to the injustice of the existing system of parliamentary representation. The people of Upper Canada have bitterly complained that though they numbered four hundred thousand souls more than the population of Lower Canada, and though they have contributed three or four pounds to the general revenue for every pound contributed by the sister province, yet the Lower Canadians send to parliament as many representatives as they do. Now, the measure in your hands brings this injustice to an end; it sweeps away the line of demarcation between the

two sections on all matters common to the whole province; it gives representation according to numbers wherever found in the House of Assembly; and it provides a simple and convenient system for readjusting the representation after each decennial census. To this proposed constitution of the Lower Chamber, I have heard only two objections. It has been alleged that until after the census of 1871, the number of members is to remain as at present; but this is a mistake. Upper Canada is to receive from the start eighty-two representatives, and Lower Canada sixty-five; and whatever increase the census of 1871 may establish will be then adjusted. It has also been objected that though the resolutions provide that the existing parliament of Canada shall establish the electoral divisions for the first organization of the federal parliament, they do not determine in whose hands the duty of distributing any additional members is to be vested. No doubt on this head need exist; the federal parliament will of course have full power to regulate all arrangements for the election of its own members. But I am told by Upper Canadians—the constitution of the Lower House is all well enough, it is in the Upper House arrangements that the scheme is objectionable. And first, it is said that Upper Canada should have had in the legislative council a greater number of members than Lower Canada.

MR. T. C. WALLBRIDGE: Hear, hear!

HON. MR. BROWN: The honourable member for North Hastings is of that opinion; but that gentleman is in favour of a legislative union, and had we been forming a legislative union, there might have been some force in the demand. But the very essence of our compact is that the union shall be federal and not legislative. Our Lower Canada friends have agreed to give us representation by population in the Lower House, on the express condition that they shall have equality in the Upper House. On no other condition could we have advanced a step; and for my part, I am quite willing that they should have it. In maintaining the existing sectional boundaries and handing over the control of local matters to local bodies, we recognize, to a certain extent, a diversity of interests; and it was quite natural that the protection for those interests, by equality in the Upper Chamber, should be demanded by the less numerous provinces. Honourable gentlemen may say that it will erect a barrier in the Upper House against the just influence that Upper Canada will exercise, by her numbers, in the Lower House, over the general legislation of the country. That may be true to a certain extent, but honourable gentlemen will bear in mind that that barrier, be it more or less, will not affect money bills. Hitherto we have been paying a vast proportion of the taxes, with little or no control over the expenditure. But, under this plan, by our just influence in the Lower Chamber, we shall hold the purse strings. If, from this concession of equality in the Upper Chamber, we are restrained from forcing through measures which our friends of Lower Canada may consider injurious to their interests, we shall, at any rate, have power, which we never had before, to prevent them from forcing through whatever we may

deem unjust to us. I think the compromise a fair one, and am persuaded that it will work easily and satisfactorily. But it has been said that the members of the Upper House ought not to be appointed by the Crown, but should continue to be elected by the people at large. On that question my views have been often expressed. I have always been opposed to a second elective chamber, and I am so still, from the conviction that two elective houses are inconsistent with the right working of the British parliamentary system. I voted, almost alone, against the change when the council was made elective, but I have lived to see a vast majority of those who did the deed wish it had not been done. It is quite true, and I am glad to acknowledge it, that many evils anticipated from the change when the measure was adopted have not been realized. I readily admit that men of the highest character and position have been brought into the council by the elective system, but it is equally true that the system of appointment brought into it men of the highest character and position. Whether appointed by the Crown or elected by the people, since the introduction of parliamentary government, the men who have composed the Upper House of this legislature have been men who would have done honour to any legislature in the world. But what we most feared was, that the legislative councillors would be elected under party responsibility; that a partisan spirit would soon show itself in the chamber; and that the right would soon be asserted to an equal control with this House over money bills. That fear has not been realized to any dangerous extent. But is it not possible that such a claim might ere long be asserted? Do we not hear, even now, mutterings of a coming den and for it? Nor can we forget that the elected members came into that chamber gradually; that the large number of old appointed members exercised much influence in maintaining the old forms of the House, the old style of debate, and the old barriers against encroachment on the privileges of the Commons. But the appointed members of the council are gradually passing away, and when the elective element becomes supreme, who will venture to affirm that the council would not claim that power over money bills which this House claims as of right belonging to itself? Could they not justly say that they represent the people as well as we do, and that the control of the purse strings ought, therefore, to belong to them as much as to us? It is said they have not the power. But what is to prevent them from enforcing it? Suppose we had a conservative majority here, and a reform majority above—or a conservative majority above and a reform majority here—all elected under party obligations—what is to prevent a dead-lock between the chambers? It may be called unconstitutional—but what is to prevent the councillors (especially if they feel that in the dispute of the hour they have the country at their back) from practically exercising all the powers that belong to us? They might amend our money bills, they might throw out all our bills if they liked, and bring to a stop the whole machinery of government. And what could we do to prevent them? But, even supposing this were not the case, and that the elective Upper House continued to be guided by that discretion which has heretofore actuated its proceedings,

still, I think, we must all feel that the election of members for such enormous districts as form the constituencies of the Upper House has become a great practical inconvenience. I say this from personal experience, having long taken an active interest in the electoral contests in Upper Canada. We have found greater difficulty in inducing candidates to offer for seats in the Upper House, than in getting ten times the number for the Lower House. The constituencies are so vast, that it is difficult to find gentlemen who have the will to incur the labour of such a contest, who are sufficiently known and popular enough throughout districts so wide, and who have money enough to pay the enormous bills, not incurred in any corrupt way—do not fancy that I mean that for a moment—but the bills that are sent in after the contest is over, and which the candidates are compelled to pay if they ever hope to present themselves for re-election.

But honourable gentlemen say, "This may be all very well, but you are taking an important power out of the hands of the people, which they now possess." Now, this is a mistake. We do not propose to do anything of the sort. What we propose is, that the Upper House shall be appointed from the best men of the country by those holding the confidence of the representatives of the people in this chamber. It is proposed that the government of the day, which only lives by the approval of this chamber, shall make the appointments, and be responsible to the people for the selections they shall make. Not a single appointment could be made, with regard to which the government would not be open to censure, and which the representatives of the people, in this House, would not have an opportunity of condemning. For myself, I have maintained the appointment principle, as in opposition to the elective, ever since I came into public life, and have never hesitated, when before the people, to state my opinions in the broadest manner; and yet not in a single instance have I ever found a constituency in Upper Canada, or a public meeting, declaring its disapproval of appointment by the Crown and its desire for election by the people at large. When the change was made in 1855 there was not a single petition from the people asking for it—it was in a manner forced on the legislature. The real reason for the change was, that before responsible government was introduced into this country, while the old oligarchical system existed, the Upper House continuously and systematically was at war with the popular branch, and threw out every measure of a liberal tendency. The result was, that in the famous ninety-two resolutions the introduction of the elective principle into the Upper House was declared to be indispensable. So long as Mr. Robert Baldwin remained in public life, the thing could not be done; but when he left the deed was consummated. But it is said that if the members are to be appointed for life, the number should be unlimited—that, in the event of a dead-lock arising between that chamber and this, there should be power to overcome the difficulty by the appointment of more members. Well, under the British system, in the case of a legislative union, that might be a legitimate provision. But honourable gentlemen must see that the limitation of the

numbers in the Upper House lies at the base of the whole compact on which this scheme rests. It is perfectly clear, as was contended by those who represented Lower Canada in the conference, that if the number of legislative councillors was made capable of increase, you would thereby sweep away the whole protection they had from the Upper Chamber. But it has been said that, though you may not give the power to the executive to increase the numbers of the Upper House in the event of a dead-lock, you might limit the term for which the members are appointed. I was myself in favour of that proposition. I thought it would be well to provide for a more frequent change in the composition of the Upper House, and lessen the danger of the chamber being largely composed of gentlemen whose advanced years might forbid the punctual and vigorous discharge of their public duties. Still, the objection made to this was very strong. It was said: "Suppose you appoint them for nine years, what will be the effect? For the last three or four years of their term they would be anticipating its expiry, and anxiously looking to the administration of the day for reappointment; and the consequence would be that a third of the members would be under the influence of the executive." The desire was to render the Upper House a thoroughly independent body—one that would be in the best position to canvass dispassionately the measures of this House, and stand up for the public interests in opposition to hasty or partisan legislation. It was contended that there is no fear of a dead-lock. We were reminded how the system of appointing for life had worked in past years, since responsible government was introduced; we were told that the complaint was not then that the Upper Chamber had been too obstructive a body—not that it had sought to restrain the popular will, but that it had too faithfully reflected the popular will. Undoubtedly that was the complaint formerly pressed upon us, and I readily admit that if ever there was a body to whom we could safely entrust the power which by this measure we propose to confer on the members of the Upper Chamber, it is the body of gentlemen who at this moment compose the legislative council of Canada. The forty-eight councillors for Canada are to be chosen from the present chamber. There are now thirty-four members from the one section, and thirty-five from the other. I believe that of the sixty-nine, some will not desire to make their appearance here again; others, unhappily, from years and infirmity, may not have strength to do so; and there may be others who will not desire to qualify under the statute. It is quite clear that when twenty-four are selected for Upper Canada and twenty-four for Lower Canada, very few indeed of the present House will be excluded from the federal chamber; and I confess I am not without hope that there may be some way yet found of providing, for all who desire it, an honourable position in the legislature of the country. And after all, is it not an imaginary fear—that of a deadlock? Is it at all probable that any body of gentlemen who may compose the Upper House, appointed as they will be for life, acting as they will do on personal and not party responsibility, possessing as they must a deep stake in the welfare of the country, and desirous as they must

be of holding the esteem of their fellow-subjects, would take so unreasonable a course as to imperil the whole political fabric? The British House of Peers itself does not venture, *à l'outrance*, to resist the popular will, and can it be anticipated that our Upper Chamber would set itself rashly against the popular will? If any fear is to be entertained in the matter, is it not rather that the councillors will be found so thoroughly in harmony with the popular feeling of the day? And we have this satisfaction at any rate, that so far as its first formation is concerned, so far as the present question is concerned, we shall have a body of gentlemen in whom every confidence may be placed.

But it is objected that in the constitution of the Upper House, so far as Lower Canada is concerned, the existing electoral divisions are to be maintained, while, as regards Upper Canada, they are to be abolished—that the members from Lower Canada are to sit as representing the divisions in which they reside or have their property qualification; while in Upper Canada there is no such arrangement. Undoubtedly this is the fact; it has been so arranged to suit the peculiar position of this section of the province. Our Lower Canada friends felt that they had French Canadian interests and British interests to be protected, and they conceived that the existing system of electoral divisions would give protection to these separate interests. We in Upper Canada, on the other hand, were quite content that they should settle that among themselves, and maintain their existing divisions if they chose. But, so far as we in the west were concerned, we had no such separate interests to protect—we had no diversities of origin or language to reconcile—and we felt that the true interest of Upper Canada was that her very best men should be sent to the legislative council, wherever they might happen to reside or wherever their property was located. If there is one evil in the American system which in my mind stands out as pre-eminently its greatest defect, except universal suffrage, it is that under that constitution the representatives of the people must reside in the constituencies for which they sit. The result is that a public man, no matter what his talent or what his position, no matter how necessary it may be for the interest of the country that he should be in public life, unless he happens to belong to the political party popular for the time being in the constituency where he resides, cannot possibly find a seat in congress. And over and over again have we seen the very best men of the republic, the most illustrious names recorded in its political annals, driven out of the legislature of their country, simply because the majority in the electoral division in which they lived was of a different political party from them. I do think the British system infinitely better than that, securing as it does that public men may be trained to public life, with the assured conviction that if they prove themselves worthy of public confidence, and gain a position in the country, constituencies will always be found to avail themselves of their services, whatever be the political party to which they may adhere. You may make politicians by the other, but assuredly this is the way that statesmen are produced.

But it is further objected that the property qualification of the members of the Upper House from Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland may be either real or personal estate, while in the others it is to be real estate alone. This is correct; but I fancy it matters little to us upon what species of property our friends in Prince Edward Island or in Newfoundland base their qualification. In Canada real estate is abundant; every one can obtain it; and it is admitted by all to be the best qualification, if it be advisable to have any property qualification at all. But in Newfoundland it would be exceedingly inconvenient to enforce such a rule. The public lands there are not even surveyed to any considerable extent; the people are almost entirely engaged in fishing and commercial pursuits, and to require a real estate qualification would be practically to exclude some of its best public men from the legislative council. Then in Prince Edward Island a large portion of the island is held in extensive tracts by absentee proprietors and leased to the settlers. A feud of long standing has been the result, and there would be some difficulty in finding landed proprietors who would be acceptable to the people as members of the Upper House. This also must be remembered, that it will be a very different thing for a member from Newfoundland or Prince Edward Island to attend the legislature at Ottawa from what it is for one of ourselves to go there. He must give up not only his time, but the comfort and convenience of being near home; and it is desirable to throw no unnecessary obstacle in the way of our getting the very best men from these provinces.

But it is further objected that these resolutions do not define how the legislative councillors are to be chosen at first. I apprehend, however, there is no doubt whatever as regards that. Clause 14 says: "The first selection of the members to constitute the federal legislative council shall be made from the members of the now existing legislative councils, by the Crown, at the recommendation of the general executive government, upon the nomination of the respective local governments." The clear meaning of this clause simply is, that the present governments of the several provinces are to choose out of the existing bodies—so far as they can find gentlemen willing and qualified to serve—the members who shall at starting compose the federal legislative council; that they are to present the names so selected to the executive council of British America when constituted—and on the advice of that body the councillors will be appointed by the Crown. And such has been the spirit shown from first to last in carrying out the compact of July last by all the parties to it, that I for one have no apprehension whatever that full justice will not be done to the party which may be a minority in the government, but it is certainly not in a minority either in the country or in this House. I speak not only of Upper Canada but of Lower Canada as well—

HON. MR. DORION: Ha! ha!

HON. MR. BROWN: My honourable friend laughs, but I assure him, and he will not say I do so for the purpose of deceiving him, that having been present in conference and in council, having heard all the discussions

and well ascertained the feelings of all associated with me, I have not a shadow of a doubt on my mind that full justice will be done in the selection of the first federal councillors, not only to those who may have been in the habit of acting with me, but also to those who have acted with my honourable friend, the member for Hochelaga.

Now, I believe I have answered every objection that has come from any quarter against the proposed constitution of the federal legislature. I am persuaded there is not one well-founded objection that can be urged against it. It is just to all parties; it remedies the gross injustice of the existing system; and I am convinced it will not only work easily and safely, but be entirely satisfactory to the great mass of our people. But I go further; I say that were all the objections urged against this scheme sound and ~~agent~~, they sink into utter insignificance in view of all the miseries this scheme will relieve us from—in view of all the difficulties that must surround any measure of parliamentary reform for Canada that could possibly be devised. Will honourable gentlemen who spend their energies in hunting out blemishes in this scheme remember for a moment the utter injustice of the one we have at present? Public opinion has made rapid strides in the last six months on the representation question,—but think what it was a week before the present coalition was formed! Remember how short a time has elapsed since the member for Poël (Hon. Mr. J. Hillyard Cameron) proposed to grant one additional member to Upper Canada, and could not carry even that. Remember that but a few weeks ago the hon. member for Hochelaga (Hon. Mr. Dorion), who now leads the crusade against this measure, publicly declared that five or six additional members was all Upper Canada was entitled to, and that with these the Upper Canadians would be content for many years to come. And when he has reflected on all this, let the man who is disposed to carp at this great measure of representative reform justify his conduct if he can, to the thousands of disfranchised freeholders of Upper Canada demanding justice at our hands. For myself, I unhesitatingly say, that the complete justice which this measure secures to the people of Upper Canada in the vital matter of parliamentary representation alone, renders all the blemishes averred against it utterly contemptible in the balance.

But the second feature of this scheme as a remedial measure is, that it removes to a large extent the injustice of which Upper Canada has complained in financial matters. We in Upper Canada have complained that though we paid into the public treasury more than three-fourths of the whole revenue, we had less control over the system of taxation and the expenditure of the public moneys than the people of Lower Canada. Well, the scheme in the Speaker's hand remedies that. The absurd line of separation between the provinces is swept away for general matters; we are to have seventeen additional members in the House that holds the purse; and the taxpayers of the country, wherever they reside, will have their just share of influence over revenue and expenditure. We have also complained that immense sums of public money have been systematically taken from the public chest for local purposes of Lower Canada, in which the people of

Upper Canada had no interest whatever, though compelled to contribute three-fourths of the cash. Well, this scheme remedies that. All local matters are to be banished from the general legislature; local governments are to have control over local affairs, and if our friends in Lower Canada choose to be extravagant they will have to bear the burden of it themselves. No longer shall we have to complain that one section pays the cash while the other spends it; hereafter, they who pay will spend, and they who spend more than they ought will have to bear the brunt. It was a great thing to accomplish this, if we had accomplished nothing more, for if we look back on our doings of the last fifteen years I think it will be acknowledged that the greatest jobs perpetrated were of a local character, that our fiercest contests were about local matters that stirred up sectional jealousies and indignation to its deepest depth. We have further complained that if a sum was properly demanded for some legitimate local purpose in one section, an equivalent sum had to be appropriated to the other as an offset, thereby entailing prodigal expenditure, and unnecessarily increasing the public debt. Well, this scheme puts an end to that. Each province is to determine for itself its own wants, and to find the money to meet them from its own resources. But I am told that though true it is that local matters are to be separated and the burden of local expenditure placed upon local shoulders, we have made an exception from that principle in providing that a subsidy of eighty cents per head shall be taken from the federal chest and granted to the local governments for local purposes. Undoubtedly this is the fact, and I do not hesitate to admit that it would have been better if this had been otherwise. I trust I commit no breach of discretion in stating that in conference I was one of the strongest advocates for defraying the whole of the local expenditures of the local governments by means of direct taxation, and that there were liberal men in all sections of the provinces who would gladly have had it so arranged. But there was one difficulty in the way—a difficulty which has often before been encountered in this world—and that difficulty was simply this, it could not be done. We could neither have carried it in conference nor yet in any one of the existing provincial legislatures. Our friends in Lower Canada, I am afraid, have a constitutional disinclination to direct taxation, and it was obvious that if the confederation scheme had had attached to it a provision for the imposition of such a system of taxation, my honorable friends opposite would have had a much better chance of success in blowing the bellows of agitation than they now have. The objection, moreover, was not confined to Lower Canada—all the lower provinces stood in exactly the same position. They have not a municipal system such as we have, discharging many of the functions of government; but their general government performs all the duties which in Upper Canada devolve upon our municipal councils, as well as upon parliament. If, then, the lower provinces had been asked to maintain their customs duties for federal purposes, and to impose on themselves by the same Act direct taxation for all their local purposes, the chances of carrying the scheme of union would have been greatly lessened.

But I apprehend that if we did not succeed in putting this matter on the footing that would have been the best, at least we did the next best thing. Two courses were open to us—either to surrender to the local governments some source of indirect revenue, some tax which the general government proposed to retain, or collect the money by the federal machinery, and distribute it to the local governments for local purposes. And we decided in favour of the latter. We asked the representatives of the different governments to estimate how much they would require after the inauguration of the federal system to carry on their local machinery. As at first presented to us, the annual sum required for all the provinces was something like five millions of dollars—an amount that could not possibly have been allotted. The great trouble was that some of the governments are vastly more expensive than others—extensive countries, with sparse populations, necessarily requiring more money per head for local government than countries more densely populated. But as any grant given from the common chest, for local purposes, to one province, must be extended to all, on the basis of population, it follows that for every \$1,000 given, for example, to New Brunswick, we must give over \$1,300 to Nova Scotia, \$4,000 to Lower Canada, and \$6,000 to Upper Canada, thereby drawing from the federal exchequer much larger sums than these provinces needed for local purposes. The course we adopted then was this: We formed a committee of finance ministers, and made each of them go over his list of expenditures, lopping off all unnecessary services and cutting down every item to the lowest possible figure. By this means we succeeded in reducing the total annual subsidy required for local government to the sum of \$2,630,000—of which Lower Canada will receive annually \$880,000, and Upper Canada \$1,120,000. But it is said that in addition to her eighty cents per head under this arrangement, New Brunswick is to receive an extra grant from the federal chest of \$63,000 annually for ten years. Well, this is perfectly true. After cutting down as I have explained the local expenditures to the lowest mark, it was found that New Brunswick and Newfoundland could not possibly carry on their local governments with the sum per head that would suffice for all the rest. New Brunswick imperatively required \$63,000 per annum beyond her share, and we had either to find that sum for her or give up the hope of union. The question then arose, would it not be better to give New Brunswick a special grant of \$63,000 for a limited number of years, so that her local revenues might have time to be developed, rather than increase the subsidy to all the local governments, thereby placing an additional burden on the federal exchequer of over eight hundred thousand dollars per annum? We came unanimously to the conclusion that the extra sum needed by New Brunswick was too small to be allowed to stand in the way of union—we also determined that it would be the height of absurdity to impose a permanent burden on the country of \$800,000 a year, simply to escape a payment of \$63,000 for ten years—and so it came about that New Brunswick got this extra grant—an arrangement which received, and receives now, my hearty approval. It is only right to say, however, that New Brunswick may possibly be in a

position to do without this money. The House is aware that the federal government is to assume the debts of the several provinces, each province being entitled to throw upon it a debt of \$25 per head of its population. Should the debt of any province exceed \$25 per head, it is to pay interest on the excess to the federal treasury; but should it fall below \$25 per head, it is to receive interest from the federal treasury on the difference between its actual debt and the debt to which it is entitled. Now, it so happens that the existing debt of New Brunswick is much less than it is entitled to throw on the federal government. It is, however, under liability for certain works, which if proceeded with would bring its debt up to the mark of \$25 a head. But if these works are not proceeded with, New Brunswick will be entitled to a large amount of annual interest from the federal chest, and that money is to be applied to the reduction of the \$63,000 extra grant. And this, moreover, is not to be forgotten as regards New Brunswick, that she brings into the union extensive railways now in profitable operation, the revenues from which are to go into the federal chest. A similar arrangement was found necessary as regards the island of Newfoundland—it, too, being a vast country with a sparse population. It was found absolutely essential that an additional grant beyond eighty cents per head should be made to enable her local government to be properly carried on. But, in consideration of this extra allowance, Newfoundland is to cede to the federal government her crown lands and minerals—and assuredly, if the reports of geologists are well founded, this arrangement will be as advantageous to us as it will be to the inhabitants of Newfoundland.

I am persuaded, then, that the House will feel with me that we in Canada have very little to complain of in regard to the subsidies for local government. But if a doubt yet remains on the mind of any honourable member, let him examine the trade returns of the several provinces, and he will see that, from the large quantity of dutiable goods consumed in the Maritime Provinces, they have received no undue advantage under the arrangement. Let this too ever be kept in mind, that the \$2,630,000 to be distributed to the local governments from the federal chest is to be in full and final extinguishment of all claims hereafter for local purposes; and that if this from any cause does not suffice, the local governments must supply all deficiencies from a direct tax on their own localities. And let honourable members from Upper Canada who carp at this annual subsidy, remember for a moment what we pay now, and they will cease their grumbling. Of all the money raised by the general government for local purposes in Canada, the tax-payers of Upper Canada now pay more than three-fourths; but far from getting back in proportion to what they contribute, or even in proportion to their population, they do not get one-half of the money spent for local purposes. But how different will it be under federation! Nine hundred thousand people will come into the union, who will contribute to the revenue quite as much, man for man, as the Upper Canadians, and in the distribution of the local subsidy we will receive our share on the basis of population—a very different arrangement from that

we now endure. I confess that one of the strongest arguments in my mind for confederation is the economical ideas of the people of these Maritime Provinces, and the conviction that the influence of their public men in our legislative halls will be most salutary in all financial matters. A more economical people it would be difficult to find; their prime ministers and their chief justices get but £600 a year, Halifax currency, and the rest of their civil list is in much the same proportion.

But there is another great evil in our existing system that this scheme remedies; it secures to the people of each province full control over the administration of their own internal affairs. We in Upper Canada have complained that the minority of our representatives, the party defeated at the polls of Upper Canada, have been, year after year, kept in office by Lower Canada votes, and that all the local patronage of our section has been dispensed by those who did not possess the confidence of the people. Well, this scheme remedies that. The local patronage will be under local control, and the wishes of the majority in each section will be carried out in all local matters. We have complained that the land system was not according to the views of our western people; that free lands for actual settlers was the right policy for us; that the price of a piece of land squeezed out of an immigrant was no consideration in comparison with the settlement among us of a hardy and industrious family; and that the colonization road system was far from satisfactory. Well, this scheme remedies that. Each province is to have control of its own crown lands, crown timber and crown minerals, and will be free to take such steps for developing them as each deems best. We have complained that local works of various kinds—roads, bridges and landing piers, court houses, gaols and other structures—have been erected in an inequitable and improvident manner. Well, this scheme remedies that; all local works are to be constructed by the localities and defrayed from local funds. And so on through the whole extensive details of internal local administration will this reform extend. The people of Upper Canada will have the entire control of their local matters, and will no longer have to betake themselves to Quebec for leave to open a road, to select a county town, or appoint a coroner. But I am told that to this general principle of placing all local matters under local control, an exception has been made in regard to the common schools. The clause complained of is as follows: "6. Education; saving the rights and privileges which the protestant or catholic minority in both Canadas may possess as to their denominational schools at the time when the union goes into operation." Now, I need hardly remind the House that I have always opposed and continue to oppose the system of sectarian education, so far as the public chest is concerned. I have never had any hesitation on that point. I have never been able to see why all the people of the province, to whatever sect they may belong, should not send their children to the same common schools to receive the ordinary branches of instruction. I regard the parent and the pastor as the best religious instructors—and so long as the religious faith of the children is uninterfered with, and ample

opportunity afforded to the clergy to give religious instruction to the children of their flocks, I cannot conceive any sound objection to mixed schools. But while in the conference and elsewhere I have always maintained this view, and always given my vote against sectarian public schools, I am bound to admit, as I have always admitted, that the sectarian system, carried to the limited extent it has yet been in Upper Canada, and confined as it chiefly is to cities and towns, has not been a very great practical injury. The real cause of alarm was that the admission of the sectarian principle was there, and that at any moment it might be extended to such a degree as to split up our school system altogether. There are but a hundred separate schools in Upper Canada, out of some four thousand, and all Roman Catholic. But if the Roman Catholics are entitled to separate schools and to go on extending their operations, so are the members of the Church of England, the Presbyterians, the Methodists, and all other sects. No candid Roman Catholic will deny this for a moment; and there lay the great danger to our educational fabric, that the separate system might gradually extend itself until the whole country was studded with nurseries of sectarianism, most hurtful to the best interests of the province, and entailing an enormous expense to sustain the hosts of teachers that so prodigal a system of public instruction must inevitably entail.

Now, it is known to every honourable member of this House that an Act was passed in 1863, as a final settlement of this sectarian controversy. I was not in Quebec at the time, but if I had been here I would have voted against that bill, because it extended the facilities for establishing separate schools. It had, however, this good feature, that it was accepted by the Roman Catholic authorities, and carried through parliament as a final compromise of the question in Upper Canada. When, therefore, it was proposed that a provision should be inserted in the confederation scheme to bind that compact of 1863 and declare it a final settlement, so that we should not be compelled, as we have been since 1849, to stand constantly to our arms, awaiting fresh attacks upon our common school system, the proposition seemed to me one that was not rashly to be rejected. I admit that, from my point of view, this is a blot on the scheme before the House; it is, confessedly, one of the concessions from our side that had to be made to secure this great measure of reform. But assuredly, I for one have not the slightest hesitation in accepting it as a necessary condition of the scheme of union, and doubly acceptable must it be in the eyes of honourable gentlemen opposite, who were the authors of the bill of 1863. But it was urged that though this arrangement might perhaps be fair as regards Upper Canada, it was not so as regards Lower Canada, for there were matters of which the British population have long complained, and some amendments to the existing School Act were required to secure them equal justice. Well, when this point was raised, gentlemen of all parties in Lower Canada at once expressed themselves prepared to treat it in a frank and conciliatory manner, with a view to removing any injustice that might be shown to exist; and on this understanding the educational clause was adopted by the conference.

MR. T. C. WALLBRIDGE: That destroys the power of the local legislatures to legislate upon the subject.

HON. MR. BROWN: I would like to know how much "power" the honourable gentleman has now to legislate upon it? Let him introduce a bill to-day to annul the compact of 1863 and repeal all the sectarian School Acts of Upper Canada, and how many votes would he get for it? Would twenty members vote for it out of the one hundred and thirty who compose this House? If the honourable gentleman had been struggling for fifteen years, as I have been, to save the school system of Upper Canada from further extension of the sectarian element, he would have found precious little diminution of power over it in this very moderate compromise. And what says the honourable gentleman to leaving the British population of Lower Canada in the unrestricted power of the local legislature? The common schools of Lower Canada are not as in Upper Canada—they are almost entirely non-sectarian Roman Catholic schools. Does the honourable gentleman, then, desire to compel the protestants of Lower Canada to avail themselves of Roman Catholic institutions, or leave their children without instruction? I am further in favour of this scheme because it will bring to an end the sectional discord between Upper and Lower Canada. It sweeps away the boundary line between the provinces so far as regards matters common to the whole people—it places all on an equal level—and the members of the federal legislature will meet at last as citizens of a common country. The questions that used to excite the most hostile feelings among us have been taken away from the general legislature, and placed under the control of the local bodies. No man need hereafter be debarred from success in public life because his views, however popular in his own section, are unpopular in the other, for he will not have to deal with sectional questions; and the temptation to the government of the day to make capital out of local prejudices will be greatly lessened, if not altogether at an end. What has rendered prominent public men in one section utterly unpopular in the other in past years? Has it been our views on trade and commerce—immigration—land settlement—the canal system—the tariff—or any other of the great questions of national interest? No; it was from our views as to the applying of public money to local purposes—the allotment of public lands to local purposes—the building of local roads, bridges, and landing-piers with public funds—the chartering of ecclesiastical institutions—the granting of public money for sectarian purposes—the interference with our school system—and similar matters, that the hot feuds between Upper and Lower Canada have chiefly arisen, and caused our public men, the more faithful they were to the opinions and wishes of one section, to be the more unpopular in the other. A most happy day will it be for Canada when this bill goes into effect, and all these subjects of discord are swept from the discussion of our legislature.

I am further in favour of this scheme as a remedial measure, because it brings to an end the doubt that has so long hung over our position, and

gives a stability to our future in the eyes of the world that could not otherwise have been attained.

HON. MR. HOLTON : Hear, hear !

MR. BROWN : The hon. member for Chateauguay cries "hear, hear" in a very credulous tone ; but the hon. member should be one of the very last to express doubts on this point. Has he not, for many years, admitted the absolute necessity of constitutional changes, ere peace and prosperity could be established in our land ? Has he not taken part in the contests to obtain those changes ? Has he not experienced the harsh and hostile feelings that have pervaded this House and the whole country ? And did he not sign the report of my committee last session, declaring a federal union to be the true solution of our troubles, political and constitutional ? And does the honourable member think these matters were not well known in the United States, and that the hope of our annexation to the republic was not kept alive by them from year to year ? Does he fancy that our discords and discontent were not well known in Great Britain, and that the capitalist and the emigrant were not influenced by our distractions ? Does he fancy that people abroad, as well as at home, did not perfectly understand that Upper Canada would not much longer submit to the injustice from which she suffered ; and that until the future relations of the two sections were adjusted, no one could predict safely what our future position might be ? But when the measure before us has been adopted—when justice has been done to both sections—when all are placed on an equal footing—when the sectional matters that rent us have been handed over to sectional control—when sectional expenditure shall be placed on sectional shoulders—will not a sense of security and stability be inspired which we never before enjoyed, and never could have enjoyed under existing circumstances ? Viewed then from a merely Canadian stand-point—viewed solely as a remedial measure—I fearlessly assert that the scheme in the Speaker's hands is a just and satisfactory remedy for the evils and injustice that have so long distracted the province ; and so strongly do I feel this, that were every word of objection urged against our union with the Maritime Provinces just and true to the very letter, I would not hesitate to adopt the union as the price of a measure of constitutional reform in Canada so just and so complete as now proposed. So far from the objections urged against union with the Maritime Provinces being sound, so far from union with them being a drawback to this measure, I regard it as the crowning advantage of the whole scheme. I make no pretension to having been in past years an advocate of the immediate union of the British American colonies. I always felt and always said that no statesman could doubt that such was the best and almost the certain future destiny of those colonies ; but I doubted greatly whether the right time for the movement had yet arrived. I knew little of the Maritime Provinces or the feelings of their people ; the negotiations for a union were likely to be difficult and long protracted ; and I was unwilling to accept the hope of a measure so remote and so uncertain in lieu of the practical remedy for practical evils in Canada which we were

earnestly seeking to obtain, and which our own legislature had the power immediately to grant. But of late all this has been changed. The circumstances are entirely altered. A revolution has occurred in Great Britain on the subject of colonial relations to the parent state—the government of the United States has become a great warlike power—our commercial relations with the republic are seriously threatened—and every man in British America has now placed before him for solution the practical question, What shall be done in view of the changed relations on which we are about to enter? Shall we continue to struggle along as isolated communities, or shall we unite cordially together to extend our commerce, to develop the resources of our country, and to defend our soil? But more than this: many of us have learned, since we last met here, far more of the Maritime Provinces than we ever did before. We have visited the Maritime Provinces—we have seen the country—we have met the people and marked their intelligence, their industry and their frugality—we have investigated their public affairs and found them satisfactory—we have discussed terms of union with their statesmen, and found that no insuperable obstacle to union exists, and no necessity for long delay. We come to the consideration of the question to-day in a totally different position from what we ever did before; and if the House will grant me its indulgence, I think I can present unanswerable arguments to show that this union of all British America should be heartily and promptly accepted by all the provinces.

I am in favour of a union of the British American colonies, first, because it will raise us from the attitude of a number of inconsiderable colonies into a great and powerful people. The united population of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, is at this moment very close on four millions of souls. Now, there are in Europe forty-eight sovereign states, and out of that number there are only eleven having a greater population than these colonies united, while three of the eleven are so little ahead of us that before the next census is taken, in 1871, we shall stand equal in population to the ninth sovereign state of Europe. Then the public revenues of the united provinces for 1864 were \$13,260,000, and their expenditures summed up to \$12,507,000. And large as these sums may appear, it is satisfactory to know that the taxation of British America—were there no reduction from present burdens, which I am sure there will be—will be one-third less per head than the taxation of England or France. There are only five or six countries in Europe in which the taxation is less than ours will be, and these, moreover, are either petty principalities or states which do not enjoy a very high degree of civilization.

Then, as regards the imports and exports of the united provinces, they summed up in 1863 to the following dimensions: Imports, \$70,600,963; exports, \$66,846,604: total trade, \$137,447,567. Now, I should like honourable gentlemen to notice this fact, that in 1793—long after the United States had achieved their independence and established a settled

government—their exports and imports did not amount to one-third what ours do at this moment. There are few states in Europe, and those with a vastly greater population than ours, that can boast of anything like the extent of foreign commerce that now passes through our hands.

Then, as to our agricultural resources, I find that 45,638,854 acres have passed from the governments of these colonies into private hands, of which only 13,128,229 are yet tilled, and 32,510,625 acres have still to be brought into cultivation. The whole of these forty-five millions are picked lands—most of them selected by the early settlers in this country; and if our annual agricultural products are so great now, what will they be when the thirty-two millions yet to pass under the plough have been brought into cultivation? and what will they not be when the vast tracts still held by government are peopled with hardy settlers? According to the census of 1861, the value of the agricultural productions of the previous year in the united provinces of British America was \$120,000,000; and if we add to that the garden products, and the improvements made on new lands by the agricultural labourers of the provinces, it will be found that the actual product of the industry of our farmers in that year was \$150,000,000. The assessed value of our farms—which is always greatly less than the real value—was \$550,000,000 in the year 1861.

Then, in regard to the minerals of the united provinces; what vast fields of profitable industry will we have in the great coal beds of Nova Scotia, in the iron deposits found all over the provinces, in the exhaustless copper regions of Lakes Huron and Superior and the eastern townships of Lower Canada, and in the gold mines of the Chaudière and Nova Scotia. And if the mind stretches from the western bounds of civilization through those great north-western regions, which we hope ere long will be ours, to the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains, what vast sources of wealth to the fur trader, the miner, the gold hunter and the agriculturist, lie there ready to be developed.

Nor can another source of wealth be altogether forgotten. The President of the United States is said recently to have declared that the produce of the petroleum wells of the United States will in half a dozen years pay off the whole national debt of the republic. Well, we too have "struck oil," and every day brings us intelligence of fresh discoveries, and if the enormous debt of our neighbours may possibly be met by the oily stream, may we not hope that some material addition to our annual industrial revenue may flow from our petroleum regions?

Another vast branch of British American industry is the timber and lumber trade. In the year 1862 our saw-mills turned out not less than 772,000,000 feet of manufactured lumber, and our whole timber exports summed up to the value of \$15,000,000.

The manufacturing interests of the provinces, too, are fast rising into importance; agricultural implement works, woollen factories and cotton mills, tanneries and shoe factories, iron works and rolling mills, flax works

and paper mills, and many other extensive and profitable mechanical establishments are springing up among us, and rapidly extending their operations. And to add to all, we have already 2,500 miles of railway, 4,000 miles of electric telegraph, and the noblest canal system in the world, but which, I hope, will soon be infinitely improved.

These are some examples of the industrial spectacle British America will present after the union has been accomplished; and I ask any member of this House to say whether we will not, when thus united, occupy a position in the eyes of the world, and command a degree of respect and influence, that we never can enjoy as separate provinces? Must it not affect the decision of many an intending emigrant, when he is told not of the fishing and mining pursuits of Nova Scotia, or of the ship-building of New Brunswick, or of the timber trade of Lower Canada, or of the agriculture of Upper Canada, but when he is shown all these in one view, as the collective industrial pursuits of British America? I am persuaded that this union will inspire new confidence in our stability, and exercise the most beneficial influence on all our affairs. I believe it will raise the value of our public securities, that it will draw capital to our shores, and secure the prosecution of all legitimate enterprises; and what I saw while in England, a few weeks ago, would alone have convinced me of this. Wherever you went you encountered the most marked evidence of the gratification with which the confederation scheme was received by all classes of the people, and the deep interest taken in its success. Let me state one fact in illustration. For some time previous to November last our securities had gone very low down in the market, in consequence, as my honourable friend the Finance Minister explained the other night, of the war raging on our borders, the uncertainty which hung over the future of this province, and the fear that we might be involved in trouble with our neighbours. Our five per cent. debentures went down in the market so low as 71, but they recovered from 71 to 75, I think, upon the day the resolutions for confederation, which we are now discussing, reached London. Well, the resolutions were published in the London papers, with eulogistic editorial articles, and the immediate effect of the scheme upon the public mind was such that our five per cents. rose from 75 to 92.

HON. MR. HOLTON: What has put them down since?

HON. MR. BROWN: I will presently tell the honourable gentleman what has put them down since. But I say that, if anything could show more clearly than another the effect this union is to have on our position over the world, it is a fact like this, that our securities went up 17 per cent. in consequence of the publication of the details of our scheme. The honourable member for Chateauguay asks, "What put them down again?" I will tell him. They remained at 91 or 92 until the news came that a raid had been made from Canada into the United States, that the raiders had been arrested and brought before a Canadian court, and that upon technical legal grounds, not only had they been set free, but the money of which they had robbed the banks had been handed over to the robbers. The

effect of this news, coupled with General Dix's order, was to drive down our securities 11 per cent. almost in one day. But, as my honourable friend the Finance Minister suggests, this is but an additional proof of the accuracy of the argument I have been sustaining—for this would not have happened, at all events to the same extent, if all the provinces had been united and prepared, as we are now proposing, not only for purposes of commerce but for purposes of defence.

Secondly, I go heartily for the union, because it will throw down the barriers of trade and give us the control of a market of four millions of people. What one thing has contributed so much to the wondrous material progress of the United States as the free passage of their products from one state to another? What has tended so much to the rapid advance of all branches of their industry as the vast extent of their home market, creating an unlimited demand for all the commodities of daily use, and stimulating the energy and ingenuity of producers? I confess that in my mind this one view of the union—the addition of nearly a million of people to our home consumers—sweeps aside all the petty objections that are averred against the scheme. What, in comparison with this great gain to our farmers and manufacturers, are the fallacious money objections which the imaginations of honourable gentlemen opposite have summoned up? All over the world we find nations eagerly longing to extend their domains, spending large sums and waging protracted wars to possess themselves of more territory, untilled and uninhabited. Other countries offer large inducements to foreigners to emigrate to their shores—free passages, free lands, and free food and implements to start them in the world. We ourselves support costly establishments to attract immigrants to our country, and are satisfied when our annual outlay brings us fifteen or twenty thousand souls. But here is a proposal which is to add, in one day, nearly a million souls to our population—to add valuable territories to our domain, and secure to us all the advantages of a large and profitable commerce now existing. And because some of us would have liked certain of the little details otherwise arranged, we are to hesitate in accepting this alliance! Have honourable gentlemen forgotten that the United States gladly paid twenty millions in hard cash to have Louisiana incorporated in the republic? But what was Louisiana then to the Americans in comparison with what the Maritime Provinces are at this moment to Canada? I put it to honourable gentlemen opposite—if the United States were now to offer us the state of Maine, what possible sum could be named within the compass of our ability that we would not be prepared to pay for that addition to our country? If we were offered Michigan, Iowa or Minnesota, I would like to know what sum, within the compass of Canada, we would not be prepared to pay? These states are portions of a foreign country, but here is a people owning the same allegiance as ourselves, loving the same old soil, enjoying the same laws and institutions, actuated by the same impulses and social customs; and yet when it is proposed that they shall unite with us for purposes of commerce, for the defence of our common country, and to develop the vast natural resources of our united domains, we hesitate to

adopt it! If a Canadian goes now to Nova Scotia or New Brunswick, or if a citizen of these provinces comes here, it is like going to a foreign country. The customs officer meets you at the frontier, arrests your progress, and levies his imposts on your effects. But the proposal now before us is to throw down all barriers between the provinces—to make a citizen of one, citizen of the whole; the proposal is that our farmers, and manufacturers and mechanics, shall carry their wares unquestioned into every village of the Maritime Provinces, and that they shall with equal freedom bring their fish, and their coal, and their West India produce to our three millions of inhabitants. The proposal is, that the law courts, and the schools, and the professional and industrial walks of life, throughout all the provinces, shall be thrown equally open to us all.

Thirdly, I am in favour of a union of the provinces because—and I call the attention of honourable gentlemen opposite to it—because it will make us the third maritime state of the world. When this union is accomplished, but two countries in the world will be superior in maritime influence to British America, and those are Great Britain and the United States. In 1863, no fewer than 628 vessels were built in British America, of which the aggregate tonnage was not less than 230,312 tons. There were built in Canada, 158 vessels, with 67,209 tons; Nova Scotia, 207 vessels, with 46,862 tons; New Brunswick, 137 vessels, with 85,250 tons; Prince Edward Island, 100 vessels, with 24,991 tons; Newfoundland, 26 vessels, with 6,000 tons; total, 628 vessels, with 230,312 tons. Now, in 1861—the year preceding the outbreak of the civil war—all the vessels built in the United States, with their vast seaboard and thirty millions of people, were in the aggregate but 233,193 tons—only three thousand tons in excess of the British American Provinces. And I hesitate not to affirm that if the people of British America unite cordially together in utilizing the singular facilities we unitedly possess for the extension of the shipping and ship-building interests, many years will not elapse before we greatly surpass our neighbours in this lucrative branch of industry.

HON. MR. HOLTON: How much of the shipping built in that year do we own now?

HON. MR. BROWN: How much of what the Americans built in 1861 do they own now? Why is my honourable friend so anxious to decry the industry of his country? If we have not the ships it is because we sold them, and the money is in our pockets, and we are ready to build more. In 1863 we sold ships built by our mechanics to the large amount of \$9,000,000 in gold. But if my honourable friend from Chateauguay will permit me, I am going on to indoctrinate him upon the point of the ownership of vessels—

HON. MR. HOLTON: Don't!

HON. MR. BROWN: Ah! my honourable friend does not require to be instructed; well, will he tell us how many tons of shipping are now owned by British America?

HON. MR. HOLTON: I am aware that most of the vessels my honourable friend speaks of, and the building of which he cites as a proof that we will be a great maritime power, were sold abroad. Building ships is a good thing, and selling them is a better, but that does not prove us to be a great maritime power.

HON. MR. BROWN: My honourable friend cannot eat his cake and have it too. If we got \$9,000,000 for a portion of the ships we built in 1863, it is clear we cannot own them also. It did not require a man of great wisdom to find out that. But I was going on to show the amount of shipping that was owned in these provinces. I hold in my hand a statement of the vessels owned and registered in British America, made up to the latest dates, and I find that the provinces unitedly own not fewer than 8,530 vessels, with an aggregate tonnage of not less than 952,246 tons.

HON. MR. HOLTON: Sea-going?

HON. MR. BROWN: Sea-going and inland.

HON. MR. HOLTON (ironically): Hear, hear!

HON. MR. BROWN: Why is my honourable friend so anxious to depreciate? Is it then so deplorable a thing to own inland vessels? None knows better than my honourable friend when to buy and when to sell—and yet, I greatly mistake if there was not a time when my honourable friend thought it not so bad a thing to be the owner of ships and steamers on our inland seas. Am I wrong in believing that my honourable friend laid the foundation of his well-merited fortune in the carrying trade of the lakes? and is it for him, from momentary partisanship, to depreciate such an important branch of national industry? What matters where the ship floats, if she is a good and a sound ship?—and the inland tonnage includes so many steamers, that in value it will compare favourably with that of the sea-going. On the 31st December, 1864, Canada owned 2,311 vessels, of 287,187 tons; in 1863, Nova Scotia owned 3,539 vessels, of 309,554 tons; New Brunswick, 891 vessels, of 211,680 tons; Prince Edward Island, 360 vessels, of 31,222 tons; Newfoundland, 1,429 vessels, of 89,603 tons; total, 8,530 vessels, of 952,246 tons. Now, it is quite true that the United States have a much larger commercial navy than this, and Great Britain a vastly larger one; but it is equally true that the country next to them in importance is France, and that notwithstanding her thirty-five millions of people, large foreign trade, and extensive sea-coast, she owns but 60,000 tons of shipping more than British America. In 1860, the aggregate commercial navy of France was but 996,124 tons. I say, then, that even as ship-owners the British American confederacy will occupy from the first a proud place among the maritime states of the world, and that when her ships hoist a distinctive flag alongside the Cross of Red, there will be few seas in which it will not be unfurled. And let me here mention a fact which came under my notice while recently in the Lower Provinces—a fact of great importance, and from which, I think, we, who are more inland, may well profit. I learned that, as in the British isles, a system of joint-stock ship-building has been spreading over many parts of the Maritime

Provinces. Ships are built and owned in small shares—say in sixteenth, thirty-second, or sixty-fourth parts, and all classes of the people are taking small ventures in the trade. Most of the ships so built are sold, but a portion, and an increasing portion every year, are sailed, and sailed with profit, by the original joint-stock holders. I was delighted to be told that some of those clipper vessels which we often hear of as making wonderful trips from China and India and Australia to British ports, are vessels built and owned in New Brunswick, under this joint-stock system. So much for the building and ownership of ships; now let me show you what will be the strength of the united provinces in seafaring men. By the census of 1861, it appears that the number of sailors and fishermen then in Canada was 5,958; in Nova Scotia, 19,637; in New Brunswick, 2,765; in Prince Edward Island, 2,318; in Newfoundland, 38,578; total, 69,256. Whether regarded merely as a lucrative branch of industry, or as affecting our maritime position before the world, or as a bulwark of defence in time of need, this one fact that British America will have a combined force of 70,000 seamen, appears to me an immense argument in favour of the union. And let us look at the products of the labour of a portion of these men—the fishermen. From the latest returns I have been able to meet with, I find the joint products of our sea-coasts and inland lakes were, in the years named, estimated at the following values: Upper Canada (1859), \$380,000; Lower Canada (1862), \$703,895; Nova Scotia (1861), \$2,072,081; New Brunswick (1861), \$518,530; Newfoundland (1861), \$6,347,730; total, \$10,022,236. I was unable to find any estimate as regards Prince Edward Island, but fancy the amount there must be about \$200,000. But be this as it may, so valuable a fishing trade as this of the united provinces does not exist in any part of the world. And no doubt these estimates are far under the fact, as a large portion of the delicious food drawn by our people from the sea and inland waters could not possibly be included in the returns of the fishery inspectors. And let us observe, for a moment, the important part played by this fishing industry in the foreign commerce of the provinces. The exports of products of the sea in the year 1863 were as follows: From Canada, \$789,913; Nova Scotia, \$2,390,661; New Brunswick (1862), \$303,477; Newfoundland, \$4,090,970; Prince Edward Island, \$121,000; total exports, \$7,696,021. Add to this, \$9,000,000 received in the same year for new ships, and we have \$16,696,021 as one year's foreign exports of our ship-building and fishing interests. With such facts before us as the result of only a partially developed traffic, may we not fearlessly look forward to the future in the confident hope of still more gratifying results, when, by combined and energetic action, a new impetus has been given to these valuable branches of industry?

But there remains a still more singular comparison to be made. I refer to the statement of ships annually entering and leaving our ports. Of course every one comprehends that a large amount of the tonnage entering and leaving ports on the upper lakes is repeated in the returns over and over again. This is the case, for instance, with the ferry boats between the American and Canadian shores, that carry passengers and a small quan-

tity of goods. It would be unfair to put down the tonnage of such boats, every time they enter or leave a port, as foreign commerce. Still there is a large amount of valuable shipping engaged in the inland trade, and a vast amount of freight is carried between the countries; and the only just plan is to state separately that which is sea-going shipping and that which is inland. Acting on this plan, I find that in 1863, the tonnage between Canada and foreign ports was as follows:

	Inwards:	Outwards.	Total.
Canada	1,041,309	1,091,895	2,133,204
Nova Scotia	712,939	719,915	1,432,854
New Brunswick	659,258	727,727	1,386,985
P. E. Island (1862)	69,080	81,208	150,288
Newfoundland	156,578	148,610	305,188
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Inland Navigation.	2,639,164	2,769,355	5,408,519
Canada	3,538,701	3,368,432	6,907,133
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total tons	6,177,865	6,137,787	12,315,652

Now, the United States are in the same position as we are in respect to this inland traffic, and they include it in their returns as is done here. And what do you think is the difference between their tonnage and ours? Why, ours is over twelve millions and theirs is but sixteen millions. There are not four millions of tons of difference between the two. And let it be recollected that the United States have had seventy years start of us. As regards France, the whole amount of shipping that entered and left the ports of that great country in one year was but 8,456,734 tons—four millions of tons less than that of the British American Provinces. May we not then, when this union is accomplished, fairly claim to be the third maritime state of the world; and may we not even entertain the hope that, at some future day, a still higher position is not beyond our reach, when the days of puberty have been passed and the strength of manhood has been reached? I ask honourable gentlemen, in looking at these figures, to consider what the effect must be when they are set down thus collectively, side by side, in official commercial returns, in comparison with the commerce of all the great maritime states? Will it not strengthen our position abroad? will it not give us a degree of influence and importance to have it known that British America wields so large a share of the world's commerce? And if honourable gentlemen will still further consider the deep importance to Canada, in her inland position, of exercising her just influence in the control of so valuable a maritime interest, I think they will come to the conclusion that all the objections urged against this union are, in the balance of its advantages, utterly contemptible.

✓ In the fourth place, I go for a union of the provinces, because it will give a new start to immigration into our country. It will bring us out anew prominently before the world—it will turn earnest attention to our resources, and bring to our shores a stream of immigration greater, and of a better class, than we ever had before. I was in England when the first

public announcement of this scheme was made, and witnessed, with pleasure, the marked impression it produced. You could not go abroad, you could not enter into any company, in any class of society, where Canada or the British American Provinces were mentioned, but you heard this union movement spoken of almost with enthusiasm. And I say that it is desirable that this scheme should not be delayed, but be carried through promptly and vigorously. I hesitate not to say that it should be accomplished with a vigorous effort to give a new impetus to our industrial enterprises, to open up fresh lands for settlement, and to cheapen the transport of our produce to the sea-board. With the consummation of this union, I trust we will have a new immigration and a new land settlement policy—that we will ascertain every lot of land we actually own, so that a printed list may be placed in the hands of every immigrant—that the petty price we have been heretofore exacting will no longer be exacted, but that to actual settlers, who come among us to hew out for themselves and their children homes in the forest, no burthen or condition will be demanded, beyond resident occupation for a certain number of years, and a fixed amount of improvement on the land.

HON. MR. HOLTON : Unfortunately for your argument, the lands will be in the hands of the local governments.

HON. MR. BROWN : So much the better. My honourable friend can manage his public lands in Lower Canada as he likes, and we will manage ours. And, speaking for the western section, I am bound to say there are very few shrewd men in Upper Canada who do not feel that far more public benefit is to be gained from the industry of a hardy actual settler upon 100 acres of land given to him free, than the trumpery \$150 that can be squeezed out of him as its price, the payment of which keeps him in trouble perhaps for years, and retards the progress of the country. On this question of immigration turns, in my opinion, the whole future success of this great scheme which we are now discussing. Why, there is hardly a political and financial or social problem suggested by this union that does not find its best solution in a large influx of immigration. The larger our population, the greater will be our productions, the more valuable our exports, and the greater our ability to develop the resources of our country. The greater the number of tax-payers, and the more densely they are settled, the more lightly will the burden of taxation fall upon us all. And in this question of immigration is found the only true solution of the problem of defence. Fill up our vacant lands, double our population, and we will at once be in a position to meet promptly and effectually any invader who may put his foot with hostile intent upon our soil.

And this question of immigration naturally brings me to the great subject of the North-West Territories. The resolutions before us recognize the immediate necessity of those great territories being brought within the confederation and opened up for settlement. But I am told that, while the Intercolonial Railroad has been made an absolute condition of the compact, the opening up of the great west and the enlargement of our canals

have been left in doubt. Now, nothing can be more unjust than this. Let me read the resolutions :

"The general government shall secure, without delay, the completion of the Intercolonial Railway from Rivière du Loup, through New Brunswick to Truro, in Nova Scotia.

"The communications with the North-Western Territory, and the improvements required for the development of the trade of the great west with the seaboard, are regarded by this conference as subjects of the highest importance to the federated provinces, and shall be prosecuted at the earliest possible period that the state of the finances will permit."

The confederation is, therefore, clearly committed to the carrying out of both these enterprises. I doubt if there was a member of the conference who did not consider that the opening up of the north-west and the improvement of our canal system, were not as clearly for the advantage of the Lower Provinces as for the interests of Upper Canada. Indeed, one gentleman held that the Lower Provinces were more interested—they wished to get their products into the west, they wanted a back country as much as we did, they wanted to be the carriers for that great country—and they were, therefore, to say the least, as much interested in these questions as we were. But honourable gentlemen lay stress upon the point that, while the one enterprise is to be undertaken at once, the other is not to be commenced until the state of the finances will permit. No doubt this is correct, and the reason for it is simply this: The money has already been found for the Intercolonial Railway. They must be well aware that the late government (the Macdonald-Sicotte administration) agreed to build the Intercolonial Railway, and obtained from the Imperial government a guarantee of the debentures for building it, so that that money is ready, at a very low rate of interest, whenever required. We know where to find the money for one enterprise at a rate we are able to bear, and can thus at once go on with a work which must be gone on with if this union is to be consummated. But we don't know this of the other great work; and we all felt that it would be exceedingly indiscreet—I, myself, as the special advocate of opening up the great west and of the enlargement of our canals, felt that I could not put my name to a document which declared that at all hazards, while our five per cent. debentures were quoted at 75 or 80 per cent. in the money market, we would commence at once, without an hour's delay, any great public work whatever. Honourable gentlemen opposite must not imagine that they have to do with a set of tricksters in the thirty-three gentlemen who composed that conference. What we have said in our resolutions was deliberately adopted, in the honest sense of the words employed, and not for purposes of deception. Both works are to go on at the earliest possible moment our finances will permit, and honourable gentlemen will find the members of the cabinet, from Lower as well as from Upper Canada, actuated by the hearty desire to have this whole scheme carried out in its fair meaning.

When recently in England, I was charged to negotiate with the Imperial government for the opening up of the North-West Territories. In a few days the papers will be laid before the House, and it will then be seen whether or not this government is in earnest in that matter. The gentlemen who formed the conference at Quebec did not enter upon their work with the miserable idea of getting the advantage of each other, but with a due sense of the greatness of the work they had on hand, with an earnest desire to do justice to all, and keeping always in mind that what would benefit one section in such a union must necessarily benefit the whole. It has always appeared to me that the opening up of the north-west ought to be one of the most cherished projects of my honourable friends from Lower Canada. During the discussion on the question for some years back I had occasion to dip deep in north-west lore—into those singularly interesting narratives of life and travels in the north-west in the olden time, and into the history of the struggles for commercial dominancy in the great fur-bearing regions; and it has always struck me that the French Canadian people have cause to look back with pride to the bold and successful part they played in the adventures of those days. Nothing perhaps has tended more to create their present national character than the vigorous habits, the power of endurance, the aptitude for out-door life, acquired in their prosecution of the north-west fur trade. Well may they look forward with anxiety to the realization of this part of our scheme, in confident hope that the great north-western traffic shall be once more opened up to the hardy French Canadian traders and *voyageurs*. Last year furs to the value of £280,000 stg. (\$1,400,000) were carried from that territory by the Hudson's Bay Company—smuggled off through the ice-bound regions of James' Bay—that the pretence of the barrenness of the country, and the difficulty of conveying merchandise by the natural route of the St. Lawrence, may be kept up a little longer. The carrying of merchandise into that country, and bringing down the bales of pelts ought to be ours, and must ere long be ours, as in the days of yore; and when the fertile plains of that great Saskatchewan territory are opened up for settlement and cultivation, I am confident that it will not only add immensely to our annual agricultural products, but bring us sources of mineral and other wealth on which at present we do not reckon.

While speaking on this question of immigration, I would remind the House, and it is impossible to urge it too strongly, that these provinces are now presented to the world in a very disadvantageous aspect, as different communities. When a party in Europe thinks of emigrating here, he has to ascertain separately all about New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia, and Upper and Lower Canada, and if by chance he meets a party from some one of these provinces, he has to listen to a picture of the merits of that one section in high contrast to the demerits of all the rest, and the result is the poor man's ideas about us become a mass of confusion. On the other hand, if he seeks to know the inducements for emigration to New South Wales or New Zealand, he gets it in one picture—in an official form—and the offer is made to pay his passage to these lands

of hope. A large amount of emigration, and of money which the emigrant takes with him, are thus carried off to a much more distant land than this, and one that does not offer equal inducements to the settler. But how different will all this be when these provinces stand united, and present to emigrants a combination of so many branches of profitable industry? In turning over some United States statistics, I recently fell upon a very curious official calculation, made by the United States government, as to the value of immigration. By the census of 1861 the population of the United States was over thirty millions; and this calculation was to ascertain what the population would have been had there been no immigration into the country, but the population had been left to advance solely by its own natural increase. And what do you think was the result? Why, it is shown that if the United States had received all the immigrants that came to them up to 1820, and then stopped receiving them, the population, at this moment, instead of 30,000,000, would have been but 14,601,485. It is shown that if immigration had gone on until 1810, and stopped then, the population now would have been only 12,678,562. Had it stopped in 1800, the population now would have been 10,462,944; and had it stopped in 1790, the population now, instead of 30,000,000, would have been but 8,789,969. These are most valuable facts, which should be impressed on the mind of every public man in British America. If we wish our country to progress, we should not leave a single stone unturned to attract the tide of emigration in this direction; and I know no better method of securing that result, than the gathering into one of these five provinces, and presenting ourselves to the world in the advantageous light which, when united, we would occupy.

Fifthly, I am in favour of a union of these provinces, because it will enable us to meet, without alarm, the abrogation of the American reciprocity treaty, in case the United States should insist on its abolition. I do not believe that the American government is so insane as to repeal that treaty. But it is always well to be prepared for contingencies; and I have no hesitation in saying that if they do repeal it, should this union of British America go on, a fresh outlet for our commerce will be opened up to us quite as advantageous as the American trade has ever been. I have never heretofore ventured to make this assertion, for I know well what a serious task it is to change, in one day, the commercial relations of such a country as this. When the traffic of a country has passed for a lengthened period through a particular channel, any serious change of that channel tends, for a time, to the embarrassment of business men, and causes serious injury to individuals, if not the whole community. Such a change we in Canada had in 1847. But as it was in 1847, so it will be in 1866, if the reciprocity treaty is abolished. Our agricultural interest had been built up on the protective legislation of Great Britain, and in 1847 it was suddenly brought to an end. We suffered severely, in consequence, for some years; but by degrees new channels for our trade opened up—the reciprocity treaty was negotiated—and we have been more prosperous since 1847 than we ever were before. And so, I have not a doubt,

will it be in the event of the reciprocity treaty being abolished. Profitable as that treaty has unquestionably been to us—and it has been more profitable to the Americans—still, were it brought to an end to-morrow, though we would suffer a while from the change, I am convinced the ultimate result would be that other foreign markets would be opened to us quite as profitable, and that we would speedily build up our trade on a sounder basis than at present. A close examination of the working of the reciprocity treaty discloses facts of vital importance to the merits of the question, to which you never hear the slightest allusion made by American speakers or writers. Our neighbours, in speaking of the treaty, keep constantly telling us of the Canadian trade—what they take from Canada and what Canada takes from them. Their whole story is about the buying and selling of commodities in Canada. Not a whisper do you ever hear from them about their buying and selling with the Maritime Provinces—not a word about the enormous carrying trade for all the provinces which they monopolize—not a word of the large sums drawn from us for our vast traffic over their railways and canals—and not a whisper as to their immense profits from fishing in our waters, secured to them by the treaty. No; all we hear of is the exports and imports of Canada—all is silence as to other parts of the treaty. But it must not be forgotten that if the treaty is abolished and this union is accomplished, an abolition of reciprocity with Canada means abolition of reciprocity with all the British American provinces—means bringing to an end the right of the Americans to fish in our waters; their right to use our canals; their right to the navigation of the St. Lawrence; and that it also implies the taking out of their hands the vast and lucrative carrying trade they now have from us. It must be always kept in mind that though the United States purchase from Canada a large amount of agricultural products, a great portion of what they purchase does not go into consumption in the states, but is merely purchased for transmission to Great Britain and the West India markets. They merely act as commission agents and carriers in such transactions, and splendid profits they make out of the business. But beyond this, another large portion of these produce purchases, for which they take so much credit to themselves, they buy in the same manner for export to the Maritime Provinces of British America, reaping all the benefit of the sea-going as well as the inland freight—charges and commissions. The commercial returns of the Lower Provinces show not only that the Americans send a large quantity of their own farm products to those provinces, but a considerable amount of what they (the Americans) receive from us, thereby gaining the double advantage of the carrying trade through the United States to the seaboard, and then by sea to the Lower Provinces. I hold in my hand a return of the articles purchased by the Maritime Provinces from the United States in 1863, which Canada could have supplied. I will not detain the House by reading it, but any member who desires can have it for examination. I may state, however, in brief, that in that year the broadstuffs alone bought by the Lower Provinces amounted to no less than \$4,447,207; that the import of meats, fresh and cured, amounted to

\$659,917; and that the total value of products which the Lower Provinces might have bought more advantageously from us, summed up to over seven millions of dollars. The Americans must therefore bear in mind, that if they abolish the reciprocity treaty, they will not only lose that seven millions which they now receive for their products, but the carrying trade which goes with it. But, on the other hand, when we have this union, these products will, as they naturally should, go down the St. Lawrence, not only for the advantage of our farmers, but swelling the volume of our own shipping interests. The Americans hitherto have had a large portion of our carrying trade; they have brought us our goods—even our European goods—and taken our produce not only to Europe but even to the Lower Provinces; and I say one of the best features of this union is, that if in our commercial relations with the United States we are compelled by them to meet fire with fire, it will enable us to stop this improvidence, and turn the current of our own trade into our own waters. Far be it from me to say I am an advocate of a coercive commercial policy; on the contrary, entire freedom of trade, in my opinion, is what we in this country should strive for. Without hesitation, I would, to-morrow, throw open the whole of our trade and the whole of our waters to the United States, if they did the same to us. But if they tell us, in the face of all the advantages they get by reciprocity, that they are determined to put a stop to it, and if this is done through a hostile feeling to us—deeply as I should regret that this should be the first use made by the northern states of their new-found liberty—then, I say, we have a policy, and a good policy, of our own to fall back upon. And let me say a word as to the effect of the repeal of reciprocity on the American fishing interest. The Americans, in 1851, had engaged in the cod and mackerel fishing, in our waters, shipping to the extent of 129,014 tons; but under the influence of the reciprocity treaty it rose, in 1861, to 192,662—an increase, in ten years, of upwards of 63,000 tons, or fifty per cent. The repeal of reciprocity will give us back all this increase, and more, for it will be a very different thing in the future from what it was formerly to poach on our fishing grounds, when these provinces are united and determined to protect the fisheries of the gulf. This fishing interest is one which may be cultivated to an extent difficult, perhaps, for many of us to conceive. But we have only to look at the amount of fish taken from our waters by the Americans and other nations, and the advantages we possess, to perceive that if we apply ourselves, as a united people, to foster that trade, we can vastly increase the great traffic we now enjoy. On the whole, then, I come firmly to the conclusion that, in view of the possible stoppage of the American reciprocity treaty, and our being compelled to find new channels for our trade, this union presents to us advantages, in comparison with which any objection that has been offered, or can be offered to it, is utterly insignificant.

Sixthly, I am in favour of the union of the provinces, because, in the event of war, it will enable all the colonies to defend themselves better, and give more efficient aid to the empire, than they could do separately. I am not one of those who ever had the war-fever; I have not believed in

getting up large armaments in this country ; I have never doubted that a military spirit, to a certain extent, did necessarily form part of the character of a great people ; but I felt that Canada had not yet reached that stage in her progress when she could safely assume the duty of defence ; and that, so long as peace continued and the mother country threw her shield around us, it was well for us to cultivate our fields and grow in numbers and material strength, until we could look our enemies fearlessly in the face. But it must be admitted—and there is no use of closing our eyes to the fact—that this question of defence has been placed, within the last two years, in a totally different position from what it ever occupied before. The time has come—it matters not what political party may be in power in England—when Britain will insist on a reconsideration of the military relations which a great colony, such as Canada, ought to hold to the empire. And I am free to admit that it is a fair and just demand. We may doubt whether some of the demands that have been made upon us, without regard to our peculiar position at the moment, and without any attempt to discuss the question with us in all its breadth, were either just or well considered. But of this I think there can be no doubt, that when the time comes in the history of any colony that it has overcome the burdens and embarrassments of early settlement, and has entered on a career of permanent progress and prosperity, it is only fair and right that it should contribute its quota to the defence of the empire. What that quota ought to be, I think, is a matter for grave deliberation and discussion, as well as the measure of assistance the colony may look for, in time of war, from the parent state ; and assuredly, it is in this spirit that the present Imperial government is desirous of approaching the question. I am persuaded that nothing more than that which is fairly due at our hands will be demanded from us, and anything less than this, I am sure, the people of Canada do not desire. In the conversations I had, while in England, with public men of different politics, while I found many who considered that the connection between Canada and England involved the mother country in some danger of war with the powerful state upon our borders, and that the colonial system devolved heavy and unreasonable burdens upon the mother country, and while a still larger number thought we had not acted as cordially and energetically as we ought in organizing our militia for the defence of the province, still I did not meet one public man, of any stripe of politics, who did not readily and heartily declare that, in case of the invasion of Canada, the honour of Great Britain would be at stake, and the whole strength of the empire would be unhesitatingly marshalled in our defence. But, coupled with this, was the invariable and most reasonable declaration that a share of the burden of defence, in peace and in war, we must contribute. And this stipulation applies not only to Canada, but to every one of the colonies. Already the Indian empire has been made to pay the whole expense of her military establishment. The Australian colonies have agreed to pay £40 sterling per man for every soldier sent there. This system is being gradually extended ; and, union or no union, assuredly every one of these British American colonies will be

called upon to bear her fair share towards the defence of the empire. And who will deny that it is a just demand, and that great colonies such as these should be proud to meet it in a frank and earnest spirit. Nothing, I am persuaded, could be more foreign to the ideas of the people of Canada, than that the people of England should be unfairly taxed for service rendered to this province. Now, the question presented to us is simply this: Will these contributions which Canada and the other provinces must hereafter make to the defence of the empire, be better rendered by a hardy, energetic population, acting as one people, than as five or six separate communities? There is no doubt about it. But not only do our changed relations towards the mother country call on us to assume the new duty of military defence — our changed relations towards the neighbouring republic compel us to do so. For myself, I have no belief that the Americans have the slightest thought of attacking us. I cannot believe that the first use of their newfound liberty will be the invasion, totally unprovoked, of a peaceful province. I fancy that they have had quite enough of war for a good many years to come, and that such a war as one with England would certainly be the last they are likely to provoke. There is no better mode of warding off war when it is threatened than to be prepared for it if it comes. The Americans are now a warlike people. They have large armies, a powerful navy, an unlimited supply of warlike munitions, and the carnage of war has to them been stript of its horrors. The American side of our lines already bristles with works of defence, and unless we are willing to live at the mercy of our neighbours, we too must put our country in a state of efficient preparation. War or no war, the necessity of placing these provinces in a thorough state of defence can no longer be postponed. Our country is coming to be regarded as undefended and indefensible — the capitalist is alarmed, and the immigrant is afraid to come among us. Were it merely as a measure of commercial advantage, every one of these colonies must meet the question of military defence promptly and energetically. And how can we do this so efficiently and economically as by the union now proposed? I have already shown that union would give us a body of 70,000 hardy seamen ready and able to defend our sea-coasts and inland lakes; let us now see what would be the military strength of the confederation. By the last census (1861) it appears that the men (from 20 to 60 years of age) capable of bearing arms in British America, were as follows: Upper Canada, 308,955; Lower Canada, 225,620; Nova Scotia, 67,367; New Brunswick, 51,625; Newfoundland, 25,532; Prince Edward Island (from 21 to 60 years of age), 14,819; total, 693,918. With the body of efficient soldiers that might be obtained from this vast array of men, the erection of defensive works at salient points, and the force of British troops that would soon come to our aid, who can doubt that the invasion of our country would be successfully resisted?

Seventhly, I am in favour of this union because it will give us a sea-board at all seasons of the year. It is not to be denied that the position of Canada, shut off as she is from the sea-board during the winter months,

is far from satisfactory; and should the United States carry out their insane threat of abolishing the bonding system, by which our merchandise passes free through their territory, it would be still more embarrassing. The Maritime Provinces are equally cut off from communication inland. Now, this embarrassment will be ended by colonial union. The Intercolonial Railway will give us at all times access to the Atlantic through British territory. As a commercial enterprise, the Intercolonial Railway has not, I apprehend, any considerable merit; as a work of defence it has, however, many advocates; but if the union of the provinces is to go on, it is an absolute necessity; and as the price of union, were there no other argument in its favour, I heartily go for it. The advantage it will confer on the Maritime Provinces can hardly be overrated. It will make Halifax and St. John the Atlantic sea-ports of half a continent; it will insure to Halifax, ere long, the establishment of a line of powerful steamers running in six days from her wharves to some near point on the west coast of Ireland; and it will bring a constant stream of passengers and immigrants through those lower provinces that never otherwise would come near them.

I could go on for many hours piling up arguments in favour of this scheme, but already I have detained the House too long, and must draw to a close. But I think I have given reasons enough to satisfy every candid man who desires the advancement of his country, why this House should go unanimously and enthusiastically for "the union, the whole union, and nothing but the union!" Before sitting down, however, there are one or two general objections urged against the scheme which I am desirous of meeting, and I will try to do so as briefly as possible. And first, I am told that we should have made the union legislative and not federal. Undoubtedly this is a point on which different opinions may be honestly held by men sincerely seeking the same ends; but, speaking my own views, I think we came to a most wise conclusion. Had we continued the present legislative union, we must have continued with it the unjust system of taxation for local purposes that now exists, and the sectional bickering would have gone on as before. And can any honourable gentleman really believe that it would have been possible for a body of men sitting at Ottawa to administer efficiently and wisely the parish business of Red River and Newfoundland and all the country between? Only think of bringing suitors and witnesses such distances to promote a bill for closing a side-line or incorporating a club! And if such a thing were desirable, would it be possible for any body of men to go through such a mass of work? Why, the Imperial parliament, with 650 members, sits for eight months in the year, and even our parliament sits three or four months; how then would it be possible for the legislature of all the provinces, with a thousand or twelve hundred bills before it, to accomplish it all? The whole year would not suffice for it—and who in these colonies is able to sacrifice his whole time to the duties of public life? But, there is another reason why the union was not made legislative—it could not be carried. We had either to take the federal union or drop the negotiation. Not only were our friends from Lower

Canada against it, but so were most of the delegates from the Maritime Provinces. There was but one choice open to us—federal union or nothing. But, in truth, the scheme now before us has all the advantages of a legislative union and a federal one as well. We have thrown over on the localities all the questions which experience has shown lead directly to local jealousy and discord, and we have retained in the hands of the general government all the powers necessary to secure a strong and efficient administration of public affairs. By placing the appointment of the judges in the hands of the general government, and the establishment of a central court of appeal, we have secured uniformity of justice over the whole land. By vesting the appointment of the lieutenant-governors in the general government, and giving a veto for all local measures, we have secured that no injustice shall be done without appeal in local legislation. For all dealings with the Imperial government and foreign countries, we have clothed the general government with the most ample powers. And finally, all matters of trade and commerce, banking and currency, and all questions common to the whole people, we have vested fully and unrestrictedly in the general government. The measure, in fact, shuns the faults of the federal and legislative systems and adopts the best parts of both, and I am well persuaded it will work efficiently and satisfactorily.

I am told that the cost of working this federation scheme will be enormous. Now, it would be a very rash thing for me, or any other person, to assert that the expense will not be great; for we all know that any system of government may be made either economical or extravagant precisely according to the discretion of those who administer it. But this I am confident of, that with ordinary discretion, far from being more costly than the existing system, a very considerable reduction may be readily effected; and one thing is quite certain, that no ingenuity could make it a more costly or extravagant system than the one we have now. Undoubtedly the mode in which the local governments shall be constructed will very much affect the cost of the whole scheme; but if we adopt (as I earnestly hope we will) simple and inexpensive machinery for local purposes, I am quite satisfied that there will be a reduction to the people of Canada on the amount they now contribute. I have great confidence in the economical effect of placing local expenditures on local shoulders, and in the salutary influence, in the same direction, of the representatives of the Maritime Provinces when they come among us.

HON. MR. HOLTON: The trouble is that they will spend our money—not theirs.

HON. MR. BROWN: The honourable gentleman is entirely wrong, and I am amazed at his making such a statement. There is no portion of the community that will pay more money, per head, to the revenue, than the people of the Maritime Provinces. If the honourable gentleman had turned up the commercial returns of those lower provinces and calculated the effect of our tariff, if applied to them—or even a tariff less than ours,

for our tariff must be reduced—he would have known that they will bear their full proportion of the national burdens.

I am told that the arrangement as to the debt is unfair—that we have thrown on the federal exchequer the whole of the debts of the Maritime Provinces, but only a portion of the debt of Canada. There is not a particle of force in this objection. The whole debt of Canada is \$67,500,000, but five millions of this is due to our own people, to meet which there are certain local funds. Now, if we had thrown the whole \$67,500,000 on the federal treasury, we must also have handed over to it the local revenues, which, so far as these five millions are concerned, would have been precisely the same thing. But, as regards the public debt with which the federal government would start, it would not have been the same thing. By restricting the debt of Canada to \$62,500,000, we restricted the debt of the Maritime Provinces to the same proportion, or \$25 per head of their population; but had we thrown our whole debt of sixty-seven and a half millions on the confederation, the proportion of debt for the several Maritime Provinces must have been increased, and the whole debt very greatly augmented. But in throwing these five millions on the local governments of Upper and Lower Canada, do we impose a burden on them they are unable to bear? Quite the contrary; for with the debt, we give them the corresponding sources of revenue from which to meet it. The local governments of Upper and Lower Canada will severally not only have funds, from the subsidy and other sources, to meet all expenditure, but a large surplus besides. I am told that this federation scheme may be all very right—it may be just, and the very thing the country needs—but this government had no authority from parliament to negotiate it. The honourable member for Cornwall (Hon. John S. Macdonald) particularly pressed this objection, and I am sorry he is not in his seat.

HON. MR. HOLTON: It is quite true.

HON. MR. CARTIER: No, the reverse is true.

HON. MR. BROWN: I am astonished to hear such a statement repeated. No one knows better than the honourable member for Chateauguay and the honourable member for Cornwall that in the ministerial explanations brought down to this House at the time of the formation of this government, it was distinctly declared that the government was formed for the special purpose of maturing a scheme of federal union, and that it would take means, during the recess, for opening negotiations with the Maritime Provinces, to bring about such a union.

HON. MR. HOLTON: But not to conclude them.

HON. MR. BROWN: What we have done is entirely subject to the approval of parliament. The honourable member for Cornwall is the very last man who should have raised such an objection, for he attended a caucus of the liberal members of the assembly, heard the whole plans of the government explained, precisely as they have been carried out, and he was

the very person who moved that I should go into the government to give them effect.

MR. DUNKIN : And I heard something more said—that nothing should be done which did not leave the House perfectly free.

HON. MR. BROWN : I can assure my honourable friend that, as far as that goes, he never was more free in his life than now. We do not pretend to say that anything we have done binds this House ; any member may object if he pleases : but I do say we received the approval of the House for opening negotiations, and it is a miserable pretence to say anything to the contrary. We did no more than has been done by every government, under the British system, that ever existed. We have but made a compact, subject to the approval of parliament. So far as this government is concerned, we are firmly committed to the scheme ; but so far as the members of the legislature are concerned, they are as free as air ; but I am confident that this House will almost unanimously accept it—and not with changes and amendments, but as a whole—as the very best compromise arrangement that can be obtained.

HON. MR. HOLTON : We have not the treaty-making power.

HON. MR. BROWN : I remember a government formed from that side of the House, and the honourable member for Hochelaga (Hon. Mr. Dorion) will remember it too, which made a treaty respecting the building of the Intercolonial Railroad. The honourable member for Cornwall was premier of that government, and it does not lie in his mouth now to object to what he himself did. But the honourable gentleman is entirely wrong when he says we had no power to make this compact with the Maritime Provinces. We had full power, express instructions to enter into it.

HON. MR. HOLTON : Did the Parliament of England give you that power?

HON. MR. BROWN : No ; the honourable gentleman ought to know that the treaty-making power is in the Crown—the Crown authorized us specially to make this compact, and it has heartily approved of what we did.

I am told that the people of Canada have not considered this scheme, and that we ought not to pass it without appealing to the electors for their approval. Now a statement more incorrect than this, or more injurious to the people of Canada, could not be made. They not only have considered this scheme—for fifteen years they have been earnestly considering it—but they perfectly comprehend it. If ever question was thoroughly debated in any country, the whole subject of constitutional change has been in Canada. There is not a light in which it could be placed that has not been thoroughly canvassed ; and if the House will permit me, I will show from our historical record how totally absurd this objection is. The question of a federal union was agitated thirty years ago, and here is the resolution adopted by both Houses of the Imperial parliament so far back as 1837:

"That great inconvenience has been sustained by His Majesty's subjects inhabiting the provinces of Lower Canada and Upper Canada, from

the want of some adequate means for regulating and adjusting questions respecting the trade and commerce of the said provinces, and divers other questions wherein the said provinces have a common interest; and it is expedient that the legislatures of the said provinces respectively be authorized to make provision for the joint regulation and adjustment of such their common interests."

In the instructions given to Lord Durham by the Imperial government in 1838, this passage occurs:

"It is clear that some plan must be devised to meet the just demands of Upper Canada. It will be for your Lordship, in conjunction with the committee, to consider if this should not be done by constituting some joint legislative authority, which should preside over all questions of common interest to the two provinces, and which might be appealed to in extraordinary cases, to arbitrate between contending parties in either; preserving, however, to each province its distinct legislature, with authority in all matters of an exclusively domestic concern. If this should be your opinion, you will have further time to consider what should be the nature and limits of such authority, and all the particulars which ought to be comprehended in any scheme for its establishment."

In Lord Durham's admirable report of 1839, I find this passage:

"The bill should contain provisions by which any or all of the other North American colonies may, on the application of the legislature, be, with the consent of the two Canadas or their united legislature, admitted into the union on such terms as may be agreed on between them. As the mere amalgamation of the Houses of Assembly of the two provinces would not be advisable, or give at all a due representation to each, a parliamentary commission should be appointed for the purpose of forming the electoral divisions and determining the number of members to be returned on the principle of giving representation as near as may be in proportion to population. The same commission should form a plan of local government by elective bodies, subordinate to the general legislature, and exercising a complete control over such local affairs as do not come within the province of general legislation. The plan so framed should be made an Act of the Imperial parliament, so as to prevent the general legislature from encroaching on the powers of the local bodies. A general executive or an improved principle should be established, together with the supreme court of appeal for all the North American colonies."

And here is the statement of Lord John Russell, in 1839, while introducing the original bill founded on Lord Durham's report:

"The bill provides for the establishment of a central district at Montreal and its neighbourhood, at which the government shall be carried on, and where the assembly shall meet. The other parts of Upper and of Lower Canada are each to be divided into two districts. It is proposed that these districts should be formed for the purpose of becoming municipal districts, for the imposition of taxes and rates for all local purposes."

My next quotation shall be from the proceedings of a body of gentlemen who made a great commotion in their day and generation—the British American League. I hold in my hand the proceedings of the league of 3rd November, 1849, and among other names mentioned I find those of the Hon. George Moffatt, Thomas Wilson, the Hon. Geo. Crawford, the Hon. Asa A. Burnham, John W. Gamble, Mr. Aikman, of Barton, Ogle R. Gowan, John Duggan, the Hon. Col. Fraser, George Benjamin, the Hon. P. M. Vankoughnet, and last, though not least, the Hon. John A. Macdonald—of whom, however, I find it recorded that he spoke in a very jocose manner. Here is the resolution of the league :

“That whether protection or reciprocity shall be conceded or withheld, it is essential to the welfare of this colony, and its future good government, that a constitution should be framed in unison with the wishes of the people, and suited to the growing importance and intelligence of the country, and that such constitution should embrace a union of the British North American Provinces on mutually advantageous and fairly arranged terms, with the concession from the mother country of enlarged powers of self-government.”

I pass on to 1856, when we had the motion and speech of my honourable friend the Minister of Finance (Hon. Mr. Galt) in favour of a union of all the British American Provinces, but, as the whole House is familiar with it, I shall not read the document. But in the Votes and Proceedings of this House, of 25th April, 1856, I find a very remarkable document. It is a notice of motion to be made in this House, and its contents are as follows :

“Resolved,—1. That the inconveniences arising from the Legislative Union between Upper and Lower Canada, render desirable the dissolution of that Union.

“2. That a committee be appointed to inquire into the means which should be adopted to form a new political and legislative organization of the heretofore provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, either by the establishment of their former territorial divisions, or by a division of each province so as to form a confederation having a federal government and a local legislature for each one of the new provinces, and to deliberate as to the course which should be adopted to regulate the affairs of united Canada in a manner which would be equitable to the different sections of the province.”

HON. MR. CARTIER: Whose notice was that?

HON. MR. BROWN: This notice of motion was given by my honourable friend the member for Hochelaga (Hon. Mr. Dorion).

HON. MR. DORION: It was in amendment of that of the honourable member for Sherbrooke, which I did not exactly like.

HON. MR. HOLTON: And which that honourable gentleman did not venture to move, so that the House did not pronounce upon it.

HON. MR. BROWN: But my honourable friend (Hon. Mr. Dorion) made a speech which I perfectly remember. He held this motion in his hand while he spoke.

HON. MR. DORION: I made a speech on the motion of the honourable member for Haldimand, Mr. Mackenzie, not on my own.

HON. MR. BROWN: That does not signify. I seek not to fasten down my honourable friend to the views he then held. Much light has been thrown on the whole subject since 1856, and I trust we will all act on our conscientious convictions of what is best for the country now, without regard to any opinions we may at other times have held. But when my honourable friend and others allege that there never has been in Canada an agitation in favour of a federal system, and that the people have never considered such a proposition, I think it directly in point to prove the contrary by my honourable friend's own proceedings. The next step in the constitutional agitation of the country was the formation of the Brown-Dorion administration. That was in 1858; and to show how serious my honourable friend opposite (Hon. Mr. Dorion) and myself and our ten colleagues viewed the position of the country from the denial of constitutional reform, I will read the official statement of the basis on which the government was formed. I read from the Journals of the Legislative Council for 1858:

"For some years past, sectional feelings have risen in this country, which, especially during the present session, have seriously impeded the carrying on of the administrative and legislative functions of the government. The late administration made no attempt to meet these difficulties or to suggest a remedy for them, and thereby the evil has been greatly aggravated. His Excellency's present advisers have entered the government with the fixed determination to propose constitutional measures for the establishment of that harmony between Upper and Lower Canada which is essential to the prosperity of the province. They respectfully submit that they have a right to claim all the support which His Excellency can constitutionally extend to them in the prosecution of this all-important object."

Here was a government formed seven years ago for the express purpose of doing that which we are now engaged in—a government distinctly telling the Governor-General that the peace and prosperity of the country were endangered because constitutional remedies were deferred; and yet my honourable friends opposite, who with me were responsible for that document, tell us that we are not now in a fit position to legislate upon this question. But I come next to the famous despatch to the Colonial Minister, signed in 1858 by my honourable friend the Minister of Finance, the Attorney-General (east), and the Hon. John Ross. It stated that "very grave difficulties now present themselves in conducting the government of Canada;" that "the progress of population has been more rapid in the western section, and claims are now made on behalf of its inhabitants for giving them representation in the legislature in proportion to their numbers;" that "the result is shown by an agitation fraught with great danger

to the peaceful and harmonious working of our constitutional system, and, consequently, detrimental to the progress of the province;" that "this state of things is yearly becoming worse;" and that "the Canadian government were impressed with the necessity of seeking for such a mode of dealing with those difficulties as may for ever remove them." What must have been the state of public feeling when the conservative government of 1858 ventured to use such language as this?—and how can any one pretend that the people do not comprehend this question, when seven years of agitation have passed since that document was penned?

I come now to a still more important document—one that goes into the details and the merits of just such a scheme as that before the House. I refer to the manifesto issued, in 1859, by the Lower Canada members of the liberal party in this House. It is very long, and I will only read from it a few extracts:

"Your committee are impressed with the conviction that whether we consider the present needs or the probable future condition of the country, the true, the statesmanlike solution is to be sought in the substitution of a purely federative for the present so-called legislative union; the former, it is believed, would enable us to escape all the evils, and to retain all the advantages, appertaining to the existing union."

"The proposition to federalize the Canadian union is not new. On the contrary, it has been frequently mooted in parliament and in the press during the last few years. It was, no doubt, suggested by the example of the neighbouring states, where the admirable adaptation of the federal system to the government of an extensive territory, inhabited by people of divers origins, creeds, laws and customs, has been amply demonstrated; but shape and consistency were first imparted to it in 1856, when it was formally submitted to parliament by the Lower Canada opposition, as offering, in their judgment, the true corrective of the abuses generated under the present system."

"By this division of power the general government would be relieved from those questions of a purely local and sectional character, which, under our present system, have led to much strife and ill-will."

"The committee believe that it is clearly demonstrable that the direct cost of maintaining both the federal and local governments need not exceed that of our present system, while its enormous indirect cost would, in consequence of the additional checks on expenditure involved in the new system, and the more direct responsibility of public servants in the province to the people immediately affected by such expenditure, be entirely obviated."

"The proposed system could in no way diminish the importance of the colony, or impair its credit, while it presents the advantage of being susceptible, without any disturbance of the federal economy, of such territorial extension as circumstances may hereafter render desirable."

Now, who were the signers of the address?—on whose special responsibility was this manifesto sent forth to the world? Why, it was signed by my honourable friend opposite, Hon. A. A. Dorion, Hon. T. D. McGee, Hon. L. T. Drummond, and Hon. L. A. Dessaulles, four of the most able and most popular leaders of the Lower Canada liberal party—the party now virulently opposing the resolutions before the chair. So my honourable friend opposite (Hon. Mr. Dorion) not only agitated the country for constitutional changes, but insisted that it should take the shape of a federal union, because of the cheapness of that system and the facility it afforded for bringing within the federation the other British American Provinces; and yet, six years after the promulgation of this document, my honourable friend gets up and repudiates a federal union because of its frightful cost, and because it does bring within the federation the other British American Provinces!

MR. POWELL: Who wrote that document?

HON. MR. BROWN: I cannot exactly say who did the composition; but will not my honourable friend from Chateauguay (Hon. Mr. Holton) permit me to ask if his hand is not discoverable in it? If so, he well may be proud of it, for it is a masterly exposition.

HON. MR. HOLTON: Will my honourable friend accept it as an amendment to his scheme?

HON. MR. GALT: No; ours is better than that!

HON. MR. BROWN: I come now to the great meeting of the reformers of Upper Canada, known as the Toronto convention of 1859, and at which 570 delegates were present from all parts of the western province. Here are the two chief resolutions:

"5. *Resolved*,—That in the opinion of this assembly, the best practicable remedy for the evils now encountered in the government of Canada is to be found in the formation of two or more local governments, to which shall be committed the control of all matters of a local or sectional character, and some joint authority charged with such matters as are necessarily common to both sections of the province.

"6. *Resolved*,—That while the details of the changes proposed in the last resolution are necessarily subject for future arrangement, yet this assembly deems it imperative to declare that no government would be satisfactory to the people of Upper Canada which is not based on the principle of representation by population."

Here we have the very essence of the measure now before us for adoption—deliberately approved of by the largest body of representative men ever assembled in Upper Canada for a political purpose; and yet we are to be told that our people do not understand the question, and we must go to them and explain it, letter by letter, at an immense cost to the country, and at the risk of losing the whole scheme? But let us see what followed. A general election was ordered in 1861—there was a fierce contest at the

polls—and the main question at every hustings was the demand for constitutional changes. The result of that contest was the overthrow of the Cartier-Macdonald ministry and the formation of the Macdonald-Sicotte administration in its room. But so bitter had been the struggle for and against constitutional changes, and so clearly defined were party lines upon it, that it was found impossible to construct that government without a distinct pledge that it would resist every motion made upon the subject—

HON. MR. HOLTON : Did you recognize the propriety of that course ?

HON. MR. BROWN : No, indeed, I did not. I but cite the fact to show how thoroughly the whole question has been agitated, and how perfectly its bearings have, for years past, been understood. Well, mark what followed. One short year had not passed over the heads of the Macdonald-Sicotte ministry before they tottered to their fall; and so repugnant to the House and to the country was their conduct on the constitutional question, that they dared not appeal to the country until they had changed their avowed policy upon it, and replaced the men who had forced upon them the narrow policy of the year before, by gentlemen understood to be more in favour of constitutional changes. The government (Macdonald-Dorion), so reconstructed, went to the country in 1863, but in the year following, it too fell in its turn, simply because it did not deal boldly with the constitutional question—

HON. MR. DORION : We had the support of all who were in favour of the question.

HON. MR. BROWN : Indeed, you had not.

HON. MR. HOLTON : We should have fallen if we had attempted to deal with it.

HON. MR. BROWN : I entirely deny that; had you pursued a bold policy upon it you might have been in office up to this hour. Well, the Macdonald-Dorion made away for the Taché-Macdonald administration, but it too soon fell by a majority of two, simply because it did not deal with the constitutional question—

A VOICE : Oh, oh !

HON. MR. BROWN : My honourable friend cries "Oh, oh," and I am perfectly amazed at his doing so. I am about to offer my honourable friend the most complete proof of the correctness of my statement—proof so conclusive that if he does not accept of it as such, I do not know how he can be convinced of anything. In one single day the Taché-Macdonald administration, by taking up the constitutional question boldly, turned their minority of two into a majority of seventy. Could anything prove more unanswerably than this the deep hold this question has on the public mind, and the assured confidence of the members of this House that their constituents understand its whole merits, when, in one day, such a startling political revolution was brought about ? Was it, think you, a doubtful consideration that could have induced the Upper Canada opposition, almost as one man, to cast down their party intrenchments and make

common cause with their opponents? Could there have been the slightest doubt as to the sentiments of our people and the imperative necessity of immediate action, when such men as now sit on the treasury benches were forced, by their supporters, to unite for the settlement of this question? And could there be a more conclusive proof of the ripeness of public opinion than the unanimous and cordial manner in which our so uniting has been sustained by the press of all parties, and by the electors at the polls? Never, I venture to assert, was any great measure so thoroughly understood, and so cordially endorsed by the people of Canada, as this measure now under consideration. The British government approves of it, the legislative council approves of it, this House almost unanimously approves of it, the press of all parties approves of it; and though the scheme has already been directly submitted to fifty out of the one hundred constituencies into which Canada is divided, only four candidates ventured to appear at the hustings in opposition to it—all of them in Lower Canada—and but two of them were elected.

And yet we are to be told that we are stealing a march upon the country; that it is not understood by the people: and that we must dissolve the House upon it, at a vast cost to the exchequer, and at the risk of allowing political partisanship to dash the fruit from our hands at the very moment we are about to grasp it! I have no fears whatever of an appeal to the people. I cannot pretend to speak as to the popular feeling in Lower Canada, but I think I thoroughly understand the popular mind of the western province, and I hesitate not to say that there are not five gentlemen in this chamber (if so many) who could go before their constituents in Upper Canada in opposition to this scheme, with the slightest chance of being returned. It is because I thoroughly comprehend the feelings of the people upon it, that I urge the adoption of this measure at the earliest possible moment. The most gross injustice is to be rectified by it; the tax-payer is to be clothed with his rightful influence by it; new commercial relations are to be opened up by it; a new impulse to the industrial pursuits of the country will be given by it; and I for one would feel myself false to the cause I have so long sustained, and false to the best interests of my constituents, if I permitted one hour unnecessarily to pass without bringing it to a final issue. It was only by the concurrence of most propitious circumstances that the wonderful progress this movement has made could have been accomplished. Most peculiar were the circumstances that enabled such a coalition to be formed as that now existing for the settlement of this question; and who shall say at what hour it may not be rent asunder? And yet, who will venture to affirm that if party spirit in all its fierceness were once more to be let loose amongst us, there would be the slightest hope that this great question could be approached with that candour and harmony necessary to its satisfactory solution?

Then, at the very moment we resolved to deal with this question of constitutional change, the Maritime Provinces were about to assemble in

joint conference to consider whether they ought not to form a union among themselves; and the way was thus most propitiously opened up for the consideration of a union of all British America. The civil war too in the neighbouring republic; the possibility of war between Great Britain and the United States; the threatened repeal of the reciprocity treaty; the threatened abolition of the American bonding system for goods *in transitu* to and from these provinces; the unsettled position of the Hudson's Bay Company; and the changed feeling of England as to the relations of great colonies to the parent state; all combine at this moment to arrest earnest attention to the gravity of the situation, and unite us all in one vigorous effort to meet the emergency like men.

The interests to be affected by this scheme of union are very large and varied; but the pressure of circumstances upon all the colonies is so serious at this moment, that if we cannot now banish partisanship and sectionalism and petty objections, and look at the matter on its broad intrinsic merits, what hope is there of our ever being able to do so? An appeal to the people of Canada on this measure simply means postponement of the question for a year; and who can tell how changed ere then may be the circumstances surrounding us? The man who strives for the postponement of this measure on any ground, is doing what he can to kill it almost as effectually as if he voted against it. Let there be no mistake as to the manner in which the government presents this measure to the House. We do not present it as free from fault, but we do present it as a measure so advantageous to the people of Canada, that all the blemishes, real or imaginary, averred against it, sink into utter insignificance in presence of its merits. We present it, not in the precise shape we in Canada would desire it, but as in the best shape the five colonies to be united could agree upon it. We present it in the form in which the five governments have severally adopted it—in the form the Imperial government has endorsed it—and in the form in which we believe all the legislatures of the provinces will accept it. We ask the House to pass it in the exact form in which we have presented it, for we know not how alterations may affect its safety in other places; and the process of alteration once commenced in four different legislatures, who could tell where that would end? Every member of this House is free as air to criticise it if he so wills, and amend it if he is able; but we warn him of the danger of amendment, and throw on him all responsibility of the consequences. We feel confident of carrying this scheme as it stands, but we cannot tell what we can do if it be amended. Let not honourable gentlemen approach this measure as a sharp critic deals with an abstract question, striving to point out blemishes and display his ingenuity; but let us approach it as men having but one consideration before us—the establishment of the future peace and prosperity of our country. Let us look at it in the light of a few months back—in the light of the evils and injustice to which it applies a remedy—in the light of the years of discord and strife we have spent in seeking for that remedy—in the light with which the people of Canada would regard this measure were it to be lost, and all the evils of past years to be brought

back upon us again. Let honourable gentlemen look at the question in this view, and what one of them will take the responsibility of casting his vote against the measure? The future destiny of these great provinces may be affected by the decision we are about to give to an extent which at this moment we may be unable to estimate, but assuredly the welfare for many years of four millions of people hangs on our decision. Shall we then rise equal to the occasion?—shall we approach this discussion without partisanship, and free from every personal feeling but the earnest resolution to discharge conscientiously the duty which an overruling Providence has placed upon us? It may be that some among us will live to see the day when, as the result of this measure, a great and powerful people may have grown up on these lands—when the boundless forests all around us shall have given way to smiling fields and thriving towns—and when one united government, under the British flag, shall extend from shore to shore; but who would desire to see that day, if he could not recall with satisfaction the part he took in this discussion?

I have done. I leave the subject to the conscientious judgment of the House, in the confident expectation and belief that the decision it will render will be worthy of the parliament of Canada.

THE RECIPROCITY NEGOTIATIONS.

The following speech was delivered in the senate during the session of 1875, being the one immediately following the reciprocity negotiations at Washington in 1874, and was intended to be a semi-official account of these negotiations—conducted by Sir Edward Thornton and Mr. Brown as joint plenipotentiaries—and also a general review of the whole trade relations of Canada with the United States, and a history of the former negotiations, including the Washington treaty of 1871. The speech also contains many statistical statements which Mr. Brown had prepared for his work at Washington.

MR. BROWN said: In rising to make the motion of which I have given notice, I am sure you will all feel that it is right and fitting, and will be expected by the country, that I should take this earliest opportunity of laying before the House such a statement of the recent negotiations between the United States government and Great Britain in regard to commercial reciprocity between the United States and Canada, as may be in the public interest and befitting my position. I have the more pleasure in doing so because I feel that in dealing with this matter before the senate, I shall be sustained by the honourable gentlemen who compose this body in taking an enlarged view of the whole question, in leaving aside many frivolous criticisms that have been made by political partisans, and in contending that because a commercial treaty is very advantageous for one party it does not follow that it may not be equally good for the other. It is very easy to fancy things that might advantageously have been included or omitted in any such arrangement, but it must be always borne in mind that when two parties sit down to make a bargain the result arrived at cannot be what each desires to obtain, but what both will consent to. The merit or demerit of every such compact must therefore be tested by looking at it in its bearings as a whole, and not by minute dissection of minor points.

I shall not waste time by entering into any elaborate argument as to the advantages which must flow from throwing down the barriers in the way of international commerce between two countries so contiguous to each other as are the United States and this Dominion. We have ample proof of this in the commercial history of Great Britain since the union of the three kingdoms. We have it still more markedly in the great material results directly flowing from the free interchange of products between the several states of the neighbouring republic. And nowhere can be found a more gratifying illustration of the grand results that flow from commercial

freedom than we have in the progress of our own Dominion since the accomplishment of confederation. Though the customs barriers against intertraffic between the British North American provinces have only been removed since July, 1867, the united foreign commerce of the provinces has risen from an annual average, for thirteen years before confederation, of \$115,000,000, to the enormous amount, in the seventh year after it, of \$240,000,000. Twenty-five years ago the subject of commercial reciprocity was, I believe, quite as well if not better understood by the people of Canada than it is now. It is twenty-one years since the treaty of 1854 went into operation; but it took six years to negotiate it, and during that time the people of the provinces became thoroughly conversant with the various advantages which flow from such arrangements; and if the statesmen who conducted the negotiations of those years were present to-day they would hear with astonishment that any member of this chamber entertained a doubt as to the enormous advantage which must accrue to both countries from the consummation of such a treaty as that which has been recently discussed. It is only nine years since the old treaty of 1854 was brought to a close by the action of the United States government. The wonderful success which attended that treaty is shown by the fact that the interchange of traffic between the United States and the British North American provinces, during the thirteen years of its continuance, increased from \$33,000,000 in the year immediately preceding that in which the treaty went into operation, to no less than \$84,000,000 in 1866—the year in which it was repealed. Since 1866 there have been several negotiations with the United States for the renewal of the old treaty.

I will briefly refer to each of them, not for the purpose of drawing invidious comparisons—for I hope nothing will cross my lips to-day to excite party feeling—but simply for the purpose of showing clearly the past history and present position of the reciprocity question. Such questions as this should, I think, be regarded from a higher point than that of mere partisanship. We are all alike concerned in the prosperity of our foreign commerce, and in securing good relations with our powerful neighbours, and to these ends we should all heartily contribute, whatever party may be in power, or charged with the negotiations. In the negotiations of 1865-6 for a renewal of the treaty, offers were made to the American government by our then Finance Minister, Sir A. T. Galt, which in my opinion ought not to have been made. The government then existing in Canada was the coalition government formed in 1864 for the special purpose of carrying confederation of the whole British North American provinces. I was a member of that government and, as is well known, it was in consequence of the policy adopted by my colleagues in the conduct of the reciprocity negotiation that I felt compelled to resign my position as President of the Executive Council. I resigned because I felt very strongly that though we in Canada derived great advantage from the treaty of 1854, the American people derived still greater advantage from it. I had no objection to that, and was quite ready to renew the old treaty, or even to

extend it largely on fair terms of reciprocity. But I was not willing to ask for renewal as a favour to Canada; I was not willing to offer special inducements for renewal without fair concessions in return; I was not willing that the canals and inland waters of Canada should be made the joint property of the United States and Canada, and be maintained at their joint expense; I was not willing that the customs and excise duties of Canada should be assimilated to the prohibitory rates of the United States; and very especially was I unwilling that any such arrangement should be entered into with the United States, dependent on the frail tenure of reciprocal legislation, repealable at any moment at the caprice of either party. I firmly believed that good as the reciprocity treaty had been for Canada, in the event of repeal, we had a commercial policy of our own open to us for adoption not greatly inferior to that we would be deprived of; and unless we got a treaty for a definite term of years, and conditions of fair reciprocity, without such embarrassing entanglements as were proposed, I was willing that the treaty of 1854 should be repealed, and each country left to follow its own course. My colleagues determined to proceed in the manner I deprecated; I could not be responsible for such a policy; and to avoid responsibility for it, I resigned office. The government sent deputies to Washington to obtain, if possible, legislative reciprocity—they did all they could to obtain it, but without success, and the treaty of 1854 came to an end on the 17th of March, 1866. I have not changed my opinions from what they were in December, 1865. I still believe that Canada largely profited by the treaty of 1854, but that the Americans profited by it still more; and we all know now—for we have tested it—that Canada has a commercial policy of her own but little if at all inferior to that she was deprived of in 1866. Notwithstanding this I am still strongly in favour of a commercial treaty with the United States for a definite number of years; and so long as it was just and profitable to Canada, I should be all the better pleased the more profitable it proved to our American friends. It is always well to have two strings to one's bow; it cannot possibly be injurious to secure access to a market of forty millions of people at the price of permitting our own people to buy some of their wares from them free from customs duties. Treaties of the comprehensive character of that proposed with the United States ought not to be—cannot be—adjusted by ounce scales. By the removal of all artificial barriers in the way of a fair exchange of the products of industry, both parties must benefit. No man sells unless he benefits by doing so, and no one buys unless he finds advantage in it. And who shall tell, when two countries throw open their respective markets to each other, which of them derives most advantage from the arrangement? It takes years of practical experience to obtain data for such a comparison; and the ramifications of commercial interchanges are so far-reaching, and so various and complicated, that it is hardly possible to judge with accuracy on which side the balance turns.

More than one effort was made by the late government for the renewal of the old treaty between 1866 and 1869. In 1869 formal negotiations

were entered into with the American government, and the *projet* of a treaty was presented for discussion. The negotiations continued from July, 1869, to March, 1870. This *projet* included the cession for a term of years of our fisheries to the United States; the enlargement and enjoyment of our canals; the free enjoyment of the navigation of the St. Lawrence River; the assimilation of our customs and excise duties; the concession of an import duty equal to the internal revenue taxes of the United States; and the free admission into either country of certain manufactures of the other. This negotiation ended abruptly in March, 1870, but it is instructive to observe—and I refer to it for the purpose of pointing out that, from the repeal of the old treaty in 1866 up to the recent negotiations, the government of Canada has always held the most liberal views as to the considerations that might be included in a treaty with the United States.

The negotiation of 1870 was soon followed by the high joint commission, nominally for the adjustment of our fishery disputes, but in reality for the settlement of the *Alabama* embroglio. We all know what was the cost to Canada of that negotiation. The fisheries of the St. Lawrence went from us for twelve years; the navigation of the St. Lawrence was presented to the United States in perpetuity; the use of our canals was ceded to them for twelve years. And to show exactly the position to which the relations of the two countries were then reduced, it will not be deemed unfitting that I should read a few short extracts from the official protocols of the high joint commissioners. And first as to our invaluable sea-coast fisheries.

The question of the fisheries was discussed at the conference of the 6th of March, 1871, when the British commissioners stated that "they considered that the reciprocity treaty of the 5th of June, 1854, should be restored in principle. The American commissioners declined to assent to a renewal of the former reciprocity treaty." They said, "That that treaty had proved unsatisfactory to the people of the United States, and consequently had been terminated by notice from the government of the United States, in pursuance of its provisions. Its renewal was not in their interest, and would not be in accordance with the sentiments of their people."

At conferences held on the 7th, 20th, 22nd and 25th of March, the American commissioners stated: "That if the value of the inshore fisheries could be ascertained, the United States might prefer to purchase, for a sum of money, the rights to enjoy in perpetuity the use of these inshore fisheries in common with British fishermen, and mentioned \$1,000,000 as the sum they were prepared to offer. The British commissioners replied that this offer was, they thought, wholly inadequate, and that no arrangement would be acceptable of which the admission into the United States, free of duty, of fish the produce of the British fisheries, did not form a part; adding that any arrangement for the acquisition by purchase of the inshore fisheries in perpetuity was open to grave objections." During these

discussions the British commissioners contended that these inshore fisheries were of great value, and that the most satisfactory arrangement for their use would be a reciprocal tariff arrangement and reciprocity in the coasting trade. The American commissioners replied that their value was overestimated; that the United States desired to secure their enjoyment not for their commercial or intrinsic value, but for the purpose of removing a source of irritation, and that they could hold out no hope that the congress of the United States would give its consent to such a tariff arrangement as was proposed, or to any extended plan of reciprocal free admission of the products of the two countries. But that inasmuch as one branch of congress had recently more than once expressed itself in favour of the abolition of duties on coal and salt, they would propose that coal, salt and fish be reciprocally admitted free, and that . . . they would further propose that lumber be admitted free from duty, from and after the 1st of July, 1874." The British commissioners, on the 17th of April, stated that this offer was "regarded as inadequate; that H. M. government considered that free lumber should be granted at once, and that the proposed tariff concessions should be supplemented by a money payment. The American commissioners then stated that they withdrew the proposal which they had previously made of the reciprocal free admission of coal, salt and fish, and of lumber, after July 1st, 1874." They expressed their willingness "to concede free fish and fish oil as an equivalent for the use of the inshore fisheries, and to make the arrangement for a term of years; that they were of opinion that free fish and fish oil would be more than an equivalent for those fisheries; but that they were also willing to agree to a reference to determine that question and the amount of any money payment that might be found necessary to complete an equivalent." The British commissioners on 18th April accepted this proposal, and Articles XVIII. to XXV. thereanent were agreed to.

• "The British commissioners proposed to take into consideration the question of opening the coasting trade of the lakes reciprocally to each party—which was declined."

• "The British commissioners proposed to take into consideration the reciprocal registration of vessels as between the Dominion of Canada and the United States—which was declined."

• At the conference on the 23rd March, the American commissioners stated: "That unless the Welland Canal should be enlarged so as to accommodate the present course of trade, they should not be disposed to make any concessions, &c." At the conference on the 27th March, the "proposed enlargement of the Canadian canals was further discussed. It was stated on the part of the British commissioners that the Canadian government were now considering the expediency of enlarging the capacity of the canals on the River St. Lawrence, and had already provided for the enlargement of the Welland Canal, which would be undertaken without delay."

It would be seen by these extracts from the official records of the high joint commissioners how very humble a position in the eyes of the commissioners Canada held as a negotiator with the United States for reciprocal commercial advantages; and to show the effects of the concessions made by that commission, I will now read from a speech made by Sir A. T. Galt, in the Canadian House of Commons, on 24th February, 1871, in reference to the appointment of that commission, and the great danger that serious injury might be done by it to Canadian interests. Sir Alex. Galt used the following language:

"The fisheries were of paramount importance to us. They meant an important source of employment and trade to us, and a field for the training up of seamen. They have intrinsic merits also. They constitute valuable means of commercial exchange with the United States—means of securing useful trading equivalents from our neighbours. It was the way we dealt with the fisheries and navigation of the St. Lawrence, upon which depended our future advantage and superiority with the United States, in negotiating any commercial convention. If we made an improper use of them, if we lost those advantages, we should be placed in a position of inferiority, having nothing to offer for enviable opportunities."

Sir Alexander Galt wound up his speech by moving the following as one of a series of resolutions, earnestly deprecating interference by the commission with the territorial rights of the people of Canada:

"That this House has always been, and now is, prepared to concede the most free and unrestricted use of the fisheries and inland navigation to the United States, upon receiving as an equivalent therefor complete compensation in the modification of the United States' commercial system, directed to the more free and liberal interchange of the products of labour in the two countries. That the concession to the United States of the freedom of the fisheries and of the St. Lawrence, without compensation, would place Canada in a most disadvantageous position for future negotiations, by depriving her of the means of offering any adequate equivalent for those concessions she is desirous of obtaining from that nation."

Other negotiations took place after the treaty of Washington was signed, but to these it is not now necessary to refer. Such then was the position of the reciprocity question when Sir John Macdonald's government resigned and the present administration came into power. And to show the light in which the right honourable gentleman who leads the opposition in the House of Commons then regarded the situation, I will now read from a speech of that gentleman, made in the other chamber in March, 1874, when the announcement was made to parliament that I had been associated with Sir Edward Thornton in the renewal of negotiations:

"His honourable friend from West Toronto had thrown out a remark which would discourage the negotiation at Washington, because he had stated that the old reciprocity treaty, if they obtained that, would not

give satisfaction to the country, as something more was wanted. Now, if they were only to be consulted in making such a treaty, they could put in what they thought proper; but there were two sides to the question, and what our negotiator had to think of was, not whether we should get all we required, but to get as much as possible. He should be very glad to see Canada get the old reciprocity treaty; he had no hopes that he would succeed in getting it in its entirety, but if the honourable gentleman made an approximation to it he should be exceedingly glad. If they could protect the salt, wool, and timber interests, so much the better; and if they could open the market still more, so much the greater gain for Canada. They should not scan too much the concessions made on the part of the United States, so long as our concessions were not too great on the other side."

The right honourable gentleman, at the very moment when the men who had relieved him of the cares of office were about opening negotiations at Washington, might well have omitted so inconsiderate a statement as that even a small portion of the old treaty would be acceptable to Canada in exchange for what he (Sir John A. Macdonald) had left it in our power to offer to the United States. I cannot but think it was exceedingly wrong that such a statement should have been made with the certain knowledge that it would be carried to Washington, and be used there in depreciating the value of our concessions to the Americans. While agreeing with both of the honourable gentlemen from whose speeches I have read, as to the injurious influence of the Washington treaty concessions on our position as negotiators with the republic, I entirely dissent from them in their assumption that, apart from the use of our great sea fisheries and the free navigation of the St. Lawrence, we have not commercial advantages to offer to the Americans quite equal in value to any we seek from them. I venture to think that this error has tinged all their negotiations at Washington, and that a close inquiry as to the value to the United States of the commercial traffic alone between the republic and the British provinces for a long series of years past would show it to have greatly surpassed in importance and profit any other branch of their foreign commerce, except their direct trade with the British Isles. I have never doubted that our neighbours, if they did not already recognize this fact, would come ere long to acknowledge it, and that the value of the vast carrying-trade they derive from us, of the great saving in cost of transportation realized from the free use of our internal navigation, and of their lucrative enjoyment of our Atlantic coast fisheries, would come home to them more clearly as the settlement loomed nearer in the distance that must be made, and cannot be evaded some seven or eight years hence, when the concessions of the high joint commissioners shall come to an end. It was in this belief that the present Canadian government reopened negotiations at Washington—not, as has been diligently asserted by their political opponents, with hat in hand, but in the frank, independent attitude of men who ask no favours, but believed they had ample equivalents

to offer for all they sought to obtain. The time of their going to Washington was not of their selection—they had to go. Articles XXII. and XXIII. of the Washington treaty rendered it absolutely necessary that they should do so. Let me read the words :

"ARTICLE XXII.—Inasmuch as it is asserted by the government of Her Britannic Majesty that the privileges accorded to the citizens of the United States under Article XVIII. of this treaty are of greater value than those accorded by Articles XIX. and XXI. of this treaty to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, and this assertion is not admitted by the government of the United States : it is further agreed that commissioners shall be appointed to determine, having regard to the privileges accorded by the United States to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, as stated in Articles XIX. and XXI. of this treaty, the amount of any compensation which, in their opinion, ought to be paid by the government of the United States to the government of Her Britannic Majesty in return for the privileges accorded to the citizens of the United States under Article XVIII. of this treaty; and that any sum of money which the said commissioners may so award shall be paid by the United States government, in a gross sum, within twelve months after such award shall have been given.

"ARTICLE XXIII.—The commissioners referred to in the preceding article shall be appointed in the following manner, that is to say : One commissioner shall be named by Her Britannic Majesty, one by the President of the United States, and a third by Her Britannic Majesty and the President of the United States conjointly ; and in case the third commissioner shall not have been so named within a period of three months from the date when this article shall take effect, then the third commissioner shall be named by the representative at London of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. In case of the death, absence, or incapacity of any commissioner, or in the event of any commissioner omitting or ceasing to act, the vacancy shall be filled in the manner hereinbefore provided for making the original appointment, the period of three months in case of such substitution being calculated from the date of the happening of the vacancy.

"The commissioners so named shall meet in the city of Halifax, in the province of Nova Scotia, at the earliest convenient period after they have been respectively named, and shall, before proceeding to any business, make and subscribe a solemn declaration that they will impartially and carefully examine and decide the matters referred to them to the best of their judgment, and according to justice and equity; and such declaration shall be entered on the record of their proceedings.

"Each of the high contracting parties shall also name one person to attend the commission as its agent, to represent it generally in all matters connected with the commission."

Mr. Rothery, a distinguished English juriconsult, and registrar of the High Court of Admiralty, arrived in Canada shortly before the late

government left office in 1873, as the duly appointed agent of the British government to get up the case for Canada in the fishery arbitration provided for by these articles. I know nothing of what passed between either the late or the present government and Mr. Rothery while he was at Ottawa; but in passing through Toronto on his way to Washington, Mr. Rothery saw several prominent public men, with a view to acquiring information as to the value of our sea-coast fisheries, and the best mode of collecting evidence to sustain our claim, and among them I had the honour to be included. I availed myself of the opportunity to express to Mr. Rothery my strong conviction that the submission to any three arbitrators of the power to place a cash value on our great sea fisheries was exceedingly distasteful to the great mass of the Canadian people. I reminded him that Canada in 1854 conceded these fisheries to the United States for a term of years as part of a commercial arrangement between the two countries, and I ventured to suggest how much better it would be were the same thing repeated now, and the concession of the fisheries merged in a general treaty of commercial reciprocity for a term of years and on a mutually advantageous basis. I expressed my belief to Mr. Rothery that if he could succeed in bringing this about he would confer a great benefit on both countries, and establish good relations between them for years to come, and that probably he might find the United States government not disinclined to entertain the proposition. Who that owns a property of enormous value would voluntarily consent to dispose of it for a price to be determined by three persons, of whose very names he was ignorant? Would he not say: "Let us dispense with arbitrators; tell me the compensation you propose, and then I will tell you if I will dispose of it?" Who can tell what view may be taken of our fisheries by the umpire selected by the Austrian ambassador? Would the Americans be satisfied if he gave an award equal to the great estimate we place upon them? And what would be the feeling of our people if he named a sum much under their expectation? Nay, in view of the vast annual value now drawn from the St. Lawrence fisheries—the exhaustless character of those fisheries—the rapidly increasing population of this continent dependent on them for daily supplies of fish, and the fact that there is no other fishery in the world to enter into competition with them—what greater folly could be imagined than to have a money value placed upon them at all?

Mr. Rothery went on to Washington, and some weeks after I had the pleasure of learning from him that he had suggested the substitution of a general commercial treaty for the fishery arbitration, and there was some hope of its being favourably entertained. But meantime, the Canadian government had been moving in the matter, and in February of last year I was informed by them that there was some movement at Washington in favour of a renewal of the old reciprocity treaty, and they were anxious that I should visit that city unofficially, and ascertain what were the prospects of success. I went immediately to Washington, and had the advantage of discussing the whole subject with many of the prominent

public men of the republic. I heard a very general desire expressed for the establishment of better commercial relations with Canada, if terms could be arranged to the satisfaction of both parties; this I communicated to the government on my return home. Of the official action that followed I have no personal knowledge, but on the 17th of March a commission was issued, under the great seal of Great Britain, appointing Sir Edward Thornton and myself joint plenipotentiaries on the part of Her Majesty to negotiate a treaty of fisheries, commerce, and navigation with the government of the United States. On the 28th March the negotiation was formally opened, and I will now read, from the official record, an extract showing the position held in the matter by the Canadian government:

"When Her Majesty's advisers invite the government of the United States to reconsider the whole commercial relations of the republic and the Dominion, with a view to place them on a friendly and durable basis of reciprocal advantage, the question naturally presents itself, how it comes that, having prospered so well since the repeal of the reciprocity treaty of 1854, Canada now seeks for its restoration. The answer is as natural as the question. The population of the United States is forty millions, and that of the Dominion is but four millions. The boundary between them is for the most part but a surveyor's line, often unknown even to those who live beside it; and it is of the utmost importance to Canada that common interests and mutual good-will should exist between the two countries. And what so conducive to this end as commercial intercourse, generously carried on and mutually profitable? The people of Canada are not ignorant that a market near at hand is better than a distant one; and good as their present markets are, they would gladly have the old one in addition. They comprehend the barrier that custom house restrictions throw in the way even of the existing traffic; and they seek to have these withdrawn. They are proud of their own St. Lawrence route, and intend to improve it to the uttermost for the benefit of the great west and Canadian traffic, but would gladly use the ocean ports and other channels of commerce of the republic, when freights and fares and friendly reciprocity draw them in that direction. And very great as have been the advantages always accruing to the United States from reciprocity, the Canadians can find only cause of rejoicing at that so long as they themselves continue to enjoy that moderate degree of prosperity with which Providence has blessed them. There is no mystery in their desire that the commercial relations of the republic and the Dominion should be placed on the most kindly and unfettered and mutually advantageous basis consistent with their respective existing obligations, and with that connection with Great Britain which the Dominion so happily enjoys.

"It was with these views, and in this spirit, that the Canadian administration availed itself of the opportunity presented by the twenty-second article of the treaty of Washington to represent to Her Majesty's government the advantage that would accrue to both countries by the substitution of a satisfactory commercial treaty in lieu of the money compensation to be

paid (under arbitration) by the United States, for twelve years' enjoyment of the coast fisheries of the Dominion. It was felt that if the large value placed by the Canadian people on their fisheries were not reasonably compensated by the results of the arbitration, a feeling of dissatisfaction might be engendered in the provinces not conducive to international harmony; and that if, on the other hand, an award were made equal to the confident anticipations of the provinces, the good feeling restored in the United States by the treaty of Washington might be sensibly impaired. To merge the matter in a general measure of mutual commercial concessions, for the mutual advantage of both parties, and with injury or injustice to neither, seemed the fitting conclusion to be arrived at by the governments of two great nations. Her Majesty's ministers were pleased to adopt the suggestion of the Canadian government, and the matter having been brought under the attention of the Secretary of State, and through him to the notice of the President of the United States, a friendly response was at once received, and the necessary measures instituted for opening formal negotiations."

Gentlemen may therefore dismiss from their minds the false impression that the initiation of this negotiation by the gentlemen on the treasury benches was in the slightest degree improper or undignified. And I take this opportunity of expressing my regret that heated partisans outside the walls of parliament should have spoken of the attitude held by the United States government in these negotiations as if it had been intended to delude or overreach. Nothing could be more unfounded or unjust. The President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and all the other distinguished persons who took an interest in the negotiations, with hardly an exception, showed the most friendly feeling towards Canada, and a sincere desire to bring about more satisfactory commercial relations. True, they naturally enough looked at the question from their own point of view, and sought to get an advantageous arrangement for their country; but they never concealed or undervalued the difficulties that stood in the way of success; and to the unsettled condition of the country, and the financial difficulties now pressing for adjustment, may, in a great measure, be attributed the unfavourable advice in the matter recently given to the President by the senate of the United States.

And now let me call attention to the manner in which the negotiations proceeded, and especially to the fact that all that was sought by the British plenipotentiaries was simply the renewal, for a term of years, of the old reciprocity treaty, and the concurrent abandonment of the fishery arbitration. From the American government came the suggestion of an enlargement of the scope of the old treaty. Mr. Fish suggested the enlargement of our canals, and he was at once informed that the Canadian government was ready to treat for their enlargement. Mr. Fish suggested the addition of manufactures to the free list of the proposed treaty, and here is the reply that was made as officially recorded:

"In regard to the addition of certain classes of manufactures to the

free list under the old treaty, we reminded Mr. Fish that the revenue of the Canadian Dominion was largely obtained from a fifteen per cent. *ad valorem* duty on manufactured goods, and that any articles made free in Canada under agreement with any foreign country must be made free to Great Britain. But we added that the government of Canada was desirous to afford every facility for the encouragement of extended commercial relations between the republic and the Dominion, in the belief that nothing could tend more to their mutual advantage, not only in a pecuniary sense, but as tending to foster and strengthen those friendly feelings that ought eminently to prevail between two peoples mainly derived from the same origin, speaking the same language, and occupying the geographic position towards each other of the United States and Canada. We conveyed to Mr. Fish the assurance of the Canadian government, that acting in this spirit, and in the confidence that we would be met in the same spirit by the government of the republic, the assent of Canada will be heartily given to any measure calculated to promote the free and fair interchange of commodities, to reduce the cost of transportation, or conduce to the joint advantage of the two countries, so that it be not seriously prejudicial to existing industrial interests of the Canadian people."

It was then suggested that a *project* of a treaty should be prepared, to form the basis of discussion. That was agreed to, and a *project* was accordingly prepared and presented to the American government by the British commissioners. It suggested: 1.—That the duration of the treaty should be 21 years. 2.—That all the conditions of the old treaty of 1854 should be renewed. 3.—That the following additional articles should be added to the free list of the old treaty: Agricultural implements to be defined; bark, extracts of, for tanning purposes; bath bricks; bricks for building purposes; earth ochres, ground or unground; hay; lime; malt; manufactures of iron and steel—to be defined; manufactures of iron or steel, and wood jointly—to be defined; manufactures of wood—to be defined; mineral and other oils; plaster, raw or calcined; salt; straw; stone, marble, or granite, partly or wholly cut, or wrought. 4.—That the fishery arbitration provision of the Washington treaty should be abandoned. 5.—That the entire coasting trade of the United States and Canada should be thrown open to the shipping of both countries. 6.—That the Welland and St. Lawrence Canals should be enlarged forthwith, so as to admit of the passage of vessels 260 feet long, 45 feet beam, and a depth equal to that of the lake harbours. 7.—That the Canadian, New York, and Michigan Canals should be thrown open to the vessels of both countries on terms of complete equality, and with full power to tranship cargo at the entrance or outlet of any of the said canals. 8.—That the free navigation of Lake Michigan should be conceded forever to Great Britain, as the free navigation of the St. Lawrence River had been conceded to the United States by the high joint commission in 1871. 9.—That vessels of all kinds built in the United States or Canada should be entitled to registry in either country with all the advantages pertaining to home-built vessels. 10.—That

a joint commission should be formed and continued, charged with the deepening and maintaining in efficient condition the navigation of the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers and Lake St. Clair. 11.—That a similar joint commission should be formed and maintained for securing the erection and proper regulation of lighthouses on the great lakes. 12.—That a similar joint commission should be formed and maintained to promote the protection and propagation of fish in the inland waters common to both countries. 13.—That the citizens of either country should be entitled to letters patent for new discoveries in the other country on the same terms as the citizens of that country enjoyed. 14.—That joint action for the prevention of smuggling along the lines should be a subject of consideration and co-operation by the custom authorities of the two countries.

Time was of course needed for consideration of these suggestions, and for inquiry and discussion in regard to them, and it very soon became manifest that the absence of exact knowledge as to the intertraffic between the republic and the provinces in past years, as to the actual operation of the treaty of 1854 during the thirteen years it was in force, and as to the advantage to be gained by our neighbours from access to our markets in our improved position, stood greatly in the way of successful negotiations.

The misapprehensions found to exist as to the condition of Canada, her revenue, her foreign commerce, her shipping, her railway system, and the extent and prosperity of her various industrial avocations, was truly marvellous. On every hand, and from very unexpected quarters, you heard it alleged as beyond question that the commerce between the countries in bygone years had been of little account to them, but always in our favour; that our neighbours bought from us pretty much all we had to sell, while we bought little or nothing from them; that the reciprocity treaty made the matter much worse, and enriched us at their expense; and that the abolition of the treaty of 1854 had brought us well nigh to our wits end. I do not mean to say that such mistakes as these were found among many of the prominent statesmen at Washington, but with a very large proportion of the politicians congregating at the capital such ideas were sincerely entertained and unhesitatingly affirmed. Let me give you an example. I had the good fortune to meet a well-known statesman, equally remarkable for his ability, high personal character and kindness of heart, as for the extreme nature of his protectionist opinions. The subject of the proposed treaty came up, and I ventured to express the hope that it would receive a more friendly reception from him than had been accorded to a previous one. "What possible good," was his exclamation, "can we get from a treaty with Canada! When the last treaty existed we took everything from you that you had to sell, and you took nothing from us." "Surely," I replied, "you are not stating this seriously." "Of course I am," said he; "surely you don't deny that it was so?" My reply was that I not only denied it, but was prepared to show, beyond the shadow of a doubt, and from the official returns of the United States, that from 1820 up to 1864 the inhabitants of the British provinces had bought from the

United States merchandise and produce to the extent of over \$150,000,000 in excess of what the United States had bought from them in the same years. I said I had no faith myself in what was termed "the balance of trade," but if there was any truth in it, the traffic of the United States with the provinces must be all that could be desired, for up to the third year before the treaty was repealed it always showed a large annual balance against Canada. He was utterly incredulous—indignantly incredulous—though my statement was strictly accurate. "But," said I, "let us suppose that you are correct—let us suppose that during all these past years you bought a vast amount from Canada and we bought very little from you—was that a very great disadvantage to you? Do you think your merchants and traders would have flocked over as they did to the lumber mills and farm-yards, and factories and fishing ports, of the provinces to buy our stuff, to the extent of many millions per annum, unless they got profit by it? They might have done it once or twice with a loss, but would they have done it for fifty years in succession, steadily and largely increasing the amount of their purchases from year to year? And apart from the great profits that must have been realized by the resale of the goods, was there not great gains to the United States from the transportation of all that stuff overland to your ocean ports, and in shipping it from them in your sea-going vessels to foreign countries?"

I made very little impression on my protectionist friend, and his case is but one out of a great many similar to it. Indeed, it is hardly to be wondered at that very great misapprehension should exist in the United States as to our traffic with that country. Until the B.N.A. colonies were confederated in 1867, all the provinces were isolated from each other, their public accounts and trade and navigation returns were published separately, if published formally at all; their customs and excise duties were entirely different; and their shipping returns were made up separately, if made up at all. No clear statement of the united traffic of all the provinces with the American republic in past years was ever compiled until last year—we ourselves in Canada were ignorant of its vast extent—and the absence of reliable data left us open to the misrepresentations of our protectionist opponents in the republic. Put our traffic together in one account, and hardly could a branch of trade in the United States be named which did not profit by it; but take the traffic of the several provinces apart, and there was hardly a branch of trade that could not be shown, from the example of some one province, to buy nothing of that sort. Upper Canada was shown to send wheat and flour to the United States every year to great amounts—and the attention of western farmers was pointed earnestly to the fact—but it was carefully omitted to be told at the same time that Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island took much more of these commodities from the United States than the States took from Upper Canada. Cape Breton and Nova Scotia were shown to send a few hundred thousand tons of coal to the Boston and New York markets—and the indignant protests of Pennsylvania were hurled against

such an iniquity—but it was carefully omitted to be told that Upper and Lower Canada took four or five times the quantity of coal from Pennsylvania than Cape Breton and Nova Scotia sent into the States. Just so was it with a very large portion of the commodities we sold to our American friends. Yet it was by such weapons that the false impression was implanted deep on the public mind of the United States that the traffic with the provinces was utterly unprofitable to the republic.

It soon, as I have said, became perfectly manifest that these false impressions so created must be removed if satisfactory progress was to be made in the reciprocity negotiations. Reliable returns of the traffic for a long series of years between the countries must be compiled, balances struck, comparisons with other countries exhibited. All this was done—every figure having been taken from the official returns of the United States, and a memorandum on the commercial relations of the two countries was prepared, which is now, I believe, in the hands of hon. gentlemen. How entirely erroneous were the impressions of our neighbours as to our traffic with them in past years, is shown beyond cavil in that document. It shows that the British North American provinces, in the 34 years from 1820 to 1854, bought merchandise from the United States to the extent of \$167,000,000; that the United States bought from us in the same period goods to the extent of \$67,000,000; and that the so-called "balance of trade" was, therefore, \$100,000,000 against the provinces. It shows that from 1854 to 1866—being the thirteen years during which the treaty of 1854 was in operation—according to the United States returns (for there is a great discrepancy between their returns and ours) the balance was \$20,000,000, and according to the Canadian returns, \$95,000,000 against us and in favour of the republic. A large portion of this discrepancy occurred during the last two years of the treaty's existence, and no doubt arose in large degree from the loose valuations at the custom houses on the lines during these years. The memorandum shows further that the gross traffic between the United States and the British provinces, rose, in the eight years immediately before the treaty went into operation, from eight millions of dollars in 1845, to nine millions in 1846; to ten millions in 1847; to twelve millions in 1848; to fifteen millions in 1850; to eighteen millions in 1851; and to twenty millions in 1853. In 1854 the reciprocity treaty went into operation, and at one jump the traffic went up in that year to no less than thirty-three millions of dollars. In the following year it went to forty-two millions; in 1857 to forty-six millions; in 1859 to forty-eight millions; in 1863 to fifty-five millions; in 1864 to sixty-seven millions; in 1865 to seventy-one millions; and in 1866 (when the treaty came to an end) to no less than eighty-four millions of dollars. The gross amount of traffic between the countries during the thirteen years of the treaty's operation amounted, according to the United States returns, to no less than \$671,000,000, and according to the Canadian returns, to \$630,000,000—either of them a sum which, considering all the circumstances, must be admitted to be marvellously great. I know not where, in the history of

commerce, a parallel of success to this can be found, if we keep in mind that one of the parties to the treaty had at the time but three millions of population.

The memorandum shows also that the purchases from the United States by the British American provinces during the thirteen years of the treaty's operations were greater than the purchases from them of China, Brazil, Italy, Hayti, Russia and her possessions, Venezuela, Austria, the Argentine Republic, Denmark and her possessions, Turkey, Portugal and her possessions, the Sandwich Islands, the Central American States, and Japan, in the same years, all put together. It shows further, that our purchases during the existence of the treaty were of the most valuable character, there having been no less than \$150,000,000 of farm products, \$8,500,000 of timber, \$24,000,000 of miscellaneous, and no less than \$151,000,000 of general merchandise—a sum to which no other country approached in these years. The memorandum shows also that, in addition to these great commercial exchanges between the countries, an enormous transportation traffic was carried over United States railways and canals between the provinces and Atlantic ports, and *vice versa*. Accurate returns of this traffic do not appear to have been kept until very lately, but in the six years—namely, from 1868 to 1873—for which we have returns, it appears that the merchandise transported for the British American colonies over American lines was of the total value of \$162,000,000. The memorandum brings out, moreover, from the official statements of United States commissioners, that our shore fisheries are not of the slight value to the United States that they were placed at in the protocols of the high joint commissioners, but that, on the contrary, they had in the year 1862 over 203,000 tons of shipping engaged in the St. Lawrence fisheries, and 28,000 seamen; that the returns that year considerably exceeded \$14,000,000; that at least 5,000 new seamen are annually broken in for the United States marine service; that 600 sail have in one season fished for mackerel in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and taken fish to the value of \$1,500,000; and that from 40,000 to 50,000 tons of the United States fishing fleet, worth from \$5,000,000 to \$7,000,000, annually fish near the three-mile line of the provinces. It shows that three years from the repeal of the reciprocity treaty, which deprived United States fishermen of the shore privileges enjoyed under the treaty, the United States tonnage in the trade had fallen from 203,000 tons in the year 1862 to 62,000 tons in 1869, a falling off of seventy per cent.; that the reconcession of these shore privileges under the Washington treaty doubled the tonnage of the American fishing fleet from what it was in 1869, and that it will soon exceed the tonnage of 1862. The memorandum shows yet further that the foreign trade of Canada was not seriously injured, as seems to have been supposed across the lines, by the abrogation of the treaty; but that, on the contrary, while from 1854 to 1862 our foreign traffic had averaged but \$115,000,000 per annum, it had in the year immediately following the abrogation risen to \$142,000,000, in 1869 to \$145,000,000, in 1870 to \$165,000,000, in 1871

to \$180,000,000, in 1872 to \$214,000,000, and in 1873, the seventh year of the repeal, to no less than \$240,000,000.

But the memorandum brings out another fact worthy of note—that though the repeal of the treaty did not for an hour stay the increase of our foreign trade, it greatly lessened the proportion of it done with the United States. During the existence of the treaty the aggregate exchange of commodities with the republic gradually rose, until in the year of its repeal it amounted to 52½ per cent. of our whole foreign traffic. But in the first year after repeal it fell to 42 per cent.; in 1868 to 41 per cent.; in 1869 to 40 per cent.; in 1872 to 36 per cent.; and in 1873 to 35 per cent. And the memorandum discloses another most important fact—that a great change in the character of the traffic between the countries resulted from the repeal of the treaty. For example, that the price of lumber has gone up so much, and the demand has continued so good, that while we sold to the United States people but five millions of dollars worth in the year before the expiry of the treaty, and an annual average of but three millions during its whole continuance, we sold in the single year of 1873 over eleven million dollars worth. Again, that in regard to wheat, flour, provisions, and other like commodities, of which both countries have a surplus, the effect of the prohibitory duties of the United States has simply been to send the Canadian surplus of these products to compete successfully with the American article in foreign markets where they formerly held sole possession. And still further, it shows that Canada has become a large purchaser of American products in the Chicago and Milwaukee markets, which it carries by the St. Lawrence route for consumption in foreign countries—that this trade only commenced with the repeal of the treaty, but in the six years following that event aggregated the large amount of \$46,583,312. And strange enough, in regard to the much abused “balance of trade,” it shows that since the repeal of the treaty the balance had gone so systematically against the republic, and so steadily in favour of the provinces, that, in the seven years following repeal, a balance of nearly \$52,000,000 had to be settled with our people by the United States. Nay, it is clearly shown that in spite of all the discouragement that has been thrown in the way of our traffic by high customs duties and custom house barriers, our annual purchases from the United States are still large enough to keep us in the front rank of their foreign customers; and that with the exception of the British Isles, no country takes as large an amount from them as we do. This memorandum was completed on the 27th of April, and was immediately communicated to Mr. Fish. It was referred to the treasury department for examination, and remained in its hands for several weeks. Its facts and figures were closely examined, and their accuracy acknowledged fully and frankly. From that time there was a manifest improvement in the impressions, as to the character of Canadian commerce, of such persons as took the trouble to read the memorandum, and these were not a few; and the progress of the negotiations was sensibly accelerated. The attention of the United States public press was aroused to the importance

of the question—the merits of the proposed treaty were thoroughly canvassed, and, though severely criticised by the ultra-protectionist organs, I have no recollection of any similar measure being received with such general favour by the leading papers of the republic as was accorded to our project. In New York, the *Tribune*, *Herald*, *Times*, *World*, *Evening Post*, *Express*, *Journal of Commerce*, *Graphic*, *Mail*, and many other leading exponents of public opinion, all declared in favour of a new treaty; and in Boston, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and other great cities, the unanimity of opinion among the leading journals was equally remarkable.

I cannot pass from this part of the subject without referring to a charge that originated in Philadelphia, and was echoed far and wide over the continent—ay, even in Canadian journals—that this unanimity of the press was obtained by the corrupt use of Canadian public money. The charge is utterly without foundation—it has not a vestige of truth to palliate its concoction. Not one shilling has been spent illegitimately to promote the negotiation, and a final answer to this and all similar charges is found in the fact that the entire cost of the negotiation to the people of Canada, including all necessary disbursements, will amount to little more than \$4,000. The negotiation now went on from day to day; the several clauses of the project were discussed, alterations suggested, modifications adopted, the draught treaty as it now stands submitted for the approval of the three governments, and all that remained to make it ready for signature was the clear definition for custom house purposes of some articles in the free lists, and the correction of an appearance of ambiguity in the wording of one or two passages. It had been understood that congress would be unable to adjourn before the end of July, but unexpectedly the determination was arrived at to adjourn on the 22nd of June, and that day was near at hand. The Secretary of State suggested that the draft treaty, as it then stood, should be sent down by the President of the United States to the senate for advice, and if favourably entertained by that body, the necessary correction of language could be made and the treaty formally executed. It was of course for the United States government to judge as to the mode of obtaining the sanction of the senate, and the plan suggested was adopted. The draft treaty only reached the senate two days before the adjournment of congress, when it was quite impossible to discuss and decide so large and complicated a question as its adoption involved, and the consideration of it was accordingly adjourned to the next ensuing session.

We come now to the consideration of the several provisions embraced in the draft treaty, as transmitted to the senate by the President of the United States. And let me say very frankly that I do not stand here to-day to contend that the conditions of this bargain are more favourable to Canada than to the United States. On the contrary, I believe that in a commercial treaty between a people of forty million souls and one of four million, it is almost in the nature of the thing that to the larger country the largest advantage must accrue. But greatly advantageous as this

treaty—if it ever goes into operation—must be to our friends across the lines, there is enough in it, I venture fearlessly to assert, to set the wheels of industry in motion on this side the lines, and to give such an impetus to the development of our great natural resources as would amply compensate us for all the concessions we are pledged to in the agreement. I acknowledge the force of all that is said as to the immense advantage possessed by the American people in a contest with a colony of one-tenth their population, and hardly yet past the first stages of forest settlement. I admit the larger means, the vastly greater experience, and the eminent business sagacity they would carry into the contest; but I have faith enough in the industry, the energy, the enterprise, and the indomitable perseverance of my countrymen, and in the cool blood of our northern clime, to believe that in the long run, and with a fair field, Canada would hold her own under all these disadvantages.

As you are aware, the draft treaty embraces ten propositions: 1.—The concession to the United States of our fisheries for twenty-one years, and the abandonment of the Washington treaty arbitration. 2.—The admission, duty free, into both countries of certain natural products therein named. 3.—The admission, duty free, of certain manufactured articles therein named. 4.—The enlargement of our Welland and St. Lawrence Canals. 5.—The construction of the Caughnawaga and Whitehall Canals. 6.—The throwing open to each other, reciprocally by both countries, the coasting trade of the great inland lakes, and of the St. Lawrence River. 7.—The concession to each other on equal terms of the use of the Canadian, New York, and Michigan Canals. 8.—The reciprocal admission of vessels built in either country to all the advantages of registry in the other. 9.—The formation of a joint commission to secure the efficient lighting of the great inland waters common to both countries. 10.—The formation of a joint commission to promote the protection and propagation of fish on the great inland waters common to both countries.

Now then, let us examine these propositions *seriatim*. The first, second and seventh of them go naturally together, and they need no comment. They embrace simply the conditions of the old treaty of 1854, which operated so favourably for us, and so much more favourably for the United States. The third proposition—as to manufactures—is the only item that has met with bitter opposition, and that, strangely enough, from all three countries. I will leave it for the present and return to it again. The fourth proposition—for the enlargement of our existing canals—is one eminently for the advantage of the United States, and involves a very large expenditure on our part. It is impossible to estimate the enormous annual gains that must result to the farmers of the western states when vessels of 1,000 or 1,200 tons shall be able to load in the upper lake ports and sail direct to Liverpool—free from transshipment expenses, brokers' commissions, way-harbour dues and ocean port charges, and return direct to the prairies with hardy immigrants and cargoes of European merchandise. Canada, no doubt, would have her share of benefit from all this—

but it could not be compared for a moment with that of the great north-western and some of the middle states. The fifth proposition—for the construction of the Caughnawaga canal—would be also an immense boon to the United States. It would open up to the dense manufacturing population of New England, for the first time, a direct water communication of their own with the great west: it would enable them to load ships of 1,000 tons at their Lake Champlain ports with merchandise for the prairie states, and bring them back freighted with farm produce; and when the Whitehall Canal should be enlarged to Troy, and the improvements of the Upper Hudson completed to deep water, where in the wide world could be found so grand a system of internal water navigation as that, stretching, as it then would, in one continuous ship channel from New York on the Atlantic to the west end of Lake Superior, and possibly, ere long, to the eastern base of the Rocky Mountains? Canada, too, would have her share of profit in all this. Her great lumber interests on the Ottawa and its branches would find full advantage from it, and the enterprising farmers of the middle and eastern counties of Ontario would have the New England market, with its three and a half millions of manufacturing population, opened to their traffic. The sixth proposition is the concession to each other of the inland coasting trade, and nothing could be done more sensible or more profitable to both parties. Our season of navigation on the lakes is short—the pressure for vessels in particular trades at special times is very great on both sides of the lakes, and freights advance to unreasonable rates. Cheap transportation is a foremost question in this western industrial world, and what can be conceived more absurd than to see, as is often seen, large quantities of produce lying unshipped for want of vessels, because foreign bottoms cannot take freight from one port to another in the same country? What the United States could fear from the competition of our limited marine with the 5,576 vessels of all kinds, and an aggregate tonnage of 788,000 tons, it is difficult to imagine. The eighth proposition—for the reciprocal admission of vessels built in either country to registry in the other—is generally regarded as highly advantageous to this country, and no doubt such is the fact. But I confess I cannot see why it ought not to be regarded as infinitely more advantageous to the United States. During the civil war the merchant vessels of the republic were sold in large numbers to foreign owners, and acquired foreign registers; and notwithstanding that ship-building had almost disappeared from the United States in consequence of an extreme protectionist policy, the law absolutely forbade their being brought back or vessels of foreign build being purchased in their room. The consequence is, that at this moment nearly the entire passenger traffic of the Atlantic is in the hands of foreigners—a vast proportion of the freight of merchandise from and to foreign countries is also in the hands of foreigners—and only two months ago we had the startling statement made officially by Mr. Bristow, the very able secretary of the United States treasury, that no less a sum than one hundred millions of dollars is paid annually by the people of the United States to foreign ship-owners for freights and fares. Now, a large portion of these

ships, which the people of the United States require so urgently, can be as well built in St. John and Halifax and Quebec, and at less cost than in any other country. Why then deprive American citizens of the privilege of buying them from us, and sailing them as their own? We are told that American ship-building is reviving, but were it to revive with all the rapidity the most sanguine could desire, it could not keep pace with the wear and tear of the present reduced marine and the annually increasing demand, much less begin to supply the vacuum created since the war. The ninth and tenth proposals are for the appointment of joint commissions for the care of the lighthouses and the fisheries of the inland waters common to both countries; but as to these there is no difference of opinion, and no doubt of the great mutual advantage that might flow from the proposed concerted action in regard to them.

These, then, are the whole of the items; and now let us return to the one we passed by -- the list of manufactures.

I shall not allege for one moment that there is no ground whatever for the loud outcries we have heard from protectionist manufacturers against the admission of their wares to the free list of the treaty. That some would have suffered by the competition it would have entailed I readily admit, for in all vocations there are men whose want of experience, or want of energy, or deficiency of capital, unfit them for such a contest. But while all our sympathies must have gone heartily with such men in these circumstances, had the treaty been consummated, I cannot think that this great measure, affecting advantageously as it would have done so large a proportion of our industrial population, ought to have been given up simply because some among us might have suffered from its provisions. Are there not always sufferers by every new measure of taxation, by every change of the tariff, by every new municipal assessment scheme? And yet who dreams of rejecting a great measure of public policy because such individual hardships unfortunately attend them? I cannot, however, help thinking that many of the gentlemen who have been complaining most loudly of their threatened ruin would have been more frightened than hurt had it gone into effect. It cannot be an unmixed evil to exchange a market of four millions of buyers for one of forty millions, and I know some shrewd manufacturers among us who heard with deep regret of the action of the American senate. It is not to be doubted, however, that a great deal of the alarm which has been professed in reference to this section of the scheme has arisen from the parties not knowing exactly what the treaty proposed. I have myself met many persons who supposed that they would be most injuriously affected by it, but who found on a little inquiry that their articles were not in the slightest degree affected. A curious instance of this was seen in the exciting meeting of New York druggists to denounce the injurious influence of the treaty on their trade, though not an article in their business was touched by its provisions. Only within the last few days I met a most intelligent gentleman who was positive that his business was to be very much injured; if not destroyed;

but it turned out, after a little conversation, that the article he mainly manufactured was not at all affected by the treaty. And there have been many such cases among those loudest in their protestations. A great deal of the indignation, too, and a great deal of the eloquence has proceeded from parties who were angry, not because their wares were included in the scheme, but because they were excluded from it.

But I am ready to meet all objections to this part of the proposed treaty on higher and broader grounds. I contend that there is not one article contained in the schedules that is a fit object of taxation; not one that ought not to be totally free of duty, either in Canada or the United States, in the interest of the public. I contend that the finance minister of Canada who—treaty or no treaty with the United States—was able to announce the repeal of all customs duties on the entire list of articles in schedules A, B and C—even though the lost revenue was but shifted to articles of luxury—would carry with him the hearty gratitude of the country. I call the attention of the senate earnestly to this fact, that nearly every article in the entire list of manufactures is either of daily consumption and necessity among all classes of our population, or an implement of trade, or enters largely into the economical prosecution of the main industries of the Dominion. Let me read to you the whole list: Agricultural implements, all kinds; axes, of all kinds; boots and shoes, of leather; boots and shoemaking machines; buffalo robes, dressed and trimmed; cotton grain bags; cotton denims; cotton jeans, unbleached; cotton drillings, unbleached; cotton plaids; cotton ticking; cottonades, unbleached; cabinet-ware and furniture, or parts thereof; carriages, carts, waggons, and other wheeled vehicles and sleighs, or parts thereof; fire engines, or parts thereof; felt covering for boilers; gutta percha belting and tubing; iron—bar, hoop, pig, puddled, rod, sheet, or scrap; iron nails, spikes, bolts, tacks, brads, or springs; iron castings; india rubber belting and tubing; locomotives for railways, or parts thereof; lead, sheet or pig; leather, sole or upper; leather, harness and saddlery; mill or factory or steamboat fixed engines and machines, or parts thereof; manufactures of marble, stone, slate, or granite; manufactures of wood solely, or of wood nailed, bound, hinged, or locked with metal materials; mangles, washing machines, wringing machines, and drying machines, or parts thereof; printing paper for newspapers; paper making machines, or parts thereof; printing type, presses and folders, paper cutters, ruling machines, page numbering machines, and stereotyping and electrotyping apparatus, or parts thereof; refrigerators, or parts thereof; railroad cars, carriages, and trucks, or parts thereof; satinetts of wool and cotton; steam engines, or parts thereof; steel, wrought or cast, and steel plates and rails; tin-tubes and piping; tweeds, of wool solely; water-wheel machines and apparatus, or parts thereof. These articles were selected with a triple object. The first was, as I have already stated, that they should be articles of common daily use among the people or affecting the prosecution of our leading industries; the second was that they should be of such a character as to

be difficult to smuggle across the lines, and easy of identification as the genuine production of Canada or the States; and the third was that they should be as far as possible the production of branches of industry natural to Canada or the United States, and in which a considerable intertraffic between the two countries might reasonably be expected. And if the list is carefully examined, I think it will be admitted that the articles fairly fulfil these three conditions. Could anything be more impolitic than the imposition of customs duties on such articles as these? Time was in Canada when the imposition of duty on any article was regarded as a misfortune, and the slightest addition to an existing duty was resented by the people. But increasing debt brought new burdens; the deceptive cry of "incidental protection" got a footing in the land; and from that the step has been easy to the bold demand now set up by a few favoured industries, that all the rest of the community ought to be, and should rejoice to be, taxed 17½ per cent. to keep them in existence. And it is remarkable how small a portion of the community are concerned in the maintenance of this injustice. I hold in my hand an accurate return of the men, women and children personally employed in all the industries that could possibly have been affected either advantageously or injuriously by the treaty had it gone into operation, and it appears that the entire number is 68,813. Of these, a considerable number would practically not be affected at all, for they have no protection now and do not want any; a large number would only be affected in a small part of their business; and a very large number would be advantageously affected by the treaty. The number who could honestly declare that "ruin" to them would be the result would be small indeed. And it is not unworthy of note how very small are the contributions of the industries that might be affected by the treaty to the foreign exports of the country. In the year ending 30th of June, 1874, the exports of domestic products were as follows:

Products of the farm	834,269,311
Products of the forest	26,817,715
Products of the fisheries	5,292,368
Products of the mine	3,977,210
New ships	790,675
Miscellaneous	419,800
	<hr/>
Manufactures	871,673,085
	2,353,663
	<hr/>
Total	973,926,748

The amount of manufactures imported that year was, therefore, a little over two millions of dollars; but I hold in my hand a return of the articles that made up this amount, and I find that several hundred thousand dollars of it could not fairly be classed as manufactures at all; that more than half of the remaining amount is made up of articles not protected now; and that the contributors who are protected now and could injuriously be affected by the treaty, are few in number and very small exporters. And now let us place in contrast with this the great agricultural interest with its half

million of hardy workers, which has no protection, which feeds the whole people, and contributes besides annually to the foreign exports of the Dominion commodities to the value of thirty-four millions of dollars. I hold in my hand a return of the customs duties levied on agricultural products going into the United States; and to show the advantage that would have accrued to our farmers from the operation of the treaty, I will now read some of the items: Animals, 20 per cent.; beef, 1c. per lb.; butter, 4c. per lb.; cheese, 7c. per lb.; honey, 20c. per gallon; lard, 2c. per lb.; meats smoked, &c.), 35 per cent.; pelts, 10 per cent.; pork, 1c. per lb.; sheepskins, 3 per cent.; tallow, 1c. per lb.; wool (worth 32c. and under), 10c. per lb. and 11 per cent.; wool (worth over 32c.), 12c. per lb. and 10 per cent.; barley, 15c. per bushel; beans, 10 per cent.; bran, 20 per cent.; flax (undressed), \$5 per ton; flax (dressed), \$20 per ton; flax-seed, 20c. per bushel; flour, 20 per cent.; fruit (green), 10 per cent.; hay, 20 per cent.; hops, 5c. per lb.; Indian corn, 10 per cent.; malt, 20 per cent.; maple sugar, 20 per cent.; meal (oat), 4c. per lb.; meal (corn), 10 per cent.; oats, 10c. per bushel; peas (seed), 20 per cent.; peas (vegetable), 10 per cent.; peas (split), 20 per cent.; rye, 15c. per bushel; seeds, 20 per cent.; tobacco, 35c. per lb.; vegetables, 10c. per lb.; wheat, 20c. per bushel. All these duties would have been swept away, and the American market thrown freely open for all farm products. The great lumber interest, too—in which 100,000 men are said to be engaged—which has no protection, which not only supplies our home market, but sends twenty-seven millions of dollars worth of lumber annually to foreign countries, and employs a large fleet of vessels in its traffic—how would it have been affected by the operation of the treaty? Why, it would have swept away an average duty of 20 per cent. from the entire exportations to the States. And just so would it have been with our great mineral interest. Seventy-five cents per ton now levied on Cape Breton and Pictou coal would have been abolished, and the New England markets would have been freely opened to our coal trade. Twenty per cent. on iron ore and one and a half cents per lb. on lead ore would also have disappeared. The great coast fishery interest would also have been largely benefited, for the American market would have been secured to it for twenty-four years to come. On the whole, therefore, I think it will be safe to come to the conclusion that however a portion of our manufacturing interests might have been affected by the treaty, the result on the large industries of the Dominion could not have failed to be beneficial.

I come now to the objections which have been urged against the treaty from such quarters as entitle them to a formal answer. The first of these is the allegation that the treaty discriminated against Great Britain in favour of the United States. Nothing could be more unfounded than this. It was perfectly understood from the opening of the negotiations that no article could be free from duty in regard to the United States that was not also free with regard to Great Britain, and nothing else was ever contemplated for a moment.

The other objections which have been made I find so clearly formulated in a memorial of the Dominion Board of Trade, and clothed in such unusually temperate language, that I shall answer them *seriatim*. And I venture to believe that a very cursory examination will show how very little force is contained in the whole of them.

The first objection of the board is in regard to what has been styled "the sliding scale," and about which we have heard a very great deal for many months past. In the first place, then, I have to say that the gradual reduction of the existing customs duties was not part of the treaty, but merely a mode of putting the treaty in operation as easily as possible for all parties concerned. It was suggested merely as a means of overcoming two difficulties found to exist, not only in the United States but in Canada as well. It was supposed to be not undesirable to give manufacturers some time of preparation for the change by gradually reducing the existing duties on foreign goods. Moreover, had the duties gone off in one day the revenues of both countries would have been seriously affected, and the simultaneous imposition of new taxes to replace the loss of revenue might have been a difficult task. But, in truth, the importance of this matter has been absurdly exaggerated. It has been totally ignored that though the duties of the United States on fine manufactured goods are enormously high, on the articles we send them the average is only about 24 per cent. Now, one-third of this coming off would have made their rate for the first year 16 per cent, while ours would have been nearly 12, and for the second year their rate would have been 8 per cent, against our 6; and at the end of the second year all the duty would have come off in both countries. Moreover, the important fact seems to have been forgotten or concealed, that we would have had some compensation for that small sliding scale disadvantage, in the fact that the coasting trade and ship registry clauses would have gone at once into operation, while the enlargement of our canals could not have become available before 1880. And to sum up the matter, it is by no means certain that the sliding scale might not have been dispensed with altogether; for in the Customs Acts giving effect to the treaty, clauses would no doubt have been inserted giving the two governments power by proclamation to put the whole treaty in force at any earlier moment they might mutually find convenient.

The second objection of the Board of Trade is the danger they see in a promise to complete the canal works by 1880. I dare say the Canadian government carefully considered this matter before they committed themselves to it, and had the best advice upon the point that skilled engineers could afford them; and I venture to believe that my honourable friend in the other chamber, who so admirably presides over the public works department, was as competent to judge of what was fitting to be done in the premises as any man in Canada.

The third objection is that in the opinion of the Board of Trade the entire ocean coasting trade of the United States should have been conceded

to Canada. No doubt; but probably the other party had something to say to that.

The fourth objection of the board is that the right of obtaining United States registry for Canadian ships cannot be regarded as a valuable concession, seeing that Canadians, instead of keeping their ships and sailing them, might be seduced into selling them, and thereby transfer to the Americans the great profits of the carrying trade. I venture to think this objection is not worthy of a reply.

The fifth objection of the board is, that the Caughnawaga Canal should not have been stipulated to be built until the construction of the Whitehall Canal was absolutely secured. The Canadian government thought otherwise, and I venture to believe they were right in what they did. The chief interest of the United States may be "in the opening up of a new route to the ocean;" but a very important interest in Canada is to open up a new water route from New England to the West.

The sixth objection of the board is, that the right of re-entry of goods into the country of their production should have been provided for, but was not. All goods placed in bond can now be re-entered in the country from whence they came. Surely the board cannot mean that broken packages of goods should be returned?

The seventh objection of the board is, that it cannot tell whether goods manufactured in either country must be composed entirely of native materials. Certainly not.

The eighth and last objection is, that all consular fees and certificates should have been abolished by the treaty, but were not. It is by no means clear that this would have been an advantage.

With regard to the recent action of the United States senate on the draft treaty, and its return to the president with the advice that it was inexpedient to proceed with it, I may state he explained that the proceedings of the senate were taken in executive session, and therefore strictly secret, but the probability is that no full discussion of the matter had taken place in consequence of the shortness of the session, the absorbing interests of the questions now agitated, and the large financial deficit that had to be met by the imposition of new taxes. The fate of the negotiation is, however, settled for the present, but the agreement that resulted from it is on record, and no doubt will yet make its appearance again, and form the basis of a new and more successful negotiation. It took six years to conclude the negotiation for the treaty of 1854, and not a few delays and rejections occurred in that time. I totally misconstrue the present temper of the American public mind if a great change on the subject of protection and finance and foreign trade is not approaching; and when that day arrives, the large and practical scheme embraced in the draft treaty will hardly be forgotten. But be that as it may, it is not for the people of Canada to be influenced by any such anticipation. They have shown their

ability to open new markets for themselves when the American market was closed against them, and the clear path for them is to follow up, with redoubled energy and perseverance, the policy on which they have entered. Let the Americans load their industries with customs duties as they choose; be it the firm policy of Canada to remove every barrier in the way of commercial extension, to repeal all duties on raw materials, on articles used in manufacturing, and on the common necessities of daily life, and to replace the revenue lost, if needed, by a wiser and cheaper system of taxation; let them seek to develop their great national industries, and especially the agricultural, shipping, fishing, mineral, and lumber industries; let them open up new markets adapted to their traffic; and let the Canadian flag be found floating on every sea.



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ERRATA.

Page 13, twelfth line from bottom, for "1853" read "1950."

Page 204, fifteenth line from bottom, for "minister" read "ministers."

Page 205, thirteenth line from top, for "reliability" read "stability."

Page 208, fourteenth line from top, for "an feat accompli" read "an
"fail accompli."

Page 208, twentieth line from top, for "the minister" read "a minister."

Page 245, bottom line, for "according to the" read "according as the."